Freud, Husserl and Psychosis

Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online

ChapterTitle Freud, Husserl And “Loss Of Reality ” : Classical Psychoanalysis, Transcendental Phenomenology And

Explication Of Psychosis

Chapter Sub-Title

Chapter CopyRight - Year Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010(This will be the copyright line in the final PDF)

Book Name Phenomenology and Existentialism in the Twenthieth Century

Corresponding Author Family Name OlsvikParticle

Given Name Egil H.Suffix

Division

Organization

Address Please provide City, Please provide State, Please provide Country

Email

Abstract In the following paper I am not going to deal with psychiatry in the traditional sense, but with what psychiatryis dealing with. Or, more precisely; with what psychiatry ought to be dealing with.Freud’s psychoanalysis hasboth been influential for, and been influated by existential philosophy in the twentieth century. Freud’s attitudetowards philosophy was deeply ambivalent – he both rejected most of philosophy as being forms of sublimation,and regarded rationalism as a defensive strategy relative to the alienating primary processes of the unconscious.But Freud’s own meta-psychology, as ex. in the Jenseits des Lustprinzips – may be read as a genuine attemptin existential phenomenology. Given that Freud’s psychoanalysis has contributed strongly to the configuration ofmodern subjectivity, a philosophical, phenomenological analysis of Freud may elucidate deep a historicity of modernsubjectivity.My efforts in this paper are twofold; first I try to demonstrate how Freud’s theory bears heavily uponclassical thinking of our tradition. I claim that Freud was in fact re-collecting, or even maintaining a deep current inthe Western humanistic tradition, hinting to unruly powers of a an un-personal “Will” constantly pressing on to breakfree. Freud’s originality thus lye less in conceiving new ideas, than in demonstrating unthought-of dimensions andconsequences in ex. Kant’s model of the mind. Thus Freud is able to see a rudimentary theory of psychopathologyalready described by the tradition.Secondly, and this is my main point in this paper, is that that Freud in fact ordereda phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation of his own work, and if read in this perspective, a new horizonopens for psychoanalysis. To achieve this I will demonstrate an often overlooked resemblance of Freud’s theory ofthe unconscious and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of the “will” (as in HUA XV), which may then be seenas a genuine motivational theory of the Self.My interpretative suggestion is that Freud wanted to explicate deep,existential consequences of an uncanny knowing in the Self of both being the source of its enduring existence –and at the same time having the notion of not being its own origin. The Self, therefore, has an aporetical, almostirrealizing appearance to it’s Self, hence being under a constant pressure of ontological inconstancy, which mayupsurge as profound psychical irruptions, witch may be labelled “pathological”.In conclusion I argue that the mainlack in psychoanalysis is a fuller theory of constitution, which Husserl’s phenomenology perhaps may provide. Isuggest a thorough phenomenological re-reading of Freud, in order to provide a potent theoretical contribution topsychopathological research.

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F

SPB-192269 Chapter ID 16 January 5, 2010 Time: 09:48am Proof 1

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

E G I L H . O L S V I K

F R E U D , H U S S E R L A N D “L O S S O F R E A L I T Y ” :

C L A S S I C A L P S Y C H O A N A L Y S I S ,

T R A N S C E N D E N T A L P H E N O M E N O L O G Y

A N D E X P L I C A T I O N O F P S Y C H O S I S

A B S T R A C T

In the following paper I am not going to deal with psychiatry in the traditionalsense, but with what psychiatry is dealing with. Or, more precisely; with whatpsychiatry ought to be dealing with.

Freud’s psychoanalysis has both been influential for, and been influated byexistential philosophy in the twentieth century. Freud’s attitude towards phi-losophy was deeply ambivalent – he both rejected most of philosophy as beingforms of sublimation, and regarded rationalism as a defensive strategy relativeto the alienating primary processes of the unconscious. But Freud’s own meta-psychology, as ex. in the Jenseits des Lustprinzips – may be read as a genuineattempt in existential phenomenology. Given that Freud’s psychoanalysis hascontributed strongly to the configuration of modern subjectivity, a philosoph-ical, phenomenological analysis of Freud may elucidate deep a historicity ofmodern subjectivity.

My efforts in this paper are twofold; first I try to demonstrate how Freud’stheory bears heavily upon classical thinking of our tradition. I claim that Freudwas in fact re-collecting, or even maintaining a deep current in the Westernhumanistic tradition, hinting to unruly powers of a an un-personal “Will” con-stantly pressing on to break free. Freud’s originality thus lye less in conceivingnew ideas, than in demonstrating unthought-of dimensions and consequencesin ex. Kant’s model of the mind. Thus Freud is able to see a rudimentary theoryof psychopathology already described by the tradition.

Secondly, and this is my main point in this paper, is that that Freud in factordered a phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation of his own work, andif read in this perspective, a new horizon opens for psychoanalysis. To achievethis I will demonstrate an often overlooked resemblance of Freud’s theory ofthe unconscious and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of the “will” (asin HUA XV), which may then be seen as a genuine motivational theory of theSelf.

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana CV, xx–xx.DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3785-5_16, C© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80


My interpretative suggestion is that Freud wanted to explicate deep, existen-tial consequences of an uncanny knowing in the Self of both being the source ofits enduring existence – and at the same time having the notion of not being itsown origin. The Self, therefore, has an aporetical, almost irrealizing appearanceto it’s Self, hence being under a constant pressure of ontological inconstancy,which may upsurge as profound psychical irruptions, witch may be labelled“pathological”.

In conclusion I argue that the main lack in psychoanalysis is a fuller theory ofconstitution, which Husserl’s phenomenology perhaps may provide. I suggesta thorough phenomenological re-reading of Freud, in order to provide a potenttheoretical contribution to psychopathological research.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

In most of psychiatry, even in psychoanalysis, most people have now aban-doned the idea that the psychoses are understandable from a 1.-personperspective, as they are assumed to be a more or less random outcome ofbrain-pathology (Lucas, 2003; Willis, 2001). And in the “bible” of modern psy-chiatry, the Diagnostical and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (APA,2004), it is bluntly stated that as it is not possible to give an adequate def-inition of the word “thought”, there cant’ be given a definition of “mentaldisorder” either (sic!). Thus, leaving the field open for bio-psychiatric inter-ventions, which for the most are based on a 3.-person-perspective, or if youlike, on an objectivist metaphysics fused with behavioural theory. In line withthis trend, there is also a tendency to avoid the use of “metaphysical” conceptslike “reality” and “ego”. As I see it, these opinions are based on fundamental,onto-epistemological misunderstandings.

In the following I will therefore try to demonstrate, how a possible theoreti-cal merge of classical psychoanalysis and transcendental phenomenology maycontribute to the understanding and clarification of what many hold to be thecore symptom of schizophrenia, namely “formal thought disorder” (DSM IV,APA, 2004; Bleuler, 1916). My argument here is mostly based on an interpre-tation of Husserl’s theory of constitution, or, so to speak, a reversed version ofthat theory. And in Ideen III Husserl raises the question of the possibility of asolid ontology of the mind – founded in transcendental idealism. Husserl wasof course, not doing psychopathology. But if we are sympathetic to his searchfor irreale Objektivität – as the bedrock for any science of human experience,perhaps this may lead to a path where we may speak of a psycho-pathology in

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

F R E U D , H U S S E R L A N D “ L O S S O F R E A L I T Y ”

a real sense. But just how then, are we to proceed in order to make an adequatedescription of the psychotic experience?

P S Y C H O A N A L Y S I S A S C O N F L U E N C E O F C L A S S I C A L

P H I L O S O P H Y ?

Let’s start with a question that may set a perspective for the analysis to come;what is the relation of Freud and the philosophical tradition? Firstly, we maynote that according to Freud, philosophy should direct itself with insights frompsychoanalysis as leitmotif – a serious philosophy must at least acknowledgepsychoanalysis, according to Freud, because:

Die Philosophie hat sich allerdings wiederholt mit dem Problem des Unbewuβten beschäftigt,aber ihre Vertrether haben dabei – mit weningen Ausnahmen – ein von den zwei Positioneneigenommen , die nun anzufüren sind.1

Here we see a good example of how Freud reads the philosophical tradition.Even though we may say that Freud not was a “great” philosopher, he certainlywas an important thinker. Like many of the great, canonical thinkers, his wasa prismatic mind, and perhaps his greatest gift lay in providing a synthesis ofstrongly influential ideas of the tradition. Perhaps we may regard Freud as adialectical thinker, in that he attempted to take a step back, and to de-scribea culturally formed subjectivity, that already had been constituted? As Platoalso stepped back from the discussions and the arguments presented, Freudmay have wanted to just rapport what he was able to see. In this perspective,psychoanalysis is a confluence of our tradition, both as expression of a genuinehistoricity in the phenomenology of the modern Self, and as result of the deeplydevoted individual, for whom his existence depended upon clarification.

So, given that Freud’s theory has contributed strongly to the configurationof modern subjectivity, it also seems that Freud in fact was re-collecting, oreven maintaining a deep current in the Western tradition. A current whichalways has been feared by certain instances of society, but as Freud stated,there will always be a constant discontent in civilization. In this he was hint-ing to the unruly powers of the “Will” that is constantly pressing on to breakfree. If regarded in such a perspective – in the light of say, Plato, Goethe,Schopenhauer and Nietzsche – then we see that Freud’s project is in line withan age-old struggle of man, to build courage to face the Trolls of night, to letthe spears of the sun boast them asunder. Letting the I be were the Id was.

Though all thinking of psychoanalysis must begin with Freud, the scopeshould be widened to reflections on both the historical heritage of psychoanal-ysis and interpretation of its philosophical implications. As Freud’s theories

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160


bears upon classical thinking of our tradition, psychoanalysis may be said tobe as relevant as it is? Though perhaps an exaggeration, in this sense, philos-ophy at least, carries with it memories of a distant past – and in this mannerI think that the philosophical, even phenomenological analysis of Freud mayelucidate a deep historicity of our subjectivity.

But of course there are some problems in all this. In that Freud wants tosupport his theory by drawing on a host of classical philosophers, and philoso-phies, he stands in danger of importing conflicting material. This level ofinquiry is not made explicit by Freud himself. One main objection to Freud’sstatement in the quotation just presented is that he seems to imply a clearlymodern concept of subjectivity in his critique of traditional philosophy. Butwhat about Freud’s own philosophical position?

Freud’s attitude towards philosophy was deeply ambivalent2 – he bothrejected most of philosophy as being forms of sublimation, and regarded ratio-nalism as a defensive strategy relative to the alienating primary processes ofthe unconscious. But Freud’s own meta-psychology, as ex. in the Jenseits desLustprinzips – is a genuine attempt in existential phenomenology. I will arguethat Freud in fact ordered a phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation ofhis own work, and if read in this perspective, a new horizon opens. I will returnto this below.

The main objective for Freud was to present an encompassing theory of sit-uated subjectivity that (always already) is pre-formed by a common culturalmeaning. Freud had a fairly close resemblance with the historiological currentsin his own time. Here I am not only thinking of Dilthey but also Husserl. Mypoint here is that even though his anthropology and hence his view of historic-ity was of a more pessimistic type, almost in line with Spengler, the main trendin Freud’s argumentation is marked by a distancing from the naïve rationalistictradition from cartesianism. According to Freud this tradition had hyperboliseda shallow conception of a transparent Ego; which had been reified on a culturallevel. But here as often is the case, Freud is notoriously unclear.

Even though Freud’s metapsychology developed and matured during hiscareer, Freud was making performative inconsistencies in his self-critique. AsI see it, this follows from his not performing a thorough methodological anal-ysis of the idealistic tendencies in his own thinking. This argument is basedon the fact that the early Freud explicitly employs Kant’s ontological dualismas a qualification for the division of unconscious and conscious dimensions ofpsychic life. As Freud states in the paper on the unconscious:

Just as Kant warned us not to overlook [Kant uns gewarnt hat] the fact that our perceptionsare subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

200


though unknowable [unerkennbaren Wahrgenommenen], so psychoanalysis warns us not to equateperceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes (. . .)3

But as both Freud him self matures, his theory develops, and the Kantianantagonism is gradually seen as being to rigid. But again, because Freud neverfully succeeded in overcoming the basic argumentative structure he developedon the basis of Kant’s ontological dualism in the early period, he remained“trapped” in a solipsistic position. Freud’s early theoretical basis is a static,dualistic model for the organisation of the psychic. Even though he makes aneffort to reformulate psychoanalysis in a profound manner in the late mid-dle period (1914–1923), this basic opposition remains. As already indicated,Freud’s philosophical meta-psychology matured during his career, and he wasconstantly trying to revise the theory, in accord with his clinical observations.By this I am not claiming that Freud was generally more “right” later thatearlier in his writings, but the deep, metaphysical reinterpretation of the mid-dle period (about 1920) is a rich, philosophical smorgasbord. In and by theessay Das Ich und Das Es, Freud now takes a Nietzschean position, and in facttries to regard human existence within a (temporally and genetically) reversedPlatonism. (I have tried to read Nietzsche’s critique of Kant as the elder Freud’sself-critique.) This then leads to a profound and drastic change in the view ofthe unconscious, and hence on (psychic) life in general. In the late period Freudwas experimenting with a recentering of the I in psychoanalysis. By taking theposition of the I as point of departure, psychoanalysis becomes existensialised.Freud now wants to know what is the essence of “love”, asking for the ultimatemeaning of death etc.

But, even though he was making an attempt of radicalising psychoanalysisby deepening it’s philosophical dimensions, he ended up by stating a purelypsycho-logical reality (for the individual). But – without performing a philo-sophical analysis of the concept of “reality” as such. What we lack in Freudthen, is a robust theory of constitution.

F R E U D ’S O R D E R I N G O F A H E R M E N E U T I C A L

I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F P S Y C H O A N A L Y S I S

So then, may psychoanalysis be regarded as existential phenomenology?Before answering this, there are some difficulties that must be faced. Firstly;phenomenology is a purely descriptive discipline, therefore: if psychoanaly-sis is regarded in this perspective, we in fact must bracket out – suspend, allnormative aspects of psychoanalysis. Consequently, it becomes transformedinto a philosophical method. Psychoanalysis may then be seen as a pre-clinical

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240


approach – or perhaps even as philosophical anthropology – i.e. a thoroughformulation of what it means to be a human being.

This is further explored by Freud in Jenseits der Lustprinzips,4 where psy-choanalysis becomes a philosophy of the meaning of death for and in, life.Jenseits is structured by a generalised composition, and Freud seems to havehad an anthropological ambition for this essay. Therefore it must be seen aspsychopathologicaly neutral.

Let’s then see to the opening lines of Jenseits, where Freud in fact seems tohave ordered a phenomenological-hermeneutical reading of psychoanalysis:

(. . .) we would like to express our gratitude towards any philosophical or psychological theory,which could inform us on the interpretation of the for us imperative problem of lust and unlust.5

Let’s take Freud verbally here – in fact must we not? What does Freud indeedsay here? As I see it, he is de facto ordering a method which is to give anadequate description of meaning. This is the basic principles of a phenomeno-logical hermeneutics – further: what Freud in fact does in the Jenseits is are-centering of subjectivity, i.e. that he so to speak turn psychoanalysis on it’shead, now taking the dimensions of the I as starting point to ask: how far doesthe region – the field of meaning of the I really reach? (This is also a prob-lem in the Cartesian Meditations.) What may that mean in context? Let’s nowstart looking into what a phenomenological and hermeneutical re-reading ofpsychoanalysis might look like.

It is important to realize, from the start, that the later Freud attempted toprovide a ontological redescription of the essence of the I, and, that the revisedpsychoanalysis of the 1920s operates on a far more personalistic orientationthat earlier. This also inflicting the relations of other people, and it seems tome, at least, that the concept of the Id – the That – not only encompasses thatwhich is unknown of the Self by the I, but also, or especially, of the mindof Others – which again must influence the perspective of both remembranceand hope (sedimentation and projection). But what does all this mean, moreconcretely?

According to Freud, Jenseits was “committed” in pure curiousness, and hesaid that he wrote it as a piece of philosophical psychology. As the title Jenseitsindicates, Freud wanted to explore the regulative forces of the psyche, espe-cially the Supra-I (Über-ich), and ask whether now the cultural aspects ofmentality in fact had to be given explicit priority. In this theoretical transition,the developmental theory of the psycho-sexual stages were toned down. Freudrather now wanted to seek for the Ur-quelle of existentiality, by analysingprimary narcissism and the genesis of the rudimentary Self. By turning theperspective in this manner, psychoanalysis was to present a more originary

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

257

258

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

277

278

279

280


explanation of the existential dimensions of the I. By letting immediate experi-ence lead the way, psychoanalysis was opened for a reinterpretation of a deeplydisturbing situation for the I, the Id is perceived as representative of somethingUnheimliche, “something” which alienates the I from it’s Self.

In this view, the I is doomed to never finding a solid substantiation for it’sSelf. The Self can never be anything but an idea for the I. This self relatingrelating, may be experienced as being deeply disturbing for the I. Because theI “knows” that it isn’t the source of it’s Self, this leads to a certain degree ofaniexiety. The “will to life”, or to “self-preservation”, if one prefers, is then tobe seen as the primary source of psychic organisation.

This then opens for my main interpretative hypothesis, which in part rep-resents my “deliverance” of Freud’s order: psychoanalysis explicates deep,existential consequences of an uncanny knowing in the I of both being thesource of its enduring existence – and at the same time having the notion ofnot being its own origin. The Self, therefore, has an aporetical, almost irrealiz-ing appearance to the I, hence being under a constant pressure of ontologicalinconstancy, which may upsurge as profound psychical irruptions, witch maybe labelled “pathological”.

As already mentioned, Freud seemed to focus more on the cultural dimen-sions of the I in this later period. This perspective is presented in detail in theanalysis of the Supra-I, which is the instance that invests perception with valueand so constitutes or rather, transforms the surroundings into a “world”.

S U P R A - I , “R E A L I T Y ” A N D P S Y C H O T I C E X I S T E N C E

In the analysis of the Supra-I, Freud uses two different terms to distinguishtwo basic dimensions in the I-Self-constellation: the Ideal-Ich, which pointsforward in time – towards a social idealisation – the source of the neurosis,and the Ich-Ideal, which points backwards in time. Now I want to focus onthe latter – the I-Ideal – hence towards the “original position” of the I, i.e. thesituation of primary narcissism – the source of psychosis. A state in which therudimentary I is unable to differentiate between it’s own libidinal structures andthat of the “outer” world. To understand this, we must try to imagine, revitalise,the experience of the toddler. That is, attempt to understand the phenomenalfield of a very young child, say 6 months of age.

In this primary situation there is then no rational objects – all what is per-ceived is a plastic “something” that which just is – Das Es. If we now followFreud in his theory on the genealogy of the Self, then we see that in the rudi-mentary phases there are no clear boundaries for the I – and if the I really is

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


281

282

283

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

292

293

294

295

296

297

298

299

300

301

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

309

310

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

318

319

320


a compromise product, a shrunken rest of a more primary experience, then itfollows that both the experience- and certainly the concept of ontological dual-ism is a late, mature product in the Self – what we may label “objectivism”is therefore a psychologically secondary level of thinking. The psychologicalpossibility of acknowledging the “objective” has deep presuppositions. Furtherin this primary, original position, there is no “I” and no “World” it all flowstogether, is an Es – that which just is. If taken as valid it seems to follow thatthe feeling of irreality must proceed the concept of the real – or to rephrase:for the rudimentary I the Real is irreal and the Irreal is the real. For the rudi-mentary Ich the Es appears as phantasmatic. In this perspective we may evensay that reality it self is a comprise product. “Reality” is a product of gradualdifferentiations of the environment. What the Self understands – what it haspreconditions to understand – as being real, its “reality” is the psychic realityof the I – or again: the psychoanalytical concept of reality is a plastic, libidi-nal configuration – it is phenomenal in its structure. I find this argument quiteinteresting, but let’s now look at it’s phenomenological validity and rationality.

At a certain point in all this, Freud the alleged anti-philosopher sees to haveradically misunderstood his own thinking. Let me now try to qualify this state-ment, by criticising Freud’s conception of “reality”, in order to elucidate howthis may cast light on the explanatory power, or lack of such, relative to severemental pathology – ex. “psychosis”. Let me now schetch out the basic argumentin Freud regarding psychosis, for then to return to my questions.

Freud claims that the psychotic I first dissociates from the outer world, toconstrue a “new” world for it’s Self because of a unconscious need for con-sistency – the manifest schizophrenic symptoms therefore, are attempts tofill out crucial lacks in the synthesis of the I. This attempt at self-healing,like in Schreber – may be interpreted as a desire for regaining a consistent,autonomous lifespan. These attempts at self-healing then show them selvesas manifest symptoms of deeper latent functional deficiensies in the primarystructures of the I, which then desperately tries to cope with strong antagonisticforces in the Self – by deforming it’s I. Thus:

(. . .) for neurosis the deciding factor will be the dominance of reality [die übermacht desRealeinnflusses], while in psychosis will be the Id. In a psychosis, loss of reality is inevitable(. . .).6

For Freud, then, “reality” seems to be an outer phenomenon. The objective“world” is as it is experienced by almost everyone. But this is a naivety. Hasnot Freud claimed that it is the I which is the ultimate source of all libidinalinvestments? Yes, this is so – but if this is the case – is not the appearance ofthe world a result of the “workings” of the I? Yes, this seems to be the case –

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

338

339

340

341

342

343

344

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360


hence: must it not follow that the deformation of the I also is a deformationof the world? If this is the case, the formulation “loss of reality” in psychosisis therefore not quite accurate – the “loss of reality” in psychosis seems ratherfirstly connected to a weakening of the rational structuring of the objectiveRealeinnflusses. Which in fact, when Freud is read consistently: actually opensthe Self for a more original, affective and unstructured form for being. But herea new dimension of the problems open; even though this experiential dimensionis apparently more real – it is given as less real-istic. Therefore, the aniexietyassociated to the struggle for upholding rational experience, is not a defenceagainst reality, but it is a defence of the reality of the Self’s reality.

May we therefore regard psychosis as a loosening of a primary repression?7

In the late model of psychoanalysis (post 1919), also the Id may become struc-turally defective, because the Ich-ideal, or if one likes – the retentive sedimentsof the I, as a substantial portion of the Self, may be expressed as an irruptiveand inconsistent functioning Über-Ich. The phenomena of psychotic distur-bances may now be understood as a result of that primary configurations of theI haven’t proceeded in an adequate development, with the result that the pre-conditions for the experience of “objective” reality has not been consolidatedin the I. Or, if one likes; we may speak of a partially defective constitution ofthe I-Self-configuration.

Hence: these unconsolidated dimensions in the I are marked by an originaryontological ambivalence, and it is when this experience becomes to strong thatthe integrative functions of the I is unable to synthesise its material, the “schizo. . .” – the splitting, fragmenting of the I occurs:

(. . .) being an adult in no way guaranties a protection against the original traumatic aniexiety-situation. Every individual probably has a limit beyond which his mental apparatus fails in it’sfunctions of mastering the quantities of excitement which must be eliminated.8

When a certain level of negative intensity is experienced by the I, when this“anexietal border” is crossed, the integration of the I-Self-consellation – whichis a secondary, psychological product, collapses. In analytic terms this thenwould be a regression beyond the reality principle – which then constituteswhat we may call a psychotic “phantasy-world”. But to say as Freud does, thatthe phantasmatic character of the Real is becoming gradually split of duringthe maturation of the I, is only to say that it is repressed, or to say it withSchopenhauer: that it has become distant within the nexus of associations.9

And as such, that it always has the potential to perform a psychological mod-ification of the uncanny stressor, so that the Self may relate to is as it pleases,by becoming psychotically regressed. In order words; the I is now existentiallyimmersed in it’s own psychic sphere.

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


361

362

363

364

365

366

367

368

369

370

371

372

373

374

375

376

377

378

379

380

381

382

383

384

385

386

387

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

397

398

399

400


On this background, I so far reach the following conclusion; because Freudupheld an unqualified and inconsistent position relative to the (phenomenonof) the “real” – he maintained that it was the denial of the Real whichcaused psychosis – but this seems to me as an misunderstanding: rather it isa hermeneutical principle that a surplus of meaning will be experienced as alack of meaning (“perplexity”) due to the immensity of work needed to clar-ify the psychic material. So when Freud first stresses the importance of theOedipal-drama, and secondly, hyperbolized the abduction “Father”/“Reason”as the primary source of “repression” of the Outer world, then this unjustifiedinsistence on the Paternal object in fact led to a implicit naturalistic, dualisticontology within the basic framework of psychoanalysis.

This then, led Freud, the anti-philosopher, into problems he seemed unableto resolve, in spite of the efforts at an ontological revision in the late period.The argumentative defect regarding psychosis in Freud is therefore due to thelack of understanding of that the “world” and the “Self” cannot be seen as beingessistentially separate – without an I, no reality, and without a reality, no I. Mypoint now being that Freud did not go far enough when he claimed that the I isthe source of all libidinous investments. Or to make a long story short; Freudlacked a theory of constitution.

This therefore leads over to my next argumentative phase in this paper. Iwill now attempt to present the same experiential dimensions, the same groupsof phenomena within Husserl’s vocabulary. If I succeed in this, then we maytake a fresh look at psychoanalysis again, perhaps being better informed at adetailed level.

A H U S S E R L I A N P E R S P E C T I V E O N U N C O N S C I O U S

M O T I V A T I O N A N D T H E C O N C E P T

O F “W I L L E N S I N T E N T I O N A L I T ÄT ”

Husserl is often regarded as impersonal and abstracted, and it is usual to claimthat transcendental phenomenology is irrelevant for concrete, personal life – oreven for persons in general. This is a wrongful conception that probably followsfrom pore knowledge of the later period of Husserls thinking. In order to graspthese problems more radicallty, one therefore has to try to understand the fullimplications of taking the experiences of the “life-world”, as is expressed bythe principle of all principles also. The task therefore entails to understandhow:

(. . .) the path here leads back to the Ur-evidenz of the Lifeworld, which always is alwayspregiven.10

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

429

430

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

440


If one looks to the even later writings, ex. HUA XXVIII, we see that Husserlthere returns to the question of the subjective, without leaving the transcen-dental level, under the heading of reconstitution of the transcendental Ego aspsycho-physical person. The later Husserl wants to present a description of thepersonal that is invested by the insights of his earlier analyses, that is – with aclarified view on the conditions of possibility for subjective experience.11 Thismotivation is also presented clearly at the end of the CM (HUA I), under §§59,60 and 61, witch opens by analyses of the “ontological explication” of purephenomenological thinking. Subsumed here, are the problems of “life” and“death”, of the “movement of the generations”, and the “individual position inthe total historical complex”.12

And if we look to a lecture from 1933, on “universal motivation of drives asthe source of social togetherness”, this argumentation is clarified even further.What Husserl in fact wants to clarify here, is the phenomenological basis for,and content in, the concept of procrastination.13 Even though it is not statedexplicitly, Husserl now alludes to what commonly is known as a theory on sex-ual motivation, but expands the field of meaning of such a view. The problemarises from the tension in the acknowledgement of the subjective desire and thevarious degree of understanding of the desire of others. Here we may see thatHusserl’s argument may be compared to Freud. But, Husserl’s perspective is,in some important ways, deviating from Freud in certain aspects. Let’s use thephenomenon of “hunger” as example to illustrate. Hunger may be understoodboth as expression of a bodily located source of desire, and it is an “urmodus”of a primary willensintentionalität. A derived modus of this is the sexual need,says Husserl, and this desire is most oftenly directed towards others. The sex-ual motivation may be directed towards all sorts of objects, but finds its mostfull degree of fulfilment in the copulation.14

Analysed in a purely phenomenological manner, the primary drive of thesubject demonstrate an originary state of unhibited (“free”) energy, witch itis the task of sociality to master and cultivate. But this strong component ofbasic desire lasts on in mental live and functions a natural motivation for the“I” and its stream of projected ambitions. Husserl claims that these motiva-tions yields reciprocally for every individual, so that we may speak of a mutualflowing of primary drive qualities in social fields. Hence, human beings will notfirstly acknowledge each other as rational individuals, but feel others as givenin oscillating affective modes. It is only secondarily that these modes may beconcretised as “happy”, “sad” etc. Most often, the meaning of the Other is givenin an unclear and obscure modus. And, says Husserl, this obscurity may it selffunction as a form of social hunger. We therefore have a basic need to under-stand the Other’s “deep” motivations, because they have a profound effect on

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


441

442

443

444

445

446

447

448

449

450

451

452

453

454

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

464

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

472

473

474

475

476

477

478

479

480


our own perceptual configuration of the Mitwelt. This is of course not alwaysthe case, but the tendency is latently present. But how may this become clari-fied in a more concrete sense? What is the basic origin of this “social hunger”?By answering this question, I will be elucidation a clear, existential dimensionin Husserl.

In an immediate, experiential modus, people are given for others as value-intentional beings, that are driven by different motivations in their natural sur-roundings. Human beings are not primarily rational beings; Husserl states.15

The primary characteristic of sociality is to be a system of drives. When a sub-ject “wants” something, this necessarily implies the wills of others as well.Thus the primary will of the subjects’ grips into each other, modifies them, andchannels the intersubjective affections on basis of common, basic hierarchiesof value, constituted in the life world. This basic pattern also seems to supportthe experience of “understanding something”, ex. an utterance, a gesture etc.The mental processes will then modify the given such that they contribute toa regulation of the self-understanding of the Other. This varies in intensity, ofcourse, but the closer the individuals are related, the more strongly the affectiveeffect will be (Mother/Child as prototype). In this way, then, the transcendentalsubjectivity will always set its stamp on the existential experience of others,without the person needing to “know” exactly how the affections intertwine.This is the husserlian version of the Supra-I.

We see that Husserl’s phenomenology states originary and passive willing-ness in the “core” of the I, witch leads the subject to experience anonymousdrives at an existential level. At a purely descriptive level though, these interna-tionalities may be explicated within the retention/protention-system (rememberthe distinction in Freud of Ich-Ideal and Ideal-Ich). By the temporal synthe-sising of the different corresponding acts, the “I” is structured as a unifiedsystem of meaning. This formality may be explicated as a purely personal I,that always has a self-reference in concordance with a “world”, and a socialfield of commonness. But, the “I” is not the originary source of its own motiva-tion. The personal I is framed, so to speak, by apperseptive, affective passivity,witch varies in intensity.

Expanded to a general theory of a phenomenology of the will, this leadsto a view of the I as being motivated by fluctuating and varying degrees ofinsight regarding the own and others existential goal-directedness. Further,we see that a husserlian theory on existential motivation implies drive-energystemming from both Leib, as a culturally defined system, and biologi-cal needs of the Körper. In addition, there are “higher motivations” of aalmost sublimated kind – such as religious, aesthetic values. Generalised in a

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


481

482

483

484

485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

515

516

517

518

519

520


phenomenologically valid manner, this leads to a rich existential theory ofhuman life and its conditionings.

But this structural analysis of the immediate will and its relevance for theconstitution of social fields must now be expanded by some further remarksin order to achieve understanding of a material reconstitution of the I withinHusserl’s phenomenology. Thus far in the analysis, we have seen that there isa pre-personal motivation in the I, which may be labelled “drive”. This drivemay attain an undecided plurality of forms and needs, such as ex. “hunger”,“sexual” drives etc. But, again, all this seems to need an even more profoundexplanation, witch I will now attempt.

T H E Q U E S T I O N O F T H E M O T I V A T I O N A L S T R U C T U R E O F

T H E P R I M A R Y D R I V E S : “L I F E ” A N D “ B A S I C S A T I S F A C T I O N ”

As I have tried to demonstrate, like Freud, Husserl does not regard humansas rational beings. There are passive motivational structures, that functionsorganisationally in the “I” and its activities. A first problem in this, as alreadymentioned, is that social fields must be regarded as systems structured andinvested by drive-energy, and that the apperseptive dimensions of others can’tbe perceptually accessible (for me). If the perceptual qualities of the Otherare not given for me, this then leads to problems of understanding motivationfor objectification of social experience. Questions like these are indicative ofa deeper layer of functionality in subjectivity, which precede active, reflectivemental activity. How then, may the constitution of the Other be explained inthis pre-rational dimension?

Husserl states that a complete knowing of the Other is principallyimpossible.16 This is not due to a defect in the phenomenological method.Rather it is a phenomenological fact, and it is this lack of existential connect-edness that founds the motivation for setting up ideal notions of Others and theSelf. It follows that such phantasised forms of social cognition, may replacethe originary perception, and be held as expressive of a “character”, a “person-ality” etc. Thus, a thorough, phenomenological analysis may demonstrate thatpsychological conceptualisations are secondary (“constituted”), and that posi-tive psychology – as a form of meaning in the Lebenswelt – is secondary also.There seems then, to be phenomenological support for saying that, there is anunderlying form in the structure of subjectivity, that is less unstable, thoughless explicit – it is unconscious. This “form” of the active Ego or the personal

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


521

522

523

524

525

526

527

528

529

530

531

532

533

534

535

536

537

538

539

540

541

542

543

544

545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

558

559

560


I, therefore seems to be the constitutive strata of the immediate, existentialexperience. How may this be qualified by Husserl’s theory of self-perception?

By Husserl’s own words, it is the case that:

The deeper motivation, witch precedes human remembrance, I cannot reach by phenomenology,not either in the self-streaming flow of remembrance, is only achievable by a reconstruction of auniversal type.17

A reasonable interpretation of this is that because the anonymous dimensions(the Self) of the individual are not given for the I in a strong degree of expli-cation, the I cannot communicate it’s self-experience clearly either. If the“person” is something witch basically “happens”, then persons always are ina process of cultivating the Self as a cultural nexus, in light of the “higher”motivations I mentioned over. As a consequence, the “person” cannot reach anobjective notion of the meaning of the Self, due to the principal lack of substan-tiality of its remembrances. “My” life then, is perceived as a incomplete field ofcomplex motivations and realisations. The explicated history of a personal life(ex. a therapeutic self-report given in psychoanalysis), must be a fluctuatingstructure – a re-construction, on the basis of present motivations, that also fadeout in a temporal modification. In accord with the protational system of pre-sentedness, these unrealised motivations for self-explication are experienced asvalues for the subject, something that is going to be realised.

Hence, there will occur a stream of originary, passive structures of motiva-tion that functions as a form for mental causality, which varies in degrees ofintensity and explication. It is when the Ego has a need for abstracting certainperceptual aspects of this originary experience, that there is an explication of“objectified” moments of experience. Such isolated moments (“parts”), doesnot exist firstly. They are re-presented again and again through these extremelycomplicated processes.18 The concrete experience of a “Me”, in the form asexed, cultural identity, is therefore not an objective entity.

I have now set my self in position to attempt answers to my initial problems.How may we both provide a more substantial psychopathological explanationfor psychosis – and – how may phenomenology invest psychoanalysis in thismatter?

A H U S S E R L I A N R E S P O N S E T O T H E P R O B L E M O F “L O S S

O F R E A L I T Y ”

Let’s here start with a hard question; what is thought? Let’s ask like this:if it is true that the essence of reality must be sought by tracing the gene-sis of givenness – that is assigned to a “world”, then the perplexity of the

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

573

574

575

576

577

578

579

580

581

582

583

584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600


deranged I-Self-constelation, may be formulated as the problem of reconstruct-ing the intentional history of the present state of mind. In Husserl, all typesof experience are founded within the domain of human consciousness, whichis actively imputing meaning at the surrounding world. This world is first andforemost mine. On one level, this is to say that my phenomenal field is primarilystructured according to the confluence of my bodily sensations and intentions(“drives”). If I am blinded or lamed, this would make the world appear dramat-ically different to me. On another level, it means that what I call my “Self” is aresult of intentive processes that literally are resulting of deeper, transcendentalmental processes – which never can be made subject of intentional control –they are genuinely unconscious. Together, these processes are substrate for thatwhich is labelled “transcendental Ego”. So, in a phenomenological language,the transcendental Ego is constitutive both of the world as its field of interest,and the subjective notion of “Selfness” as a part of this world. Theoreticallythis position is called transcendental idealism.

To prepare an answer to the challenge of how to re-describe the problem of“loss of reality” in psychoanalysis, I now ask which processes that are func-tioning at the kernel of this constituting activity. With Husserl, it may all besummed up as how to understand the temporal synthesizing of different typesof mental acts. And Husserl states that: fastslår noe som kan være relevant idenne sammenhengen:

No matter how alien in essence mental processes may be with respect to one an, they are none theless constituted in one temporal stream, as members of the one phenomenological time.19

But what does this mean more concretely? Let’s illustrate through an easyexample: when reading this text, I am not explicitly aware of my glasses. Butnot only do they sharpen my view, but the glass itself is pre-reflexively taken to“have” certain qualities such as “hardness”, “transparency”, “fragility” and soforth. If we ask where these qualities has their origin, one could, I think, arguereasonably, that it is only for me as a thinking human subject, that the glasses“has” this cluster of meanings that makes them the culturally stable object thatthey are. And further, the wall behind me, the room under us, and the backside of this paper sheet, none of these phenomena are directly given, they aremediated. But none the less, they are necessary moments of my immediateexperience. The same principle goes for the experience of my “Self”.

The continuous structuring of “my” passive horizon as a concrete field ofmeaning has always already performed mental acts, before I can reflect uponthem; they are passive. This is to say that my phenomenal field is given as astable, structurally organized whole. My average, daily subjective experienceis therefore, for the most experienced on a background of a passively pulsating

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


601

602

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640


horizon of meaning (“screen memories”). In short, I do not have to activelythink, to make the “world” appear as world. The individual mental life, is thusstanding out, or rather: ex-cisting (from Greek: ex stasis – to stand out), froma presumably undecided horizon, in which both my future and my past, aregiven as constituent aspects of all my present existential projects. When sayingthat the meaning-background is ever pulsating, this is to say that it is alwayschanging in phases of likeness and difference, but the phenomenal field is nor-mally tending towards likeness, or if one likes: it tends towards a condition ofhomogeneity. These processes are labelled “receptivity”, and are functioningat the lowest level of awareness in the Ego/I. All explicated entities which isgiven for the active ego, or the I, are always already the result of constitutive,passive mental processes. Which in their turn, point to deeper structures in thetranscendental Ego. And this is what Husserl speaks about as the synthesiz-ing functions of the inner time consciousness. And this is important, becauseaccording to Husserl, this is factually the seat of identity in general. It is theseprocesses that found the stable and solid character of a “world”. To understandthis, one must ask further about the meaning of the concept of “synthesis”.

In Husserl’s theory, all intentive processes are combined in what he callssyntheses. Such syntheses occur when multiple intentive aspects of a perceivedentity are combined to form a whole, or one could say: a gestalt. And it is suchstructures of meaning that is denoted under the rubric of “thing” – ex. “me”.A synthesis is therefore a collection of multiple formation-modalities, whichbelong to mental acts of every type.

And because of this, the passive, plural intendings of horizon-consciousnessare given common foci, which in turn is the basis of distinguishing acts of anhigher type, like using and manipulating of symbols, i.e.: language. On thebasis of this, it can be made understandable that the parts of the meaning-structures are inter-dependent. Entities are always seen as parts of largerwholes; they do not stand out in isolation. A fork points to the knife and soon . . .. This not only goes for the single experiences, but mental life as such iscombined in this manner. This is the permanent background that makes up thebasis for self-evident identity in the I.

The “world-phenomenon”, when analyzed in this manner, therefore has aninner horizon, which is structured according to certain principles. Accordingto Husserl this formal structure of the individuals original sphere (Eigenwelt),is what is usually named by the common title of “reason”.20 (Unfortunately,this occasion does not permit a further explication of this problematic – whichwould lead to a critique of Kant’s position also.) The active Ego, the I, whichis reflexively given to itself, as part of this inner horizon, always first appearsin a state of primordial, pre-categorised meaning. And because of this, the

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


641

642

643

644

645

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

668

669

670

671

672

673

674

675

676

677

678

679

680


world it “sees” may have an “unhomely” character. But in “normal” states ofbeing, a further consequence of the stable character of the world’s inner horizonis experience of predictability. The active Ego can, again normally speaking,project it’s Self into a future which is taken for granted. At the pre-reflexivelevel, this founds an “automatic” positionality, which is the founding belief ina natural, functioning world – the life world that is given in an unproblematicmode.

This is what Husserl calls the “ur-doxa”.21 Every conceivable entity thatstands out on this background is seen as “real”. But because the inner horizonof the entity may be influenced by other systems of meaning, objects may bepresented in unusual ways, as optical illusions may demonstrate. In such cases,the co-intendings are being synthesized in a way that is producing “impossi-ble”, but none the less perceived phenomena. And because the “Self” is alsogiven as an integral part of these systems, it to may be given in such derangedinfluenced ways, and hence appear as “strange” (for the I). In some cases –ex. in “psychosis”, the Ego may (begin) to synthesize it’s Self with aspects ofthe inner horizon which earlier were seen as alien to it. It may hear it’s ownthoughts, or having problems of distinguishing “here” and “there” (birdsongs“in” my head etc.). This may cause the experience of objects to dissolve, or takeon radically new forms. The horizon may begin to appear in a fragmented way.And this is the self-pathology of the Ego, which is commonly called “formalthought-disorder” – or perhaps; a loss of “reality”.

A phenomenological theory of schizophrenia must be based on reflectionslike these. In the early phases of schizophrenia the “world” often begin toemanate in an utterly strange and frightening way. When the essential struc-tures of the World and Self are radically re-arranged, because of disturbancesin the passive mental processes, this has as its results what Jaspers called“borderline experiences”. Features that before were taken for granted, canthen be taken as just the opposite and vice versa. As the Ego is formativeof “identity” it may also form experience of “non-identity”. When the limitsof reason are diminished, nothing is impossible, and states of severe con-fusion will set in. This is what Laing called “ontological insecurity”, andit is the first stage in the psychotic development. The individual may doubtwhether he is really dead or alive, if he really is an automat or not etc. In mostcases such borderline-experiences produces an extreme aniexiety, which maybecome severely handicapping. When situations like these appear, the activeEgo must take over the functions that used to belong to the passive ego-aspects.Nothing else matters now, but to re-create a harmonious world in which theself may reside in a homely fashion – and so; all the “libido-energy” has tobe employed, withdrawn towards the kernel of subjectivity. The individual who

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


681

682

683

684

685

686

687

688

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

699

700

701

702

703

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711

712

713

714

715

716

717

718

719

720


is damned with this hellish situation is first and foremost occupied with a des-perate attempt to preserve what is left of “normality” (i.e. “autonomy” and“futurality”), and may therefore begin to isolate himself, in order to work inpeace.

But the I can’t exist without an explanation of the new situation, and maynow choose an interpretation based primarily on affect. Hence we see a form ofregression toward a childlike way of living. In time, the ego may find a way outby construing a new and stable surrounding for it self, but maybe at the price ofwhat we call a “psychotic” condition. If so, radical loneliness awaits becauseof a deep lack in the ability to relate socially. The psychosis is a symptom of aradical breakdown in the intersubjective dimension.

And, according to Freud, there is no difference in principle between statesof dreaming and those of psychosis; they only vary in duration and intensity.If this is so, then what we call “psychosis” is nothing strange at all – sincewe all have experienced it some way or other. And again, if this is true, thenit isn’t unthinkable that the same principles that regulate our waking think-ing also are active during the dream work. And, if the phenomenologicalmethod may provide an adequate description of the way so people think, thenmaybe the phenomenological study of dreams can be the king’s road to the fullunderstanding of the mental as such?

C O N C L U S I O N

I will now present my closing statements. An upholder of a meta-psychologyfounded in affective irrationalism, should also agree that his basic logic is basedin an auto-erotic tendency. Or, that “logic” is the result of a subliminated pri-mordial aniexiety. And if this is so, there must be as different ways of thinkingas there are psycho-logics – hence: equally many versions of psychoanalyses.Freud was neither dumb nor lazy. So why was he unable to sort these problemsout? I think Derrida could be right when claiming that Freud became entangledin a “paleonymic game”, so that the elder layers of metaphorisity of his theorygave raise to perhaps unconscious inconsistencies. As Freud seemed unwillingto abandon the central dogmas of the early phase of theoretical development, heremained trapped within a naive, objectivistic framework, with an equally naïveconception concerning time and space – in fact seems to have confused them –with the consequence that Freud’s psychoanalysis ended up with a mechanistictendency, in spite of the effort at an ontological revision in the middle period.

In the opening remarks of this philosophical analysis of psychoanalysis, Iasked whether psychoanalysis or philosophy that would have the most to gain

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


721

722

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

730

731

732

733

734

735

736

737

738

739

740

741

742

743

744

745

746

747

748

749

750

751

752

753

754

755

756

757

758

759

760


of a mutual collaboration – it seems to me that philosophy, even existentialphenomenology, both could, and perhaps should learn from psychoanalysis theimportance of a “scientific” observation of the facticity of actual lived life, todownplay it’s perhaps speculative tendency – but on the other hand: we see thatthe core of psychoanalytic theory, the premises for observation, are built onclassical, “speculative” philosophy towards which Freud was deeply ambiva-lent, the reasons for this remains obscure – but Freud himself remained a naïvephilosophical idealist because he so strongly defended the notion of a psycho-logical reality. Because of his lack of philosophical insight he remained underthe spell of the cardinal problem of idealism, namely ontological dualism – orrather; how to connect mind and world. If Freud had succeeded in developingthe concept of “libido” further, then he could have toned down this speculativetendency and then also resolved the basic problems of psychoanalysis.

In line with this line of reasoning, I think that a closer examination of psy-choanalysis may facilitate a more profound understanding not only of Freud,but perhaps also of some “deep” presuppositions of philosophy it self. AsFreud’s theory is so heavily laden by the classical tradition, then perhaps are-thinking of psychoanalysis in light of these sources may bring psychoanal-ysis closer to current systematic philosophy also? Perhaps then we may see arenewed familiarization with psychoanalysis? This may resemble what Husserlcalled a possible revitalisation of the core ideas of psychoanalysis. So thequestion may remain: what do a human want?

University of Bergen, Norway

N O T E S

1 GSW VIII, Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse, p. 407.

AQ1

2 Both Husserl and Freud followed Brentano’s lectures at the Universität Wien. We knowthat Freud studied Brentano’s Psychologie von dem Empirischen Standpunkt. Brentano actuallyrecommended Freud as the German translator of J. S. Mill’s Grote’s Plato.3 GSW, X, Das Unbewuβte, p. 270.4 GSW XIII, p. 4.5 GSW, XIV, DNP, p. 363.6 According to C. G. Jung who held a 5-year seminar on the Zarathustra, Nietzsche was in peri-ods severely deranged. And, if read psychographically, this is perhaps expressed clearly ex. in the“Fiest of the Donkey”. If we may trust Jung in this, then Nietzsche perhaps tried to outscribe, soto speak, troubling experiences from altered states of consciousness. Experiences like these werethen claimed to be of a more original type; a purely aesthetic way of being, or a heightened recep-tivity regarding the Ürsprunglische which in a certain sense are un-personal and hence, universalforms for the active thinking of the human mind. Or, if one will: an immediate experience of theunconscious.

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


761

762

763

764

765

766

767

768

769

770

771

772

773

774

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800


7 GSW, XIV, ISA, p. 307.8 The importance of understanding these deeper, hidden processes is, according to Schopenhauer,that unconscious motives will continue to exert influence on the person, regardless of how longit has been since they arose. If these are to continue to exert their influence on a unconsciouslevel, then this may lead to a disaster. Further, the unconscious motives may become split offfrom their original context, and their affective “location” may then become associatively separatefrom the accurate situation in which they were created. Then the person may loose recognitionof the structure of his mental representations, with the consequence that motivational drives maybecome unintelligible for the person. And, by this: also the “world” may appear as alienatingand even dreamlike. We in fact here see a rudimentary, but in my eyes, radical phenomenologyof psychopathology. Or to modify, by these derangements of the logical matrix of the Self, theborders of “conceptual reality” and “psychic reality” are being blurred.9 HUA VI, §34d, p. 131. My italics.10 HUA XV, nr. 34, p. 593.11 HUA I, §59, p. 163.12 HUA XV, nr. 34, p. 593.13 HUA XV, nr. 34, p. 593.14 HUA XV, nr. 34, p. 594.15 HUA XV, p. 631.16 HUA XV, p. 632.17 HUA IV, §54, p. 213.18 HUA III, §118, p. 291.19 HUA I, §23, p. 92.20 EuU, §7, p. 24.

C I T E D L I T T E R A T U R E

Freud, S. Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse – Briefe an Wilhelm Flieβ Abhandlungen undNotizen aus den jahren 1887–1902, (S. Fischer Verlag 1950).

Freud, S. Gesammelte Werke. Chronologisch Geordnet, I, (GSW), (Imago Publishing Co., Ltd.1948) I, (1892–1899).

Freud, S. Gesammelte Werke. Chronologisch Geordnet, I, GSW II, III, (Die Traumdeutung)(1900–1901).

Freud, S. Gesammelte Werke. Chronologisch Geordnet, I, GSW, VIII, (1909–1913).Freud, S. Gesammelte Werke. Chronologisch Geordnet, I, GSW, IX, (1912).Freud, S. Gesammelte Werke. Chronologisch Geordnet, I, GSW, X, (1913–1917).Freud, S. Gesammelte Werke. Chronologisch Geordnet, I, GSW, XIII, (1920–1924).Freud, S. Gesammelte Werke. Chronologisch Geordnet, I, GSW, XIV, (1925–1932).Husserl, E. HUA IV, in M. Biemel (ed.), Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänome-

nologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution(The Hague, Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1952).

Husserl, E. Erfahrung und Urteil – Untersuchungen zur genealogie der Logik (Hamburg, ClaassenVerlag, 1964).

Husserl, E. HUA XV, in I. Kern (ed.), Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus demNachlass. Dritter Teil. 1929–1935 (The Hague, Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973a).

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

816

817

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840


Husserl, E. in S. Strasser (ed.), Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (The Hague,Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973b). Husserliana I, (HUA).

Husserl, E. HUA VI, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzenden-tale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie (The Hague,Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).

Husserl, E. HUA III, in K. Schuhmann (ed.), Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänome-nologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführungin die reine Phänomenologie 1.Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage – Nachdruck (The Hague, Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff,1977).

Husserl, E. HUA XXVIII, in U. Melle (ed.), Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre. 1908–1914(The Hague, Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).

UN

CO

RR

EC

TED

PR

OO

F


841

842

843

844

845

846

847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

859

860

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

This is an Author Query Page Integra

Freud, Husserl And “Loss Of Reality”

Q. No. Query

AQ1 Please provide endnote text for“5”.

Freud, Husserl and Psychosis

Documents

Transcript of Freud, Husserl and Psychosis