Feminist Theory in Science: Working Toward a Practical Transformation

Feminist Theory in Science: Working Toward a Practical Transformation

DEBOLEENA ROY

Although a rich tradition offeminist critiques of science exists, it is often difficult for feminists who are scientists to bridge these critiques with practical transformations in scientific knowledge production. In this paper, I go beyond the general bases of feminist critiques of science by using feminist theory in science to illustrate how a practical transformation in methodology can change molecular biology based research in the reproductive sciences.

REFLECTION

Having recently completed my Ph.D. in reproductive neuroendocrinology, I have experienced first-hand the difficulties in keeping the words “feminist” and “scientist” side by side. I spent my graduate years in a lab, working on a bench, using the principles and techniques of molecular biology to create scientific knowledge. My goal, however, was to become a feminist scientist. More easily said than done. In the process of developing a career as a scientist trying to he a feminist, 1 managed to create another career path for myself in a parallel universe as a feminist trying to be a scientist. Following the completion of my degree, I left the lab bench and have since found a new home in a Women’s Studies department as the resident feminist scientist. It’s all very confusing and exciting. But before the lab smells of LB broth and TEMED fade from my memory, I think that sharing my experience will he useful for feminist scientists, students, and others.

In my undergraduate years as a microbiology major, the biggest problem I faced was the resistance on the part of my professors to make room for a feminist perspective in the classroom. The underlying sentiment was that feminist

Hypatia vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 2004) 0 by Deboleena Roy

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thought and science were completely different areas of scholarship that would not and should not ever meet. I used to joke about it, hut now I think it was no coincidence that the Women’s Studies and the Medical Sciences departments at my university were as far away from each other on campus as was physically possible. I actually had one professor in a fourth-year Human Diseases course tell me that if I wanted to spend class time talking about women’s health issues, I had better go to the “Female Studies department.”

When I gathered the courage to continue studying biology at the graduate level, the predicament I found myself in was very common among other feminists who enter scientific fields. As is often the case, “in an effort to create a successful career in science, unfortunately many scholars either leave their views at the lab door or after years of struggling to find a place within the patricentric ivory tower, they cannot sustain their critical feminist perspective” (Christian- sen-Ruffman 1993, 19). In my undergraduate years, at least I had the nerve to raise my hand in class and push some buttons by trying to include a feminist perspective in our class discussions. This was not so easy to do at the graduate level as an increasing number of barriers appeared before me. As a graduate student in the sciences, I quickly learned that “radical” and “nonscientific” ideas would not be tolerated and that intellectual conformity seemed to be the key to success. Feminists have repeatedly emphasized the need for more feminists to become scientists and for women to keep informed of the technologies that shape our lives (Hubbard 1995; Franklin 1990; Benston 1982). In my opinion, the issue is not simply about feminists learning more about technology or more feminists becoming scientists. In order for feminists to thrive in science and develop careers in science they need immediate role models and supportive mentors who are not afraid of including feminist thought in the creation of scientific knowledge. In addition, they need to receive a science education that is not based on the use of sexist, classist, and racist paradigms. I was encouraged to pursue a doctoral degree in reproductive science by many feminists outside of science whom I respected and admired, but the truth is the more 1 tried to become a scientist, the harder it became for me to apply feminist critiques of science to my daily practice.

As difficult as it all seemed, I realized that in order to do a Ph.D. in reproductive biology and use molecular biology techniques, it was no longer sufficient for me to simply engage in feminist critiques of science. I needed to formulate a concrete feminist model of scientific inquiry that spoke directly to my experiences. I didn’t have a name for it then, hut what I was in pursuit of was feminist theory i n science. This emerging field of scholarship bridges feminist critiques of science with practical transformations of science and is being developed mostly by feminist scientists. With their first-hand experience, they have brought new insights into how feminist approaches can influence the creation of scientific knowledge. In the second year of my Ph.D. studies, when I was really starting

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to grapple with the definition of feminist scientist, I had two life-changing experiences. The first was that I picked up a book called the The Real World of Technology (1990) written by experimental physicist Dr. Ursula Franklin. When I realized that she was Professor Emeritus at my own university, I decided I needed to speak to her. Perhaps she had already worked out a model for feminist science in physics. I was looking for a recipe from her that I could tweak for the biological sciences. When I posed my question to her, Dr. Franklin was both brilliant and vague. She gave me one clue and told me that the rest would come. That clue was an essay written by Margaret Benston called “Feminism and the Critique of Scientific Method” (1982).

In this essay, Benston was working toward a different science by formulating her questions of scientific inquiry within a context of community (Christian- sen-Ruffman 1993). Benston felt that what was needed in a new science was a sense of the limits of appropriateness of reductionism, a consideration of the connections between the knower and the known, and an understanding of appropriate levels of discourse (Benston 1982,64). After reading Benston’s work on developing a new science, I realized that in order to take my first steps toward a feminist science, I would have to formulate my own questions of scientific inquiry in a context relevant to me. And just as I was about to sail out into this uncharted territory, the second life-changing event occurred.

I remember it so clearly. I had just spent twelve frustrating hours working in the lab and finally decided to head home. On my way home, I was telling myself that I was foolish to think that I could pull off this degree and lead this secret life as a feminist spy, when there it was. Shining under the front window display lights of the Women’s Bookstore, I saw before me a reason to go on. It was a copy of Bonnie Spanier’s Imlpartial Science (1995). I think I stood frozen in front of that window wondering if my eyes were playing tricks on me. For before me was the most obscure but relevant subtitle that I had ever read: Gender Ideology in Molecular Biology. Although I am not mentioned in the dedication, I am convinced that this book was written with me in mind. Now I not only had a vision of formulating my own questions of scientific inquiry in a context that was relevant to me but I also had a feminist framework in molecular biology to follow.

FEMINIST THEORY IN SCIENCE: WHERE CAN IT TAKE Us?

Feminist critiques of science have focused on the ideologies, politics, epistemologies, economics, and metaphysics of traditional science and brought our attention to biases based on sex, race, class, sexual orientation, and other arbitrary categories (Fausto-Sterling 1985; Tuana 1989; Martin 1987). Although a rich tradition of feminist critiques of science exists for feminists who are scientists working within scientific establishments, it is difficult to bridge the ideas of

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these critiques with practical transformations in scientific knowledge production. For example, how should a feminist scientist conduct experiments? The actual transformations based on feminist critiques of science are left up to the individual scientist.

In this paper, 1 go beyond the general bases of feminist critiques of science. I will attempt to extend these critiques by drawing upon a n emerging field of scholarship referred to as feminist theory in science (Rosser 1989). I will use feminist theory in science to illustrate how a practical transformation in methodology can change scientific knowledge production. More specifically, I will demonstrate how a feminist model of inquiry can change how we conduct inolecular biology research in the reproductive sciences. My work is based on a feminist approach of inquiry proposed by Sandra Harding (1987) and later described in the context of molecular biology research by Spanier (1995).

This model of feminist inquiry has some similarities to, but is also distinct from, the model of inquiry traditionally used in science. In the lab and in the classroom, young scientists are taught how to produce and report scientific knowledge in a powerfcilly uniform way. This is one of the great strengths of modern Western science. As early as grade six, I recall being taught that scientists use Scientific Method with a capital “S” and a capital “M” as both their guide for and their means of knowledge production. The framework of Scientific Method consists of the hypothesis, materials and methods, results, and discussion. This framework may seem very simplistic, hut its power lies in its simplicity. Those of us who know better realize that the production of scientific knowledge cannot occur within the confines of these four components. Yet I do not recall a single instance throughout my undergraduate or graduate science training where a professor pulled me aside and told me that there was more to Scientific Method than these four components. In fact, it is not likely that most feminists starting their careers as scientists would be exposed to critiques or in-depth analyses of the Scientific Method. They would have been taught, as I was, that the scientist begins her journey by formulating a Hypothesis. In order to prove or disprove this hypothesis, the scientist outlines an experimental plan and calls this materials and methods. She then conducts experiments and records the data. These are her results. Once the data has been collected, the results are then placed into a discussion where supporting theories and paradigms are used to bring relevance to her findings. According to the Scientific Method, scientists must report their findings and discuss their work using these four strict headings and most of the time in a specific order.

In the lab and classroom, scientific epistemology, scientific methodology, and scientific method are all conflated into one entity and given the name Scientific Method. The feminist scientist must therefore learn to take a step back from this inonolith called Scientific Method and appreciate the distinction between epistemology, methodology, and method. To make this distinction, I would like

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to turn to some of the discussions that have evolved out of the “method debates” among feminist social scientists in the late 1980s as they raised issues very simi- lar to those raised in the biological sciences. In these discussions, epistemology is described as a theory of knowledge, methodology as the broad theoretical basis that informs and shapes the character of various methods, and method as a technique for gathering evidence or conducting research (Harding 1987; Eichler 1997). Upon learning these distinctions, it becomes possible to imagine how feminist epistemologies and feminist methodologies could be used to create scientific knowledge. The problem arises for the feminist scientist in trying to understand what a feminist method in science would look like.

Therefore, before I go any further, I would like to address the “feminist method in science” question. When it is said that feminist theory in science will lead to practical transformations, what exactly do we mean? We can think in terms of curriculum changes, integrating feminist perspectives into science education, and continued sexist-paradigm busting. But can practical transformations of science occur, both at the metaphysical levels of epistemological and methodological changes, and at the more mundane level of method? Can feminist theory in science be used to create a feminist method in science? And is this the same question as whether feminist theory in science can influence how we “practice” or “do” science in the lab? Others before me have addressed the feminist method in science question and come up with various answers. I would like to address the issue of a feminist method in science and contribute to this debate from the other side as a scientist, and up until recently, as a lab- dweller.

However, I must make a comment before I proceed. I believe that when asking the feminist method in science question, one must have already pre- supposed the existence of a feminist science in the epistemological and methodological senses and must also be careful not to equate the meaning of the feminist method question with either of these.

In her essay “Can There Be a Feminist Science?” Helen Longino argues for a process-based approach and rejects a content-based approach to characterizing feminist science. In her contribution to the method debates, Longino states, “I want to suggest that we focus on science as practice rather than content, as process rather than product; hence, not on feminist science, but on doing science as a feminist” ( 1989,47). Her rejection of a content-based approach is based on the idea that theories of feminist science conflate “feminist” with “feminine.” She argues that such theories “encode a particular world view, characterized by complexity, interaction and wholism,” thus portraying feminist science as “the expression and valorization of female sensitivity and cognitive tempera- ment” (1989, 46). She also claims that feminist science cannot emerge from a “feminist standpoint,” which she considers to be an essentialist notion. After having made this distinction between a content-based “feminist science” and a

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process-based “doing science as a feminist,” Longino arrives at the main point of her argument. She poses the question: “[Clan there be a feminist science? If this means: is it in principle possible to do science as a feminist?, the answer must be: yes. If this means: can we in practice do science as a feminist?, the answer must be: not until we change the social and political context in which science is done” (Longino 1989, 56).

These statements raise two issues for me as a feminist scientist. First of all, what exactly does she mean when she says “to do science as a feminist?” Does this “do” imply method? And if it does, does this mean that until one defines a feminist method in science they cannot, in principle, “do” science as a feminist? Secondly, must this change that she speaks of occur at the level of the institution, or can the individual scientist act as an agent of change and bring a social and political context into the science that they “do”?

In feminist critiques of science, terms such as “do” and “practice” are commonly used to describe the process of scientific knowledge production. They flow freely among the different levels of epistemology, methodology, and method. However, as a scientist I find it confusing when these words are used while the level of the process to which they are meant to refer is not clearly defined. In her essay, Longino also writes: “The doing of science involves many practices: how one structures a laboratory (hierarchically or collectively), how one relates to other scientists (competitively or cooperatively), how and whether one engages in political struggles over affirmative action. It extends also to intellectual practices, to the activities of scientific inquiry, such as observation and reasoning” (Longino 1989, 47). It appears that the feminist “doing of science” and the “practices” to which she refers here lie at the levels of epistemology and methodology, but not method. Yet earlier in her essay, she dismisses theories of feminist science, which presumably include feminist epistemology and methodology, on the grounds that they are content-based. In an attempt to support her process-based approach, Longino thus reconfigures the question C a n there be a feminist science! into Is it possible, in principle and in practice, to do science as afeminist! In this way, her choice of terminology both includes and masks the feminist method in science question. To “do” science would seem to involve the technical aspects of conducting scientific research belonging to the level of method, such as conducting experiments and gathering evidence. However, Longino neglects to address the relationship between “doing” and scientific knowledge production at this very level. Longino’s process-based approach fails to make a clear distinction between the different levels of scientific knowledge production on which the “doing” of science can occur.

Harding has dealt with the question of developing a feminist method for the social sciences and biology, and suggests that the effort “is misguided and furthermore should be abandoned” (1989, 17). She is right. She argues against a distinctive feminist method of research in the social sciences and biology and

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suggests that what distinguishes what feminist researchers “do” from what nonfeminist researchers “do” involves analyzing gender critically, taking women’s experiences into account and including them as valid scientific evidence, and identifying the complex subjectivities in ourselves and what we observe. “DO” in this sense refers to the doing of research at the levels of epistemology and methodology. So, is there a feminist method in science? I would have to agree that the answer is no. Speaking from the perspective of a biologist, method has a very specific meaning. It refers to lab work-the nuts and bolts of experimentation. Now, if one was to ask whether there is a feminist way of “doing” science, the answer is yes and no. There is not a feminist way to pipette, centrifuge, or run a statistical test. However, one can still be “doing” feminist science if the reason for pipetting, centrifuging, and running a statistical analysis originates from a feminist epistemological and methodological basis.

For the feminist scientist, then, feminism can exist as an epistemology and as a methodology, but not as a method. But for the benefit of the feminist scientist, I have one further piece of advice. In the end, it does come down to the method question and you must be armed with the correct answer in order to explain yourself and what you do to both the scientists who are not feminists and the feminists who are not scientists. Inasmuch as feminism can exist as an epistemology and methodology in science, for the feminist scientist the science that you do can exist only as a method. This method is not to be confused with the capital “M” Method. When you are practicing science as a feminist, you are not engaging in science as a methodology or epistemology. So after learning that the Method in Scientific Method really includes scientific epistemology, methodology, and method, you have to stop doing what you did not realize you were doing and start thinking of science as a method only, not also as a methodology or an epistemology.

Let me return to an earlier question: Can feminist theory in science be used to create a feminist method in science? Since there can be no feminist method in science, the question no longer carries meaning. However, now we can appreciate that this question is not the same as, can feminist theory in science influence how we “practice” or “do” science in the lab? This question begs to be rephrased. We must now ask, can feminist theory in science influence the production of scientific knowledge at the level of epistemology and methodology? The answer should be a resounding “Yes!” But now let me consider the caveat presented by Longino when she comments on whether or not there can be a feminist science. She says that “if this question means can we in practice do science as feminists?, the answer must be not until we change the social and political context in which science is done” (1989, 56). She also states: “Doing science differently requires more than just the will to do so and it would be disingenuous to pretend that our philosophies of science are the only barrier. Scientific inquiry takes place in a social, political and economic context which

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imposes a variety of institutional obstacles to innovation, let alone to the intellectual working out of oppositional and political commitments” (55).

It is true that scientific inquiry does not occur in isolation and that a scientist, his or her supervisor, department, institution, and governmental granting agency all have a great deal of influence over the scientific enterprise. But does this mean that although we can now see that feminist theory in science may be used to create a feminist science whose knowledge would be based on feminist epistemology and methodology, we can not proceed any further until the social and political context in which the science is “done” changes? This raises several issues. Is science “done” by the individual scientist working in a lab, or is it “done” by the supervisor, the department, the institution, or the granting agency that provides the funds? If the answer is that science is done by all of the above, then whose social and political context has to be changed? The individual scientist’s context! The scientific institution’s context? Everybody’s context? The real question is, is i t all or nothing? Or can an individual t ry to do feminist science even if the social and political context of the institution(s) in which it is done is not completely changed to reflect a feminist vision?

For the scientist working away at her lab bench who also considers herself a feminist, how I address this last question will determine the status of her current existence. I think the answer is obvious. One has to try. The individual has to try to do feminist science even if her context and the context of the institution in which she works do not resonate with each other. This is where feminist theory in science comes in, by bridging feminist critiques of science with practical transformations of science. If we want the feminist scientist to thrive, the least that feminist theory in science can do is to try to provide her with concrete strategies on how to “do” feminist science. This sets the stage for my own attempt at realizing the potential of feminist theory in science.

PRACTICAL TRANSFORMATION: CONLWCTING MOLECULAR BIOLOGY RESEARCH I N T H E REPRODUCTIVE SCIENCES

For the feminist scientist, feminism may not be able to exist as a method, but it can and does exist as a methodology and an epistemology. So how do we use feminist methodology and epistemology for the production of scientific knowledge? The answer to this question is not so simple. There appear to be several different and soinetiines contradictory ideas as to how feminist ethical theory in science application would evolve. But the common element among these different ideas is the pursuit of a science that recognizes the needs of, and treats with respect, those who are oppressed and whose voices either cannot be heard or cannot be understood (Birke 1994; Messing and Mergler 1995).

In my attempt to put feminist theory in science into practice, I have replaced Scientific Method’s methodology with a feminist methodology. For the femi-

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nist scientists out there this means that I want to stop thinking in terms of hypothesis, materials and methods, results and discussion. As an alternative methodology, I want to use a model of feminist inquiry proposed by Harding (1987) for the social sciences. Spanier has taken up this model and applied it to her research revealing the sexist paradigms used in molecular biology. The components of this methodology include (i) locating the Origins of Problemat- ics; (ii) uncovering the Purposes of Inquiry; (iii) interpreting the Hypothesis and Euidence; and (iv) establishing a Relationship between the Inquirer and herlhis Subject of Inquiry (Spanier 1995,41). I must point out that this is not the only feminist model of inquiry available but I think that by using the framework of this model I can illustrate realistically both the promises and perils of put- ting feminist theory in science into practice. In order to demonstrate how this feminist methodology can be used to change molecular biology-based research in the reproductive sciences, I will use examples from current research in the field as well as from my own Ph.D. work.

ORIGINS OF PROBLEMATICS

Scientific Method does not recognize any events prior to the derivation of the Hypothesis. This omission is purposeful. In order to obey the doctrine of “objectivity” in the Scientific Method, any form of influence, whether personal or environmental, must be removed from the mind of the scientist. “Scientists, and the information they collect are treated as though they are culture-free, class- less, apolitical; as though the scientist’s attempts at objectivity were routinely successful” (Namenwirth 1986,34). Feminists argue that no scientific evidence or interpretation is without influence by cultural and social biases (Hubbard 1989; Haraway 1986; Lewontin 1991; Fox Keller 1996). Envisioning scientific knowledge that is valid despite this recognition is key in order for feminist theory in science to be ahle to change how it is that we practice science.

The first component of feminist inquiry, which asks where the idea of the research to be conducted originates and what it is influenced by, is referred to as the Origins of Problematics:

Ideally, feminist research originates in the material and political concerns of women-centered efforts to improve the quality of life for women, children and hence, the planet. [I would note that improving the quality of life for men should not be excluded]. Women’s concerns about what is wrong with society, such as violence, poverty, sexual abuse, and the misuse of power over people and resources, are placed at the center of a feminist approach, in contrast to conventional scientific motivations, such as the accrual of knowledge for its own sake, the advancement of capi-

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talism, or personal ambition. Explicitly stated feminist values may reorder funding priorities for research, question metaphors chosen and promoted for biological life, and re-vision who should be recruited in to the profession (Spanier 1995,41).

Therefore, in this feminist model of inquiry, in starting with the Origins of Problematics, a scientist is forced to think not only about her hypothesis hut about what factors have influenced her to arrive at this particular hypothesis. The factors that influence a scientist, in turn, depend on who they are. An example of how the Origins of Problematics would change how and what molecular biology-based research is conducted in reproductive science can be demonstrated using the technology of embryonic genetic screening.

Once we recognize that scientists bring with them certain biases based on their gender, race, and class, we must then acknowledge that the direction of research in reproductive biology in North America largely depends on the gender, race, and class perspectives of white, middle-to-upper-class men. The predominance of white upper-class male doctors and scientists participating in reproductive biology research over the last century has been associated with increased medical intervention in the processes of pregnancy and female reproductive health care (Corea 1986; Ehrenreich and English 1978). Societies, and the scientists within these societies, have repeatedly used science to rational- ize, justify, and naturalize dominant ideologies and to maintain the status quo (Namenwirth 1986). In this way, research in reproductive biology has been used by the institutions of science and medicine to justify the misuse of power over women, regardless of their race and class, in the name of their “well-being.”

Turning to the example of embryonic genetic screening, we must ask why this molecular biology based technology has been granted such prominence. In embryonic genetic screening, cells from a developing embryo are isolated from maternal peripheral blood. The DNA in the nuclei of these cells is extracted and analyzed for certain genes thought to he associated with diseases (see Steele et al. 1996). What dominant ideologies are being rationalized in this research? The promise of perfection and “well-being” is now offered through techniques such as genetic screening of embryos for people who can afford to pay for “perfect” babies. In these cases, genetic screening would select against a fetus with anything that is perceived as a physical or mental disability. What value does that place on the lives of people who live with these challenges in our society today? Who has the power and desire to formulate a hypothesis that leads to more research on embryonic genetic screening?

As a Ph.D. student, the director of my department was an upper-class white male. His (sub)?/conscious Origins of Problematics intimately influenced what type of research was funded in our department, which scientists got to practice that research, and ultimately, how women received reproductive health care.

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This observation is not made to suggest, however, that simply replacing male scientists with female scientists would rectify the existing problem within reproductive biology research. Feminist epistemologies must replace the existing epistemologies, and this can be done by either women or men. Before the embryonic genetic screening experiments begin we have to ask, Why do we want to screen genes? The intentions and motives of the scientist should be made known. This process can begin when scientists start their scientific inquiry by locating the Origins of Problematics in their research.

As I was doing my Ph.D. research and thesis writing, I faced the daily challenge of practicing feminist science. Had I not been aware of Spanier’s work and Harding’s model of feminist inquiry, I know that I would not have been able to finish my degree. Now, having completed my Ph.D., I thought it would be interesting and only fair that I put my own research on the spot. In this paper I claim to provide a practical transformation of how experiments can be conducted in reproductive biology research, but can I show to both feminists and scientists that my own research counts as feminist science?

My Ph.D. thesis examined the effect of a hormone called melatonin on reproduction at the level of Gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) neurons of the brain. Melatonin is a hormone that is naturally synthesized in humans and other animals at nighttime by the pineal gland, which is located at the base of the brain. Melatonin is best known for its regulation of circadian rhythmicity, but has also been shown to have antioxidant properties and to play a role in the reproductive control of seasonally breeding animals (Arendt 1995). In humans, the sleep cycle effects of this hormone are better understood, but there is also a great deal of interest in melatonin’s possible role in the regulation of reproduction. Clinical trials indicate that at high doses (levels that the body would not normally encounter), melatonin can be used as a contraceptive in women (Voordouw et al. 1992). GnRH, on the other hand, is a hormone produced by less than 1000 neurons in the hypothalamus of all mammals and which is known to play a crucial role in reproduction by regulating the levels of other gonadal hormones such as estrogen and testosterone in both women and men (Yen 1991). The neurons that produce GnRH are referred to as the GnRH neurons. My research involved trying to connect melatonin’s role in reproduction with GnRH neurons of the hypothalamus. The real question, however, is whether or not my research qualifies as feminist science. It is time to put my own work to the test. A good place to start would be to locate the Origin of Prohlematics in my research.

(i) Did my thesis originate in the material and political concerns ofwomen-centered efforts to improve the quality of life for those who are oppressed?

It is possible that research on melatonin may help to improve the quality of life for both women and men by addressing material health concerns involv- ing sleep disorders and cancer prevention. But from a point of view of holistic

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medicine, administration of melatonin would only help to treat symptoms. The preferable option would be to create a healthy environment in which stress and environmental toxins leading to these disorders and diseases would be removed. But many would argue that the reality of that kind of healthy environment is unattainable at present. So in the meantime, there are those who would wish to treat their symptoms with the most nonintrusive, naturally based remedy as possible. Melatonin-mediated therapy for sleep disorders and cancer treatments may therefore represent a preferable alternative to other chemotherapies.

The material concern of women with regards to the access of melatonin for oral contraception is more complicated. For those who wish to use oral contraceptives, melatonin may be viewed as a possible “natural” contraceptive, but no more natural than estrogen and progesterone-based contraceptives. As it stands, very little is understood regarding the totality of effects of melatonin on reproduction. My thesis was based on a concern to better understand the broader effects of melatonin on reproduction, apart from its ability to block ovulation in women. By examining the neuroendocrinological effects of melatonin, I demonstrated that melatonin may have farther-reaching systemic antigonadotropic effects (Roy et al. 2001). In other words, melatonin inhibits many other hormones involved in the positive control of reproduction and prolonged overdosing may be detrimental to women’s reproductive health.

In tnelatonin research, the bodies of animals and women have been used as materials to test yet another type of contraceptive. In this field of science, the political concern of whether or not oral contraceptives represent reproductive freedom for women is not addressed. Why is it that science and medicine are so fascinated with reproductive control over women’s bodies? However, the more immediate reality is that oral contraceptives are being used by millions of women around the world. Therefore, the political concern becomes more about whether or not there exists a need for yet another form of oral contraception for women. No doubt that pharmaceutical companies who will distribute melatonin-based contraceptives will enjoy financial gain. But in terms of the political concerns from which my thesis originated, by studying the effects of melatonin from the perspective that reproduction is comprised of a series of hormonal feedback loops in the body, I showed that melatonin not only shuts down ovulation at the level of the gonads but has antigonadotropic effects at the level of the brain as well (Roy et al. 2001). I have tried to build a case that as far as contraception is concerned, melatonin should not be used.

PURPOSES OF ~NQLIIRY

In scientific discourse, the term “purpose” is often used interchangeably with the term hypothesis. As will become evident, the two words do not share the same meaning in the context of a feminist inquiry. In a scientific experiment,

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the assumption is often made that a purpose for the research obviously exists, even if it goes unsaid. At other times, the purpose is stated by way of refer- encing a particular subject area, thus suggesting that the research conducted contributes to knowledge in that field, and that the accrual of knowledge is the sole purpose of the research. By not having to state a defined purpose for the particular scientific experiment, researchers are not required to reveal the social forces prompting their research, or the biases that may exist in their reasoning for conducting the research in the first place. In terms of a feminist model of inquiry, this is unacceptable. The second component of this feminist inquiry states that:

An inquiry’s origin and its purpose are closely intertwined. Originating in concerns for women’s quality of life, a central purpose in feminist inquiry is to eliminate constraints based on sex, race, class, sexual orientation, and other arbitrary categories, in order to change society for the better. Identifying bias in language, concepts, paradigms, applications, and personnel policies of science acknowledges the harm done to science and to society by scientific studies based on questionable assumptions about the meaning of gender, race, and sexual orientation. If one purpose o f scientific inquiry is to gain more accurate understandings of the world and another is to improve the quality of life for people, then feminist inquiry, with its rigorous attention to eliminating the consequences of gender ideology, can offer corrections that expunge inaccuracies and distortions as well as encourage strict scientific standards (Spanier 1995, 42).

Therefore, in this feminist methodology, the process of defining the Purposes of Inquiry in a scientific experiment forces the scientist to consider the impact of her research in a broader context. The scientist would then be required to investigate what would be the totality of effects of a scientific intervention would be, prior to its widespread application. The point here is that even if the totality of effects cannot be fully realized, at least an attempt to consider all the effects, whether desirable or not, should be made on the part of the researcher. This requirement can only improve the current standard of scientific experimentation. An example of how the Purposes of Inquiry would change molecular biology based research in the reproductive sciences can be demonstrated using the technologies of in virro fertilization (IVF).

Consider the vast amounts of funds and time being spent on the development of IVF technologies based on molecular biology research. As feminist inquirers, we must question the Purposes of these Inquiries. In a recent review on IVF, the author states:

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Genetic disorders are a major cause of miscarriage and fetal death. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) can be used to diagnose generic defects before [emphasis added] pregnancy has occurred by creating embryos by IVF, then removing single cells which are genetically analyzed. . . . Newer techniques, however, can rapidly diagnose multiple defects including chro- mosomal aneuploidy, sex and single gene defects. Embryonic cells can also be DNA fingerprinted. . . . As embryo screening can increase IVF success rates and decrease miscarriage rates, i t will he increasingly offered in routine IVF. . . . These new, low-cost techniques may ultimately allow PGD to be offered to all IVF patients regardless of risk (Findlay 2000,672).

Is the goal of this research to eliminate constraints based on sex, race, class, sexual orientation, and other categories, in order to change society for the better? Or will the newest molecular biology based IVF technologies be developed in order to select for the participating scientist’s interpretation of the perfect human being? In terms of the accessibility issue, which classes of people will reap the so-called benefits of these technologies? If desired, will everyone have equal access to these technologies? How many subsidized “inner city” IVF clinics will we see? A feminist model of inquiry can expose the Purposes of Inquiry that scientists either want to hide or are not even aware of. Having said this, does my own research address this component of a feminist inquiry?

(ii) Was i t a central purpose of my inquiry to eliminate constraints based on sex in order to change society for the better?

Women have repeatedly been targets for contraceptive technologies. Male contraception does not seem to receive the same amount of attention. The Purpose of Inquiry of my thesis was to examine the effects of melatonin on GnRH, which is a hormone involved in regulating both male and female reproductive systems. Since I found that melatonin downregulates GnRH, I showed that no scientific basis exists for why both male and female contraception by inelatonin cannot he envisioned. This would help to eliminate some of the existing constraints based on sex that are blatantly apparent in contraceptive technologies. However, since I found that melatonin may have antigonadotropic effects at the level of the brain, and despite the health risks women have taken for the sake of contraception, I did not advise the use of melatonin for male contraception either. This is a case in point for the benefits of feminist science for men as well as for women.

(iii) Did my inquiry improue the quality of life for people by expunging inaccuracies and distortions of biased paradigms?

In order to make my research qualify as feminist science, it was critical to identify and avoid the biases in paradigms commonly used in reproductive

neuroendocrinology research. This was by far the hardest task for me. Forexample, research in this field has been deeply influenced by the paradigm ofbiological reductionism. It is true that not all forms of reductionism are evil andthat sometimes biological reductionism is necessary in order to fully appreciatethe complexity of an organism. But to echo Benston's (1982) thoughts, a senseof the limits of appropriateness of reductionism has to exist. Reductionismbecomes a problem when it leads to oversimplified models and simplistic causalthinking, which is the tendency in biological research. While caught up inthe reductionism paradigm, it becomes very difficult to determine the limits ofappropriateness. But this is not the fault of reductionist thinking in itself. Theinability to keep sight of the broader consequences, connections, and implications of one's research stems from scientific isolationism and from the idea thatscientists should not have to think about the broader consequences of theirwork. Therefore, in order for my research to pass as feminist science, I had tocritically evaluate whether or not studying melatonin-mediated regulation ofGnRH really answered any broader questions. The influences of reductionistparadigms in my work were innumerable, and I realized early on that I wouldbe unable to justify or eliminate each and everyone of them. I knew that I hadto choose my battles and not let the fact that I was not completely satisfyingthis component of the feminist model of inquiry interfere with my attempt topractice feminist science.

One of the main Purposes of my Inquiry was to examine the effect of melatonin on GnRH neurons at the level of their gene expression. In other words,my project constantly required me to work at a molecular level and deal withthe reductionist paradigm that leads us to believe that the gene is the mastermolecule. To work my way through this, I had to realize that although discovering melatonin-mediated effects on GnRH gene expression may have very littlemeaning on its own, there could be broader impacts of my research in terms ofappreciating systemic reproductive influences of hormones traditionally thoughtto have confined physiological targets. In this case, I would not have been ableto make this scientific claim had I not worked at the level of the isolated GnRHneurons. I also forced my research to go in a certain direction. After findingthe result that melatonin regulates GnRH gene expression, I made it a pointto study the effects of melatonin on other cellular components such as energyproduction by mitochondria, GnRH secretion, expression of some key proteinsinvolved in cellular activation, and the cellular signaling pathways in the GnRHneurons (Roy and Belsham 2002). In the end, my findings suggested that thecooperativity of all these factors must be responsible for the cellular effects ofmelatonin on GnRH neurons.

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HYPOTHESIS A N D EVIDENCE

According to Scientific Method, we can see that it is here that the process of experimentation is supposed to begin. Instead of searching for the Origins of Problematics and the Purposes of Inquiry, the process of experimentation begins with the derivation of a Hypothesis. By eliminating the need to recognize the broader influences and reasons for conducting the experiment and the biases in the paradigms to he used, the scientist can formulate a Hypothesis with all ideological assumptions intact. In a feminist inquiry, the Hypothesis and Evidence component would replace the hypothesis, results, and discussion components of the traditional scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the derivation of a Hypothesis, followed by the gathering of Evidence and interpretation of this Evidence, would occur along a different line:

The discipline of biology turns to “biological” explanations first, so the assumptions built into the meaning of “biology” shape what are considered plausible theories, explanations, or legitimate evidence. Feminism turns to a broader and more interdisciplinary range of knowledge and theories for explanations and forms of evidence, taking into account cross-cultural and intracultural evidence for the plasticity of human behavior and physicality. Furthermore, the long history of erroneous and harmful theories about sex, race and class differences creates a justifiable skepticism about hypotheses and evidence that ignore the dynamics of culture that shape both behavior and biology (Spanier 1995,42).

In the discipline of biology, certain ideological assumptions are built into the meaning of biology itself. These assumptions intimately shape the derivation of a Hypothesis and the interpretation of Results. A common ideological assumption, for example, is that biology can be separated from influences such as the “environment” or “culture” (Lewontin 1991; Shiva 1995; Hubbard 1988; Spanier 1995). Another powerful ideological assumption is that the scientist can approach a research question with “pure” objectivity. It is thought that only pure objectivity can produce accuracy in the collection and interpretation of Results.

In a feminist inquiry there would be no claims to pure objectivity. But at the same time, we cannot dismiss objectivity all together. For when objectivity implies quantitative research, statistics, and accuracy, there may still be something to gain from its practice. Of course, feminist science would also strive for accuracy hut would not assume that this could be achieved by pure objectivity alone. Therefore, instead of dismissing objectivity completely, Margrit Eichler argues that “[ilt seems useful to think of objectivity as a n asymptotically approachable but unreachable goal” (1991, 14). For the feminist scientist,

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however, clearly a tension arises between striving for accuracy and the desire to avoid achieving this accuracy by forming Hypotheses laden with incorrect ideological assumptions. This tension may be resolved if one were to approach the scientific inquiry with what Harding has called “strong objectivity.” She states, “We can think of strong objectivity as extending the notion of scientific research to include systematic examination o f . . . powerful background beliefs. I t must do so in order to be competent at maximizing objectivity” (1991, 149). Therefore, by examining the ideological assumptions built into the actual Hypothesis itself, the feminist scientist only increases the level of objectivity in her inquiry, thereby increasing the accuracy in the interpretation of her Evi- dence. A n example of how a Hypothesis originating from this feminist model of inquiry would alter how experiments are conducted and how Evidence is interpreted in current reproductive biology research can be demonstrated using the new technology of intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI).

As in the fields of cognitive science (Fausto-Sterling 1985), neuroanatomy (Rleier 1986; Hubbard 1988), and primatology (Haraway 1986), most research in reproductive biology appears to be framed in order to echo incorrect assumptions of gender differences. In ICSI, the sperm head from immature spermatocytes are microinjected into the cytoplasm of an egg (see Van Steirteghem, Devroey, and Liebaers 2002). This procedure is performed when the male partner in a heterosexual couple cannot produce motile sperm. For now, let us put aside the issue that the female partner in this arrangement may very well be fertile, but for the sake of this procedure may have to undergo superovula- tory drug treatments. Take, for example, a recently published paper in this field, the abstract of which reads: “Degeneration of oocytes occurs even when maximum care is exercised during ICSI, especially when the oolemma is very fragile and/or the zona pellucida is resistant. In order to be able to minimize the risk of degeneration associated with microinjection this study applied a new method: a microhole on the zona pellucida of the oocyte was drilled by laser beam just prior to ICSI to permit the penetration of the microneedle without any trauma” (Abdelmassih et al. 2002).

The hypothesis made by these traditional scientists, then, is that since fragile eggs often do not survive microinjection during ICSI, maybe drilling a hole into the outer membrane of the egg with a laser beam would allow easier penetration of the egg by the spermatocyte and lead to less degeneration. Ideological assumptions of gender differences have driven the derivation of the Hypothesis in this experiment whereby a scientist aggressively penetrates a fragile egg to allow a sperm to enter. In comparison, the feminist Hypothesis would take into account the fact that an egg is not usually fertilized by a n immature sperm, and that biological mechanisms are in place so that this does not occur naturally in a woman’s body. Instead, the feminist Hypothesis might ask why the eggs are degenerating, why the zona pellucida is resistant, and determine whether

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or not it is in the best interest of the patient undergoing the ICSI procedure to have these eggs injected with immature spermatocytes.

The Results and Discussion presented in the same paper read: “After laser- assisted ICSI compared with conventional ICSI, survival rates of oocytes were 99.6 and 84% (P<O.OOOl, n=32). . . . Fherefore] creating a microhole on the zona pellucida of the oocyte by laser beam prior to ICSI provides a less traumatic penetration of the injection needle in to the ooplasm and results in lower degeneration and higher embryo development rates than conventional ICSI in patients with fragile oocytes” (Abdelmassih et al. 2002). It is not completely clear here if the “traumatic penetration” referred to is felt by the egg, the sperm, the needle, or the scientist doing the microinjection. In any case, as gender- biased assumptions would dictate, scientists have spent inordinate amounts of time and money to recreate a scenario of “aggressively” inserting a sperm head into a “fragile” egg in a petri dish. These assumptions lead scientists to focus on ways to increase the sperm’s activation of the egg for successful fertilization and downgrade the importance of the female Contribution in fertility. Since a Hypothesis derived from the feminist model of inquiry would never ask the same question as above, obviously the Evidence gathered and then discussed by the scientist would also he different. Instead, a feminist inquiry would produce Evidence that would enhance our understanding of not only the male contribution but also the female contribution to fertility. Turning to my own work, was I able to incorporate a broader range of knowledge into my research?

(iv)Did my Hypothesis and Evidence incorporate dynamics of culture that shape both behavior and biology!

In recent years, melatonin has gained popularity as a cure for jet lag and sleep disorders. Although the sale of melatonin is illegal in some countries such as Canada, it is easily available in the United States. A few years ago, melatonin was being marketed as a wonder drug that could improve sleeping habits, prevent cancer, and even reverse the aging process. Whether or not all these benefits are true remains to he seen. However, evidence showed that people felt great after taking melatonin. It was due to this increase in public interest that some scientists, including myself, became interested in studying melatonin.

Because melatonin has been shown to have effects on both human behavior and physicality, I attempted to develop a better understanding of melatonin through non-traditional forms of evidence. Yet whenever I tried to design a Hypothesis that incorporated cultural dynamics, I was told that the question I was asking was non-scientific. In hindsight, I realize that it was not necessar- ily the cultural context itself hut rather the language that I used to formulate my Hypothesis that was considered to be “non-scientific.” Despite this fact, for a broader range of knowledge beyond the “scientific” I did learn about some herbal remedies that have been used for the treatment of both sleep disorders and contraception for centuries. This information never made it into my thesis.

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I learned that in order to substantiate the use of crosscultural or intracultural dynamics 1 had to present this information with a traditionally scientific spin. For example, in some countries distinct patterns in the number of births are observed among humans who live in regions with fewer hours of daylight year- round. I tried to draw out the importance of these events by formulating a Hypothesis that would allow me to examine the correlation between melatonin, reproduction, and circadian rhythmicity in GnRH neurons.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INQUIRER ANL) HER/HIS SUBJECT OF INQUIRY

In Scientific Method, the materials and methods component describes what animals, plants, cells, chemicals, and machines were used to conduct an experiment and how the experiments were done. Often the descriptions are in great detail, which is necessary for the replication of the same experiment by other researchers. This is a commendable feature of the Scientific Method. However, at the same time this is also one of the greatest limitations of the traditional Scientific Method, as the materials and the methods used are never connected directly to the user. In addition, when documenting this component of the traditional scientific inquiry, it is written in the past tense, so as to further dis- sociate the experimenter from any immediate relationship to the information being produced. In a feminist inquiry, the Relationship between the Inquirer and her/his Subject of Inquiry would replace the material and methods section. As discussed previously, although the methods used in a feminist inquiry will not be different than a traditional scientific inquiry, the relationship between the scientist and the subject of examination must be recognized and articulated:

One of the tenets of feminist scholarship is that the researcher should be in the same critical plane as the subject matter. By making her conceptual framework clear, the researcher places herself on a mutual footing with the material. This helps to make visible the researcher’s actual relationship to the information and interpretations of the research and promotes a self-reflexive search for researcher bias, something that is rarely considered necessary in conventional research (Spanier 1995,43).

In reproductive biology research, it is not only animals and cells that are used as materials but women as well. A strong theme in feminist critiques of science has been to see animals as “fellow sufferers” (Birke 1994, 14). This sentiment is nowhere truer than in the field of reproductive biology. An example of how the Relationship between the Inquirer and her/his Subject of Inquiry would change what research is conducted in reproductive biology can be demonstrated by examining how lab animals are treated.

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The parallel histories of violence toward animals and toward women in reproductive biology have been justified in the name of taming “nature.” Femi- nists such as Vandana Shiva (1995) recognize that biology is not separate from the environmental plane. To correct the standard assumption that the two are separate, feminists have called for the “democratization” and “(re)invention” of a biology that would create novel knowledge systems based on justified levels of appropriateness by using sensitive, noninvasive techniques (Shiva 1995, 1997; Birke 1994). Animals, particularly laboratory-bred animals such as mice and rats, are constantly being used to study reproductive physiology on the grounds that they provide models for human physiology. Yet scientists justify the use of animals to the public by stating that animals are significantly different from us so that they may be used for experimentation (Birke 1994). If required to analyze the Relationship between the Inquirer and his/her Subject of Inquiry, a scientist conducting experiments on animals would have to recognize that the real “difference” between animals and humans is that a lower ethical value has been placed on the lives of animals. Does my research meet this criterion of a feminist inquiry?

(v) Did I as the researcher make my conceptual framework clear and place myself on a mutual footing with the material I used?

When I was interviewing for my Ph.D. position, I made it a point to let my supervisor know that I would not do animal work. This was almost unheard of in my area of research, but I knew that if I did not make this clear from the beginning I would not he able to take the position. In a field where my options were restricted to whole animal studies or in vitro cell line studies, I chose to work in vim. This was the level of appropriateness that I felt justified in using in order to create scientific knowledge. But these neurons originally came from mice whose lives were sacrificed to create the neuronal cells that I used. I know that I was indebted to those mice, but faced with the choice of having to kill more animals or kill cells to do my research, I chose to kill cells. Honestly, I found it very difficult to try to place myself on a mutual footing with these neurons. How could I when I knew that I was still going to kill them for their DNA, RNA, and proteins? In this respect, I failed to incorporate this element of feminist inquiry into my own research. But while the cells were alive, I acknowledged them as life forms, not simply as materials in my study.

As for making my conceptual framework clear, 1 tried to do this at every turn. A n interesting case in point deals with the issue of the use of neuronal cells in vitro for my research. By working at the level of the cell and not with the whole animal, my research could have easily been influenced by the reductionist paradigm that holds that we can understand the biology of an organism as a whole from the information we gather about that organism at the level of its cells. In using an in vitro cell line for my study, I knew that I had to be aware

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of this when 1 interpreted my data and be careful not to assume that the same effects would occur in the whole animal. I had to remind myself of the broader picture. Curiously though, it was the nonfeminist scientists who warned me over and over again of the biases involved in doing in vitro research and the inaccuracies that could result. They urged me to back up my findings by doing whole animal studies. One might think that this was a step in the right direction on the part of traditional science, but let me here give a beautiful illustration of how the feminist scientist is caught between the drive for accuracy and the desire to avoid paradigms laden with biased ideology. The traditional scientists criticized my in vitro research because in a typical laboratory where drugs or hormones are being examined for their effects on reproductive functions, the most common models used for testing are rats, mice, or sheep. However, the normal reproductive systems of these animals are not trusted enough to guar- antee normalized or uniform results. For this reason, animals whose ovaries have been removed (and which thus have no endogenous source of estrogen) are administered uniform doses of estrogen and then tested with a n unknown drug or hormone. Scientists do not want variability in their raw material. The ideological assumption here is that animal physiology needs to be standard- ized in order to achieve accuracy in the results. At least I acknowledged the limitations of my in vitro research and still achieved accuracy. Most traditional scientists have convinced themselves that studies with whole animals are more accurate in developing our understanding of reproductive biology, but they do not question the ideological assumptions built into their own work.

CONCLUSION

I would like to return again to the question, can feminist theory in science influence the production of scientific knowledge at the level of epistemology and methodology? I t appears to me that it can. But perhaps the real question is, Are we ready for feminist theory in science to influence the production of scientific knowledge? If the social and political context in which science is done is not compatible with the vision of feminist science, is it fair to say to the feminist scientist that she must still try to do feminist science? Feminist scientist Evelyn Fox Keller writes:

Is there a conflict between our commitment to feminism and our commitment to science? As both a feminist and a scientist, I am more familiar than I might wish with the nervousness and defensiveness that such a potential conflict evokes. As scientists, we have very real difficulties in thinking about the kinds of issues that, as feminists, we have been raising. These difficulties may,

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however, ultimately be productive. . . . those elements of feminist criticism that seem to conflict most with at least conventional conceptions of science may, in fact carry a liberating potential for science (1996, 28).

My experience as a Ph.D. student was extremely rewarding for me. Not so much for the science, but instead for the challenge of conducting scientific research and still calling myself a feminist. Having compared the components of this feminist inquiry to the components of the Scientific Method, I would not say that they are mutually exclusive. In fact, all the components of the Scientific Method are included within the feminist inquiry. What the feminist inquiry does, however, is to ask the scientist to uncover the social and political forces driving their research questions as well as to establish a relationship with their research subject(s). Perhaps the real problem that traditional scientists have with feminism is that they are not up to the intellectual challenge presented by the feminist inquiry. Until feminist epistemology and methodology influence those who hold positions of power in the current scientific establishments, perhaps the feminist science inquiry can he thought to exist like the curve of objectivity, as an “asymptotically approachable but unreachable goal” (Eichler 1991, 14).

I know that in order to complete my degree, I had to make a lot of compro- mises. According to the feminist model of inquiry that I have outlined as the practical transformation in this paper, I do not think that my own research completely met the criteria of this inquiry. My supervisors never criticized my research, or the data that I produced, only how I interpreted my work. This was due to a difference of opinion between what they and I considered important and worth mentioning. 1 located the Origins of Problematics in my work. They said this was irrelevant. I stated the Purposes of my Inquiry. They said this too was irrelevant. However, they were most annoyed with my efforts to record the Relationship between myself and my Subject of Inquiry. If I tried to draw out any research biases, or even to write my methods sections in the first person, they found this unacceptable. I was told to make the appropriate changes if I wanted to be taken seriously. The chapters of my thesis were written as papers that were submitted for publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals. In order to graduate and finish my Ph.D. successfully, I had to write and rewrite these papers so many times that there were hardly any traces of a feminist inquiry left in them.

The reality of my situation was that as a graduate student, I worked with scientists not in the least bit interested in or supportive of my feminist science work. But just because my work was not supported, does this mean that I failed to practice feminist science? I think that feminist science can be practiced on an individual level, but with much difficulty. An individual can still ask “different” questions. Nobody can take that away from the feminist scientist. She can still

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try to analyze gender critically, to take women’s experiences into account, and to identify the complex subjectivities in herself and what she observes (Harding 1989). Of course it would be less difficult to do feminist science if it were seen as something that should be a coordinated effort on the part of the student, supervisor, department, university, and granting agency. However, it was this very difficulty that was ultimately productive in my case. It forced me to search for a practical transformation of traditional science. What should other feminist scientists do when faced with this difficulty? Whatever the answer to this question might be, there is still a need for feminist theory in science to provide the practical transformations. It is up to the scientist whether or not she wants to try to do feminist science.

So, are we ready? The answer is yes, if we are willing. If we are willing to accept and recognize the limitations of our own work without letting these limitations stop us from doing science, or for that matter from creating feminist science. It is a strength of feminism to set high standards, but at the same time, we cannot dismiss the efforts and small degrees of progress made by the individual. And so to the feminist scientist working at the lab bench I say, READY. . . . SET. . . . PROCEED WITH CAUTION!

NOTE

I am grateful to Margrit Eichler for encouraging me to write this essay, and to members of the BAITWoRM (Biology As If The World Mattered) network for allowing me to present a very early version of this paper at the May 2000 conference.

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Feminist Theory in Science: Working Toward a Practical Transformation

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