Post-Hegemonic Global Governance 2nd Edition

NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTE 2013 Atageldi Annayev

Kamal Makili-Alayev

Liudas Zdanivicius

Ricky Cantero

Robert Ondrejcsák

Beni Sukadis

Tran Huyen Trang

Muhammad Sikandar Khan

Zakiah Mirzaei

Maryna Vorotnyuk

Aijaz Wani

Philip Attuquayefio

Tefo Kgotlhane

Memunatu Pratt

Ana Isabel Marques Xavier

Victor Mijares Chacon

Orit Perlov

Institute for Training and Development

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INTRODUCTION For the second year in a row, we are pleased to present essays by young International Relations scholars

from abroad on the implications for world politics of the current post-hegemonic era. These scholars were

selected and funded by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs to

participate in a six-week study tour of the United States from early February to mid-March 2013. The tour

was organized by the Institute for Training and Development in Amherst, Massachusetts. Javier Corrales

from Amherst College was the academic director, and Jon Western from Mt. Holyoke College was the

main academic advisor for this program.

During their time here, participants listened to 36 lectures by prominent scholars of International Relations

on a variety of topics and regions. They also had the opportunity to share their work among themselves

and with U.S. scholars. The essays in this collection are the result of their academic work during their

time in the United States.

As was the case last year, our scholars were invited to reflect on the theme of post-hegemonic world

politics. Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a privileged position in global

politics. In this time, the United States has been instrumental in the development of a series of global

liberal and neo-liberal institutions, rules, and practices designed to organize and manage global political,

military, and economic affairs. But that system of global governance and management is changing.

Today, the international system is in a period of significant transition with the (relative) decline of U.S.

power and influence, a series of significant domestic and international economic crises across advanced

democracies, the rise of a still-authoritarian China, the emergence of unpredictable regime changes in the

Middle East, the rise of regional tensions in South Asia and East Asia, natural resource dependence and

civil strife in Africa, the spread of crime and drug trade in the Americas, the shift in the unifying beliefs

underlying the post war order, and a looming set of global environmental, resource, and demographic

challenges.

We are now entering an era of profound uncertainty. Without the prospect of U.S. hegemonic leadership,

with a declining consensus about guiding principles and policies, and in light of the substantial growth and

influence of international institutions and non-state actors, it is now widely accepted that international rule-

making today is more complex than ever. We now live in a world with multiple overlapping actors and

regimes that do not conform to a homogeneous set of shared rules backed by enforcement mechanisms.

To gain a better understanding of the uncertainty and complexity associated with the new global

environment, the Five College International Relations Program (consisting of International Relations

faculty from the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Smith, Mount Holyoke, Amherst, and

Hampshire Colleges) has been conducting a three-year research colloquium to investigate a series of

critical issues on global governance and international security in the coming decade. The colloquium has

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been hosting a series of senior scholars to examine the macro-level questions on this set of topics from a

range of theoretical and methodological perspectives.

As part of this effort, the colloquium partnered with the group of 18 International Relations scholars who

participated in ITD’s 2013 Study of the U.S. National Security Policymaking Institute. . Participants came

from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Israel, Lithuania, Micronesia, Oman,

Pakistan, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

The participants spent four weeks on the Amherst College campus and at ITD facilities. They traveled

from Amherst to Harvard University and the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. And they spent

an additional two weeks in San Diego (University of California at San Diego, University of San Diego) and

Washington D.C. for more lectures.

We asked each of our visiting scholars to write an essay and present views from his or her own regional

focus or areas of substantive expertise on the broad questions associated with post-hegemonic global

governance. These are the essays that they prepared.

Jon Western Javier Corrales Research Advisor Academic Director

Jon Western served as Research Advisor for this Academic Institute. He is a professor of political science at Mount Holyoke College. His teaching and research interests focus on U.S. foreign policy, military intervention, human rights and humanitarian affairs. He teaches courses such as American Foreign Policy; American Hegemony and Global Politics in the 21st Century; The United States and the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights; and Propaganda and War.

Javier Corrales served as Academic Director for this Institute. Professor Corrales is professor of Political Science at Amherst College. He obtained his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. He is the co-author of U.S.-Venezuelan Relations Since the 1990s: Coping with Midlevel Security Threats (Routledge 2013), Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela (Brookings Institution Press, 2011), and author of Presidents Without Parties: the Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s (Penn State University Press 2002). He serves on the editorial board of Latin American Politics and Society and Americas Quarterly.

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Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 2

Energy and Petro States .................................................................................................................. 5

New Models for Resolving Conflicts Based on Energy Security Issues, Atageldi Annayev ............................ 5

Impact of the U.S. Withdrawal from the South Caucasus on the Regional Security of the Caspian Basin, Kamal Makili-Alayev .................................................................................................................................... 8

Shale Gas (and Other Non Traditional Fossil Fuels) as Game Changers in the Global and European Security, Liudas Zdanivicius ....................................................................................................................................... 13

U.S. Pivot to Asia .......................................................................................................................... 19

Obama’s Pivot to the Pacific Rim – The “Three 3Ds” Approach, Ricky Cantero .......................................... 20

The United States Strategic Shift Towards the Pacific – Continuity and Change, Robert Ondrejcsák ......... 25

Indonesia and US Defense Relations – Opportunities, Challenges, and Impact on Regional Security, Beni Sukadis .......................................................................................................................................................36

Lifting U.S. Arms Sales Embargo on Vietnam – A Trust-Building Proposal, Tran Huyen Trang ................... 42

Political Islam ............................................................................................................................... 45

Challenges Posed by the Ideological Aspect of Islamic Terrorism in South Asia in a Post-Hegemonic World, Muhammad Sikandar Khan ........................................................................................................................ 46

Ethnic Tensions in Afghanistan after International Troop Withdrawal, Zakiah Mirzaei ............................... 51

The Syrian Crisis: A Test for the U.S.-Turkish ‘Model’ Partnership?, Maryna Vorotnyuk ............................. 54

US Withdrawal from Afghanistan and its Impact on the Region, Aijaz Wani .............................................. 58

Conflict and Governance in Africa ................................................................................................... 62

Drones, the United States and the New Wars in Africa, Philip Attuquayefio ................................................63

Prospects for Post-Hegemonic Global Governance in Africa – The Southern African Development Community Experience, Tefo Kgotlhane ..................................................................................................... 74

Regional-Global Security – Assessing the US Role in the Mali Crisis, Memunatu Pratt ................................ 78

New Issues in Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic World ........................................................... 89

Global Governance and the Quest for Multilateral Engagement – Insights and Prospects on the EU and U.S. “Virtuous Triangle”, Ana Isabel Marques Xavier .......................................................................................... 90

Towards a Western Hemisphere Security Consortium?, Victor Mijares Chacon ........................................... 97

The Rising Power of Civil Society and the Role of Social Networks in a Post-American Hegemonic Era, Orit Perlov ....................................................................................................................................................... 103

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ENERGY AND PETRO-STATES

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New Models for Resolving Conflicts Based on Energy Security Issues

In the contemporary world, energy issues have

become one of the major sources of conflict. Ever

since the United Kingdom began to use oil-based fuels

on its warships, oil has been not only economically but

geopolitically important as a resource. The 20th century

showed us that in any modern conflict, both sides

depend on oil as much as on arms.

The modern world relies on a vast energy supply to

fuel everything from transportation to communication

to security and health delivery systems. Energy plays

an important role in the national security of any given

country, and as a fuel to power its economic engines.

Threats to energy security worldwide include the

political instability of several energy-producing

countries, the manipulation of energy supplies,

competition over energy sources, attacks on supply

infrastructure, accidents, natural disasters, rising

terrorism, and dominant countries’ reliance on foreign

oil supplies. These supplies are vulnerable to non-

natural disruptions caused by internal conflict,

exporters’ interests, and non-state actors targeting the

supply and transportation of oil resources. The political

and economic instability that can be caused by war or

other factors, such as striking oil workers, can also

prevent the proper functioning of the energy industry in

supplier countries.

Throughout the ages, Central Asia has remained the

center of interest for the world’s great powers because

of its natural resources and geopolitical location.

Classically, the area has been under the control or

influence of the Persian, Russian, and British empires.

After 1991, when the political map of the world

changed, new players emerged in the “Great Game”.

Now actors such as China, Japan, and the US have

begun to protect their interests in Central Asia

alongside presences of longer standing like Russia

and Iran.

Turkmenistan is located in this hotspot of international

interest, with a quarter of the world’s natural gas

reserves, 491,210 kilometers of land and 6.2 million

citizens to protect its sovereignty and national

interests. Turkmenistan declared a policy of positive

neutrality from the first days of its independence. In

1995, it was declared a permanent neutral state by the

UN General Assembly resolution 50/80. With this

status secured, Turkmenistan became the

peacekeeping center of the Central Asia region.

Turkmenistan is one of the world’s leading

manufacturers and energy resources suppliers. It also

has a great potential for transit that serves as a

reliable basis for diversifying international cooperation

and investment beyond the energy field. In this area, it

is no coincidence that the timely and comprehensively

sound approaches taken by Turkmenistan to ensure

energy security are reflective of not only national, but

also regional and world progress. The international

initiatives undertaken by the leader of Turkmenistan

have provided for joint realization of concrete and

1st secretary, Americas desk

Ministry of Foreign affairs of Turkmenistan Atageldi Annayev Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkmenistan E-mail: atannayew@gmail.com

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effective measures with international support, relying

on the efforts of the global community.

Turkmenistan has repeatedly emphasized the

importance of its brand new universal model of

relations in the sphere of energy. This model is to be

based on balancing the interests of a multilateral group

including producers, transistors, and energy resources

consumers, on finding agreement on ideas of global

infrastructure for energy safety, and on consciousness

of long-term cooperation. Therefore, in order to

develop a fruitful negotiation process, Turkmenistan

has put the mechanism of energy diplomacy into

operation.

Turkmenistan’s representative made a speech at the

66th meeting of the General Assembly calling for the

formation of a UN expert group on energy diplomacy.

Such a group may become the effective political and

diplomatic mechanism the nation needs. Turkmenistan

also called for assistance in the drafting of an

international legal document regarding energy

resources that would provide a framework for future

energy diplomacy. The creation of such a group,

supported by such documents, could be an effective

way to realize the main goal of global energy security.

Turkmenistan places a special emphasis on the

development of an energy division within the UN. It is

conscious of the responsibility that it bears as a large-

scale producer and international exporter of

hydrocarbons. For the purpose of joining the efforts of

other UN member states and being an active

participant in the formation of international legal

foundations in the field of energy supply, Turkmenistan

has advocated for the creation of an inter-regional

energy dialogue mechanism under the aegis of the

UN.

Turkmenistan has already been active for years in

construction of pipelines to other nations, and the

diplomacy that must accompany such construction.

Particularly good examples are the Turkmenistan-

China gas pipeline has already been functioning for

several years, and the new gas line from Turkmenistan

to Iran. Recently, the cooperation of Turkmenistan,

Afghanistan, Pakistan and India has resulted in the

construction of a gas main line (TAPI) that is

unprecedented in size.

This multinational project may bring a measure of

peace and prosperity to Afghanistan, and build some

rapport around a common cause in Pakistani-Indian

relations. The completion of TAPI will create more than

20,000 positions for Afghans, and will create a

dialogue of mutual cooperation between India and

Pakistan.

In addition, trans-Caspian gas pipeline projects remain

on the agenda.

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Impact of the U.S. Withdrawal from South Caucasus on the Regional

Security of Caspian Basin: Outlook from Azerbaijan.

POST-HEGEMONIC GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Policy Paper)

“Post-Hegemonic” Caspian Basin (Introduction):

The Caspian Sea region consists of the littoral states

of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and

Turkmenistan. However, a wider geopolitical definition

of the basin also includes the adjacent states of South

Caucasus and Central Asia. The Caspian Basin can

be considered one of the most dynamic places in the

world due to the presence of two major powers –

Russia and Iran – that border rapidly developing

regional actors like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan. Bringing together South Caucasus and

Central Asia, the region attracts a lot of attention from

other major players including the United States, the

European Union, Turkey and China.

Famous for its energy reserves, the Caspian Basin is

also a very important trade and transport corridor

linking Europe with eastern markets. Thus, the

geopolitical significance of the region should not be

underestimated, especially considering that the

Caspian Basin has emerged as one of the most

important new energy producing regions. While the

region may never reach the importance of the Persian

Gulf or other globally critical energy producing areas, it

will remain one of the key regions in Eurasia, and can

have an impact on world energy supplies, thus making

it strategically important.

It has to be taken into the account that The Caspian

Basin region is landlocked, and that most of its

regional energy resources are held not by its major

powers, but by the three other littoral states. These

countries have relatively small populations, and their

domestic energy demands are low in comparison to

their supply, opening the possibility of exports that go

both to the West and the East. In such a situation,

whichever power controls the export routes from the

region is basically in control of the Caspian energy

hub.

This paper examines the involvement of the U.S. in the

region, its energy security as well as its role as a

counterbalance to Russian and Iranian interests on the

Caspian Sea. It considers the slow withdrawal of the

U.S. from the region and the consequences this will

bring for regional security. The paper will argue that

though some views on the U.S. decline in involvement

are overstated, there is a process of strategic

withdrawal and a switch in priorities and geopolitical

interests. Though the reasons for such a shift in

geopolitics are understandable, it is crucial for the U.S.

to maintain its role in the Caspian Basin through South

Caucasus. This paper also argues that keeping this

regional energy hub and counterbalancing regional

powers in the Caspian are more relevant to long-term

U.S. interests than continuing with the withdrawal from

South Caucasus and sacrificing strategic advantage

based on the shifting of resources towards the Asia

and Pacific regions.

U.S. involvement in the Caspian:

Leading Research Fellow at the Center for

Strategic Studies Under the President of the Republic, Azerbaiajan

Kamal Makili-Aliyev Center for Strategic Studies, Azerbaijan E-mail: kamal@makili-aliyev.com

9

Since the independence of the smaller states of the

Caspian Basin, the U.S. has been able to become

quite an influential power in the region. The U.S.

brought the initial technology economic investment

needed by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan

for their energy sectors to get up and running. U.S.

political, financial and technological backing of the

initial energy projects of the 1990s allowed firms like

ExxonMobil and Chevron to actively support rapid

implementation and deployment of projects such as

the pipelines of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-

Erzerum.

U.S. access to the Caspian Basin has been achieved

primarily through South Caucasus. Though the first

energy projects go back to Chevron’s 1993 deal with

Kazakhstan, the strong political alignment of

Kazakhstan with Russia was an obstacle for the

political influence of the U.S. Access to the Caspian

Basin via South Caucasus has more recently

established from Turkey to Georgia to Azerbaijan,

bypassing Armenia for two reasons: the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan (the result of

Armenian aggression) and the fact that Armenia was

under large (by now practically total) political control of

Russia.

Nonetheless, U.S. economic involvement in the region

outweighed its political engagement, which was not as

strong or direct. However, it is worth mentioning that

the U.S. still maintains a special State Department

office for Caspian energy diplomacy. President Clinton

co-signed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan documents in

Turkey, and in the days of the George H.W. Bush and

Clinton administrations, U.S. political support even

exceeded its economic support. Presently, as a part of

a strategic withdrawal and regroup, it is evident that

the U.S. has decreased its support and focus on the

Caspian Basin, especially compared to the Clinton

years. With Kazakhstan firmly tied to Russia and Turk-

menistan sealed off to virtually any foreign involvement

in the country’s political system, Azerbaijan is closer to

the United States than the others, especially if we take

into account cooperation with the U.S. on logistical

support for the war in Afghanistan and intelligence

sharing. However, relations between the two have

suffered in recent years due to what Azerbaijan

perceives as lack of commitment from the United

States over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and

withdrawal from the South Caucasus. Considering its

geopolitical realities, Azerbaijan is more interested in

pursuing an independent position and not committing

too firmly to any one side when it comes to siding with

major powers. Ultimately, all three of the smaller states

have a desire to act in this way. Azerbaijan, however,

remains in the best position to pursue such a strategy,

as Russia has very little direct influence or control over

Baku, compared to Astana or Ashgabat.1

Thus, U.S. involvement in the Caspian Basin (both

economic and political) has made Azerbaijan the main

logistical and infrastructural partner in the region,

particularly in terms of access to the Caspian. At the

same time, the U.S.’s interest in the region lies firmly

in the domain of energy security.

Energy security:

As one of the major energy-consuming nations, the

U.S. ultimately has a strategic interest in maintaining a

foothold on the Caspian Basin. Thus, dominating the

transportation and distribution of the region’s energy

resources can be named as the priority of the U.S.,

which realizes that military power and security is not

the only tactic for effective national security in the

modern world. Energy security matters as well. Hence,

securing and maintaining control or at least major

influence over the energy-rich regions of the Basin is

vital.

1R.Karimov, E.Chausovsky, K.Makili-Aliyev, Caspian Basin: Geopolitics and the Future Balance of Power, Baku, 2011, http://www.sam.az/uploads/files/SAM%20Review%204.pdf

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A 2007 Department of Energy assessment indicates

that the oil and gas production in the Caspian Basin

area is expected to rise by 171% over the period

between 2005 and 2030.2 Such potential is magnetic

to the oil and gas firms that have been eager to get

into the region ever since Moscow lost control over its

previous subjects in the dissolution of the Soviet

Union.

At that time, the newly independent Azerbaijan,

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were eager to break

away from the firm grip of the former Soviet economic

system, but they still lacked the technical and financial

capacity to achieve the full potential of their oil and gas

reserves. The infrastructure left from the Soviet Union

was pitiful, and as a result the help of western firms

was sought and appreciated. U.S. firms were there

first, followed by firms from Italy, France, Britain,

Norway, China and Japan. For the U.S. and other

western states, Caspian energy resources provided

valuable diversification from the Persian Gulf

dependency, while China and Japan were also

interested in participating in the game. The U.S. was

also interested in reducing the dependence of Europe

from Russian energy, which of course goes against

the interests of Russia, which always seeks to acquire

even greater control over Caspian energy deliveries to

outside world.3

In 2005, the U.S. Department of Energy reported that

the Caspian Basin contains proven oil reserves of up

to 44 billion barrels, and projected an increase in

output from 2.1 million barrels per day in 2005 to 5.7

million barrels per day in 2030. In addition, proven

natural gas reserves in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan combined amount to

321 trillion cubic feet, placing the region as a whole

2 DoE/EIA, “Caspian Sea”, Country Analysis Brief, January 2007; DoE/EIA, IEO 2007, Table G1, p.187, www.eia.doe.gov 3 M.Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2008, pp.115-116.

fourth worldwide in natural gas reserves, after Russia,

Iran and Qatar 4. Such an abundant energy field

cannot be ignored by any energy-dependent country.

In pursuing its energy security policy towards the

Caspian Basin, the U.S. was also interested in

enabling young, independent Caspian states to

escape the political and economic influence of Russia

through the income they receive from western firms for

funneling new gas and oil resources to the global

markets. The best example of the success of such

policy is Azerbaijan. Thanks to its cooperation and

engagement with the U.S. and Europe in energy and

other sectors, Azerbaijan was able to be practically

free of Russia’s political influence and become a

reliable partner of the West. However, the diminishing

presence of the U.S. in South Caucasus and even in

Azerbaijan could radically change the situation in

upcoming years and demolish all the success the U.S.

was able to achieve in the region, such as diminishing

Russia’s role in the transportation of oil and gas and

excluding Iran from developing Caspian energy and

enlarging its presence in the region.

U.S. as a military counterbalance for Russia and Iran:

Controlling Caspian energy is an important goal of the

U.S.’s presence in the region. However, their

secondary target is to counterbalance Russia and Iran

in terms of hard security. The U.S. maintains some

military bases in Central Asia, but they do not directly

amount to the security of the Caspian Basin. To be

directly involved in the Caspian Basin, it is obvious that

an actor must have a naval presence.

As there is a lot of talk and concentration on Iran and

its nuclear program, as well as the Israel’s response,

analysts tend to miss increasing militarization of the

Caspian Basin in recent years. The last decade had

4 DoE/EIA, Caspian Sea”, Country Analysis Brief, September 2005; DoE/EIA, IEO 2007, Table G1, p.187, www.eia.doe.gov; BP, Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007, p.22.

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shown a steady growth of militarization in every littoral

state in the Basin. Russia and Iran have modernized

and enlarged their Caspian vessels and equipment,

and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have made

considerable purchases of their own. This has

prompted Azerbaijan to build up its naval forces as

well, in some areas from scratch. It has to be taken

into account that maritime borders in the Caspian Sea

are still not delineated, and with considerable energy

resources there, an arms race is inevitable. It is only

natural that smaller littoral states are concerned for

their wealth, given the Russian naval dominance of the

Caspian.5

U.S. interests in securing energy routes from the

Caspian are closely linked with providing some form of

deterrence to Russia and Iran in the region and letting

the smaller states feel more comfortable with their

energy trade with the west. Naturally, the U.S. has

provided military assistance – both directly and

through NATO – to countries like Azerbaijan and

Turkmenistan, with less military involvement with

Kazakhstan for obvious reasons. As recently as May

2012, Azerbaijan has conducted a number of naval

military exercises called “Protection of Oil and Gas

Fields, Platforms, and Export Pipelines” using ships,

speedboats and helicopters. The main focus of the

exercises was on protection and defense against

terrorist attacks with no offensive objectives.6 The

exercises have used technology and equipment

obtained from cooperation with the U.S. and arms

trade with Israel. The “anti-terrorist” context points

toward the only country in the region with a regime

known to deal with terrorists – Iran.

5 J.Kucera, The Great Caspian Arms Race, Foreign Policy, June 22, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/22/the_great_caspian_arms_race 6 K.Makili-Aliyev, Neighborhood Challenge: Outlook for Caspian Security from Azerbaijan, New Europe, July 15-21, p.11, http://www.neurope.eu/blog/neighborhood-challenge-outlook-caspian-security-azerbaijan-0

On the other hand, to further strengthen European

energy security and control over Caspian energy

routes, the U.S. is quite interested in promoting the

idea of a Trans-Caspian pipeline that would link

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through the Caspian

Sea. Such a pipeline would ensure Turkmenistan’s

gas flow west to Europe, as opposed to east to China.

However, Russia and Iran resist the project strongly,

and the U.S. is also interested in empowering its allies

in the region with military means to secure a future gas

link from possible threats from regional powers.

Implications and conclusions:

Changes in the U.S.’s geopolitical orientation and

strategy are affecting Caspian Basin security greatly. It

is already felt that the presence of Russia and Iran is

growing in the region. For countries like Azerbaijan

that have been in strategic partnership with the U.S.

quite successfully for some years, it seems that the

U.S. is walking away from the further active

development of relations.7 U.S. withdrawal from South

Caucasus would mean that the influence of Russia

and Iran over Azerbaijan will increase tremendously.

For example, to enlarge its influence in Azerbaijan,

Iran is playing its “Shia card”. A majority of the

Muslims in Azerbaijan are Shia, as in Iran. Iranian

clergy use this to try and influence Azerbaijani Muslim

communities. Iran’s taunts and provocations create

tensions with Azerbaijan, which fears for its national

security. Recent years show the activity of Iran

growing as the U.S.’s influence falls. The U.S. does

not have to directly counter those tendencies. Instead,

assisting Azerbaijan through greater support of its

secular policies and education can influence the

situation. Another way is to increase cooperation and

intelligence-sharing between security forces when

countering radicalism.

7 K.Makili-Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy: Between East and West…, IAI Working Papers, 1305, January 25, 2013, p. 8, http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1305.pdf

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The same logic can apply to the relationship between

Azerbaijan and Russia. After the beginning of the third

presidency of Vladimir Putin, it is clear that Russia is

hardening its positions toward Azerbaijan.

Understanding that the U.S. is more cautious and less

direct in its policies towards South Caucasus after

2008, Russia has used more of its power when it

comes to Azerbaijan that it did during the Clinton or

George W. Bush administrations. Azerbaijan is trying

to strengthen its position with steps like signing the

agreement on Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP),

which strengthens European energy security and

basically removes Russians from the strategic radar

station in Gabala. However, with the already felt

withdrawal of the U.S., it will be very difficult and

maybe even impossible for Azerbaijan to continue to

withstand the onslaught of regional powers. It is still

possible for the U.S. to cooperate on the political front

with authorities in both Azerbaijan and Georgia to filter

out the pressure that Russia can exercise through the

North Caucasus, especially through the Dagestan

region.

Russia and Iran are quite determined to keep U.S. and

European influence out of the Caspian Basin. They will

continue to apply pressure on the South Caucasian

partners of the U.S., Azerbaijan and Georgia, in order

to push the U.S. out of the region as far as possible,

understanding that South Caucasus is the key to the

energy and military security balance in the Caspian

Basin. The goals of Russia and Iran in establishing

control over South Caucasus are not so much

connected with energy resources, as these regional

powers are quite energy-rich themselves. Rather it is

strategic link to Central Asia that is of the interest. It is

a positive sign that the U.S. is providing quite modest

military assistance to its partners on the Caspian, like

some donations in small vessels, equipment and

training for special forces, but nonetheless, U.S.

support now seems to be on the decline overall.

If this decline continues with the same speed and

persistence, it would mean that within a decade, the

U.S. could lose all possible leverage in South

Caucasus and be pushed completely out of the

Caspian Basin. Countries like Azerbaijan and Georgia

would not be able to assist the U.S. in furthering its

policies in the region anymore, and the U.S. would

lose its access to an important energy route,

threatening European energy security in the process.

In addition, it would be a loss of the main gateway to

Central Asia. Other gateways pass through Russia,

Iran and China.

The good news is that this process can still be

reversed at this stage. It is understandable that current

strategic priorities and lack of resources play a major

role in the situation. However, the U.S. should

consider commitment not with resources, but with

extended political involvement, the support of its allies,

and greater exercise of “soft power” in the region. As

the situation stands now, it is lack of apparent U.S.

political interest that stimulates Russia and Iran to

monopolize Caspian security.

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Shale gas (and other nontraditional fossil fuels) as the game changers in

global and European security

The shale gas revolution, which became visible in

2009-2010, has already led to a sharp decline of the

price of natural gas in the United States, and has

increased the supply of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) in

the other regions. It is quite obvious that the shale gas

revolution is just beginning. The increasing demand for

energy spurred by new technologies makes the use of

other unconventional energy sources such as oil tar

sands, and shale oil profitable (in the near future also

called “fire ice” (methane hydrate) extraction could

become profitable). Serious changes in energy supply

structure will also have a considerable impact on

global and European security.

Shale gas revolution: challenges and opportunities

The second part of the 2000s was dominated by the

pessimistic view that the world was approaching the

era of the permanent energy shortage (so called “peak

oil” theory). Rising demand (particularly from China)

and slow increase of oil production volumes led to

rapid growth of oil prices, which reached 148 USD per

barrel in the summer of 2008. Then, however, two

factors began to positively influence the sustainability

of the world energy market. The global economic crisis

lowered the rate of demand growth, and rapid

development of drilling and other technologies (in the

case of shale gas, so-called “fracking”) made

extraction of the shale gas viable alternative to the

conventional natural gas supply.

Shale gas production increased from 54 billion cubic

meters in 2007 to almost 241 million cubic meters in

20121. In the first half of 2013, this gas constituted

more than 37 percent of total production and helped

the United States to become the number one natural

gas producer in the world (with longtime leader Russia

slipping to second). In his January 2012 State of the

Union Address, President Obama declared “We have

a supply of natural gas that can last America nearly

100 years.”2

There are potentially 16 trillion cubic meters (567

trillion cubic feet) of shale gas reserves, compared

with the current proved recoverable U.S. natural gas

resources of 9 trillion cubic meters 318 trillion cubic

feet). Besides shale gas, there is a rapid development

of the production of other unconventional energy

resources, such as oil sands and shale oil. On the

more distant horizon are the huge reserves of so

called “fire ice” (methane hydrate)3.

It is worth mentioning that the future of the shale gas

revolution even in the U.S. is still unclear. There are

economic concerns – high extraction costs, unclear

longevity of the gas wells, low profitability of shale gas

extraction operations – and environmental concerns –

large consumption of water, use of possibly dangerous

1 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural gas annual, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/annual/ 2 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, January 24, 2012. 3 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States, 2013, http://www.wia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/overview.pdf?zscb=91119024

Coordinator of the National security and

defence courses of Lithuania and Lecturer of The General Jonas Žemaitis Military

Academy of Lithuania. Liudas Zdanavicius Lithuanian Military Academy, Lithuania E-mail: liudas.zdanavicius@mil.lt

14

chemicals, water contamination, and land degradation.

However, there are also constant improvements being

made to extraction technologies, which makes shale

gas production (and that of other unconventional

energy sources) cheaper and less harmful for the

environment, and further expands access to the

reserves, which previously where treated as

inextractable.

The shale gas revolution has already had considerable

impact in the U.S., on the energy market and its

economy as a whole:

• It has led to sharp decline of the domestic natural gas prices. Henry Hub spot price dropped from as high as 450 USD per 1000 cubic meters (12.69 USD per MBTU) in June, 2008 to as low as 68.8 USD per 1000 cubic meters (1.95 USD per MBTU) in April, 2011. This price later increased and in September, 2013 it was USD125.4 (3.55 MBTU), but is still more than three times lower than 20080 high.4

• The shale gas sector has created new jobs (figures differ, bust the most optimistic suggest 1.5-3 million jobs).

• Natural gas imports considerably decreased (particularly heavily importation of LNG from Qatar). This has allowed the U.S. to decrease its foreign trade deficit, one of the most pressing U.S. economic problems.

• Cheap gas prices create the opportunity for some energy-intensive sectors, including the chemical and steel industries, to once again become competitive internationally.

The revolution has also begun to change global

energy market:

• LNG market players such as Qatar, which previously based their strategy on exporting to the U.S., were forced to export to other markets (mostly Western Europe and Asia). That led to considerable price decreases of natural gas in some Western European countries.

• It has increased competition for coal producers in the United States, which have been forced to increase exports of cheap coal to Europe, which

4 U. S. Energy Information Administration, Henry Hub natural gas prices.

has had positive impact on the coal prices in some European countries.

If the trends of this energy revolution do not change,

there will be much bigger shifts to come. Firstly, shale

gas reserves are much more widespread than

conventional gas resources, which are located in a

limited number of countries. Importantly, there are

considerable shale gas reserves in countries which

currently rely heavily on energy imports (such as

China, Poland, France, Germany etc.).

World conventional and shale gas reserves5, United States Energy Information Agency estimates,

20136 Trillion cubic meters

2011 natural gas production

estimated proved

conventional natural gas

reserves

unproved shale gas technically

recoverable resources

Total World 3.51 193.54 203.79 North America 0.91 11.40 47.69 Asia and Pacific 0.37 11.83 45.48 South America & Caribbean 0.17 7.61 40.47 Middle East and North Africa 0.74 88.21 28.38 Europe 0.28 4.10 13.30 Former Soviet Union 0.85 61.64 11.74 Sub-Saharan Africa 0.06 6.28 11.04 China 0.11 3.51 31.55 Argentina 0.06 0.34 22.70 Algeria 0.08 4.50 20.01 Canada 0.17 1.92 16.22 United States 0.68 9.00 16.05 Mexico 0.06 0.48 15.42 Australia 0.06 1.22 12.37 South Africa 0.00 0.00 11.04 Russia 0.68 47.77 8.12 Brazil 0.03 0.40 6.93 South Asia 0.11 2.43 5.69 Venezuela 0.03 5.52 4.73 Poland 0.00 0.08 4.19 France 0.00 0.00 3.88 Ukraine 0.03 1.10 3.62 Libya 0.00 1.56 3.45

5 http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/ 6 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/overview.pdf?zscb=91119024

15

Pakistan 0.03 0.68 2.97 Egypt 0.06 2.18 2.83 India 0.06 1.25 2.72 Based on the data published by the EIA, British Petroleum and EU Commission.

From the data provided in the table above it is quite

clear that considerable shale gas reserves are present

in countries which have very small or no reserves of

conventional natural gas and are big importers (China,

European countries, Latin America, Argentina). At the

moment of this writing (September 2013), the shale

gas revolution is on the verge of growing beyond the

U.S. For example, China is planning to attract around

40 billion USD of shale gas investment.

This sort of development, in an optimistic scenario,

could lead to less tension in the world energy market

because of the higher supply of resources. Very

optimistically, it could lead to world of energy

abundance. Such developments are very attractive to

energy-dependent countries, but also will diminish the

effectiveness of the energy diplomacy used by Russia,

Middle Eastern countries and some other energy

exporters – for example, Russia’s use of gas delivery

as leverage to attempt to influence EU countries’ and

its neighbors’ policies in other areas.

Another effect of the shale gas revolution and the rise

of the other unconventional energy sources is that it

will greatly challenge the current sustainable

development agenda. If there an ample supply of fossil

fuels (conventional and unconventional) at attractive

prices is expected, incentives for the use of the

alternative energy sources (solar, wind power, electric

cars etc.) could diminish. The availability of shale gas

also greatly lessens the attractiveness of nuclear

energy.

By the estimates of the Energy Information Agency,

shale gas could make the U.S. fully natural gas-

sufficient until 2016 to 2022, and oil sufficient until

2030. Starting in 2016, the U.S. could become a major

natural gas exporter.

Currently, the U.S. government faces some important

decisions on its future natural gas strategy. Energy

market players are modernizing existing LNG import

terminals in order to export LNG to other markets such

as the European Union and East Asia. There are two

possible options for the U.S.:

1. To develop export of the natural gas trough the LNG export terminals, which are already built or being constructed. Producers of natural gas are heavily lobbying for this option, because it could help to increase domestic gas prices.

2. To limit export and keep domestic prices low in order to use cheap natural gas as stimulus for re-industrialization.

And even without becoming a serious exporter, the

U.S. will need to reassess its foreign policy priorities.

• The U.S. has an important technological advantage, which could be used as the leverage: currently, its corporations have serious advantages in shale gas extraction technologies.

• The U.S. may have more freedom to choose its foreign policy tools, because it will be less susceptible to energy resources delivery blackmailing (such as 1972 OPEC actions). At the same time, Washington could use riskier strategies to control energy transportation routes in order to exert greater influence on energy consumers such as China.

• There could be considerable change in U.S. foreign policy’s regional priorities. For example, the Persian Gulf region could lose at least part of its importance for to Washington.

• The U.S. will have the opportunity to diminish the influence of current major energy producers (such as Russia, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia) on their allies (including NATO member states).

Influence of shale gas on European security Before the shale gas revolution, European energy

prospects were quite bleak. They were characterized

by growing dependence on importing energy from

unreliable and sometimes unfriendly countries, along

with rapidly rising energy costs because of the “green

initiatives” (such as heavily subsidized alternative

energy projects).

16

The shale gas revolution in the U.S. has already

changed the European energy market. It has led Qatar

and other providers to export more LNG to the

European market instead. This lowered prices for

natural gas in European countries which had access to

the LNG imports (mostly Western European

countries). It has also created huge disparities in

natural gas prices between Europe and United States.

In 2007, prices in Europe were slightly lower than in

United States, but by 2013 they were 2-3.5 times

higher. This gives U.S. a industry considerable

advantage over its European competitors. In the

coming years this impact will definitely grow. It is

interesting to note, that coal export from the United

States to the European Union also considerably

increased, because coal became less competitive at

the American domestic market.

Shale gas also calls into question the EU’s green

policies, such as active implementation of alternative

energy sources (especially solar and wind). Such

“green” measures greatly lower the competitiveness of

already troubled European economies, and European

business is already pushing governments and EU

institutions to reassess in the face of new opportunities

created by the shale gas revolution.

The arrival of cheaper LNG has led to the growth of

considerable differences between two groups of the

European countries: ones which have diversified

natural gas delivery sources (including cheaper LNG)

and ones which do not.

Thanks to the ongoing decrease of LNG prices,

Western European countries have gained leverage to

negotiate discounts on long-term gas contracts with

the Russian state natural gas monopoly “Gazprom”,

which delivers around 1/3 of the European Union’s

natural gas. Countries which have no serious

alternatives to gas deliveries from Russia (Poland,

Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and the Baltic states)

suffer from higher prices, because they have no

leverage to push Gazprom to give such discounts. For

example, in the first half of 2012, Poland paid

Gazprom 525 USD per 1000 cubic meters (14,8USD

per MMbtu) of natural gas delivered, while Germany

paid around 380 USD (10,8 USD per MMbtu) despite

being further from Russia.

Source: Presentation of the head of JSC “Klaipedos nafta”, which is building LNG terminal in Lithuania, during the Energy security conference in November, 2012 (Vilnius, Lithuania).

Central and Eastern European countries are trying to

escape Gazprom’s dictate. The rapid decline of LNG

prices made this gas transportation mode much more

attractive for CEE countries. Before 2008, LNG was

not price competitively compared to Russian gas

delivered through pipelines. There are already some

LNG import terminal projects in the region in different

stages of implementation, including Swinouscje

(Poland), Klaipeda (Lithuania), Odessa (Ukraine). One

of the potential sources for future terminals is gas,

which the U.S. (or other suppliers like Algeria, Norway,

Qatar, or Trinidad and Tobago) could begin to export in

2016.

Some Central and Eastern European countries

(particularly Poland and Ukraine) could also have

serious shale gas reserves of their own. The actual

size of their reserves is still being studied, and will be

clear after test drilling. There is serious interest both

17

from CEE governments and transnational companies

to begin shale gas production in this countries. For

example, in 2012 Royal Dutch Shell began a 10 billion

USD investment project in Eastern Ukraine; Chevron

and other companies have already begun forensic

drilling in Poland; and Chevron has won contract for

exploration of potential shale gas reserves in Western

Lithuania.

If these projects find success, LNG terminals and

shale gas mining projects could greatly benefit the

economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and

increase their energy independence from Russia.

There are, however, serious obstacles in the way of

these positive potential outcomes. The debate about

the future of shale gas production in Central and

Eastern Europe mirrors a similar one in the United

States, with the two most important arguments being

ecology and economic feasibility.

• In Europe, because of the much higher

population density, fracking is more difficult,

expensive and potentially environmentally

dangerous. Some European countries have

already closed off possible shale gas production.

For example, France, which has one of the

biggest reserves of the shale gas in Europe,

banned fracking in 2001, though in 2013 it was

declared that this ban could be lifted7. In January

2012, Bulgaria banned fracking after public

protests influenced by environmentalist

arguments, stopping any possible exploitation of

the shale gas reserves. Ecological arguments

are actively used to argue against shale gas

projects in Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania.

• The economic feasibility of shale gas production

in Europe is still unclear. Ecological safety

7 France reconsiders anti-fracking law, UPI, March, 15, 2013, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/03/15/France-reconsiders-anti-fracking-law/UPI-80451363381039/

requirements could seriously increase the price

of natural gas production. It is also still unclear

how big and easily extractable shale gas

reserves are. Preliminary drilling results in

Poland have already showed that possible

reserves and their extraction profitability may

have been overestimated.8

The withdrawal of some Western companies which

had planned to extract shale gas in Poland has

showed that, with current technology, extraction of

shale gas in Europe could be more much less feasible

than in the U.S. On the other hand, some Western

European countries (including Germany United

Kingdom, and Spain) are planning to begin shale gas

exploration.

Another serious obstacle is the actions of Russia and

its state company Gazprom. Russia, which actively

used energy deliveries as the key tool of its “energy

diplomacy” (gas wars with Ukraine and Belarus, active

use of natural gas industry intermediaries, building of

pipelines in order to help or punish neighbors, etc.), is

not happy with the possibility that its influence in in

Central and Eastern Europe’s energy sector may be

weakened.

It is interesting that official position of Gazprom

towards the shale gas revolution is very skeptical. For

example, in April 2013, head of the Gazprom A. Miller

once again repeated that shale gas is a bubble which

will burst in the near future. At the same time, Russian

president Vladimir Putin has talked up shale gas

“dangers” and advocated caution. In April 2012, he

urged Gazprom to develop a strategy to tackle the

challenges posed by shale gas9.

Despite sometimes contradictory rhetoric, Gazprom is

8 Jan Cienski, Polish energy: Pressure rises in search for shale gas, Financial times, May, 22, 2013 9 Putin Dismisses Concern Gazprom ‘Slept Through’ Shale Gas Boom, Bloomberg, April, 15, 2013.

18

actively fighting to sustain its position in Europe as the

dominant supplier of energy, partly to maintain

Russia’s ability to apply its foreign policy agenda. It

has made three major moves to assert control:

• First, it has tried to sustain its long-term natural

gas delivery contract policy based on "take or

pay,” where a customer must pay for the

negotiated amount of gas even if the gas was

not consumed. And LNG prices are correlated

with oil prices. (LNG prices are usually set by

the spot values, not the long term contracts, and

thus are more unstable).

• Second, Gazprom is actively developing new

pipeline projects such as the South Stream, and

planning to increase the bandwidth of the Yamal

pipeline (through Belarus and Poland), which

was announced in April, 2013.

• Third, Russian media outlets (including such

international companies as the TV channel

“Russia Today”) are actively emphasizing

negative ecological aspects of shale gas

production. There are visible connections

between environmental movements in some

CEE countries, which actively oppose shale gas

development projects, and Gazprom. (It is worth

stating, though, that environmentalist protests

against shale gas exploration are not solely

influenced by Gazprom and other interest

groups. There are serious fears of population

towards possibly dangerous fracking

technologies.)

To sum it up, Moscow’s strategy involves both carrots

and sticks: In Lithuania Gazprom openly opposes

implementation of a so-called EU Third Energy

Package, which would destroy the monopoly of

Lietuvos Dujos (which Gazprom has partial ownership

of) over the gas pipeline network. The package would

gas from the Klaipeda LNG terminal and possible

locally produced shale gas to customers (Chevron has

won the competition to explore possibilities for shale

gas extraction). At the same time, Gazprom earlier in

2013 offered the Lithuanian government a 20 percent

discount on natural gas in return for an extension of

the long term natural gas delivery contract.

In Ukraine, “Gazprom” is actively using the terms of a

bilateral long term natural gas delivery contract,

particularly fines for breach of “take or pay” terms, in

order to influence Ukrainian foreign and domestic

policy. One of its targets is a contract with Royal Dutch

Shell for shale gas exploration in Eastern Ukraine.

Concluding remarks To sum it up, the shale gas revolution created serious

opportunities for the United States to strengthen

transatlantic cooperation. At the moment when the

“Pacific pivot” has drawn U.S. attention to Eastern and

Southeastern Asia, cooperation in the energy sector

provides great opportunities to replace lower military

presence with deeper economic integration.

For European countries, meanwhile, must wait to see

whether the U.S. decides to export natural gas, and to

where. In the best-case scenario, the U.S. would

export only to its NATO allies, which could

complement a proposed Transatlantic Trade and

Investment Partnership. In this case, the

competitiveness of the European economy would

increase and Europe would be much stronger against

outside influences, based on its energy resource

deliveries.

19

U.S. PIVOT TO ASIA

20

Obama’s Pivot to the Pacific Rim: A General Description of the “Three Ds”

Approach

1. Introduction:

In its efforts to counterbalance the emerging powers

and influences of the Asia-Pacific region, the United

States has continued to exert effort to expand and

intensify its presence on the diplomatic, defense and

development fronts. Its efforts in the region include

engagement strategies such as, among many others,

the as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The partnership

is an 11-member free trade agreement with an

underlying intent to counter China’s economic

expansion in the region. Efforts in the wider Pacific,

however, have always been, for lack of a better word,

ambiguous, and often colored with neglect and

uncertainty. While the US engages fully with Asia, the

importance of the “Pacific” portion of the “Asia-Pacific”

formulation has often been overlooked. It is only

recently that one could see a significant increase of

attention by the United States to the Pacific region.

Thus, one could argue that the 21st century will be

America’s Pacific century.

Under the Obama administration more than ever, there

is recognition and appreciation of the need to focus on

the Pacific. This is of much significance to the success

of the US military, economic and political re-

engagement strategy in the wider Asia-Pacific. During

his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global

Environment in September 2010, Assistant Secretary

of State Kurt M. Campbell stated that:

“The Obama Administration has attempted to

renew our focus and commitment to the

Pacific nations, in accordance with the

important role these nations play in the

complex and dynamic regional strategic

milieu… The President, Secretary Clinton,

and others in this Administration deeply

appreciate the historic legacy of the Pacific

and the strategic role it plays, particularly in

the twenty-first century. The region is of vital

importance to Asia-Pacific regional stability

and to our shared interests in freedom of

navigation, mitigation of climate change,

energy security, sustainable, robust fisheries,

and protecting biodiversity. Moreover, the

Pacific nations play an important leadership

role on global issues, particularly in the United

Nations and in supporting international

peacekeeping missions1.”

Assistant Secretary Campbell confirms that the highest

echelon of leadership in the United States Government

considers the Pacific region vital to its strategic

interests, both on the economic and military fronts, and

highlights a few key subjects including freedom of

navigation, fisheries, and others.

2. The First D: Diplomacy

1 http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/09/148318.htm

Assistant Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the

Federated States of Micronesia Ricky Cantero Department of Foreign Affairs, Micronesia E-mail: rcantero@mail.fm

21

Under the Obama administration, the Pacific region

has played host to a number of high-level visits, some

unprecedented, from the higher echelons of the US

Department of State and Defense. Since his 2010

congressional testimony, referenced above, Assistant

Secretary of State Campbell undertook a nine-country

Pacific tour in 2011 with the intent to reinforce the US’s

position in the Pacific region. For the first time, he

visited the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati,

Samoa, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Papua New

Guinea, the Republic of Palau and the Republic of the

Marshall Islands. In line with the “Three Ds” approach,

the Assistant Secretary was accompanied by US

Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Patrick Walsh, who

represented the defense component of the visit, and

USAID Assistant Administrator Nisha Desai Biswal,

representing the development component.

In 2012, little more than a year after his last visit,

Campbell again undertook a Pacific tour, visiting the

Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga, Kiribati, the

Marshall Islands (including Kwajalein), Palau, Papua

New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. As with the first

visit, the purpose was to meet with regional leaders to

reinforce the United States’ commitment to increased

engagement in the Pacific. Also as with the first visit,

and consistent with the “Three Ds” approach, the

Assistant Secretary was accompanied by

representatives from both the Department of Defense

and USAID. Once could conclude that the frequency of

the visits represents sincerity and commitment to

engagement.

The most prominent visit to the Pacific region was in

2012, when Secretary of State Hilary Clinton visited

Rarotonga, Cook Islands and attended, for the first

time for a US Secretary of State, the annual Pacific

Islands Forum, the region’s premier political institution.

This unprecedented visit attracted the largest and

highest-level US delegation in the Forum’s 41-year

history, a 50-strong contingent including Navy Admiral

Samuel Locklear, head of the US Pacific Command,

and Coast Guard Rear Admiral Charles W. Ray.

Consistent with the re-engagement policy of the

Obama administration, one could obviously conclude

that Clinton’s historic visit was part of an ongoing US

effort to demonstrate to the Pacific region its genuine

interest to increase and maintain its relationships in

the region. In her statement at the Pacific Islands

Forum, Clinton stated that:

“It is fair to say that for the past three and a

half years, the Obama Administration has

made a major push to increase our

engagement across the Asia Pacific. This is

a vast and dynamic region, a key driver of

global economies and politics, and the

United States has a historical presence in

this region. That’s why I have said that the

21st century will be America’s Pacific

century, with an emphasis on Pacific. The

Pacific half of Asia Pacific doesn’t always

get as much attention as it should, but the

United States knows that this region is

strategically and economically vital and

becoming more so.2”

While her message is clear, others could surmise that

her visit is really a symbolic gesture to undermine

China’s economic and diplomatic influence in the

Pacific – an influence that is growing significantly

stronger. Fergus Hanson interprets Clinton’s

participation in the regional forum as a “reflection of

Washington’s determination to stamp its domination in

every region of the Pacific, which it has always

regarded as an American lake since World War II.3”

Irrespective of varying interpretations, one could

certainly conclude that the unprecedented visit by the

2 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/08/197266.htm 3 http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/09/pifr-s04.html

22

US Secretary of State to the region’s political forum

confirms, solidifies, and gives true testimony to the

US’s continuing prioritization of the Pacific region.

3. The Second D: Defense

Seventy years ago, the battles of World War II were

fought on the beaches and tropical jungles of Pacific

island countries, many of which to this very day bear

scars and relics of war. Since then, the US has

continued to maintain a significant military presence

and influence in the north part of the Pacific which,

aside from a domestic presence in Hawaii and Guam,

includes bilateral defense and defense treaties with

the independent and sovereign states of the Federated

States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau and the

Republic of the Marshall Islands. Collectively, these

treaties encompass a strategy to prevent third party

military forces from gaining a foothold in a large part of

northern Oceania. These areas continue to be an

indispensible part of US strategic investment in the

Pacific region, and they continue to be enhanced and

strengthened on all fronts.

The south part of the Pacific region, on the other hand,

was vacated entirely by the US after World War II.

Reasons for this abandonment may be rooted in the

colonial history of these Pacific states. With the

departure of the US, Australia naturally stepped in as

the principal guardian of peace in the South Pacific.

This leadership role has constantly been scrutinized by

some south Pacific island countries, especially in the

Melanesia sub-regional bloc. Among others, the

continuing dilemma of the political situation in Fiji and

persistent problems pertaining to the Regional

Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

are regional security issues which have and will

continue to call into question the effectiveness of

Australia’s so-called guardianship role in south

Oceania.

The security partnership between the US and Australia

is arguably one of the US’s most important in the

Pacific hemisphere. As affirmed by Admiral Robert F.

Willard, former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command,

during Congressional testimony before the House

Armed Service Committee in April 2011, “The U.S.-

Australia alliance, which marks its 60th anniversary

this year, comprises the most significant partnership in

the Oceania sub-region, and is indeed one of the most

significant in the entire Asia-Pacific. 4” This was

confirmed during President Obama’s visit to Australia

during later in 2011, when he stated in his address to

the Australia Parliament that “The United States is a

Pacific power, and we are here to stay”5.

The participation of high-level military personnel in the

recent back-to-back Pacific tours undertaken by the

Assistant Secretary of State, as well as the Secretary

of State’s visit to the Cook Islands, referenced earlier,

are true testimonies to the US’s interest in re-

strengthening and re-engaging its security interests in

the Pacific region.

This re-engagement effort may be most needed in the

south Pacific, simply because that is where America

has been forgotten. The extension of ship riders’

agreements with Pacific Island States, announced by

the head of US Pacific Command Samuel J. Locklear

III when he accompanied Secretary Clinton to the

Pacific Islands Leaders Forum, is an excellent start to

this re-engagement. The agreement aims to combat

crimes of transnational nature such as drug trafficking,

human smuggling, and illegal fishing with maritime

surveillance activities by national law enforcement

personnel on US Coast Guard vessels. In the future, it

may expand to include Navy vessels. Considering the

minimal capacities of participating states to undertake

effective monitoring of transnational crime in their 4 http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/tstmny2011.html 5 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament

23

respective Exclusive Economic Zones, such

assistance will likely be welcomed. Aside from such

agreements, the most effective re-engagement

method is the application of the humanitarian

capabilities of the US military. This effort could include

operations under the Pacific Partnership (PP) umbrella

and the Construction Civic Action Detail (CCAD)

program. Such humanitarian assistance, undertaken

by the US military’s civil engineering division, is often

used for construction or repair of small community

infrastructure projects at the grassroots level, including

renovations of community schools, medical

dispensaries, and other essentials. These programs

often involve working hand in hand with local

communities, through person-to-person interaction.

The application of this side of the US military may be

what is needed in the reestablishment of US interest in

the Pacific region.

4. The Third D: Development Well before the Obama presidency, the US under

President George H.W. Bush did exert effort to

reinforce engagement with the Pacific region as a

development partner. Toward this effort, President

Bush proposed the establishment a Joint Commercial

Commission (JCC) at the United States-Pacific Islands

Summit held in October 1990 in Hawaii. The

Commission he proposed aimed to promote mutually

beneficial commercial and economic relations between

the US and Pacific island countries. Subsequently, on

January 12, 1993, a Memorandum of Understanding

establishing the Commission was signed by the US

and the then thirteen independent Pacific island

nations. What has happened to the JCC since

inception? One could argue that the JCC has not

fulfilled any of its intended developmental mandates

and objectives, and that this failure has contributed

extensively to US’s loss of influence in the pacific

region, especially during the Bush era. It could also be

said that the failure of the JCC process confirmed

existing negative sentiments that the US’s

development interest in the Pacific region, which to

certain extent has contributed to the shifting of

attention to Asia’s emerging economic powers.

Under the “Three Ds” approach as employed by the

Obama administration, the United States have

demonstrated some level of interest to re-engage with

the Pacific region. In October 2011, the US

established a new USAID Pacific Islands Regional

Office in Port Moresby. But the community of pacific

leadership still has many questions they would like

answered: “How useful is USAID?” “Can USAID really

assist with development goals?”, etc. All of this

uncertainty could most likely stem for the region’s

recent experience with the JCC process.

During Secretary Clinton’s participation in the Pacific

Islands Forum, she announced an increase in US aid

to the Pacific region with a new development aid

package of about $32 million. While this assistance

package may be welcome in the region, one could see

it as miniscule compared to assistance development

packages received by other development partners.

During the first China-Pacific Islands Forum regional

meeting held in China in 2006, for instance, an aid

package of 4.5 million dollars to support development

priorities of Forum member countries was produced.

Such aid disparities in the Pacific region bring into

consideration the importance of the many

developmental aspects of the US military, especially

under the humanitarian assistance portfolio, and the

need for consistent application of such assistance

throughout communities of Pacific states.

One could argue that the development aspect of the

“Three Ds” approach is the most problematic, due

immense financial pressures that have continued to

plague the US for the last many years.

24

5. Opportunities and Challenges:

There was once an election in a small island country.

The two candidates vying for the seat went about their

respective campaigns throughout the island. The first

candidate, who was a well-educated man with many

years of experience working in government, went to a

small community and campaigned by laying out his

impressive agenda and personal resume. The

community was very impressed with the candidate’s

knowledge of climate change, food security, maritime

laws, democratic principles, human rights, economics

and many other issues of great importance, and had

high hopes for the candidate.

The second candidate, a business owner with no

experience working in government, went to the same

community. The candidate brought and distributed

small quantities of loaves of bread, bags of rice,

cartons of chicken, cans of food, and the like. When

the result of the election came out, the second

candidate won the election by a large margin.

The underlying message of the story is that, at the end

of the day, those who deliver the things that are

needed to assist and sustain nations are those that will

be favored.

In the past several years, the geopolitical dynamics of

influence in the Pacific region have been altered

tremendously. The US must understand and

appreciate this shift in order to be effective in its push

for re-engagement and demonstrate its interest in the

wider Pacific region. Today, there are an increasing

number of political players around the region, each

vying for a piece of the political influence pie. Aside

from conventional development partners like Japan,

France, the European Union, South Korea, and China,

Russia and Cuba are now making their own mark in

the region. Of those all these nations, China has

surfaced in the role of the second candidate described

in the story above.

There has emerged a new struggle for influence in the

Pacific region between the US and China. In this

struggle, China has a history of geopolitical influence

that has long surpassed that of the United States,

especially in the south Pacific. The reasons for are

many, and are there for further contemplation.

Obama’s pivot to the Pacific region is an apparent

move to reclaim and strengthen its traditional role.

Evidence of this rebalancing effort, through the “Three

Ds” approach, has focused on affirming that the US

truly is interested in the “Pacific” part of the “Asia-

Pacific” region.

25

The United States‘ Strategic Shift Toward the Pacific: Continuity and

Change

Introduction

The goal of this paper is to analyze the global trend of

America’s strategic shift toward the Pacific and East

Asia. This development will be one of the most

important in international relations in the foreseeable

future, and will determine the state of the global

security environment. While it has been referred to as

a new development in media discussions since the

release of the new U.S. Strategic Guidance in January

2012, this is not the case. The most significant driving

forces behind this change started to emerge at least

two decades ago. Europe’s “Eurocentric worldview”

was temporarily overwhelmed by events in their

neighborhood and by US engagement in Europe’s

conflicts (wars in southeastern Europe being the most

prominent example). But the rest of the globe realized

this shift some time ago. Moreover, the Obama

administration’s steps toward the Pacific and East Asia

are to a large extent based on changes initiated or

realized by previous administrations, particularly that

of George W. Bush. From that point of view, Obama’s

“Pacific shift” is a combination of both continuity and

new elements based on long-term historical and

strategic trends. Thus, on the whole, the shift

represents more of an evolution in US policy than a

revolution.

Historic and Strategic Trends

The United States possesses both an Atlantic and a

Pacific vector in its global strategy. The primacy of the

Atlantic vector in foreign policy and strategy – with

European allies as its most important partners in world

affairs – was based on the “Europe first” mindset,

a product of World War II. That way of thinking was

based on the strategic assessment that Germany

represented a more serious strategic threat than

Japan, as well as consideration of the US’s special

relationship with the United Kingdom, its most

important ally. The emergence of the Soviet center of

power, which decisively focused on Europe both

during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War strategic

environment, extended that strategic approach.

Because of that primacy, the Atlantic vector secured a

dominant position for half a century in American

foreign policy and security strategies. [1]

During the last third of the 20th century, the

fundamentals of this geo-strategic situation started to

change. The impact of historical and geopolitical

trends that took hold in the 70s and 80s is the basis for

current developments. A global redistribution of power

and the gradual emergence of non-European and

Atlantic centers of power, mainly in the East and South

Asia (which accelerated after the geopolitical upheaval

of the early 90s) are the most important driving

forces behind current trends. From an American

perspective, it is a crucial fact that since 2000, Asia

has become America’s most important source of

imports. From a global perspective, Asia’s share of the

world’s GDP rose from 14 to 26 percent with further

growth potential. Its share of global defense

expenditures rose to about 21 percent and now

Director and Lecturer at the Centre for

European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA)

Robert Ondrejcsak CENAA, Slovak Republic E-mail: ondrejcsak@cenaa.org

26

matches the level of European defense spending. Five

of the world’s six largest armed forces are in Asia

(China, India, USA, Russia, North Korea, South

Korea). China has become second only to the US in

terms of military expenditures. The rise in Chinese

military spending and capabilities is a significant

influence on other countries in terms of increases to

their defense budgets. [2]

The collapse of the USSR, the diminishing of strategic

rivalries in Europe, and the dramatic current self-

demilitarization of European allies, compounded by

American disappointment with them, are among the

most prominent sources of current trends. Financial

austerity, which has a decisive impact on the US

military budget, is also putting significant pressure on

the prioritization of resource expenditures. [3] We also

have to take into consideration the lack of multilateral

regional security mechanisms in East Asia, and the

inherent instability this causes.

As the central actor in the current world order, the US

has to react to these ongoing trends if it wants to

maintain its position. While the relative power of non-

western centers is rising, the US still possesses

sufficient capabilities – and sufficient will – to remain

the main center of power for decades to come. It still

generates approximately 25 percent of global

economic power. In fact, the US share of global GDP

is relatively constant – from 26 percent in 1975 to 25

percent in 2012. The rise of Asian states comes

partially at the expense of Europe, whose economic

output has decreased from more than 37% in 1975 to

27% in 2012, while Asia’s has increased from 14% to

26% in the same period. [4] Thus it is likely that the

US, with the only strategic global power projection

capabilities, will maintain its primacy in international

affairs for the foreseeable future. Despite the rise of

other centers of power, the US will not share, in Paul

Kennedy’s words, the “destiny of the Netherlands” –

once the world’s leading power, now a small European

state without much influence on global affairs.

All American post-Cold War presidents acted in line

with the long-term tradition of American strategic

culture. “America must continue to lead the world we

did so much to make,” stated President Clinton in his

first Inaugural address in 1993. “America remains

engaged in the world by history and by choice,

shaping a balance of power that favors freedom,”

according to George W. Bush in his Inaugural address

in 2001. And in 2009, Barack Obama said “We remain

the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth”.

Continuity with George W. Bush’s Administration Initiatives Europe’s central position in US strategic thinking

started to erode in the early 90s, but was temporarily

masked by several events, including the Bosnia-

Herzegovina and Kosovo conflicts. However, the Old

Continent’s preeminence as measured strictly by

share of total US forces stationed abroad started to

see a drawdown from more than 300,000 troops in the

late 80s to less than 100,000 today. But these trends

were not all that dynamic given that the US was not

engaged in major strategic military operations between

1991 and 2001. The global posture of US forces

witnessed only minor changes concerning Middle

Eastern developments and the naval presence in the

Pacific, but basically, a decade after the end of the

Cold War, it was still based on the structures and

networks of military bases from before the 90s.

This means that during the Clinton era, the shift of

American attention from Europe to other regions was

rather slow, and was not declared clearly in strategic

documents. Military operations during this era were

geographically confined mainly to Europe and to a

lesser extend the Middle East (Bosnia and

Herzegovina and Kosovo in 1994-95 and 1999, Iraq in

27

1998, and a demonstration of US power in the Taiwan

Strait in 1995-96).

The first significant change came in the 2000s, with

the era of President George W. Bush. It came about

due to several reasons: obviously the events of 9/11,

but also the rapidly growing influence of East Asian

neighbors and absence of major strategic challenges

in Europe. Post-9/11 operations launched by the Bush

administration in Afghanistan and Iraq moved the US’s

and the rest of the world’s attention from Europe.

Moreover, the elevated importance of the Middle East

and Central Asia was crucial to the point that it

temporarily reversed the historical trend of the growing

importance of East Asia and the Pacific (see for

example the structure and essence of QDR 2006).

Thus, East Asia’s place in US foreign policy suffered

reduced prominence due to ongoing military

operations within the broader Middle East. On the

other hand, we have to note that during the Bush

presidency, first steps were made toward a more

realistic global post-Cold War posture for the US

military. Bush’s first Secretary of Defense, Donald

Rumsfeld, outlined important changes in the Global

Defense Posture Review of 2004, among others,

which represented the most far-reaching restructuring

of US forces abroad since the beginning of the Cold

War. This is important from today’s perspective, as it

outlined the first major strategic vision of a future

global military posture. It openly declared a major shift

in American strategic thinking, naming East Asia as a

strategic hotspot and outlining a long-term effort to

dramatically modify the US’s global military presence.

Rumsfeld proposed the following important steps:

The mission and, as a consequence, nature of US

forces in Europe started to change – along with a

reduction of numbers, the troops will be trained for

non-European deployments and less focus will be

given to maintaining static bases in Europe. More

emphasis will be placed on ad-hoc coalitions of the

willing than existing formal Alliances. The final decision

about US Forces in Europe was postponed and

modified by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who

left just two instead of four US brigades in Europe and

deployed a third one on a rotational basis for training

and exercises with allies (decision from early 2012).

The deployment of third brigade is also a part of the

solution to keeping a level of interoperability and

potential for military-to-military cooperation gained in

Afghanistan. In reference to the latter, the planned

withdrawal of major combat units by 2014 poses

a serious challenge to NATO militaries: they are faced

with either losing the capability to act together or

investing in large-scale joint training and exercises.

US strategic documents, most notably Quadrennial

Defense Review Reports, have declared openly that

the most important challenge for long-term American

strategic interests are rooted in southeast Asia. “Of the

major and emerging powers, China has the greatest

potential to compete militarily with the United States

and field disruptive military technologies that could

over time off set traditional U.S. military advantages

absent U.S. counterstrategies,“ says one QDR (pp.

26). But this is the particular region where US

capabilities are most limited, especially Southeast

Asian and east Asian Littorial states. Rumsfeld’s

initiatives were focused on new agreements with the

region’s countries (Singapore, Thailand, Australia,

etc.) enabling more freedom of action for US forces, as

well as building up new bases, including Guam’s

increased significance.

Maintaining the strength to react to a local crisis

through a strong presence in Japan and South Korea,

which also increases capacity to act out of the region’s

borders (partial redistribution of forces from Okinawa

to Guam).

28

A rise in Africa’s importance, underlined also by the

creation of AFRICOM – middle east operations

support from East Africa, counterterrorist activities in

Sahel and focus on strengthening local capabilities

(Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership).

New US military presence in Central Asia, as a

foundation for Afghanistan operations.

Focus on new styles of bases that fit into one of

several categories: Power Projection Hubs based on

the traditional structure with permanent US forces

(Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom); Main

Operating Bases also based on traditional robust

structure; Forward Operational Sites, a new model

based on rotation of US forces and limited permanent

presence, and with the possibility of locating pre-

positioned equipment for future deployments; and

Cooperative Security Locations, with focus on regional

security cooperation, logistics and support, as well as

the possibility of pre-positioned equipment. There is

high level of continuity in this approach by the new

administration’s defense leadership.

While changes in US posture were a projection of the

growing importance of Asia to its military, there were

also political initiatives with the goal of shaping the

global balance of power. The major political strategic

initiative of the Bush administration with regard to

Asian and global strategy was the establishment of the

US-Indian strategic partnership. In 2005, when Bush

and the Indian Prime Minister declared their

willingness to transform the relationship of the two

countries into a global partnership providing leadership

in areas of mutual concern and interest, it was

a crucial moment signaling the changing posture. The

earliest steps toward building up this partnership were

made by the Clinton administration (symbolically

described as a “partnership of the two greatest

democracies in the World”), but Bush’s team made it a

strategic reality. Although there are still many

unanswered questions about the intentions of both

sides, it is one of the crucial alignments which will

determine the strategic situation not only in Asia but

also globally. India gained US recognition as a nuclear

power, which significantly contributed to its rising

prestige as a global power, and New Delhi received

substantial economic benefits. Washington – if it

succeeds in keeping India in the strategic partnership

in the long term – will reap the benefits of positive

attitudes as the only power to at least partially

counterbalance Chinese influence in Southern and

southeastern Asia. From the US‘s perspective, it is the

real long-term strategic advantage of that partnership

is more valuable than any economic benefit.

Obama’s Administration – Three Key Areas of Evolution

While the Bush administration declared a gradual

change in military posture and established a strategic

partnership with India, it still remained politically and

militarily anchored in the Middle East. The majority of

US resources – not to mention political attention and

energy – went to the broader Middle East. The

symbolic change came with President Obama, and

was emphasized by withdrawal from Iraq and gradual

but significant reductions of US presence in

Afghanistan. Although still significantly bounded by two

wars in the Middle East and Central Asia, Obama

emphasized a shift in American perspective in favor of

Asia. Describing himself as “America’s first Pacific

President,” he stated that “the Pacific Rim has helped

shape my view of the world,” in Tokyo on November

14, 2009. “During my lifetime,” he said, “The fortunes

of America and the Asia-Pacific have become more

closely linked than ever” (Talev 2011). Besides

analyzing it as a reaction of strategic trends it is also a

witness to changes in “American Identity” which is

more and more anchored by Pacific and confirming

“inter-US” shift from the traditional Atlantic orientation

towards the West.

29

The most important strategic document in the shift,

and the one that produced the most actual change,

was the Strategic Defense Guidance titled “Sustaining

US Global Leadership: Priorities of 21st Century

Defense” issued in January 2012. The document

declares that “US economic and security interests are

inextricably linked to developments in the arc

extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into

the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a

mix of evolving challenges and opportunities.

Accordingly, while the US military will continue to

contribute to security globally, we will of necessity

rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” (pp.2)

(emphasis added). Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta

confirmed this during his speech at the Shangri-La

dialogue in Singapore in June 2012, where he clarified

the goals and objectives stated in January: “We have

made choices and we have set priorities, and we have

rightly chosen to make this region a priority”.

Besides these declarations, there is more specific

evidence of the importance of East Asia and the

Pacific. The first foreign visit of President Obama’s first

Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was to Asia. In

February 2009, almost immediately after being

appointed, she visited Japan, Indonesia, South Korea,

and China. In comparison with previous Secretaries

(Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Madeline Albright),

she visited East Asian and Pacific countries the most.

Almost 20 percent of her visits during her first three

years in office were to the above-mentioned regions

(Rice 9.8%, Powell 13.5%, Albright 13.2%). Europe’s

share decreased from more than 50% during Albright’s

tenure to less than 30%. Moreover, the “relative

importance” of South and Central Asia, including India,

has also risen from 1 to more than 9 percent (partly as

a consequence of deployment in Afghanistan, but not

exclusively) (Manyin–Daggett 2012). Of course, these

numbers tell nothing of the substance or results of

state visits, but they do have a symbolic message.

In a broader context, evidence for the continuation of

changes in the US approach during Obama’s first term

is supported by several mutually interlinked factors.

The first and most discussed are the modifications in

the US’s global military posture. In that regard, not

only geographical shifts but also the changing nature

and guiding strategy of deployment of US forces are

important. Second is emphasis on building new

multinational structures in East Asia and surrounding

regions, and strengthening US ties with the already

existing structures. It is important to note that

according to the new approach, East Asia, Western

Pacific, Southeast Asia, and South Asia are not

treated as separate regions anymore, but are part of a

broader geopolitical picture of U.S. foreign and

security policy. This “multinationality” also includes an

initiative to establish a Trans-Pacific Strategic

Economic Partnership and a Free Trade Area, as well

as ASEAN’s growing importance for the US.[5] Third,

we are seeing a further strengthening of traditional

bilateral alliances and partnerships (Japan, South

Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Australia) and the

construction of new ones (India, Vietnam).

The US will tailor its global military posture to a future

strategic environment in East Asia and the surrounding

regions as the most important strategic hotspot and

source of major challenges. This has implications for

the geographical distribution of American alliances and

partnerships, the re-dislocation of US forces and the

nature and structures of the US military. According to

Secretary Panetta, “By 2020 the Navy will re-posture

its forces from today’s roughly 50/50 split between the

Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between

those oceans” (2012a). There are already announced

additional steps: new deployment of 2,500 Marines to

military bases in Darwin, Australia, intensified use of

Western Australia’s harbor of Perth, and deployment

of four Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore are among

the most prominent examples. A base in Darwin –

30

close to the strategic straits of Southern Asia[6] – will

give US forces strategic depth as well as significant

freedom to maneuver, in addition to the Singapore

deployment’s direct access to the region. On the other

hand, we could read this as a first step in broader

realignment or just as a symbolic change, meant to

strengthen confidence among Asian allies that the US

is preserving its will and capabilities to be a normative

power in the broader region despite domestic financial

problems. More importantly, it is important at a

strategic level to analyze the US distribution of

resources and attention among different regions. The

regions of South-East and East Asia are major

destinations, and are unlikely to see a decrease of US

military presence in the future. Additionally, the future

distribution of resources among the four services of

the US Armed Forces has significance too. Overall

financial reductions of the US defense budget, which

goes hand-in-hand with reductions in numbers, will not

affect the Navy seriously, according to Defense

Guidance. The US Navy will maintain eleven aircraft

carriers despite the expectation of reduction by one,

and will keep the current level – 33 – of amphibious

ships for Marines. Army and Marines, and to a lesser

extend Air Force (Priorities 2012), will see more effects

of reductions. This clearly shows what kind of future

deployments are expected and planned. As President

Obama declared, “As we end today’s wars, I have

directed my national security team to make our

presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.

As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will

not – I repeat, will not – come at the expense of the

Asia Pacific” (2011).

The character and structure of the US Armed Forces

will show evidence of important changes and possible

future scenarios for geographical scope of operations.

The focus on combined Navy/Air Force operations in

the drive for modernization, restructuring and

capability development is intended to anticipate

potential missions and areas of operations. The focus

on naval-air capabilities is more suited for Pacific and

East Asian theatres (including South-Eastern Asia)

than others (the Korean peninsula is the only Land and

Air Force-dominated theatre in East Asia and Pacific

with significant US presence). Regional realities,

including access routes to potential hotspots, naval

communications, and the chain of US military bases

on island states in the East Pacific make it a theatre

suited for combined naval-air capabilities. The

emergence of the so-called Air-Sea Battle concept[7],

also a reaction to an increased level of Chinese “anti-

access capabilities,”[8] and American concerns over

Chinese activities in cyber-space after more than a

decade of large ground operations, will further

strengthen focus on East Asia and the Pacific.

Despite these important developments, it would be a

mistake to think the topic is simply a matter of military

and military-related changes. As stated above, there is

a combination of three interlinked elements. The most

important new aspect of the Obama administration’s

approach is the increased attention to multilateral

structures, both new, such as economic cooperation-

focused the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic

Partnership and Free Trade Area, and already

existing, such as ASEAN. Hillary Clinton, the first US

Secretary of State to visit the ASEAN secretariat,

launched an intensified diplomatic presence in the

region shortly after coming into office, and continuing

the course taken by the Bush administration, notably

creating the new position of the US Ambassador to

ASEAN. In October 2011, Leon Panetta became the

first U.S. Secretary of Defense to meet with all ASEAN

defense ministers. The Obama administration signed

the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with

ASEAN in 2009 – a desperately needed step, and one

whose hold by the Bush administration caused doubts

about US engagement in Southeast Asia. Moreover,

there is a new comprehensive geographical approach

31

which includes East Asia, Western Pacific, Southeast

Asia, and South Asia as one huge geopolitical and

strategic region rather than separate geographical

entities. Clinton described the Asia-Pacific as

“stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western

shores of the Americas, [spanning] two oceans – the

Pacific and the Indian – that are increasingly linked by

shipping and strategy” (2011). Assistant Secretary of

State for East Asia Kurt Campbell emphasized the

objective of “operationally making the linkage between

the Indian and Pacific Oceans the next challenge of

US strategic thinking” (Manyin–Daggett 2012, pp.5). It

is also important to note the complexity of the political

situation of ASEAN‘s approach. While its member

nations welcome a strong US presence in the region,

they are simultaneously trying to maintain balanced

partnerships with Beijing. For a majority of them, China

is the leading trade partner, and there are significant

Chinese minorities in many countries in the region with

a strong private economic presence. This means that

the member states, while pleased with US presence,

do not want to be caught it the middle of a rivalry

between great powers. In the words of Indonesian

Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, “ASEAN will not

let the region become a competition arena for

countries who consider themselves big powers,

whoever and whenever they may be” (Jakarta Post

2011). On the other hand, in September 2010, the

Indonesian Foreign Minister rejected China’s view that

the US should not become involved in the South China

Sea dispute (Ten Kate-Li 2010).

The third aspect of US foreign and security policy is its

emphasis on partnerships. Japan is maintaining its

position as the most important US ally not only in the

region but globally. According to Leon Panetta, “The

United States-Japan alliance will remain one of the

cornerstones for regional security and prosperity in the

21st century” (2012a). Washington supports Tokyo’s

international aspirations, including a permanent seat in

the UN Security Council. It has contributed to

strengthening Japanese military capabilities with focus

on missile defense, reconnaissance, intelligence, and

has advocated for greater Japanese responsibility for

security of East Asia/Western Pacific. The US also

made clear its support for Japan’s priorities in the

bilateral Japanese-Chinese dispute over the

Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, when State Department

spokesman Victoria Nuland declared that the islands

fall under the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 US-Japan

defense treaty (2012). These factors constitute a

continuum in the US approach to the region,

regardless of who is in the White House. The US has

also initiated Japanese-South Korean reconciliation,

the completion of which will enable greater focus on

regional threats, with trilateral security-related

consultations and by maintaining a strong military

presence (despite some relocation of American forces

from Okinawa to Guam). In South Korea, US troops

are in a peculiar situation: it is the only theatre where

clear and present military threats are still on the table,

which is why the US maintains a strong military

presence, but US forces stationed there are also

readily deployable outside the country and even the

region (as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan). For both

countries, the US strategic shift means an increase of

their general political and strategic importance, but

with smaller exemptions there are few new elements.

Australia is strengthening its position as a key US

military ally. Besides increased military presence

(rotational deployment in Darwin and Perth), there is a

trend of strengthening the overall importance of the

US-Australian alliance by involving Australian forces in

US-led operations (Afghanistan), bringing Australia

closer with NATO states, intensified consultations on

security issues, and trilateral/quadrilateral US-

Australian-Indian and sometimes Japanese

consultations on security questions related to South

and southeast Asia and strategic affairs. Australia is

32

clearly a beneficiary of new trends which increase its

political, military and strategic importance, and bring

more US focus to a shared interest in southeast Asian

security.[9]

One of predictable changes is the area surrounding

the Philippines. While the US military left the

Philippines after the Cold War, there is a security

alliance between two countries, and the US is

committed to defense of Philippines. According to its

new global posture, some rotational [10] US troops will

be deployed to the islands to assist in Philippine

military training. The importance of this move was

heightened by the recent Chinese-Philippine incidents

in the Scarborough Shoal. In this context, US

engagement was greatly significant for countries in the

region. Secretary of State Clinton, confirmed that:

“While we do not take sides on the

competing sovereignty claims to land

features in the South China Sea, as a

Pacific power we have a national interest in

freedom of navigation, the maintenance of

peace and stability, respect for international

law, and the unimpeded, lawful commerce

across our sea lanes. The United States

supports a collaborative diplomatic process

by all those involved for resolving the

various disputes that they encounter. We

oppose the threat or use of force by any

party to advance its claims. And we will

remain in close contact with our ally, the

Philippines”.

Secretary of Defense Panetta stated that “the U.S.

values this great partnership and the importance of the

Mutual Defense Treaty that remains the cornerstone of

our security relationship”. The issue of American

credibility in times of economic troubles is crucial, and

the Obama administration took care to reassure states

throughout the region. Undersecretary of Defense for

Policy Michele Flournoy and Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Plans Janine Davidson wrote

in a Foreign Affairs article: “U.S. naval and air forces

engaged in Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, and

Thailand give allies in Southeast Asia greater

confidence that the United States will not abandon the

region at a time of great change and uncertainty”

(Flournoy - Davidson 2012).

Vietnam belongs in the category of new partners

“discovered” by the Bush administration. Its position as

a country close to the geographic center of the

strategic pivot, the South-China Sea and main naval

transport routes, gives it a clear place in regional

geostrategy. SLOC, [11] close to Vietnam, is crucial

not only for the Chinese economy but also for Japan

and South Korea. What’s more, the potential existence

of gas and oil deposits heightens its importance even

further. Because of territorial disputes (Paracel,

Spratly) and growing Chinese assertiveness in South

China Sea, as well as Vietnam’s traditional rivalry with

China, Hanoi is seeking an external power to

counterbalance the increased Chinese geopolitical

pressure in the South. The US makes for an ideal

partner from that point of view, and thus, strategic

interests are helping bridge historical animosities.

India is the only country in South and Southeastern

Asia with global aspirations, and potential to partially

counterbalance Chinese geopolitical influence in both

of these regions. Moreover, the significant capabilities

of the Indian Navy allow US naval forces to share

responsibility with a friendly actor. Indian cooperation

also means increased warship numbers and more

favorable operational cost considerations in the area of

the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India has significant

influence in Afghanistan, Eastern Africa, South Asia

and Southeastern Asia, as well as nations of the

Indian Ocean. India’s preeminence in the broader

region is recognized by the Obama administration in

33

practice and declared in writing by the current Defense

Strategy: “The United States is also investing in a

long-term strategic partnership with India to support its

ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and

provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean

region” (Priorities 2012, pp. 2). Any US administration

in the future will likely invest significant political

resources and attention to deepening the US-Indian

partnership.

Conclusions: the Chinese factor The strategic discussion about future challenges in

East Asia started almost immediately after the end of

the Cold War – simultaneously with the launch of the

debate about the future of the United States in global

affairs. As the US became the single most important

global power with dominant presence in each strategic

region, it transformed itself into a “status quo power” in

East Asia. From that position, it has to answer the

most important challenge of the future – the rise of

new centers of power, potentially competitors, with

China as the most prominent example. The central

question was – and still is – how to handle rising

Chinese influence and its consequences for the

broader region. Basically, there are two possible

scenarios at the level of the theory. The first is to try to

integrate Beijing into the already existing international

order, created and managed by the US. This requires

sharing responsibility – and influence – with China.

This scenario is also supported by a significant level of

US-Chinese economic interdependence which,

according to some theories, will significantly reduce

the possibility of any conflict among them. The second

scenario is to build up strategic countermeasures in

order to counterbalance Chinese power by traditional

means, including regional alliances and increased

military presence to maintain military superiority not

only globally but also in the region. Although it is not

the goal of this paper to predict the future, it is possible

to say with near-certainty that the American strategy

will be a combination of these two theoretical

scenarios. The weight given to each will depend on the

strategy and approach of individual administrations,

but what is certain is that it will be the crucial strategic

challenge for future American presidential

administrations for decades to come.

The Defense Strategy 2012 declares: “Over the long

term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have

the potential to affect the US economy and our

security in a variety of ways” (Priorities 2012, pp. 2).

The long-term approach of the US was declared

clearly, and while China is not mentioned per se,

nobody questions who is the subject of the strategic

calculus at work when the Strategy states:

“The United States will continue to make

the necessary investments to ensure that

we maintain regional access and the ability

to operate freely in keeping with our treaty

obligations and with international law…

Working closely with our network of allies

and partners, we will continue to promote a

rules-based international order that ensures

underlying stability and encourages the

peaceful rise of new powers, economic

dynamism, and constructive defense

cooperation” (Priorities 2012, pp. 2).

Moreover, “Project[ing] power despite anti-access/area

denial challenges” is among the key primary missions

of US forces, according to the Strategy (Priorities

2012, pp. 4). On the other hand, similar declarations,

mainly focusing on Chinese anti-access capabilities

and securing American freedom of action, were

treated several times in the documents of previous

administrations, including QDRs.

With China the only player able to challenge US

positions in Asia-Pacific, the new approach of the

Obama administration will be tested by its ability to

manage Beijing’s rise. The US will try to shape the

34

strategic decisions of China with a combination of

military, political, diplomatic and economic steps. This

approach is based to a large extent on Chinese

strategies and which aspect will prevail: a gradual rise

simultaneous with integration of Beijing into

international system and network, or a strategic rivalry.

End Notes

[1] Even though by far the largest Cold War real-war engagements of US forces were in East Asia (Korean and Vietnam Wars)

[2] For details see: Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data 2011, 2011, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on-military-expenditure-2011.pdf, (data from 2011).

[3] In 2011 the military spending decreased by 9 billion US Dollars, a first decrease after 1998. The 2013 defense budget will go down by approximately 50-60 billion USD, almost by 10 percent, which still represents about 630 billion USD. For details see: Walker, Dinah, 2012, Trends in U.S. Military Spending, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/geoeconomics/trends-us-military-spending/p28855.

[4] Real Historical Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Shares and Growth Rates of GDP Shares for Baseline Countries/Regions (in percent) 1969-2012, Economic Research Service, Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, http://www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_Data/Historical_Data_Files/HistoricalGDPSharesValues.xls.

[5] The United States designated an Ambassator to ASEAN as the first non-ASEAN state (by G. Bush´s administration).

[6] Accounts for around a half of world container traffic and approximately 75% of Chinese oil imports (6 million bbl/d by May 2012). U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2012, Analysis: China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH.

[7] The US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta signed the Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASBC) into effect in 2011 and in November 2011 the Pentagon announced the establishment of Air-Sea Battle Office. The ASB´s ultimate goal is to enable US forces to counter current and future threats posed by advance capabilities as long-range conventional ballistic missiles and cruise-missiles, electronic and cyber capabilities, submarines, integrated air and missile defense systems, etc. majority of them belonging to the so-called “anti-access capabilities” which are developed most exclusively by Chinese military. It is the reason why the ASBC is seen as one of crucial elements of US-counter strategy to growing Chinese presence and assertiveness in South-East Asia. According to General Schwartz and Admiral Greenert, key personalities of realization of ASBC, Air-Sea Battle Concept will use “Networked, Integrated Attack-in-Depth” to “disrupt, destroy, and defeat” (NIA-D3) adversary capabilities. A joint force has to be created (integrated air, ground, and naval forces) “armed with resilient communications (networked) aims to strike at multiple nodes of an enemy’s system (attack-in-depth) along three lines of effort. If we can consider these lines in terms of an enemy archer, one could

choose to blind the archer (disrupt), kill the archer (destroy), or stop his arrow (defeat). Balanced capabilities geared towards executing all three will be required.” Forbes, J., Randy, 2012, America’s Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision, The Diplomat, March 8, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/08/americas-pacific-air-sea-battle-vision/.

[8] “Anti-access capabilities/strategies” are described as those which are trying to significantly limit the possibilities of the United States forces to project power into particular regions. Typically one concurrent power is trying to deny US access to its coastal or near-to-coastal waters, for example South-China See. For more see the Annual Department of Defense reports to US Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. For the 2011 report see: Annual Report To Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, US Department of Defense, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf. For 2012 report see: Annual Report To Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, US Department of Defense, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf.

[9] South-East Asia´s place in Australian strategic culture is crucial: from geographical point of view it is the first line of Australia’s defense.

[10] The “rotational nature” of new US deployments will be crucial – as it will differ from large constant “Cold-War-like” bases. There is lot of emphasis on this “new approach” by American representatives, see for example both former and current Secretaries of Defense speeches, Donald Rumsfeld´s and Leon Panetta´s most recent speech at Shari-La dialogue: Panetta, Leon, 2012a, Speech at the 11th IISS Asia Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, First Plenary Session – The US Rebalance Towards the Asia-Pacific, Singapore, June 2, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/first-plenary-session/leon-panetta/.

[11] Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Sources Annual Report To Congress, 2011, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, US Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf, 15.9.2012

Annual Report To Congress, 2012, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, US Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf, 10.9.2012

Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data 2011, 2011, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on-military-expenditure-2011.pdf, 2.9.2012

Bush, George, W, 2001, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2001, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25853, 1.9.2012

Clinton, William, J., 1993, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1993, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46366, 1.9.2012

35

Clinton, Hillary, 2011, America’s Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century, 2.9.2012

Clinton, Hillary, 2012, Remarks With Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting, April 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/04/188982.htm, 14.9.2012

Flournoy, Michèle – Davidson, Janine, 2012, Obama’s New Global Posture, The Logic of U.S. Foreign Deployments, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137717/michele-flournoy-and-janine-davidson/obamas-new-global-posture, 12.9.2012

Forbes, J., Randy, 2012, America’s Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision, The Diplomat, March 8, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/08/americas-pacific-air-sea-battle-vision/, 5.9.2012

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2005, White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, July 18, 2005, Washington, DC, hereafter Joint Statement, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2005/49763.htm, 16.9.2012

Manyin, Mark, E. – Daggett, Stephen, et al., 2012, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf, 18.9.2012

Nuland, Victoria, 2012, Daily Press Briefing, August 28, 2012, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/08/196986.htm, 10.9.2012

Obama, Barack, 2009, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2009, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44, 1.9.2012

Obama, Barack, 2011, Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament, November 17, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament, 1.9.2012

Panetta, Leon, 2012a, Speech at the 11th IISS Asia Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, First Plenary Session – The US Rebalance Towards the Asia-Pacific, Singapore, June 2, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/first-plenary-session/leon-panetta/, 1.9.2012

Panetta, Leon, 2012b, Remarks With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting, April 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/04/188982.htm, 14.9.2012

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), 2006, United States Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf, 12.9.2012

Real Historical Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Shares and Growth Rates of GDP Shares for Baseline Countries/Regions (in percent) 1969-2012, Economic Research Service, Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, http://www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_

Data/Historical_Data_Files/HistoricalGDPSharesValues.xls, 31.8.2012

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, US Department of Defense, January 2012, hereafter “Priorities 2012”, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, 10.9.2012

Talev, Margaret, 2011, Asia Rise Drives Obama Message as U.S.’s First Pacific President, Bloomberg, November 16, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-16/asia-rise-drives-obama-message-as-u-s-s-first-pacific-president.html, 3.9.2012

Ten Kate, Daniel – Li, Susan, 2010, Indonesia Rejects China Stance that U.S. Stay Out of Local Waters Dispute, Bloomberg, September 22, 2010, http://www.bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-22/indonesia-rejects-china-stance-that-u-s-stay-out-of-local-waters-dispute.html, 15.9.2012

The Jakarta Post,2011, New US base in RI’s backyard, November 17, 2011, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/17/new-us-base-ri-s-backyard.html, 15.9.2012

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2012, Analysis: China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH, 19.9.2012

Walker, Dinah, 2012, Trends in U.S. Military Spending, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/geoeconomics/trends-us-military-spending/p28855, 29.8.2012

36

Indonesia and US Defense Relations: Opportunities, Challenges, and Impact

on Regional Security

Background Recently, Indonesia has enjoyed warm relations with

the US in many ways. This essay will focus on defense

relations between the two nations. There are some

positive developments and also some concerns. The

strong point is that the relationship between the two

militaries is very good At the same time, though, there

is very limited cooperation on training civilian experts

on defense issues. The growing relationship of mutual

benefits has a strategic background and a pragmatic

aspect to it. I will to try to illustrate the current defense

relations of the two nations, examine the opportunities

and challenges, and examine the impact of the coming

dynamic of strategic balance. As two friends, there are

ups and down to their relationship. The nature of the

bilateral relations between the nations is an alignment,

as in William Tow’s theory,1 that mutual expectations

the nations have for each other shape their relations.

The alignment is broader and more informal

1 Page 14, Willian Tow, Alliance and Alignment in 21st Century in Brendan Taylor (ed), Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional Power: Friendship in Flux, Routledge, UK, 2007.

arrangement than alliances, and tends to be more

fluid.2

Since Indonesia gained independence in 1945, US

involvement has been steady. In that decade, the

Dutch still wanted to keep Indonesia as its colony and

even attacked twice, in 1947 and 1948. In 1947, the

US was assigned as head of the UN Commission on

the issue of Indonesia. The US played an important

role in mediating the conflict between the Dutch and

the Republic of Indonesia, especially in instituting a

historic cease fire called the Renville agreement

aboard the warship USS Renville. The Dutch launched

a second attack against Indonesia in December 1948,

but in doing so earned the disapproval of the US and

several other countries. Eventually, the US

successfully pressured the Dutch to give up their claim.

A second historic role played by the US in Indonesia’s

history was during the internal political struggle

between the Indonesian elite and the military in the

mid-1960s. An allegedly pro-communist military

takeover failed to materialize, and ultimately there was

a coup by the pro-western military. The military pushed

out the members of PKI throughout the country and

paved the way for a western-leaning army general

named Suharto to rise to power. Throughout his

tenure, President Suharto reestablished good relations

with western countries, especially the US, and cut all

diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China.

The change in international politics around the end of

cold war deeply affected Indonesia. The strategic

environment had shifted from communist containment

to democratic transition in Eastern Europe and some parts of Asia. It also affected US-Indonesia relations

after Indonesian students toppled the autocratic regime

of Suharto in 1998. His successor, Habibie, took the

helm and considered improving Indonesia’s relations

2 Page 15, ibid.

Program Manager and Researcher at

LESPERSSI based in Jakarta Beni Sukadis The Indonesian Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Indonesia Email: bsukadis@gmail.com

37

with western countries. Habibie’s government allowed

an East Timor referendum in 1999, leading to chaos

after the result was announced. The Indonesian

military was under pressure by the US and other

western countries over its gross mishandling of East

Timor issues. Mostly because of this mishandling, the

US had placed a total military embargo on Indonesia.

The arms embargo affected the capability of the

Indonesian armed forces to maintain its equipment.

The US also froze its military aid and other training

exercises in Indonesia. That embargo had an

enormous impact to the Indonesian military

modernization effort. However, when a massive

tsunami swept through Indonesia's Aceh province

killing more than 200,000 people, the US military was

one of the first military contingents to arrive in the ill-

fated province to provide humanitarian aid and relief.

Since then, bilateral relations between the two

countries have gradually improved, leading the US to

lift the military embargo in 2005.

The Common Strategic Interests of the US and Indonesia.

Indonesia is situated in archipelago that stretches from

the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. There are at

least three significant choke points and sea lanes that

provide commercial safe passage across the

archipelago. One of the important sea lanes is the

Mallaca Strait, the main route for ships sailing from the

Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and vice versa.

The Malacca Strait is sailed by 63,000 ships each

year, making it one of the most important shipping

lanes in Asia Pacific. Daily shipments of natural

resources and commodities from Europe and the

middle east to China, Japan, and the US pass through

this sea lane. However, there has been a growing

concern over the rising incidence of maritime piracy in

the Strait and its surrounding areas from the late 1990s

until 2002.

Given Indonesia's archipelagic situation, it has a

pivotal role in ensuring the security and stability of

these sea lanes (see Map 1 below). Indonesia has the

incentive to guard this maritime region because it relies

on these sea lanes for its import and export activities.

Indonesia is also home to the largest Muslim

population in the world. The 2002 Bali bombing was a

wake up call to the US that Indonesia had become the

second front in the war against terror, a label given by

President George W. Bush. Since the Bali bombing,

cooperation between the two countries has improved

considerably. Indonesia needed modern equipment to

improve its counterterrorism intelligence and

surveillance activities. It also participated in many

counterterrorism programs and actions led by the UN

and other nations.

The US has various investments in Indonesia, such oil

and gas explorations in several Indonesian provinces,

as well as the biggest gold and copper exploration in

Papua province. Its economic interests in Indonesia

are not new, although its mutual export and import is

small compare to other nations such Japan and

Australia.

Map 1. Indonesia Sea Lanes (ALKI)3

The US has a stake in Indonesia’s ability to

demonstrate its leadership among southeast Asian

3 http://rovicky.wordpress.com/2010/09/02/ingat-13-desember-hari-deklarasi-djoeanda/

38

nations. One indicator of this was President Obama's

policy pivot to Asia, where he stated that the Asia

Pacific region is the top priority of the US in its security

policy (ABC news, 2011). He has said many times that

peaceful resolution is preferable in any dispute, but

another reality in Asia Pacific is that it is a hotspot

region, with the North Korea nuclear quagmire, China-

Japan island disputes, and South China Sea (SCS)

disputes. The US emphasized its diplomatic policy

when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that she

supported a collaborative effort to solve South China

Sea disputes. She proactively lobbied to have such

disputes dealt with through multilateral solutions

(Washington Post, 2010). Thus, the Obama

administration encouraged the Indonesian government

to be a leader in mediating South China Sea disputes.

Indonesia's role in ASEAN is considered to be

important by other regional powers such as Japan and

Australia, US allies. Indonesia demonstrated its

leadership when its Minister of Foreign Affairs

conducted diplomacy after the failed communiqué on

July 2012 in the ASEAN meeting.

The relationship between the US and Indonesia is

currently at its best, according to the current

Indonesian Ambassador to the US, Dino PatiDjalal. It

is supposedly because the two nations share the same

interest – to advance a mutual relationship for the

welfare and benefit of the two nations – and also

because both share a belief in the importance of peace

and security in the regions of Southeast Asia and East

Asia.

The Opportunity of Defense Relations

From 1967 until 2010, Indonesia’s government has

sent over 5,000 military officers and many civilians to

various US institutions for education and training

purposes. It is only natural, since the US is home to

some of the best institutions for civil and military

education in the world. After the 9/11 attacks, the US

started to talk to Indonesia’s defense establishment,

leading to the annual Indonesian-US Security Dialogue

(IUSSD), which began in 2002 and continued through

this year. This forum has given an opportunity for the

two nations to talk to each other in casual and frank

manner. It also led to the establishment of the US-

Indonesia Bilateral Defense Dialogue since 2004.

This dialogue become an “icebreaker” forum to repair

broken intra-military relations following the East Timor

incident in 1999. Indonesia has participated in a wide

range of cooperative projects with the US, welcomes

the opportunities they provide. One of the highlights of

defense relations was when officials of the two

countries signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement

(DCA) in 2010, which opened the path to increased

military cooperation. For example, in 2012 there were

more than 200 joint military activities of the US and

Indonesia. It looks like the relationship has improved

and reached its most productive level since 1999.

There are a number of activities connecting the two

militaries, such as official visits, trainings, exercises,

and modernization. The technical cooperation

addresses a number of issues, i.e.; maritime security,

counterterrorism, military assistance programs,

peacekeeping operations, and also military operations

unrelated to war (disaster/humanitarian relief). Box 1

below contains a brief on Indonesia-US defense

relations in 2012.

As for maritime security, the US has donated a number

of radar installations named the Integrated Maritime

Surveillance System (IMSS). This contribution has

helped the Indonesian military protect its maritime

boundary from any sea-borne threats. As former US

defense Attaché in Jakarta John Haseman said, the

partnership has strengthened the safety of navigation

through Indonesian waters and also reduced the piracy

threat in the region. On the Indonesian side, it helped

the Indonesian government’s efforts to secure its

39

Economic Exclusive Zone and protect its fisheries

industry from illegal fishing coming from China,

Malaysia and Vietnam.

In military assistance, the US has contributed around

$80 million over several years to Indonesia. Annually, it

disburses $20-$30 million in training and peacekeeping

programs. According to John Haseman, the figure was

fairly modest, but it helped Indonesia transform its

Armed Forces into a professional military. In 2010, the

US committed $3.3 million for Indonesia’s first

peacekeeping center in Bogor, just south of Jakarta. It

was scheduled to be fully operational in 2013. The

peacekeeping center would be the largest of its kind in

Asia Pacific, covering more than 200,000 hectares of

land. This ambitious project is aimed at sustaining

Indonesia’s continued contributions to world peace

through its peacekeeping forces. The project utilized

funds from the Global Peace Operation Initiative

(GPOI) set up by the Bush administration. Previously,

the fund was also used to pay for the vehicles of

Indonesian peacekeepers in Lebanon (John Haseman,

2010).

Besides that, US military assistance also provided the

opportunity to modernize the Indonesian Armed

Forces. The US has pledged to provide Indonesia with

its used military equipment. in 2011, the Indonesian

parliament gave its approval to accept two squadrons

of used F-16 jetfighters from the US. This grant drew

strong public criticism throughout the country,

especially when the grant of the used fighters with

revealed to cost as much as buying new ones, since

the used ones needed refurbishing and upgrading in

order to extend their service age and bring their

capability up to date. The grant was not without strings

attached either: there were some requirements for

Indonesia to agree to in order to accept it. Another

thing needed by the Indonesian military was air

transport capability, as the Indonesian Air Force

needed to improve the readiness of its C130 transport

planes. Since the embargo was lifted, Indonesia was

given chance to send its C130s to be upgraded in the

US.

One of the points of cooperation is defense equipment

sales to Indonesia, namely the Foreign Military Sales

(FMS) program. The US Department of Defense has

notified Congress that Indonesia is interested in buying

AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. This is a sign of

significant progress in the defense relations of the two

nations. Indonesia has to fulfill its the “Minimum Essential

Forces” program to build its defense posture in order to

modernize the Armed Forces and turn it into a

professional military.

Box 1. Brief Explanation on US - Indonesia Defense Cooperation

US-Indonesia Defense Cooperation The U.S. is granting 30 Excess Defense Articles F-16s to Indonesia, with Indonesia refurbishing them with money from the national budget. This is a landmark case of defense cooperation.

The U.S. is procuring $2.2 million worth of heavy construction equipment, to enhance the training capacity at the newly-formed Indonesian Peacekeeping Center.

A humanitarian relief joint exercise with the U.S., Indonesia and other countries in the region is scheduled to take place in November 2012. This exercise will add to the more than 170 bilateral mil-to-mil engagements each year between the U.S. and Indonesia.

U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds are used to foster professionalism and technical expertise in the Indonesian military, while expanding overall operational capability.

Sources: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197277.htm

Training exercises are a useful tool in trying to make

the Indonesian military more professional. Its armed

forces have been involved in many joint military

exercises, especially as part of elite forces like

Indonesia Naval Frog Command (Kopaska) with US

Navy SEALs, and Indonesian Kopassus with US Army

Special Forces. Indonesia joined multilateral joint

exercises such as the Cobra Exercise in Thailand for

40

several years. The US also takes part in joint marine

exercise called Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO)

in the Madura strait. All of these certainly give a strong

boost to the perception of the Indonesian military

abroad. Another point of cooperation is the assistance

of US Defense in Indonesia Defense University’s

curriculum.

The Challenges of Defense Relations

Since 2010, the US military has established a limited

cooperation with Indonesia's Special Forces Command

(Kopassus, infamous for kidnappings and tortures in

late 90s). They were involved in counterterrorism

exercises which were kept undisclosed to the public

due to both the sensitivity of the training and the

negative association with Kopassus because of its past

reputation. The US silently and strictly investigates

Kopassus officers who have tarnished human rights

records before allowing or barring them from

participating in training on US soil. On the Indonesian

side, of course, being denied participation in ongoing

or future cooperation between two nations is a source

of shame. Thus, it could pose an awkward situation for

military officials.

From a tactical and operational point of view, training

and exercises are useful for the army, navy and air

force of Indonesia. But beyond that, as mentioned in a

previous paragraph, there are very few Indonesian

civilian defense workers who have been educated in

US institutions. This could be analyzed from two

perspectives. Perhaps there is not enough civilian

expertise in the Indonesian Department of Defense, or

maybe there is no coherent policy from the American

government to include them in trainings in the US.

Sending more civil servants and civilian specialists

abroad is necessary to balance the military’s

dominance in the Indonesian Defense Department.

Currently, out of five Director Generals in the

Department of Defense, only one is a civilian. This is

not to undermine the military officers in Defense, but a

matter of trying to balance their presence with civilian

expertise in the inner circle of the Department. If it is

not feasible to send civil servants or civilian specialists,

a possible alternative should be looked into. Sending

civilian experts or specialists to a number of defense

institution in the US, such as Army War college, Naval

War College, National Defense University, etc. would

be a very viable alternative.

As far as this author is aware, there are only a few

civilian experts outside of the government that have

had training in the US, especially in specialized

trainings and short courses or even a US defense

university. Civilian expertise is critical in ensuring

military accountability, transparency, and oversight in

order to achieve democratic governance of the armed

forces. Only when Indonesia has a critical mass of

civilians who are experts in military affairs can the

balance necessary for good, sustainable, and

accountable national defense policies be achieved.

One of the challenges that must be stated here is to

how enhance mutual trust between the two countries.

John Haseman observes that the two nations should

deal with each other on the basis of mutual trust and

good will. Otherwise, all the fruits of cooperation will

not be productive enough to get the expected

outcome. The two nations must work together on an

unprecedented level, and of course their long-term

relations will be judged by the success they have in

dealing with common interests.

The Impact of Defense Relations on Region Security

Improving defense relations since 2005 have had a

major impact on the stability of the region, especially in

the Mallaca strait. Cooperation has reduced piracy in

that area and of course deterred terrorism, notably in

2010. The joint military exercise in maritime security

41

and other issues also gives an impression that the

Indonesian military is ready to cooperate with other

countries in the region. Over time, with the

modernization of military equipment, Indonesia will be

able to secure its maritime regions. The question

remains whether the Indonesian military will feel safe

in choosing American defense equipment.

The current Indonesian military preoccupation with its

peacekeeping center will certainly distract it somewhat

from its past role as the guardian of the state. At the

same time, though, it will boost Indonesian military

performance and capability in any stabilization

operation dealing with international conflict around the

world requested by the UN. From the 1950s until now,

Indonesia has provided more than 30 contingents for

UN military operations, including in Cambodia and the

Philippines. From this standpoint, Indonesia plays a

crucial role in UN peacekeeping forces.

I fully agree with Abraham Denmark of the Center for

New American Security: Indonesia will play a pivotal

role in determining the future of regional institutions,

shaping the region’s balance of power, and ensuring

America's continued presence both in Southeast Asia

and the broader Asia Pacific region. As a rising

democracy, it can and will play significant role in the

Asia Pacific, maintaining security into the future with

diplomacy as well as military means.

Conclusion

Based the explanation above, there are still more

opportunities to be taken by both Indonesia and the US

in defense relations. There are plenty of other

opportunities for cooperation in defense matters,

particularly in educating and sending more civilians to

defense institutions in the US. These trainings will lead

to even wider acceptance of American education and

values among civilian counterparts which can be a

balance within the Indonesian Defense establishment.

In term of regional stability, US defense assistance

allows Indonesia to maintain regional security and

protect its territory from nontraditional threats, and as

for global security, the Indonesian military can

contribute more troops for UN operations.

In other words, I would like to quote the conclusion of

Abraham Denmark: "Building stronger partnership with

Indonesia will require significant investments in short

term in order to bring mostly long-term returns" (2010).

Here he means not only financial investment, but

investment of human capital through education,

training building connections to the right people

(civilian and military) in Indonesia.

As mentioned above, the stronger Indonesia is in the

diplomatic and military arena, the better for regional

stability. But defense relations can be enhanced

through various means. It is in the hands of both

nations to choose the right path to deeper and more

expansive relations. The US will gain a long term result

by building more cooperation with the Indonesian

establishment on top of strong current relations. In

particular, it should give more opportunity to civilians to

be trained in US defense education institutions.

REFERENCES

Internet- http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/06/01/US-and-Indonesia-A-growing-military-bond.aspx

http://csis.org/publication/comprehensive-partnership-nudges-us-indonesia-relations-new-levels-cooperation

Paper- John Haseman and Eduardo Lachica; "Rebuilding US and Indonesia Security Relations", Publ. East west Center, Washington DC, 2009.downloaded from,

http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/rebuilding-us-indonesian-security-relationship

Abraham Denmark, Rizal Sukma and Christine Parthemore: "Crafting A Strategic Vision: A New Era of US and Indonesia Relations". CNAS, Washington DC, (June 2010).

Report- Kerjasama Pertahanan Indonesia dan AS (KEmhan RI 2010.)

Sekilas Hasil Hasil INDONESIA – US SECURITY DIALOGUE (IUSSD), 2010.

Book Brendan Taylor

42

43

Lifting U.S. Arms Sales Embargo on Vietnam –

A Trust-Building Proposal

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations

between Vietnam and the U.S. in July 1995, bilateral

relations have increasingly become more cooperative

and broad-based. Political relations between Vietnam

and the U.S. have been improved, and bilateral

economic ties have been flourished. However, the

military-to-military relations between the two countries

are still considered minimal. The major obstacle to the

development of military relations between Vietnam

and the U.S. is the lack of mutual trust, especially

regarding the fact that the U.S. has insisted on

imposing an arms sales embargo on Vietnam.

The embargo against Vietnam is the result of an

executive order made pursuant to the Arms Export

Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in

Arms Regulations (ITAR). In 1984, the U.S. State

Department implemented a policy that denied all

licenses and other approvals with respect to defense

articles and defense services originating or destined to

Vietnam, and prohibited Vietnamese vessels, aircraft,

or other means of conveyance from taking any part in

the shipment of defense articles. In April 2007, the

U.S. amended its policy toward Vietnam to consider

licenses on a case-by-case basis for non-lethal

defense articles and defense services, and for non-

lethal safety-of-use defense articles for lethal items,

such as cartridge actuated devices, propellant

actuated devices, and technical manuals for military

aircraft that enhance the safety of aircraft crew.

During the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon

Panetta to Vietnam in June 2012, Vietnamese

Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh

expressed the hope that the U.S. would soon lift

restrictions on the sale of lethal weapons to Vietnam.

Appearing at a press conference with Secretary

Panetta, Gen. Thanh said the removal of the ban

would benefit both Washington and Hanoi. He

affirmed that lifting the U.S. lethal weapons restrictions

on Vietnam would help to “fully mobilize the

relationship between the two countries” and said that

“Once the lethal weapons restrictions are lifted,

Vietnam has the demand to buy some [items] from the

United States, firstly to repair, to overhaul, the

weapons that are left from the war. After that depends

on the financial capacity and demands of our military –

we will choose to buy certain kinds of weapons for the

process of modernization of our military.”

This paper attempts to answer the question “Why

should the U.S. lift its arms sales restrictions on

Vietnam?”. My argument concludes that it is a matter

of trust-building measures aimed at strengthening the

bilateral relationship between the nations.

As mentioned above, the major obstacle in the way of

Vietnam and the U.S. trying to cement bilateral

relations in general and military-to-military relations in

particular is the lack of mutual trust. Scholars and

policy-makers have long recognized a link between

mutual trust and the development of bilateral relations;

the traditional approach to measuring relationships

assumes that trust is a necessary condition for

Research officer at the Americas

Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Huyen Trang Tran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam E-mail: tran.huyen.trang1610@gmail.com

44

cooperation1. In reality, the improvement of bilateral

relations between Vietnam and the U.S. has occurred

thanks to the steady willingness of both sides to

gradually build mutual trust in every area of their

relations.

The first trust-building effort came from the U.S. side

in 1977, after the Vietnam war, when the Carter

Administration decided to drop its veto of Vietnam’s

application for U.N. membership and drafted a

proposal to establish diplomatic relations between the

two countries. Due to the distrust from both sides on

several sensitive issues, including U.S. POW/MIA

affairs and the humanitarian aid issue, this first effort

was not a success. Subsequently, however, Vietnam

provided information on MIAs as a trust-building

measure, without being prompted by any conditions

attached to U.S.-provided aid. Thanks to the

cooperation of Vietnam on POW/MIA issues, during

the period of 1974-1992, Vietnam returned the

remains of more than 300 Americans2.

After these initial efforts, the two sides conducted

numerous trust-building steps aimed at normalizing

relations. In April 1991, when Vietnam signaled its

willingness to host a U.S. office in Hanoi to handle

POW/MIA affairs, the U.S. proposed a detailed “road

map” for normalization with Vietnam and pledged $1

million for humanitarian aid to Vietnam. Also in 1991,

the U.S. eased travel restrictions both on Vietnamese

diplomats stationed at the United Nations in New York

and on U.S. citizens traveling to Vietnam.

Since then, Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA

matters has improved. Notably, in 1992 Vietnam

allowed U.S. investigators to access sensitive data,

including photographs of extensive Vietnamese

1 Aaron M. Hoffman, ‘A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8, 375-401. 2 Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, The Vietnam-U.S. Normalization Process, Updated June 17, 2005, 3.

archival information on U.S. POW/MIAs, and to

pursue “live sightings” reports. The U.S. pledged, and

subsequently paid out, $3 million in humanitarian aid

(mainly prosthetics and aid to abandoned or orphaned

children) for Vietnam; agreed to restore direct

telecommunications in Vietnam; agreed to allow U.S.

commercial sales to meet basic human needs in

Vietnam; and lifted restrictions on projects in Vietnam

by U.S. nongovernmental organizations. In November

1992, the United States lifted restrictions on U.S.

telephone service to Vietnam, allowing direct service

between the two countries. And in December, the

United States eased some restrictions on U.S.

companies doing business in Vietnam.

In early 1993, the report of the Senate Select

Committee on POW/MIA affairs3, which was

conducted from August 1991 to December 1992,

concluded that there was “no compelling evidence”

that POWs had been alive after the withdrawal of the

U.S. from Vietnam. Along with the cooperation of

Vietnam, the committee’s televised hearings played a

major role in defusing much of the tension surrounding

the POW/MIA issue.

Thanks to efforts from the two sides to improve

bilateral cooperation, especially on POW/MIA affairs,

President Clinton ordered an end to the U.S. trade

embargo on Vietnam on February 3, 1994. This is one

of the most significant trust-building measures

conducted by either Vietnam or the U.S. Clinton stated

in his announcement of the normalization of diplomatic

relations with Vietnam on July 11, 1995 that “from the

beginning of this administration, any improvement in

relationships between America and Vietnam has

depended upon making progress on the issue of

Americans who were missing in action or held as

prisoners of war”. He noted the success of his

decision to lift the trade embargo on Vietnam in

3 Chaired by John Kerry and vice-chaired by Bob Smith.

45

response to its cooperation with the U.S. efforts to

secure the remains of lost Americans and to

determine the fate of those whose remains had not

been found.

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations, the

bilateral relationship between Vietnam and the U.S.

has improved dramatically in all areas. The two

countries have exchanged numerous high level

political and diplomatic visits. Economic ties are the

most fully developed aspect of the bilateral

relationship; since the mid-2000s, the United States

has been Vietnam’s largest export market, to the point

where in 2010, exports to the United States

represented about 18% of Vietnam’s total exports.

According to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi, in 2009 U.S.

firms were Vietnam’s largest source of foreign

investment.

Military-to-military ties, however, remain the least

developed aspect of the relations even though in the

late 2000s, the United States and Vietnam began

significantly upgrading their military relationship.

Given the flourishing bilateral relations between the

two countries in other areas, it can be concluded that

a major obstacle to the development of military-to-

military relations is suspicion and lack of trust from

both sides. On the U.S. side, as mentioned in the

visits of Defense Secretary Panetta in June 2012 and

Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman in

January 2012, the weapons embargo will stay in place

until Vietnam improves its human-rights record.

However, in recent years human rights have been

addressed successfully by Vietnamese authorities.

Vietnam is not on the list of eight countries (Burma,

China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia,

Sudan, Uzbekistan) of particular concern released by

the U.S. State Department4. Moreover, the UN special

4 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/c13281.htm

rapporteur on human rights and extreme poverty

issued a broadly positive report after visiting Vietnam

in 20125.

In order to strengthen bilateral relations between

Vietnam and the U.S. to the fullest extent possible, the

two sides must devote political energy to overcoming

this barrier. Lifting the arms embargo on Vietnam

would express the willingness of the U.S. to build

deeper trust with their former foe on the basis of

mutual interest.

5http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-vietnam

46

POLITICAL ISLAM

47

Challenges Posed by the Ideological Aspect of Islamic Terrorism in South

Asia in a Post-Hegemonic World

Introduction: The current ‘global terrorism’ led by

Muslim militants is a complicated and multifaceted

issue with a multitude of strategic, ideological,

religious, economic, political and social aspects. To

understand this phenomenon, it must be understood

and analyzed in the context of of all these aspects.

However, hardly any of the national and international

powers and institutions seem to consider all these

dimensions in one combined strategy. Instead, it is

evident that the problem is analyzed mostly on the

basis of strategic and political aspects alone, which

further complicates the issue. This essay intends to

shed a light on the most significant, though mostly

ignored, aspect: the ideological aspect of “Islamic

Militancy”. The question is: what exactly is the ideology

of the Muslim militants?

The Ideology of Establishing an Islamic State:

Abul A’la Mawdudi was a South Asian Muslim scholar

known as the founding father of modern Islamic

fundamentalism. He was the first to propose that it is

the obligation of every Muslim to struggle for the

establishment of an Islamic state. His political ideology

based on this principle was adapted by another, the

Egyptian fundamentalist Syed Qutab, who is

considered the founder of global Islamic militancy,

spearheaded by Al-Qaeda today.

To understand the present Muslim militancy, one must

thoroughly look at Mawdudi’s writings. His teachings

are centered on the idea of the revival of Islam. The

political ideology of revival was used to counter the

western imperialism and expansionism of the British

colonialists. His understanding of Islam and

particularly of Jihad revolves around the sole objective

of the establishment of an Islamic system. To defy the

western imperialist designs, the idea of establishing an

Islamic system was considered a solution and Jihad its

instrument. Mawdudi’s brand of Jihad, however,

mandates not only the establishment of an Islamic

state but that such a state must expand its ideology to

the rest of the world. Most of the Jihadi literature of the

19th, 20th and 21st century is a reaction to western

imperialism. The armed struggle against western

imperialism is colored in terms of religion, which is an

effective method for mass mobilization.

Modern militant Islam mostly receives its ideological

support from the last century’s literature. Followers of

Mawdudi’s ideology of a struggle for an Islamic state

were not satisfied with the creation of Muslim states in

the mid-20th century. Instead, his followers kept

struggling for a more pure and righteous Islamic state.

It is pertinent to mention that though both Mawdudi

and Qutab reject secularism, nationalism and western

democracy, but Mawdudi believed in change through

political negotiation and the establishment of an

Islamic democracy, while Qutab totally rejected

democracy. Consequently, Qutab’s followers adopted

violent means for change.

Since the 1970s, Jumat-a-Islami, a party founded on

Mwududi’s principles, has frequently been defeated in

Social Sciences Professor with special focus on International Relations and

Development Studies Muhammad Sikandar Khan Institute of Management Sciences, Pakistan E-mail: sikandartangi@yahoo.com

48

elections, and has failed to constrain its followers and

workers against participation in militant activities. The

best example of their active involvement is the first

Afghan war and Kashmir insurgency. Currently, the

direct militant involvement of Jumat-a-Islami in

Afghanistan and Pakistan has waned, but the

ideological support for the cause of Muslim militants

within the party remains strong. Meanwhile, the defeat

of Soviet Union in Afghanistan gave the Mujahideens

(Muslim fighters against the Soviet Union’s occupation)

the impression that they can fight any superpower and

win. The fall of Kabul in September 1996 to the Taliban

emboldened Islamists from all over the world to claim

their first true Islamic government. The Islamists’ first

government further encouraged them to spread their

messianic mission of a puritan Islamic government to

every Islamic country, and throughout the world.

The Transition of Political Islam to Militant Islam in South Asia:

The religio-political parties in South Asia more or less

stand on the same ideological foundation: the

establishment of an Islamic order. But the means by

which they implement their agenda is different than the

militant groups. The religio-political parties believe in

democracy, while militant groups believe democracy is

a western idea and that armed resistance is the only

effective option.

In the case of South Asia, the religious ideology of

Mwududi was in favor in the late 70s, primarily due to

three factors: Zia’s Islamization policies (1977), the

Iranian Revolution (1979), and the Afghan War (1979).

These also inspired militant Islam’s grip on Pakistan

and Afghanistan.

A fourth factor which has emerged since is the “war on

terror,” which has further inflamed Islamic militancy. It

is believed that these events have fostered the

creation of modern militant Islam, side by side with

Political Islam, and made it the field of activity for many

Islamists. During the 1979 Afghan War, western

propaganda machines, along with Saudi petro-dollars

and Pakistani intelligence, created the militants and

strongly promoted their militant ideology to defeat the

Soviet Union. Little did they know, they also created a

Frankenstein’s monster. These actors could reverse

the effect of Islamic fundamentalist ideology in the

present, but for that they must take all the different

aspects mentioned above into account, set their own

agendas aside, and focus on mutual agreement. It is

obvious from the present policies that each external

actor in Afghanistan is trying to bypass the others and

pursue its own agenda. This approach only

strengthens the militants, and shows the disagreement

among the coalition forces and lack of one common

policy.

Why is America hated?

The militants’ perspective about the West, and that of

the Muslim public, is based on the perception that the

West is the root cause of every problem in the globe,

and America is the symbol of the West. Mawdudi and

Qutab’s ideologies are both a reaction to European

colonial rule. Even after gaining independence, the

Islamists and democratic forces were kept from ruling

and soon authoritarian regimes took control of the

newly independent countries. The Islamists found little

difference between the new rulers and the old colonial

masters. In this post-colonial era, America has

replaced Europe as a new imperial power, with the

new authoritarian rulers acting as collaborators with

the U.S. The whole new development was seen by the

Islamists as a conspiracy against the newly

independent Islamic states, which prompted them to

turn angrily against both the authoritarian regimes (the

lesser evil) and their patron, America (the greater evil).

On another front, the Palestinian issue, which had

been a challenge the world over since the beginning of

the past century, took its worst turn in 1947 with the

creation of the state of Israel – facilitated

49

unconditionally by America. Soon, it became the

biggest root cause of hatred toward America. Mawdudi

and Qutab did not believe in Nationalism and

Secularism, and therefore, to their adherents the

Palestinian-Israeli issue is linked with every Muslim

militant struggle as not only a Palestinian and Arab

cause but a cause for the whole Islamic world.

Pakistan’s and many other Muslim countries’ refusal to

recognize Israel is one example of the

internationalization of the Palestinian cause and how it

is interpreted as a religious and spiritual issue rather

than a regional dispute over a piece of land.

On certain occasions America may have supported the

Muslim cause, particularly in the case of Bosnia and

Albania, but America’s involvement in those conflicts is

little remembered in the Muslim world, and perception

matters as much as a fact. This is what we can

understand from the narration mentioned in the book

"Faith at War: A Journey on the Frontlines of Islam,

from Baghdad to Timbuktu (2006)" by a Wall Street

Journal correspondent Yaroslav Trofimov. The book

provides first-hand perspectives of the relationship

between Islam and conflict, both inside and outside the

Middle East. It includes case studies on Iraq, Mali,

southern Thailand and Bangladesh. Yaroslav relates

an anecdote:

“One of the most enlightening conversations I

had in Saudi Arabia was with one local

academic, who put forward a statistic that is

often quoted in public debate. He said, "Look

back. In the 1970s, a barrel of oil cost 20-

something dollars, and the cars we were

buying from America cost $1,000. Well, now,

oil is not $25 a barrel; it's $50 a barrel, and the

cars that we buy from America cost $20,000.

We are being robbed. And this feeling (an

economist may disagree with this of course,

but perceptions are just as important as

reality) and this perception that day-to-day

poverty in countries such as Saudi Arabia is

caused by Western political pressure, by

Western attempts to control their countries,

are very real. It is this perception that has

been fueling radicalism”.

The after effect of the September 11 terror attack in

the form of American retaliation against Al-Qaeda in

Afghanistan and Iraq increased the hatred many

Muslims feel toward America and the West in an

unprecedented way. Noted scholar Akbar S. Ahmed

comments:

“The intensity is extremely high, perhaps the

highest levels of anti-Americanism and anti-

Semitism I have ever seen…The negative

feeling in the Muslim world against Americans

and Jewish people is very acute. People are

extremely upset about several things: the

ongoing crisis, as they see it, in the Muslim

world, the crisis around the Palestinian-Israeli

crisis and the U.S. invasion of Iraq and

Afghanistan. At the same time, they see an

attack on Islam in the Western media, ridicule

of the Prophet Muhammad and calling him a

terrorist. People in the Muslim world really

believe that Islam is under attack”.

Mr. Ahmed also highlights the importance of

understanding the power of ideology. In an interview

about his book Islam Under Siege (2003) he says:

“It tells us that analysts of the West still think

in terms of poverty as a factor in violent

action. You look at the world through your own

cultural context. In the United States, people

talk about certain ethnic groups, and they

claim these groups are more likely to be

inclined toward crime. Then they impose this

supposition on the Muslim world. It isn't the

case at all. In Islam Under Siege, I argue that

50

notions of honor and revenge -- almost tribal

traditions of taking revenge and redeeming

honor -- are driving a lot of these young

men… Many of them are educated and well

off. Bin Laden is the classic example -- a

multi-millionaire, who could have lived a very

comfortable life. But he is living in the caves

somewhere, hiding, and leading, by all

accounts, a very nomadic existence. Why is

he doing this? Why are these young men

blowing themselves up? Something is driving

them that is beyond economic factors.

The irony is that despite the number and strength of

the states who oppose Al-Qaeda and the Taliban,

these non-state actors have organized and become

more powerful, and the hatred of the west, particularly

America, is growing day by day. This makes

understanding the power of their ideology all the more

urgent.

What should America do?

Though Obama’s National Security Strategy is

different than the Bush administration’s, and it did

include some positive points, it still lacks engagement

and dialogue with the Islamic world. The Obama

administration changed the phrase “Islamic terrorism”

to only terrorism, and the administration’s strategy

documents refer to Al Qaeda and its affiliates as the

enemy, rather than terrorists. Terror, administration

officials say, is a state of mind and a tactic, not an

enemy.

This change in language, although it depicts a positive

change and a new approach to global terrorism,

seems more rhetoric than reality, and not much

different in its essence than the previous policies. The

lines “The United States must reserve the right to act

unilaterally” and “We must maintain our military's

conventional superiority” appear in President Obama’s

just-released National Security Strategy and cover

letter, which looks no different than the previous

strategy of Bush.

America must realize that the issue of terrorism is a

global one. It cannot be resolved by one country with

unilateral approach. It needs a comprehensive strategy

which should look at all different dimensions, and all

the major actors must be on one page. Different

policies by different actors will counter allies rather

than terrorists. Lately, the war on terror has become a

war of national governments against their own people

(the insurgents) and the use of force against their

people has made the war more lethal, more prolonged

and more complicated. The international community,

particularly America, Pakistan and Afghanistan, must

focus now on destroying the ideology of Al-Qaeda and

the Taliban rather than killing their adherents.

The masses must be separated from the influence of

the militants. There exists strong tacit support for

militant ideology among the people of Afghanistan and

Pakistan. According to one Pew survey, 94% of

Pakistanis consider themselves Muslims first, rather

than Pakistanis, first which shows the primacy of their

affiliation and attachment to their religion. One can

easily imagine how vulnerable they could be to the

ideology of the militants. Since 9/11, military action has

been the primary action by the coalition forces against

the militants. But we have seen that this approach has

not borne much fruit. The militants must be kept

engaged on all fronts, and in the longer run the best

strategy to counter their influence is to strengthen

democratic intuitions, take traditional religious scholars

(who has tremendous influence on the militants) on

board, reform education systems and create socio-

economic opportunities. Americans spend $750 billion

on their defense budget every year. Recently it was

estimated that the cost of buying and operating 2,443

F-35 Joint Strike Fighters is $1.3 trillion. Even one per

cent of that amount spent on countering radical militant

ideology would be beneficial. During the arming of the

51

Mujahedeen against the Soviets, the Americans

funded the radical ideological Jihad and American

universities played a crucial role in printing Jihadi

literature. They must now fund this counter ideology in

order to fight the global menace of terrorism, especially

in Pakistan.

Conclusion:

The future of Islamic militancy is strong, it will grow

more and will spread to many places. Recent polls in

Islamic countries show a trend of growing support for

the religious parties. According to Akbar S. Ahmed:

“If America continues what it is doing now,

then the success of the religious party is

guaranteed, because the blunders being

made by the United States in its foreign policy

ensure the emergence and consolidation of

the exclusivist groups. The continuation of

grievances in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan

and now Lebanon expands the breeding

ground for terrorists to recruit more people to

their cause. This would be at great cost to

Islam because it is ultimately a religion of

balance and compassion. But all this is now

being affected by the men of violence and

emotion”.

There are many changes which the world powers,

particularly America, must adopt. America may be a

super power, and its policies may affect the globe, but

according to Ziauddin Sardar it is a “knowledgeable

ignorant” country where the people hardly take any

interest in their country’s foreign policy or

understanding the Muslim world’s point of view.

According to the Paris-based International Herald

Tribune, 58 percent of non-US respondents felt that

Washington’s policies were a “major cause” of

resentment and anger against the United States. In

contrast, only 18 percent of U.S. respondents blamed

their government’s policies.

America must seriously start dialogue with the Muslim

world. America should come out from its ivory tower

and shun the policy of coercion, instead initiating a

policy of cooperation with Muslims to counter the

influence of the minority militant groups. Ideology is

one of those aspects which must be realized and

analyzed properly. Terrorism becomes a force when

ideological motivation meets with operational

capabilities. Tribal society, rough terrain, socio-

economic issues, illiteracy, and authoritarianism made

these societies more prone to militancy and religiosity.

If the stakeholders in the global war on terror,

particularly America, fail to understand the significance

of the power of ideology and don’t counter the militant

ideology, then we can expect a violent and chaotic 21st

century.

References: Akbar, S. Ahmed, “The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life” <http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Five-Years-After-911-Dialogue-with-Islam-Cause-for-Hope.aspx> Sardar, Ziauddin & Davies, Merrly Wy (2002) Why Do People Hate America? Icon Books, UK. Trofimo, Yaroslav (2006) "Faith at War: A Journey on the Frontlines of Islam, from Baghdad to Timbuktu," Henery Holt and Co, America. <http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Faith-at-War-Reports-from-the-Islamic-World.aspx>

52

Ethnic Tensions in Afghanistan after International Troop Withdrawal

There are many different ethnic groups living in

Afghanistan. Most of the population consists of four

main ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and

Uzbek. There has not been any official census

recording the percentage of the population belonging

to each ethnic group, but there are some numbers that

scholars use to estimate the formation of the

population. For example an approximate distribution of

ethnic groups based on the CIA World Factbook is

Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%,

Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, and other 4%.

What will future ethnic tensions in Afghanistan look like

beyond 2014? This paper tries to answer that

question. It is a pressing one – Afghanistan is a

country that has experienced ethnic conflicts

throughout its history, expecially during past decades.

Historical view:

In 1747, modern Afghanistan was established by

Ahmad Shah Durrani, a Pashtun tribal leader who

defeated Iranian forces and named his conquered

territory Afghanistan. From that time, the Pashtun

ethnic group has held political power and has tried to

exclude other groups from the politics and decision-

making of the country. The other groups have faced

discrimination, especially the Hazara ethnic group,

because they are not only ethnically different but also

religiously different from other groups. All other groups

are Sunni Muslims but most Hazara people are Shia.

In 1880, when King of Afghanistan Abdul Rahman

Khan wanted to centralize the country and limit the

autonomy of the territorial leaders, he announced a

war against other ethnic groups. He also used tensions

caused by religious differences as a tool to get more

support from Sunni Pashtun tribes. Khan asked the

country’s religious leader to announce that the Hazara

people were infidels, and to declare the conflict a holy

war, making killing Hazara and looting their property a

religious practice.

King Khan conquered the territory of the Hazara

people, killed most of the men, sold the women and

children into slavery, and relocated most of them into

areas of the country with the harshest climates. From

that time on, Hazaras faced deliberate discrimination

from all parts of the society, while other groups, like

the Tajiks and the Uzbeks, ignored them in the political

sphere.

Invasion by the Soviet Union: When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979,

all ethnic groups participated in the resistance against

the invasion of their country. But the occupation gave a

new set of expectations to many in the country,

especially minority groups like Uzbeks and Hazaras,

that persisted even when the Soviet occupation was

undone. While under communist government, these

once-ignored people found some areas to participate.

For example, they found government facilities open to

them for the first time.

General Abdur Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek militiaman,

played an important role in helping Najibulla, a

president installed by the Soviet Union as head of the

Instructor of Politics and International

Relations at Ibne Sina Institute of Higher Education

Zakiah Mirzaei Ibne Sina, Afghanistan E-mail: zakiah.mirzaei@gmail.com

53

communist government in Kabul. But he also played a

great role in the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992.

Mojahideen Era:

When Mojahideen came to Kabul, they did not reach

an agreement to share power, because Pashtun

leaders did not accept the change. They wanted to

keep total power in their hands as before, but Tajiks

and other minorities wanted to have some influence in

the direction and the future of the country.

Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik leader, became the

president in 1992, giving many Tajiks hope for their

future, but he first agreed to transfer the power to an

elected president in 1994, and then refused to keep his

promise, which made the situation complicated and

angered many influential Pashtuns.

During the civil war, all groups used ethnic tensions as

a tool to recruit more troops. In Kabul, the city was

divided by ethnic population, and if a person of a

different ethnicity entered the wrong area he would

certainly be killed by another group.

Rise of the Taliban: The Taliban appeared in 1994 with the military support

of Pakistan and financial backing from Saudi Arabia.

While many people in Afghanistan struggled for day-to-

day survival, the Taliban – the students of Islamic

schools and mostly Pashtuns – gained support from a

wide range people based on the expectation that they

would adhere to the teaching that all Muslims are

equal, and no Muslim is superior to another Muslim. At

first this made the people optimistic about Taliban rule,

but their hopes were not realized. The Taliban had

been trained by extremist teachers with a very narrow

interpretation of what constitutes Islam.

The Taliban tried to revive the old strategy of Abdul

Rahman Khan and kill Hazaras for being Shia

Muslims, ethnically different from the most of the Sunni

majority and resistant to their rules. They played a role

in increasing ethnic tension in Afghanistan because

they harassed and massacred more than 4,000

Hazaras and Uzbeks for ethnic reasons.

After the Taliban:

The Taliban collapsed before the Northern Alliance,

the strongest front of resistance, along with

international forces led by the US.

The Northern Alliance was created by Ahmad Shah

Massoud, Abdul Rashid Dostum and Abdul Karim

Khalili in 1996 after the Taliban seized Kabul. Three

ethnic groups, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, were

united in this resistance movement. The Northern

Alliance got support from Iran, Russia and India.

Massoud, the Tajik leader, was the military

commander of the Northern Alliance.

In the Bonn Conference, the Northern Alliance had a

strong influence, but the US diplomatic team and the

UN envoy tried to balance the conference by inviting

representatives of almost every faction in Afghanistan.

Finally, they agreed on Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun

leader, to become the president.

But the Northern Alliance, especially the Tajiks, were

in the main ministries – the Ministry of foreign Affairs,

the Ministry of Interior and other key positions.

Pashtuns were divided at that time. Hamid Karzai was

not their best option, but there was no other person

who could get support from the other participants in

Bonn Conference.

Hamid Karzai administration and ethnic issues:

When he became the president of Afghanistan, Karzai

needed to gain support and legitimacy among the

Pashtun people, too. There were several factors that

pushed the new president to struggle to satisfy his

Pashtun fellows.

Conclusion:

Pashtuns are not happy with the current situation

because their long-standing grasp on power has been

challenged. The other groups, with the assistance of

54

the international community and especially the United

States, now share political power in the country.

The Pashtun dominated regions face more attacks by

NATO and ISAF forces because Taliban are mostly

found there. Of all the ethnic groups, the Pashtuns are

most unhappy with the international forces.

It is likely that after 2014, when international forces

leave Afghanistan, Pashtuns, with the assistance of

new Taliban and Pakistan, will try regain control. The

other groups may get support from other influential

countries and start to resist, and once again

Afghanistan may find itself in a civil war divided by

ethnic lines.

55

The Syrian Crisis: A Test for the U.S.-Turkish ‘Model’ Partnership?

The Syrian crisis, which started in 2011 with anti-

government protests and transformed into a full-scale

civil war, poses a major security problem for

neighboring Turkey. U.S. interests are at stake too,

since the whole Middle Eastern security architecture,

imperfect as it is, is jeopardized by the war. Syria was

always a test case for Turkish-U.S. relations. Given the

failure of attempts to pass a UN Security Council

resolution on Syria, and the support Bashar Assad’s

regime has received from Russia, Iran, Iraqi Shiite

militias and Lebanese Hezbollah, securing Turkish

support for a crisis management efforts was a crucial

achievement for Washington. Turkey is a key regional

player in the Middle East and its loyalty to the U.S.

cannot be taken for granted.

During the last decade, Turkey and the U.S. had a

range of policy differences, including Turkey’s stance

on the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Russian-Georgian

war in 2008, Iran sanctions, and the crisis in Turkish-

Israeli relations. Earlier, in the 1990s, one of the issues

that marred Turkish-US relations was Syria. At a time

when Ankara had very bad relations with Damascus, it

blamed Washington for being too mild on Syria.

According to Turkey, Syria openly supported the

Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK) – a terrorist

organization operating in Turkey’s southeast.

Under the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP)

“Policy of Zero Problems with our Neighbors,”

implemented in 2002, Turkish rhetoric on Syria has

changed. According to this new policy, Turkey aims to

reduce conflicts with neighbors in order to create

stability and prosperity for itself and its neighborhood.

Since then, relations with Syria have been

considerably de-securitized. From Syria’s perspective,

things improved to the point that they felt they had a

trustworthy partner in the hostile Western-allied camp.

On the Turkish side, Assad's Syria was regarded as a

test case for the viability of the “zero problem policy”.

This often led to uncritical engagement with Assad.

Since 1998, Turkey and Syria have deepened their

military cooperation, created a free-trade area,

introduced visa-free travel, and solved the water rights

issue. Syria changed its stance on the Kurdish issue,

cutting off support for the PKK and expelling PKK

leader Abdullah Ocalan.

After the onset of revolutions in the Middle East – the

so called Arab Spring – the U.S. and Turkey, anxious

about potential instability, nevertheless were united in

praising what they perceived as democratic

transformations of authoritarian regimes. They

condemned the Syrian government’s crackdown on

civil unrest within the country in 2011, and called for

Bashar Assad to step down and allow for a more

representative and democratic government to take

charge of the country. U.S. Secretary of State John

Kerry declared “The United States has had the same

goal as Turkey from the very beginning.” In his words,

the U.S. and Turkey have undertaken individual and

coordinated steps to address the Syrian situation.

Among those he listed were joint attempts to find a

political solution, putting sanctions on Assad’s regime,

Lecturer and Research Fellow at the Center

for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow at the National

Institute for Strategic Studies Maryna Vorotnyuk Odessa Mechnikov National University, Ukraine E-mail: mvorotnyuk@yahoo.com

56

securing the Turkish border with NATO Patriot

missiles, and providing humanitarian aid to refugees

and internally displaced persons. A military solution is

a last-resort measure for both the U.S. and Turkey,

and though former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

stated that the U.S. will “work with Turkey and other

partners to hold the Assad regime accountable,” there

are reasons to believe that a military operation is

regarded as against the interests of both players.

Hence, it is clear that Turkish discourse on Syria has

changed considerably. In certain cases, it stands with

the U.S., and occasionally even surpasses U.S.

rhetoric in the degree of hostility towards the Syrian

government. The explanation for this shift lies in the

essence of Turkish-American relations, the new

character of Turkish security policy and strategic

culture, and, most importantly, changing regional

dynamics.

Turkish-American relations and the Arab Spring

Turkish-U.S. relations have been called a ‘model’

partnership, indicating the highest level of strategic

ties. Obama’s naming of Turkish Prime-Minister R.T.

Erdogan as one of his best friends, and not just

political partner, seems to be a strategic move to

underline the important role Turkey plays for the U.S.

Iraq, Iran, Israel and now Syria are the key areas

where the White House expects support and policy

coordination from Turkey. However, despite the

rhetoric and the enormous significance of bilateral

relations, the history of cooperation between the two

states is full of examples where Turkey did not meet

expectations and acted according to its own agenda

instead of Washington’s. This, together with the

domestic transformations Turkey is currently

undergoing, quite naturally led to the widespread fear

that the west is losing Turkey.

The good news is that these fears are groundless,

since they do not take into account the fact that,

despite Ankara's growing activism and assertiveness,

it cannot act on its own. Even as a significant regional

power, security calculations inevitably limit Turkey’s

maneuvering room.

Part of the explanation lies with the fact that Muslim

but secular Turkey has always been “the Other” in the

Middle East. Due to its NATO membership, its alliance

with the U.S. and Israel (with whom relations were

exemplary until the early 2000s), and a deep-seated

mutual mistrust between Arabs and Turks dating back

to the Ottoman Empire, the truth is that Ankara is not

always a welcome player in the Middle East. The

concept of the “zero problem policy,” eloquently crafted

by A. Davutoglu, then advisor to the Prime Minister

and now Foreign Minister, was catchy enough to

attract attention to Turkey's initiatives in its

neighborhood and earn praise for its benign intentions.

But it was too removed from reality to actually change

regional attitudes overnight. It has ultimately yielded

zero results, in part because Turkey has zero

neighbors without problems. Acknowledging that this

‘curse of geography’ is an independent factor when

explaining the failure of Turkish peace diplomacy is of

paramount importance.

Ironically, the zero problem policy approach was

clearly undermined in theory by the existing principle of

a human-centered Turkish foreign policy. While the

zero problem policy apparently was based on securing

the stability of its neighborhood (particularly with

regard to the Assad regime), the human-centered

foreign policy mandated support of political orders

based on justice, democracy, rule of law and human

rights. And when the “zero problem policy” did not

succeed because of the uncontrollable turmoil the

Arab Spring incited in Turkey's neighborhood, Turkey

had to reclaim the banner of the humanitarian actor

supportive of democratic regime change after the fact.

57

The AKP administration worked to challenge this

seeming contradiction between support of stability

(support of regimes) and promotion of democracy

(support of civil movements). The Turkish Foreign

Minister still characterizes the zero problem policy as

“more relevant than ever” and argues against

criticizing the policy “in a simplistic way, as if it

suggested we would continue to follow this ideal at all

costs and condone regime-inflicted violence on

innocent civilians”. In his words, “When we initiated the

‘zero problem’ policy, it was in no way meant to

suggest that Turkey would pursue a values-free

realpolitik agenda, solely focused on advancing its

economic and security interests”. He described the

challenge that the Arab Spring and, in particular, the

Syrian crisis posed to Turkey in the following way:

“The Arab Spring, thus, presented us all with

difficult decisions. We either could maintain ties

with these oppressive rulers, or we could

support the popular uprisings to secure basic

democratic rights. More significantly, the

uprisings also posed a challenge to the

conceptual foundations of our new foreign

policy, which we had carefully nurtured over the

years. Turkey naturally opted for the second

alternative with regard to Syria, leading many

analysts to argue that we have abandoned the

‘zero problems with neighbors’ policy, or claim

that it had simply failed.”

Ironically, Turkey’s title as the human rights security

power in the Middle East is quite questionable.

Notorious for its harsh dealing with Kurdish and other

minorities, and notwithstanding the significant progress

it made in last decade, Turkey is still a problematic

human rights security actor. The shift of balance in

civil-military relations in favor of the ruling AKP, its

witch hunt against the military and those who seem to

question the democratic nature of its political

monopoly, and continuing breaches of political

freedoms clearly indicate the long journey ahead

before Turkey can be recognized as a country that

considers human rights a strategic imperative of its

development.

So far, the human rights security discourse has mostly

taken place in the foreign policy realm. Turkey was

quite successful in advocating itself as a model of

transformation for the states in the Arab spring.

Moreover, it managed to become an important

humanitarian aid actor, ending the stereotype that it is

purely an aid recipient. It is active in peacekeeping

operations, and it is widely believed that it is the

presence of Turkish soldiers that makes many

peacekeeping missions better received by local

Muslim populations in many parts of the world.

Chance of a military solution in Syria: where is the real 'red line'?

As the civil conflict in Syria has continued, the U.S.

and Turkey have often resorted to rhetoric of certain

“red lines”. Initially, they threatened a serious

punishment for Bashar Assad’s regime, including

direct military intervention in Syria, if he could not meet

the demands of the international community to stop the

bloodshed. Obama referred to the use of chemical

weapons by the Syrian regime as a “game changer”.

Nevertheless, after sarin gas was used in Syria in

March and May 2013, even after the U.S. stated it was

governmental forces which used it against the

opposition, no clear response was formed. Washington

opted for diplomatic pressure and called for Geneva-II

talks that would search for a solution between the

regime and opposition with the moderation of other

interested parties.

In the same vein, Turkish leadership turned out to be

trapped by harsh rhetoric, which did not have any

impact on Assad’s actions. The Reyhanli incident on

May 11, 2013, in which 51 Turkish citizens lost their

lives and many more were wounded after a bomb

58

explosion, was allegedly launched by Syrian

intelligence services on Turkish-Syrian border, which

has served as a shelter for Syrian refugees and

opposition forces. Still, it did not become a 'red line' in

mentality of Turkish leadership. The shooting down of

a Turkish military jet by Syria in June 2012, resulted

similarly when Turkey invoked Article 4 of the

Washington Treaty (which provided for consultations

between the NATO members) and not Article 5

(collective defense against the aggressor).

A military solution is not the best solution for Turkey

and the U.S. Domestic considerations matter greatly in

decision-making processes in Ankara and Washington.

Obama’s reluctance to drag the U.S. into any military

conflict that would undermine the notorious selective

engagement of the U.S. worldwide is well-known. The

idea of a military operation in Syria is not popular in

Turkey either, not only among the considerable

Turkish Alevi population (which is believed to support

the Syrian Alevi regime), but among a broader

demographic in the country. The Turkish population

generally does not support any military intervention,

especially into another Muslim state, as shown by its

reaction to the military operation in Iraq in 2003. There

is reason to believe that Erdogan is cautious to handle

the Syrian issue in a way that does not harm his

prospects of being elected President in Turkey’s first

popular presidential elections in 2014. Moreover, the

issue of Syria’s future is challenging because of the

lack of clear democratic alternative to Assad’s regime.

Syrian opposition is remarkably dispersed and

disintegrated, with different factions directly competing

for international recognition and support. This makes

crossing the 'red line' even more difficult, as after a

military operation Assad might be replaced with a

regime even more unpredictable and hostile to Turkey

and the West in general.

Conclusions

With all its complexity, the Syrian crisis reveals the

limitations of Turkish regional policy. It showed the

pitfalls of Turkey’s traditional approach, which gives

precedence to stability over the promotion of

democracy in its neighborhood. After the start of the

Syrian crisis, Turkey has awkwardly shifted its position

from support of Assad to criticism of the regime.

Apparently, the unilateralism that underpinned Turkish

foreign policy in the last decade of its “Policy of Zero

Problems with our Neighbors” has not survived the

Syrian civil war and the security threats resulting from

it. The Syrian crisis has become a litmus test for

Turkey’s claims on being a pivotal humanitarian power

in the region after long years of support to some

authoritarian regimes. At the same time, Turkey’s

ability to promote democratization of Middle Eastern

states by serving as a model of change after the Arab

Spring was severely put to test.

In light of the current crisis, Turkey reconsidered and

reclaimed the strategic imperative of its partnership

with the U.S. and NATO. The U.S. remains a natural

Turkish partner in preserving regional stability. It

seems that the gap between discourse and action will

persist in Turkey’s approach to Syria, with Ankara

being unwilling to take unilateral actions. The most

preferable option for both actors would be to reach a

diplomatic solution on Syria, to implement agreements

made in Geneva, including a cease-fire, the release of

prisoners, and the creation of a representative

transitional government in Syria. The turmoil that might

be caused by military operation and the ambiguity of

who might rise to power after Assad comprise the

worst-case scenario for Turkey and the U.S. The

Turkish-American model partnership will retain its

importance, while selective promotion of democracy

seems to remain their primary behavior in the Middle

East.

59

US Withdrawal from Afghanistan and its Impact on the Region

The year 2014 is expected to be an important one for

the world in general and the South Asia region in

particular. In 2014, United States and NATO forces are

scheduled to leave Afghanistan, freeing regional

players to exert their dominance. India and Pakistan

are desperately trying to gain a strong presence in the

country. The manner in which the two neighbouring

nuclear rivals will intervene in Afghanistan and interact

with each other in their pursuit of a foothold in Afghan

politics will largely determine the future of the region.

Afghanistan has an unfortunate history of being

attacked and occupied, and yet considered dangerous

to the security and the stability of the world. Over the

past two centuries the great powers of the modern

world have inexplicably occupied the Afghan land.

They have found that, in the words of journalist David

Lyon, “Afghanistan has a history of confounding the

optimism of invaders”. When US-led NATO forces

occupied Afghanistan, the pretext was to wipe out

terrorist camps and deny them any sanctuary. Twelve

years later, the occupying forces have come to realise

that they have not only failed, but have also dented

their own image and prestige.

When wealthy nations with highly sophisticated armies

lose wars to rag-tag groups, some domino effect is all

but certain to occur (though it never means that the

same rag-tag army will cross international borders and

subject people to slavery). The United States, in its

hubris, invaded Afghanistan thinking that earlier

occupiers simply lacked stamina and the requisite

technology – a mistake invaders have made before.

Even the British Empire, more powerful at its height

than any nation today, could not subdue the Afghans.

Its prestige suffered from the loss, and Afghanistan

earned the nickname “the graveyard of empires”.

Impact on the Region

Taking into account the checkered history of the

region, especially the deep-seated rivalry between

neighbouring nuclear powers India and Pakistan, the

withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan will have a

substantial effect. Ideally, these neighbouring countries

will have the wisdom to fill the void by supplying their

own forces and resources. It is no secret, however,

that India and Pakistan will also be fighting for

influence over Afghanistan. The US has set a 2014

deadline for its own withdrawal, and both Pakistan and

India are trying hard to maximize their spheres of

influence ahead of that date. Pakistan ostensibly has

the upper hand because of its past ties and closer

proximity. However, India is a massive country, and is

not going to be a pushover. So far, the extent of India’s

influence in Afghanistan has surprised Pakistan each

time it has been demonstrated.

India is trying hard to get a stronger foothold in

Afghanistan mainly for two reasons: first, to more

completely contain and encircle Pakistan

geographically, and second, to prevent Islamic

fundamentalism from seeping into India. However,

India’s strategy begs the question: when has becoming

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Kashmir, J&K, India

Aijaz Ashraf Wani University of Kashmir, India E-mail: aijazpol@gmail.com

60

involved in Afghanistan’s affairs ever benefited another

nation before? Pakistan is actually an example of the

lack of positive effect Afghan involvement can have.

For a long time, Pakistan has considered Afghanistan

a geographical buffer – a region that gives them

“strategic depth”. Contrary to this assumption, though,

it is Afghanistan that has gained strategic depth of its

own from Pakistan1. The idea that Pakistan’s security

benefits from Afghanistan is a hollow one. Afghanistan

has been easily occupied by foreign forces many times

in the past, giving those forces access to the Pakistani

border for as long as they can maintain a foothold in

Afghanistan. That the same past occupiers have

eventually had to withdraw due to Afghan resistance is

of little benefit to Pakistan. It is for this reason that

Eqbal Ahmad refers to Pakistan’s strategy as a

“mirage mis-named strategic depth”. 2

India is nonetheless concerned about Pakistan gaining

any advantage in the region, and is trying to obstruct

Pakistan’s attempts toward strategic depth. But the

truth is, if Pakistan is left to live in its illusion of

strategic depth, India’s security will not suffer. A

Taliban government in Afghanistan would not be a

reliable ally to Pakistan. Afghans, like most of the

people in the world, don’t like to be ruled by foreigners,

but unlike others, Afghans are more ready to fight to

push foreigners out of their land. One cannot assume

that Afghans will tolerate the interference of any other

country. As with many countries in political turmoil,

Afghanistan needs and expects assistance from other

countries, but it is very important for aid-giving

countries be aware of how their aid is perceived by

different factions in Afghanistan. There are currently

groups within Afghanistan who hate and resent the

1 Ron Moreau , Sami Yousafzai ‘You Have the Watches, We Have the Time’ The Daily Beast , Oct 2, 2011 2 Eqbal Ahmad, ‘A mirage mis-named strategic depth’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 27 Aug. - 2 Sep. 1998

manner in which both Pakistan and India have

provided aid.

India thinks that Taliban ascension in Afghanistan is

against its interest. This is one of the reasons that,

even while hundreds of Indian children are dying, and

thousands are unable to study, India’s government has

sent two billion dollars of aid to Hamid Karzai’s

government in Kabul. India has been taken in by the

illusion of Pakistani influence over the Taliban, and its

moves in response have been risky. The reality is that

if it came to power, the Taliban would have to

consolidate domestically first. It would not try to get

muddled into the affairs of other states. Once it

consolidates its power, it would behave like the rest of

the states in the world, placing its self-interest

paramount. The immediate task of the Taliban would

be to keep Afghanistan under one rule.

For Pakistan, on the other hand, containing the Taliban

is and must be a major concern. There is every

chance, as is already apparent, that rising Taliban

influence in Afghanistan will cascade across the border

and influence the internal politics of Pakistan. India can

utilize that internal conflict to gain ground on Pakistan

as both an economic and military power. Pakistan is

deeply apprehensive that if India gains a foothold in

Afghanistan, it will try to fuel insurgencies in volatile

areas along the border, in order to destabilize

Pakistan. Therefore, it will try its best to keep India

away from Afghanistan and increase its own influence

in the country.

India’s greatest worry is that after the withdrawal of

NATO forces from Afghanistan, the hardened fighters

may trickle over to the Indian part of Kashmir. This

concern is not unfounded – the withdrawal of NATO-

led forces would definitely infuse new vigor into the

resistance movement in Kashmir. In 2008, these fears

drove Kashmiri people to the streets, prompting then-

US presidential candidate Barack Obama to link peace

61

in South Asia with the resolution of the Kashmir

conflict3.

India is wary of Pakistan’s tactics as well. It believes

that the Pakistani military is biding its time until the

Americans are really desperate for progress in

Kashmir, and will then demand its price from the US.

Indian decision-makers want to engage with Pakistan,

but as was obvious during a recent foreign ministers’

press conference, Pakistan was unwilling to offer

anything on Kashmir other than the usual rhetoric.

Pakistan wants to buy time, but India doesn’t have any

to spare with the US timetable for withdrawal in

Afghanistan looming. The US would certainly not want

Kashmir to become another Afghanistan, or Palestine

for that matter, that could unite all the fundamentalist

forces in the Muslim countries of Central and South

Asia. If Taliban fighters trickle over to Kashmir, as

former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Mullah Zafeef

and author Ahmad Rashid chillingly suggest in their

books, it would endanger not only India but other

powers in Asia where insurgencies are a concern.

Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, stated in 1998

that although his organization supports jihad in

Kashmir, the Afghan men fighting in Kashmir are there

on their own initiative4. Many, though, are seriously

concerned that the Taliban will engage more in

Kashmir in the future, and they are making these

concerns public. The truth is, though on some

occasion some Taliban fighters might join the fight in

Kashmir and come under Pakistani influence, Pakistan

would have to pay a price to the Taliban for any

substantial number of fighters, and the Taliban will

weigh its options before it agrees to smuggle its men

into Kashmir. In the past, the Taliban has exerted

pressure on Pakistan to recognize them as the

3 David Lyon “In Afghanistan: Two hundred years of British, Russian and American Occupation” Palgrave Macmillian 4 Ahmad Rashid ‘Taliban: The story of the afghan Warlords’ Pan Books

legitimate government in Kabul before offering any

material support5.

Even if Taliban fighters started pouring into Kashmir,

though, it is unlikely that they would get any support

from the local population, as figures like hardliner

Hurriyat Chairman Mr. Syed Ali Geelani and Jihad

Council Chief Mr. Salahuddin have repeatedly

condemned their actions. Moreover, Kashmiris are

made of a different mettle. Unlike Afghans, Kashmiris

are not interested in bearing the hardships of open

conflict fueled by outside fighters. Kashmiris don’t

believe that to create a new order you need to destroy

the older one. They have demonstrated repeatedly that

although they would like to change the system, they

are not interested in creating more suffering for

themselves. Thus, Indian fears that the Taliban may

engage in Kashmir are unfounded.

Of course there is a chance that, buoyed by their

success against US forces, the Taliban will try to

infiltrate other Muslim locales. Ever since Kashmir was

brought under the domain of India, it has been India’s

weakest point, and the Indian state has no solution to

achieve greater security there.

“The road to stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan,”

wrote Pankaj Mishra, “runs through the Valley of

Kashmir6”. The former Head of Saudi intelligence for

24 years, Turki al-Faisal, urged President Obama to

“push India and Pakistan to fix Kashmir7” in his seven

point action plan to achieve progress in Afghanistan.

US Admiral Mike Mullen endorses this point, stating “I

think unlocking Kashmir, which is a very difficult issue

on the Pak-Indian border, is one that opens it all up8”.

5 Ahmad Rashid ‘Taliban: The story of the afghan Warlords’ Pan Books 6 Pankaj Mishra ‘Afghanistan: The India & Kashmir Connection’New York Book Review, Jan 14, 2011 7 Pranab Dhal Samanta ‘Push India, Pak to fix Kashmir: Saudi prince to Obama’ Indian Express Oct 14, 2009 8 David Wolfe ‘Admiral Mullen acknowledges keys to peace in Afghanistan begins in Kashmir’

62

Although I am of the firm belief that it will be very hard

for Taliban ideology to get support from the Kashmiri

people, the fact of the matter remains that there are

many who increasingly see radicalization imported into

Kashmir. “After all,” observes David Lyon, “It was in

Kashmir that the radicalization had begun in the early

1990s that has now spread worldwide9”.

Indian and Pakistan have until 2014 to take a firm

stand on the Kashmir issue. As far as the US is

concerned, the best thing it can do for peace and

stability in the region (after having created so much of

mess) is to try to bring India and Pakistan together to

work toward the restructuring of Afghanistan. At

present, even the humanitarian aid that each of the

two countries are doing in that country is being

regarded with suspicion by the other. If the two

countries could be brought together to develop a

common strategy for their involvement in Afghanistan,

it would help not only with the rebuilding of that country

but would also greatly increase the prospects of peace

in the region.

Additionally, the US needs to rethink its policy towards

the Muslim world, in particular its involvement in

conflicts involving Muslims. That can help the US

improve its negative image. It is paradoxical that

although a large portion of the world’s Muslim

population has no love for the US, they at the same

time look toward it for help when they fight against

tyrannical regimes. They also look toward the US for

help in solving conflicts in Israel, Kashmir, and

Chechnya, for the betterment of the whole world. After

the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan, if it does

not get actively involved in assuaging some of the

serious issues involving Muslims, fanatics in the

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/01/admiral-mullen-acknowledges-keys-to-peace-in-afghanistan-begins-in-kashmir/ 9 David Lyon “In Afghanistan: Two hundred years of British, Russian and American Occupation” Palgrave Macmillian

Muslim world will continue to try to rally people against

the US and harm its interests.

63

CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

64

Drones, The United States and The New Wars in Africa

Abstract

Among the evolving challenges to global peace and

security are the growing number of incidents of

terrorism in Africa. These, together with varied

responses from national governments and the

international community, suggest a new kind of war,

the third in a progression after the independence wars

of the early 50s and the intrastate wars that have

defined the continent since the latter part of the 20th

Century. With cases in Nigeria, Mali, Algeria, Somalia

and Libya, among others, the continent is fast earning

a reputation as one of the major frontiers in the War

on Terror. As a global hegemon and an interested

stakeholder, the US has intensified collaboration with

a number of African countries towards combatting

international terrorism. Similarly to its activities on

other fronts, one of the strategies of choice appears to

be a reliance on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drones).

The use of drones has, however, generated

substantial controversy both internationally and

domestically within the US. These debates have

revolved mainly around the legal ramifications and the

political fallout from the use of drones. This is further

compounded by the relative secrecy marshaled

around the use of drones by the Obama

administration. By carrying out a content analysis of

secondary data, this paper highlights terrorism as the

new style of warfare in Africa and the US’s response

with drones. It is argued that notwithstanding the

political-legal conundrums, drones are the only way

the US can make game-changing interventions

through intelligence gathering and elimination of key

targets in several hotspots in Africa. It concludes by

suggesting policy options to counterbalance the utility-

negating publicity currently surrounding the use of

drones in Africa.

Keywords: Terrorism, Drones, United States,

Africa, Security

Introduction From the various independence wars that dominated

the early 20th Century to the civil wars of the late 20th

Century, Africa has been one of the most unstable

continents in recent history. Within this period, the

continent has also witnessed varying movements of

terrorism, from the Mau Mau1 campaigns in Kenya in

the 1950s to acts by rebel groups and state agents in

the infamous intrastate wars of sub-Saharan Africa in

the late 80s. While the first movement evolved mainly

from political acts geared toward the struggle for

independence, the latter was mainly manifested in

attempts to obtain psychological or strategic

advantages by combatants in the brutal civil wars of

Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Great Lakes region and a

number of such civil war theatres in Africa. The

element of unrestrained violence commonly identified

as a defining feature of terrorism2 was palpable in all

these movements, but the socio-political or military

drive for these movements barely included religion.

Thus, although the Joseph Kony-led Lord’s Resistance

Army has often been cited in commentaries as an

example of a Christian fundamentalist group engaged

Research Fellow at the Legon Centre for

International Affairs & Diplomacy Philip Attuquayefio Ph.D. University of Ghana, Ghana E-mail: pattuquayefio@gmail.com

65

in terrorism3, it is in reality a group fighting for the

nationalist concerns of the Acholi People of northern

Uganda. Kony’s assertion that he received instructions

from the holy spirit is the group’s only claim to

Christian doctrine.

The 1990s however, marked the dawn of religious

fundamentalism and terrorism on the continent. An

overwhelming proportion of these terrorist movements

trace their foundations to Islam, a religion that is

ordinarily portrayed as one of peace, though

fundamentalists continue to roll out some of the most

violent terrorist actions in Africa. This arguably came to

the world limelight with the August 7, 1998 terrorist

bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es

Salaam that killed over two hundred people.

Subsequently, in 2002, an-Israeli-owned hotel in

Mombasa, Kenya was attacked.4 The attribution of

these events to the Egypt-based Islamic Jihad and

other Al Qaeda surrogates such as its namesake in the

Islamic Maghreb was the first public indication that

international terrorist organizations were connecting

with and activating affiliates on the continent.

Subsequently, the actions of Al-Shabaab in Somalia,

the relatively recent rise of Boko Haram in northern

Nigeria, and the insurrection of Islamic fundamentalists

in Mali in March 2012, as well as the renewed interest

in security on the continent by the US and Great

Britain, all point to Africa’s emerging relevance as a

frontier for the worldwide war on terror.

As a global hegemony, the US has traditionally been

an advocate of global peace and security and has

engineered actions, often collectively, to guarantee this

state of affairs. This notwithstanding, the post-Cold

War recalibration of global alliances along the lines of

geopolitical significance saw the gradual, and in some

cases not so gradual, waning of US interest and

activities in various parts of Africa. In cases like

Somalia, humanitarian intervention in disasters further

coalesced with this general trend to reduce US interest

in Africa.5 Following the 9/11 attacks on the US and

the consequent launch of the global war on terror, the

US has renewed active interest in regions considered

breeding grounds for terrorists. The recent

recalibration of US interest in Africa is, justifiably, a

result of the growing movement of terrorists on the

continent. An oft-cited statement, attributed to Susan

Rice, aptly summarizes this view thus:

Much of Africa is a veritable incubator for the

foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor,

overwhelmingly young, disaffected, unhealthy

and under-educated populations often have

no stake in government, no faith in the future

and harbor an easily exploitable discontent

with the status quo. For such people, in such

places, nihilism is as natural a response to

their circumstances as self-help. Violence and

crime may be at least as attractive as hard

work. Perhaps that is part of the reason why

we have seen an increase in recent years in

the number of African nationals engaged in

international terrorism. These are the swamps

we must drain. We must do so for the cold,

hard reason that to do otherwise, we place our

national security at further and more

permanent risk. We must do so not for liberal,

humanitarian or moral reasons, but out of

realpolitik recognition that our long-term

security depends on it.6

Consequently, since 9/11, the primary objective of US

actions on the continent has been to address the

region’s potential to host terrorist havens that recruit

and deploy international terrorists around the world.

Just like the terrorist threat, the approach for US

interventions on matters of national security have also

evolved, from conspicuous full-scale military actions in

the Bush and Clinton years to the “light footprints”

66

mantra favored by the current Obama administration.

The latter has involved the use of Special Forces and

other relatively more discreet approaches. A critical

element of the Obama administration’s

counterterrorism approach is the use of Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Popularly known as Drones,

UAVs are remotely controlled aircrafts designed with a

capacity to carry a wide variety of accessories for both

civilian and military use. These include long range

cameras, communication and target detection sensors

and military hardware such as missiles. Added to this

is the stealth ability of some drones. Consequently,

they are now common in reconnaissance, surveillance

and target engagement missions.7 (It has been

suggested that experimentation with drones have been

going on since the early 1990s – their first deployment

in a war context was in the former Yugoslavia in the

mid-1990s, where they were reportedly used as

surveillance equipment.8) Subsequent evolution of

drones has seen their emergence as armaments for

target engagement, particularly in the post-9/11

counterterrorism activities of the US. One of the early

cases was reported in Yemen in 2002, where six

alleged Al Qaeda operatives were killed by drone fire.

Since then, drones have fast gained notoriety as the

armament of choice9 among the myriad options

available to the US.

Currently, the Obama administration’s legal opinion on

the use of drones remains classified, yet statements by

President Obama and Central Intelligence Agency

Director John Brennan provide an inkling of the

administration’s justification for the use of drones. In a

much-publicized speech on US counterterrorism

activities, President Obama suggested that “some

areas where terrorists have taken refuge are remote

and beyond the reach of the local government”.10

Similarly, prior to the senate confirmation hearing on

his nomination as CIA Director, John Brennan

indicated that drones “dramatically reduce the danger

to US personnel and to innocent civilians, especially

considered against massive ordnance that can cause

injury and death far beyond the intended target”.11

While these suggestions from the White House and the

CIA may sound apocryphal, evidence points to many

successes, particularly in the destabilization of terrorist

cells, the gathering of invaluable intelligence and the

assassination of top operatives on the command and

control hierarchy of terrorist organizations in

Afghanistan, Pakistan and other parts of the world. It is

noted, for instance, that Osama Bin Laden, in a

correspondence collected from the house he occupied

prior to his execution, had made a tacit admission of

the effectiveness of drones by admonishing his

generals to avoid drone areas.12

The use of these drones for target engagement

missions has not been without controversy, both in

host countries, where it has garnered political fallout

and cast in doubt US moral leverage in global affairs,

and within the domestic politics of the US, where the

administration has been accused of arbitrarily

authorizing executions, including of US citizens. The

latter constitutes a legal conundrum that continues to

attract negative publicity to the use of drones. The

tactical fallout may have been even more dire, possibly

spurring an increase in volunteers ready to launch a

global jihad against the US and its western allies in the

wake of of drone casualties in countries such as

Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen.

The readiness of the US to deploy drones to prosecute

the war on terror in Africa is a certainty. In 2001, the

US acquired and renovated Camp Lemonnier from the

armed forces of Djibouti and subsequently, in May

2003, designated the facility as the base for the

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-

HOA). Since then, Camp Lemonnier has earned a

reputation as a critical base for drone operations

around the Horn of Africa and Yemen.13 In March

67

2013, President Obama announced plans to set up

another base in the West African country of Niger.

Besides Djibouti and Niger, reports suggest that the

US has access to even more operational range for

drones than publicly acknowledged. In terms of

operability, the first reported use of drones within the

continent was a 2007 incident in which drones guided

antitank missile gunships to destroy a convoy carrying

one of Al Qaeda’s top operatives and a suspected

hideout in Somalia. Since then, the US is reported to

have operated drones from a number of sites in Africa,

including Djibouti and Burkina Faso.

In examining the state of the terrorism in Africa and the

options available to combat it, this paper argues that

the only way the US can make game-changing

interventions through intelligence gathering and

elimination of key targets in several hotspots in Africa

without compromising its own national security is

through the use of drones. It concludes by suggesting

policy options to counter balance the utility-blighting

publicity currently surrounding the use of drones in

Africa.

Terrorism: The New Wars in Africa

In the aftermath of the independence wars, the second

major wave of conflicts on the continent - the civil wars

of the post-Cold War era between the late 1980s and

early 1990s – saw a succession of violent conflicts in

countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Cote

D’Ivoire, among others. Along with these conflicts

came abductions, systematic rape, genocide and a

host of actions that fall within the generic description of

terrorism.14 These acts were mainly domestic in nature

and perpetrated by ethnic and political groups. It was

therefore not surprising that the US maintained a

general disinterest in activities in Africa during that

period, with scholars such as Kaplan merely describing

parts of Africa as dysfunctional regions.15

The latter part of the 1990s witnessed a marginal rise

in terrorist incidents on the continent. Unlike the

previous period, an overwhelming majority of these

acts were attributed to the activities of Islamic

extremists. The manifestations of these acts were

undoubtedly ruthless yet somewhat limited to relatively

few countries in the east and the Horn of Africa. In the

1998 attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar

Es Salaam, for instance, two hundred people were

killed and over a thousand injured. Yet in comparison

to the global numbers, it was insignificant. In fact,

during that period, Africa placed a mere fifth, behind

Latin America, Western Europe, Asia and the Middle

East, as the most targeted region for international acts

of terror.16

In the 21st Century, acts of terrorism in Africa have

risen exponentially.17 They have manifested in

insurrections in almost every region of Africa. This is

attributable to a number of events. One of these has to

do with the post 9-11 war on terror, and the military

actions in Iraq and Afghanistan by the US and its

allies. Statistics have, for instance, shown dislocation

and relocation of suicide terrorist cells and training

camps as well as the death or detention of several top

operatives of Al Qaeda following the commencement

of the US-led war on terror.18 With the disruption of its

activities, Al Qaeda has adopted a more diffused

approach, one that has seen the centralised command

and control previously held by Osama Bin Laden

diffuse to other parts of the world in line with the

objective to strike soft targets of the US and its western

allies. With Africa playing host to monumental

commercial and state interests of the US and a

number of Western countries, Al Qaeda’s strikes

against these targets have been intended to

demonstrate that they and their affiliates still retain the

will and capacity to operate around the world.19

Relatedly, the diffusion indirectly caused by the war on

terror has made identifying and neutralizing terrorist

68

cells more difficult. It has further exacerbated the

resentment of the US and its allies among Muslims,

and thus made many more receptive to the message

and methods of Al Qaeda and other terrorists groups.

The franchising20 of the Al Qaeda has also contributed

to the increase in terrorist activities on the continent. In

these loose operations, terrorist organizations in

various parts of the world, including Africa, continue to

both adopt and adapt the modus operandi of Al Qaeda.

One of the foremost organizations demonstrating this

franchise model is Boko Haram. Operating mainly from

the Northern parts of Nigeria since 2002, Boko Haram

claims to be fighting for the institution of Islamic rule in

Nigeria. Besides their objective, their modes of

operation – a combination of suicide attacks and car

bombs in civilian areas – is dangerously similar to Al

Qaeda’s. Thus, in spite of the fact that Boko Haram is

perceived as a domestic terror group operational only

in Nigeria, it is undoubtedly pursuing an anti-western

agenda. This is further emphasized by the group’s

kidnapping of foreign workers.

Elsewhere on the continent, a number of terrorist

organizations have engineered actions that fit within

the anti-western agenda of Al Qaeda but also indicate,

in some cases, the localized grievances of these

groups. In North Africa, for instance, Al Qaeda in

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been engaged in high-

profile terrorist actions against the West, its interests in

the region, and supporters of western ideals. Formerly

known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and

Combat (GSPC), the group was recognized in 2006 by

Ayman Al Zahawari, the second in command in Al

Qaeda, which inspired the name change.21 With

operations running through Algeria, Mauritania,

Morocco, Northern Mali and other parts of the Sahel-

Sahara region, AQIM has masterminded kidnappings

and bombings with the goal of ridding North Africa of

western influence and installing fundamentalist

regimes across the region. These have manifested in

attacks such as the December 11, 2007 car bombing

of the UN offices in the Algerian capital. Their

versatility, paired with the porous borders and vast

territories in the region and their collaboration with

other like-minded organizations in the area, has

resulted in an expanding trans-regional terrorist

network, fast gaining reputation not just for its adopted

Al Qaeda tag but also a lengthy resume of terrorist

activities.

The West African Sub-Region is home to two relatively

recent terrorist organizations. Boko Haram operates

mainly in Northern Nigeria and Cameroon, while Ansar

Dine operates from Northern Mali. The former was

formed in Maiduguri in 2002 as the Congregation and

People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad.22 It is,

however, known as Boko Haram, a Hausa moniker

accorded to the group mainly based on its

condemnation of western education. In spite of their

relatively recent adoption of terrorist actions, the group

has successfully undertaken some of the gravest

attacks in the region, including an August 26 bombing

of a UN complex. Similarly to AQIM, the leaders of

Boko Haram exploited Nigeria’s governance

challenges, particularly relating to corruption and

disparities in the allocation of socio-economic

opportunities between the country’s North and South

populations, to mobilize a base of followers

discontented with the status quo. Given its links to

AQIM, Al Shabaab and Hezbollah23, and its

operational flexibility in a region with porous borders,

the fear that Boko Haram will expand their influence is

justified. In May 2013, a military offensive was

launched against the group in Nigeria’s three northern

states. Aided by the declaration of curfews in some

cities, reports suggested that the group’s leadership,

personnel and training structures had been

decimated.24 In spite of this, experience with terror

cells in other parts of the world suggests that once the

69

central goals are established, setbacks and disruptions

from counterterror forces are temporary, and groups

and cells relocate and often hit back in a variety of

revised ways. What makes this trend noteworthy is that

in the case of Boko Haram, it was not until a

government crackdown on the group in 2009, which

led to the extrajudicial killing of the leader Mohammed

Yusuf25, that the group commenced massive terror

activities including suicide bombings. With this record,

it is safe to assume that the group will continue its

operations in the foreseeable future. Indeed, in a tape

recording attributed to Abubakar Shekau, the leader of

the group, he calls on “brethren in Iraq, Pakistan,

Afghanistan and Syria to join Boko Haram’s holy

war”.26 Although this is mere rhetoric, it also reflects

the resilience of the group’s leadership. This is

certainly not the tone of one ready to retire. A further

threat to the region is the presence of Ansaru, a

breakaway of fringe elements in Boko Haram. Ansaru

has sought since January 2012 to fight for Islamist

rule. Though a smaller group, it has obtained some

recognition through the high profile kidnapping and

execution of western targets.

Akin to Boko Haram, Ansar Dine also emerged out of

discontent with a prevailing governance structure in

Mali. Its ranks swelled following the Arab spring in

Libya. When the Gaddafi regime fell, mercenaries who

had fought in that war, armed with Gaddafi’s weapons,

moved into Northern Mali where ethnic Tuaregs

mobilized under the National Movement for the

Liberation of Azawad (MLNA) have been engaged in a

long-running rebellion with the government in Bamako

over the independence of Azawad. Based on that

existing grievance, Ansar Dine emerged in 2012,

fighting alongside MLNA to take control of significant

areas in Northern Mali and enforcing a strict Sharia

law. Following intervention by France, Ansar Dine and

other Islamic fundamentalist groups have been driven

out of Mali’s northern cities of Timbuktu and Gao

among others. The Malian terrain, which can be

likened to the Afghanistan due to its desert-like

features, has, however, prevented the complete

destruction of the group. As indicated earlier, the

continued presence of the groups founding principles

will make sure that these groups continue to exist,

striking available targets, kidnapping for both ransom

and political statements to display their continued

relevance. Coupled with persistent governance

challenges in the region and the immutable demands

of fundamentalists for an Islamic government, the

Sahel Sahara region remains one of the most volatile

terrorist outposts on the continent.

In the Horn of Africa, the dominant Al Shabaab

continues to attract attention as arguably the

continent’s most prominent terrorist organization, both

in terms of its links with Al Qaeda and its ability to

strike targets considered sympathetic to the west or

detrimental to Islam. While it is deemed an outgrowth

of the Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), a radical

organization that confronted the Siad Bare regime in

the early 1990s, in 200327 it was its role as the

enforcing arm of the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU)

when the Union took control over Mogadishu and tried

to exert a level of law and order in the Somali capital

that is most notable. Following the Ethiopian

intervention in December 2006, the ICU was all but

disbanded except for the Al Shabaab, which withdrew

to the south central region of the country and launched

what has become a long-running insurgency, first

against the Ethiopians and subsequently against

troops serving in the African Union Mission in Somalia.

While its stated objective remains the creation of an

Islamic State of Somalia, its affiliation with Al Qaeda

has meant that the group has also sought to hit targets

deemed as affronts to the global jihad currently been

pursued by Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

70

The trend of terrorism around the continent is

demonstrative of the intensifying wave of Islamic

fundamentalism and the possibility that it will generate

and sustain training camps and recruits, as in Pakistan

and Afghanistan. It also justifies the renewed focus of

the US on Africa.

Negotiating Drones for Africa

The above dynamics of terrorism on the continent of

Africa are not lost on US policy-makers. However,

Since the Somalia debacle in 1993, the US appears to

have acknowledged its relative weaknesses on the

continent. This is related to the fact that it was never a

colonial power in Africa and its actions on the continent

during the Cold War were mostly limited to covert CIA

operations. The US’s experience launching actions in

Africa is therefore more naturally aligned with covert

drone-like operations than open warfare such as in

Iraq and Afghanistan. The current inclusion of drones

in the US strategy is also in line with the Obama

Administration’s “light footprints” and “leading from

behind” policy.

Admittedly, the adoption of drones is confronted by

some controversies. This can be compared to those

surrounding waterboarding and other enhanced

interrogation techniques applied in US detention

facilities. Unfortunately, the debate on the utility of

drones in the context of terrorism is significantly

challenged by what can best be described as the Pak

Syndrome. This is the reality that debates on the utility

of drones are heavily influenced by their application to

the war on terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Consequently, the application of drones is confronted

by utility-negating propaganda that portrays drones as

killer devices28 and does not acknowledge the

intelligence gathering relevance and the impact of such

intelligence on the war on terror, including the fact that

the intelligence gathered has led to the prevention of

even more strikes, and by implication, more deaths by

terrorists.

The Pak syndrome also dilutes the complementary

capacity of drones in the war on terror. While

objections have been raised to the legality of drone

use, the Pak syndrome also appears to have created

legal conundrums focusing on issues concerning the

right to fair trial for suspects among others. These

objections are often overrated, and do not reflect the

reality that the war on terror is unconventional in many

respects, nor that the African context requires the utility

of drones. In arguing the veracity of the latter, it is

submitted that an analysis of the trend of terrorism in

Africa points to some continent-wide commonalities,

from the use of guerilla tactics to the exploitation of

governance vacuums and large expanses of

geographical areas to the effects of Africa’s infamous

porous borders on the activities of terrorist

organizations. While these illuminate the nature of the

terrorist threat in Africa, they also suggest which

strategies are likely to make an impact in managing the

phenomenon of terrorism on the continent. A number

of these commonalities and their implications for drone

use are examined herein.

Conventional wisdom points to the rise of conflicts in

conditions of economic deprivation and resource

abundance. Yet in Africa, it has been noted that

conflict also emerges in situations where the state is

unable to assert itself, creating power vacuums that

can be captured by professional war groups. Recent

commentary on Mali has, for instance, focused on

Islamic insurgents and the France-led action to reclaim

the overrun territory. The focus to some extent

redirected attention to Africa as a fertile ground for

nourishing world class terrorists. Yet in reality, Mali

remains a mere symptom of the growth of terror on the

African continent, a case of widening governance

deficit taken advantage of by an already blossoming

71

corps of Islamic extremists. For many years, the West

African country has had governance and security

challenges which manifested in alienation of parts of

the population compared to the capital of Bamako and

the thriving insurgency of Toureg rebels in the north of

the country. In fact, the starting point for the current

challenges of the country was the ousting of the

Amadou Toumani Toure government by soldiers who

were protesting against inadequate equipment to deal

with challenges posed by rebels. In spite of the

successes of the France-led coalition, the governance

and security vacuum remains unaffected. Thus, even if

a government is put in place, post-conflict dynamics

will continue to produce instability in that region. The

area will continue to be exploited once the French-led

troops depart.

The above challenges in Mali are typical of other

countries serving as recruitment grounds. In Somalia,

the continent sees a country that has come no longer

earns the “failed state” label that was ascribed to it

about a decade ago, yet the inability of its government

to generally reach an agreement or maintain legitimate

coercive power on the overwhelming influence of

religious and ethnic leaders reveals a governance

crisis that is been exploited by al Shabaab and other

less prominent groups of terrorists. The case of the

North African countries of Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia,

and to a lesser extent Egypt, offer even more

complexities in terms of the governance and security

vacuum that provides grounds for the nurturing of

international terrorism. These countries are technically

in the post-conflict, or peace consolidation, stage

where a myriad of challenges must be faced.

Politically, for instance, it is critical for a post-conflict

government or a transitional government to ensure that

it is fairly visible in all parts of the country. The reason

for this is not far-fetched; having reneged once (as a

matter of policy or sheer inability) on its responsibility

to protect its people, governments in post-conflict

stage necessarily attempt to reintroduce the whole

idea of governance as well as political participation at

every level of the state. The influence and flexibility of

immediate post-conflict governance is therefore small.

Evidence of this abounds in the North African country

of Egypt, where there have been countless mass

protests in the last three months, as well as in Somalia

in the horn of Africa.

Related to the above is the fact that even after conflict

has officially ended, there are vestiges of the conflict

which influence the post-conflict environment. The

extent to which these are managed can influence the

success of post-conflict development. An example is

the continued dominance of destabilizing figures in

certain parts of the post-conflict country. This category

may also include warlords and tribal leaders who

garnered enough credibility and respect during the

period of the war and whose activities can be

detrimental to the post-conflict efforts of the country.

While such figures may have run aground as a result

of victor’s justice or the conclusion of democratic

elections following the terms of a peace agreement,

they can find continued relevance through their

interventions in areas such as community security,

where the national government may be perceived as

failing. The persistence of these sub-national

authorities makes the context quite dangerous to

navigate. In fact, Libya offered an insight into that

threat with the attack on the US embassy in Benghazi.

Furthermore, the context of post-conflict development,

as described above, entails the decimation of social

and political institutions, most of which are responsible

for advancing the human security needs of the people.

The void created by the decimation often explains the

appalling conditions of illiteracy, malnutrition, and high

mortality rates registered by post-conflict countries.

These are conditions associated with poverty, which

incidentally is known to bear some relationship with

terrorist recruitment. Thus, in spite of US assessment

72

and interest in the terrorist-creating or terrorist-

sustaining environment developing in Africa, from a

governance perspective, Africa presents a potentially

explosive platform, the vicissitudes of which will be

dangerous for US ground operations but permissible

for drone use.

Another feature of the new wars relating to terrorism in

Africa is the guerilla tactics employed by the various

terrorist organizations on the continent. The implication

is that timeless principles of war, as espoused by the

Geneva and Hague conventions, for instance, are not

being adhered to. For Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, AQIM

and Al Shabaab for instance, civilian targets are

legitimate targets and so are injured US soldiers. The

weapons of choice for terrorist have been decided

more by availability and less by restrictions of Jus in

Bello. A stark reminder of the disregard for legal

principles is the attack on the US consulate in

Benghazi, Libya, which, needless to say, ignored the

inviolability of diplomatic premises, one of the

preeminent provisions of post-Westphalia diplomatic

relations. Unfortunately, the US is bound to adhere to

all the rules that terrorist organizations, herein

considered as unconventional combatants, flout with

impunity. In such an unfavorably unbalanced terrain,

the use of conventional combatants, the alternative to

drones, cannot be recommended.

Africa’s infamously porous borders, and the flexibility

they offer for trans-regional terrorism, are another

reason why conventional interventions by the US

should not be contemplated. As noted above, almost

all the Islamic fundamentalists groups straddle entire

regions with relative ease. In the case of Mali, for

instance, it has been indicated that porous borders to

the North have facilitated the migration of fighters from

Algeria-based AQIM as well as vestiges of the Libyan

conflict to move in and operate. The fact that

mercenaries are crossing borders in Africa means that

mobilizing terror for cross-country targets of US and

Western interests is made much easier. The expanse

of territory straddled, the number of countries operated

in and the sovereignty implications that the US will

have to confront in pursuit of terrorists and networks

makes it simply impracticable for conventional forces.

In contrast, the reconnaissance and target

engagement capacities of drones makes them the

ultimate efficient tool for monitoring the flow of terrorist

networks and illicit weapons and the building of training

camps in Africa. The long, porous borders necessitate

the use of drones.

Related to the above is the lack of capacity of most

African governments to gather and organize high-

quality intelligence on the activities of terrorists and

their networks. A number of factors account for this

reality, the obvious being the lack of political

commitment as manifested in the inability of

governments to commit funds for developing

intelligence databases countrywide and across

regions. Additionally, terrorist organizations in Africa

are operating on multiple fronts, adopting mutating

strategies and enlisting combatants whose identities

are amorphous. This makes the collection of

intelligence difficult and by implication, makes

conventional deterrence strategies generally unusable

in these wars. In the absence of such intelligence,

countries currently confronted by the activities of

terrorism, such as Nigeria and Mali, are having to

depend on inadequate or nonexistent intelligence to

fight what is in reality a lost battle ab initio. From the

determination of terrorist cells to the identification of

key members and their arrest or execution, the reality

is that the war on terror is fought more effectively when

it favors intelligence over brute force. Additionally,

weapons proliferation in Africa also makes it

impossible to gauge the strategic or tactical ability of

terrorist organizations and could lead to severe

miscalculation with unpredictable consequences.

73

Particularly in Libya, where the revolutionary forces

violently confronted the Gadhafi regime, the end of the

war has seen hardly any meaningful program of

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of

former combatants. A number of combatants also

alluded to pro-US sentiments for as long as Gadhafi

was the enemy, a simple case of “the enemy of my

enemy being my friend”. The implications of this could

be obvious – the existence of many armed people

uncommitted enough to be manipulated, a proliferation

of arms and a growing fundamentalist rhetoric that can

be mobilized toward terrorist objectives. A critical

component of US assistance to Africa as regards the

war on terror must therefore relate to intelligence

gathering and dissemination. The surveillance

capabilities of drones are absolutely essential in these

circumstances.

Related to the intelligence deficit in most African

countries is an infrastructural deficit that can forestall

the progress of conventional troops but can be

effectively harnessed by radical groups employing

guerilla-style tactics. With vast areas virtually

undeveloped, such as the Sahel Sahara region,

conventional military tactics will be confronted by

accessibility challenges. Such terrain, however, favors

the guerilla tactics of Africa’s terror networks, who are

prone to exploit such vulnerability of conventional

troops through kidnapping and suicide bombings

among other strategies. Drones, on the other hand, are

not prone to be affected by the infrastructure deficit.

Finally, one of the components of the war on terror

since 2001 has been the US desire to win hearts and

minds. Within the African continent, the America’s

reputation appears to have floundered. Indeed, in

terms of security, the US record suggests an

opportunistic actor interested in the continent during

the Cold War days yet quick to move on after the fall of

the USSR. While this is undoubtedly symptomatic of

the nature of global politics, the re-entry of the US to

Africa’s security affairs based mainly on the assessed

effects of African-bred terrorism and its impact on US

national security should be approached with extreme

caution and discretion. Under the circumstances, a

less visible approach to intervention, one that favors

the stealth operations of drones, is preferred to ground

invasion and other conventional tactics.

Conclusion

To make a meaningful impact in the new war on terror

in Africa, the US is best served by keeping a light

footprint and continuing the use of drones. However, to

neutralize the effects of “Pak Syndrome,” the Obama

administration will have to be more open about the use

of drones in Africa. Such openness must necessarily

lead to a more expansive characterization of the utility

of drones, one that stresses the critical intelligence

gathering capacities in regions where human

intelligence can be complicated and natural terrains

can stymy the movements of US troops. Together with

enhanced coordination with host governments, the US

can effectively channel drones to improving the

security dynamics of Africa.

End Notes

1 An underground army of insurgents that spread a reign of terror against British colonial administration in Kenya in the 50s by mutilating their victims which included Kenyans perceived to have been supportive of the colonial administration. 2 In its generic sense however, terrorism refers to the employment of violence for political, social, religious and economic motives. This definition highlights the methods rather than motives. Thus, irrespective of how noble the motives are, the resort to violence qualifies the act as terrorism. See Attuquayefio, P “Exploring Suicide Terrorism and its Effect on International Security” in Legon Journal of International Affairs Vol.3 No. 1. May 2006. 3 W. Michael Reisman, “Legal Responses to Genocide and Other massive Violations of Human Rights” in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol 59 No.4 pp75 to 80. Reisman describes it as an outgrowth of Christian Fundamentalist Revolt, and A. Vinci describes the group as a Christian Fundamentalist Rebel Group See (Vinci, Anthony. "The strategic use of fear by the Lord's Resistance Army." Small Wars & Insurgencies 16.3 (2005): 360-381. De Waal, Alexander. Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. Indiana University Press, 2004.

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4 Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison “The Terrorist Threat in Africa” January/February 2004 Foreign Affairs available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59534/princeton-n-lyman-and-j-stephen-morrison/the-terrorist-threat-in-africa 5 From the 3rd-4th October 1993, elements of US troops taking part in Operation Continue Hope, a sequel of an earlier Operation Restore Hope (together with Italy, Morocco, Pakistan, Belgium, Malaysia, Canada, France and Belgium) in Somalia came under attack. The casualties suffered and the treatment of the dead and wounded servicemen reverberated shock among the US public. The consequent withdrawal of US forces by the Clinton administration was to mark the start of a long period of military disengagement from Africa. 6 “Africa and the War on Global Terrorism” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations First Session of the 107 Congress Nov 15 2001, p. 29 Serial no. 107-46 Available online at http://www.house.gov/international—relations 7 Washburn, Alan, and Moshe Kress. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles." In Combat Modeling, pp. 185-210. Springer US, 2009. 8 Nick Turse and Tom Engelhardt Teminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare 2001-2050, Charleston, SC: Despatch Books, 2012,p9) 9 Brennan has suggested that the US has relied on the use of drones only as the last resort in cases were it has been difficult to apply conventional deterrent or law enforcement capacity such as arrest and detain. This author however believes that it is not so. They have been used without exploring the other options in cases were it appeared that the other options will not work. 10 http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/05/23/obama-defends-us-drone-program/ Obama defends US drone program, renews push to close Guantanamo Published May 23, 2013 11 Chris McGreal “John Brennan defends drone attacks as he prepares for tough Senate hearing” In Washington Guardian.co.uk Thursday 7 February 2013 12 http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/03/bin-laden-documents-fear-of-drones/ May 3rd, 2012 ..04:49 PM ET Bin Laden documents: Fear of drones By Pam Benson 13 "Unmanned aerial vehicles: Death from afar". The Economist. 3 November 2012. Retrieved 30 December 2012. 14 In its generic sense, terrorism refers to the employment of violence for political, social, religious and economic motives. This definition highlights the methods rather than motives. Thus, irrespective of how noble the motives are, the resort to violence qualifies the act as terrorism. See Attuquayefio, P.,”Exploring Suicide terrorism and its Threat to International Security” in Legon Journal of International Affairs Vol. 3 No. 1 May 2006 15 Africa Today page 54 16 Botha, Anneli, and Hussein Solomon. "Terrorism in Africa." Defense Journal 1, no. 1 (2005). 17 The number of terrorists incidents recorded increased from eleven in 1996 to fifty-five incidents in 2000. See Hough, Mike: New York terror: The implications for Africa. In: Africa Insight, 32 (1/2002), pp. 65-70. 18 Cronin, A.(2003) “ Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict” . Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2003. Available at http://fpc.State.gov/documents/organization/21191.pdf 19 Martha Crenshaw,2007:69 20 This refers to the post 9-11 trend of terrorist organisations in various parts of the world such as the Sahel and Mahgreb regions

ascribing to the ethos and modus operandi of Al Qaeda and in some cases receiving tacit or express support from Al Qaeda leaders. 21Jonathan Masters, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), January 24, 2013. Available at http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717 22"Nigeria policemen in court trial for Boko Haram killing". BBC News. 13 July 2011. 23 In May 2013, the Nigeria Army Discovered a cache of carefully stowed away weapons including rpgs, and etc from the northern city of Kano. Nigeria's State Security Service said they were intended for use against "Israeli and Western interests". 24 24 May 2013 Nigerian army 'destroys' Boko Haram camps in north-east http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22662476 24Nigeria's Boko Haram chief 'killed' Mohammed Yusuf reportedly killed in police detention after arrest. Last Modified: 31 Jul 2009 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/07/2009730174233896352.html 26Boko Haram rebels say Nigerian military offensive is failing. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/29/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSBRE94S0GT20130529 Abubakar Shekau's By Isaac Abrak,Wed May 29, 2013 . 27 Jonathan Masters, “Al-Shabaab” February 5, 2013 Available at http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650 28 http://rt.com/usa/drone-warfare-protest-washington-825/ Drones out of everywhere! Washington march against US drone warfare

75

Prospects for Post-Hegemonic Global Governance in Africa

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Experience

This article offers a personal perspective, and does not

in any way reflect or represent the official position of

the government of Botswana or that of the SADC

regional economic bloc. In addition, the intent of this

paper is not to produce an academic analysis but to

provide a first-hand account of events experienced

during the author’s interactions with the world as a civil

servant in the area of security and policy making in

Botswana.

Definitions and Meanings SADC

This is a regional group of countries in southern Africa,

founded in April 1980 by the Lusaka Declaration with

the core objective of reducing economic dependence

on the apartheid-era South Africa. The group initially

consisted of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland,

Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and

Zimbabwe. It was then called the Southern African

Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), but

in August 1992, through the Windhoek Treaty, more

members joined and it was transformed into the

Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Many of the member nations have small populations,

small economies, and poor infrastructure, and are

landlocked, militarily weak, and ravaged by poverty.

These countries on their own could simply not

compete in the same market as the huge economic

power that was apartheid South Africa. They were

therefore compelled by these circumstances to form a

regional group in order to improve their chances of

surviving in the same neighbourhood as South Africa.

Post-hegemony

Hegemony refers to great power accumulated by one

nation, with which it can dominate other states and

compel them to behave in ways that sometimes benefit

the powerful nation to their own detriment. It is a

common word in international relations, and is derived

from an ancient Greek word used to refer to a leader

and to their rule over the state. That state would

exercise power over other states, and those states

being prevailed upon would accept the supremacy of

the hegemon. Hegemony would normally be

characterised by authoritative power, and legitimacy as

a hegemon would be measured by voluntary

acceptance of ones rules and values. In this vein, one

would say that the US as a hegemon enjoys not only

massive resources but also recognition and respect

from countries who want to be associated with order,

standards and rule of law. Post-hegemony, then,

would be understood to refer to a transitional period

after dominance.

One narrative of present international conditions

suggests that after decades of maintaining unrivaled

supremacy and monopoly over world politics, the US

may have reached a stage where it has no capacity to

continue to dominate, as its power to do so is

declining. This narrative goes on to ask whether, with

these unfolding world events, any prospect for future

Deputy Director General at the Directorate

of Intelligence and Security (D.I.S.) Tefo Kgotlhane Directorate of Intelligence and Security, Botswana E-mail: tefo340@yahoo.com

76

post-hegemonic global governance exists in today’s

geopolitical landscape.

To respond to the first aspect of the narrative, what

constitutes “declining power” must be defined for the

purpose of this essay. Here, it refers to increased

participation by states in determining action on global

issues, as opposed to leadership by the hegemon,

currently the US. This could be suggested to indicate

loss of position and power. I accept this definition and

understanding, because the alternative argument that

the current slowing down of the US economy

conclusively indicates the death of its hegemony is

unconvincing at best.

I believe it is more likely that the current situation is a

deliberate shift in foreign policy to allow the voices of

others to be heard. I expect that America will continue

to command immense power and influence over other

states for a long time, and other states will continue to

voluntarily associate with and accept the legitimacy

and authority of the US over any competitors it may

have for status as world leader.

Is China a threat?

At the moment, China is successfully steering a rapidly

growing economy, but I am not convinced that it is

aspires to or is focused on cultivating a leadership role

in the world economy. Arvind Subramania’s “The Rise

of China,” which does not understate China’s

ambitions, agrees on this.

A simple comparison of China and the US will reveal

that the US still possesses the strongest military, and

its ability to strike in any part of the world is simply

unrivaled. Its aircraft carriers, transport planes, war

technology, and strategically placed military bases put

it in a strong position to fight and win wars in any

corner of the world. US influence and participation in

global governance institutions like the United Nations,

the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank is

universally acknowledged and highly regarded.

China, on the other hand, largely maintains a

defensive outlook, with a military strategy that seems

to be concerned more with defending their territory

than projecting forces to fight wars. China also has a

serious image problem, which does not make it

attractive as a potential world political leader. It has

been accused by some of currency manipulation, and

tends to be averse to any peer-review mechanisms.

In my view, China does not appear to threaten the

US’s hegemonic position, now or in the foreseeable

future.

United States National Security Policy Shifts It is important to note that the US is not exempt from

world order, as it is affected by world events and thus

its policy must shift along with the rest of the world

toward trends like supporting prosperity through

integration and liberalism. That it is choosing to lead

through influence and persuasion enhances the

prospects for post-hegemonic global governance. The

concept of post-hegemony does not here describe the

notion of declining power and influence, but rather

opening up to allow expanded global participation in

decision-making. Participation in this manner does not

necessarily translate into influencing actions. The final

decision may favor or not favour the smaller

participating countries – in most cases it would favor

the position of those with the most influence. When the

process involves the participation of the smaller states,

they will, in most cases, take partial responsibility for

policy outcomes, as they would have participated in

the process leading to the final decision or position. In

my view, this approach does not diminish the influence

or ability of the powerful to lead. Today, in light of what

the George W. Bush administration had done to

America’s global reputation, this shift in foreign and

77

national security policy is more critical for the US than

ever before.

Prospects for Post-Hegemonic Global Governance

The question to address now is, is there any prospect

of the emergence of a post-hegemonic global

governance? Though nothing is certain, the simple

answer yes, because in theory a post-hegemonic

environment offers an attractive global vision guided

by liberalism, with successfully economically integrated

countries more stable and more inclined to peaceful

resolution of conflicts. This environment is appealing,

and if achieved and properly implemented, would

mean increased political and economic security

through shared resources and reduced competition.

In pursuit of these goals, countries around the world

have lately themselves into regions such as the

European Union, SADC, ECOWAS and many others.

The thinking behind these groups was originally that

successful regional affiliations would eventually

translate into successfully globalized political and

economic arrangements.

However, global governance is easier said than done.

Regions have continued to discover serious

challenges, making it very difficult for them to succeed

individually and thus pushing the goal of globalized,

interconnected regional groups further from

attainability. An excellent example of this challenge is

the difficulties SADC has faced.

The SADC Perspective The concept of regionalism in Africa dates back to

1958, when the All African People’s Conference in

Accra, Ghana adopted it as a strategy for fostering

economic and political development. African leaders

believed that the creation of regional blocs would

rescue the continent from colonial and later neo-

colonial influences and put Africa in a better position

to engage effectively with the most economically

powerful countries of the developed world.

SADC was founded in 1980 through the Lusaka

Declaration. Initially, the bloc was concerned primarily

with resolving poverty and outdated economic policies

in the region, and therefore its main objective was to

promote economic and social development through

cooperation and integration. However, when the

regional bloc was transformed through the Windhoek

Treaty in 1992, it expanded its mandate to include

peace and security issues. The expanded agenda

outlined the following objectives, among others:

Promote sustainable, equitable economic growth and

socio-economic development that will ensure poverty

eradication;

Promote common political values which are shared

through legitimate and effective democratic institutions;

Consolidate democracy, peace and security.

While there have certainly been some successes in

the region thanks to integration through SADC, there

remain huge challenges which will make it difficult for

the region to achieve high success for a long time to

come.

Sovereignty

The issue of sovereignty appears to be as the main

reason why SADC is failing to achieve many of its

objectives. It must resolve this issue before it can

succeed. Member states are very reluctant to cede

their sovereignty and transfer policy decision-making

from a national to a sub-regional level. This is mainly

because most of these countries are young

democracies which have recently emerged from wars

for liberation, and therefore strongly cling to their

sovereignty as a symbol of their identity. This, put in

simple terms, means national objectives are held

supreme over regional ones. National objectives have

immediate impact on the lives and livelihoods of

78

ordinary citizens, making it difficult for political leaders

to justify spending time pursuing and committing to

regional objectives. In some countries, corrupt leaders

also see sovereignty as an important tool to shield

them from processes which encourage transparency

and might push to install peer review mechanisms.

In addition to the above, there are many other factors

which also contribute towards making regionalism and

integration difficult put into practice. These include

issues like poor governance, poor infrastructure,

incompatible economic and political systems across

borders, poor education and lack of job skills,

competition among member states, and South Africa’s

regional economic hegemony.

The general assumption is that for integration to

succeed, there must be a positive economic and

political atmosphere to enable it. In my view, the above

factors would not allow for such integration, and must

be resolved before progress can be made.

79

Regional-Global Security – Assessing the US Role in the Mali Crisis

Introduction

From the perspective of the early 21st century,

regional security institutions have seen considerable

growth in their roles and functions. Before World War

II, few international institutions dealt exclusively with

security matters. The main exception was the League

of Nations. Today, by contrast, a large number of

intergovernmental organizations in Europe, Africa, the

Americas, Asia and the Middle East/Islamic World

have sprung up. The range of their activities is

impressive – from peace support operations,

peacekeeping and dispute settlements to arms control

and foreign policy. It must also be noted that regional

security organizations do not operate in isolation but

in a web of linkages and networks including the United

Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and African

Union (AU). In order to further strengthen the missions

of regional security institutions, countries such as the

United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Japan

play a very significant role. The US in particular has

been a key figure in maintaining international security

through its hegemonic role since World War II and its

posture in fighting the war on terror since 9/11. It is

expected that the hegemonic role of the US should

give critical support to regional security around the

world and promote world peace. In pursuit of these

goals, the US has many opportunities to support

regional security institutions in combating terror and

ending violence and conflicts worldwide.

This article will give an overview of regional-global

security that focuses on the Economic Community of

West African States (ECOWAS) as a regional security

institution in the context of the US National Security

Strategy towards Africa. The value of the US

intervention in Mali will be explored, and the argument

that the US needs to do more to strengthen ECOWAS

as a West African regional security institution that can

fight terrorism and develop counterterrorism capability

will be discussed. Further, this article will explore the

argument that Africa Command (AFRICOM) is

necessary to strengthen ECOWAS’s regional security

mandate to fight terrorism and build strong

counterterrorism knowledge and skills. AFRICOM is

an integral component that complements locally based

and regional security in the sub-region. The US, in

addition to its support for regional security in Africa

through its US Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa

and the US Africa Command, is expected by many

Africans to be a strong ally in their fight against

terrorism in the sub-region.

Many states in Sub-Saharan Africa are relatively weak

when it comes to promoting accountability, good

governance and economic prosperity. Weak states in

Africa are affected by poor governance, poverty, a

political patronage system, low morale within security

forces because of meager salaries, poor conditions,

nepotism, lack of access to basic social services, and

flawed elections. These factors will be explored by

assessing the US’s role in contributing to the

resolution of the Mali crisis. This article will concludes

with a description of specific shortcomings and

Head of Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, and Associate Professor at Fourah

Bay College

Memunatu Pratt University of Sierra Leone and Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone E-mail: pratt.memunatu@gmail.com

80

recommendations that will have policy implications for

future US National Security Strategies and foreign

policy practice in Mali and the West Africa sub-region.

Overview

Etymologically, the term ‘security’ is derived from the

Greek word “asphaleia,” which more literally describes

the relationship between security and insecurity

simultaneously. This interpretation can also be found

in the Latin “sine cura,” the direct root of the English

word. It must be noted that the English word for

security does not carry the same meaning as the

Greek or Latin. Security therefore encompasses both

security and insecurity concurrently. It is believed that

the concept of security is largely rooted in the oral

tradition. There have been plenty of debates about

what security really is. According to Paul D. Williams1,

it is impossible for the world to make sense of politics

without security. The concept saturates contemporary

society and is abundant in the speeches of politicians

and pundits. In newspaper columns and radio airtime,

on television and computer screens, images of

security and insecurity are always present. In social

sciences, security is often referred to as an essentially

contested concept, with no consensus as to its

meaning. The concept has been the subject of many

debates and has been defined in different manners by

scholars. Constant in all of these definitions, though, is

the consensus that security is the condition of being

protected against danger or loss. On the international

stage, regional organizations and security institutions

like the UN, EU, and AU are therefore invaluable

providers of this protection. Regional security

institutions like ECOWAS, as well as the AU Peace

and Security Council and the AU Standby Force,

implement collective standards for enhancing security

and global peace. Though these efforts have been

1 Security Studies An Introduction edited by Paul D. Williams (2008)

successful in some crises, they have not been so

successful in others.

Two key institutions that have succeeded together in

implementing regional and global security

mechanisms in Africa are ECOWAS and the AU. In

Sub-Saharan Africa, ECOWAS, working with

ECOMOG and the AU, has largely been successful in

dealing with crises in fragile states. As a result of

poverty, poor governance, corruption, patronage

politics and scarce resources, a majority of the

countries in Africa, and West Africa in particular, have

struggled to sustain peace and sound democratic

systems of government. This has often resulted in

violent conflicts, political instability and coups d’état.

Regional security institutions have therefore been

under tremendous pressure to achieve their stated

objectives of dealing with insecurity and resolving

crises.

It is against this backdrop that ECOWAS can serve as

a mechanism of regional-global security in the future,

in line with the US Strategy on Sub-Saharan Africa

and AFRICOM in rolling out the Obama Doctrine.

ECOWAS will be an asset to the implementation of the

US National Security Strategy by helping to fight the

war on terror and protecting US national interests in

Africa. An example can already be seen in Mali, which

has been the a recent victim of the war on terror, and

is of particular concern in the US National Security

Strategy and to foreign policy interests worldwide.

ECOWAS

ECOWAS is a regional grouping that began as sixteen

West African states in 1975. (It now has fifteen

member states, with Mauritania leaving the group). It

was founded to promote cooperation and integration

through the establishment of an economic union in

West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its

peoples, foster relations among member states, and

contribute to the progress and development of the

81

African continent. Convinced that economic progress

could not be achieved unless the conditions for

security were assured in all member states of the

community, ECOWAS has since expanded its mission

to include security responsibilities. ECOWAS member

states established ECOMOG to deal with the

insecurity that followed the collapse of the state

structure in the Republic of Liberia in 1990, which

subsequently spilled over into Sierra Leone.2 The

force has since contained several conflicts in the West

African sub-region. Since its establishment, ECOWAS

has been at the forefront of promoting a regional

approach to peace and security, and it is known to

possess the leading architecture for peace and

security on the continent.3 ECOMOG, through

ECOWAS, played a central role in ending civil wars in

some states in West Africa, especially in Sierra Leone

and Liberia. its activities have also covered other

states, including Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire and Niger.

Today, the parts of West Africa that share borders with

Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are being

confronted with a new form of warfare: Islamist

terrorists and the remnants of Al Qaeda in the

Maghreb. Also, Nigeria, which is the most populous

country in West Africa, is engaged in fighting Islamists

commonly referred to as Boko Haram. These two

groups of terrorists have posed serious security

challenges in West Africa. Their style of warfare has

left the sub-region in a very weak position to defend its

territorial integrity, protect its citizens and keep

terrorism out of fragile states. This new development

has made West African states into key regional allies

to the US in its war on terror. The US National

Security Strategy and its foreign policy objectives

2 Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security, 24 March 2008. 3 Adekeye Boulder;(2002) Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers

towards Africa clearly exemplify that. But to what

extent this attention has been successful in resolving

the Mali crisis (a repercussion of the Arab Spring),

dealing with endemic governance and corruption, and

strengthening security in West Africa is not yet clear.

As outlined in the revised ECOWAS Treaty in 1993

and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,

Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and

Security in 1999, the political and security situation in

Mali fits well within the mandates for an ECOWAS

intervention. The Mechanism’s preamble states that

illicit cross-border activities (such as the type that has

plagued Mali’s security for the last 20 years)

“contribute to the development of insecurity and

instability and jeopardize the economic and social

development of the sub-region”.4 Additionally, Article

25 states that intervention is required under

circumstances of civil conflict that threaten to induce a

humanitarian emergency or pose a significant threat to

regional peace and security. And lastly, the article

legitimizes military action following the overthrow of a

member state’s elected government and/or

widespread human rights violations – both of which

have taken place in Mali in 2012.5

The Mali Crises

The Arab Spring nearly two years ago created a

number of unintended consequences for the African

continent. The proliferation of terrorist activity across

North Africa and into the Sahel region manifested itself

in Northern Mali. Prior to the death of the Libyan

dictator Muamar Gadhafi, Mali experienced turmoil

from its northern Tuareg population. Since the 1960s,

Tuareg tribesmen have demanded independence. For

nearly ten months, Mali was dependent on the

4 Economic Community of West African States 1999. ‘Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace keeping and Security’ Available at http:www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap101299&lan=en 5 Adam Sandor The Problems and Prospects for ECOWAS in Mali, Africa Portal, Backgrounder No 51 January 2013

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international community to address these crises.

However, the Eurozone’s involvement in Syria’s civil

war and China and Japan’s dispute over the

Senkaku/Diayu Islands occupied more US attention

and effort than the situation in Mali. Mali had a coup

d’état led by low-level military officers in March 2012

that led to a security vacuum in the north. This allowed

a small group of Jihadist groups seized more and

more territory, imposing harsh forms of Islamic law on

the defenseless civilians. Not until January 11, 2013,

when France began bombing the Islamists to stop

their advancement on Bamako, did the rest of the

world awake to the situation in Mali. By April 2013, the

collapse of state authority in northern Mali had allowed

a separatists rebel movement, the MNLA (the French

acronym for National Movement for the Liberation of

Azawad), to take over the North’s cities with the aim of

declaring the independence of the state of Azawad.

The dream of Azawad lasted for less than two months,

when MNLA forces were pushed out of power by two

other Islamist groups, Ansar Dine and MUJAO

(Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa).

These movements acted to institute governance

structures and systems based on a strict interpretation

of Sharia in the areas that they controlled, imposing

such penalties as cutting off the hands of accused

thieves, requiring women to wear hijabs in public, and

segregating boys and girls in school. Even though this

was accompanied by the displacement of 250,000

people, the 2012 northern Mali crisis did not provoke

much international attention beyond words of

condemnation. It was not until December 2012 that

the United Nations Security Council approved a plan

to retake northern Mali via the deployment of an initial

3,300-person West Africa force. This has now been

increased to 8,000 troops committed by West African

states and other African countries with support from

the African Union. The plan was to first train West

African troops, in preparation for an invasion not

expected until late 2013.

This was the situation in Northern Mali when the

French shocked the world and intervened in mid-

January 2013. There are now approximately 4,000

French troops deployed in Mali. 2,000 French troops

have already been withdrawn and a total of 6,000

West African soldiers are to be deployed alongside

Malian troops to protect the north. These forces have

taken over control of the cities of Gao and Timbuktu,

and France has already started pulling out its troops

from Northern Mali, leaving the combined international

peace support operations force to train and defend the

territorial integrity of the country.

On April 22, France’s National Assembly and Senate

voted to extend the country’s military intervention in

Mali. The resolution passed unanimously in both

houses of Parliament. Three days later, the United

Nations Security Council approved Resolution 2100,

creating a policing mission beginning on July 1, 2013.

The mission is called by its French acronym

MINUSMA. Its projected size is 11,200 soldiers and

1,400 police. There are some 6,000 African troops

serving in a peacekeeping role in south Mali, while

French soldiers are engaged in combating the rightist

militants in northern Mali. There is also a military

training mission run by the EU that has some 200

trainers from France, the UK, Ireland and 19 other

countries, with the brief to prepare 2,000 ground

troops and hundreds more to provide infrastructure

support. 31 soldiers from The Royal Irish Regiment,

Irish Defence Forces and the UK’s Royal Marines 1st

Battalion are training an initial group of 800 Malian

troops. The British and Irish troops are largely carrying

out infantry training; the Greeks handle intelligence

classes; and Germany built a field hospital at the

training camp north of Bamako. The project aims to

create four new battalions capable of defending Mali.

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The US is also a key backer of the French

intervention: it has recently bolstered its military

presence in West Africa and opened a drone airbase

in Mali.

The US Role

The war on terror had been the main focus of the US

and other world bodies since the attack of September

11, 2001. This had led to a defined US National

Security Strategy and a new foreign policy to fight the

war on terror with no defined boundaries. The NSS

describes four pillars of the US Strategy toward sub-

Saharan Africa as of June 14, 2012, stating:

“The United States will partner with sub-

Saharan African countries to pursue the

following objectives: (1) strengthen

democratic institutions; (2) spur economic

growth, trade and investment; (3) advance

peace and security; and (4) promote

opportunity and investment. Across all

objectives, we will deepen our engagement

with Africa’s young leaders; seek to

empower marginalized populations and

women; address the unique needs of fragile

and post-conflict states; and work closely

with the UN and other multilateral actors to

achieve our objectives on the continent”.6

Realizing these stated goals seems challenging, and

some analysts are of the opinion that African affairs

are generally a low foreign policy priority for the US.

This basis for this belief was exemplified by France’s

deep engagement in Mali, contrasted with limited US

support for the operation at the time of France’s

intervention. Many were left puzzled by this, though

President Obama later recommitted the US to

combatting the scourge of terrorism in Mali. Foreign

Policy magazine described it as a “perfect illustration

6 U.S Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa June 2012

of the Obama Doctrine,” with the US “one contributor

among many” while “an American ally has been

working tirelessly to bring the United Nations forward,

provide a political solution, organize countries in the

region to provide troops, and take the lead in

operations”.

The Obama Doctrine

Foreign Policy’s assessment is correct: Obama’s

approach to the Mali crisis clearly illustrated the

Obama Doctrine – “UN Mandate, regional buy-in,

[and] leadership by an American ally”. Further,

President Obama reiterated the US’s role in the

military coup that overthrew a democratic government

in Mali, creating the instability that enabled Al Qaeda

to over run the country. The coup was the work of

military officers and units trained by the US. The

fighters working with Al Qaeda are veterans of the war

in Libya, armed with weapons looted there. It is

assumed that the attack on Mali is part of the

widespread insecurity that Libya’s transition has

created in the region, and US policy had done nothing

about it.

From this perspective, the US bears some culpability

for the terror engulfing Mali. The administration saw it

as a security interest for the new international order to

act in accordance with the Obama Doctrine, (though

US engagement was delayed for weeks, and the US

Ambassador to the UN described the UN plan as

“crap”). When France commenced their military

operation to prevent Al Qaeda and other Islamic

extremists from strengthening their hold on Mali, and

to eventually remove them from the territory, the

Obama administration demanded payment for any

military support provided. Ten days into the operation,

US officials hadn’t even decided whether to make air-

to-air refuelling sorties available for French planes.

According to the Obama administration, this was a

delay only caused by consultations with the French to

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assess how best the US could supplement the support

already provided by other countries. The Obama

administration then began to engage, but avoided

taking on the lion’s share of the work through a well-

coordinated strategy with allies, especially the French.

Regional conditions then exacerbated Mali's already

fragile situation, catching ECOWAS and the AU

unprepared.

Since the French intervention, the Obama

administration has made it clear that it has no intention

of putting boots on the ground. Rather, the US has

offered significant assistance to France and other

countries participating in the coalition to remove

Islamic extremist elements from Mali. US support has

included shared intelligence and airlifts of materials for

the French army, Air Force C-17 sorties transporting

personnel supplies and equipment to Bamako, and

refuelling of French air operations. The US has also

provided airlifts to countries in the sub-region including

Togo and Chad, and signed a status of forces

agreement with Niger. The agreement established the

framework for a potential military presence in the

region.

The Obama administration has clearly had a larger

role in the region, and must ensure that this role

succeeds. The September 11, 2012 attacks on the US

mission in Benghazi, where four Americans, including

US Ambassador Christopher Stevens died, as well as

the terrorist attack on a gas facility in western Algeria

that left three Americans dead, show that the US has

security interests in the region. It is necessary,

therefore, for the US to accept a role in containing the

threat of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other

terrorist groups that have threatened to establish a

safe haven in Mali. In May 2013, the president of Mali

warned that if the US and its allies do not contain the

unfolding insecurity situation in Libya, it could become

another Somalia, threatening the peace and stability of

neighbouring countries. This, he said, had been

exacerbated by the intervention of the French,

ECOWAS and the US in training the African military,

mainly West African forces, to deploy in the north,

which has historically been controlled by the French.

Other factors also include the Nigerian government’s

actions to remove Boko Haram from their territory.

Prior to the fall of northern Mali to Islamist extremists,

a US state department program had 100 trainers from

private security firms headquartered in Germany. The

program was known as the African High Command, or

AFRICOM. The mission of AFRICOM is sustained

security engagement. A long-term project whose value

will be seen in twenty years, it involves the following:

assistance in security capacity-building as requested

by African states, continual dialogue to ensure US

understanding of needs and wants, and going beyond

crisis response to actively promote the conditions that

prevent conflict. It operates as part of the US

government, and complements the policy goals of the

State Department and US Agency for International

Development. AFRICOM is coordinated with African

partners on a bilateral basis, and would also provide

support to multilateral African organisations such as

the African Union and regional economic communities.

Further, it will work with international partners,

including foreign donors and non-governmental

organisations (NGOs). Cooperation is not limited to

state actors: though the potential exists to partner with

civil society, the media and NGOs, the partnership

does not have direct link to economic development.

The specific focuses of AFRICOM include national

and regional capacity to participate in peace-keeping,

improved counterterrorism cooperation, defense

reform, professional democratic militaries, HIV/AIDS

85

awareness, and increased co-operation with

Europeans.7

The outgoing head of AFRICOM told the New York

Times that the Congressional Intelligence Committee

had not focused on Africa. AFRICOM can oversee all

of Africa (with the exception of Egypt), but its

headquarters has been in Germany. It is understaffed

and poorly financed for challenges that include

countering Al Qaeda in Mali, Islamist extremists in

Libya and armed rebellion in the Democratic Republic

of Congo. It was originally tasked with training of

African troops to provide and “African solution” to

Africa’s problems, but most of the troops it trained

over the past two years are barely up to the task of

defending their countries against new threats. With no

assigned forces on the continent except for a handful

based in Djibouti, AFRICOM itself remains weak.

Weak states in Africa are the new front of the global

war on terror, where the US faces a new generation of

Islamists. With budget cuts looming, Washington must

find a new way to address the emerging threat. It must

re-strategize how it addresses security, especially in

West Africa, which is challenged by terrorism and

fragile states that lack the capability to undertake their

own counterterrorism strategies. The training provided

by the US to Mali did not provide them the opportunity

to fight terrorism, especially in the face of poor salaries

and weak political infrastructure coupled with poor

governance and accountability controls.

ECOWAS Response

In response to the Mali crisis, heads of the states of

ECOWAS and the African Union met several times to

discuss a resolution to the conflict. Several steps were

taken at the regional and national level. Defense staffs

had meetings on the deployment of troops and use of

force as last resort. These meetings eventually

7 RUSI Africa Programme http://www.rusi.org/africa/ AFRICOM and US-Africa Relations Rusi Conference 18 February 2008

provided the framework for the greater UN role

promulgated bby UN Security Council Resolution 2085

and adopted by the Security Council at its 6898th

meeting on December 20, 2012. In February 2013, the

members of ECOWAS appointed Nigerians Shehu

Usman Abubakarr and Yaye Garba as commander

and deputy commander of the African-Led Military

Operation (AFLMO), and reviewed unfolding political

events and ways to accelerate deployment of the

African forces. They reaffirmed their commitment to

assist Mali in resolving the security situation, and

expressed their gratitude to France for leading the

operation to halt the advance of the terrorists groups

and pave the way for the implementation of UNSR

2085. They hailed Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria

and Togo for deploying their troops, and welcomed the

decision of Côte d’Ivore, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra

Leone to contribute to the contingent of AFLMO.

ECOWAS and the AU also formed a committee on

Mali to decide the best way to implement the

December 20 UN Resolution which endorsed the

deployment of AFLMO under chapter VII to resolve

the political crisis in Mali.

On February 28, West African leaders called for the

regional military action against Al Qaeda-linked rebels

in northern Mali to be transformed into a UN

Peacekeeping mission as quickly as possible to

secure desperately needed funds. Paris hoped that as

of March 2013 it could start withdrawing 4,000 troops,

but it instead had to wait for the effective deployment

of an African force plagued by logistical and financial

setbacks. At a meeting in Yamoussoukro, Côte

d’Ivoire, presidents of the West Africa regional bloc of

ECOWAS called on France, the US and Mali to lobby

for the mission to receive a UN peacekeeping

mandate. After struggling for four months to secure

funding for its deployment, international donors at a

meeting in Addis Ababa pledged over $455 million for

Mali, which later grew to $950 million. These pledges

86

are yet to be fulfilled. As it stands, the African-led force

and ECOWAS do not have the resources to fully

engage in the Malian crisis, and are still looking to the

UN, France, the US and other donors. The UN has

now given the go-ahead for the deployment of an

international force in Mali, though the majority of the

foot soldiers will be from ECOWAS and some other

African countries. Strangely, China has contributed

500 troops to protect Malian borders as the French

have commenced withdrawal of their troops.

Mali’s Crisis and its Implications for US National Security Strategy toward the Sub-Saharan Region

An essential part of the US National Security Strategy

in dealing with the global terrorism threat while

reducing direct US involvement is the build-up of the

capacity of partner nations and allies to do more for

themselves. The US spends millions of dollars to train

security forces worldwide, and has massively

expanded security assistance programs in Africa, the

Middle East and south/southeast Asia in order to build

regional defenses against the proliferation of Al Qaeda

and its affiliates. This strategy, though, has also

influenced military service plans for organizing,

equipping and training US forces. Events in Mali call

into question the US strategy, as tens of millions of

dollars were spent on equipment and training for

Malian security forces, the US Army and Special

Forces Command sent a number of training missions

to that country, and yet the coup still forced a halt to

US assistance activities and fractured the Malian

Army. While the French government’s decision to

assist Mali is commendable, its action also highlights

growing weaknesses in its military capability and by

extension those of the US and NATO allies.

One of many US foreign policy goals is “Preventing

future acts of international terrorism, defending US

allies’ security, helping other countries to build

democracies and promoting economic development in

other areas”. These goals correspond with the US

National Security Strategy and the US Strategy

Towards Africa. On June 27, 2010, the Obama

Administration released its first National Security

Strategy with a focus on the following; co-operation

and engagement, recognizing new global actors,

promoting constructive engagement, promoting

democracy and human rights, and ensuring strong

alliances. Key areas that have significance to Africa

have to do with the diversity and complexity of the

continent, which offers the US several challenges –

primarily disrupting and defeating Al Qaeda and its

violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan and

around the world; and denying safe havens and

strengthening at-risk states, wherever Al Qaeda and

its terrorists affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven

(as they have in Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb and

the Sahel). Wherever they move, the US will meet

them with growing pressure.

Even though the Obama administration is not one that

pursues leadership, it clearly has demonstrated that it

has a role to play. Therefore, its increased assistance

to the French and comprehensive support for the

African-led regional force, mainly ECOWAS, in

sustaining the assault on the Islamists rebels is vital.

Instability across North Africa and the Sahel is due to

the Arab Spring and the Obama administration’s

shortcomings in efforts to contain the emerging

threats. In a situation where weak governments are

unable to establish law and order, nefarious actors

including Al Qaeda affiliates have exploited the power

vacuum. Mali is an indirect consequence of the fall of

Libya’s Gadhafi regime. Tuaregs returning to Mali from

Libya contributed to the military coup, and some argue

that Mali’s predicament is a product of domestic

political crisis. Mali was far from a model democracy.

Corruption and marginalization by former President

Amadou Toumani Toure was rampant. The

87

deteriorating regional conditions exacerbated Mali’s

fragile situation.

Conclusion: Shortcomings and Recommendations

In proffering an assessment of shortcomings and

offering recommendations, there are some rhetorical

questions that are worth reflecting on. With all the

efforts invested in Mali by the US, why did the coup

take place and include defections of US-trained

soldiers to the Islamist rebels and remnants of Al

Qaeda? Does the US role in Africa only emphasize

economic development in line with US national

interest at the expense of building a strong regional

security institution? Will support for developing good

governance and strong institutions in Africa be a token

cause? Will a focus on supporting elections neglect

the effect of elections on institutions of governance,

democratic practice and human rights?

The US, through USAID, undertakes development and

humanitarian programs in Africa, but the fundamental

issue is whether that can fully succeed without a

strong security apparatus at both the local and

regional levels. The challenge for the US National

Security Strategy and the mission of ECOWAS is to

supplement militaries in protecting their own states,

help governments maintain their armies (particularly

with good salaries and equipment), and provide them

with the training and logistical support they need to be

a strong ally in the war on terror and prevent coups

and political instability at the local and regional level.

With the US not prepared to put boots on the ground,

strong support for African soldiers is necessary.

The situation in Mali suggests that the effort to build

the capacity of allies is more difficult, and results less

satisfying, than the US strategy assumes. Also,

despite commitments by NATO allies to bolster Malian

military capabilities and invest in assets such as ISR

platforms, logistics systems and aerial lift and

refuelling, the alliance is still deficient in these areas.

Finally, with the US looking to offload some of its

global security responsibility to allies and partners,

both shortcomings are bad for global security and the

nascent US counterinsurgency, cyber-security, and

antiterrorism operations. Some analysts have

described the US stance as rhetorical, and its strategy

on the ground in Mali as somewhat vague and half-

hearted – one in which the US keeps a close eye on

the situation but leaves most of the action to

international partners.

There are other shortcomings on the US side: the

Malians have been engaged in violations of human

rights as documented by the Human Rights Watch.

The US has legal constraints that prohibit it from

providing direct financial support to the Malians,

including the “Leahy Law,” which prohibits the US from

providing weapons or training to the security forces of

any foreign country if the Secretary of State has

credible evidence that they have committed gross

violations of human rights. Section 7008 of the Foreign

Assistance Act also prohibits the US from providing

support to a government that has been deposed by

military coup. Other issues with implications for the

US’s role have to do with the protection of civilians,

especially after the withdrawal of French troops from

Mali. To fill this absence, a UN peacekeeping mission

needs to be established and funded. The US therefore

needs to support the Africa-led peacekeeping force

proposed by ECOWAS and the AU, and support from

other non-African countries must have a bigger role in

curbing human rights violations in partnership with the

Malian government and other allies. Humanitarian

assistance needs are critical, as over 400,000 Malians

have been displaced. There is $373 million UN

humanitarian appeal for displaced Malians which

currently is grossly underfunded. The US has provided

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just under $1.5 million. The US needs to fulfil its

obligations in Mali with respect to human rights,

humanitarian assistance and holding of successful

elections, and leadership in Congress, the State

Department and the Pentagon need to bring forward

clear strategies to address these needs.

Todd Moss, senior research fellow at the Center for

Global Development, outlined the challenges that an

ECOWAS intervention force could encounter. He

argued that even with material and logistical support

from France and the US,8 ECOWAS would lack the

military capacity to engage in sustained counter-

insurgency combat in both urban areas and desert

terrain.9 Moreover, any new government formed in

Bamako will lack the political credibility needed to

implement a power-sharing agreement with the MNLA

rebels, or with other rightist Islamist groups. In

addition, Mali’s south holds ECOWAS in contention –

shortly after Captain Amadou Sanogo’s coup d’état,

for example, a regional delegation was barred from

landing at Bamako’s airport due to a political

demonstration against ECOWAS interference,

particularly its small peacekeeping force on standby

and the economic and monetary sanctions it had

declared.

Clearly, many question the regional body’s support for

peace and security in Mali. The Malian military also

has a tense relationship with ECOWAS, as it took

ECOWAS several weeks to hold openly acknowledge

issues within the Malian armed forces including

morale, their capacity for operations in the north, and

their alleged role in the arrest and torture of political

dissidents. ECOWAS cannot adopt a long-term role in

the country until such a role is based on a formal

request from a Malian national unity government. Until

8 Moss Todd ‘Why Malis Path to Peace Must Start in the South’ June 27 Available at; http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2012/06 9 ibid

then, the organisation must focus on its strengths:

assisting with civil-military relations programs,

professionalizing the armed forces, and building

security services that deal with regional threats to

stability. As Paul Williams and Jürgen Haacke argued

in 2008,10 the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and

Good Governance sets out clear principles for

constitutional law and appropriate civil-military

relations. Their conclusions were summarized by

Adam Sandor: “Some member states have better

track record than others in this regard, but in general

ECOWAS promotes a regional security culture

informed by regular patterns of instability within its

member states and regular involvement of its armed

forces”. An ECOWAS intervention force in Mali

comprised primarily of national territorial police and

paramilitary police could therefore remove major

impediments to security by targeting higher-level

trafficking networks and providing security along major

roads between major cities. ECOWAS needs to play

to its strengths by supporting a return to civilian rule

and promoting rule of law and security.

With regard to US support and military assistance,

AFRICOM needs to be fully funded and resourced,

and its mandate reintegrated into the ECOWAS

structure and mechanism with properly defined

coordination mechanisms. This will give it a quick-

response capability to deal with regional security

institutions and bolster support for any military

operation not led or undertaken by the US but with its

allies. Training support for defense teams in individual

countries must be harmonized and revamped to

address terrorism and counterinsurgency. African

militaries are poorly funded by their governments,

plagued by low salaries and marred by corruption and

patronage. Security sector reforms must be put in

10 Williams Paul D. and Haacke Junger (2008) Security Culture Transnational Challenges and the Economic Community of West African States’. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 26:2

89

place within the framework of good governance and

institutional accountability. There are successful

military and security mechanisms that have been put

in place that can be used as a guide for US support for

training in the region. Good governance and elections

must not be the end goal – the US must stay engaged

with weak states to prevent them from becoming

breeding grounds for Islamists and Al Qaeda

operatives. The support the US provides to France for

Mali is commendable, but not sustainable –the

regional body must be provided with not only training

but logistics to enhance their military role. The US also

needs to invest in post-conflict peace-building

programs while helping build the foundation for a

legitimate government. Elections are the most

democratic way forward, but as demonstrated in

Sierra Leone and Liberia, there must be support for

the post-election governance reforms, especially in

security and economic development. ECOWAS needs

to be provided with support for the ongoing

negotiation, reconciliation and mediation activities.

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NEW ISSUES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

IN A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD

91

92

Global Governance and the Quest for Multilateral Engagement

Insights and Prospects on the EU and U.S. “Virtuous Triangle”

It is now ten years after the release of EU foreign

policy chief Javier Solana’s European Security

Strategy, and the release of U.S. President Barack

Obama’s new National Security Strategy is imminent.

It is in this context that this essay will argue that,

despite the differences in terms of capabilities and

geopolitical spheres of intervention, Hobbesians and

Kantians are converging in a “virtuous triangle” of

values, norms and interests, where multilateralism and

engagement are the means to survive in a post-

hegemonic era.

Tackling concepts: Global Governance in a post-hegemonic era International Relations literature tends to agree that

after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the end of

the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States claimed

an uncontested hegemony. However, as the director

of the EU Institute for Security Studies writes, “the

post-Cold War ‘unipolar’ world turned ‘multipolar’, and

as a result the West can no longer tackle global issues

– made more pressing indeed due to this very

transformation – on its own any more than it can deal

singlehandedly with regional crises.” (Vasconcelos,

2009:5)

The September 11 attacks drew attention to the

vulnerability of a single power. The economic crisis,

which started in the US in 2008, soon had a domino

effect throughout the world, especially among

Europe’s fragile economic foundations. But if we agree

that those two events reshaped the international

relations and are changing global governance

patterns, how can we address global governance in a

post-hegemonic era? Although it is a contentious

label, we will define “global governance” as a growing

set of new tools, mechanisms, procedures,

instruments, institutions, actors and capabilities that

interact in a global network with common values and

norms, pushing society forward through consent and

transfer of skills. In this interpretation, global

governance emerges as a valid approach to

understand the new patterns of the post-cold war era.

As former US National Intelligence Council Chair

Robert Hutchings writes:

“U.S. leadership will be necessary but not

sufficient. It is necessary because no

other country or group of countries wields

the essential power and influence in each

of these areas – or as much capacity to

block action by others – as the United

States does. But the US lacks the

capacity to deliver progress entirely by

itself in any of them. The illusion that the

United States, as the sole superpower,

could solve global problems on its own

surely has been shattered by the

experience in Iraq over the past few

years. Nor would the emerging

distribution of global power and influence,

characterized by a dramatic shift of

Assistant Professor and Postdoctoral

Research Fellow at NICPRI – Research Unit in Political Science and International

Relations Ana Isabel Xavier NICPRI, Portugal E-mail: xavier.anaisabel@gmail.com

93

power and influence roughly from west to

east, permit a new global order to be

managed by a U.S.-European

condominium.”

(Hutchings, 2009: 120).

However, when Robert Kagan published his book

“Power and Weakness” in 2002, his argument was

clear: let’s stop pretending that the US and the EU are

not different, don’t have different strategic cultures,

interests, principles and values. Ten years later, the

author clarified that “the essay, and the book that

followed, have been viewed as a part of the Bush era,

a response to or justification of the transatlantic split

that opened over Iraq, a defense or inspiration for

Bush’s supposed ‘unilateralism’… The essay was

really a product of the 1990s.” (Kagan, 2012) Further

perspective is provided by Robert Cooper, who wrote

for the Hoover Institution:

When Kagan wrote his essay both the

EU and the U.S. were looking good,

especially the United States: victor in

the Cold War, solo superpower and

ready to use its power for good causes

– getting Saddam Hussein out of

Kuwait, making peace in Bosnia, and

rescuing Kosovo from a potential

genocide. The EU also was a winner in

the Cold War: Through enlargement it

was taking over from NATO as the

stabilizing force in Europe; through the

Economic and Monetary Union it was

going to enter a new phase of

integration; and it was endowing itself

with the instruments of diplomatic reach

and power projection.

This paper will question Kagan’s assumptions and

argue that both the United States and Europe are

fated to coexist and cooperate in a global governance

scenario and converge in terms of values and norms,

even if the geopolitical spheres of interest differ.

In fact, over the last several years, the U.S. and the

EU have been challenged in several ways, face the

same global threats. Only together can they hope to

prevent these threats from materializing. The EU is

undoubtedly a global player (Bretherton and Vogler,

1999): the enlarged Union combines more than 450

million people; it has one of the most competitive

currencies in the international financial markets; and it

is the world’s biggest economic unit, with the most

substantial trade volume with Africa, Latin America

and with the emerging markets in India and China.

Together, the EU Member States also form the

biggest donor of humanitarian aid in the world. As a

result, the EU has the ability to be a strategic actor on

the global stage and act as a community of norms and

values of stability and cooperation in many parts of the

world. Per Hettne and Soderbaum, “the type of power

exercised by the EU is of the ‘soft’ rather than the

‘hard’ type and based on economic instruments,

dialogue and diplomacy” (Hettne and Soderbaum,

2005).

In fact, Europe maintains a Kantian profile and aims to

be recognized as a normative power, but as nearly 30

crisis management operations in three different

continents have showed since 2003, the EU also has

the ambition to share the burden and produce security

in its neighborhood and beyond. At the same time, the

U.S. maintains its Hobbesian nature, as proven by the

administration's persistent failure to address the crisis

in Syria effectively, along with its backseat approach in

Mali and current debates on the drones policy. The

U.S. is shifting its prime interests to the Asia-Pacific

arena in order to assure its primacy and leadership.

However, if we read both actors’ Security Strategies

carefully (European Council, 2008; European Council,

2003; U.S. Government, 2010), Europeans and

94

Americans seem to be converging in a “virtuous

triangle” of values, norms and interests, agreeing that

in a post-hegemonic era the principle that shapes

international relations and affects global governance

patterns more than ever is multilateralism. In fact,

Solana first called for an effective multilateralism in his

2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), and the 2010

US National Security Strategy (NSS) recognizes the

importance of ensuring strong alliances, broad

cooperation and stronger institutions and mechanisms

for cooperation (U.S. Government, 2010: 40-47).

Therefore, ten years after the ESS and on the eve of a

new NSS, this essay endorses a policy of multilateral

engagement as a common strategy to deal with the

challenges of the 21st century.

The “virtuous triangle” of values, norms and interests in the European and US Security Strategies Proclaimed and adopted by the 83rd conclusion of the

2003 Brussels European Council, the Strategy

(European Council, 2003) presented by Javier Solana,

the EU's former High Representative for Foreign and

Security Policy, projects the EU as a producer and

promoter of norms and values for its surroundings and

rest of the world.

In addition, the Strategy argues that insecurity is

caused by poverty, disease and ignorance, which

leads to terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and

organized crime. Moreover, the ESS defends that the

political will is more valuable than the use of force and

that “we need to be able to act before countries

around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are

detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise”

(European Council, 2003: 11). That was one of

Solana’s calls, and while Giscard d’Estaing was trying

to restructure a politically disoriented Europe by

drafting a Constitution for Europe, Solana meant to

reshape the EU as a global player, recognizing that

the EU must take a more prominent position on the

international stage.

In his 2008 amendment (European Council, 2008),

Solana insisted upon the argument that no single

country can tackle complex problems on its own and

that terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, regional conflicts, state failure or

organized crime (the so called “new threats”) must be

prevented through a multilateral approach. Therefore,

he called for a more active, more capable and more

coherent European Union and reminded that security

and development are sides of the same coin if you

want to both prevent and fight against threats. This

assumption would also lead to the tangential debate

on securitization (vide Buzan and al, 1998).

In the U.S., the National Security Strategy (NSS) is,

undoubtedly, one of the most defining documents of

each administration. The NSS released on May 27,

2010 is even more important than many of the past,

since it represented the official Obama doctrine of his

first term. It starts with the assumption that:

“At the dawn of the 21st century, the

United States of America faces a broad

and complex array of challenges to our

national security. Just as America helped

to determine the course of the 20th

century, we must now build the sources

of American strength and influence, and

shape an international order capable of

overcoming the challenges of the 21st

century.

The European Security Strategy (2003 original text

and 2008 amendment) and the US National Security

Strategy (2010 version), can be conceptualized as a

simple triangle divided between values, norms and

interests.

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Starting with interests, we would argue that the main

interest of the European Union is to assure stability,

because political instability is the major threat to the

EU and therefore contributes to the world’s insecurity.

The more than 20 civil and military operations since

2003, in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, are an

attempt to keep the geographical frontiers of Europe

safe from the political instability that can also export

new threats to the EU. Indeed, it is clear that the EU is

gaining real confidence in its assumed role as an

external actor, distinctively European, neither NATO

nor UN. This is apparent in the different CSDP

missions, and as EU leadership recognizes the

advantages of it, the Union’s newfound confidence

must be sustained in future missions. However, there

is still a lack of visibility on the ground and within

European member states. What it has already

achieved is both rather fragile and too recent to fully

evaluate, and the main questions are if these great

efforts are sustainable and can reinforce the “global

player” visibility, and if they will make a real difference

in the political process of the countries where the EU

intervenes. Moreover, the EU stills lacks a grand

strategy to define its future undertakings in terms of

economic and political projects.

In the case of the US, with no major clashes between

Republicans and Democrats, we would argue that

primacy remains the central interest of the nation a

post-hegemonic era and the number one concern for

current and future administrations. In fact, Bush’s and

Obama’s National Security Strategies (2002, 2006 and

2010) agrees on the ambition that no emerging or

existing rivals whatsoever can challenge America’s

status as the great power and leader among nations.

In terms of values, we would argue that the EU’s

perspective is based in democracy, good governance

and human rights, reflecting the Copenhagen criteria

settled in 1993 in order to define the economic,

political and legal preconditions to be part of the

Union. For Obama, the values would also lie in

creation of a security apparatus based in democracy,

good governance, respect for human rights and rule of

law. For that purpose, the 2010 NSS highlights the

importance of leading by example, promoting

democracy and human rights abroad and meeting

basic needs (U.S. Government, 2010: 35-39).

Finally, in terms of norms, for the US the key would be

legitimacy. In this specific question, we could argue

that the Obama administration (as in Libya) is quite

concerned about the Security Council’s legitimacy as

a validation of preemptive measures. For the EU,

legitimacy is also the main norm, recognizing that “the

United Nations Security Council has the primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international

peace and security” (European Council, 2003: 9).

In sum, for both the U.S. and the EU, security is the

primary concern. Both consider democracy, good

governance, human rights prerequisites for all

societies to develop, and both act to prevent new

threats and meet new challenges. For that purpose,

the United Nations Security Council represents the

“temple” of legitimacy, giving approval and support for

their actions on the world stage.

The only element where Americans and Europeans

don’t seem to converge is in the attention given to

their role in the world. The EU’s focus is on stability for

its member states and its region – it “no longer wants

to rule the world, but it would be the world’s

schoolmaster” (Cooper, 2012). In contrast, the U.S.’s

interest is in primacy – it seeks to ensure that no other

player challenges American territory and allied

interests´ security. In other words, the U.S. is making

a “commitment to build a stronger foundation for

American leadership, because what takes place within

our borders will determine our strength and influence

beyond them” (U.S. Government, 2010: 2).

96

Nevertheless, despite their natural differences,

Americans and Europeans possess the qualities

necessary to work together, and share the same

values and norms with many actors all through the

world. Indeed, in a scenario of increasing

interdependence and interpolarity (Grevi, 2009), both

the EU and the U.S. must be committed to a more

effective cooperation among international, regional

and national state and non-state actors to deal with

the growing interconnectedness of present and future

challenges (AA.VV, 2007).

Prospects and final remarks

In this essay, we started by recalling Kagan’s call to

put in perspective the U.S. and EU’s differing

perspectives and approaches towards global

governance in a post-hegemonic era. For that

purpose, after defining the conceptual framework, we

highlighted the European and National Security

Strategies as the key documents demonstrating an

interests-values-norms triangle. For some, this

academic exercise might seem a poor comparison,

since we are contrasting a federal state, the U.S., with

a “non-identified political object” (Jacques Delors) with

28 different strategic cultures and a unclear

transnational identity influenced by different historical

backgrounds, levels of economic development,

geopolitical and geographical settings, a military

history, international relations, political cultures and

ideologies.

Therefore, we can reflect upon the fact that an EU

strategic culture may inspire references, guidelines,

tendencies but, until now, it does not oblige a common

action, nor a unique voice. It can inspire a guide to

action but, until now, has not provided a single unified

voice. For example, if we take into account the

legitimated use of force, and the impact on national

public opinions, in countries like France or the United

Kingdom, force can be understood as defending their

own interests. But in the traditionally neutral Nordic

countries such as Finland, Sweden or Denmark, force

should be restricted as much as possible and always

with strategic partnerships and a UN mandate or a

request by the host country. The diversity of a

particular society’s geographical, political, cultural and

strategic experience will produce multiple strategic

cultures. Consequently, EU member states are far

from being able to achieve a common strategic culture

and a transnational culture seems doomed.

At the same time, we cannot disregard the fact that

American administrations also face a structural

institutional reluctance – congressional opposition – to

surrender any national sovereignty in multilateral

endeavors. Some examples may be found on the

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,

the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination against Women, the Rome Statute of

the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol to

the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change, the World Health Organization Framework,

and the Convention on Tobacco Control.

But here we have decided to focus on other questions,

especially if we assume that “the decade has exposed

the weakness of power and the failure of rules”

(Cooper, 2012). So, how can global governance

instruments and a focus on human rights, democracy

and development help to maintain and project power?

How do we recognize and define power? If nowadays

power is shifting at a global level (Grevi, 2009: 17) to a

smart and “shared” approach (mixing Hobbesian and

Kantian options), how can success and leadership be

achieved?

Some authors can be helpful in advancing these

arguments. First, Moisés Naim claims that power is

slipping away and decaying, so we need to change

the way we think and talk about power (2013:1-2).

97

Second, Nye’s theses on “smart power” (2004; 2006),

defined as the combination of hard (meaning coercion

and payment) and soft power (persuasion and

attraction). In fact, in his most recent book, the author

quotes a speech given by Hilary Clinton, where she

admits that “America cannot solve the most pressing

problems on our own, and the world cannot solve

them without America. We must use what has been

called smart power, the full range of tools at our

disposal” (2012: ix).

But others besides the U.S. must pay attention to this

issue. If the European Union also wants to wield

“smart power,” it has to find ways to combine

resources into successful strategies and prove its

ability to affect others and spread its values, norms

and interests. We have to keep in mind that, first, the

EU is not a federal state, and security and defense

issues are still part of the individual member states’

“realms”; and second, that the EU is now facing one of

its most severe identity crises. The reality is that “the

EU needs to both exercise influence through soft

power and be able to deploy hard power in a targeted

and strategic way” (Grevi, 2005). In fact, the EU’s

capacities in action reveal its search for a strategy,

and the ESS may be considered only the embryo of a

future, more comprehensive European strategic

culture. But if the EU really aims to be a strategic actor

on the global stage, substantial efforts must be made

to avoid double standards and end internal and

external dissident chatter that questions the political

cohesion of the EU.

Consequently, the EU should be more comprehensive

in exploring the roots of conflicts, hone its policies to

fight against insecurity, and develop military forces

configured in new ways for new global security

scenarios. Regional conflicts, failed states, weapons

of mass destruction, human rights violations in general

– all these threats exemplify what the EU has to

resolve with instruments of both hard and soft power.

The EU must be cognizant of the financial crisis and

find a way to spend better without reducing the military

expenditure. To that end, we surely cannot disregard

the debate on “pooling and sharing” within the

European Union (Kempin, 2013) and “smart defense”

in NATO, which will have a direct impact on the U.S.’s

role in transatlantic policy and its shift to an Asia-

Pacific centered strategy.

But if we agree that the United States is unlikely to

decay or even to be surpassed in its primacy, it is also

true that the U.S. will need “a strategy to cope with the

rise of the rest, and will need to find a new narrative in

order to rediscover how to be a smart power” (Nye,

2012: 234). It will also need to adopt a mindset that

will provide “maximum flexibility, enabling us to plan

better for the future and minimize the effects of the

risks” (Idem: 233). As stated previously, the U.S. also

needs to redefine a grand strategy to assure its

primacy (with no emerging or existing rivals). To do

so, something is apparently missing between

containment (the trend in a cold war scenario as

stated in Kennan, 1946) and empowerment (the best

strategy to deal with the other’s dominance in a post-

hegemonic world, as argued by Subramanian, 2011).

One of the possible lessons learned from the EU

model and the European neighborhood policy is that,

between containment and empowerment, the key

might lay in engagement (Nye, 1995). In fact, strategic

partnerships and a coercive public diplomacy may

help the U.S. find a new “smart power” narrative.

And even if we agree that “on the all-important

question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality

of power, the desirability of power – American and

European perspectives are diverging” (Kagan, 2002:

3), we can also recognize that, with its strengths and

weaknesses, opportunities and threats, a multilateral

approach may be useful to diminish the gap between

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American and European power perspectives.

Moreover, if the United States still wants to see its

leadership abilities recognized in an uncertain post-

hegemonic world, the strategy must be clear with

regard to its national priorities – its approach to

regions including the near “backyard” (Latin America),

the rising powers (Asia and Pacific) and the major

current worldwide threats (North Korea).

Therefore, the next Obama National Security Strategy

must embrace a more “Kantian” approach, concerning

the core principles of democracy, social welfare and

individual freedoms. That surely demands “a global

response to global challenges” and a collective action

within international institutions, heralding a new era of

American multilateral engagement in global

governance issues. In a post-hegemonic era, the U.S.

strategy must focus on empowering local civil society

and governments to find their own development and

governance. In order to maintain its primacy, the U.S.

must engage more, and dictate less; support more,

and intervene less; and socialize more, but confront

less. Otherwise, it is likely to lose both support of its

citizens to be a leader in global governance, and its

primacy in stating what power is and who has the

skills and capabilities to define it.

References

AA.VV, 2010. Global governance 2025: at a critical conjuncture. Paris: EUISS (European Union Institute for Security Studies).

Adler, Emanuel; Michael Barnett (eds.), 1998. Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John, 1999. Europe as a global actor, Routledge, London.

Cooper, Robert, 2012. “Hubris and False hopes”. Policy Review, 172. Hoover Institution: Stanford University.

European Council, 2008. Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – providing security in a changing world. 11 and 12 December 2008.

European Council, 2003. A secure Europe in a better world - European security strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003.

Grevi, Giovanni, 2009. The interpolar world: a new scenario. Paris: European Institute of Security Studies, Occasional Paper 79.

Grevi, Giovanni, 2005. Reflections after the NO votes: what makes the EU an international actor? Available online at: http://www.gees.org/documentos /Documen-01692.pdf

Hettne, Björn and Soderbaum, Fredrik, Civilian Power or soft imperialism?, in: European Foreign Affairs Review (Volume 10), 2005, p. 535-552.

Hutchings, Robert, 2009. “The United States and the emerging global security agenda”. In Peral, Luis (ed.), Global security in a multipolar world. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Paper, n.º 108, 103-120

Kagan, Robert, 2012, “A comment on context”. Policy Review, 172. Hoover Institution: Stanford University.

Kagan, Robert, 2002. “Power and Weakness”. Policy Review. 3-28. Hoover Institution: Stanford University.

Kempin, Ronja, 2013. “How to maintain hard capabilities in times of budget cuts?”. Policy Paper 66. Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute.

Kennan, George, 1946. “The sources of soviet conduct”. Foreign Affairs.

Naim, Moisés, 2013. The end of power: from boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states – why being in charge isn’t what it used to be. New York: Basic groups.

Nye Jr., Joseph S., 2012. The future of power. New York: Public affairs

Nye Jr., Joseph S., 2006. “In mideast, the goal is ‘smart power’”. Boston Globe.www.boston.com.news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/08/19/in_mideast_the_goal_is_smart_power/.

Nye Jr., Joseph S., 2004. Soft power: the means to success in world politics. New York: Public Affairs

Nye Jr., Joseph S., 1995. “East Asian Security: The Case for Deep Engagement”, Foreign Affairs

Subramanian, Arvind, 2011, Eclipse: living in the shadow of China’s economic dominance. Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

United States Government, 2010. National Security Strategy. Washington D.C.

Vasconcelos, Álvaro de, 2009. “Multilateralising multipolarity II - Between self-interest and a ‘responsible power’ approach” in In Peral, Luis (ed.), Global security in a multipolar world. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Paper, n.º 108, 5-14.

99

Towards A Westerm Hemisphere Security Consortium?

PRESENTATION

The distribution of power is changing fast worldwide.

Traditionally, U.S. national security policy has been

founded on the principle of primacy. Sometimes this

primacy is interpreted as benevolent leadership, and

other times as cruel imperialism. But primacy in every

corner and in every issue is not longer a realistic

possibility – not in a multipolar and post-hegemonic

world. This paper discusses the effects of power shifts

in the Western Hemisphere particularly with regard to

U.S.-Brazil relations. The hypothesis is that the

strategic dialogue established between the United

States and Brazil could be the key to developing a

hemispheric security consortium. The development of

recent bilateral ties aims to an build an agreement to

manage security in the region. However, Brazil is not

alone in Latin America, and the rise of secondary

powers1 is becoming in an obstacle for the bilateral

configuration of that consortium.

1 In this paper the term “secondary power” is using in the sense issued by: Nolte, D. (2010). How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics. Review of International Studies, 36, 881-901.

In the first part of this paper we describe some effects

of multipolarity in the Western Hemisphere, particularly

regarding the rise of Brazil and its relations with the

United States using the Power Transition Theory

approach. In the second part, the strategic dialogue

explanation in presented, as well as some facts that

support the hypothesis of a closer and more security-

related relationship between the United States and

Brazil. In the third part we discuss the possibility of a

hemispheric security consortium, taking account the

policies of the ascending secondary powers in Latin

America. In the final part we present conclusions and a

short recommendation for U.S. national security

policymakers.

MULTIPOLAR EFFECTS IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Multipolarity is a common condition in the international

system. Since 1648, after the Peace of Westphalia,

when the main European powers recognized each

other as sovereign entities, more than eighty-seven

percent of the time the world’s politics have been

dominated by a multipolar order. A period of bipolarity

was an important era in the configuration of the current

world. However, the rivalry between the United States

and the Soviet Union is, in terms of historical time, a

blink. Despite that fact, the construction of international

images of power, and the development of international

studies, is still strongly influenced by Cold War logic.

The western hemisphere is sensitive to this, because

the principal institutions of regional governance –

especially the Pan-American conglomeration that is the

Organization of American States – are products of the

bipolar era.

The end of the Cold War had a similar effect in the

Americas as in the rest of the world. The regional

presence of the United States, though, remained

constant thanks to simple geography. Its power

projection to Eurasia since the middle of the nineties

creates favorable conditions for two political

Assistant Professor of Political Science and

Researcher at the CLES Latin American Center for Security Studies

Victor M. Mijares Simón Bolívar University, Caracas, Venezuela E-mail: vmijares@usb.ve

100

phenomena: the rise of the Bolivarian project launched

from Venezuela and inspired by Cuba; and the

necessity of a regional security-responsible power able

to exert influence, a role that fits with Brazil’s national

interest and capabilities. Both phenomena are related

to the post-hegemonic shift in the Americas, and the

multipolar world order.

Providing strong Latin American leadership became a

goal for Brasilia, and a necessity for Washington. For

the United States to be able to count on a strong Latin

American security partner was not important during the

bipolarity of the Cold War or the decade of America’s

undisputed primacy. But in a multipolar order, with an

American transfer of interests and forces to Eurasia,

and now to Asia-Pacific with the “pivot” strategy, Brazil

appears to be a proper security partner. However,

when a great power is losing international influence

and a rising power is gaining it, the chance of conflict

arises. That is the prediction of the Power Transition

Theory.2

According to PTT, the likelihood of conflict and

cooperation in international politics can be predicted by

comparing national capabilities and influence. Thus,

national power – in the form of population size,

economic performance, and military competence, as

well as location and interaction – could explain the

dynamics of a particular regional system. But as we all

know, capabilities are not enough. Joseph Nye defines

soft power as “the ability to shape the preferences of

others,” while “Hard power … rests on inducements …

or threats”.3

We can consider hard power or soft power, but the key

question of PTT is if the established power and the

rising one will clash or cooperate. The U.S.-Brazil

relation is closer to cooperation than to conflict, for two

2 Organski, A.F.K. (1958). World Politics. New York: Alfred Knopf. 3 Nye, J.S. (2004). Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, [Kindle edition: pos 213].

reasons: first, Brazil is far from a exceeding the power

of the U.S. – instead, its power in South America is

relative to the continent economically, diplomatically,

and militarily (as we will see in further in this essay);

and second, Brazil is not a revolutionary rising power,

it is a revisionist one – a power who does not want to

change the international rules, but to improve its

position and benefit in the existing structure. That

position in a multipolar world makes Brazil able to be

an interlocutor for both conservative and radical

governments. It is an implicit governability pact among

the Brazilian elite. These conditions are the basis for

the strategic dialogue between two asymmetrical

powers with different historical paths and interests, but

with the very same objective: stability in the Americas.

THE U.S.-BRAZIL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

What does strategic dialogue mean in the context of

U.S.-Brazil relations? A strategic dialogue is the

interaction between two or more major players in a

regional system. In terms of strategic thinkers like

Clausewitz or Schelling, a strategic dialogue is not

necessarily considered a peaceful interaction, because

the capability of threatening or hurting the counterpart

is always a rational alternative. Nevertheless, in the

U.S.-Brazil relation’s context we should understand

strategic dialogue as a diplomatic interaction in the

sense of international law and customs. The strategic

element in this kind of dialogue is given by the rational

interaction and the shared purpose of establishing a

regional security regime. According to that, not every

bilateral or multilateral international interaction is a

strategic dialogue in strict sense, because some

influence and capabilities are requested.

Considering this, the main question we must address

is: does Brazil have the strength to get into a strategic

dialogue about hemispheric security with the United

States? The short answer is no. The historic presence

of the United States in Latin America is a matter of

101

capabilities and cultural influence. American power

shapes hemispheric politics. But with American interest

focusing in other regions, an important role has been

left to Brazil, because, even when this emerging power

is not a symmetric interlocutor, its capabilities and

power have made it the first hemispheric choice for a

strategic dialogue. Thus, there is not a power transition

in the Western Hemisphere.

Brazil truly creates great expectations, but is a

frustrated power. Since the days of military regimes,

Brazilian elite have been dreaming of making the

country a global player. In the last fifteen years Brazil

has shown impressive economic performance; in ten

years, nearly forty million Brazilians (almost the total

population of Argentina) moved up from poverty to the

middle class. In the 2008 economic crisis, Brazil was

the first big national economy to officially leave behind

the recession. In regional diplomacy, Brazil launched

the MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL (Common Market of the

South) and UNASUR/UNASUL (Union of South

American Nations), and wove a political and economic

network of South American partners. In an early stage,

the southern nations were the main partners

(Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay), but lately the self-

proclaimed revolutionary governments became closer

to Brasilia. According to Randall Schweller4, that type

of alignment is common: a regional revisionist rising

power (a wolf) avoid risks in its relations with the

regional great power (a lion), while a radical-but-weak

power (a jackal) is able to confront, but unable to

transform its regional environment. The coalition

between wolves and jackals is natural because the

firsts give support while the latter take the risks of

diplomatic confrontation. But the international conduct

of states is not always lineal, especially in a multipolar

environment.

4 Schweller, R. (Summer, 1994). Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, 72-107.

The former Minister of Foreign Relations and current

Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, was the main

agent in the policy of keeping in touch with the great

powers. This process has become more active since

Dilma Rousseff came to office in early 2011. For

instance, in the Brazilian F-X2 project5 – an open

competition among major foreign aircraft companies

for the chance to sell Brazil its new fighter fleet –

Boeing’s F-18 Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, and

Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen were picked as finalists. During

Lula’s period, the French Rafale was the favorite, with

strong support from the former Minister of Defense, the

nationalist Nelson Jobim. But Jobim is no longer in

office, replaced with the pragmatic Amorim, and now

the Brazilian government is more favorable to the

American F-18 Super Hornet.

The U.S.-Brazil strategic dialogue is based, as we

already said, in an important common objective:

hemispheric stability. Democracy, human rights, and

the free market are marginalized in the bilateral

agenda, while strategic security issues are paramount.

The United States expects Brazil to be a responsible

regional security stakeholder. In order to facilitate that,

the Obama administration is giving Brazil political

recognition as a strategic security partner, even with

the asymmetry of power, and Brazil is expecting the

support it needs to become an official great power with

a permanent seat in the UN Security Council as the

legitimate representative of Latin America. The United

States seems not completely sure about giving that

position to Brazil, and Brazil is not completely able to

be what the United States expects. For those reasons

the dialogue is still immature and imperfect.

5 Defense Industry Daily Staff (2013 June 19). Brazil’s F-X2 Fighter Competition. Defense Industry Daily. Retieved from: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-embarking-upon-f-x2-fighter-program-04179/

102

A HEMISPHERIC SECURITY CONSORTIUM?

What is a regional security consortium? The Cold War

experience provides very few bases for the

development of this concept. During the period of

bipolarity, the two superpowers had different levels of

conflict and episodes of mutual recognition. The

détente was the closest approach to a global security

regime beyond the formal agreement established in

the UN Security Council. In multipolar systems, the

balance of power is the common outcome in which the

risk-taking and risk-aversion behaviors create a natural

but precarious international stability. Before answering

the first question, we must address another one: what

kind of sub-system is the Western Hemisphere? The

massive and unmatched power of the United States

means it is not bipolar, unless we accept a very

unbalanced bipolar system, which is a contradiction. It

is not a multipolar sub-system, where the competitors

are not ready yet to get into a strategic dialogue (taking

Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, and Chile as Latin

American secondary powers that could be able to play

a more active role in hemispheric security). Thus, the

Western Hemisphere is a transitional system moving

from unipolarity to an unknown system. For radical

governments, the preference is multipolarity, but for

Brazil the best choice is bipolarity.

Considering that, we can define a regional security

consortium as a relatively informal agreement among

two or more major powers able to dominate security

issues and establish a fluent strategic dialogue. The

foundations of that dialogue are common international

interest, common political values, and common

strategic culture. A Western Hemisphere security

consortium could be the condition for a proper post-

hegemonic regional reality. The increasingly close

relationship between the U.S. and Brazil looks like the

dawn of this agreement.

But how could an immature and imperfect strategic

dialogue be the beginning of a hemispheric security

consortium? The answer may be seen in the

reengagement strategy of the U.S. and its increasing

commitment to the Asia-Pacific rim. The Asia Pivot,

geostrategic commitments in Eurasia, and increasing

interest in Africa bring Brazil the opportunity of sell

itself as the only and necessary partner in Latin

America. In the spring of 2008, U.S. Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice and Minister of External Relations

Celso Amorim started a round of mutual consultations

about the future of the western hemisphere. In the late

fall of that year, Brazil successfully proposed the

establishment of the South American Defense Council

within the South American Nations Union (the

UNASUR). Despite the dominant anti-American

rhetoric of the Council, the State Department officially

supported the collective defense initiative.

During Barack Obama’s visit to Brazil in March 2011,

diplomatic tensions arose because of Libya. The no fly

zone imposed by NATO, the support to the Libyan

rebels in Benghazi, and the UN Security Council

Resolution 1973 were criticized by Rousseff’s

government. In a multipolar world with rising powers, a

regime change operation conducted through a military

intervention by NATO could not be tolerated, according

to Brazil. Despite that bitter experience, the two

American powers understood that they needed each

other in order to dealing with the hemisphere’s stability

and power projection. In May 2013, during his Latin

American tour, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said in

Rio de Janeiro: “You can no longer claim ‘We are a

developing nation.’ You have developed… What goes

with that is worldwide responsibility to speak, to speak

out.”6 The U.S. is looking for a security partner in the

6 Barnes, T. (2013 May 29). Biden praises Brazil in speech, calls country ‘developed’. Miami Herald. Americas. Retrieved from http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/29/3422908/biden-praises-brazil-in-speech.html#storylink=cpy

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western hemisphere, and Brazil is available to take the

job. The possibility of a hemispheric security

consortium gives the U.S. and Brazil not only the

possibility to improve their relations, but also the

conditions to act toward regional stability in their

mutual best interest. The consortium may build the

foundations of a new security governance framework

in a post-hegemonic world.

However, a new frustration for Brazil cannot be

completely avoided. Their informal but geopolitically

relevant project with the U.S. has external resistance:

Hispanic American countries in the Pacific Alliance.

Peña Nieto’s Mexico foreign policy strategy is about an

assertive approach to Latin America. Since the North

American Free Trade Agreement of 1994, Mexico’s

geopolitical influence in the hemisphere crumbled as it

focused exclusively its relation with the United States.

Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile create the Pacific

Alliance, a bloc of rising Latin American economies

with shores on the Pacific Ocean. This bloc is

motivated by the increasing importance of the Pacific

rim, and inspired by the same principles of the Trans-

Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership: the

liberalization of markets in an environment of trust in

order to promote security cooperation and prosperity.7 In a multipolar world, an economic bloc is more than it

appears, because the political alignments are not

completely settled. That gives a post-economic

characteristic to the economic blocs, a geopolitical

sense. The Pacific Alliance is a response to two major

phenomena in the Western Hemisphere: the post-

hegemonic rapprochement of the United States toward

Latin America, and the rise of Brazil. The Pacific

Alliance’s strength may introduce a weakness into the

U.S.-Brazil hemispheric security consortium.

SOME CONCLUSIONS 7 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership. TPP Agreement. Retrieved from: http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/main-agreement.pdf

The strategic dialogue between Washington and

Brasilia is an important pillar for hemispheric security,

and it is possible that its importance will increase

further in the future. The United States needs a Latin

American security partner if it wants to fulfill the

requirements of the Pivot strategy without any security

trouble in its own hemisphere. Its main threats are

overseas, but in order to be able to project power

across the globe, the great power needs a stable

neighborhood. As already discussed, Brazil is the

obvious choice. For its part, Brazil needs to project its

power in the region as a responsible security

stakeholder. This emerging power is not a great power,

capable of dealing with regional security issues single-

handed, but for now it is the only power with some

capabilities and influence across Latin America. Due to

that, the prospect of a regional security governance

framework is a possibility with Brazil.

At a first glance, a hemispheric security consortium

seems possible and desirable. It could be possible,

because no other single Latin American country is in

Brazil’s position to become in a regional security

manager, and it is desirable since that consortium

might ensure stability as a regional security

governance regime. However, the foreign and security

policies of other Latin American countries overshadow

the possibility and the desirability of the project. The

Pacific Alliance is a response to Brazil’s power position

in the region. Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile are

not trying to take the lead in the region, but to be global

players outside of Brazil’s influence. Brazil is not an

attractive security partner if it cannot be taken as the

undisputed leader of Latin America. Recent protests

within Brazil are an obstacle to that. citizen

mobilization over grievances are not unusual in rising

countries, because growth is often accompanied by

inequality and corruption, at the same time as citizens’

expectations and standards are rising. But if Brazil

starts to retract its economic and political capabilities,

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its power projection will suffer, and the path to a

security consortium would be uncertain.

Despite the appearance, this is not a major dilemma

for U.S. national security policymakers. It is a fact that

Washington is trying to reinforce its presence in the

Pacific rim, with special attention to China’s seas, but

in order to do that its own hemisphere must be stable.

Brazil is the most important single security partner, and

a fluent strategic dialogue with Brasilia is essential. But

South American power cannot drive regional security

conditions alone. The Andean countries and Mexico

are taking more substantial roles in the hemisphere

and elsewhere in Asia-Pacific, the region in which the

United States wants to run its main power projection

capabilities. The hemispheric security consortium

should be more than a two-way agreement. The

strategic dialogue with Brazil is a must, but is not

enough in order to deal with a rapidly changing

security environment.

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The Rising Power of Civil Society and the Role of Social Networks in a Post-

American Hegemonic Era1

Over the last five years, the fissures within the social,

economic, and political structures of countries across

the Middle East have become increasingly clear.

Though the components of their societies have largely

remained the same, the balances of power between

them has begun to shift. Citizens have begun to slowly

re-shape their societies and leaders according to their

own needs and values. As this process unfolds, we

must take note of its emerging characteristics –

namely, the weakening of centralized states and the

disappearance of the traditional paradigm of

government and government relations.

In the short term, the re-shuffling of societies and

politics will mean domestic chaos, heightened

polarization, the deterioration of law and security,

international uncertainty, and at times, civil war. Yet

the more decentralized these states become, the

more room will be created for change and the

emergence of a new order. This process will take time.

1 Special thanks to Olivia Holt Ivry for her assistance in this publication.

Amid the mayhem, new actors have emerged. Some

are destructive, violent, and radical, while others are

constructive and more democratic. To empower the

latter and weaken the former, we must adjust our

strategic approach to national security. Alongside

traditional “hard power” tools such as weapons and

fences, we must continue and increase engagement

with constructive actors and empower them to

challenge and produce alternatives to the destructive

forces on their own. We must make them into islands

of stability.

Our national security approach must be flexible,

capable of integrating new tools and dispensing the

obsolete ones, and cognizant of the ebb and flow of

social dynamics and the emergence and

disappearance of new actors. Rather than trying to tip-

toe around the newly empowered “Arab street,” for

example, which is inherently emotional, irrational,

unstable, and unpredictable, we must learn to

navigate it, harnessing its energy toward our national

security goals. Redefining national security according

to these principles will ground state security in civil

society, reducing their dependency on individual

governments or officials and stabilizing their doctrines.

This broader foundation is especially critical at a time

of widespread unrest, and will provide a basis for

future growth.

The Obama Doctrine is a reflection of the changing

face of national security. The President's national

security approach is more restrained, centering on a

principle of being internationally “present, but not

deeply involved.” It emphasizes doing more with less

– using new tools and technologies and a combination

of soft and hard power, such as economic sanctions

and drone strikes, to engage in combat from afar. This

puts fewer lives at risk and diffuses perceptions of the

U.S. as an “occupying” or “imperialist” power.

At the same time, however, the President understands

Researcher at the INSS on Social Media in

the Arab World Orit Perlov Institute for National Security Studies, Israel E-mail: orit.perlov@gmail.com

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that this combative approach to national security is

only one end of the equation, and must be

accompanied by an embrace of local leaders to

empower them to marginalize militants on their own.

The U.S. National Security Strategy released by the

White House in May 2010 calls for "broad conception

of what constitutes our national security...while

preserving the flexibility to endure setbacks and to

make necessary adjustments." It outlines a strategy in

Afghanistan for "focusing assistance on supporting the

President of Afghanistan and those ministries,

governors, and local leaders who combat corruption

and deliver for the people," and a domestic strategy

to "empower… communities to counter radicalization"

in the U.S.

Social networks (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and

YouTube) are key tools of communication, whose

incorporation into national security strategy will

achieve many of the aims outlined above. Their

penetration into Middle Eastern civil societies provides

a pathway to building domestic alliances between

nations and societies - highly valuable assets in

national security. They allow for discourse and

collective action between actors with a mutual interest

in strengthening civil society. These tools are able to

build where hard power tools destroy. The more

domestic actors engage in such a discourse, the more

likely they are to direct their efforts towards stabilizing

their society. This momentum is worth sustaining,

since it is often citizen apathy and fear that allows

radical groups to take root.

The usage of social networks in the Middle East has

evolved to deal with its emerging challenges. Where

democracy is lacking, social networks provide a

democratic platform; where rigid social structures

marginalize women and minorities, they act as an

equalizer. Their most useful purposes are as follows:

• Intelligence collection and understanding social,

political, and economic trends

• Building trust and improving relations between

nations

• Public messaging and diffusing social tensions

• Tracing young leaders of civil societies and public

opinion, both on the national and local levels

• Mobilizing members of civil society to become

partners in national security

1. Intelligence collection and understanding social, political and economic trends

Social networks provide access to a wider spectrum of

societal groups that were inaccessible in the past. At

any given moment, these networks expose viewers to

the voices of about 10-30% of each country

represented. They provide a cross-sectional view of

the educated middle class and the youth (ages 18-40).

We hear different voices at different volumes on

different topics across all ages, sexes, religions,

professions, and locations.

As such, social networks are excellent tools for the

collection of information. They allow us insight into the

trends and discussions of the Arab street. Whereas in

the past, interactions between the countries of the

Middle East largely took place at the official level,

these same countries now have access to the

unofficial strata of society. Finally, we have full

transparency, and the depth of the conversation can

help us to paint a more reliable picture of reality.

Moreover, during periods of national chaos, when it

may be difficult to glean accurate information from

official channels, social networks remain pockets of

stability. Possible benefits to intelligence communities

include the following:

• A clearer picture of domestic social dynamics,

including the push-and-pull between different

societal segments (i.e. religious vs. secular, etc.)

• A more accurate and comprehensive gauge of

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public opinion towards countries, governments,

armies, politics, and societies

• Greater access to the sermons of various religious

leaders and a deeper understanding of their

religious doctrines (via YouTube)

• Insight into interactions between politicians and

social media members on matters of policymaking

• More transparent depictions of the foreign and

domestic stances of various political parties

• A streamlined and more accurate mechanism for

following developments on the ground

• Real-time photos

Case Study: Syria - Intelligence Analysis in the Middle of Chaos

Since the revolution in Syria began in March 2011, the

world has witnessed a civil uprising that has devolved

into a bloody civil war. Demands for socio-economic

reforms quickly devolved into calls for the fall of the

Assad regime and the ongoing conflict has resulted in

more than 80,000 dead, over one million refugees and

three million displaced persons all over the country. As

the political and armed opposition bodies were

established, various militias popped up and new

actors—both constructive and destructive, both Syrian

and foreign—emerged. Despite the chaos, it is still

possible to document the unfolding of events, analyze

the trends in civil society, understand the leadership of

the various militias, and trace the civilian responses

from neighboring countries affected by the conflict.

Who are these actors? What are their agendas? What

are the fears and aspirations of each sect within Syria

– the Kurds, Christians, Alawites, Druze and Sunnis?

What kind of weaponry is being used by the regime

and the militias? Who are the leaders of public opinion

within civil society? Social networks are virtually the

sole platform that allows us to analyze all of the above

and more. Traditional and mainstream media have

become nearly obsolete; they, too, depend on the

social media.

Unlike in the past, we can now feel the heartbeats of

the conflict and hear the voices of civil society. About

12-15% of Syrian citizens are active members of

social networks. Syrians are constantly updating and

posting information, using YouTube and Facebook to

document massacres in real-time, the movements of

the rebels, the kinds of weapons being used, all of

which lends further depth to our analyses of the

conflict. This affords us insight into the various

opposition groups, such as the FSA and al-Nusra, and

what each stands for. It helps us answer such

questions as: are these new leaders legitimate in the

eyes of the Syrian people? Should the international

community intervene? Should countries transfer arms

or money to the rebel groups and if so, to whom?

What is the end game? What will the post-Assad order

look like? What are the implications for the stability of

the neighboring countries – Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan

and Israel? What are the foreign interests that are

prolonging or exacerbating the conflict? Intelligence

agencies are increasingly looking to social networks to

answer these questions. For the United States and

other western nations seeking to form international

coalitions against the Assad regime, it is essential to

use these tools.

2. Building Trust and Improving Relations between Nations

Social networks are unrivaled tools of communication

that allow us to observe and influence others. With

their huge audience of around 40-50 million people

across the Middle East, they hold great potential for

generating solidarity, breaking old models of thinking,

and building trust. As democratic platforms that give

an equal voice to every member in a shared space,

they facilitate discussion among the masses and open

new means of interaction and opportunities for

engagement.

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Case Study: Egypt and the U.S.

Egypt has undoubtedly maximized the use of social

networking tools, enabling simultaneous dialogue

within the population. 15 million out of Egypt’s total

population of 95 million are active users of social

networks. Egyptian President Morsi, the ruling

Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), prominent Egyptian

journalists, religious figures, various opposition

parties, politicians, and almost all of the young

generation of the middle and upper classes interact

online. In short, anyone who is literate and has

Internet access has a Facebook, YouTube, and/or

Twitter account. Many also maintain blogs.

Although U.S. embassy social networking accounts

are regularly active, the U.S. government has not yet

figured out how to exploit them to their fullest

potential. Today, they are used mostly for informal

diplomacy, for the dissemination of information (i.e.

President Obama’s policies) and for building bridges

with the young generation of Egypt to minimize anti-

American sentiment.

Many young Egyptians value this direct, online

interaction with the U.S. because they feel that their

voices are finally being heard. Yet the attitudes of this

young generation towards the U.S. are still

ambivalent. On the one hand, the revolutionaries,

particularly the democratic, liberal and secular youth,

want U.S. support. Initially, they had hoped their

mutual values with the U.S. would win them ample

support. However, much to their chagrin, they now feel

that the U.S. is exclusively supporting Morsi and the

Muslim Brotherhood because they were

“democratically elected.” They feel that the U.S. has

allowed its interests, such as the safe passage

through the Suez Canal, the peace agreement with

Israel, and military cooperation, to trump its values.

They think that because the Muslim Brotherhood was

elected in a relatively fair democratic fashion and they

and the army are the most politically organized

bodies, the U.S. has decided to engage with them at

the expense of the younger generation and

revolutionaries.

It is not too late to influence these perceptions. The

U.S. should take advantage of the various social

media channels available in Egypt today to explain

their policies and commitments.

3. Public Messaging and Diffusing Social Tensions

With their wide reach and penetration, social networks

facilitate the spreading of ideas and information, which

are invaluable tools for public messaging. They have

removed the middle man from the conversation,

allowing users to petition wide sections of society

directly and simultaneously. Since there is thus far no

limit to their use, the platform provided by social

networks is literally endless, and the full scope of its

influence is yet unknown. As such, social networks are

highly useful for influencing public opinion and

combating the delegitimization of some voices.

Case Study: Israel-Gaza and “Operation Pillar of Defense”

The past has proven that social networks are the most

effective preemptive tools for real-time information

dissemination and warnings of military intentions.

These tools make it harder for the adversary - whether

it be a state or organization - to shirk responsibility for

mass unpreparedness and circulate falsehoods to

manipulate public opinion. This was demonstrated in

November 2012, during ‘Operation Pillar of

Defense’—Israel’s operation to put an end to ongoing

rocket fire from Gaza into Israel. We witnessed real

time online psychological and informational warfare

between the IDF’s social network accounts and the ‘al-

Qassam Brigade.' The ‘al-Qassam Brigade’ account

continuously disseminated false information about

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rocket attacks in Israel in an attempt to falsely portray

“success.” The IDF preempted this strategy by

circulating photos and YouTube videos of where

rockets actually hit. This diminished the success of

Hamas’ propaganda campaign. In the future, the U.S.

could also make use of social networking platforms to

preempt false information about their use of drones

and paint a more in depth picture of drone attacks and

other military operations.

4. Tracing Young Leaders of Civil Society and Public Opinion on the National and Local Levels

What made the Arab Spring unique was its

convergence with the Facebook revolution. For the

first time, revolutions had faces, voices, and

conversation. Social networks can help us to track the

messages and followings of social media leaders,

introducing us to new actors and new organizations.

Case Study: Jordan, “The King and ‘Y’”

The more one uses social networks, the more clear it

becomes who are the leaders of local, regional, and

national public opinion. A recent example of this can

be seen in Jordan, where King Abdullah II attempted

to preempt the threat of popular revolution by

engaging young middle class activists on issues of

reform in the lead-up to the 2013 elections. Fearing

that his regime might be compromised by existing

unrest and political Islamic attempts to undermine his

authority, the King realized the need to expand his

traditional support base of tribal sheikhs, and began to

curry favor with young middle class supporters of his

constitutional reforms. By following the various social

network trends and tracing public opinion leaders, the

King knew which relevant activists to invite to youth

forums. He listened to the critiques of the young

generation, making them feel as if their voices were

heard and securing their support for his reforms. His

approach was successful: not only did young public

opinion leaders support the King, but voter turnout

was higher than the previous election. This thwarted

the Muslim Brotherhood's attempts to boycott the

election, which would have harmed the democratic

process. This is a potent example of how social media

can be used to foster partnerships between local,

regional, and national interests.

5. Mobilizing Civil Society to Become Partners in National Security

In the past, the most effective tools for indoctrination

and mobilization in the Middle East were the radio and

Mosques. These are no longer sufficient. Social

networks have become the best tools for mobilizing

appropriate communities for specific goals. They can

help to build domestic consensus around causes.

Case Study: Egypt (Anti-Harassment of Women) and Libya (Disarming of Militias)

In recent years, we have witnessed the power of

social media to mobilize populations all over the

Middle East for national security causes. In Egypt,

social networks have mobilized a campaign, called

OpAntiSH, against sexual harassment of women.

There are now numerous citizen volunteer groups that

accompany women into Tahrir square and other

protests to protect them against rampant harassment.

The protests in Libya against armed militias in 2012

provides another example of how citizens might be

mobilized to become partners in national security. In

Benghazi, over 50,000 Libyan protestors took to the

social networks and the streets in outrage over the

assassination of the U.S. ambassador, Chris Stevens,

calling for those harboring the perpetrators to hand

them over for trial and for the independent militias to

lay down their arms. Within 2-3 days, the perpetrators

were handed over and militants began turning in their

weapons.

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6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The changing face of national security in the post-

American hegemonic era requires attendant

adaptations of U.S. national security doctrine. The

dispersal of power from states to smaller, non-state

actors and organizations demands a wider integration

of civil society into national security and a more multi-

disciplinary approach to broader engagement. Hard

power can no longer stand alone – to be effective, it

must be fused with soft power, the combination of

which can be called “smart power."

Social networks constitute a crucial tool of this new

“smart power,” given their effectiveness in intelligence

collection, building trust and improving relations

between nations, public messaging, tracing young

leadership of public opinion, and mobilizing civil

society. Yet these are not the only tools. Any one tool

is meant to be used in concert with others and social

media is no different. On a national level, hard power

tools can destroy, whereas soft power tools like social

media can build. On a regional level, state-to-state

diplomacy remains crucial, but will be stronger when

rooted in ground-up diplomacy between civil societies.

On a domestic level, in security fields such as

counterterrorism, social networks can help the state

solicit public help in identifying potential or confirmed

terrorists, as was the case in the aftermath of the

Boston Marathon bombings. On each of these levels,

different tools help to fill the gaps left by others,

creating a stronger and more comprehensive solution

to national security problems.

I believe that in the future, social networks will become

an indispensable tool in U.S. national security and

foreign policy. As the U.S. maximizes its use of these

tools, the extent of their potential will become

increasingly clear.

Institute for Training and Development 447 West Street, Amherst, Massachusetts

www.itd-amherst.org

Publication Design by Abril Navarro, Logistical Coordinator

Editing by Owen Hooks Davis

October 2013