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FACC 17/2018

IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

FINAL APPEAL No. 17 of 2018 (CRIMINAL)

(ON APPEAL FROM CACC No. 352 OF 2015)

BETWEEN

HKSAR Respondent

and

HARJANI HARESH MURLIDHAR Appellant

THE APPELLANT’S CASE

I. POINT OF LAW

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The following was certified as a question that raised a point of law of

great and general importance:

“Whether wilful blindness is a sufficient basis for sustaining

liability under section 25 (1) of the Organized and Serious Crimes

Ordinance, Cap. 455.”

2. Liability for section 25 (1) is incurred under two limbs, either under the

first limb by knowing or under the second limb by having reasonable

Record

Part A

121

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grounds to believe that any property, whether in whole or in part or

indirectly, represents the proceeds of an indictable offence and thereby

deals with that property.

B. WILFUL BLINDNESS

3. Although the term wilful blindness would appear to be self-defining, the

phrase has, nevertheless, caused difficulty in its application.

4. To do something wilfully is with forethought, to do a deliberate and

conscious action or omission and whilst arguably could include a reckless

application it would not though include negligence per se – see below at

§[9].

5. Other than the term “wilful blindness” the principle that it espouses has

conjured up a number of similar phrases such as “shut eye knowledge”,

“blind eye knowledge”, “turning a blind eye”, “Nelsonian blindness” and

arguably incorrectly the term constructive knowledge – see below at §[9].

6. The earliest reference to wilful blindness that has come to counsels’

notice is in the case of R v William Sleep (1861) CLC 472 where at 480

Willes J stated ‘The jury have not found, either that the prisoner knew

that these goods were Government stores, or that he wilfully shut his eyes

to that fact.’

7. In Roper v Taylor’s Central Garages [1951] 2 The Times L.R 284 Lord

Devlin at 288 referred to three ‘degrees’ of knowledge; actual knowledge,

knowledge of the second degree and constructive knowledge.

8. By knowledge of the second degree, Lord Devlin meant shutting your

eyes to an obvious means of knowledge or deliberately refraining from

making enquiries for not wanting to know the results – in the eyes of the

law it amounts to actual knowledge.

9. Lord Devlin made it clear that there was a clear distinction between a

deliberate decision to shut one’s eyes from facts one does not want to

know and a state of mind which is negligent in making enquiries which a

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reasonable and prudent person would make. In the former it amounts to

actual knowledge whilst the latter amounts only to constructive

knowledge which in general ‘has no place in the criminal law’.

10. Thereby, it is submitted, it may be extrapolated from Roper that ‘wilful

blindness’ encompasses a guilty mind and as such adheres to the maxim

actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Further, it is to be adjudged

subjectively.

11. It should be noted that at 61.3 of the Specimen Directions in Jury Trials

pertaining to Trafficking in Dangerous Drugs it refers to ‘Shut Eye’ or

constructive knowledge. The reference to constructive knowledge would

appear to be at odds with Roper.

12. The Law Commission in their Report on the Mental Element in Crime

(1978) Law Commission Report No. 89 at §45 and 47, recommended that

knowledge be codified (it wasn’t) and defined so that ‘A person knows

of circumstances not only when he knows that they exist but also when

he has no substantial doubt that they exist’.

13. The Law Commission at §47 in considering a person who ‘is shown

deliberately to have shut his eyes to the existence of the relevant

circumstances of an offence … a jury or court would generally infer, and

so find as a fact, that he had no substantial doubt that those circumstances

existed’.

14. In ‘Turning a Blind Eye’ As Constituting Mens Rea by M. Wasik and

M.P. Thompson (1981) 32 N.I.L.Q. 328 the authors at 328-329 refer to

the meaning of wilful blindness from leading academics. Sherif Gordon

stated:

Wilful blindness exists where A deliberately shuts his eyes to

the means of knowledge because he prefers to remain in

ignorance. Wilful blindness should be restricted to the

situation where the accused believes that a certain state of

affairs exists, knows that he can confirm this belief by taking

a simple step like asking a question, or walking round a

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corner to read a notice-board, but does not do so, because he

wants to be able to remain in ignorance.

Whilst from Professor Glanville Williams:

A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can

almost be said that the defendant actually knew. He suspected

the fact; he realised its probability; but he refrained from

obtaining the final confirmation because he wanted in the

event to be able to deny knowledge. This, and this alone, is

wilful blindness. It requires in effect a finding that the

defendant intended to cheat the administration of justice.

It is to be noted that one refers to believing and the other to suspecting.

This though may be a difference without distinction.

15. The authors commented at [329] that ‘D’s blindness is induced

deliberately’ and thus it would exclude ignorance and thereby as

submitted above at §[4] also negligence. Further at [330] the authors

stated:

Thus, Professor Williams talks of a case where D “suspected”

a fact and/or “realised its probability”. This, combined with

D’s turning a blind eye, means that “it can almost be said

that the defendant actually knew”, and this would then be

sufficient proof of the mental element for a crime requiring

“knowledge” rather than “belief” or “suspicion”.

16. In conclusion, the authors at [342] in defining wilful blindness stated

‘…at the time of the actus reus, or at some previous time closely

connected with the actus reus, the necessary mental element was at the

forefront of his mind – he actually adverted to the fact or the risk …and

then deliberately turned a blind eye.

17. In Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th Edition) at [203-204]

rather than treating wilful blindness as actual knowledge per Roper it is

argued that:

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D does not know the relevant circumstances in such cases,

since he has refrained from finding out, and it may not be

easy to establish that he had an overwhelming strong belief

(that it is virtually certain) that the prohibited circumstance

exists. Wilful blindness should therefore be treated as a form

of reckless knowledge, and relevant only when reckless

knowledge is sufficient, unless it can be shown that D

refrained from making enquiries because he was virtually

certain that his suspicion would be confirmed.

18. Conversely in Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and

Doctrine (6th Edition) at [157-159] placed wilful blindness as falling

between two mens rea alternatives that of recklessness as to the

circumstances (reckless knowledge) and actual knowledge. Hence:

…where a defendant realises or suspects the circumstance

might exist and refrains from investigating further is a case

of reckless knowledge. Even without further investigation, the

defendant knows already that there is a risk that the

circumstance is present. So if the mens rea of an offence

requires only recklessness, then the defendant may be

convicted e.g. rape. [157]

19. In regard to wilful blindness the authors stated it applies:

…where the defendant intentionally chooses not to enquire

whether something is true because he has no real doubt what

the answer is going to be. Its effect is to attribute knowledge

of the circumstances to the defendant. In other words, where

the wilful blindness doctrine applies, the law will treat the

defendant as having actual knowledge and not merely

reckless knowledge…[158]

20. However wilful blindness cannot be implied merely because the

defendant should or ought to have made enquiries. The authors conclude

that a defendant can be wilfully blind in two situations [158]:

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…first is if he shuts his eyes and fails to enquire because he

is virtually certain what the answer will be (in other words he

has no substantial doubt see below §[13]) or …if the means

of knowledge are easily at hand, and D realises the likely

truth of a matter but refrains from enquiry in order not to

know.

21. Glanville Williams : Textbook of Criminal Law (4th Edition) by Dennis J

Baker in referring to the doctrine of wilful blindness at [6-017] stated that

this:

…is meant to deal with those whose philosophy is: “Where

ignorance is bliss, ‘tis folly to be wise.” To argue away

inconvenient truths is a human failing. If a person

deliberately “shuts her eyes” to the obvious, because she

“doesn’t want to know,” she is taken to know – and at the

very least is reckless since she takes the risk of the facts being

what she thinks they might end up being. While all the cases

agree on this, they are sixes and sevens on what wilful

blindness means. The best view is that it applies only when a

person believes the facts will exist and deliberately avoids

investigation further in the hope of providing herself with an

escape route.

22. The author then goes on and gives the following example:

An example of wilful blindness in the proper sense is where

an employer knew that his business was being run in an

illegal way, and absented himself without having altered the

arrangements; he was held to “know” that the law was being

broken in his absence even though he had no direct

information about what was happening then. In other words,

it is an example of subjective recklessness.

The wilful blindness embraces recklessness and thus not a

substitute for actual knowledge or belief; although evidence

of wilful blindness might be used to infer knowledge or a

belief.

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23. However, with respect to the author this is a flawed premise in that it is

an example of continuation of actual knowledge of facts or circumstances

without reason for interruption of those facts and circumstances. The

employer started from a position of certainty and did not avert his state

of mind to that knowledge at that time. The fact that the employer then

absented from the business does not then invoke wilful blindness except

perhaps from a purely philosophical view point.

24. To give a crude example; X, who is known to Y as a crack cocaine dealer

and manufacturer asks Y to borrow his premises for a week. Y is present

when X arrives with other persons carrying everyday household items

that can also be used in the manufacture of crack. Fearing the worse Y

does not ask what those items are for and leaves the premises and does

not return until after X has vacated the premises – Y is wilfully blind to

what X is doing. If on the other hand Y stays in the premises and then

sees X use the items to start to manufacture crack and then leaves and

also does not return until after X has vacated the premises then Y does

not, in those circumstances, become wilfully blind.

25. However, the author does argue at [6-020] that if a statute requires, as

part of the element of the offence ‘knowledge’, then you can’t equate

knowledge from reckless wilful blindness. The mens rea is actual

knowledge and not recklessness – if it were otherwise the legislature

could state ‘knowing that the fact exists or being reckless whether it

exists’.

26. In Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co. Ltd [2003] 1

AC 469 the House of Lords considered what had to be proved in order to

establish an assured’s blind-eye knowledge.

27. Lord Clyde at [481 A] stated:

Blind-eye knowledge in my judgment requires a conscious

reason for blinding the eye. There must be at least a suspicion

of a truth about which you do not want to know and which

you refuse to investigate.

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28. Lord Hobhouse at [486 A-H] examines the position further noting Lord

Denning stating that ‘turning a blind-eye is far more blameworthy than

mere negligence. Negligence in not knowing the truth is not equivalent

to knowledge of it’.

29. Further at [486 G-H] Lord Hobhouse stated:

The illuminating question therefore becomes “why did he not

inquire?” If the judge is satisfied that it was because he did

not want to know for certain, then a finding of privity should

be made. If, on the other hand, he did not inquire because he

was too lazy or he was grossly negligent or believed that

there was nothing wrong, then privity has not been made out.

An ambiguity has arisen from the use by Roskill LJ of the

phrase “had he thought of it”. This suggests that the test may

be objective. If so, that is not correct. The test is subjective:

Did the assured have direct knowledge of the

unseaworthiness or an actual state of mind which the law

treats as equivalent to such knowledge?

30. Lord Scott at [517 C-D] concluded:

In summary, blind-eye knowledge requires, in my opinion, a

suspicion that the relevant facts do exist and a deliberate

decision to avoid confirming that they exist. But a warning

should be sounded. Suspicion is a word that can be used to

describe a state-of-mind that may, at one extreme, be no more

than a vague feeling of unease and, at the other extreme,

reflect a firm belief in the existence of the relevant facts. In

my opinion, in order for there to be blind-eye knowledge, the

suspicion must be firmly grounded and targeted on specific

facts. The deliberate decision must be a decision to avoid

obtaining confirmation of facts in whose existence the

individual has good reason to believe. To allow blind-eye

knowledge to be constituted by a decision not to enquire into

an untargeted or speculative suspicion would be to allow

negligence, albeit gross, to be the basis of a finding of privity.

That, in my opinion, is not warranted by section 39(5).

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31. Whilst obviously this was a decision in civil law it is submitted, however,

that no lesser standard would be applicable in criminal law.

32. The position in Hong Kong would appear to treat wilful blindness with

some degree of circumspect. Hence in Archbold Hong Kong 2018 at [16-

38] the learned authors state – ‘There is some authority for the view that

in the criminal law “knowledge” includes “wilfully shutting one’s eyes

to the truth”…However, such a proposition must be treated with great

caution. The clear view of the courts at present is that this is a matter of

evidence, and that nothing short of actual knowledge (or, in the case of

dishonest handling, belief) will suffice.’

33. In particular, arguably in the most prolific of indictable criminal cases

where knowledge is a key requisite, namely drug trafficking, the

emphasis is on what the defendant knew with the burden lying entirely

upon the prosecution and accordingly unless in the most obvious of cases

a jury should not be directed on wilful blindness – see HKSAR v Yang

Yulang [2013] 4 HKLRD 170 at §[24-25] and in particular HKSAR v Li

Yanhong [2016] 1 HKLRD 924 at §[27-33].

C. THE ISSUES

34. Whilst not intending to descend into an epistemological thesis it is

submitted that there are three conscious mental states of awareness:

knowledge, belief and suspicion.

35. Lord Nicholls in R v Saik [2007] 1 AC 18 at [36] §[26] stated that

knowledge means true belief. Accordingly, it is submitted that it is

something you know so that you are as certain as you can be and it may

be referred to as actual knowledge.

36. Regrettably perhaps for the purposes of this appeal, after Lord Nicholls

had stated that knowledge (in respect to the provision on money

laundering) meant true belief he went on to say: ‘Whether it covers wilful

blindness is not an issue arising on this appeal’.

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37. Belief however is a lower state of awareness. Despite how much you may

believe in something that belief may have the possibility of being wrong

and subject to contradiction.

38. Suspicion on the other hand is the lowest form of awareness and is subject,

it is submitted, to wide variables or degrees of separation, which do not

apply to actual knowledge and or belief, varying from a strong suspicion

based on one or more factors at one end to just a gut instinct or a feeling

of unease at the other end of the scale.

39. Actual knowledge is not applicable to the doctrine of wilful blindness in

the sense that if you already know something there is no question that you

can be blind to it.

40. There is no difficulty in finding that belief is applicable to wilful

blindness in that you may believe a certain set of facts but rather than

having your belief confirmed to be true, so that you have actual

knowledge, you make no enquires.

41. It is submitted that the real difficulty arises when there is only suspicion.

How much suspicion would give rise, by a failure to enquire, to a finding

of wilful blindness?

42. On the basis that once wilful blindness has been established from the

evidence, is knowledge then to be determined as a matter of law or by

inference?

43. Does wilful blindness equate to actual knowledge or only to a lesser

degree of awareness?

44. Where the requirement of an offence requires actual knowledge can you

then be recklessly wilfully blind and acquire actual knowledge?

D. Comparative Jurisdictions

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45. The following comparison between various jurisdictions in relation to

money laundering and wilful blindness are respectfully submitted for

consideration by the Court. It should be noted that this is a selective rather

than comprehensive review.

United States of America

46. The United States first implemented anti-money laundering legislation

under the Money Laundering Control Act 1986. Arguably the impetus for

jurisdictions to enact regulatory provisions to stem money laundering

came from the US. It is self-evident that criminal organisations are not

defined by borders and thereby regulations need to be universally applied

internationally.

47. Whilst it may be said that the US has found great success in stemming

organised crime and international drug cartels’ ability to launder their

proceeds, it may seem paradoxical that the US has arguably the least

draconian money laundering laws.

48. The Laundering of Monetary Instruments are comprised of three distinct

offences set out at section 1956 US Code, Title 18 Chapter 95 under (a)1-

3. Section (a)1 set out below, comes closest in design and purpose as our

s.25(1).

(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial

transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,

conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in

fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity—

(A) ….

(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part—

(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful

activity; or

(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or

Federal law…

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49. It should be noted that first, the mens rea required is ‘knowing’ and

secondly there are two stages to prove, ‘knowing’ that the property is the

proceeds of an unlawful activity and ‘knowing’ that the purpose of the

transaction is to launder the money.

50. The case law arising under this section establishes clearly that knowledge

can be established by showing that a defendant was wilfully blind to facts

patently before him – see US v Rivera-Rodriguez (Court of Appeals, First

Circuit) Citation: 318 F.3d 268 (1st Cir. 2003) at [271].

51. In US v Frigerio-Migiano (Court of Appeals, First Circuit) Citation: 254

F.3d 30 (1st Cir.2001) at [35] the court stated:

The government contends, as an alternative argument, that

to the extent Frigerio lacked knowledge of the money

laundering conspiracy, he was “willfully blind” to the illegal

activities around him. We have indeed stated that where

there are prominent “red flags” that signal criminal activity

is afoot, a jury may infer that a defendant deliberately

ignored facts which would have otherwise been obvious to a

reasonable person. United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61,

66 (1st Cir.1995). However, no such “red flags” were

present here. Rivera's testimony indicated that even he did

not become wary of Phone Home's business until he had

worked there for over seven months. His knowledge of the

money laundering operation, moreover, was gained through

working with the computer. By contrast, Frigerio worked

at Phone Home for less than seven weeks and did not use the

computer. The activity occurring in Phone Home was

therefore not a sufficient “red flag” to permit an inference of

wilful blindness to the conspiracy.”

52. It is perhaps of interest to note that the court found at [34] that a jury

could reasonably conclude that Fregerio knew he was handling money

derived from an illicit activity (sufficient for liability under s.25(1)) but

the government must also prove that Fregerio knew that the dealing with

the money was part of a money laundering scheme, which on appeal it

was found that they had failed to do.

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53. In US v Gabriele (Court of Appeals, First Circuit) Citation: 63 F.3d 61

(1st Cir. 1995) in considering the aspect of knowledge and wilful

blindness the court stated at [66]:

The district court carefully instructed the jury that Gabriele

could not be convicted unless he “knew that the money or

property involved in [the particular] monetary transaction

was obtained from the proceeds of some criminal offense,”

and that the “knowledge” element was not met merely by a

finding that Gabriele “might have known”, “should have

known”, or “could have known.” Like terms denoting other

mens rea elements, “knowledge” is not readily susceptible to

a more precise definition than is derived from the

connotation suggested by the term itself.

54. The court went on to examine the issue of a wilful blindness direction:

A wilful blindness instruction is warranted if (1) the

defendant claims lack of knowledge; (2) the evidence would

support an inference that the defendant consciously engaged

in a course of deliberate ignorance; and (3) the proposed

instruction as a whole could not lead the jury to conclude that

an inference of knowledge was mandatory.

55. The court found that there was no error in the direction given by the

district court as set out below:

“In deciding whether a defendant acted knowingly, you may

infer that the defendant had knowledge of a fact if you find

that [he] deliberately closed his eyes to a fact that otherwise

would have been obvious to him.” Further the court

cautioned the jury: “it’s up to you to decide whether…this

defendant deliberately closed his eyes to a fact and, if so,

what inference should be drawn. It’s important, however, to

bear in mind that mere negligence or mistake in failing to

learn a fact is not sufficient.”

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56. Accordingly, the aspect of wilful blindness is determined by what was

actually known by the defendant and from that whether an inference may

be drawn as to whether the defendant had knowledge.

Australia

57. Under the Criminal Code ss.400.3, 400.4, 400.5, 400.6, 400.7, and 400.8

money laundering offences are sub-divided according to the value of the

property starting at property worth $1,000,000 or more, $100,000 or more,

$50,000 or more, $10,000 or more, $1,000 or more and money or property

of any value.

58. The offences are then also sub-divided by different levels of mens rea

hence, a person commits an offence if he deals with money or other

property and; believes it to be the proceeds of crime, or is reckless or he

is negligent.

59. A further offence is created under s.400.9 where a person commits an

offence if he deals with money or property and it is reasonable to suspect

that the money or property is the proceeds of crime. Two offences are

created for money and property of $100,000 or more or where the money

and property is less than $100,000.

60. Counsel were not able to unearth any cases in regard to the application of

wilful blindness to money laundering. Though it may be surmised that

given the various different states of mens rea available in establishing an

offence for money laundering the issue of wilful blindness may not have

necessarily arisen.

61. In relation to wilful blindness and the importation of narcotics the court

stated at §[11] in Pereira v DPP [1988] HCA 57 :

It is never the case that something less than knowledge may

be treated as satisfying a requirement of actual knowledge.

Secondly, the question is that of the knowledge of the accused

and not that which might be postulated of a hypothetical

person in the position of the accused, although, of course,

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that may not be an irrelevant consideration. Finally, where

knowledge is inferred from the circumstances surrounding

the commission of the alleged offence, knowledge must be the

only rational inference available. All that having been said,

the fact remains that a combination of suspicious

circumstances and failure to make inquiry may sustain an

inference of knowledge of the actual or likely existence of the

relevant matter. In a case where a jury is invited to draw such

an inference, a failure to make inquiry may sometimes, as a

matter of lawyer's shorthand, be referred to as wilful

blindness. Where that expression is used, care should be

taken to ensure that a jury is not distracted by it from a

consideration of the matter in issue as a matter of fact to be

proved beyond reasonable doubt.

62. Accordingly, actual knowledge may be inferred from wilful blindness

and it is assessed subjectively.

Singapore

63. Under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes

(Confiscation of Benefits) Act Cap. 65A offences relating to money

laundering are divided into benefits from drug dealing and benefits from

criminal conduct (ss.43, 44, 46 and 47). Two types of offences apply,

assisting another to, retain benefits of drug dealing or benefits from

criminal conduct (ss.43-44) and acquiring, possessing, using, concealing

or transferring benefits of drug dealing or criminal conduct (ss.46-47).

64. The mens rea used is the same as s.25(1) namely knowing or having

reasonable grounds to believe.

65. No cases relating to wilful blindness and money laundering could be

located by counsel. Though the issue of wilful blindness was subject to a

detailed analysis by the Court of Appeal in Tan Kiam Peng v Public

Prosecutor [2008] 1 SLR(R) 1 at §[96-142].

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66. Tan differed significantly from an earlier magistracy appeal in which

Yong Pung How CJ in Public Prosecutor v Koo Pui Fong [1996] 2 SLR

266 had assessed wilful blindness.

67. In Koo Yong CJ stated at [271 A-E]:

I think that it would be reasonable to say that a person ‘knows’

a certain fact if he is aware that it exists or is almost certain

that it exists or will exist or occur. Thus knowledge entails a

high degree of certainty…Of course, we would never have the

benefit of going into the mind of another person to ascertain

his knowledge and in every case, knowledge is a fact that has

to be inferred from the circumstances. This concept of wilful

blindness does not introduce a new state of mind to that of

knowing…It is simply a reformulation of actual knowledge.

It seems to me that it is wholly in keeping with common sense

and the law to say that an accused knew of certain facts if he

deliberately closed his eyes to the circumstances, his wilful

blindness being evidence from which knowledge may be

inferred…But this is different from saying that wilful

blindness should be automatically equated with knowledge.

And further at [272 H-I]

However, there is a vast difference between a state of mind

which consists of deliberately shutting the eyes to the obvious,

the result of which a person does not care to have, and a state

of mind which is merely neglecting to make inquiries as a

reasonable and prudent man would make. The latter, also

known as constructive knowledge, is not knowledge at all.

68. The reasoning by the court of appeal in Tan however, was that once wilful

blindness could be inferred from the evidence then that equated to actual

knowledge in law – see §[104, 123, 124]. In particular at [124] the court

stated:

What is clear from the above observations is that the accused

is under no legal obligation not to turn a blind eye. However,

if he does in fact turn a blind eye, that could, on the facts, be

taken to be wilful blindness on his part. If so, this would be

tantamount to actual knowledge in law…

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69. Thus, rather than having inferred wilful blindness from the evidence and

then proceeding to determine whether actual knowledge can then be

inferred (per Koo) the court found that if there is wilful blindness that is

actual knowledge.

70. The court also sought to draw a distinction between wilful blindness and

recklessness at [127] in regard to deliberate conduct. With respect, it is

submitted that in reality that is an artificial distinction. In both wilful

blindness and recklessness there is a deliberate course of conduct arising

from an awareness of circumstances. If the course of conduct was not

deliberate, then it would not be reckless (or wilful blindness) but instead

negligence.

71. The approach taken by the court in Tan was discussed by Toh Yung

Cheong in Knowing, Not Knowing and Almost Knowing: Knowledge

and the Doctrine of Mens Rea (2008) 20 SAcLJ 677. From §[5-31] the

author examines wilful blindness in the wake of the decision in Tan,

identifying the different approaches in the application of wilful blindness

as a matter of inferring knowledge (the inference view) to the approach

taken in Tan that once wilful blindness is established then that equates in

law to actual knowledge (the identity view).

72. In summing up the position as the law stands in Singapore in regard to

wilful blindness Toh states at [29] that wilful blindness is definitionally

equivalent to knowledge and there is no need for the court to take the

further step of inferring knowledge once an offender is found to be

wilfully blind.

England

73. Money laundering laws are set out in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in

Part 7. Sections 327 and 328 approximate the mischief covered by s.25(1).

74. Under s.327(1) a person commits an offence if he:-

(a) conceals criminal property;

(b) disguises criminal property;

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(c) converts criminal property;

(d) transfers criminal property;

(e) removes criminal property from England and Wales or from

Scotland or from Northern Ireland.

75. Under s.328 (1) A person commits an offence if he enters into or becomes

concerned in an arrangement which he knows or suspects facilitates (by

whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal

property by or on behalf of another person.

76. The mens rea for both offences is ‘knowledge’ or ‘suspicion’ – see

Butterworths Money Laundering Law §[1165] and §[1218] and

s.340(3)(b) where property is criminal property if the alleged offender

knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit.

77. As to ‘knowledge’, Butterworths Money Laundering Law at §[1166]-

[1167] states that it ‘includes not only actual or direct knowledge but also

what has been termed ‘wilful blindness’. Reference is then made to

Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange [1986] 1 W.L.R. 674.

78. In Westminster Lord Bridge at [684 D-E] stated:

…it is always open to the tribunal of fact, when knowledge

on the part of a defendant is required to be proved, to base

a finding of knowledge on evidence that the defendant had

deliberately shut his eyes to the obvious or refrained from

inquiry because he suspected the truth but did not want to

have his suspicion confirmed.

79. In R v Pace [2014] 1 W.L.R. 2867 at [2887 H] the court stated:

Even so, as observed by Lord Hope in para 62 of his speech

in R v Saik [2007] 1 AC 18, the margin between knowledge

and suspicion is perhaps not all that great, at all events where

the person has reasonable grounds for his suspicion. Where

a defendant can be shown deliberately to have turned a blind

eye to the provenance of goods and deliberately to have failed

19

to ask obvious questions, then that can be capable, depending

on the circumstances, of providing evidence going to prove

knowledge or belief.

80. In R v Moys (1984) 79 Cr App R 72 the court made it clear at [75] that a

finding of wilful blindness does not equate to knowledge (or belief) but

rather an inference of knowledge:

To direct the jury that the offence is committed if the

defendant, suspecting that the goods were stolen, deliberately

shut his eyes to the circumstances as an alternative to

knowing or believing the goods were stolen is a misdirection.

To direct the jury that, in common sense and in law, they may

find that the defendant knew or believed the goods to be

stolen because he deliberately closed his eyes to the

circumstances is a perfectly proper direction.

Further the court made it clear at [76] that:

The question is a subjective one and it must be proved that

the defendant was aware of the theft or that he believed the

goods to be stolen. Suspicion that they were stolen, even

coupled with the fact that he shut his eyes to the

circumstances, is not enough, although those matters may be

taken into account by a jury when deciding whether or not

the necessary knowledge or belief existed.

81. Accordingly, wilful blindness is applied (subjectively) in money

laundering cases as a way of establishing knowledge, though only by way

of inference.

E. WILFUL BLINDNESS AND s25(1)

20

82. It is submitted, that wilful blindness is a sufficient basis for sustaining

liability under s.25(1).

83. The fact that a proper inference of knowledge can be drawn in

circumstances giving rise to wilful blindness would satisfy the

requirement of “knowing” under the first limb of s.25(1).

84. I would, respectfully, also commend the view of the court in Tan at §[141]

that wilful blindness is not a concept where a succinct legal maxim can

be applied. Wilful blindness is particularly fact sensitive. However, the

following principles of wilful blindness, garnered from the matters set out

above, are respectfully submitted:

1) whether a person is wilfully blind should be

subjectively assessed.

2) In doing so and for want of a better expression and to

borrow the US phrase, what were the red flags.

3) Was the defendant aware of all or any of the red flags.

If he wasn’t aware – that would be the end of the

matter. If he was aware to all or some, did he then

deliberately shut his eyes to those red flags.

4) What is his explanation for shutting his eyes to those

red flags – is that believable. If yes that is also the end

of the matter. If no, then you may infer wilful

blindness.

5) Having then found that the defendant was wilfully

blind you may then infer knowledge.

85. Whilst it would seem that in cases where the ‘red flags’ are so

overwhelming, a contention that a defendant was not aware of them could

simply not be believed. Similarly, if the ‘red flags’ were not

overwhelming, an explanation that the defendant was not aware of them

could be believed. However, the difficulty arises in situations that fall

between these two stools.

21

86. Perhaps therefore, to ensure consistency and clarity, the proposed

requirement set down by the Law Commission would be applicable, that

is, a defendant had no substantial doubt to the relevant circumstances.

87. Can wilful blindness also be applied to the second limb of ‘having

reasonable grounds to believe’? As discussed above, believing is not the

same as knowing, though of course they can result in the same legal

consequences. It is important that it is clear how the prosecution bring

their case. If it is alleged that a defendant was wilfully blind, then it would

be appropriate to assert that the defendant had knowingly dealt with the

proceeds. Conversely, it would be inappropriate to proceed on the basis

that there was wilful blindness but bring the prosecution case not on the

basis of knowing but on having reasonable grounds to believe.

88. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that evidence of wilful blindness

should only have an application to the first limb of s.25(1).

F. WILFUL BLINDNESS AND THE APPELLANT

89. Although this is not an issue of this appeal, given the matters raised by

the judge in his reasons it may be remiss if they are not addressed.

90. The judge made a clear determination that he found that the Appellant did

not know and that there was insufficient evidence for such an inference.

91. Yet the judge went on to say that the Appellant ought to think or dig deep

into the matter. Yet he did not but simply turned a blind eye to the

situation…I am sure anyone looking objectively at the grounds Defendant

had would believe differently from Defendant, who was in fact turning a

blind eye to a highly questionable situation which he must have so

appreciated…I find Defendant’s so-called ‘belief’ was just ill-founded

and equivalent to turning a blind eye to obvious suspicion.

92. With respect to the judge there are a number of issues that arise. There is

no half way house application of wilful blindness. If it applies, then you

may infer knowledge. Having determined that the Appellant did not know

nor was there any evidence in which knowledge might be inferred it is

Record

Part A

52 K-L &

53 F-G

Record

Part A

56 C-D

56 J-M

64 O-P

22

then incongruous to then refer to turning a blind eye (by which knowledge

may be inferred).

93. As set out above, the judge fell into error by applying what the Appellant

‘ought’ to have done from an objective view point and what anyone else

would have done.

94. Accordingly, this was not an application of wilful blindness.

II. SUBSTANTIAL AND GRAVE INJUSTICE

G. BACKGROUND

95. The Appellant, after trial, was convicted on the 4th August 2015 of one

offence of conspiracy to deal with the proceeds of an indictable offence.

96. On the 7th October 2015 the Appellant was sentenced to 3 years and 9

months. The Appellant was released from prison on the 27th January 2018.

97. On the 22nd March 2017 leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was

granted on Ground One of the Appellant’s perfected grounds of appeal

against conviction. The Appellant was also granted leave to amend

Ground One should the Appellant care to do so.

98. By way of an amended Ground One filed with the Court on the 11th April

2017 the Appellant appealed his conviction on the following basis:

The LTJ failed to properly take into account the evidence of

the Appellant’s beliefs and perceptions so as to wrongly find

that the Appellant had reasonable grounds to believe that the

property in question was the proceeds (in whole or in part) of

an indictable offence and thereby the LTJ erred in law and or

the conviction recorded against the Appellant was unsafe or

unsatisfactory.

99. At the hearing of the appeal on the 18th August 2017 the Court reserved

judgment. On the 12th September 2017, the Court dismissed the appeal.

23

100. On the 16th May 2018 the Appeal Committee granted leave for the

Appellant to appeal on the basis that it was reasonably arguable that a

substantial and grave injustice had occurred.

H THE TRIAL

The Prosecution’s Case

101. The prosecution brought their case on the basis that the Appellant

knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the property in question

was the proceeds, in whole or in part, of an indictable offence. The factual

context of the prosecution’s case, which was not challenged, was:

1) That on the 8th July 2014, Dragon Asia Fertilizer Limited (DA)

had been duped by email fraud to make a deposit of

US$539,400 into a bank account held by Sino Investment and

Trading Limited (“SIAT”), a company that had been set up in

Hong Kong by the Appellant and Castelino Brian Mario

(“Brian”) on the 15th October 2012.

2) DA, which is a Hong Kong based company had, on or about

the 21st May 2014, entered into a contract worth

US$11,953,600 to ship fertilizer to a Bangladesh company. In

turn DA entered into a contract with a mainland Chinese

company, Sinochem Fertilizer Ltd. (“SC”), to supply and ship

the fertilizer to the Bangladesh company for US$10,788,000.

DA would thereby make a profit on the deal of US$1,165,600.

3) By the contract prepared by SC, DA was to deposit 5% of the

contract price into SC’s Hong Kong based subsidiary, Dohigh

Trading Ltd. (“D”), with the balance to be settled by way of a

Letter of Credit (“L/C”) with D named as the beneficiary.

4) The contracts were exchanged by way of email. Unbeknown to

DA and SC their email accounts had been hacked whereby DA

signed a contract that had been changed so that instead of D as

the beneficiary, SIAT was named. SC though received a signed

contract with the intended parties unchanged. The parties were

therefore unaware of the subterfuge.

Record

Part A

117-119

Record

Part A

6-17

24

5) On the 8th July 2014 DA arranged for the 5% deposit, namely

US$539,400, to be paid into SIAT’s State Bank of India (“SBI”)

account and opened an L/C with SIAT named as the

beneficiary.

6) Between the 9th to 17th July 2014, Brian, who was at all times

offshore, arranged in 15 transactions for US$327,175 to be

transferred out of the SIAT account, of which US$38,500 was

transferred to a SIAT Hong Kong dollar account held with SBI.

7) The Appellant, who had also been offshore, arrived in Hong

Kong on the 12th July 2014. The Appellant, in four separate

transactions, withdrew HK$236,000 from SIAT’s SBI Hong

Kong dollar account.

8) By the 17th July 2014 DA became aware from SC that the 5%

deposit had not been transferred into D’s account as contracted.

Realising that they had been deceived DA made a report to the

police on the same day.

9) The Appellant was arrested on the 21st July 2014 as he was

about to cash a cheque for HK $4,500 drawn from SIAT’s

Hong Kong dollar account at a branch of SBI.

10) At the time of the Appellant’s arrest there was a total of US

$211,950 in SIAT’s SBI US dollar account, HK $298,157.50

in SIAT’s HK dollar account. There was a further US $10,000

divided equally in Hong Kong bank accounts of two separate

companies that had also been set up in Hong Kong by Brian

and the Appellant. This accounted for about US $260,273 of

the US $539,375 or about 48% of the money that had been

deposited into SIAT’s account.

The Defence Case

102. It was Appellant’s case that he had been duped by a person he knew

as Daniel, whom he believed was an agent acting for a third party, into

believing that he was part of a fertilizer deal. Daniel had sent him the L/C

which the Appellant believed to be genuine and had no reason to know

Record

Part A

22-27

25

that it had been obtained by deception. The L/C had been properly issued

by the bank.

103. The Appellant came to Hong Kong, in part, to ensure that the shipment

went ahead and to complete the documentary formalities so as to execute

the L/C.

104. The Appellant upon arrest had provided the telephone number of

Daniel, who was subsequently identified as Diablo Ibrahim. The

prosecution were to call Ibrahim as a witness (PW10). Ibrahim had denied

the Appellant’s account of his involvement and was to testify to that

effect.

105. At the commencement of the trial the Appellant produced Skype text

messages, emails and telephone text messages between him and Daniel,

who also used the name Coolsaint - (Exhibits D1, D3 and D4).

106. The provenance and authenticity of these documents were not

challenged by the prosecution. Upon examination, the prosecution

informed the court that they would no longer rely on Ibrahim as a witness

but tender him for cross-examination.

107. After Ibrahim gave evidence the prosecution amended the charge to

include Ibrahim as one of the co-conspirators.

108. The Appellant claimed the following and relied upon the documents

of correspondence between him and Daniel as well as documents

showing his past business dealings (Exhibit D2):

1) That he was involved in disparate business projects though he had

originally started in garment manufacturing.

2) At one time he had been a consultant to the Ghanaian Government

as part of the President’s Special Initiative in setting up garment

manufacturing in Ghana (Exhibit D2 page 52).

Record

Part A

13-17

Record

Part A

18-19

Record

Part A

4

17-22

Record

Part A

22-26

26

3) As a consequence of this appointment he had travelled extensively

to many countries including the USA and China and had been

granted multiple entry business visas to enter Hong Kong.

4) Whilst in Ghana in 2012 he had become acquainted with a person

called Elden.

5) One of the recipients added by Elden in email correspondence to

the Appellant was Daniel. On the 1st September 2013 Daniel

contacted the Appellant by email by which he introduced himself

and hoped that they would be able to do business in the future.

6) It was to the Appellant’s understanding that Daniel wished to

introduce business opportunities, primarily confirming house

business and the Appellant provided bank account details to

Daniel. No business though came to fruition.

7) Between the 3rd and 4th July 2014 Daniel contacted the Appellant

to advise him that a sum of US $539,400 would be deposited into

SIAT’s account and that this was 5% of the contract of US $10.788

million. The Appellant was aware that this was for a fertilizer deal.

The commission on the deal was 15%, with 12% for SIAT and 3%

to Daniel.

8) On the 7th July 2014 Daniel sent the Appellant by email a copy of

the L/C that had been taken out by DA. The Appellant believed

that the L/C was genuine and that this was a genuine business deal.

(The L/C made reference to the US $539,400)

9) He noticed that the address on the L/C for SIAT was wrong and

asked Daniel where he had got this address and that it could cause

difficulties when presenting documents to the bank when it came

time to settle the L/C.

10) The Appellant had asked Daniel whether he had a supplier for the

fertilizer or whether he needed to find one and whether he had to

27

arrange inspection of the fertilizer. Daniel had replied that they

should wait for the 5% to arrive first before proceeding further.

11) By the 10th July 2014 Daniel pressed for the Appellant to withdraw

the money from the SIAT account.

12) On the 12th July 2014 the Appellant arrived in Hong Kong and on

the 14th July he met with Daniel and was shown a copy of the

‘altered’ contract. Daniel promised to send him a copy but never

did.

13) On the 15th July 2014 Daniel sent him details as to how the money

should be dispersed from the SIAT account. The Appellant told

Daniel that he would require documentation from the L/C

Applicant (DA) that the disbursement was in accordance with their

wishes. Daniel also pressed for payment of his 3% commission.

The Appellant asked Daniel to provide a bank account and a copy

of passport for proper documentation.

14) He would not give Daniel his 3% until the deal was completed but

would give him a nominal sum in the meantime.

15) He did not make the disbursements per Daniel’s instructions as

Daniel did not provide proper written authorisation from the L/C

Applicant. He did not consider it proper to go behind the agent’s

back (Daniel) and speak directly with DA as that would not be

good business practice and may compromise any future business.

However if the L/C was due to expire and he still had not received

proper instructions he would have gone to DA.

16) He believed that the business deal was real and that was why he

had come to Hong Kong. He would go to China to supervise and

ensure that the deal went ahead and make sure all the conditions

were complied with so that the L/C could be settled. If the deal

didn’t go ahead the 5% would be returned minus any expense

incurred.

28

17) Prior to coming to Hong Kong he had discussed the deal with

Brian and how to utilize part of the 5% for cash flow for other

business projects. If Daniel had produced written authorisation

from DA he would have used the L/C as collateral to obtain a loan

from SBI to cover any disbursements.

18) He also used his trip to Hong Kong to advance his own business

in relation to a hydro-electric project in Sri Lanka with potential

development to expand to projects in Africa. He had already been

in communication via email with Invest Hong Kong, a government

department, and had submitted a business plan. He intended to set

up an office in Hong Kong with the hiring of local staff and was

arranging for specialist machinery for the project to be

manufactured on the mainland. Whilst he was in Hong Kong prior

to his arrest he had already viewed a number of premises with a

view to lease for the business.

109. The Appellant called one defence witness, Benson Tam Man Yuen

(DW2). He had known the Appellant for over thirty years. DW2 had lived

in Sri Lanka and had done business with the Appellant’s father who

owned garment factories. In 1995 DW2 had set up his own business in

Hong Kong and had provided documents of some previous business

dealings with the Appellant that were part of exhibit D2. As part of his

business DW2 also did confirming house business, though he referred to

it as consolidation business. He would charge between 12-15% of the

contract price. If the Appellant brought any confirming house business to

him they would split the fee 50-50.

The Judge’s Reasons

110. In finding that the Appellant was guilty the judge stated:

1) The Appellant’s belief that the money was legitimate should be

confidence in the truth or existence of something not

immediately susceptible to rigorous proof. The whole situation

was so questionable it called for rigorous proof or due diligence

enquiry. The Appellant was to receive a disproportionate

reward and in such circumstances the Appellant should have

Record

Part A

55-56

§202

29

thought deep about it, but the Appellant did not, he turned a

blind eye to the situation, he chose not to perform any due

diligence enquiry. The Appellant’s belief that the money was

legitimate was ill-founded.

2) The test for having reasonable grounds to believe is anyone

looking at the grounds the Appellant had would believe that the

property was the proceeds of an indictable offence. The

Appellant’s belief is a ground to take into consideration but it is

not over-riding or a determinative ground. Was sure that anyone

looking objectively at the grounds would believe differently

from the Appellant, who was in fact turning a blind eye to a

highly questionable situation that the Appellant must have

appreciated. The Appellant ought to have known but he chose

not to; he was only concerned with the profit.

3) In considering Yan Suiling (2012) 15 HKCFAR 146 the court

was not saying that if defendant was found to hold an honest

belief then he/she must be acquitted. Otherwise the test would

be a watered down to purely a subjective test. Rather the test is

that a jury should consider such grounds that an accused had

and looking at those grounds objectively would believe the

property represented the proceeds of an indictable offence.

Alternatively, it may be put whether the accused ought to have

known. The accused’s belief is a ground that must be

considered but it is not an over-riding or all decisive ground.

4) The Appellant pleads that he had a sincere belief in the business

deal and the source of the money. The Appellant’s belief was

ill-founded. It was a thought casually held as a result of a lack

of due diligence. The Appellant should have been alerted when

he was offered 12% of the deal as it was unreasonably lucrative

and highly suspicious. The Appellant ought to have known

there was something highly irregular in the deal and therefore

he ought to have known that the US $539,375 represented the

proceeds of an indictable offence. The Appellant’s belief was

ill-founded and was the same as turning a blind eye to obvious

Record

Part A

56 §203

Record

Part A

63

§223-

224

Record

Part A

64

§226-228

30

suspicion. Therefore, the Appellant could hardly be said to be

sincere or in good faith.

111. However, against these findings the judge also found:

1) That the Appellant was engaged in many businesses. That

the Appellant had been talking to Mr. Mak from

www.investhk.gov.hk and really wanted to set up an office

in Hong Kong.

2) PW10 lured the Appellant to use SIAT’s accounts.

3) PW10 had not told the Appellant anything of the fraud.

4) That the Appellant had asked PW10 whether he had a

supplier for the fertilizer or whether the Appellant should

find one and whether PW10 needed inspection in China and

that he could do that, having done this in Ghana, Gambia and

Kenya.

5) That the Appellant had asked PW10 whether the DAP

fertilizer (di-ammonium phosphate) was black or white and

hoped that it would be shipped out.

6) The Appellant was hoping to execute the L/C on time.

7) The Appellant was not refusing to transfer the money but

would do so later and would have enough money if the L/C

was executed.

8) The Appellant did not want to ask PW10 any questions that

might jeopardize their business. The Appellant just eyed the

mega profit, 12% of US $10,7888,000 which the Appellant

and Brian would share equally. That in order to get the L/C

money the Appellant would have to execute the L/C.

Record

Part A

34-35

§125

58-59

§210

40-41

§147

52-53

§189

42

§151

52

§187

52

§188

54

§197

52-53

188-189

31

9) The Appellant had to wait for the L/C to be executed. For

that the Appellant would have to go to China. Accordingly,

the Appellant had to stay in Hong Kong for some time.

10) The Appellant wanted to stall on payment and hoped that

he could have time to execute the L/C before its expiry.

11) Found that the Appellant had not acted fraudulently or

dishonestly.

I. APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEAL

112. The Court found that the LTJ had required that any genuinely held

belief by a defendant must also be reasonably held – this was wrong.

Accordingly, there had been a wrong decision on a question of law.

113. However, the Court found that despite misapplying the law, the LTJ

had nevertheless, by a different route, determined that that the Appellant

did not truly hold the belief that he claimed. The LTJ had repeatedly used

the phrase that the Appellant’s belief was ill-founded, thereby there was

no basis for the Appellant’s belief. Further, the LTJ had also repeatedly

used the phrase that the Appellant had ‘turned a blind eye’ in other words

was aware of the reality of the situation but had chosen to ignore it.

Finally, the LTJ had found that the Appellant’s belief was not sincere or

in good faith which was a finding that it was not truly held.

114. Accordingly, the Court found that the LTJ had, by a perfectly proper

route, found that the Appellant’s belief was not truthful and thereby

dismissed the appeal.

J. THIS APPEAL

115. The Court of Appeal rightly found that the judge had misapplied the

law but then wrongly found that, by a different route, the judge had found

that the Appellant did not truly hold the belief he claimed. However, once

it had been rightly determined that the judge’s reasoning was flawed,

there was no other alternative basis to uphold the conviction.

55

§199

59-60

§214

76-77

§37-38

Record

Part A

98-99

§57-58

99-101

§59-65

32

116. If the Appellant did not believe that this was a genuine business deal

then the Appellant would know that the L/C could not be legitimately

executed and as such the most that could be obtained was the 5% down

payment. In such circumstances the Appellant having reasonable grounds

to believe that the money was tainted (proceeds of an indictable offence)

could do the following:

a) Leave the money alone; or

b) Withdraw all the money whilst safely offshore.

The Appellant took neither option.

117. The thread that runs throughout the judge’s judgment is that the

Appellant was wanting to execute the L/C.

118. The L/C could only be executed if the fertilizer was shipped and the

appropriate documents were presented to the bank. That was never going

to happen, a matter the Appellant would at least suspect if he had

reasonable grounds to believe. The fact that the judge found that the

Appellant was wanting to execute the L/C was indicative of the Appellant

believing that this was a genuine deal and diametrically opposite to

having reasonable grounds to believe that the money was fraudulent.

119. The judge accepted that it might not have been appropriate for the

Appellant to contact either Dragon Asia or Sinochem. When the

Appellant was asked why he hadn’t asked more questions from Daniel he

replied that he didn’t see the need to. The judge though found that the

Appellant’s explanation unreasonable and found that the reason he hadn’t

wanted to ask anything was that it might upset their business.

120. With respect to the judge this reasoning is simply illogical. If the

Appellant had reasonable grounds to believe why would it effect their

business by asking Daniel, who was part of the fraud. If the judge had

found that the Appellant hadn’t asked questions because he didn’t want

any suspicions confirmed, that would be a different matter. But that was

not the judge’s reasoning.

Record

Part A

49-50 §181

52 §187

52 §188

54 §197

55 §199

56 §203

59-60 §214

54 §197

33

121. Instead he found that the Appellant was concerned about not losing

the business and the ‘mega profit’. But the profit would only come if the

business was genuine.

122. The LTJ found that anyone looking objectively at the grounds the

Appellant had would believe differently from the Appellant, who was in

fact turning a blind eye to a highly questionable situation which the

Appellant must have so appreciated.

123. This suspicion was reasoned objectively and then worked backwards

to find that it must have been obvious to the Appellant so that the

Appellant’s belief was ‘ill-founded’.

124. It is submitted that the Appellant comes squarely within the principles

set out by the Court in Yeung Ka Sing Carson (2016) 19 HKCFAR 279

at §118-119.

125. The Court of Appeal found that the judge had, nevertheless, by a

different route found that the Appellant’s belief was not truthfully held.

This determination by the Court was flawed firstly in that it was not

discernible that the LTJ had taken a different ‘route’, (in that the LTJ’s

reasoning was conjoined with his misapplication of the law) and secondly

it was incongruous to the LTJ’s finding with regard to the Appellant’s

actions and intentions – see above §112.

126. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted, that the conviction should be

quashed.

Dated this 30th July 2018

Trevor Beel

Priscilla Lau

Counsel for the Appellant

Record

Part A

56 §203

34

FACC 17/2018

IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

FINAL APPEAL No. 17 of 2018 (CRIMINAL)

(ON APPEAL FROM CACC No. 352 OF 2015)

BETWEEN

HKSAR Respondent

and

HARJANI HARESH MURLIDHAR Appellant

THE APPELLANT’S CASE

Filed on the 30TH July 2018

Jal N. Karbhari & Co.

Solicitors

Rooms 703-707, 7th Floor

Cheung Lee Commercial Building

25 Kimberly Road, Kowloon

Hong Kong

Tel : 2367 7577

Fax : 2367 7897

Our Ref: JNK-12428-17-LA-MD