European perspectives

of the Western Balkans

countries

I

Afrim HOTI – Igor KOSÍR

(editors)

Prishtina 2015

AAB College

© Authors of this international team of university teachers and researchers

Editors:

Prof. ass. dr. Afrim HOTI

University of Prishtina, Kosovo

Faculty of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Prof. Ing. Igor KOSÍR

Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

Faculty of Political Science and International Relations

International Relations and Diplomacy Department

Opponents:

Prof. PhDr. Peter TEREM Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

Faculty of Political Science and International Relations

International Relations and Diplomacy Department

Associate Prof. Ing. Obadi Saleh Mothana OBADI Institute of Economic Research, Bratislava

Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovakia

Associate Prof. Ing. Peter KNAPIK Bratislava University of Economics, Slovakia

Faculty of Commerce

International Trade Department

Prof. Dr Arsim BAJRAMI University of Prishtina

Faculty of Law

Copy Editor:

Besfort MEHMETI

AAB College, Prishtina

With the decision of the editorial board of AAB College No. 1229/2015. date 07.10.2015 is

decided to be published the monograph European Perspective of the Western Balkans

Countries which can be used as a university textbook

AAB College, Prishtina

in cooperation with Institute for Promoting European Values in Bratislava, Slovakia,

University of Prishtina, Kosovo, as well as Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica,

Slovakia

Prishtina 2015 1st edition ISBN 978-9951-494-53-3

3

Contents

Preface ........................................................................................................... 5

Mária HOLUBOVÁ - Ľubica SAKTOROVÁ

1 The Balkans – Crossroads of Interests of Superpowers During

1878-1914 ...................................................................................................... 7

Igor KOSÍR– Sherif SHEHATA – Peter SMERIGA

2 Forming the European Economic Continental Complex .................... 23

Denisa ĈIDEROVÁ– Brikenë DIONIZI

3 EU Accession Experience and Perspectives: The Case of Slovakia and

Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) ..................................................................... 65

Zenun HALILI

4 The Protection of ethnic and linguistic minorities in Europe ............ 103

Rastislav KAZANSKÝ

5 Ethnicity asa security approach - a key factor for peace and

stability ...................................................................................................... 129

Anton VUKPALAJ

6 European Integration and the International Criminal Tribunal for the

Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): The politics of conditioning ......................... 145

Arton MUSLIU

7 Multi-ethnicity in the Western Balkans. Kosovo as a successful

story. .......................................................................................................... 165

Martin BALCO

8 The Impact of the Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute on Integration of

the Republic of Macedonia to the EU and NATO ..................................... 181

Karolina TICHÁ

9 Lobbying à l´Union Européenne ....................................................... 201

4

Hana VERMEŠOVÁ

10 L´influence de la question du Kosovo sur l´eurointégration de la

Serbie (2008-2012) .................................................................................... 217

Afrim HOTI

11 Kosova in Former Yugoslavia and Its Way to the EU Integration:

Perspectives and Challenges ...................................................................... 243

5

Preface

All parts of European continent were impacted by the process that was

not known as dominant in international economic relations among the

nations at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century. It is a process

of approaching, adaptation and sustainable linking deliberately of two or

more national economies, firstly neighbouring, later the other ones in order

to form more efficient economic system, motivating and interesting for

entrepreneurs, businessmen, bankers, traders, producers and finally for all

parts of population – consumers: the process of international economic

integration.

There were several examples of this type of intensively cooperating

neighbourhood: Prussia and later German Customs Union (Zollverein),

successful during the 19th century and efficiently contributing to

a realization of ambitions of Prussia to unify German speaking small,

medium and bigger states into the unified German state in 1871 (Deutsches

Reich). Southern African Customs Union, organized and set up by London

based British Empire in 1910, was an interesting model of this process in

the practice, too, but was organized among not independent countries but

four British colonies. But the customs union, created and functioning

between small European countries from the beginning of the 1920s as

between Belgium and Luxembourg (BELUX) in 1921 and between

Switzerland and Liechtenstein in 1923, were the perfect pioniers of building

the closer and efficient economic relations between the nations. By adding

an example of BENELUX (customs union of Belgium, Luxembourg and the

Netherlands, being realized four years after signing the London convention

in 1944) we are approaching the era of the great personalities of the

economic theory which used the practical experience of existing functioning

small customs unions as well as the theoretical conclusions of Jacob

VINER´s theory. There were namely Jan TINBERGEN, Duch economist,

the first European Nobel prize winner in economic sciences, and Béla

BALASSA, U.S. economist of Hungarian origine. They created

a theoretical basis for using a new economic cathegory – international

economic integration. And this process had been developed dynamically

until now. It represents a very important subsystem of todays globalization

and impacted all continents.

6

European integration is assessed as the most experienced and successful

in many dimensions. It has, parallelly with interesting economic results, the

peace creation function, too. The team of university teachers and researchers

of four countries (Albania, Egypt, Kosovo and Slovakia) and four

universities tried to analyze not only historical aspects of a specific

development in the Western Balkans region, and in the territory of former

Yugoslavian federation, but the authors tried to contribute to a discussion

and a presentation of the vision of European perspectives of these nations as

Slovenia, the first ex-Yugoslavian republic, and Croatia, the first Western

Balkans country - are the good examples. Of course, all Western Balkans

countries are geographically in Europe. But European perspectives, using

the „Brussels English“, mean a building, developing and widening of

existing potential for efficient transformation of national economy and

society in order to create the real conditions for becoming an EU associate

country, later EU candidate country and finally to join the European

integration process fully.

The editors and the authors are grateful to AAB College in Prishtina,

Institute for Promoting European Values in Bratislava, University of

Prishtina as well as Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica for their

efficient support to an edition of this international interdisciplinary scientific

script.

Afrim HOTI and Igor KOSÍR,

Prishtina, August 2015

7

1 The Balkans – Crossroads of Interests of Superpowers During 1878-19141

Mária HOLUBOVÁ - Ľubica SAKTOROVÁ

Abstract: Crimean War (1853 - 1856) caused major shifts in the balance

of forces between European powers. Together with Russia, the French

government tried to undermine the Turkish, British and Austrian influence

in the Balkans. The preliminary San Stefan peace treaty between Russia and

Turkey (March 1878) anticipated adjustment of the political situation in the

Balkans essentially following the national borders. The definitive peaceful

conditions were established by Congress of Berlin (June - July 1878). The

complete independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania was confirmed.

In September 1908 Austria-Hungary declared the annexation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina as a unilateral act.The Bosnian crisis contributed to a further

escalation of conflicts between Austria-Hungary, Germany and the

countries of the Triple Entente. In 1912, the Turkish dominion in Europe

was almost completely destroyed.Results of the First Balkan War meant the

strengthening of Serbia and in particular the impact of the Triple Entente in

the Balkans.Among the countries of the Triple Entente and the Triple

Alliance occurred a battle regarding the influence on Romanian, Bulgarian

and Turkish government in 1913. Next year, European powers, which

followed its own objectives, were preparing for war.

1 Note: In 1878, under the guarantee of Germany and Chancellor Otto von

BISMARCK held the Congress of Berlin, where the great powers and the

Ottoman Empire agreed and defined spheres of interests in the Balkans. In 1914,

after the Sarajevo assassination of Franz Ferdinand d'Este, the successor to the

Austro-Hungarian throne, the First World War broke out. PhDr. Mária HOLUBOVÁ, PhD., Faculty of Political Science and International

Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

(maria.holubova@umb.sk).

JUDr. Ľubica SAKTOROVÁ – LL.M, M.A, Faculty of Political Science and

International Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

(lubica.saktorova@umb.sk).

8

Keywords: Balkans, European powers, territorial and political interests,

national liberation, Balkan wars, Ottoman Empire, Triple Entente, Triple

Alliance, First World War

For an assessing the developments in the Western Balkans region now it

is very interesting as well as useful to imagine the “map” of developments

and the main trends and impacts of them on the following evolution,

including the changes - alternations of the stable periods with the

turbulences since the 1870s. It is of the first importance in any analysis of

Western Balkans developments totake into account the deeper history of the

region and of its individual countries in relation to the overall pattern of

industrialisation and society development in Europebeing linked to

theterritorialandpolitical interests of European powers there. The

100stanniversary (1914 – 2014) gave us a perfect occasion for it.

1.1 Conflict of Territorial and Political Interests of European Powers in the Balkans

Crimean War2 caused major shifts in the balance of forces between

European powers. Russia lost the position of the leading continental power

in Europe in favour of France. Discrepancies between Russia and Britain

have been deepening. Even the Russo-Austrian relations resulted in a

substantial cooling that, during a clash interests in the Balkans,led to open

2 Note: Crimean War took place from 1853-1856, when sharpened Russia's

relations with Turkey, where a mission of Prince MENSHIKOV, on behalf of

the Russian government demanded the right to protect the Orthodox population.

Following the rejection of Russian demands, without a declaration of war, the

Russian troops occupied Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldova,

which were under the sovereignty of the Turkish sultan. The Turkish

government, which was supported by Great Britain demanded the withdrawal of

Russian troops from the Danubian principalities. As a result of increased British

and French influence in Constantinople, Turkey has declared war against Russia

on 4th

October 1853.

9

hostility.Russiaon the other hand come together with Prussia and gradually

well with France3. The conclusions of the Paris peace conference of 1856

were not strictly followed, some of the requirements of the United Kingdom

France did not support at all. Together with Russia, the French government

tried to undermine the Turkish, British and Austrian influence in the

Balkans.4

1.1.1 Russo-Turkish Warand the Congress of Berlin in the context of international relations

National liberation war against the Turkish occupation in the Balkans

again ignited traditional rivalry of the Russian and the Austrian policies in

this area. The British government has shown a commitment to maintain the

integrity of the Turkish Empire and did not want to accept penetration of

Russia to the Black Sea straits.Not even the German diplomacy was willing

to wholeheartedly support Russian politicians and was the first for

conveying theagreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

In July 1875 uprising has begun in Herzegovina and shortly after that

in Bosnia. It was exactly these events that allowed the Austrian and the

Russian government to seek to expand their own influence in the Balkans

under the slogan of "protecting the Christian population".

The great powers requested by the note of Foreign Minister of Austria-

Hungary from 30thDecember 1875 and by the Memorandum of the Russian

Prime Minister GORCHAKOV of 13th May 1876 from the Turkish

government to adhere to reforms and to grant autonomy to the states.

Turkey rejected the requirements.

3 Note: French Emperor Napoleon III. and Foreign Minister WALEWSKI were not

interested in total weakening of Russia, as it would significantly strengthen the

UK.

4 Note: Despite the radicalism of the powers during 1858-1859, France supported

the unification of Wallachia and Moldova to the Romanian national state and

provided moral support to the anti-Turkish movement in Serbia and

Montenegro.

10

After a new uprising in Bulgaria in May 1876, when the news about the

Turkish violence and atrocities against civilians spread across the whole

Europe, Serbia declared the war against Turkey on 30th

June and

Montenegro on the 2nd

July 1876.

Despite the partial successes of Montenegro and the help of Russian

volunteers, the military operations of Serbia were held unsuccessfully. The

Russian government did not want to accept Turkey's victory, but planned

strategyto not enter a military confrontation with Austria-Hungary.

The contentious issues were discussed at a meeting in Zákupy on 8th

of

July 1876, where the Russian Tsar Alexander II. and Chancellor

GORCHAKOV met the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph I. and Minister

ANDRÁSSY. Both sides have come to differing interpretations of the results

of this meeting.

A secret Austro-Russian conference in Budapest held on 15th

January

1877 brought a temporary solution promising neutrality of Austria in case

of Russo-Turkish War. It also brought an agreement on the Austrian

occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina.Moreover, the parties agreed that,

in the Balkans, therefore, no new Slavic power will come into existence.5

Under the guise of promoting the resolution of Constantinople, Czarist

Russia declared war against Turkey on 24th

of April 1877. The Russian

army crossed the Danube and seized the Shipka (Ńipka) pass. After several

months of fighting, they managed to conquer the Bulgarian city of Pleven

andthen it progressed very quickly. On 20th of January 1878 the fortress of

Edirnefelldown and on 31th of January 1878, the parties of conflict agreed

on a ceasefire. The UK government has strongly warned Russia before

proceeding to Istanbul.

The preliminary peace treaty between Russia and Turkey was signed on

3th

of March 1878 in San Stefan near Istanbul. It anticipated adjustment

of the political situation in the Balkans essentially following the national

borders.

5 Note: The results of The Istanbul Conference of Ambassadors of the great powers

held during the 23th

of December 1876 -20th

of January 1877 led to

recommendations/proposals of internal reforms in the Balkan provinces of the

Turkish (Ottoman) Empire. The Turkish Government, supported by the UK,

rejected these proposals.

11

Serbia, Montenegro and Romania should become a fully independent

state and territory should be extended.Great Bulgaria, which included the

Macedonia, should be extended from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea.Kars,

Ardahan, Bajazid, Batumi and south western part of Bessarabia, which

Russia lost in the 1856 should be connected to Russia. Romania should be

compensated by the northern part of Dobrogea.

English and Austro-Hungarian government felt aggrieved by the Treaty

of San Stefan and refused to recognize it.Great Britain promised to help

Turkey in case they withdraw Cyprus and in case Turkey would be

threatened by new military danger. However, definitive peaceful conditions

were established by Congress of Berlin, which was held on 13th

of June till

13th

of July 1878.

Russia has managed to retain the remaining parts of Bessarabia towards

the Danube Delta and cities in Asia Minor, except Bajazid.The biggest

dispute between the superpowers hasoccured because of Bulgaria, which

was divided despite the initial decisionnotto do so.Only the northern part

remained in fact separate, although formally dependent. Southern Bulgaria

also called Eastern Rumelia received partial autonomy and Macedonia

returned back under Turkish supremacy. Russian occupation in both parts of

Bulgaria was limited to nine months.

The complete independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romaniawas

confirmed. Right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, including

Novopazarskog Sandņak that separated Serbia from Montenegro was

confirmed to Austro-Hungary. The territory of Greece should be partially

extended to the part of Epirus and Thessaly.After the Berlin Congress, even

more than before has the Balkans peninsula become a meeting place for

interests of the great powers known as the “powder keg of Europe”.

1.1.2 Outbreaks of conflict in the Balkans as a prerequisite of the First World War

Penetration through the Balkans to Turkey and to the Middle East has

become theessential direction of expansion of the German colonial policy.

The British government saw in this an effort to threaten the access routes to

India and tried to face this German influence by exerting pressure on the

12

Turkish Sultan, for example, by not providing financial assistance and the

promotion of reforms in Macedonia. Influential circles in Austria-Hungary

began to strive for subjugation of Serbia, which was the epitome of

national liberation fight in the Balkans. As a first step towards this goal

they prepared annexation of the occupied provinces of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, which at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 formally remained

under Turkish sovereignty. After the defeat of Japan and the subsequent

internal turmoil, the Czarist Russia put a considerable effort into foreign

policy regarding getting free passage through the Black Sea. At the same

time however, Russia did not exclude a separate agreement with other

powers at the expense of Turkey.

The diplomatic activity of the European powers in the Balkan issue

peaked after winning the Young Turkish revolution. Russian Foreign

Minister IZVOĽSKIJ6 undertook a journey through Europe promoting the

regime change in the Black Sea straits. When negotiating on 15th of

September 1908 at the castle Buchlov near Brno (now in the Czech

Republic) with the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister AEHRENTHAL, he

promised in exchange for support to his initiatives, that he will give a

consent with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and proposed the

convening of an international conference in order to review the Berlin

agreement of the 1878. During the 15th

to 16th

September 1908 Austria-

Hungary declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a

unilateral act 7 which provoked outrages in Turkey, Serbia and large

6 See: MITTERAND, F. Zvrhnutí orli, 2013, Kaligram, Bratislava, p. 416, ISBN

978-80-8101-760-5. Note: Count Alexander Petrovich IZVOĽSKIJ was a

Russian diplomat who served as Russia's ambassador to the Vatican, Belgrade,

Munich, Tokyo and Copenhagen. In the years 1906-1910 he was Minister of

Foreign Affairs, later ambassador in Paris, where he died in 1919. He was the

major architect of Russia's alliance with Great Britain and France as well as he

supported the Russian armaments. He became famous nevertheless for his

saying pronounced in the First World War (those reason was his hostility

against Austria-Hungary, due to the fact that in 1908 with the annexation of

Bosnia and Herzegovina the Russians were deceived) „C´est ma Guerre!“ (This

is my war!) 7 See: MITTERAND, F.: „Zvrhnutì orli“, 2013, Kaligram, Bratislava, p. 416, ISBN

978-80-8101-760-5. Note: Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister tried to obtain

the consent of Russia with annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by fraud,

where the promise of the minister IZVOĽSKIJ of free hand in the Balkans, was

misexplained as consent to annexation.Hostility of Russia towards Austria

13

disagreement of powers. Several months persisting Bosnian crisis, during

which the Austro-Hungarian army in December 1908 and March 1909

partially mobilized against Serbia, ended up in compromise of the

opponents of the annexation. The Turkish government waived the

sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina for compensation 2,500,000

pounds sterling by the Treaty of 26th of February 1909. Austria-Hungary has

again abolished occupation of the Novopazarskog Sandņak. Under an open

pressure from Germany, the Russian government has approved the

annexation on 22th of March 1909. On the 31

th of March1909 the Serbian

government approved the annexation. Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister

tried to obtain the consent of Russia with annexation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina by fraud, where the promise of the minister IZVOĽSKIJ of

free hand in the Balkans, was misexplained as consent to annexation.

The Bosnian crisis contributed to a further escalation of conflicts

between Austria-Hungary, Germany and the countries of the Triple

Entente. Only the Italy continued in its secret move away from the Triple

Alliance and concluded the agreement on the status quo in the Balkans with

the Russian government on 24th of October 1909 in Raconigi. The Italian

government has promised to support Russian plans in the Black Sea straits

and Russia has committed not to obstruct the Italian claims to Tripoli. New

efforts of the German policy on secession of the Czarist Russia from the

Triple Entente, which were demonstrated during a visit of Tsar NICHOLAS

II. and Foreign Minister SAZONOV in Potsdam at the William II. residence

on 4th - 5

th November 1910 remained without success. Instead of a general

political agreement was on 19th of August 1911 signed only German-

Russian agreement, which determined the interests in Turkey and Persia8.

Hungary, which was manifested later, was therefore understandable. Russian

diplomacy expected something on return on the side of the Bosporus, but got

nothing. Austrians betrayed them. The annexation of 1908 will play a very

important role in unleashing the First World War, when Russia will be stronger

and when it becomes apparent that the Austro-Hungarian domination over

Bosnia and Herzegovina is fragile and uncertain. 8 Note: Germany yet suffered a diplomatic defeat during the second Moroccan crisis

in 1911 after the German demonstration in Agadir. Under pressure from the

British government the German diplomacy had to recognize French protectorate

over Morocco and Germany received as a compensation a small area in the

French Congo all legalized by the Agreement of 4th

of November 1911. Agadir

14

Rivalry of the European powers in the Balkans has been closely linked

with the national liberation movement of the Balkan nations against the

Turkish occupation and also with the efforts of individual governments to

extend the Balkan area. At the initiative of Serbia and the active diplomatic

support from Czarist Russia, the Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations were led

since April 1911 on the establishment of the Balkan alliance against Turkey,

possibly against Austria-Hungary. Disputes arose on the question of

Macedonia, the territory which was claimed by Serbia and Bulgaria.

Another disputed territory in the Balkans was Albania, which was

nevertheless required by Serbia, Austria-Hungary and Italy.

The allied Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty, which was signed on 13th March

1912, included a commitment to mutual support in case of an attack of third

country, especially of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the secret annex to the

treaty anticipated joint military appearance between the two countries

against Turkey. The treaty determined the Serbian and the Bulgarian claims

on Macedonian territory, but the question of the midrange area has been

left upon the decision of Russia. The French and the British Government

agreed with the treaty, which was yet amended by the military agreement on

12th May 1912. After a short negotiation, the Treaty of alliance between

Bulgaria and Greece was concluded on 29th May 1912. The treaty aimed to

provide even more offensive and completely unrestricted choice of pretext

for declaring war to Turkey. Russian, French and Austro-Hungarian

government tried in vain to prevent the outbreak of the First Balkan War.

Military actions against Turkey began on 9th

October 1912 by

Montenegro, on 17th

October by Serbia and on 18th

October by Bulgaria

and Greece. Within a few weeks Serb forces captured area of

Novopazarskog Sandņak and the northern part of Albania, the Greek army

occupied Thessaloniki and Bulgarian army was approaching

Istanbul.Turkish dominion in Europe was almost completely destroyed. On

3th November 1912, the Turkish government turned to the powers with the

request for mediation of peace. The Russian government has warned

Crisis led to a spectacular expansion of chauvinistic sentiments in the press and

in public opinion of European powers. The outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War of

Tripoli, did not result in increased diplomatic activity due to the fact that all the

great powers were committed contractually to not interfere Italians in this

aggression.

15

Bulgaria against occupation of Istanbul. The Austro-Hungarian government

flatly refused to accept the accession of Serbia to the Adriatic Sea. This

attitude was supported by the governments of Germany and Italy.

The truce between Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia was concluded on 3th

December 1912; it suspended military operations. The only exception was

the Albanian town Shkodra, which was surrounded by the Montenegrin

troops as well as Edirne and Janina, where the Greek unit operated. Since

the 17th of December 1912 at the same time two conferences were held in

London; one of State representatives, which were at war and the other of the

six powers. On the 27th of December 1912, at the insistence of Austria-

Hungary and Italy, the Conference adopted the decision on the

establishment of the Albanian state, where a provisional government under

the sovereignty of Turkey should be instituted, but still under surveillance of

great powers. Other conflicts arose not only between Turkey and victorious

Balkan countries, such as the city of Edirne and the Aegean islands, but also

between Bulgaria and Serbia on Thessaloniki and Eastern Thrace.

On 3th of February 1913, after the January coup d'état in Turkey were the

military action renewed. Turkish troops suffered defeat again, mostly by the

fall of fortress in Edirne on 26th March 1913. Turkey concluded the new

truce with Bulgaria on 16th April and with other countries on 20

th April

1913. However, discrepanciesyet again broke out between the Balkan

countries and also between the superpowers at the resumption of

negotiations in London. The critical situation arose on 22th of April 1913

regarding the town of Shkodra that was occupied by Montenegro and that

they refused to pass to Albania. Based on the ultimatum of British Foreign

Minister Lord GREY, the Balkan states were forced to adopt a decision of

the great powers.

London peace treaty between Turkey and the victorious Balkan

countries signed on 30th

May 1913 left from the entire Turkish rule in

Europe only Constantinople (Istanbul) and a narrow strip of land around the

Black Sea waterways in the south-east of the line Enos-Midia. The whole

rest of the country was divided between Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and

Bulgaria, except for Albania, whose constitutional status should be

designated by the great powers. Moreover, the issue of the Aegean islands

was the subject of resolution and subsequent decision of the great powers.

Results of the First Balkan War meant the strengthening of Serbia and in

16

particular the impact of the Triple Entente in the Balkans. Position of the

Austria-Hungary and the Triple Alliance after the first Balkan War was

seriously weakened.

German and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy used the dissatisfaction,

which originated in Bulgaria due to the occupation of Macedonia and Serbia

and tended to support the aggression of the Bulgarian Government against

the other Balkan states. On the contrary, Serbia and Greece in particular

have tried to obtain further concessions from Bulgaria and on 1th of June

1913 entered into a secret agreement, which was later joined by Romania.

The Russian government has attempted to mitigate the conflict between the

Balkan countries, but on the 29th July 1913, the Bulgarian Government

began military action against Serbia and Greece.Bulgaria suffered a rapid

defeat in the second Balkan War, in which Romania and Turkey

participated accordingly.

On 10th

August 1913 States signed the peace treaty in Bucharest, which

declared to Serbia the greater part of Macedonia. Greece gained the

southern part of Macedonia including the city of Thessaloniki and the

Western Thrace. Romania received southern Dobrogea. According to the

Bulgarian-Turkish agreement of the 29th of September 1913, the European

part of Turkey was extended to the Eastern Thrace with Edirne. After the

Second Balkan War, Bulgaria and Turkey began to sympathize with the

line of the foreign policy of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Among the

countries of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance occurred a battle

regarding the influence on Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish

government.

1.2 Balkan War – the End of the Struggle for National Emancipation and the Beginning of a New Conflict

In 1912, four of the five Balkan states - Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and

Bulgaria - which gradually emerged in the 19th century after they gained

final independence of the Orthodox population from Ottoman domination,

agreed on a common military action. Their aim was to conquer the

remaining European part of the Ottoman Empire. Members of Balkan

17

League submitted ultimatum to the Sublime Porte on 17thSeptember

9

asking it for an immediately granted autonomy to all areas of the Christian

population in the Balkans. Istanbul rejected the ultimatum note. In fact, the

requirements could not even be realized in the specified time period.

Military action against the Ottoman Empire was started by Montenegro on

9th

October 1912; ten days later it was followed by Bulgaria, Serbia and

Greece10

. Since the beginning of the war armies of the Balkan Association

had much higher morale. The euphoria from the belief that they were

fighting for a just cause of their nation and fulfilment of desires was

probably close; created wonders. The second war showed that the common

goals however were not so common.

The military operations of the first Balkan war were very successful and

proceeded in parallel on two fronts: Track and Macedonia. Thracian front

was crucial, it defended the access to Istanbul and therefore the Ottomans

focused most of its military power there. Greek navies took the lead at sea.

It started hindering the supplies of the Ottoman Balkan troops via marine

arteries and began to occupy the eastern islands. Disintegration of the

Ottoman army was accomplished. Bulgarians conquered Edirne and Greek

Serbian and Montenegrin army conquered Janie and Shkoder. The Sublime

Porte signed a peace treaty on 17th

May 1913, by which it gave up all its

European territories, including most of the Aegean islands11

to the benefit of

the Balkan League.

Conflict of the Second Balkan War arose from disagreements between

members of the Balkan League about conquered territories; therefore the

Second Balkan War was also known as interlined war. The Russian

diplomacy had a share in the conflicts. It was the emissaries who convinced

the Orthodox Balkan states of the currently favourable conditions, therefore

of the apparent chance to achieve great territorial gains rather than focusing

on the details.

9 Note: Dates are given according to the Orthodox Julian calendar.

10 Note: Historianspoint out thata quick decisionandan appropriate timingof the

ultimatumarose from the factthatjust beforethe outbreak offightingin the

BalkansOttoman Empirefought an unsuccessfulwarwithItaly on theterritory

oftoday'sLibya. This conflictrevealeditsmilitaryweakness to the world. 11

Note: Crete, Samos, Chios, Lesbos, Thasos, Samothraki.

18

Russian interests can be seen in the background of their initiatives.

Weakening or direct elimination of the Ottoman Empire was the long-term

aim of Czarist Russia. Russian diplomacy also believed that they could play

the role of an arbitrator after the war, assigning the conquered territories.

That would only strengthen Russian influence in the Balkans and indirectly

imply a weakening of the position of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans.

Each party winning the Balkan alliance wanted to keep the whole

territory conquered by their troops. A new fact provides explanation. Just at

the time of the Balkan wars the sixth Balkan country – Albania started to

form12

. States of the Balkan League first did not recognize the declaration

of Albania and fought in the new state as in the Ottoman territory. It soon

became clear, however, that the idea of territorial gains were considerably

adjusted by this new reality. Everyone sought compensation in Macedonia

and its reallocation.13

Balkan nations reached the peak of emancipation and empowering

and a completion of their liberation match in Balkan Wars. Events of the

Balkan wars may serve as a suitable balance sheet in search of certain

historical facts. European powers found that the Balkan Peninsula was

definitely becoming an arena measuring forces between them. Balkan states

ranked into their camps based on how convenient were the results of their

own military efforts. Balkan wars have thus become a prelude to an even

greater conflict. The First World War did not start in South-Eastern Europe

in 1914, but two years earlier.

In early 1914, Armaments of the European powers reached

unprecedented dimensions. A key factor in international relations on the eve

of the First World War was the British-German conflict, accompanied and

12

Note: The united Albanian political representatives declared 28th of November,

1912 full Albanian independence from Ottoman Empire vilayets Bitlis, Skadar,

Ioannina and Kosovo. 13

Note: The most disappointing were the territorial gains of Bulgaria. Despite

significant Macedonian gains, its hould lose further projected territories this

way, which it previously protected by a contract with Serbia and decided to

settle their dispute by military intervention against Serbia. This plan failed.

Secluded Bulgaria lost a significant part of the Macedonia gains, but also of

southern Dobrogea with port Silistrato, Romania by signing the peace treaty of

Bucharest on 28th

of July, 1913. City Edirne which its army conquered at the

cost of large human casualties, had to be returned to the Ottoman Empire.

19

complicated by further contradictions in Europe and other parts of the

world.

German land forces were better trained and equipped than the Triple

Entente States, but its lead dwindled over time, therefore the Germans were

most interested in accelerating the military conflict. They underestimated

the coherence of the Entente powers and did not accept the secret Franco-

Russian Naval Convention of 16th July 1912. Despite the ongoing Anglo-

German negotiations on non-European issues, like envisaged agreement of

15th June 1914 on the definition of spheres of influence in the Middle East

and increasing of the Anglo-Russian disputes in Persia, hope of the

escalation of disputes between the Triple Entente States was not fulfilled.

Other European powers, which followed its own objectives were

preparing for war. Great Britain wished for a disposal of Germany from the

colonial policy as the most serious competitor; France wanted to restore the

supremacy in Europe and to acquire Alsace-Lorraine; Tsarist Russia wanted

to strengthen positions in the Black Sea straits and the Balkans, where

Austria-Hungary, which wanted to destroy Serbia, also had their interests.

In that atmosphere, really little incentive, such as a shot in Sarajevo, was

needed to initiate an armed conflict.

20

PhDr. Mária HOLUBOVÁ, PhD.

Graduated from the Faculty of Arts at the

Matej Bel University (MBU), Banská Bystrica,

Slovakia - Department of History and

Linguistics. She works at the Department of

International Relations and Diplomacy of the

MBU Faculty of Political Science and

International Relations in Banská Bystrica.

Parallelly she is teaching at the Prague based

University of International and Public

Relations. She is a nationally recognized

expert on the history of international relations

and diplomatic protocol.

JUDr. Ľubica SAKTOROVÁ, LL.M, M.A

Graduated from the Faculty of Law, Matej

Bel University in Banská Bystrica. She also

completed the postgraduate degree at the

University of Surrey, Great Britain in the field

of international law and at the University of

Versailles, France in the field of social

conflicts and violence. At the present, she is

working as a PhD. candidate at the Department

of International Relations and Diplomacy of

the Faculty of Political Science and

International Relations at MBU in Banská

Bystrica.

21

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

HAFFNER, S. (1995). Od Bismarcka k Hitlerovi. Olomouc: Votobia

1995. 203p. ISBN 80-85885-90-5.

MITTERAND, F. (2013). Zvrhnutí orli. Bratislava: Kalligram 2013.

416p. ISBN 978-80-8101-760-5.

RYCHLÍK, J. (2009). Medzi Viedňou a Carihradom. Praha: Vyńehrad

2009. 400p. ISBN 978-80-70219-57-7

TEJCHMAN, M. (2005). Dejiny Srbska. Praha: Lidové noviny 2005.

670p. ISBN 807-1066-71-0.

BERĎAJEV, A. N. (1999). Ruská idea – základné otázky ruského

myslenia v 19.storoĉí. Praha: Alpress 1999. 247p. ISBN 978-80-7298-069-

7.

BLACK,J. (2003). Dejiny Európy. Praha: Vyńehrad 2003. 543s. ISBN

80-7021-376-0.

BESALA, J. (2009). Utajené dejiny Európy. Frýdek-Místek: Alpress

2009. 401p. ISBN 978-80-7362-652-5.

SHEHATA, S. – KOSÍR, I. – SMERIGA, P. (2014). An Analysis of the

Turkish Foreign Policy towards; and Following the Arab Spring. London,

England: Journal on Law, Economy and Management, Vol. 4, 2014, No. 2,

pp. 25-33. ISSN 2048-4186.

VESELÝ, Z. (2010). Dejiny medzinárodných vzťahov. Praha: Aleń

Ĉenek 2010. 605p. ISBN 978-80-7380-278-3.

22

23

2 Forming the European Economic Continental Complex

Igor KOSÍR– Sherif SHEHATA – Peter SMERIGA

Abstract: The process of international economic integration totally

changed the postwar international relations. The second part of the 20th

century was much different that the first one. European Union represents

the mainstream of European integration process. Today´s EU´s integration

unit of 28 members – there are 6 EEC founders of 1957, 5 newcomers,

additional 6 new members from EFTA (parallel wave of European

integration since 1960) as well as 11 new members from former CMEA

(COMECON) playing the role of an opposition model of European

integration between 1971 and 1991, including the new states of

disintegrated USSR, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia. EU plus EFTA form

the European Economic Area, the higher order integration of two existing

European integration units. Switzerland, an EFTA member, is not a full

EEA member. The Swiss integration with EU is realized thanks to 17

bilateral sectoral agreements on free trade area and common market levels

(as EEA). Turkey is integrated with EU on customs union level and there is

ongoing process of a creation of free trade area with Mediterranean

countries, 3 EU Eastern Partnership countries as well as with Western

Balkans countries. This is a longterm process of a creation of the European

Economic Continental Complex with a potential to play a role of the

important center of economic power in global dimension.

Prof. Ing. Igor KOSÍR, PhD., Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia,

Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, International Relations

and Diplomacy Department (igor.kosir@umb.sk).

Mgr. Sherif SHEHATA, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia,

Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, International Relations

and Diplomacy Department, student of doctoral studies, counselor of Egyptian

diplomatic service (sherif.shehata@google.com).

Ing. Peter SMERIGA, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia,

Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, International Relations

and Diplomacy Department, student of doctoral studies

(peter.smeriga@google.com).

24

Keywords: European integration, Western Balkans, EU enlargement,

stabilization and association agreements, candidate countries, accession

negotiations, a;cquis communautaire, free trade regime, customs union,

flexible exogeneous integration, common market, single market, economic

and monetary union, EU membership, European Economic Area, European

Economic Continental Complex, globalization

There were three collapses of globally important impact within the new

global economic organism – the world economy at the beginning and during

the first half of the 20th century:

1): The first world war – WWI (1914 - 1918) began on July 28, 1914,

when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. This seemingly small

conflict between two countries spread rapidly. Soon, all European powers:

Germany, Russia, Great Britain, and France were all drawn into the war.

They were involved in treaties that obligated them to defend certain other

nations in case of war conflict. But 100 years later, there is general

consensus that many European powers waited for any reason, any single

occasion to start the war. Germany and Austria-Hungary were active and

they were situated soon in the center of this bloody development. Western

and eastern fronts quickly opened along their borders. The both fronts

gradually locked into place. In the same year 1914, the Ottoman Empire was

brought into the fray as well. Germany tricked Russia into thinking that

Turkey had attacked it. As a result, much of 1915 was dominated by Allied

actions against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean region as well as in

Mesopotamia. 1917: The United States declared war on Germany in April,

in November, the Bolshevik Revolution prompted Russia to pull out of the

war. In 1918, the governments of both Germany and Austria-Hungary began

to lose control as both countries experienced multiple mutinies from within

their military structures. In the late fall of this year the member countries of

the Central Powers signed armistice agreements one by one including

Germany as the last, signing its armistice on November 11, 1918. As a

result, Austria-Hungary was broken up into several smaller countries,

including Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia. German Empire, under the

Treaty of Versailles, was severely punished with hefty economic

25

reparations, territorial losses, and strict limits on its rights to develop

militarily. WWI had left Europe devastated. Those countries that had fought

in it, had suffered casualties never experienced before.The total deaths of all

nations who fought in the war is thought to have been 8.5 million with 21

million being wounded.1 Many historians believe that the Allies were

excessive in their punishment of Germany and that the harsh Treaty of

Versailles actually planted the seeds of World War II, rather than foster

peace.

2) The Great Depression (World Economic Crisis – 1929 - 1933)

represented a collapse of economy and society of leading country of the

world economy and community – USA, influencing other parts of the world

thanks a deep interdependence. Causes of the Great Depression typically

include a weak banking system, overproduction, bursting credit bubble, the

fact that farmers and industrial workers had not shared in the prosperity of

the 1920s, and a government-held laissez faire policy. Herbert Hoover

(1874-1964), a Republican, was president when the Great Depression

began. He infamously declared in March 1930 that the U.S. had “passed the

worst” and argued that the economy would sort itself out. The worst,

however, had just begun and would last until the outbreak of WWII (1939).2

On “Black Tuesday,” October 29, 1929, the beginning of this great and long

depression, the market lost $14 billion, making the loss for that week an

astounding $30 billion. This was ten times more than the U.S. annual

federal budget and far more than the USA had spent in WWI. In the 1930s,

unemployment reached 25% and the GDP dropped 25% in US economy.3

Before the start of the Great Depression, there were 25,000 banks in the

United States. By 1933, almost half of those banks (11,000) had failed.4 The

1 See: The Treaty of Versailles. [Cit. 3.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk /treaty_of_versailles.htm> as well as

World War I. [Cit. 2.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/ww1/summary.html>. 2 See: The Great Depression. [Cit. 12.2.2015.] Available at

<http://facts.randomhistory.com/2009/04/12_great-depression.html>. 3 See: Economists Discuss 2009 vs. the 1930s. Rock Island, Illinois: Augustana

College, January 27, 2009. [Cit. 27.3.2009.] Note: In 2009, during next global

economic crisis, unemployment was at 8.1% and the GDP had so far dropped

2%.USA didn‟t have the “social safety net” in the 1930s that it has today... 4 See: Facts About The Great Depression. [Cit. 22.2.2015.] Croft Communications,

Inc. 2015. Available at<http://thegreatdepressioncauses.com/facts/>.

26

Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930 increased U.S. tariffs which, in turn,

decreased international trade (especially in the farming sector) and helped

spread the Great Depression worldwide.5 It peaked between 1932 and 1933.

A new economic policy both for intra-American as well as international

dimension of U.S. acting was needed.

3) The Second World War – WWII (1939 - 1945) began in September

1939 when Britain and France declared war on Germany following

Germany's invasion of Poland. Twenty years ago, in 1919, during preparing

the Versailles Treaty Georges Benjamin Clemenceau, then French prime

minister, wanted revenge. He wanted to be sure that Germany could never

start another war again. Germany had to pay 6,600 million pounds for the

damage caused by the war. This country could not afford to pay the money

and during the 1920s the people in Germany were very poor. There were not

many jobs and the price of food and basic goods was high. Plus, there were

the strong impacts of the Great Depression there, too. People were

dissatisfied with the government and voted to power a man who promised to

rip up the Treaty of Versailles. His name was Adolf HITLER, a NSDAP

party leader.6 After becoming German chancellor in January 1933 almost

immediately he began secretly building up Germany's army and weapons. In

1934 he increased the size of the army, began building warships and created

a German airforce (Luftwaffe). HITLER also made two important alliances

two years later. The first was called the Rome-Berlin Axis Pact and allied

HITLER´s Great German Empire with MUSSOLINI´s Kingdom of Italy.

The second was called the Anti-Comintern Pact and allied Germany with

the Empire of Japan. The first victim of HITLER: Austria (Anschluss). The

policy, adopted by CHAMBERLAIN´s British government became known

as the policy of Appeasement. Neville CHAMBERLAIN felt that giving in

to HITLER's demands would prevent another war. The Munich Agreement

5 See: HAWKINS, W. (2008): Panic Control. Washington, D.C.: The Washington

Times, May 12, 2008. [22.3.2015.] Available

at<https://books.google.sk/books?id=64kQBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT93&lpg=PT93

&dq=Hawkins:+Panic+control+The+Washington+Times&source=bl&ots=s8jN

1IatIS&sig=gVIA3CppRxvgsR8FjmfGbNtvqw&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=7oA7Vd_m

KMm0UefTgaAO&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Hawkins%3A%20P

anic%20control%20The%20Washington%20Times&f=false>. 6 See: World War Two – Causes. History on the net, 14.8.2014. [Cit. 3.12.2014.]

Available at <http://www.historyonthenet.com/ww2/causes.htm>.

27

(Germany-Italy-Great Britain-France) stated that HITLER could have the

Sudetenland region of Czecho-Slovakia provided that he promised not to

invade the rest of this Central European country. When Germany invaded

the rest of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939, British PM was still not

prepared to take the country to war over "..a quarrel in a far-away country

between people of whom we know nothing."…and following victims:

Poland, BELUX countries, the Netherlands, France, Albania, Denmark,

Norway…The invasion of Yugoslavia by Germany and Italy began on 6

April 1941, simultaneously with the new Battle of Greece. On 11 April,

Hungary joined the invasion. By 17 April the Yugoslavs had signed an

armistice and by 30 April 1941 all of mainland Greece was under German

or Italian control.7 HITLER decided finally to attack the Soviet Union, too.

Operation Barbarossa8 commenced on 22 June 1941. About four million

soldiers of the Axis powers invaded USSR along a 2,900 km front. Japanese

attacked USA (naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii) on December 7, 1941.

This attack led to the United States´ entry into World War II. The alliance

“United nations” against HITLER-MUSSOLINI-HIROHITO pact was

created. The Soviet Stalingrad and Kursk victories represented the important

turning in the WWII development. D-day invasion of Normandy (6 June

1944),9 a coordination of the war efforts and strategic operations among

U.S., Soviet Union and Great Britain (their leaders summits in Tehran,

Yalta) led to the final victory and the total collapse of Nazi Germany in May

1945 (following by Potsdam conference - from 17 July to 2 August

1945).The victorious troika (STALIN-TRUMAN10

-CHURCHILL11

)

decided there how to administer punishment to the defeated Nazi Germany,

which had agreed to unconditional surrender nine weeks earlier, on 8 May

1945. The goals of the Potsdam conference also included the establishment

7 See: Balkan Campaign (World War II). [ Cit. 22.3.2015.] Available

at<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_Campaign_%28World_War_II%29>. 8 See: Operation Barbarossa. [Cit. 20.3.2015.] Available

at<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barba-rossa>. 9 See: Normandy landings.[Cit. 23.3.2015.] Available

at<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normandy_landings>. 10

Note: New American President Harry TRUMAN replaced Franklin Delano

ROOSEVELT after taking office after former president‟s death in April 1945. 11

Note: The British PM Winston CHURCHILL was replaced during the conference

as a leader of the British delegation in line with the outcome of the 1945 general

election by Clement ATTLEE, the new British Prime Minister.

28

of post-war order, peace treaty issues, and countering the effects of the

war.12

The WWII involved more countries, cost more money, and killed

more people than any other war in human history. Between 50 and 70

million people died. Atomic bombings of Japanese cities Hiroshima and

Nagasaki in August 1945 by Americans opened totally new era in human

civilisation.

2.1 Dynamization of economic internationalization in the second part of the 20th century

All these three globally important events influenced deeply the

functioning of the world economy during its first 70 years.13

The linkages

among the basic elements of the world economy – national economic

complexes – were strongly and deeply impacted and the volume as well as

value of the world trade (exports and imports) collapsed three times

enormously. The existing system of international trading during these crisis

development stages was influenced strongly by the principle of

protektionism and by the trade policy method of bilateralism. Surprisingly,

the world economy bastion of this system was based within the national

economy of the world economy new leader – USA.

American experts prepared deliberately the system of stabilization of the

postwar world economy. It was supposed to be based on theree pillars of the

world economy: two Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank

(originally the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and

International Monetary Fund (in line with the results of Bretton Woods

conference of finance ministers of United nations alliance countries in 1944)

as well as the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) of principles and rules of

international trading – firstly as the Geneva based General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (GATT - negotiated and approved by 23 nations in 1947)

12

See: Potsdam Conference. [Cit. 23.3.2015.] Available

at<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Conference>. 13

Note: New global economic organism – world economy – was born at the

beginning of the 1870s. The main factors of its creation: 1) international trading

widened to the global dimension and 2) colonialism – this system dynamized it

by interlinking the international markets.

29

and after a collapse of the U.S. project of International Trade Organizationin

1948 replaced 47 years later by the World Trade Organization, the

institutionalized MTS, functioning since January 1995.

All this strategic global organizational steps were in line with the U.S.

Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (TAA), approved by the Congres in

1934 and the ideas of former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell HULL (1933 -

1944). His new trade policy approaches were based on a support of the free

trade principle as well as of the multilateralism as the favoured trade policy

method.

The TAA approval was the total failure of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act

priciples and rules of 1930 and of its old supporters in the Congres. The

TAA was against the trade policy obstacles and barriers. Free trade

supported by principle of the most favoured nation (GATT Article I)

became – year by year - the ideal principle of the foreign trade policy of

nations, promoted namely among advanced (developed) countries – OEEC

members, later OECD14

members. USA became the new bastion – of the

free trade regime as a basis of international trade policy elaborated and

developed in the framework of MTS.

The third pillar of the world economy – MTS became the instrument of

dynamic economic internationalization. Being realized mostly by growth

function of foreign trade of the countries, creating the additional resources

of their economic growth, the growing international trading initiated and

motivated the development of economic theory concentrated on the

international economics area. Analyzing the results and heritage of

Prussian Customs Union (germ.: Preußische Zollverein) existing after 1818,

German Customs Union (germ.: Deutsche Zollverein) functioning after

1834, which assisted a lot to the economic and later political unification of

the German speaking states (1871) and a creation of the unified German

14

Note: OEEC = Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (1948 - 1960)

playing the role of European partner of the U.S.-Canada Marshall plan being

replaced in 1961 by the OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development with membership of non-European countries (USA, Canada,

Japan, Australia, New Zealand... since 1994 Mexico, since 2010 Chile), too.

This organisation was known longtime as an elite club of the most developed

countries, now, since 2010 as G34 – the most recognized economic organization

within the world economy. Slovakia joined OECD on 14 December 2000.

30

Empire (germ.: Deutsches Reich), a functioning of Southern African

Customs Union (SACU) established by London in 1910 as well as the

customs union theory of professor Jacob VINER15

working for the League

of Nations in Geneva, too, and practice of BELUX (1921) and BENELUX

later (1944), the researchers developed the theory of international

economic integration.

Dutch Professor Jan TINBERGEN, the first European Nobel prize

winner in economic science (1969) "for having developed and applied

dynamic models for the analysis of economic processes",16

underlined the

potential of international trading and trade liberalization process in his

book “International Economic Integration” (Amsterdam: Elsevier 1953).

American Professor of Hungarian origin Béla BALASSA presented the

“Theory of Economic Integration” (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. IRWIN

1961) and the basic cathegory “international economic integration” as a

process and as a state. His presentation of the definitions of a free trade

area, a custom union, a common market, an economic union as well as a

complete economic integration was a perfect and until now recognized

contribution to the scientific characterization of this relatively new

international economic process being developed in the international

economic practice in characterized stages gradually (ŃÍBL – ĈIDEROVÁ

2002a).

In today´s European Union and other functioning integration units

(EFTA, MERCOSUR, AFTA, NAFTA, EEU, etc.17

), the first four stages of

international economic integration were approved by economic practice.

15

Note: Jacob VINER presented an analysis of customs unions functioning and

impacts: trade creation and trade diversion. See: VINER, J. (1950): The Custom

Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1950.

Chapter 4. 16

See: All Prizes in Economic Sciences. [Cit. 11.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.nobelprize.org/ nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/>.

17

Note: EFTA = European Free Trade Association (established in 1960), ASEAN

= Association of South-East Asian Nations (established in 1967), MERCOSUR

= Southern Common Market (established in 1991), AFTA = ASEAN Free Trade

Area (established in 1992), NAFTA = North American Free Trade Area

(established in 1994), EEU = Eurasian Economic Union (established in 2014).

31

About 90% of existing preferential regional trade agreements18

are linked

with free trade area creation, the most of them are bilateral ones. This

BALASSA´s complete economic integration (BALASSA´s theoretical 5th

stage) represents the completing final phase of the process of economic

union19

building (theoretical 4th stage), not a special integration stage. The

higher integration level than economic and monetary union, it is an

international political integration yet. It is called “political union” (ŃÍBL

2006). In Europe, an idea of the “United States of Europe” was developed

and discussed several times during the last century. One of the last authors

of this USE concept was the former Vice President of European

Commission and Commissioner for Justice and Fundamental Rights (until

30 October 2014) Viviane REDING of Luxembourg.20

18

Note: In 2015, there are approximately 400 preferential regional trade agreements

(RTAs).RTAs have become increasingly prevalent since the early 1990s. As of

7 April 2015, some 612 notifications of RTAs (counting goods, services and

accessions separately) had been received by the GATT/WTO. Of these, 406

were in force. These WTO figures correspond to 449 physical RTAs (counting

goods, services and accessions together), of which 262 are currently in force.

What all RTAs in the WTO have in common is that they are reciprocal trade

agreements between two or more partners.See: Regional Trade Agreements.

[Cit. 10.3.2015.] Available at <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/

region_e.htm>. 19

Note: In European integration since 1980s, the term „Economic and Monetary

Union“ is used for this fourth stage of international economic integration

(BALASSA´s economic union) underlining the sensitivity and complexity of

a creation and a complete building of the monetary part of economic union.EU

Economic and Monetary Union was established during 1990s and the single

European currency euro (EUR) was firstly issued in the form of banknotes and

coins and distributed into the circulation on 1 January 2002 among the

population of 12 EU member countries. This eurozone has now 19 members.

Slovakia joined EMU fully on 1 January 2009.

20

See: REDING, V. (2012): A powerful vision for our future. Why we now need a

United States of Europe. Brussels: EC 2012. [Cit. 10.11.2014.] Available at

<http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/use_en.pdf>.

32

2.2 International economic integration – the new form of an intensive economic internationalization in the globalization era

The most valuable and longterm positive gains in the postwar

international economic relations´ progressive development was impacted by

the successful negotiating and finally signing the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade in Geneva in 1947. The GATT implementation in the

practice and an increasing of its signatories (since 23 to 123 in 1994)

represented a new quality of external factors influencing and motivating the

national economies to be more open and more cooperative.

Twenty three trade policy expert teams of the participating countries

decided by this new approach in international trade policy to create a new

internationally important and perspectively globally functioning system of

principles and rules of international trading. It was a very important step,

really historical. More then 40 thousand customs concesions were reached

during this first multilateral negotiations Geneva round in 1947.21

The MTS was created and is valid as well as functioning from 1948. It

was not an institutionalized MTS as was predicted by the U.S. project of

International Trade Organization from the beginning but was a temporary

system. The GATT played this role during a period of more than four

decades - since 1948 until 1994.

Naturally, the first postwar year´s increase of the world trade value (in

export as well as in import) was impressive: 50%, being followed by other

interesting increasing of the world trade value in 1947 by 22%. The MTS

orientation to trade facilitation and liberalization influenced positively the

increasing of the world trade value as well as volume during following

years, too. During 55 years until 2000 – the end of the 20th century as well

as of the second millenium – the world trade development was impacted

21

See also: BENEŃ, O. (1988): Všeobecná dohoda o clech a obchodu – GATT.

Praha: ĈSOPK 1988.

33

only by two more important crisis22

but not comparable with the Great

Depression of the 1930s. It was more or less a sustainable growth of the

international exchange of goods and services.

This positive development was sustainably impacted by the new

phenomenon in then international relations – international economic

integration (IEI), too. Béla BALASSA linked this process with an

elimination of existing customs tariffs and the other trade barriers and

obstacles, describing firstly two stages of trade integration – free trade area

and customs union.23

But a common market – an economic policy regime

being characterized by four basic economic integration freedoms (not only

by the free movement of goods as trade integration), being characterized as

the third theoretical as well as practical stage of IEI,24

represented the

higher level of economic motivation for researchers as well as for

practitioners and integration supporters, too. The journalists used the term

„common market countries“ for 6 members – founders of the European

Economic Community in the period of the customs union building (1958 -

1968) as well as later. We know the idea of a common market (new

modified term: single market - approved to use during the 1980s) was

realized in the practice of the European Communities only at the end of

1992.

He compared the classic international economic cooperation, being

linked with the negotiations on trade facilitation and decreasing of existing

barriers level influencing positively the trading between negotiating parties,

with this new phenomenon of IEI, being linked with a total elimination of

this non acceptable discrimination on the borders. He considered the

22

Note: The world trade development was impacted for the first time since 1945 by

important crisis only during the first petroleum shock (1973 - 1975). It led to

a creation of a global coordination group G6 (1975 – USA, Japan, Great Britain,

Germany, France, Italy) in Paris, being transformed to G7 in 1976 (an accession

of Canada) and to G8 in 1997 (an accession of Russia). The second petroleum

shock (1979 – 1981/82) impacted negatively the development of the world

trade, too. 23

Note: The definitions of a free trade area as well as a customs union were

presented in the basic text of the new temporary MTS: in the GATT Article

XXIV in 1947 (as well as in the GATT´94 Article XXIV). 24

See: BALASSA, B. (1966): Teorie ekonomické integrace. Praha: Svoboda 1966,

p. 25-26, 235-256. SAC 25-124-66.

34

customs tariffs and their functions and impacts on the trading process and

the whole economies as a classic disrimination case (BALASSA 1966)

limitating the growth and prosperity of the nations.

The international economic integration was considered not only as the

„labelling“ for the very open and strongly cooperative national economies

(within the integration units) and something typical for an era of an

intensively growing international trading25

but as the new form of an

intensive economic internationalization such typical for the globalization

era (ŃÍBL – ĈIDEROVÁ 2002b). The IEI process created a much stronger

and deeper interdependence in international relations of the postwar period.

Within the integration units (groupings) there was and is the most intensive

and the deepest reached level of an economic liberalization process. The

economic relations between the companies of two members of integration

unit were developing in the framework of the same system of conditions as

there had within one national economy system.

But the existing integration groupings did not represented the closed

economic systems. They wanted to be stronger and stronger, larger and

larger, relatively open and parallelly with the processes of integration

deepening and integration widening, the enlargement process of these

integration units as well as a flexible exogeneous integration, aiming for

and supporting a creation of a stable and cooperative neighbourhood, were

realized, too.

The dominant centers of economic power (G2 of the second part of the

20th century – USA and European Communities) tried to build step by step,

enlargement by enlargement – an influencial and perspectively

dominant continental economic complexes.26

The Russian Federation tried

25

See. TINBERGEN, J. (1953): International Economic Integration. Amsterdam:

Elsevier 1953. 26

Note: EU realized during the four decades several enlargement waves: 1973 –

Northern enlargement, 1981 – Hellenic enlargement, 1986 – Iberic enlargement,

1995 – EFTA enlargement, 2004 and 2007 – Central Eastern Europe and

Mediterranean enlargement and 2013 – Croatian enlargement. Mainstream

European integration unit initiated a creation of the higher order integration of

two integration units (EU + EFTA) in European Economic Area 1992 – 1994.

There are several examples of the EU flexible exogeneous integrations on

a customs union level (Turkey, Andorra, San Marino, Monaco) as well as on

a free trade area level (Korea – functioning, Singapore – negotiations

35

to reintegrate the disintegrated Soviet economy after 1991 and to create an

important Euro-Asian economic complex: firstly in the framework of 12 ex-

Soviet economies and states being named the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), later in the framework of a new project of a

customs union creation. The first framework for this customs union was

created by EurAsEC (Eurasian Economic Community). The trilateral

customs union of EurAsEC (Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan) was established in

July 2010. At the end of May 2014, Astana trilateral summit of the

EurAsEC approved a transformation of this integration unit into a new:

Eurasian Economic Union (EEU),27

being promised by then prime

minister Vladimir PUTIN during his presidential campaign 2011-2012. The

Astana Treaty establishing the EEU came into efect on 1 January 2015.

The African patriots decided to transform the Organization of African

Unity (OAU) into a continental African integration unit. The African

Union, imitating the European Union experience as well as an internal

organizational structure, was born in 2001.

IEI is a very dynamic process and namely during the 1990s and 2000s it

reached a lot of successes, dynamic developments and inspirations.

terminated, other ASEAN members, India, GCC, MERCOSUR – being

negotiated) and there is an ongoing negotiation process on a creation of the

biggest free trade area within the world economy – EU-USA in the framework

of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). USA signed

firstly CUSFTA with Canada (1988), later NAFTA (included Mexico, too in

1992). It led to the project elaboration of FTAA (Free Trade Area of the

Americas – a free trade project for 34 Western hemisphere countries) negotiated

(1994 - 2005) and interrupted later. Now, during the second decade of the 21st

century U.S. have intention to contribute to a creation of two globally important

big free trade areas: one under the umbrella of TTIP and the second in the

framework of negotiated TPP (Transpacific Partnership) with 11 U.S. Asia-

Pacific partners: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,

New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. 27

Note: The Astana Treaty establishing the EEU was signed on 29 May 2014. On

the second day of its existance (January 2, 2015) Armenia joined EEU and

Kyrgyzstan membership was planned to be relized in May 2015. On May 21,

2015 with a signature, Kyrgyz President Almazbek ATAMBAYEV committed

his country at last to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.

36

2.3 European integration – the most experienced and the most recognized process of international economic integration within the world economy and community

The oldest concept of European integration was elaborated in Great

Britain at the end of the 1930s. The London based Federal Union NGO

elaborated the first draft of the European constitution and was aiming for

a post war large Pan-European free trade area creation including the Soviet

Union membership.

But the first successful integration project was elaborated in France by

Jean MONNET, being supported by the 7th post war prime minister (1947-

48) and later minister of foreign affaires of the country Robert SCHUMAN.

These two men became the „fathers“ of integrated Europe.

The first project (1951-52) of a new French-German post war peaceful

economic and political cooperation – European Coal and Steel Community

(ECSC)– contributed a lot to the next several successful integration steps

and led not only to a setting up the other integration community

concentrated only to one but perspective and important part of an energy

sector: European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) but definitely to

a creation of the first European integration block being a complex

integration model.

Both ECSC and Euratom were the exemples of sectoral integration.

Namely a successful functioning of ECSC contributed a lot to a large and

general acceptance of a new IEI process vision in European continent.

From todays assessment, it was quite long28

historical process. At its

beginning, it was an integration of small neighbouring countries –

28

Note: If we decide to consider for the starting point of European integration this

famous day of March 25, 1957 – linking with a signing of the Treaty

establishing European Economic Community – European mainstream

integration´ age is 58 years now (the closest position to the main official

historical approach of the Brussels EU institution), if we recognize this

historical moment in 1951 – an establishment of the first European modern

integration unit (of sectoral integration only...) by a signing of the first Treaty

37

monarchies of the North part of our continent, having some specific

historical linkages in case of BELUX as well as of BENELUX.

The perfect functioning of this successful experiment during the first

years of the customs union existance (BENELUX: 1948 - 1957) influenced

Jean MONNET and Robert SCHUMAN to try to realize the same

experiment with a participation of much stronger economies (France, West

Germany29

and Italy), the national economic complexes with much higher

potential for an economic development potentially being accelerated in the

framework of an integration process.

This process was firstly based on the experiment and the experience of

an integration of only two but then very important sectors of economy (coal

and steel ones), important for both civil as well as defense sectors of the

countries, selected by Jean MONNET and his team (at the Paris based

General Commissariat of Planning established by Charles de GAULLE

government immediately after the WWII termination in 1945 in order to

recover the French national economy).

This sectoral integration of ECSC allowed to think seriously after

several years about a complex integration project with a participation of all

6 cooperating European countries yet. And EEC accompanied by Euratom,

other sectoral integration being set up in March 1957, too, was a base for

a long term development of an established complex integration unit, aiming

to integrate all and complete 6 economic complexes, not only several

sectors of the economies of these countries.

establishing European Coal and Steel Community, EU´ s age is 64 years in

2015, but identifying the beginning of European integration with BELUX´

setting up (1921), this process of European integration continuity from a

bilateral unit of Belgium and Luxembourg, developing from a monetary union

to a customs union and an economic union, later to trilateral dimension with the

Netherlands (BENELUX 1944) and finally to a sixtlateral dimension of the EEC

(1957), the European mainstream integration process´ historical line is long

nearly one century (94 years, in 2015). 29

Note: Since 1949, in the territory of occupied Germany, two states were set up:

the Federal Republic of Germany – in Western part of the German territory, and

the German Democratic Republic in Eastern reduced side of the territory of

former Great German Empire, being created from the post war Soviet

occupation zone.

38

For EEC strategists the final target of this process was a reaching the

„four basic economic integration freedoms regime“ in the practice of their

6 economies being integrated together, creating parallelly the basic pillars of

the future international economic complex (TAUCHMAN, 1971; FILIP,

1976; FILIP, 2005). So, a strategic EEC goal was a creation of the common

market.

A project of a customs union creation on a basis of perfectly functioning

BENELUX customs union since 1948 served as a tactical one, creating a

free trade policy regime being identified with the first basic integration

freedom – free movement of goods, representing a key element for the

integration continuity oriented to a reaching the strategic EEC goal. It was

one of the most successful of all integration projects in nowadays EU

history being terminated 1.5 year earlier as was planned.

The next period of European integration was not so successful as the

customs union building. The common market project was much more

comprehensive and complicated than was predicted at the beginning (in

Rome). The approved deadline was the year of 1980.

But at the beginning of the 1980s, the European integration process was

in a very special state of „Eurosclerosis“. Officially, there were the

optimistic statements and assessments but in reality, the national

governments approved and implemented a lot of economic policy

instruments of evidently disintegration character.

The EU legislation (acquis communautaire system) including the

sanctions was needed. Fortunately, the new President of European

Commission, former French minister of finance, Jacques DELORS, invited

the experts to prepare the analyses on the cost of Non-Europe as well as on

a completion of European single market.30

30

Note: Non-Europe – a term for a regulated disintegration process, single market –

it was a new name for this not very successful project of the common market

creation being identified with „Eurosclerosis“ period. The basic analytical paper

supporting its building, it was „White Paper on a completion of internal

market“. The second one: the CECCHINI Report: „The Cost of Non-Europe in

the Single Market“. The report headed by Paolo CECCHINI of European

Commission estimated that completing the Single Market would contribute

significantly to economic growth and consumer welfare within the then-

European Communities. New 2014 PATAKI report estimates that completing

39

The SEA contained the sanctions aspects of integration agreements

among the member states, too, and contributed enormously to the

completion of this originally strategic aim of EEC and the 1957 Rome

summit. It identified all details of the process of a completion of the regime

of 4 basic economic integration freedoms as well as the obligations and

responsabilities of the member countries.

The single market level of European integration was reached basically at

the end of 1992. It was a goal of the DELORS Commission. The decade of

the 1990s was characterized by a very optimistic and entusiastic climat in

Europe (after a peaceful collapse of the bipolar world) as wel as in then

international relations, being favourable for a new integrations setting up.

The European integration process knew several successes, too:

- A single market setting up created the very good conditions for the

higher integration level preparatory process. A creation of an EU

economic and monetary union had the clear plans as well as

criteria (Copenhagen criteria) taking into account basically only

positive circumstances and developments.

- The EU primary acquis system was modified by the new Treaty on

European Union, known as the Maastricht Treaty, too. On

November 1, 1993, EU became the new symbol, „logo“ and the

name of the mainstream European integration, with parallell using

of the „old“ names as European Community (new expression for

this old EEC), European Communities (integrating all three: EC,

Euratom as well as ECSC until its end in July 2002).31

the Single Market would entail economic gains ranging from 651 bilion to 1.1

trilion euro per year, equivalent to a range of 5% to 8,63% of EU GDP. The first

major revision of the Rome Treaty – „Single European Act“ (SEA) was a key

legislation supporting this single market creation in practice, it became an

integral part of the “primary acquis communautaire“ (an EU primary

legislation), being initiated and later approved by DELORS Commission in

February 1986 and coming into effect on 1 July 1987. See also: PATAKI, Z.

(2014): The Cost of Non-Europe in the Single Market. „Cecchini revisited“.

Brussels: EU/EPRS 2014, p. 3. 31

Note: The Paris Treaty establishing ECSC was signed in 1951 and came into

effect in July 1952 for 50 years. That is why ECSC terminated its activities in

July 2002. The ECSC responsabilities and activities linked with both sectors of

coal and steel were absorbed by the concrete organs – the parts of the European

Commission.

40

Figure 1. A Comparison of BALASSA´s International Economic

Integration Theory with the British Approach and the EU Integration

Practice

Note: The BALASSA´s complete economic integration stage is not more

mentioned by economic theory as well as practice. It is possible to consider

it as the highest level of economic and monetary union building in the

integration practice. Great Britain had a very useful experience from

organizing a preferential trading club – the Commonwealth Preference

System (being a result of Ottawa agreements 1932), characterized by

a conventional decreasing of average tariffs level within club members

trading and functioning in the framework of its British Commonwealth of

Nations, being established in 1926.

Legend: * Thanks to opt-out negotiated by the government of M.

THATCHER Great Britain is not obliged to join a monetary part (eurozone)

of the EU Economic and Monetary Union. European Monetary Union

(eurozone) as well as a single European currency – euro – were politically

rejected by the most of British political parties in the 1990s. The City,

London based, one of the most important and globally influential financial

centers of the world economy (parallelly with New York, Zurich and

41

Tokyo), based historically on the British pound, would like to play this role

henceforth. In theory, the British theorists differentiate two stages of this

high level of international economic integration: an economic union as Béla

BALASSA and separately a monetary union, too. But BALASSA

understood the monetary union as an integral part of the economic union. **

European Communities (at the beginning: European Economic Community

in 1958) started their integration process by enlarging the perfectly

functioning customs union of BENELUX (1948 - 1957). The sixtlateral

customs union, it was a very successful process, being completed 1.5 year

earlier than it was planned and predicted (1970). Nowadays EU customs

union is assessed and considered as one of the most successful European

integration projects. Based on the common commercial policy of all EU

members and on its basic instrument – TARIC 32

(EU common external

tariff), this customs union is functioning perfectly for more than 47 years

yet (2015). After the international economic integration completion there is

a higher form of integration but political one, not economic. The theorists

named it a political union.33

- The Luxembourg and following Oslo processes of ECs-EFTA

cooperation (started in Luxembourg in 1984) was finally

successfuly terminated by the Oporto Agreement on European

Economic Areabeing signed by 12 ECs (since 1993 EU) countries

and 7 EFTA members on May 2, 1992, creating the higher order

integration in Europe (integration of two integration units). EFTA

countries became integrated to the EU on the levels of a free trade

area and a common (single) market. The Swiss referendum on EEA

membership held in December 1992 was not successful, but later

negotiations led to the special Swiss model of integration being

realized on a basis of 17 bilateral sectoral agreements - BSAs

32

Note: TARIC (from French „le tarif intégré communautaire“ – is the name of the

EU common external tariff, the key element of customs union integration stage

functioning. 33

Note: Nowadays European Union is not only an economic integration model in

practice but has several elements of political integration, too: European

parliament and direct elections of its deputies, election of the president of

European Council, common foreign and security policy, developing of a new

EU diplomacy, etc. That is why all theorists now concentrate naturally on both

economic as well as political integration elements and aspects of the European

integration development.

42

(including FTA of 1972, 7 BSAs of 2002 and 9 BSAs negotiated

and agreed in 2004 as well as approved by one partial referendum

needed in 2005).

- The process of a deepening of Transatlantic Partnership was

started in 1990 by the Transatlantic summit and its Transatlantic

Declaration. It was accompanied by the ideas as Transatlantic

Free Trade Area (TAFTA) or Transatlantic Market (TAM), in

2013 being preprared for realization in negotiations on an

agreement on Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

(TTIP) between EU and USA, creating potentially the largest free

trade area within the world economy.

- After the collapse of the bipolar world, EU was preparing for the

new enlargements having several new candidates from EFTA – the

parallell European integration unit, as well as from former

COMECON (CMEA)34

– the third European integration unit. After

EFTA enlargement (1995 – Austria, Finland and Sweden) the EU

was transformed into EU 15, after two phases of the next Central

Eastern European and Mediterranean enlargement, realized in

2004 and 2007, EU 15 was enlarged to the EU 25 and later EU 27

dimension.35

The last 2013 enlargement (Croatian) gave to EU

a dimension of 28 member countries (states). Croatia became the

second ex-Yugoslavian nation joining EU after Slovenia (2004).

- The process of a deep EU cooperation and trade integration with

Mediterranean countries (Barcelona process) started at the end of

1995 too, parallelly with an incresing of the level of integration with

Turkey (from free trade area since 1970 to the customs union level

since 1995/96). But Turkey-EU integration is a flexible exogeneous

integration (without an EU membership). Since 1999, Turkey is an

EU candidate country (officially) and since 2005, EU-Turkey

negotiation process on future membership has continued.

34

Note: COMECON was a name for CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic

Assistance) – an opposition wave of European integration (1971 - 1991), being

used in Western countries. This socialiste economic integration was based on

the Comprehensive programme approved by Moscov CMEA summit in 1971.

CMEA as international economic cooperation organisation (balancing OEEC

and later OECD establishing) was established in 1949 in Moscow. 35

Note: In 2004, the following Central Eastern European countries joined EU:

Slovenia, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and

two Mediterranean island countries: Malta and Cyprus. In 2007, Bulgaria and

Romania, both the Eastern Balkans countries.

43

- EU negotiated and signed the first Partnership and Cooperation

Agreement (PCA) with Russia (1994, coming into force in 1997),

later with Ukraine, Moldova and other ex-Soviet republics, too.

Since 2004, there is a framework of the Common Economic Space

between EU and Russia (including an energy sector). In 2014, EU

signed three association agreements (including deep and

comprehensive free trade agreements - DCFTA) with EU Eastern

Partnership countries (Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova).

- During this Jacques DELORS golden decade (1985 - 1995), EU

prepared criteria, conditions as well as institutional framework for

the next integration higher level – the highest stage of IEI –

economic amd monetary union. In 2002, the first 12 EU member

countries started to use euro banknotes and euro coins, including the

Hellenic Republic.

European Union knew not only the successes but the serious problems as

„Eurosclerosis“ period (1970s and the early 1980s) linked with a common

market building as well as a serious eurozone crisis as an impact of both

internal and external factors (internal heterogeneity after several

enlargements and global economic crisis impacts after September 2008),

too.

But European mainstream integration in general and European Union

concretely are representing the most experienced and recognized integration

unit within the world economy, being the perfect example and core of the

forming much larger European Continental Economic Complex, creating

actively a system of integration linkages and networks, parallelly with

a motivating interdependence with its partners economies of EFTA, Eastern

European as well as Southern and South-Eastern partners economies, too.

It served and still serves (in the key areas and stages of IEI) as an

example for other integration projects as well as existing integration units of

other continents (ASEAN in South-East Asia, MERCOSUR as well as

UNASUR in South America, African Union – AU in African continent,

EEU in ex-Soviet Euro-Asia, etc.) within the phenomenon being called

44

(named) the global economic integration.36

It is a network of an

institutional integration as well as of a functional integration existing,

functioning and developing in global dimension as a very important

phenomenon of a globalization process in the 21st century.

Together, it is represented by a global system of more or less 400

elements.The most of elements of this global integration network are the

elements of functional integration – the bilateral free trade areas (90%) and

customs unions (7%). They are functioning on a basis of the bilateral free

trade agreements (FTAs) and the customs union agreements (CUAs). This

small part of the agreements is represented by the agreements on services.37

EU Customs Union is functioning perfectly for more than 47 years (in

2015). Its Common Commercial Policy is an example for other European

common policies. And its basic instrument – TARIC - is a recognized and

useful instrument of the transparent and very well functioning European

system of principles and rules of the external trade of European Union,

being a strong pillar of EU internal market, too.

The large EU Internal Market respresenting this BALASSA´s common

market IEI stage38

or DELORS´s single market form of European IEI

vision and practice of 1980s and 1990s39

and operational since the end of

1992/beginning of 1993, is functioning in the European integration practice,

too, and is permanently rebuilding (in the linkages with the new EU

enlargements as well as with the developments at the international markets

and their impacts on EU economy in the framework of a new knowledge

based economy and society).

36

See: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2006): Global Europe: Competing in the

World. A Contribution to the EU´s Growth and Jobs Strategy. [COM(2006) 567

final.] Brussels: 4 October 2006, p. 3. 37

See: Regional Trade Agreements. [Cit. 10.3.2015.] Available at

<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e /region_e/region_e.htm>. 38

See: BALASSA, B. (1966): Teorie ekonomické integrace. Praha: Svoboda 1966,

pp. 25-26, 235-256. SAC 25-124-66. 39

See: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1985): Completing the Internal Market.

[White Paper from the Commission to the European Council. Milan, 28-29 June

1985.COM (85) 310 final.] Brussels: EC 14 June 1985. See also: Single

European Act. Brussels: EC 1986, 1987.

45

EU Economic and Monetary Union is not functioning perfectly

(without any problems and complications) since it was impacted strongly by

global economic crisis after 2008 developments in the world economy, but

it is still the sole existing example of economic union (or economic and

monetary union), this final stage of IEI in the practice of international

relations in the 21st century.

Now, it is still facing the impacts of this never ended Hellenic crisis. The

EMU system is still under evolution, development and adaptation to the new

trends of the international financial relations and the international monetary

system existing within the world economy. The euro (EUR), a single

European currency, is internationally as well as globally recognized and

largely used parallelly with the global reserve currency – US dollar.

2.4 Forming a large European Economic Continental Complex and the similar tendencies in other continents

During more than four decades (since 1973), nowadays EU

was enlarged several times: the first enlargement (Northern): Great

Britain, Danmark, Ireland (1.1.1973); the second (Hellenic): Greece

(1.1.1981); the third (Iberic): Spain, Portugal (1.1.1986); the fourth

(EFTA): Austria, Sweden, Finland (1.1.1995); the fifth (Central

Eastern European and Mediterranean): 1. phase: Slovenia, Poland,

Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,

Cyprus (1.5.2004); 2. phase: Bulgaria, Romania (1.1.2007); the sixth

(Croatian): Croatia (1.7.2013).

Now, there are 6 official EU candidate countries (EU CCs):

Turkey (since 1999), Macedonia (2005), Monte Negro, Iceland (both

2010), Serbia (2012) and Albania (2014). For the next 2.5 year, an

additional enlargement is not predicted by Jean-Claude JUNCKER,

a new elected President of European Commission since 1 November

2014.

EU enlargement process is a very important factor, probably

the key one, for a meaningful initiating of the process of creation of

the international economic complex as a result of IEI process in our

46

continent not only in dimension of EU member countries (now EU 28

dimension), but in wider dimension. The other factors supporting this tendency are existing and developing in

the framework of several different forms of a flexible EU exogeneous

integration. This one is an integration of EU non-member country

(countries) with European Union on one or two levels (stages) of IEI –

basically now, on a free trade area level but there are an exemptions, too:

- The European Economic Area functioning as the higher order

integration of two existing European integration units (EU +

EFTA) with a small modification (adopting the special Swiss model

of integration after the negative result of the Swiss referendum on

the Swiss EEA membership on 6 December 1992). EEA now = EU

+ EFTA – CH (Switzerland). EFTA 3 (Norway, Iceland and

Liechtenstein) as well as Switzerland are integrated with EU on the

level of a free trade area and a common market (See: Figure 2, EU

and EFTA column).

- Integrating the Turkish economy with EU by implementing the

Customs Union Agreement (CUA) since the end of 1995 /

beginning of 1996. The similar form of the flexible exogeneous

integration with EU are represented by the cases of San Marino,

Monaco and Andorra integration.

- A similar form of the flexible exogeneous integration, but on free

trade level is represented by EMFTA project (still not realized)40

for

supporting the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in the

framework of Barcelona process since the end of 1995 and now, in

the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM 42). The

conventional basis of this project is represented by the Euro-

Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA).

- The project CEFTA II being linked with the South-Eastern region

of our continent (namely with Western Balkans) had the very

40

Note: EMFTA – Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area – was presented as an

economic pillar of Barcelona process since the end of 1995 and was planned to

be realized until 2010. This project was not successful. Now, there are several

MENA region countries of really, very high level of unstability, namely Libya

and Syria.

47

similar aspects and aims, too. The most successful of former

CEFTA II members (as well as of CEFTA I,41

located in Central

Europe) is Croatia, the newest full EU member since 1 July 2013.

As a result of the developments in former Yugoslavian territory

(civic war´s tragedies), the basic conventional instrument of this

potential flexible exogeneous integration, elaborated by EU experts

and aiming to assist a basic FTA integration with EU, is a

Stabilization and Asociation Agreement (SAA).

- The similar project was linked with a setting up of the EU Eastern

Partnership initiative (May 2009) aiming at the strengthening of

trade and economic relations with several ex-Soviet republics

(Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan).

The new Association Agreements (AAs) including Deep and

Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) were signed in

Brussels on June 27, 2014 with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

There are still the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements

(PCAs) of the end of 1990s valid for other ex-Soviet nations trade

and economic relations development with EU, including EU-Russia

relations. Russian national economic complex was identified as one

of the most important, strategic globally for EU.42

41

Note: CEFTA I (Central European Free Trade Agreement) was a result of the

Central European summit of four Visegrád group countries (V4) in Cracovia

(Krakow) in Poland in 1992. After joining EU in May 2004 (V4 countries and

Slovenia, all CEFTA parties), the other CEFTA parties as Bulgaria and Croatia

continued under an umbrella of the new CEFTA II, being located in the Western

Balkans region (including Kosovo) plus Moldova. The new CEFTA Secretariat

was established. It is located in Brussels. 42

See: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2006): Global Europe: Competing in the

World. A Contribution to the EU´s Growth and Jobs Strategy. [COM(2006) 567

final.] Brussels: 4 October 2006, p. 9.

48

Figure 2. Forming European Economic Continental Complex

Legend: AAs – association agreements, AEEA – Agreement on

European Economic Area, BSAs – bilateral sectoral agreements, CH –

Confédération helvétique = Swiss Confederation, CIS – Commonwealth of

Independent States, CM – common market, CU – customs union, CUA –

customs union agreement, DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade

Agreement (in practice: Area), EaP – Eastern Partnership, ECs – European

Communities, EEA – European Economic Area, EEU – Eurasian Economic

Union, EFTA – European Free Trade Association, EMAAs – Euro-

Mediterranean association agreements, EMFTA – Euro-Mediterranean Free

Trade Area, EMU – economic and monetary union / European Monetary

Union (eurozone), FTA protocole – protocole to the Free Trade Agreement,

FTA – free trade area, GE – Georgia, IM – internal market, MD – Moldova,

SAA – stabilization and association agreements, SM – single market, TR –

Turkey, UA – Ukraine.

All these EU activities, European Economic Area as well as all

mentioned forms of the flexible exogeneous integration, are linked with:

- a deeper trade and economic cooperation of one non-member

country with European Union,

- later with an association, a mutual free trade regime creation,

- later with a potential status of an EU candidate country,

49

- later -negotiating country

- and finally the future European Union member.

An original mainstream European integration grouping – European

Economic Community – was a perfect example of a model of homogeneous

integration. All member states were more or less on the same economic

development level (the OECD members – an elite club of advanced or

developed countries). There were able to reach all integration stages

together – stage by stage - in the same moment. The situation in European

mainstream IEI was changed namely after the Hellenic enlargement of

European Communities was realized in 1981.

This enlarged integration unit (ECs 10) became a model of

heterogeneous integration. More and more (thanks to the next Iberic

enlargement being realized in 1986 as well as thanks to the Central Eastern

European and Mediterranean enlargement in 2004 and 2007 and the

Croatian enlargement in 2013).

A creation of the large European Economic Continental Complex

became the priority No. 1 for European strategists, not a forming of an

integration block – a homogeneous integration model in the practice.

Of course, this heterogeneity of member economies (it is still first of all

an IEI... but with the strengthened political features adopted during several

last decades) can have not permanently only positive or neutral impact on

the integration process development. The Hellenic crisis, lasting for several

years yet and still representing a very topical – really daily issue, is a very

good example of it.

The forming a large economic continental complex is a very

comprehensive process. It is possible to monitor and assess the similar

trends to be realized in the practice of international economic relations in

American continent (a development from CUSFTA 1988, NAFTA 1994 and

the FTAA project), in South America (a development from CAN,

MERCOSUR to the UNASUR project realization since May 2008), in

Eastern Asia (a development from ASEAN, APT, a new EAS43

since 2005

43

Note: APT = ASEAN + 3 (ASEAN Plus Three), an pro-integration forum since

1997. EAS = East Asia Summit, a continuity of former APT since 2005. Now,

in a dimension of ASEAN + 8.

50

in dimension ASEAN+6 and since 2011 ASEAN+8, including Russia and

USA) as well as in Africa (African Union, parallelly developed with several

regional African integration groupings – from Southern African Customs

Union – SACU, in the South of the continent – firstly since 1910, to the

Union of Arab Maghreb – UAM, in African North-West - 1989).

In America, it was namely Peterson Institute for International Economics

in Washington, D.C. and its Director C. Fred BERGSTEN (1981 - 2012),

sustainably developing new and new projects supporting the idea of the

large American (Western hemisphere) integration creation.

From Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area (CUSFTA) based on the

REAGAN-MULRONEY agreement (January 1988), to an enlarged

trilateral integration NAFTA (being signed in December 1992 in

dimension USA-Canada-Mexico, coming into effect on January 1,

1994), to be followed by a „bridge“ integration 2005 CAFTA 7

(Central America Free Trade Area) enlarging this integrated area

from U.S. economy to 6 Central American states, too (Guatemala,

Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Salvador and Caribbean

Dominican Republic) and approaching the area of the South America,

to the final project of establishing the Pan-American integration

FTAA 34 (Free Trade Area of the Americas)44

under the umbrella of

the Organization of American States (OAS).

44

Note: FTAA project was prepared by American strategists and trade policy

experts for 34 countries of all „Americas“ (Northern, Central, Caribbean as well

as Southern).

51

Figure 3 The Structure of the World Economy and Community

Source: KOSÍR, I.: Ukraine and European Integration Process. In

ROUET, G. – TEREM, P. (eds.): Ukraine entre l´intégration et le voisinage.

Voisinages Européens. Vol. 4. [Colloque international franco-slovaco-

ukrainien „Ukraine entre l´intégration et le voisinage“, Université de

Tchernivtsi, Ukraine 11-12 June 2008.] Bruxelles: Bruylant 2009, p. 87.

ISBN 978-2-8027-2867-2.

Legend: Model was updated to the situation of May 2015: G40 is

represented advanced (developed) countries, 34 OECD members, 5

members of global coordination group BRICS as wel as Singapore, one of

the most competitive national economies (SCHWAB 2014, p. 13). G48 is

representing a group of the least developed countries (LDCs) within the

world economy identified by UNO permanently. They are the poorest

developing countries (DCs). In the framework of all DCs there are newly

industrialized countries (NICs), too. NICs represent the most successful

DCs in industrialization process. A special group of dynamically growing

national economies is known as the new global coordination group BRICS

– Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Namely China and India

52

are considered as very perspective globally. During 2001 – 2008 period it

was only a virtual quadrilateral group BRICs identified by Jim O´NEILL of

Goldman Sachs (O´NEILL 2001). EU represents now a developing model

of heterogeneous international economic integration. EU7 – they are the

new EU members (Malta, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania,

Croatia) but not OECD members parallelly (not yet). From 28 EU members

there are 21 OECD members parallelly (original EU15 before 2004

enlargement + Visegrád group + Slovenia + Estonia). There are now 6 EU

candidate countries (EU CCs). Two of them are OECD members since the

first year of its activities – 1961 (Turkey and Iceland). Additional four EU

CCs are located in Western Balkans (Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and

Albania). Among nations of top mini-pyramid there are all B4WT members

(Big Four of the World Trade): China, European Union including its leader

of foreign trade activities – Germany, USA and Japan (International trade

statistics 2014, p. 29). G40 including the second most competitive economy

- Singapore and EU7 countries are building knowledge society and

economy, the countries of the middle of the pyramid - the most of the DCs

– are building industrial society and economy, the poorest DCs – LDCs –

they are still living with a heritage of agricultural society and economy.

The UNASUR establishment as an enlarged higher order integration

unit (UNASUR = MERCOSUR + CAN (two integrations) + Chile +

Guyana + Suriname) in May 2008 in Brasília is possible to assess as

a reaction of Southern American states to the U.S.´ FTAA project.

UNASUR45

is integrating all 12 countries of this part of Western

hemisphere and Brazil is playing the role of a natural leader. Its SAFTA

project means a creation of the South American Free Trade Area until 2019.

Basically, it will be a free trade area between two customs unions

(MERCOSUR and CAN). There is also a Latin American integration too,

being logically larger than South American one. It was represented by

45

Note: CAN – Andean Community of Nations (span.: Comunidad Andina de

Naciones), a quadrilateral customs union (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and

Bolivia). UNASUR – Union of South American Nations (span.: Unión des

Naciones Suramericanas), an enlarged higher order integration of CAN 4 +

MERCOSUR 5 (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela) + Chile,

Guyana and Suriname.

53

LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Area) since the Treaty of Montevideo

signing in 1960. In 1980, LAFTA was reorganized into the Latin American

Integration Association (LAIA), with a membership of Mexico, Panama and

Cuba, too.46

The biggest progress in economic continental complex creation was

reached in Europe. There were several other projects supporting this long

term aim. For example, then President of European Commission Romano

PRODI declared on May 17, 2001 in occassion of the Moscow Russia-EU

summit together with Vladimir PUTIN, President of the Russian Federation,

that EU and Russia agreed on a setting up a Common European Economic

Space (CEES) as well as a Joint High-Level Working group to develop

together this concept.

At the beginning of the new millenium, establishment of this CEES was

generally considered as undoubtedly important both from the perspective of

promotion of Russia´s integration into the world economy and that of

determination of medium-term and long-term prospects of further

cooperation between Russia and the European Union, with EU enlargement

and Russia´s forthcoming accession to the WTO taken into account.

For the European Union, Russia was considered in 2001 as a major

foreign trade partner in absolute terms and presented opportunities for

capitalisation of EU strengths through increased complementarities. EU and

Russia, both globally important parties would like to gain increased

stability, security and economic prosperity from a setting up this CEES. In

2004, following the European and Russian experts recommendations,

a Common Economic Space between EU and Russia was created parallelly

with other three common „spaces“.47

46

Note: LAIA, span.: Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración, ALADI. Former

LAFTA, span.: Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio, ALALC.

47

Note: Russia finally joined WTO on August 22, 2012 after a very long (since

1993), comprehensive and complicated negotiation process. In 2004, parallelly

with CES, a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (CSFSJ),

a Common Space of External Security (CSES) as well as a Common Space of

Research and Education (CSRE, including Culture) were created. The Ukrainian

crisis in 2014 seriously impacted all.

54

A building stable and cooperative relations with all countries of the EU

Northern, Eastern, South-Eastern as well as Southern neighborhood is a part

of EU vision of a peaceful and competitive future. A creation of the large

European Economic Continental Complex including its stable and

cooperative neighbourhood allows and shall allow the integrated Europe to

play a much more important role in the world economy and community.

Prof. Ing. Igor KOSÍR, PhD.

Former Director of the Center for

Strategic Studies of the Slovak Republic

(1992 - 1995) as well as former Vice

Rector for International Cooperation of

Matej Bel University (MBU) in Banská

Bystrica, Slovakia. Graduated from the

Faculty of Commerce at the Bratislava

University of Economics (BUE),

Slovakia – Foreign Trade Economics

Department. He held teaching and

research posts for more than 20 years at

the BUE and its International Trade

Department (he was a Vice Dean of the BUE Faculty of Commerce

for International Cooperation (1991-92). He served in Slovakian state

administration (1992 – 2003): from 1992 until 1995 he was a Director

of the Center for Strategic Studies of the Slovak Republic, he has

been working with the ministries since 1996: the ministry of

economy, agriculture (1997 - 2001) and labour, social affairs and

family (2001 - 2003) as ministerial section´s Director General or

department´s Director for International Cooperation. He was

responsible for negotiations with European Commission during the

EU accession process (in two chapters) as member of the team of then

Slovakian Chief Negotiator Ján FIGEĽ. He was Vice President of the

Committee of Senior Advisors to UNO ECE Governments in Geneva

(1993 - 1995) as well as President of the Council of Europe´

55

Committee for Ministerial Conferences Organizing in Strasbourg

(2001 - 2002). He has teached parallelly at MBU, Bratislava Pan-

European University as well as at the Prague based University of

International and Public Relations. He is a recognized expert on the

theory and practice of international economic integration and world

economy theory. Nowadays, he works at the MBU Faculty of

Political Science and International Relations in Banská Bystrica and

parallelly he is teaching at the Reims Champagne-Ardenne University

in France (EU External relations).

Mgr. Sherif SHEHATA

Graduated from the Faculty of Political

Science and International Relations of

the Matej Bel University in Banská

Bystrica, Slovakia, he also continued to

serve as a diplomat of the Arab Republic

of Egypt as counselor (during several

years in Russia, Hungary, Slovakia and

now in Ukraine). His field of interest and

research is: "The Impact of Egypt´s

Revolution on Its Foreign Policy and

International Relations". At the present,

he is a PhD. candidate at the Department

of International Relations and Diplomacy

of the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at the

MBU Banská Bystrica.

56

Ing. Peter SMERIGA

Graduated from the Końice University,

Slovakia, he also completed the

postgraduate studies at the Faculty of

Political Sciences as well as at the Faculty

of Islamic Studies of the University of

Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. His

field of interest and research is: "Islamic

Phenomenon and European Perspective of

the Western Balkans countries". At the

present, he is a PhD. candidate at the

Department of International Relations and

Diplomacyof the Faculty of Political Science and International

Relations at the MBU Banská Bystrica.

57

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978-80-557-0155-4.

ŃÍBL, D. (2006): Európska únia. Bratislava: Ekonóm 2006. ISBN 80-

225-2179-5.

ŃÍBL, D. – ĈIDEROVÁ, D. (2002a): Analýza výhod a nevýhod ĉlenstva

SR v EÚ. In: Zhodnotenie dopadov vstupu SR do EÚ na výkonnosť a

konkurencieschopnosť slovenskej ekonomiky. Bratislava: Ekonóm 2002, pp.

46 – 52.

ŃÍBL, D. – ĈIDEROVÁ, D. (2002b): Slovenská republika a Európska

únia. Potrebujú sa navzájom? Oĉakávania – výhody – nevýhody. Bratislava:

CEŃ-Eurounion 2002.ISBN 80-88984-11-4.

63

ŃÍBL, D. - ŃAKOVÁ, B. - ĈIDEROVÁ, D. - MIŃKOVIĈOVÁ, D.

(2002): Európska únia: faktografická príruĉka. Bratislava: Ekonóm 2002.

ISBN 80-225-1558-2.

TAUCHMAN, J. (1971): Nástin teorie ekonomického komplexu ve

světové ekonomice. Praha: Academia 1971.

TEREM, P. – RÝSOVÁ, L. – KOSÍR, I. (2008): Integration processes.

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TINBERGEN, J. (1953): International economic integration.

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Brussels - Luxembourg: ECSC-EEC-EAEC, Office for Official Publications

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VINER, J. (1950): The Custom Union Issue. New York: Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace 1950. Chapter 4.

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64

65

3 EU Accession Experience and Perspectives: The Case of Slovakia and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999)1

Denisa ČIDEROVÁ– Brikenë DIONIZI

Abstract: Power as one of central concepts in the area of international

relations may be referred to in terms of geography; demography; impact or

development of economic nature; governance; diplomacy; national identity

or military terms among others. As Béla BALASSA said: “In examining the

recent interest in economic integration, we have yet to comment on the role

of political factors. There is no doubt that – especially in the case of Europe

– political objectives are of great consequence”. Interdependence

comprehensively characterised by the complex interdependence theory is

also illustrated by the theory of an economic complex. European

mainstream integration is representing a forming international economic

complex, one of the world centers of economic power. Moreover, it is

necessary to relate existing model of flexible endogeneous and flexible

1 This chapter results from: scientific research conducted at the Bratislava

University of Economics in the framework of the VEGA project No. 1/1057/12

(Department of International Trade, BUE Faculty of Commerce) titled Solving

the Debt Crisis in a Monetary (not Fiscal) Union and Factors of Future

Deepening of the Crisis in Europe and in Slovakia; Master theses supervised by

Denisa ĈIDEROVÁ: Perspectives of the European External Action Service in

the framework of the Lisbon Treaty (Dominika SRNÁKOVÁ, 2011), and

Representing interests of V4 countries in terms of their Presidencies and the

renewed consensus on enlargement – Western Balkans‟ focus (Beata

FEJESOVÁ, 2013); forthcoming papers: ĈIDEROVÁ, D. – KOVAĈEVIĆ, D.:

“Slovakia and Croatia as „New‟ Member States of the EU: Experiences” and

ĈIDEROVÁ, D. – KOVAĈEVIĆ, D.: “Slovakia and Croatia as „New‟ Member

States of the EU: Perspectives”as well as consultations with Dr. Brikenë

DIONIZI at the Bratislava University of Economics in spring 2014. Associate Professor, Ing. Denisa ĈIDEROVÁ, MA, PhD., University of

Economics in Bratislava, Faculty of Commerce, International Trade

Department, Vice-Rector for Science and Doctoral Studies at the Bratislava

University of Economics (denisa.ciderova@euba.sk).

Dr. Brikenë DIONIZI, University of Shkoder “Luigj Gurakuqi”, Faculty of

Economics, Department of Business Administration (bdionizi@unishk.edu.al).

66

exogeneous integration of the European Union to the formation of the

European Economic Continental Complex (EECC) and the concept of the

Common European Economic Space (CEES). An EU enlargement process

plays a key role in a creation of this mentioned continental model of

intensive cooperation. Certain degree of extra-EU euroisation relates to the

so-called European microstates just like Montenegro, and Kosovo (UNSCR

1244/1999). These Western Balkans countries are at the heart of flexible

endogeneous and flexible exogeneous integration of the European Union.

CEFTA practice and experience as a regional model of trade integration as

wel as the Slovakian European integration experience since 1991 would be

the motivating resources of inspiration for further effort in the way of really

European perspectives.

Keywords: theory of international economic integration; international

organisation; international relations; political unity; interdependence;

theory of an economic complex; EU neighbourhood; complexity of

cooperation; flexible endogeneous integration; flexible exogeneous

integration; stabilization and association process; potential candidate

status;

“In examining the recent interest in economic integration, we have yet to

comment on the role of political factors. There is no doubt that – especially

in the case of Europe – political objectives are of great consequence. The

avoidance of future wars between France and Germany, the creation of a

third force in world politics, and the re-establishment of Western Europe as

a world power are frequently mentioned as political goals that would be

served by economic integration.[2] Many regard these as primary objectives

and relegate economic considerations to second place. No attempt will be

made here to evaluate the relative importance of political economic

considerations. This position is taken, partly because this relationship is not

quantifiable, partly because a considerable degree of interdependence

exists between these factors. Political motives may prompt the first step in

economic integration, but economic integration also reacts on the political

2 Cf.theory of „the third power“ in ŃÍBL et al. (2002), pp. 831-2.

67

sphere; similarly, if the initial motives are economic, the need for political

unity can arise at a later stage.”

Bela BALASSA, reprinted from The Theory of Economic Integration

(Greenwood Press, 1961, notes omitted3). In NELSEN, B. F. – STUBB, A.

(eds.): The European Union – Readings on the Theory and Practice of

European Integration. 3rd

ed. – comprehensively revised and updated.

Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan 2003, p. 183. ISBN 978-1-4039-0422-5.

3.1 Politics meets economics

In his coverage of fifty key thinkers in international relations of the

twentieth century, M. GRIFFITHS addressed the following categories:

realism; liberalism; radical/critical theory; theory of international society;

international organisation; postmodernism; gender and international

relations; historical sociology/theories of the state; and theories of the

nation, though seeking “to show how key thinkers, whilst they can be

usefully slotted into long-standing traditions of thought, are rarely bound by

them” (GRIFFITHS, 1999, p. 43).

Power (P. DRULÁK in KRATOCHVÍL – DRULÁK et al., 2009, pp.

179-82) as one of central concepts in the area of international relations may

be referred to in terms of geography; demography; impact or development

of economic nature; governance; diplomacy; national identity or military

terms among others. Thus, S. STRANGE – whose contribution to the

establishment and development of the international political economy

(examining the political background of economic processes just like the

economic background of political processes) was vital – identified

structural power on the grounds ofthe knowledge structure, the financial

structure, the security structure, and the production structure (GRIFFITHS,

1999, p. 43).4 Furthermore, J. RUPNIK (2007, p. 18) claims “[s]i la

3 For notes cf. e.g. BALASSA, B. (1964): Teoria da integração económica. Estudos

de economia moderna – Clássica editora. Lisboa: Livraria Clássica Editora,

1964 (The Theory of Economic Integration, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961). 4 M. GRIFFITHS (1999, pp. 44-5) further states that S. STRANGE „endorses a

version of balance-of-power diplomacy, arguing that Europeans in particular

68

définition classique du pouvoir est « pour A d‟amener B à faire ce qu‟il ne

ferait pas autrement [reference to S. STRANGE, 1988, p. 24] », on peut

dire que l‟approche européenne correspond plutôt au soft power défini par

Joseph NYE comme la capacité à « amener l‟autre à vouloir ce que vous

voulez » ou la « capacité à façonner les préférences des autres »[reference

to J. NYE, 2004, pp. 2 and 5]”. In contrast with the concept of hard power5,

the European Union (EU) has a potential of a civil power6 model formulated

by J. RUPNIK (2007, p. 21) as follows: “la possibilité pour l‟Union de

promouvoir son propre modèle de « puissance civile » (dépassement des

conflits par le dialogue institutionnalisé des États, l‟interdépendance des

économies et l‟interpénétration des sociétés [reference to P. HASSNER,

1995, pp. 335-354]) dépend en partie de son soft power, c‟est-à-dire de

l‟attrait que l‟UE exerce sur sa périphérie”.

Interdependence comprehensively characterised by the complex

interdependence theory of R. O. KEOHAN and J. S. NYE (1977) is also

illustrated by the theory of an economic complex (ŃÍBL et al., 2002, p. 825;

KOSÍR, 2007a, pp. 19-21) elaborated in the 1960s by J. TAUCHMAN and

later further developed by J. FILIP, Ľ. CIVÍN, and M. ŃIKULA. Moreover,

I. KOSÍR (2007a, p. 22) related his model of flexible endogeneous and

flexible exogeneous integration of the European Union to the formation of

the European Economic Continental Complex (EECC) and the Common

European Economic Space (CEES).

Hence, the issue of “Europe-puissance” vs “Europe-espace” arises,

formulated by L.MACEK (2011, p. 59) as follows: “Évidemment, ces [une

puissance traditionnelle versus une « puissance civile »] clivages existent

must develop a common currency and take much greater responsibility for their

security needs than they have thus far“. 5 Cf. the statement “La capacité de l‟UE à recourir à la force pour maintenir ou

même imposer la paix (hard power) reste limitée comme l‟a démontré la guerre

de dissolution de la Yougoslavie au cours de la décennie 1990.” (RUPNIK,

2007, p. 21) with the current status quo in the neighbourhood of the European

Union. 6 Cf. MACEK (2011), p. 59.

69

indépendamment de la question de l‟élargissement proprement dite. Mais,

une fois encore, les vagues successives d‟adhésion à l‟Union européenne

ont contribué à les accentuer, en bouleversant les rapports de force internes

entre partisans d‟une « Europe-puissance » (sceptiques vis-à-vis de

l‟atlantisme et promoteurs d‟une puissance autonome, sinon rivale des

États-Unis) et partisans d‟une « Europe-espace » (c‟est-à-dire une Europe

qui s‟organise autour d‟un marché intérieur et d‟un espace commun de

liberté, de sécurité et de justice, sans devenir pour autant un acteur majeur

sur la scène internationale).”

Visualisation of complexity of cooperation with focus on the

EU (i.e. the EU28 characterised by the advanced degree of an

economic and monetary union7 in terms of the 1961 B.BALASSA‟s

theory of economic integration8) and its neighbourhood (with status

quo prior to the launch of the “Eurasian Union” project) is, firstly,

depicted in Figure 4a, and, secondly, more in detail indicated in

ensuing Figures 4b and 4c using a “zoom-in” perspective.

7 Cf.economic (and monetary) union in ŃÍBL et al. (2002), p. 326.

8 Note: Theory of economic integration was represented (with gradually

intensifying integration) by: a free trade area – a customs union – a common

market – an economic union – a complete economic integration (BALASSA,

1961, reprinted from The Theory of Economic Integration in NELSEN –

STUBB et al., 2003, pp. 180-1)

70

Figure 4a. Visualisation of complexity of cooperation: focus on the

EU28 and its neighbourhood (prior to the launch of the “Eurasian

Union” project referred to as “EAU”)9

Legend: AF – Afghanistan; AM – Armenia; AZ – Azerbaijan; BG –

Bulgaria; BY – Belarus; CH – Switzerland; CN – China; DK – Denmark;

DZ – Algeria; EG – Egypt; FI – Finland; GE – Georgia; GR/EL – Greece;

IL – Israel; IR – Iran; IS – Iceland; JO – Jordan; KG – Kyrgyzstan; KZ –

Kazakhstan; LB – Lebanon; LI – Liechtenstein; LY – Libya; MA –

Morocco; MD – Moldova; NO – Norway; PK – Pakistan; PS – Palestinian

Authority; RO – Romania; RU – Russia; SE – Sweden; SY – Syria; TJ –

Tajikistan; TM – Turkmenistan; TN – Tunisia; TR – Turkey; UA – Ukraine;

UZ – Uzbekistan;

BSS – Black Sea Synergy; CAS – (EU) Central Asia Strategy; CIS –

Commonwealth of Independent States; CU – Customs Union (Russian

9 Note: Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was established on 29 May 2014 in

Astana by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Since 2 January 2015 there was

EEU 4 (with Armenia) and since May 2015 there is EEU 5 (including

Kyrgyzstan).

71

Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan); EaP – Eastern Partnership; EAU –

Eurasian Union project; ECO – Economic Cooperation Organization;

EEA31 – European Economic Area; EFTA – European Free Trade

Association; ENP (East and South) – European Neighbourhood Policy;

EU28 – European Union; GU(U)AM Group (incl. Uzbekistan); NC – Nordic

Council; ND – Northern Dimension; SCO – Shanghai Cooperation

Organization.

Source: ĈIDEROVÁ – REPÁŃOVÁ – ŃEPTAKOVÁ (2013), p. 47.

The European Economic Area (EEA31) represents economic integration

of extra-EU EFTA3 (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein) countries with 28 EU

Member States, while the terms of Swiss cooperation with the EU28 based

on bilateral legal framework are now subject to renegotiation. Among the

intra-EU Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and

Slovakia) countries, Slovakia – currently holding the Visegrad Group

Presidency – is fully integrated not just in the Schengen area, but even in the

Euro area indicated (as EA 19 incl. Lithuania) in Figure 4b. Subsequently,

Figure 4c additionally specifies special status of Kosovo (UNSCR

1244/1999) vis-à-vis the Euro currency in a comparative perspective.

72

Figure 4b. Slovakia and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) in a comparative

perspective: European Union, Euro area and Schengen area enlargements

since 2004

EU enlargement Euro area enlargement Schengen

enlargement

2004

Cyprus 2007 Slovenia

2007

Czechia

Czechia 2008

Cyprus Estonia

Estonia Malta Hungary

Hungary 2009 Slovakia Latvia

Latvia 2011 Estonia Lithuania

Lithuania 2014 Latvia Malta

Malta 2015 Lithuania Poland

Poland ? Sweden Slovakia

Slovakia ? Czechia Slovenia

Slovenia ? Hungary 2008 Switzerland

2007 Bulgaria ? Poland 2011 Liechtenstein

Romania ? Bulgaria ? Bulgaria

2013 Croatia ? Romania ? Romania

?

negotiating

candidate

countries

? Croatia ? Croatia

?

non-

negotiating

candidate

countries

€

Montenegro

Kosovo

(UNSCR1244/1999)

? Cyprus/

Turkey

? potential

candidates

opt-

out

Denmark

United Kingdom ?

Western

Balkans10

Legend: bold font points out at Slovakia and/or Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) /

potential candidates / WBs11

.

10

Cf. alternative related terminology such as: CESEE economies/countries –

Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE); SEE countries – South-

Eastern European (SEE) countries; WBC countries – Western Balkan countries:

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia; EBC countries – Eastern Balkan countries:

Bulgaria and Romania; OMS – “old” Member States; NMS – “new” Member

States. For details see Nowotny – Mooslechner – Ritzberger-Grünwald (eds.),

2011.

73

Sources: Based on EUROPEAN COMMISSION; EUROPEAN

COMMISSION: Latvia and the euro, available at:

<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/countries/latvia_en.htm>;

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011); EUROPEAN COMMISSION :

Schengen Area, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-

do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/; http://europa.eu.

Additionally, the reality that all extra-EU EFTA4 (Norway, Iceland,

Liechtenstein, Switzerland) countries are incorporated in the Schengen area,

and certain degree of extra-EU euroisation (Figure 1c) relates to the so-

called European microstates just like Montenegro, and Kosovo (UNSCR

1244/1999) is at the heart of flexible endogeneous and flexible exogeneous

integration of the European Union referred to above.

Figure 4c. Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) in a comparative perspective:

Euro-related facts

EU member states

(non-Euro area)

EU candidate

countries

and potencial

candidates

Others

ERM II:

DK

Unilateral euroisation

(no separate legal

tender):XK, ME

Euroisation:

European

microstates

(Republic of San

Marino, Vatican

City, Principality of

Monaco and

Andorra), some

French overseas

collectivities

Euro-based currency

boards:BG, CZ, HR

Euro-based currency

boards:

BA

Managed floating

regime with the euro as

reference currency and

an inflation target:RO

Stabilised arrangement

with euro as a reference

currency:

MK

Free-floating regime

with an inflation target:

HU, PL, SE, UK

Free-floating regime

with an inflation target:

AL, IS, RS, TR

Other arrangements

using the euro as a

reference currency:

Switzerland

11

Cf.WBs (Western Balkans) vs WB (World Bank). See also: EUROPEAN

COMMISSION (2009b).

74

Legend: EU – European Union; AL – Albania; BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina;

BG – Bulgaria; CZ – Czech Republic;DK – Denmark; HR – Croatia; HU –

Hungary; IS – Iceland; ME – Montenegro; MK – Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia (FYROM); PL – Poland; RO – Romania; RS – Serbia; SE – Sweden;

TR – Turkey; UK – United Kingdom; XK – Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999).

Source: adapted excerpt from EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2014), p. 67.

Theoretical framework is primarily aimed at: explanatory, comparative,

predictive, normative or constitutive nature of individual approaches

(KRATOCHVÍL, 2008, pp. 19-20); yet, V. BENEŃ claims that “[e]volution

of the European integration theory ... resulted in theoretical pluralism. ...

Theoretical pluralism is also attachedto thematic pluralism. Individual

approaches to the European integration theory aspire to respond to an

extensive array of research questions covering a variety of European

integration aspects: stretching from “grand” themes such as the origins,

evolution and deepening of European integration to issues related to the

decision-making process in the “multi-level” nature of the EU.”

(KRATOCHVÍL – DRULÁK et al., 2009, p. 289).

Bearing in mind a sample of studies carried out in the pre-/post-

accession period (Ústav slovenskej a svetovej ekonomiky SAV,

2002;European Commission,2009a; Ministerstvo zahraniĉných vecì

a európskych záleņitostì Slovenskej republiky, 2014) and resting on our

earlier analyses (Báráňová-Ĉiderová – Svitana – Vetrák, 2006; Kosír et al.,

2007; Báráňová-Ĉiderová, 2007; Baláņ – Báráňová-Ĉiderová – Kittová –

Kosír – Liberĉan – Mattoń – Silná – Vetrák, 2008; Ĉiderová – Kovaĉević,

forthcoming) in the framework of the EU accession process, this chapter

aims to address the issue of the Slovakian accession experience when

reviewing status quo of the European integration process vis-à-vis Kosovo

(UNSCR 1244/1999) in a “zoom-in”/”zoom-out” comparative perspective –

with reference to recently released data –as well as challenges that lay

ahead, taking into consideration the scope and limits of such analysis.12

12

Cf.methodological pluralism claimed by N. HYNEK (KRATOCHVÍL –

DRULÁK et al., 2009, p. 173), and inEILSTRUP-SANGIOVANNI (ed.), 2006,

p. 466f.

75

3.2 EU accession experience: Focus on Slovakia

“[B]oth Slovakia and the Vatican can be seen as weaker than any of

their neighbours and probably not stronger than any of the regional or

global players with which they have any meaningful interactions. Does this

mean that Slovakia and the Vatican should belong to the same category?

And if yes, then what category would that be? Microstates? Small States? If

not, then which one is stronger? Is it the Vatican with its undisputable

global influence or Slovakia with its greater geographic and demographic

resources and ability to influence such bodies as the EU to an arguably

greater degree than the Vatican?”

DUMIENSKI, Z.: Microstates as Modern Protected States: Towards

a New Definition of Micro-Statehood. Centre for Small States

Studies/Institute of International Affairs, University of Iceland Press,

2014. ISSN 1670-4290, p. 20.

Relativity of impact of Slovakia could also be illustrated in these terms:

with its 1.06% share in EU28 population and 0.79% share in EU28 GDP,

the SlovakRepublic is represented in voting of the Council of the European

Union by up to 1.99% (2013 Eurostat est. in MINISTERSTVO

ZAHRANIĈNÝCH VECÍ A EURÓPSKYCH ZÁLEŅITOSTÍ

SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY, 2014, p. 8). And, Central European location

of Slovakia – indicated in Figure 5a introducing basic facts about Slovakia

and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) – in terms of “wider Europe”13

is also

evidenced by the fact that as much as 94% of the Slovak borderline stand

for the Union‟s internal border (MINISTERSTVO ZAHRANIĈNÝCH

VECÍ A EURÓPSKYCH ZÁLEŅITOSTÍ SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY,

2014, p. 28).

13

Cf. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2003).

76

Figure 5a. Slovakia and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) in a comparative

perspective: basic facts

Slovakia Kosovo

(UNSCR 1244/1999)

Total area

49,035 km

2 10,887 km

2

Land area

48,105 km

2 10,887 km

2

Location

Central Europe

Slovakia

SE Europe

Kosovo (UNSCR

1244/1999)

Population

5,488,339 1,847,708

Ethnic groups

Slovak 86%; Hungarian 10%;

Roma 2%;

Ruthenian/Ukrainian 1%

Albanian 92%;

other (incl. Serb, Bosniak,

Gorani, Roma, Turk,

Ashkali, Egyptian) 8%

Chief religions

Roman Catholic 69%;

Protestant 11%;

Greek Catholic 4%; none 13%

Muslim, Serbian

Orthodox,

Roman Catholic

Principal

languages

Slovak (official),

Hungarian, Roma, Ukrainian

Albanian, Serbian

(both official),

Bosnian; Turkish; Roma

Establishment 1 January 1993

Unilateral declaration

of independence

on 17 February

2008(recognised by 110

UN

members incl. 23 EU MSs

by 8 October 2014)

Member of major

international

organisations

UN, EU (2004; Schengen 2007;

Euro area 2009), NATO (2004),

OECD, OSCE, WTO

UN (IBRD, IMF)

Sources: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014c), p. 3; The World

Almanac® and Book of Facts (2014), pp. 796-7 and 833.

77

A decade after establishment of the Slovak Republic as one of two

successors of the former Czecho-Slovakia in 1993 (Figure 5a), Slovakia was

involved in signing of the EU Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003.

Afterwards, in the course of a decade (2004 – 2014)14

of membership in the

EU, the GDP per capita (in PPS, EU28 = 100) of Slovakia fuelled by the

catching-up process rocketed from 57% in 2004 to 76% in 2012

(EUROSTAT, 2014c).15

Alternatively, the “Slovak success story” is presented in the latest OECD

Economic Survey of Slovakia as follows: “The Slovak success story has

benefited mainly the western part of the country. GDP per capita in

Bratislava is the 6th highest among 272 regions in the EU28 ..., although the

country as a whole ranks only 20th out of 28 EU countries.” (OECD, 2014,

p. 7).

Subject to data availability for comparative purposes – while bearing in

mind the scope of our focus – this brings us to a glance at GDP in aggregate

as well as per capita terms (Figure 5b) complemented with GDP

developments in time (Figure 5c), extended toadditional three CESEE

(Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe) countries of population similar

to the one of Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) that are linked to the reality or

the prospect of EU membership, too.

14

Note: For a timeline covering major events between 1990 – 2014 see Figure 6. 15

Cf. MINISTERSTVO ZAHRANIĈNÝCH VECÍ A EURÓPSKYCH

ZÁLEŅITOSTÍ SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY (2014), p. 10.

78

Figure 5b. Slovakia and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) in a comparative

perspective with an EU Member State or Candidate Country status

SK XK SI MK LV16

Status

Recent

experience

of federal

statehood

ex-

Czechoslovakia ex-

Yugoslavia

ex-

USSR

European

Union

perspective

member

state potential

candidate

member

state

candidate

country

member

state

Indicators

Population

(„000)

5,488,339 1,847,708 1,992,690 2,087,171 2,178,443

GDP (bil.

USD)

134.1 bil. 13.6 bil. 58.9 bil. 22.2 bil. 37.9 bil.

GDP p. c.

(USD)

24,600 n.a. 28,700 10,800 18,600

GDP

growth (%)

+2 +2.1 -2.3 -0.3 +5.6

import

(mil./bil.

USD)

76 bil. 3.3 bil.

(2011) 28 bil. 6.2 bil. 16.1 bil.

export

(mil./bil.

USD)

80.7 bil. 419 mil.

(2011) 27.6 bil. 4.1 bil. 12.5 bil.

Legend: SK – Slovakia; XK – Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999); SI –

Slovenia;MK – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM); LV –

Latvia; n.a. – data not available.

Source: The World Almanac® and Book of Facts (2014), pp. 796, 798,

801, 833-834.

Figure 5b covers EU and non-EU – seemingly unrelated – countries, yet,

with a number of common characteristics in the following chronological

order. Firstly,Slovakia, Slovenia and Latvia each have experience of recent

federal statehood. Secondly, having disintegrated from the federal statehood,

Slovakia, Slovenia and Latvia participated in a free trade area arrangement,

16

Cf. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010).

79

i.e. in CEFTA or BAFTA, respectively, prior to their accession to the EU.

Thirdly, Slovakia, Slovenia and Latvia share their experience of the 2004

unprecedented EU enlargement (incl. their involvement in the Schengen

area and the Euro area). Incompatibility of accession to the EU with CEFTA

(or BAFTA, respectively) led to the transformation17

of CEFTA to CEFTA

2006 – thus not just “stretching”, but even “shifting” from the Central

European to the SEE region18

– now also with participation of Kosovo

(UNSCR 1244/1999).

Currently, export performance dropped notably in the second quarter of

2014in the case of Slovakia chiefly as a result of decelerated GDP growth

registered by its key trading partners, and imports fuelled by recovery of

private consumption are projected to outnumber exports in 2014 (with

outlook towards renewed import/export convergence reflecting high import

intensity of SK exports). In the case of Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999), lower

degree of its dependence19

on exports mitigated impact of the global crisis.

According to available data20

, net exports were lately driven predominantly

by import substitution (even though both exports and imports are on the

17

Note: As if from “CEFTA 1.0” to “CEFTA 2.0” (or CEFTA II). 18

Cf.“Les arguments en faveur (ou contre) le fédéralisme sont politiques et non

économiques. Il existe certes un lien entre le politique et l‟économique : pour

les investisseurs étrangers, la stabilité, l‟ouverture des frontières et le

développement des voies de communication régionales sont des arguments non

négligeables dans des petits pays enclavés. Des accords bilatéraux de libre-

échange ont été signés, mais l‟évolution est lente vers la création d‟une zone de

libre-échange ou un « marché commun » de l„Europe du Sud-Est. Le

rattachement progressif à partir de 2007 des Balkans à la CEFTA (Central

European Free Trade Area) sera un pas important dans cette

direction.”(RUPNIK, 2007, p. 133). 19

Note: Its openness to trade lessened owing to the shift of total trade from 70.4%

of GDP (2012) to 66.4% of GDP (2013) 20

Cf. reference to “available indicators as well as anecdotal evidence” quoted in

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014e), p. 6. In its alternative 2014 report the

European Commission introduced that “GDP per capita reached € 2,800 in

2013, equal to 11% of the EU28 average” with observation that “a measure

using purchasing power standards is not available for Kosovo” (EUROPEAN

COMMISSION, 2014h, p. 51). The Council of the European Union commented

in the framework of the General Affairs Council meeting held on 16 December

2014 on this issue, too, stating that “... the Council recalls the importance of

accurate and reliable statistics as a key factor in economic governance”

(COUNCIL OF THE EU, 2014, p. 2).

80

rise, their overall contribution to the trade balance is negative) and subdued

domestic demand. Substantial degree of dependence on remittances is

directly linked to labour outflow from the Balkans to the economies of

Western Europe and plays a role in sustaining consumption and alleviating

elevated unemployment levels in the home country alike.21

Following the European Council statement (EUROPEAN COUNCIL,

2014, p. 10) in its 23-24 October 2014 conclusions: “The economic and

employment situation remains our highest priority. Recent macroeconomic

developments are disappointing with low GDP growth and very high

persisting levels of unemployment in much of Europe as well as

exceptionally low inflation.” , in Figures 5c-5e we streamline our attention

to Slovakia22

and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999)23

in a comparative

perspective with the EU24

and the EA25

.

21

Note: “Remittances secure a substantial share of the income for many

households, but they also lead to higher reservation wages, which may be

another reason for the low employment rates,” claimed the 2010 report

(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2010, p. 39). The European Commission now

expects higher private consumption due to the March 2014 decision of the XK

government on significant public wage and pension increases. (EUROPEAN

COMMISSION, 2014e, pp. 6 and 38). 22

Note: 2011-2013 performance and 2014-2016 forecast. 23

Note: 2011-2013 performance. 24

Note: 2013 performance and 2014-2016 forecast. 25

Note: 2013 performance and 2014-2016 forecast for Euro Area (EA).

81

Figure 5c. Slovakia and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) in a comparative

perspective: GDP (%)

Legend: EU – European Union; EA – Euro area; SK – Slovakia; XK –

Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999).

Sources: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014a), pp. 1 and 107;

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014e), pp. 40-41; EUROPEAN

COMMISSION (2014h), p. 52.

Both Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) and Slovakia registered economic

growth above the EU and EA average in 2013 as displayed in Figure 2c,

with SK GDP predicted to pursue a trend synchronised with forecasts for

the EU and the EA.

Although fragile economic recovery across the EU as a legacy of the

global crisis was hampered by uncertainty stemming from geopolitical

tensions coupled with less favourable global economic prospects, envisaged

improvement in both foreign and domestic demand, additional advancement

of the Banking Union in the EU – underlined by recent structural reforms –

are behind the Autumn 2014 EU economic forecast.

-1,0

0,0

1,0

2,0

3,0

4,0

5,0

2011 2012 2013 2014f 2015f 2016f

Year

GD

P (

%)

EU EA SK XK

82

Figure 5d. Slovakia and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) in a comparative

perspective: Inflation rate (%)

Sources: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014a), pp. 1 and 107;

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014e), pp. 40-41; EUROPEAN

COMMISSION (2014h), p. 52.

Inflation rates of Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999), Slovakia, the

European Union and the Euro Area illustrated in Figure 5d correlated

in 2013 (EA 17)26

, with SK inflation trajectory foreseen to gradually

converge with EU and EA average.

Falling tendency of inflation witnessed in 2014 has corresponded

with economic situation just like lower commodity prices; however,

reinforced economic activity inducing rising wages will drive

inflation upwards.

26

Note: The Euro Area was enlarged by two Baltic states, former Baltic Free Trade

Area (BAFTA) members during the last two years: Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania

in 2015. There are 19 EU member countries using the single European currency

euro in 2015.

-1,0

0,0

1,0

2,0

3,0

4,0

5,0

6,0

7,0

8,0

2011 2012 2013 2014f 2015f 2016f

Year

Infl

ati

on

(%

)

EU EA SK XK

83

Figure 5e. Slovakia and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) in a comparative

perspective: Unemployment rate (%)

Sources: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014a), pp. 1 and 107;

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014e), pp. 40-41; EUROPEAN

COMMISSION (2014h), p. 52.

Figure 5e demonstrates extensive discrepancy of the 2013 rate of

joblessness in Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) when compared to the situation

as well as trends in Slovakia, and the EU alongside the Euro Area (on

average); still, especially youth unemployment27

remains a major challenge

overall.

Private consumption backed not just by low commodity prices, but also

by increasing disposable income, still faces the challenge of steady fading of

the crisis accompanied by persisting high unemployment. Hence, economic

growth gaining momentum is expected to show labour market

improvements in a later phase of the forecast horizon.

27

Note: Possibly aggravated in combination with the long-term, unskilled, or

gender-related unemployment; needless to say, with the growing share of young

population in some pre-accession economies mirroring their demographic

trends, adequate supply-demand match on the labour market increasingly

becomes of utmost importance.

5,0

10,0

15,0

20,0

25,0

30,0

35,0

40,0

45,0

2011 2012 2013 2014f 2015f 2016f

Year

Un

em

plo

ym

en

t (%

)

EU EA SK XK

84

3.3 EU accession perspective : Focus on Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999)

“The dynamics of the return [of CEECs to Europe] changed over the

years, however, and brought with them setbacks and reverses that did not

endure for long. The European Commission was charged, as usual, with the

supervision of the preparations for membership. Nevertheless, it had never

before (nor probably never will again) encounter such accessions differing

in both quantitative and qualitative respects. The diversity of States (even

excluding Cyprus and Malta) ... became apparent over time, as national

identities and priorities vis-à-vis the EU developed. ... The accessions of

2004 and 2007 thus mark the reunification of Europe, though this process

still remains to be fully realized in the western Balkans and Turkey.”

TATHAM, A. F.: Enlargement of the European Union (Kluwer Law

International – Kluwer European Law Collection, Volume 4). The

Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer / Kluwer Law International, 2009, p. 116.

ISBN 978-90-411-2463-0.

Claiming that delimitation of Europe as a so-called pan-region (or

macro-region) represents a challenge particularly in the East, P. JUREK

suggests addressing Eastern28

Europe and South-Eastern Europe (depicted

in Annexes1a-b together with the respective territorial visions and diasporas

of local origin over time) adhered to by three civilisations29

as transitional

regions intersecting the rim of the Eurasian as well as the Middle-Eastern

pan-regions (P. JUREK in CABADA – ŃANC et al., 2011, pp. 309-12 and

395). Similarly to diverse application of the multi-faceted term Balkan30

,

historical and/or geographic interpretation associated with the SEE region

varies, too.31

Variability of internal dynamics as well as progress towards

EU membership registered between 1990 – 2014 in individual successors of

ex-Yugoslavia (and ex-Czecho-Slovakia in a comparative perspective) is,

therefore, summarised in Figure 3, which follows.

28

Note: In the area along the eastern border of the EU incl. Eastern Balkan

countries. 29

Note: In the area of the Western Balkan countries. 30

Cf. M. JEŅOVÁ in CABADA – ŃANC et al. (2011), p. 351f. 31

e.g. cf.GIRGLE (2009); PELIKÁN – HAVLÍKOVÁ – CHROBÁK – RYCHLÍK

– TEJCHMAN – VOJTĚCHOVSKÝ (2004); HRADEĈNÝ – HLADKÝ et al.

(2008).

85

Figure 6. Timeline: ex-Yugoslavia and ex-Czecho-Slovakia in a

comparative perspective (1990 – 2014)

Year Ex-Yugoslavia Ex-Czecho-Slovakia

1990 XK as Republic of Kosovo

CS Agreement between the EEC

and the EURATOM and the Czech

and Slovak Federative Republic on

Trade and Commercial and

Economic Cooperation

1991 HR, SI&MK declared

independence

CS Visegrad Group (V3),

Europe Agreement signed between

the Community and the Czech and

Slovak Federative Republic (16

December 1991)

1992

BA independence;

RS&ME as new Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia (State Union of

Serbia and Montenegro since

2003)

CEFTA

1993

Copenhagen European Council:

Copenhagen criteria;

SI Cooperation Agreement signed

between the EEC and Slovenia

CZ&SK independent countries;

Visegrad Group (V4);

Copenhagen European Council:

Copenhagen criteria;

CZ&SK Europe Agreement

1994 Essen European Council Essen European Council

1995 BA Dayton/Paris SK applied for EU

1996 SI applied for EU CZ applied for EU

1997

Luxembourg European Council:

SI bilateral intergovernmental

conference to be convened in

1998

Luxembourg European Council:

CZ bilateral intergovernmental

conference to be convened in

1998;

SK preparation of negotiations to

be speeded up in particular

through analytical examination of

EU acquis

1998 SI accession negotiations

launched

CZ accession negotiations

launched

1999

SI Europe (association)

Agreement;

XK UNSCR 1244/1999

Helsinki European Council

2000

Feira European Council: all SAP

countries “potential candidates”

for EU membership;

Zagreb Summit: SAP launched

SK accession negotiations

launched

2001 HR&MK signed SAA

86

2002

Copenhagen European Council:

SIcompletion of accession

negotiations for 2004 EU

enlargement

Copenhagen European Council:

CZ&SKcompletion of accession

negotiations for 2004 EU

enlargement

2003

Thessaloniki European Council:

EU perspective for the Western

Balkans reiterated;

HR applied for EU

2004

SI joined the EU;

HR candidate country status;

MK applied for EU

CZ&SK joined the EU

2005 MK candidate country status

2006

CEFTA 2006;

ME declared independence;

MK European Partnership

2007

SI joined the Euro & Schengen

area;

ME European Partnership, signed

SAA

CZ&SK joined the Schengen area

2008

XK unilaterally declared

independence, EULEX;

RS&BA European Partnership;

RS&BA signed SAA;

MK Accession Partnership;

ME applied for EU

2009 RS applied for EU SK joined the Euro area

2010

ME candidate country status;

XK ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo

declaration of independence and

UN General Assembly resolution

2011

HR signed EU Accession Treaty;

RS – XK EU-facilitated dialogue

launched

2012

RS candidate country status;

XK declared end of supervised

independence, SAA feasibility

study;

BA High Level Dialogue on the

Accession Process

2013

HR joined the EU;

RS – XK First agreement of

principles governing

normalisation of relations

2014 XK SAA initialled

87

Legend: BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina;CS – federation of CZ&SK; CZ

– Czech Republic; HR – Croatia; ME – Montenegro; MK – Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM); RS – Serbia; SAA –

Stabilisation and Association Agreement; SAP – Stabilisation and

Association Process; SI – Slovenia; SK – Slovakia; XK – Kosovo (UNSCR

1244/1999).

Sources: BÁRÁŇOVÁ-ĈIDEROVÁ (2007), p. 24; BALÁŅ –

BÁRÁŇOVÁ-ĈIDEROVÁ (ed.) – KITTOVÁ (ed.) – KOSÍR –

LIBERĈAN – MATTOŃ – SILNÁ – VETRÁK (2008), p. 295;

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014g); ŃESTÁK – TEJCHMAN –

HAVLÍKOVÁ – HLADKÝ – PELIKÁN (1998), pp. 675-676; ŃÍBL et al.

(2002), p. 901; See: <http://europa.eu>, too.

Within a quarter of a century between 1990 – 2014 (Figure 6) the EU has

not just expanded to eastern Bundesländer – now embracing all of 16

German Bundesländer – but it has continued to grow in a series of

enlargement rounds from 12 to 28 members, too. Consequently, earlier

members have had a stake in the enlargement-related decision-making in

later stages, i.e. 2004 entrants vis-à-vis countries acceding in 2007 and

2013. Particularly the case of ex-Yugoslavia is one of gradual integration

with the EU, spreading from Member State (Slovenia; Croatia) through

candidate32

country (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/FYROM;

Montenegro; Serbia) to potential candidate status (Kosovo/UNSCR

1244/1999; Bosnia and Herzegovina); worth mentioning is that the number

of negotiated acquis communautaire chapters transformed from 31 (e.g. in

the case of the 2004 EU enlargement as specified in Figure 4) into 35 (e.g.

in the case of the 2013 EU enlargement).

Having referred to the complex interdependence theory by R. O.

KEOHAN and J. S. NYE (1977) in the introductory passage of this chapter,

we also wish to point out the contribution of Ch. P. KINDLEBERGER33

(1968) to the perception of interdependence, when relating to the statement:

32

Note: since 2014 candidate country status related also to Albania.

33

See also reference in KOSÍR (2007b), p. 35.

88

“Interdependence – political and economic – with the Union‟s

neighbourhood is already a reality.” (COMMISSION OF THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2003, p. 3). The aspect of asymmetry in the

context of integration also addressed by A. MORAVCSIK and M.

VACHUDOVA (2003)34

– as long as being intrinsic in terms of

compliance35

– is in terms of the acquis communautaire elaborated in detail

in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Slovakia and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) in the light of EU

acquis communautaire

Acquis

communautaire&

SK 2004 EU Accession N

Y Acquis

communautaire&

XK 2014-2015

Progress Report

Progress

D I + +/– –

1. Free movement of

goods Political criteria +

2. Free movement of

persons

Democracy and the

rule of law

3. Freedom to provide

services

Human rights and the

protection

of minorities

4. Free movement of

capital

Regional issues and

international

obligations

5. Company law Economic criteria +/–

6. Competition policy

The existence of a

functioning market

economy

7. Agriculture

The capacity to cope

with competitive

pressure and market

forces within the

European Union

8. Fisheries European standards

9. Transport policy Internal market

34

Reference in RUPNIK (2007), p. 18.

35

Cf. NOUTCHEVA (2012), pp. 4, 29, 32 and 200.

89

10. Taxation Free movement of

goods +/–

11. Economic and

Monetary Union

Movement of persons,

services and right of

establishment

+/–

12. Statistics Free movement of

capital +/–

13. Social policy and

employment Customs and taxation +/–

14. Energy Competition –

15. Industrial policy Public procurement –

16. Small and medium-

sized enterprises

Intellectual property

law +

17. Science and research

Employment and social

policies, public health

policy

+/–

18. Education and training Education and research +/–

19.

Telecommunications

and information

technologies

WTO issues –

20. Culture and audio-

visual policy Sectoral policies

21.

Regional policy and co-

ordination of structural

instruments

Industry and SMEs +/–

22. Environment Agriculture and

fisheries +/–

23. Consumers and health

protection

Environment and

climate change –

24.

Co-operation in the

field of justice and

home affairs

Transport policy –

25. Customs union Energy –

26. External relations Information society

and media +/–

27. Common foreign and

security policy Financial control +/–

28. Financial control Statistics +/–

29. Financial and

budgetary provisions

Justice, freedom and

security

90

30. Institutions Visa, border

management, asylum

and migration

+

31. Other Money laundering +/–

32.

Drugs +/–

33. Police +

34. Fighting organised

crime and terrorism +/–

35. Protection of personal

data +/–

Legend: SK – Slovakia; XK – Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999); N – non-

existence of a transitional period; Y – existence of a transitional period; D –

transitional period demanded by the respective country (i.e. Slovakia); I –

transitional period imposed on behalf of the European Union (in terms of

negotiations with the European Commission).

Sources: Based on BÁRÁŇOVÁ-ĈIDEROVÁ – SVITANA – VETRÁK

(2006), pp. 15-19; EUROPEAN COMMISSION: Report on the results of

the negotiations on the accession of Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the

Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and

Slovenia to the European Union; EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014c);

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014g); FIGEĽ – ADAMIŃ (2004); Treaty

concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia,

the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania,

the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the

Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union (incl.

the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the

Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the

Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the

Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic;

Annexes; Protocols; and the Final Act), 2003.

When presenting the so-called 2014 EU Enlargement package, former

European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Ńtefan

FÜLE (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2014f) stated: “Five years ago, we

91

set out to strengthen the credibility and the transformative power of

enlargement policy. We put a particular emphasis on three pillars: rule of

law in 2012, economic governance in 2013 and this year, we‟re setting out

new ideas to support public administration reform, and strengthening of

democratic institutions. Today, this approach is bearing fruit. The process

is credible and is bringing concrete results through reforms that gradually

transform the countries concerned, improving stability in our immediate

neighbourhood. It also makes the countries better prepared for the EU entry

and for the responsibilities of the membership.”

Next, within the mandate of the new European Commission (since 1

November 2014) new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security

Policy/Vice-President of the Commission Federica MOGHERINI, and new

Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement

negotiations Johannes HAHN jointly commented on the formation of the

new government in Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) as follows: “We welcome

the formation of a new government in Kosovo and look forward to working

with the new authorities in Pristina. Today‟s [9 December 2014]

constitutive session of the Assembly and election of the government ends the

political deadlock that prevented progress in Kosovo following the general

elections of 8 June 2014.” (EEAS / EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2014),

reiterated by the Council of the European Union in the framework of the

General Affairs Council meeting held on 16 December 2014 (COUNCIL

OF THE EU, 2014, p. 10).

Both Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999) and Bosnia and Herzegovina being

potential candidates for EU membership, emphasis in a “twin” (alias follow-

up) chapter will next be placed on the EU accession experience and

perspectives as in the case of Slovakia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

92

Associate Professor Ing. Denisa ČIDEROVÁ, MA, PhD.

Following her studies of European Integration

and Internationalisation (1998); Economic

Diplomacy (2000); Political Science (2002); and

European Politics (2001, University of

Leicester, Leicester, UK – UNIVERSITY OF

THE YEAR 2008/2009) Assoc. Prof. Dr. Denisa

ĈIDEROVÁ defended her Ph.D. thesis (2005)

titled “Benefits and Risks of the European Union

Enlargement to Central and East European

Countries for the EU” as well as post-doctoral

thesis (2008) with defence titled “Differentiation

in the Context of the Fifth European Union Enlargement”. In the course of

her Ph.D. studies she was active as a Teaching Assistant in the international

programme Certificate in European Law and Economics (CELE) at the

University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovak Republic, between 2001 and

2004. Additionally, Assoc. Prof. ĈIDEROVÁ qualified as a sworn

translator registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic. Over

the years she has been intensively working on an extensive range of

international and national projects focused on various target groups, which

reflected in her publications (with interdisciplinarity as a leitmotif) as well

as supervision of Bachelor, Master and Ph.D. theses. Between February

2007 and January 2015 she held the position of the Vice-Dean of the

Faculty of Commerce, University of Economics in Bratislava, for

International Relations (gradually also entrusted with the agenda of a Vice-

Dean-Plenipotentiary for Implementation of the Quality Management

Policy) and has referred to her multidisciplinary studies (domestically and

internationally) in her career. In February 2015 Assoc. Prof. ĈIDEROVÁ

started her tenure in office as the Vice-Rector for Research and Doctoral

Studies at the University of Economics in Bratislava..

93

Dr. Brikenë DIONIZI

Young university teacher as well as

researcher. Foof quality and safety, hygienic

engineering and design, restaurant sector

development, European integration process

– there are the areas of her professional

interest. At the present, she is working at the

Department of Business Administration,

Faculty of Economics of the University of

Shkoder “Luigj Gurakuqi”, Albania.

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101

3.4 Annexes

Annex 1a. Diasporas of natives from the region in the world

in Millennium years

Source: CATTARUZZA – SINTÈS (2012), p. 75.

102

Annex 1b. Overlapping regional perceptions indicating territorial

claims

Source: CATTARUZZA – SINTÈS(2012), p. 52.

103

4 The Protection of ethnic and linguistic minorities in Europe

Zenun HALILI

Abstract: Most countries today are culturally diverse. In very few countries

can the citizens be said to share the same language, or belong to the same

ethnonational group. This diversity gives rise to a series of important and

potentially divisive questions. Minorities and majorities increasingly clash

over such issues as language rights, regional autonomy, political

representation, education curriculum, land claims, immigration and

naturalization policy, even national symbols, such as the choice of national

anthem or public holidays. Finding morally defensible and politically viable

answers to these issues is the greatest challenge facing democracies today.

In Eastern Europe and the Third World, attempts to create liberal

democratic institutions are being undermined by violent nationalist

conflicts. In the West, volatile disputes over the rights of immigrants,

indigenous peoples, and other cultural minorities are throwing into question

many of the assumptions which have governed political life for decades.

Since the end of the Cold War, ethno-cultural conflicts have become the

most common source of political violence in the world, and they show no

sign of abating.

Key Words: Human Rights, Minorities, Languages, Minority Rights,

Minority Languages, Minority Protection, Linguistic Diversity

Associate Prof. Dr. Zenun HALILI, Senior Political Advisor at the Ministry of

Education, Science & Technology, former Head of Department of Political

Science of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Pristina, Kosovo

(zenunhalili@yahoo.com).

104

4.1 Minority Rights in Historical Perspective

International relations that have to do with the position of European

minorities possess an identifiable history not only in the twentieth century

but from the 1640s onwards. The Congress of Westphalia is conventionally

taken as the dividing line between the medieval and modern periods in the

conduct of international affairs. By 1644 when this congress was

assembled, the feudal society of medieval Christendom had clearly been

replaced by a modern, vertical society of sovereign, territorial states. In

other words, the fundamental spatial organization of modern international

relations had been established.1

In the 1640s there were obviously no minority rights as they were

understood in the early 1990s--i.e. as attaching to certain individual human

beings by virtue of their membership in a particular national community.

Nevertheless, international agreements from the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries reveal an early political formulation of minority rights as religious

freedoms bestowed upon certain nonconformist Christian communities by

the sovereign. Religion--rather than some other defining characteristic such

as language or culture, for example--was the focus of minority rights during

this period because religious affiliation was the most important dividing line

between different communities in Europe at this time.

Men and women in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries defined

their social relationships interms of religious similarity or difference;

Catholic or Protestant, Lutheran or Calvinist rather than Irish or English,

German or French were the labels variously used to separate insiders from

outsiders.2 Minority questions usually arose at precisely those moments

when the spatial framework of the states system was being modified and

new anomalies between the pattern of human communities and international

boundaries--insiders and outsiders--were being created. For example, the

1 See: JACKSON PREECE, J. (1998): National Minorities and the European

Nation-States System. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 56. 2 Note: For a discussion of inside/outside distinctions in international relations see

WALKER, R. (1993):

Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge:

CUP, 1993.

105

Peace of Westphalia ( 1648) itself not only detailed a general territorial

redistribution amongst the various sovereigns who had become entangled in

the Thirty Years War, but also granted certain concessions to those of the

'Confession of Augsburg' (i.e. Protestants).3

Protestants were returned the churches and ecclesiastical estates that they

had possessed in the year 1624, and were guaranteed the free exercise of

their religion both in private and in public. Likewise, both the Treaty of

Nijmegen ( 1678) and the Treaty of Ryswick ( 1697), which settled disputes

arising from the French/Spanish struggle to control the Netherlands,

guaranteed the continued enjoyment of all 'honours, dignities and benefices'

both 'secular and ecclesiastical' that adherents of all Christian faiths in the

transferred territories had enjoyed prior to the outbreak of war.4

These guarantees were reaffirmed in the Treaty of Utrecht ( 1713).

Similar minority stipulations can also be found in the Treaty of Oliva

(1650), the Treaty of Dresden (1745), the Treaty of Hubertus burg (1763),

and the Treaty of Paris (1763). At about the time of the 1815 Congress of

Vienna a new legitimizing principle began to appear in the relations

between states--nationalism and its corollary the nation-state. The rise of

nationalism is linked to the experience of both the American and the French

Revolutions and to the Napoleonic Era which followed.5 The American

Revolution did much to popularize the Lockean ideas of toleration, natural

rights, and political representation and to link these to the concept of

legitimate power.

The French Revolution went on to make the rights of nations a corollary

to the rights of man. In the final years of the eighteenth century and the

beginning of the nineteenth, Napoleon offered a certain degree of national

independence at the price of association with the expanding Napoleonic

Empire to those subject peoples that continued to live in dynastic rather than

national states. For example, he issued a proclamation to the Hungarians of

the Habsburg Empire in 1809.The various treaties signed at Vienna are

noteworthy in the evolution of minority rights because they mark the first

3 See: PARRY, C. (ed.)(1969): The Consolidated Treaty Series. New York: Oceana

Publications Inc., 1969, p. 327. 4 See: Ibid.

5 See: BREUILLY, J. (1993): Nationalism and the State. Manchester: MUP, 1993.

106

occasion on which minorities were defined as national groups rather than

religious communities. TheVienna Final Actprovides some of the earliest

evidence of civil and political rights in addition to religious freedoms being

guaranteed to peoples transferred from one sovereign authority to another.

Alongside this impetus for political incorporation came the

corresponding tendency towards assimilation of minority communities

within the dominant national, cultural, and linguistic group. It is therefore

important to remember that minority guarantees defined solely in terms of

equal civil and political rights are compatible with assimilations objectives.

The tendency to use minority rights to equal treatment as a justification of

assimilations campaigns designed to transform outsiders into insiders has

been a recurring feature of international minority guarantees from Vienna

onwards. As the nineteenth century progressed, this new national

formulation of minority rights gained in credence until by the 1878

Congress of Berlin the question of national minorities had become a

corollary to the rise of new nation-states outside Western Europe.

As international society expanded eastwards, particularly into the Balkan

Peninsula, national minority rights to civil and political liberties as well as

religious freedoms came to be the price exacted by the great powers for

their acquiescence in border changes affecting new nation-states such as

Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and Bulgaria. There was in these

treaties, unlike those of earlier periods, a substantial element of unequal

sovereignty imposed on new states by existing powers. As a condition of

their international recognition such states had to demonstrate a willingness

to comply with a 'standard of civilization' (defined by, for example,

adherence to the rule of law, respect for civil liberties, and minority

guarantees) which went beyond the traditional, minimalist criteria for

establishing sovereign independence that historically concerned only the

effective control of territory and people.6 National minority undertakings

included in international treaties from the late nineteenth century were no

longer voluntarily assumed by states as gestures of international goodwill -

as they had been in earlier periods - but were externally dictated

preconditions for the new nation-states' membership in international society.

6 See: GONG, G. (1984): The Standard of Civilization in International Society.

Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.

107

4.2 International System of Minority Guarantees

The protection of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups is one of the

oldest concerns of international law. For pragmatic as well as humanitarian

reasons, international law has been a protective instrument, because the

minorities question has never contained itself entirely within national

legislation. General or common international law grants a State the right to

intervene on behalf of its own subjects whenever another State, in dealing

with them, disregards the proper standards of civilized behavior or does not

fulfill some obligation it has accepted by treaty touching upon their legal

status abroad.7 It is nonetheless clear that international relations require that

a state has no free hand in dealing with foreigners, even when the latter are

settled in its territory.8 The question is what about those persons who are not

claimed as citizens by other states? Here the traditional law of nations seems

to have little or nothing to say.

Governments can and may be as harsh as they please towards their own

citizens and towards stateless persons: international law does not restrain

governments on this account.9 At the most, so called “humanitarian

interventions” might take place, when the behavior of a government and the

populace against certain groups of their countryman becomes so oppressive

and cruel that other states feel entitled and morally bound to step in and stop

such brutality. A new or fairly new development was started by the peace

treaties that formally ended the First World War, and a few collateral

conventions and declarations, which saddled some new or enlarged states

with a set of obligations favoring national minorities, and entrusted to the

League of Nations the task of seeing that such obligations were carried out.

The direct purposes of the minority regime were two-fold. First, to

ensure that persons belonging to State‟s population but distinguished from

its majority on account of their group peculiarities such as ethnic traits,

7 See: NOVA, R. (1965): The International Protection of National Minorities and

Human Rights. Harward Law Journal, Vol.II. 1965, p.275. 8 See: OPPENHEIM, L. (1958): International Law: A Treaties. Vol.7 (1958) , p.

279. 9 See: Ibid, p.280.

108

religious creed, language, and culture, would not be made to suffer, because

they were different, at the hands of the majority. A second purpose of the

institution was that of preventing that state affected by such “splinter

groups‟ would proceed, in the pursuit of “national unity”, to absorb, and

assimilate them by preventing them, either forcefully or deviously, to keep

their cherished natural and historical characters. While the rules on

fundamental rights, equality of treatment and non-discrimination aimed

mainly at putting all citizens on the same footing, by their part of the

national majority or of a minority, the other provisions, namely those on the

use of the minority language and the grant of facilities for the furtherance by

minority people of their religious and cultural heritage, aimed mainly at

allowing and even helping minorities to maintain their own historical

individualizing traits.

The post-Second World War system of human rights actually raises the

question of what place minority rights occupy in this system and how they

relate to human rights. Historically speaking, one may observe a parallel

development of human and minority rights, with legal instruments

continually shifting emphasis from one to other. Both groups of rights

existed together in interaction but in relative independence, but since the

Second World War the situation has became more complex. On the one

hand, the relationship between the two fields is unclear even in theory and,

on the other, literature open by raises queries about minority questions

forming part of human rights.10

Even if the answer is more or less

affirmative, the legal arrangements make it evident that minority rights are

generally viewed in the context of human rights today. It is not the case that

the two fields could or should be separated. The idea is that the instruments

and legal institutions used in the international sphere of human rights should

have regard for the specifics of those rights, which constitute an

indispensable element of effective protection of minority rights.11

10

See: WHITAKER, B.(1984): Minorities: A Question of Human Rights. 1984. 11

See: BAKA, A.B. (1993): The Convention and the Protection of Minorities

Under International Law. In The European System of Protection of Human

Rights. 1993, pp. 877-878.

109

The United Nations Charter makes no specific mention of minorities,

Instead the emphasis is on individual human rights.12

At the San Francisco

Conference, the high level of interest in human rights did not provoke

proposals for the protection of minorities, though the Covenant of the

League did not mention them either. As a result on the fact that no

amendments favoring the protection of minorities were submitted at the San

Francisco Conference is obviously that Charter refers rather to equal

enjoyment of human rights connected with non-discrimination principle,

what means that States promoting the change from limited minorities

regime to a regime of human rights perceives qualitative differences,

between the concepts of „prevention of discrimination “ and „ protection of

minorities” by implication if not expressly. Although with some reluctance,

the United Nations have adopted provisions on minorities protection of

universal relevance: Article 27 of the International Covenant and Civil and

Political Rights13

and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging

to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.14

4.3 Protection of Ethnic and linguistic minorities in Europe

Traditional national minorities make up 8 % of the EU population while

regional or minority languages are spoken by nearly 50 million people; 10

% of the EU population. At present, there are no comprehensive standards

for minority rights in the EU, even though respect for minority rights is one

of the EU s founding values enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter

of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Moreover, guaranteeing minority rights is

an essential requirement for candidate countries as laid down in the

Copenhagen criteria. Protecting traditional ethnic and linguistic minorities

and their languages is crucially important for the EU in terms of its stability,

security, prosperity, internal and external legitimacy, cultural and linguistic

diversity, and credibility.

12

See: RUSSELL, R. B. - MUTHER, J.S. (1958): A History of the United Nations

Charter. The Rule of the United States 1940-45. 1958. 13

See: UNITED NATIONS: Treaty Series (UNTS), VOL. 999, p. 171. 14

See: UNITED NATIONS (1992): General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of 18

December 1992.

110

Ethnic mobilization and claims for the protection of minority fights are

two of the most important social forces influencing international and

national political and constitutional developments. Numerous countries of

the world and Eastern Europe that have embarked upon democratization

since thelate 1980s have experienced the destructive force of ethnic

mobilization and discontent... Following world war two the protection of

minority groupswas initially played down or ignored altogether in the belief

or hope that adequate protection of individual rights would also address the

fears ofminority groups. 15

The ethno-nationalism that has swept the world

in recent years has brought back to prominence the issue of minority

protection, self-determination, and the rights of indigenous people.In

international law and politics there is a move away from the assimilation of

minorities towards the recognition of cultural pluralism as a desirable

goal.16

Several factors can be named as contributory to this shift in perception.

First of all is the fact that only 20 of the 193 member-states of the United

Nations can be regarded as homogeneous communities.17

The rest are

heterogeneous communities which have to manage the relation between

minorities and the society at large. It appears that the majority of people on

this earth are identified with a group whose cultural and religious practices

violate certain international norms of human rights.18

More and more the

apparent discrepancy between individual human rights and the rights of

minorities is observed. Secondly, ideologies which promoted cultural

globalism19

and political holism as also the various instances of religious

intolerance and ethnic cleansing, contributed to the new appreciation of the

rights of minorities.These negative movements resulted in revolts, racism,

civil wars and the seeking of nation-state status by minorities.

15

See: DEVENISH, G.E (1999): Minority Rights and Cultural Pluralism. Tydskrif

vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg, Vol. 62, 1999, p. 203. 16

See: Ibid, p. 224. 17

See: BORNMAN, E (1998): Groepsregte in 'n nuwe demokratiese bestel in Suid-

Afrika. In Focus forum, Vol. 5, 1998, p. 17. 18

See: SMOLIN, D.M. (1996): Will International Human Rights Be Used as a Tool

of Cultural Genocide? The Interaction of Human Rights Norms. Religion,

Culture and Gender. In Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 12, 1996, p. 143. 19

See: GAAL, B. (1997): Religious Minorities in Central Europe and Their

Relationships to the State. Reformed World, Vol. 47, 1997, p. 72.

111

The new interest in the rights of minorities is especially evident in the

actions of the United Nations since the 1960s. The well-known International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) states the

following (art. 27) regarding the rights of minorities:

In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities

exist,persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right,

incommunity with the other members of the group, to enjoy their own

culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own

language.20

This resolution was complemented by the Declaration of the

Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and

Linguistic Minorities, adopted by the United Nations general assembly on

18 December 1992.(17) The most recent document elaborates on the 1967

resolution (art. 2) as follows:

Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic

minorities (hereinafter referred to as persons belonging to minorities) have

the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own

religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and

without interference or any form of discrimination.

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

is the most extensive document from the Council of Europe regarding the

protection of minority rights. As of 17 March 2009 the FCNM had been

signed by forty-three states and ratified by thirty-nine Member States. The

Convention is usually considered to be the first legally binding multilateral

treaty on national minority rights. The FCNM makes clear that the

protection of minority rights is an integral part of the protection of human

rights and as such 'falls within the scope of international co-operation'.21

The title of the Convention immediately draws attention to its 'framework'

20

See: UNITED NATIONS (1995): The United Nations and Human Rights 1945-

1995. New York: UN, 1995, p. 239. 21

Note: Art. 1. declares: The protection of national minorities and of the rights and

freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities forms an integral part of the

international protection of human rights, and as such falls within the scope of

international co-operation'.

112

character suggesting, that FCNM does not provide strict normative

standards, instead it offers a set of goals to be followed by states.

Many observers see the title of the Convention as softening of legal

obligations on states party, however from a strictly legal point of view the

FCNM is a treaty under international law and it creates obligations in

international law for states.22

The FCNM covers a wide range of issues,

where persons belonging to minorities may have specific rights, and it also

underlines the importance of the right to use minority language in education,

and the freedom of expression in minority languages both in private and in

public spheres. Despite the apparent weakness of the legal commitments on

language rights enshrined in the Language Charter and the FCNM, both

treaties are important to designing a European-wide legal framework for the

protection of minority languages. They also offer a conceptual interpretation

of the reasons why the recognition and support of minority languages are a

specific commitment of all European states.

4.4 The situation of minority languages in Europe

Today in European Union Member States, around 40 million people -

almost 10 percent of the total population - speak languages different from

the majority language in their own country. Within the EU, besides the 23

official languages of the 28 Member States more than 60 regional or

minority languages are spoken which enjoy very different legal positions in

their countries. Some regional or minority languages enjoy official status,

others are just recognized by the state with a limited sphere of use, while

there are some countries where there is no legal recognition of minority

languages. This shows a great variety of state language policies and their

approach towards the recognition of a plurilingual society.

From a historical perspective the social role of language in integrating

the different groups of society was so strong, that in the 1 9th century it led

22 See: THORNBERRY, P. – ESTÉBANEZ, M. A. M. (2004): Minority Rights in

Europe: A Review of the Work

and Standards of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe

Publishing, 2004, pp. 91-92.

113

to the glorification of language as the symbolic tool of national unity. As a

consequence the nationalist movements of that period, which largely

contributed to creating modern nation-states inclined to degrade or

subjugate other dialects and non-dominant languages within the developing

constitutional framework. National and cultural identity cannot always be

defined by linguistic differences between groups, but in a European context

language often provides the most significant building block of national,

cultural community identity. Preserving the language is also often a way of

maintaining group identity, a way of maintaining inter-generational links

with one's ancestors. In one way or another, language often becomes a key

symbol of national identity and protecting it becomes an outstanding duty of

the community in preserving its identity. Preserving the language is never

just preserving a tool for communication: it is also about preserving cultural

traditions, political claims, historical consciousness and national identity.23

The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, the

Minority Languages Charter, entered into force on 1 March 1998. Unlike

most documents related to the protection of minority rights, the Language

Charter is not aimed at the protection of minority communities, its primary

goal is the 'protection of historical regional and minority languages of

Europe' 24

and it stresses that the 'protection and promotion of regional or

minority languages' is an 'important contribution to the building of a Europe

based on (. . .) cultural diversity.'25

The Charter does not acknowledge

individual or collective minority rights; its fundamental goal is to provide an

appropriate framework for the protection of regional or minority languages.

The explanatory report states that the Language Charter does not

conceive of regional, minority languages and official languages 'in terms of

competition or antagonism', but it stresses the importance of a multicultural

approach 'in which each category of language has its proper place'.26

Thus,

the terms 'regional' and 'minority' in regard to languages were used in the

23

See: KYMLICKA, W. – GRIN, F. (2003): Assessing the politics of diversity in

transition countries. In DAFTARI, F. - GRIN, F (eds.): Nation building,

Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries. Budapest / Flensburg:

LGPSRI 2003, pp. 1-28 24

See: European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. Preambule, part.

2. 25

See: Ibid, part. 6. 26

See: Ibid, 14.

114

Language Charter with reference to less widespread languages. The

fundamental concept of the Language Charter is that regional or minority

languages should be protected in their cultural functions, in the spirit of a

multilingual, multicultural European reality.

4.5 Constitutional Protection of Minorities It is estimated that one out of every eight citizens of the European Union

speaks a minority language.27

Minority language groups, in particular, have

been the subject of efforts by Member States to protect and preserve

linguistic diversity within their borders. When a minority language

achieves official status, it obtains a unique legal status within the state. The

most obvious case of formal constitutional recognition is Ireland. Ireland's

Constitution declares that the Irish language (Gaeilge, in Irish) is the "first

official language" of Ireland, though it technically a minority language and

less frequently used than English--the "second" official language.28

Finland

is another example, where the Swedish-speaking minority is protected by

the official status of Swedish in Finland.29

Through a unique constitutional apparatus, the Belgian Constitution

impliedly recognizes three official languages. Belgium can be divided into

three ethno-linguistic groupings, with a Flemish-speaking majority (about

27

See: PALERMO, F. (2001): The Use of Minority Languages: Recent

Developments in EC Law and Judgments of the ECJ. 8 MAASTRICHT J.

EURO. & COMP. L., pp. 299, 2001. 28

See: Irish Constitution. Art 8. Aavailable at

<http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20

files/Constitution%20of%20IrelandNov2004.pdf>. Note: Interestingly, Ireland

was the only signatory to the treaties that did not require that its national and

official language should be a working language of the European Community.

See: Nia mh Nic SHUIBHNE (1996): The Impact of European Law on

Linguistic Diversity. 5 IRISH J. EURO. L., pp. 63, 69, 1996; but see infra note

91. But parallelly with joining of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union

in 2007, and the recognition of Bulgarian and Romanian languages as the EU

official languages, the Irish language became one of the official EU languages,

too. 29

Note: The Finnish Constitution establishes both Finnish and Swedish as national

languages.

115

fifty-five percent), a sizable francophone minority (about forty percent) and

a small but significant regionally concentrated German-speaking population

(about five percent).30

Article 2 of the Belgian Constitution divides Belgium

into three "Communities": a German-speaking Community, a Flemish-

speaking Community, and a French-speaking Community.31

In addition,

Article 3 provides that Belgium is comprised of three regions: the Walloon

region, the Flemish region, and the Brussels region.32

Roughly speaking, the

francophone Community resides in Walloon, along with the German-

speaking minority.33

Brussels is split between Flemish and French

speakers.34

The Walloon region and the Flemish region are located,

respectively, in southern and northern Belgium.

Each Community elects a Community Council to act on its behalf.35

The

constitution lays out a complicated scheme of government that grants to the

linguistic communities varying degrees of autonomy over core cultural

competences including education, cultural policy, and inter-Community

cooperation. A sort of minority veto exists as well. The Communities are

grouped in the federal parliament such that if three-quarters of a linguistic

group believe a proposed law threatens to "gravely damage" inter-

Community relations, the dissenting group may halt the legislative process

and initiate a set of special review procedures. The regional governments

are elected by the Community Councils and their powers are derived from

devolutions from the federal government.

30

See: CUTLER, L. - SCHWARTZ, H. (1991): Constitutional Reform in

Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum? 58 U. CHI. L. REV. pp. 511, 551-552

(1991). 31

See: The Belgian Constitution. Brussels: Belgian House of Representatives,

October 2007. Art. 2. 32

See: The Belgian Constitution. Brussels: Belgian House of Representatives,

October 2007. Art. 4. 33

See: The New Encyclopedia Britannica. Vol. 4. 15th ed., London: Encyclopedia

Britannica 1998, p. 828. 34

See: The New Encyclopedia Britannica. Vol. 4. 15th ed., London: Encyclopedia

Britannica 1998, p. 584. 35

See: The Belgian Constitution. Brussels: Belgian House of Representatives,

October 2007. Arts. 115-121.

116

Notably, and unlike the Finnish and Irish examples, Belgium's federal

constitution does not recognize any official languages ,36

but instead

attempts to map its constitutional system onto an already-existing linguistic

situation. The regions and Communities themselves must determine, by way

of procedures outlined in the federal constitution, the trajectory of their own

linguistic policy.37

To use the popular legal binary, Belgium is concerned

primarily with granting procedural rights to linguistic groups, and eschews

substantive rights at the federal level. Though German is an "implied"

official language, rights to use German are limited in scope geographically;

it is officially recognized in only the nine municipalities that make up the

German-speaking Community.38

In addition, the federal government has granted German speakers limited

rights to use German in administrative capacities in a small group of

municipalities in the French-speaking Walloon region. Thus, though the

constitution recognizes the German-speaking minority and incorporates it

into the constitutional order, on the ground German speakers can rely on

limited regional rights. The constitution thus divides Belgium's geographic

space according to the languages spoken in those regions. The Belgian

Constitution presupposes an interaction between minority language groups

and the majority Flemish Community on the federal and regional levels.

Italy is the Member State wherein the largest number of minority

populations reside. Article 6 charges the Italian Republic with "protecting

its linguistic minorities with appropriate norms."39

Nevertheless, and in

part due to the protections already in place from the regions system, the

36

See: COUNCIL OF EUROPE VENICE COMMISSION (2002): On Possible

Groups of Persons to which the Framework Convention for the Protection of

National Minorities Could Be Applied in Belgium. CDL-AD 1, para. 22 (2002)

(March 12, 2002), Venice, Italy, Mar. 8-9, 2002. Available at

<http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL(2002)021-e.asp>. 37

See: The Belgian Constitution. Brussels: Belgian House of Representatives,

October 2007. Arts. 129-130. 38

See: PAS, W (2004): A Dynamic Federalism Built on Static Principles: The Case

of Belgium. In Federalism, Subnational Constitutions, and Minority Rights. pp.

157, 158-159. In TARR, G. A. et al. (eds.) (2004). 39

See: Constitution of Italy. Art.6. See also: PEGORARO, L. (2003): The Italian

Constitution: Text and Notes. Bologna: Libreria Bonomo, 2003. ISBN

9788888095332.

117

Italian Parliament passed general protective legislation pursuant to its

Article 6 powers in 1999 - fifty-one years after the Constitution entered into

force. The 1999 law protects the language and culture of the Albanian,

Catalan, German, Greek, Slovene, and Croat populations, as well as those

speaking French Provencal, Friulan, Ladin, Occitan, and Sardinian.

Spain's 1978 Constitution adopts a similar decentralized constitutional

system with respect to its autochthonous languages.40

Despite establishing

Castilian as the official language of Spain, the preamble to the Constitution

"proclaims its intention protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the

exercise of human rights, of their cultures and traditions, and of their

languages and institutions."41

The inclusion of "languages" in a preamble's

laundry list falls short of the unambiguous protective mandate contained in

Article 6 of the Italian Constitution, but nevertheless indicates the central

role Spain plays in protecting Spanish language and culture. Article 2, in

turn, guarantees a "right to autonomy" for the "nationalities and regions of

which Spain is composed."42

As far as decentralized linguistic policy is concerned, the more

interesting passage is Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution, which explains

how the "right to autonomy" is exercised in the linguistic realm. Article 3,

after establishing Castilian as the official language of Spain, declares that

the "remaining Spanish languages also have official status in the

autonomous communities, in accordance with their respective Statutes." 43

Among the seventeen autonomous communities, provided for in the

Constitution itself, are various groups that have historically had languages

40

See also: generally, C.E. arts. 143-158 (Spain). For a more complete discussion

of the Spanish Constitution and linguistic rights, see: Giovanni POGGESCHI's

appropriately titled article The Linguistic Struggle in the Almost Federal

Spanish System. In ZAGAR, M. - JESIH, B. - BESTER, R. (eds.) (1999): The

Constitutional and Political Regulation of Ethnic Relations and Conflicts. pp.

313, 315. 41

See: C.E. pmbl. available at

<http://www.boe.es/datos_iberlex/normativa/TL/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf>. 42

See: The Spanish Constitution. Art.2. See also: Spain´s Constitution of 1978 with

Amendments through 2011. Madrid: constituteproject.org, 11 March 2015. 43

See: Ibid, art.3

118

of their own (as well as nationalist aspirations), such as Catalonia, the

Basque Country, and Galicia.44

Lacking the decentralized regional, or community, structure of Spain and

Italy, other Member States administer similar policies from the central

government authorities. In the Netherlands, for instance, the Frisian

language is spoken in Friesland, a province with a population of 610,000.45

Almost fifty-five percent of the provincial population considers Frisian to be

their mother tongue, and about seventy-five percent know how to speak it.46

The Dutch government has stated formally that, along with Dutch,

Frisian is an indigenous language of the Netherlands.47

Parliament has gone

beyond mere recognition, by enacting measures aimed at accommodating

Frisian speakers in Friesland, including inter alia: detailed rules on the use

of Frisian in an administrative or judicial capacity; rules establishing the

legal basis for changing toponymical names from Dutch into Frisian; and

provisions to encourage the use of Frisian in schools.

Though the Frisian language is not threatened, and seems to be enjoying

a wide range of accommodating measures from the central Dutch

government, it must be remembered that the Dutch Constitution is silent

with respect to minority languages,48

and that the Friesland province has no

decentralized grant of authority, from the constitution or otherwise, to take

affirmative protective measures. In the Netherlands, the central government

guarantees minority language rights primarily pursuant to treaty obligations.

Similar concessions are made for the Mirandes community in northern

Portugal.

Another fascinating permutation of this strategy resulted in the "Good

Friday Agreement" entered into between Ireland and the United Kingdom in

44

See: GUIBERNAU, M. (2000): Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country. In

O'NEILL, M. – AUSTIN, D. (eds.) (2000): Democracy and Cultural Diversity.

p. 55. 45

See: LAANEN, F. Van: The Frisian Language in the Netherlands. In Minority

Rights in Europe. 46

See: Ibid. 47

See: Ibid. 48

Note: The Netherlands is one of two members of the EU having a written

constitution that has no mention of official languages.The other is Denmark.

119

1998. That treaty, among other more urgent objectives, granted limited

formal recognition to Irish and various dialects of Scots in Northern

Ireland.49

In recent years, the United Kingdom has made similar allowances for the

659,000 Welsh speakers in Wales50

and the sixty thousand Scottish Gaelic

speakers in Scotland.51

Prior to 1993, the United Kingdom merely provided

a limited discretion for local judges and administrative officials to permit

the use of Welsh. With the passage of the Welsh Language Act of 1993,

Parliament placed the Welsh language on official status with English in

dealings with the public sector.52

The Welsh Language Act breaks with a predominant policy of

Anglicization and represents a significant change in the United Kingdom's

posture regarding the Welsh minority living in the United Kingdom.53

Parliament made a similar, though less expansive, overture to the Scottish

Gaelic speakers by promulgating the Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act

2005.54

That act granted a limited official status to Scottish Gaelic in

Scotland.

France, more than any other Member State, has adopted the "ostrich

approach" to its minority languages--sticking its head in the sand rather than

acknowledging its linguistic minorities in any meaningful way.55

Article 2

of the French Constitution is notably the only article of that document

addressing language: "French is the language of the Republic."56

49

See: Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations. U.K.-Ireland, April 10,

1998, Vol. 37, I.L.M., pp. 751, 769-770. 50

See: Omniglot Writing Systems & Languages of the World: Welsh (Cymraeg). 51

See: Omniglot Writing Systems & Languages of the World: Scottish Gaelic

(Gaidhlig). Available at <http://www.omniglot.com/writing/gaelic>. 52

See: Welsh Language ACT. London: 1993, c. 38. 53

Cf. SADAT WEXLER, L. (1996): Official English, Nationalism, and Linguistic

Terror. A French Lesson, 71 WASH. L. REV. pp. 285, 337 nn. 215-216 (1996)

(discussing examples of the United Kingdom's monolingual tendencies). 54

See: TOLL, A. P. (2011): Gaelic Language (Scotland) ACT 2005. London:

Ceed Publishing, 2011, c. 7. ISBN 9786136782324. 55

See: ADDIS, A. (2001): Cultural Integrity and Political Unity: The Politics of

Language in Multilingual States. 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J., pp. 719, 730-31, 2001. 56

See: La Constitution. Art. 2. See also: CHANTEBOUT, B. (1992): La

Constitution française. Propos pour un débat. Paris: Dalloz 1992.

120

Postcolonial France has been the prototype of an assimilation-oriented

society,57

and has yet to extend formal recognition to its autochthonous

minority languages, despite the fact that an estimated 9 million French

citizens speak a minority language.58

Indeed, the French accession to the European Charter of Regional and

Minority Languages was stonewalled by the high French Constitutional

Council because certain provisions in the Charter purported to create group

rights (in violation of the unity of the French Republic) and to grant quasi-

official status to minority languages (in violation of Article 2 of the

Constitution).59

The French government has passed a handful of administrative decrees

and laws regarding the school instruction of minority languages, as well as

their presence in the mass media. Such measures are predictably toothless,

and are nearly always phrased so as to give ultimate discretion to the

teachers, school administration, or those exerting control over the public

media.

Conclusions

As illustrated in many countries in and outside Europe since the end of

the Second World War, irredentism, border disputes or external intervention

may exacerbate communal tensions. Minorities are often concentrated

around international frontiers, so minority problems have usually come to

the fore when international borders have been redrawn. If borders are to be

preserved without the use of force it is quite natural that governments

should be advised to treat their minorities equitably, for it is assimilationist

and discriminatory policies that are likely to stir discontent and provoke

secessionist claims.

The UN Declaration on Minorities, Recommendation 1201 of the

Council of Europe and the Council of Europe Framework Convention for

57

See: CITRON, S. (1992): L'Histoire de France: Autrement. p. 174, 1992. 58

See: Les 75 langues minoritaires de France. In L'Humanité, Paris, June 25, 1999.

Available at <http://www.humanite.fr/journal/1999-06-25/1999-06-25-29195>. 59

See: OELLERS-FRAHM, K. (1999): International Decision: Charte Europeenne

des Langues Regionales ou Minoritaires. 93 AM. J. INT'L L., pp. 913, 938-941,

1999.

121

National Minorities advise that minorities should have the right to have

links with their kin in neighboring countries, but this can only be possible if

there is no fear of irredentism. The old concern about irredentism existed

precisely because it could destabilize countries.

In post-cold war Europe cross-border links are possible and are regarded

as a right, as harbingers of peace, but they entail the renunciation by

countries of territorial claims. This is the context in which international

instruments such as the Council of Europe Framework Convention

forNational Minorities and theEuropean Charter for Regional or Minority

Languages recommend cooperation between regional or local authorities in

territories where the same language is used.

Today in Europe, the privilege for legal regulation of languages is not

limited exclusively to the states. The development of international human

rights law has led to the recognition of minority language rights on an

international level. Besides the universal principle of non-discrimination, in

a European context, the Language Charter and the FCNM can be considered

as offering guidelines for all European states in regulating language rights.

Within the European Union the regulation of language use is rather

functional and technical, although the recognition of all 23 state languages

as official languages in the EU leads us to the primarily political

acknowledgement of the equality of languages. The main question is how

should this principle of equality be extended to minority or regional

languages as well?

In this respect five main issues need to be taken into consideration: The

original economic and political rationale behind promoting multilingualism

within the EU should be reformulated: enhancing a more effective economic

and political integration also through the promotion of linguistic diversity

and shall not be restricted to 'state languages'. In the process of deepening

integration, states are not the exclusive boundaries of cultural or linguistic

diversity. For instance the use of languages in border regions, in a

'borderless Europe' shall not necessarily be limited by state sovereignty but

could be facilitated by Community programs as well.

122

Associate Professor Zenun HALILI

Zenun HALILI earned his master‟s

degree (M.A., 2001) in Political Science

at the Faculty of Social Sciences of

Texas A&M University, in College

Station, Texas, USA. And his doctorate

(PhD 2004) at the Faculty of Philosophy

of the University of Prishtina, Kosovo.

During his PhD studies, his scientific and

research activities focused on

Comparative Politics and American

Politics. In 2004, he successfully defended his dissertation

„Separation of Powers- Checks and Balances in U.S. Government“ at

the Department of Political Science of the University of Prishtina.

Currently Professor HALILI is serving as Senior Political Advisor at

the Ministry of Education, Science & Technology, Republic of

Kosovo. He published two books: 1. American Political System

(2006) and 2. The Middle East - History and Politics (2010).

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5 Ethnicity asa security approach - a key factor for peace and stability1

Rastislav KAZANSKÝ

Abstract: In our contribution we are trying to present some security

aspects for security which is contemporary but sometimes only in the hidden

form. This social and security factor is ethnicity. The issue of conflicts on

ethnic basis, and to the foreign world politics is clearly dominated since the

Cold War. Particular attention is paid to the ethnic conflict, not least

because they often result in severe war crimes such as genocide. Many

ethnic conflicts are leading to the considerable loss of life, serious denial of

basic human rights and material destruction, and some even escalate into

inter-ethnic or internal war. Ethnic conflicts can be defined as conflicts

between ethnic groups in a multiethnic state, which often take place as a

result of ethnic nationalism and the parties may appear to be not resolved.

The problem is trying to settle conflicts, not only theory but also modern

safety science. In our contribution we will try to illustrate selected aspects

of the relationship of national and international security and ethnic

coexistence that have an immediate impact on current international

relations.

Keywords: ethnic conflict, ethnicity, international relations, security

Introduction

At present, most operating State comprises more than one ethnic group,

and this divergence is the internal challenges of democratic governance and

the predominant world the concept of the nation state itself. One of the

1 This contribution was published with support of the project VEGA 1/0160/14

(Politické zmeny v rokoch 1945-1948 a ich dopad na povojnovú spoloĉnosť na

Slovensku.) Associate Prof. PhDr. Rastislav KAZANSKÝ, PhD. is Head of Department of

Security Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Matej

Bel University, Kuzmányho 1, 974 00 Banská Bystrica

(rastislav.kazansky@umb.sk).

130

problems that embodies this fact, the difference between the numerous

states that the law does not recognize its territory, ethnic pluralism and those

still looking for ways to deal with the ethnic divergence more constructive.

Ruling components of some states entirely deny the existence of ethnic

groups as a whole, while others provide for them strict legal criteria, which

placed them at a specific object of interest policies.

However, as ethnicity, nationalism and the accompanying conflict factor

becomes the object of investigation and theory conflicts not only in political

science? The answer may be finding that the human community as ethnic

groups that speak different languages and have different cultural traditions,

differences in everyday life there are undoubtedly thousands of small

conflicts, collapses. If people leave much room everyday conflicts do not

extend further. If these questions up to date state-political level, when

dealing with ethnic specific laws, if a solution based ethnic issues specific

ministries and special government agencies, and becomes the subject of

crisis management relationship and the security of individuals and those

approved, then the problems multiply.2 Not only in the broad eastern areas,

had the question arisenethnocracy (political means secured application

interests of the majority nation, ethnic group) as a sort of principle and

practice of the power structure. Author notes that precisely because of the

increasing ethnic conflicts and to resolve them, begins at the state-political

level with her ethnic policy apply. 3

Currently, talks about the crisis, respectively the end of multiculturalism

as a recipe for a peaceful solution to ethnic conflicts in society.4 This

argument has already penetrated into the dictionary of the current political

elite view of current security threats and even open conflicts that escalate in

the postmodern society of latent - hidden forms of structural and cultural

violence, which is an integral part of ethnicity.5 Therefore it is necessary to

2 See: GOMBÁR , C. (2000). O národe, etniku a štáte. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2000,

228 s. ISBN 80-7149-2477. 3 See: Ibid.

4 See: FENDEK, P. (2000). Súmrak európskej civilizácie nová verzia. [online] [Cit.

9.9.2011.]. Available:

<http://www.pfendek.sk/files/Zanik_europskej_kultury_a_civilizacie.pdf>. 5 See: GALTUNG, J. (1996). Peace by peacefulmeans: peace and conflict,

development and civilization. Oslo: PRIO, 1996, 272 s. ISBN: 0-8039-75112.

131

understand ethnicity and its relationship to ethnic policy as one aspect of

conditioning the security situation in the society, country and region.

5.1 The relationship Ethnicity and Policy

The issue of conflicts is based on ethnicity into the fore in the world and

politics clearly dominated by the Cold War. Particular attention is paid to

the ethnic conflict, not least because they often result in severe war crimes

such as genocide. Many ethnic conflicts lead to substantial loss of life,

serious denial of basic human rights and destruction of material, some even

escalate into inter-ethnic or internal war.

Ethnic conflicts can be understood as conflicts between ethnic groups in

a multiethnic state, which often take place as a result of ethnic nationalism

and interested parties may appear to be not solved. The problem is trying to

settle conflicts, not only theory but also modern safety science. In our

contribution we try to illustrate selected aspects of the relationship of

national and international security and ethnic coexistence that have an

immediate impact on current international relations.

Despite this, we can abstract some remarks, in which the majority

opinion agrees.

Ethnicity is a cultural characteristic that connects individuals with the

same group of people or groups of people together. Finally we could say

that sometimes the term is used as a synonym for minority group, or a kind

of euphemism for “conflict escalation race."6

Terms such as "ethnic group", "ethnic community", "minority" or

"ethnicity" are used differently by individual authors. In most cases,

however, agree on the following (very loosely shaped) definition: Ethnic

groups are historically the teams or the psychological community, whose

members share a persistent feeling of common interest and identity based on

a combination of shared historical experience and cultural value

characteristics. Exit in such groups over time, even as the course of history

6 See more: TESAŘ, F. (2007). Etnické konflikty. Praha: Portál, 2007. 251 s. ISBN

978-80-7367-097-9

132

occur, they may also change and extinction. However, before a group of

attributes can be called "ethnic" should be in the aforementioned case

definition met the following criteria:

1st: The group must have its name, the name. Names are important not

only for the initial identification of the group, but also play a role expressive

emblems collective personality.

2nd

: Language - is also a strong indicator of ethnicity and ethnic identity.

Results on language policy and language rights are often the main reason for

ethnic conflicts. Many of the linguistic minorities in the world are officially

forbidden to use their language in public, whether in the media.

3rd

: Religion, which is a historically important milestone ethnic identity.

Especially in societies where religion affects different spheres of social life,

can become a dominant factor and thus determinant for the establishment of

a specific ethnicity. becomes to be the ethnic character. The more religious

factors are associated with the other elements of social life, the greater the

level of religion in defining ethnicity is involved.

4th: A fourth feature of the definition of ethnicity is a territory. It is the

physical basis of economic and political structures, which are the main

forces in the life of ethnic groups and nations. The territorial state is

considered for determining the existence of an element of the nation in

modern times. Many ethnic groups themselves as nations, is trying to set up

your own territorial state (Kurds, Palestinians, Tamil). Most ethnic groups

in the world is identified with a particular territory, which is not only their

living space, but also real, or mythical country of origin, even sometimes

enriched by sacred significance.

5th: Common culture, which consists of a complex of different ethnic

groups of elements. The definition of ethnic groups, culture is a system of

values, symbols and meanings, norms and customs shared members. Culture

defines the way of life that distinguishes one from another ethnic group.7

7 See: TURTON D., GONZÁLES, J. (1999): EU Cultural Identities and ethnic

minorities in Europe. In EU Cultural Identities and ethnic minorities in Europe.

[online]. Bilbao : Universidad de Deusto 1999 [Cit. 14.2.2011.]. Available at

<http://www.humanitariannet.deusto.es/publica/PUBLICACIONES_PDF/01

%20Ethnic%20 Minorities.pdf>.

133

The concept of ethnic relations includes the widely differentiated forms

of social relations which link with the cultural differences is paramount.

Milton Esman identified the following categories of ethnic relations:

• It consists from domination forced operation ethnically divided system

where there are intentional unequal rights, position and opportunity.

• Merging or assimilation of dominance, including the elimination of

ethnic cultures, languages and cultural benefits of alleviating symptoms

(stakeholders).

As mentioned above, one of the basic needs of every individual is self-

categorizations, integration into the community. This is the case of national

conflicts - escalating violence on the basis of hidden -. Counterpart to these

needs, relations are between ethnic communities themselves. We are talking

mainly ethnic hostility, discrimination and exclusion, which throughout

history have recorded in many forms. In general, we can identify three

broad categories of these negative phenomena:

• The forms of ethnic hostility, which include the cruelest acts of

aggression, including the mass society

• Denial of access to social benefits in areas such as employment, school,

and home, health care and so on. Lack of social rights also leads to reduced

opportunities for political participation,

• Using abusive or offensive language, whether such forms of

presentation that is perceived as offensive.8

As will be discussed below, may be a minority group within the existing

institutional arrangements require more political, economic, cultural and

administrative autonomy, and may even insist on separation from the

existing state unit and establishing their own independent political entity

under the new (i.e. federal) structure . On the other hand, it is possible that

this group is not satisfied with the democratic reforms within the existing

state system, aiming at implementing democracy, ethnic power-sharing or

8 See: WOLFF, S. (2011): Ethnic minorities in Europe: The Basic Facts. In Ethnic

minorities in Europe: The Basic Facts. [online]. Nottingham : Centre for

international crisis management and conflict resolution, 2011 [Cit. 21.2.2011.].

Available at: <http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/min-eu.pdf>.

134

simply more equal representation. There is a need to see the current high

separatist attempts ending with national and regional conflicts in the

present.

In many cases, those ethnic groups seeking greater autonomy, defeated

and winning central authority to have in setting its own conditions of free

realm law. In other cases again the separatist ethnic groups successfully

manage to establish their own state. To summarize the previous arguments,

we can say that there are three types of results of ethnic conflicts:

• Peaceful reconciliation

• Peaceful subdivision

• War.9

Even here we can see that the current relations of ethnicity and security

in the plane so the debate on the issues of building not only a negative peace

(absence of open ethnic violence) as well as slightly positive (way to

remove the latent forms of violence - structural and cultural. (GALTUNG,

1996). But it also shows the ethnicity of its aspects as a permanent security

threat escalation of violence in contemporary international relations.

The existence of minorities in the country does not necessarily lead to

conflict. A lot depends on the facts, to what extent is given by members of

minority ethnic identity politically heterogeneous ("projecting"), which

promotes political agendas and how the majority group responds to its

demands. Politically mobilized ethnic groups have a wide range of sources

from which to draw, and the decision to use them depends on the central

points of their requirements, which are due to the results in the final group

of development to different political agendas in order to achieve conditions

that deem to maintain, express and develop this identity. From different

political agendas of ethnic minorities is increasing different types of

requirements. These requirements may be associated either with the concept

of ethnicity or territory.

9 See: ISMAYLOV, G.,G. (2011): Ethnic conflicts and their causes. In Ethnic

conflicts and their causes. [online]. Tokyo: Jyochi university, 2011 [Cit.

21.9.2011.]. Available at: <dspace.khazar.org

/jspui/.../136/1/Gursel%20G.%20Ismayilov.doc>.

135

Ethnic demands increased in relation to one or more related areas: self-

determination, language, religious and cultural rights, access to resources /

equality of opportunity and / or material and political assistance to support

these requirements. Ethnic minorities such requirements rise in the face of

the host state or host nation and / or, where possible, to the state, or nation

ethnically close. In the absence of ethnically close people or other external

actors (international organizations, individual states) can search for

minorities and lobby for filling the position of patron. Territorial

requirements are similar to those of ethnic, it is a phenomenon of domestic

relations - as well as interethnic and international relations and we can

distinguish between nature and the level of territorial requirements.

5.2 Ethnic conflict and ethnicity

Ethnic conflicts can be defined as conflicts between ethnic groups in a

multiethnic state, which often take place as a result of ethnic nationalism

and interested parties may appear to be not solved. According Michael E.

BROWN is an ethnic conflict "a dispute about important political,

economic, cultural or territorial issues between two or more ethnic

communities. Many ethnic conflicts lead to substantial loss of life, serious

denial of basic human rights and material destruction, some even escalate

into inter-ethnic or internal war.10

The issue of conflicts based on ethnicity into the fore in the world and

politics clearly dominated by the Cold War. Particular attention is paid to

the ethnic conflict, not least because they often result in severe war crimes

as genocide, but also various forms of organized crime.

Academic explanations of ethnic conflict generally falls into one of three

research schools: Primordial‟s, instrumentalism, and constructivism.11

The

scientific debate in this case, often centered on the question of how to

effectively manage conflict through instruments such as konsocialism

10

See: BROWN, M., E. (1993): Ethnic conflict and international security.

Princeton: Princeton university press, 1993, 288 s. ISBN13: 978-0-691-00068-8. 11

See: ŃMÍD, T. - VAĎURA, V. (2007): Etnické konflikty v postkomunistickém

prostoru. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2007. 278 s. ISBN

978-80-7325-26-0.

136

whether federalization and some question whether the phenomenon of

ethnic conflict really has grown in importance until the end of the Cold

War."12

Representatives of primordial approaches to ethnic conflict ethnicity

construed as an innate trait. They argue that "ethnic groups and nationalities

exist precisely because there is a tradition of faith and incentives toward

primary objects such as biological features and especially territorial

allocation."13

Philosophical background of this concept is linked with names

like Johann Gottlieb FICHTE, and Johann Gottfried HERDER.

Primordialism very term first used at the end of the 40s of the 20th century

Clifford GEERTZ in the context of prevailing and nameless individuals

with ties to social groups. 14

According to supporters of instrumental direction of ethnic identity is the

result of social construction. Anthony SMITH notes that instrumental access

"came into the consciousness of the 60th and 70 years in the U.S. debate on

the (white) ethnic persistence of what should be an efficient boiler "(for

philosophizing about ethnicity and its political implications).”15

In view of

the ethnic identification of the instrumentalists' and ethnicity are race seen

as instrumental identities organized as a means to achieve certain

conclusions.”16

Ininstrumental access is not important whether ethnicity is

associated with the fixed perception. Even supporters of this school

generally not opposed to the notion that ethnic diversity is part of many

conflicts, or that many aggressive human beings believe they are fighting

against such differences. Instrumentalists simply argue that ethnic diversity

is insufficient to explain the conflict.

12

See: TURTON D. - GONZÁLES, J. (1999): EU Cultural Identities and ethnic

minorities in Europe. In EU Cultural Identities and ethnic minorities in Europe.

[online]. Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1999 [Cit. 14.2.2011.]. Available at

<http://www.humanitariannet.deusto.es/publica/PUBLICACIONES_PDF/

01%20Ethnic%20Minorities.pdf>. 13

See: ŃMÍD, T. - VAĎURA, V. (2007): Etnické konflikty v postkomunistickém

prostoru. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2007. 278 s. ISBN

978-80-7325-26-0, p. 12. 14

See: Ibid. 15

See: Ibid. 16

See: SMITH, Anthony (2001): Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History.

Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. ISBN 978-07-456-2396-2

137

Constructivist approaches can partly be seen as a continuation

instrumental doctrine and partly as an attempt to incorporate this learning

also benefit other schools. Exaggeration, we can note that it is a synthesis of

several learning. Formalization of the theory of constructivism is generally

associated with Jean PIAGET, who expressed a mechanism by which

knowledge is internalized knowledges. He thought that, through processes

of assimilation and adaptation are individuals from their experience new

insights. To set up a process of assimilation of individuals, incorporating

new experiences into the existing network without changing their

knowledge framework. This can occur when an individual experiences are

in accordance with their own presentation of the world, but can also occur

as a failure to change or incorrect understanding.17

You could say that the dispute between supporters of the said school

ended most decided, because "ethnicity is on the one hand recognized as a

special category, which superiority over other types of group identification

is manifested to me in moments of perceived threat. On the other hand was

demonstrated the possibility of changing ethnicity - despite

primordialistickému believe that this innate characteristic change is not

possible. To conclude this discussion it should be noted that contemporary

political scientists rarely consider a particular philosophical school. On the

contrary, we see numerous attempts to connect the two theories are not

necessarily in contradiction. Their use in empirical practice is questionable.

"18

Some supporters of the study of ethnic conflict and civil wars19

,

however, introduced theories that portray inner views on the issues of ethnic

17

See: TURTON D. - GONZÁLES, J. (1999): EU Cultural Identities and ethnic

minorities in Europe. In EU Cultural Identities and ethnic minorities in Europe.

[online]. Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1999 [Cit. 14.2.2011.]. Available at

<http://www.humanitariannet.deusto.es/publica/PUBLICACIONES_PDF/

01%20Ethnic%20Minorities.pdf>. 18

See: ŃMÍD, T. - VAĎURA, V. (2007): Etnické konflikty v postkomunistickém

prostoru. Brno: CDK, 2007. 278 pp. ISBN 978-80-7325-26-0. 19

See more: ADAŃKOVÁ, D. (2010): Transnacionálny organizovaný zloĉin a jeho

dopad na bezpeĉnosť Európskej únie. In Bezpeĉné Slovensko a Európska únia..

[Zbornìk prìspevkov zo 4. medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie, Końice 11. - 12.

november 2010.]. Końice: Vysoká ńkola bezpeĉnostného manaņérstva v

Końiciach, 2010, pp. 11-16. ISBN 978-80-89282-44-9.

138

conflict from the perspective of all three schools and traditional ideas.

Monica DUFFY TOFT example shows how the settlement patterns of

ethnic groups and socially constructed identity and charismatic leaders

demonstrate the indivisibility of these elements and show their inherent

mutual coherence. This empirical research has addressed the concerns that

we can, using the initial, instrumental or constructive approaches very

difficult to explain, and hence why some ethnic divisions escalate to

violence, while others - despite the fact that they originate in the same

geographic region - have no opportunity.20

Although the study of ethnic conflict has a long history, a real interest in

ethnic conflict outside the comparative political science dates from the

collapse of the postcommunist countries. In the above two examples, was

followed by the disintegration of ethnic conflict, which escalated to the use

of violence and the ensuing civil war.

Conclusion

There are many theories dealing with the rise of ethnic conflicts, but as

in most theoretical concepts are contradictory, there is no single

comprehensive theory that would be universally accepted and so are created

using the factors that increase the chance of an outbreak of ethnic conflict.

John weasels defined the following factors:

First - every ethnic conflict is the sum of several factors - social,

economic, political, and there are not pure ethnic conflicts dimensions.

Second - the crucial point that determines the turning point between

stability and ethnic movements pointing to the escalation of the conflict is

always a need for self-determination (self-awareness) in the dominant

majority.

Third - Ethnic conflict linked to the non-dominant group, if it feels the

oppression of any kind.

20

See: DUFFY TOFT, M. (2003): The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity,

Interests and Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton: Princeton university press,

2003, 256 pp. ISBN 0691113548.

139

4th - Ethnic conflict linked to the dominant group, if the oppression felt

by the wider links, or border, mostly historical ties.

5th - Ethnic conflict is always associated with refugee waves, and

therefore represents a double threat - in the home country in the State, which

hit the refugee wave.

6th - An integral part of ethnic conflicts is xenophobia, racism, genocide

often, all phenomena, which in terms of international law and criminal

addcited. Because, however, have extensive time and territorial action,

enforcement of law in these areas is very low.

7th - Ethnic conflicts always escalate in countries that are characterized

by the precariousness and lack of application of democratic values, because

outbreaks of ethnic conflicts occur in the most so. Third World countries, or

so.weak states (Southeast Asia, Africa, the territory north of the Andes in

Latin America, Southeast Europe, Balkan region, some countries of the

former Soviet Union)

8th - Ethnic conflicts are caused by a concentrated accumulation of

cultural, racial, local, self-identification of language problems that cause

social not-loyal other groups.

9th - Ethnic conflicts are caused by the formation and stabilization of

new institutional forms. The new state not respecting ethnic boundaries, the

emergence of military dictatorships and other authoritarian regimes, but also

representative democracy, which were reduced territory, where the absence

of historical experience consociation.

10th - Ethnic conflicts are due to linguistic reasons.

11th - Ethnic conflicts are caused by efforts to achieve national unity

It should be noted that scientists are divided as in the theories as well as

the factors they consider relevant. Ethnic conflicts arise from the loss of

balance between different ethnic groups interact. Despite the variety of

definitions that we have outlined here, except there is a negative

understanding of ethnic conflict and included, the general consensus in the

fact that conflict is necessary for the development of society. Conflicts in

human society consist of pulses to change the tense situation arising from

differences. These differences can be observed in all sorts of spheres of

human life. It is important to note that despite the latent potential of any

140

further escalation of the conflict is not always necessary that the escalation

actually occurred. May be terminated by consensus of tension, even

cooperate, but the fact remains that armed conflict cannot be excluded.

"Constructive conflict handling can lead to lasting peace and cooperation. ...

Can help to create boundaries in the group that individuals are aware of

common interests21

position in which the conflicts of interest has a

significant impact on its solution.

What are the implications for Slovakia? New challenges on the threshold

of the third millennium, Slovakia and other countries before entering into a

new paradigm. Is a party to the ongoing discussions on the changing

geopolitics, political theory22

, the onset of phase transition to a knowledge-

based society. Co-operation and seeking answers to the questions of who we

are and we walk, it is not possible without an intensive exchange of

knowledge and experience in today's globalizing world. Survive and apply

to one who will aggressively implement unilateral interests but rather in a

spirit of cooperation and assist the development of spiritual and political

development of the mosaic of the peoples of Europe. Visegrád cooperation

is developing a bridge of cooperation towards greater geopolitical entity -

the European Union, made up of Europeans, but also the peoples of Europe.

21

See: MISCHNICK, R. (2006): Nenásilná transformácia konfliktov: Manuál pre

tréning trénerov.[online]. Don Bosco, 2006 [Cit. 10.9.2011.]. Available at: <http

://www.trainingoftrainers.org/img/manual sk.pdf>. 22

See: KUCHARĈÍK, R. (2011):.Pôsobenie Európskej únie na africkom

kontinente. In Medzinárodné vzťahy 2010: Aktuálne otázky svetovej ekonomiky

a politiky. Bratislava: Ekonóm, 2011, pp. 402-408. ISBN 978-80-225-3172-6.

141

Associate Professor PhDr. Rastislav KAZANSKÝ, PhD.

Graduated from the Faculty of Political

Science and International Relations at

Matej Bel University in Banská

Bystrica. At the present, he is working

as a Head of Department of Security

Studies of the Faculty of Political

Science and International Relations at

MBU in Banská Bystrica. He is an

author of the monograph

“Contemporary research problems of

international conflicts and crisis and

their solutions”.

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dopad na bezpeĉnosť Európskej únie. In Bezpeĉné Slovensko a Európska

únia. [Zborník príspevkov zo 4. medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie,

Końice, 11. - 12. novembra 2010.] Końice: Vysoká ńkola bezpeĉnostného

manaņérstva v Końiciach, 2010. pp. 11-16. ISBN 978-80-89282-44-9.

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DUFFY TOFT, M. (2003): The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity,

Interests and Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton: Princeton university

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FENDEK, P. (2000): Súmrak európskej civilizácie nová verzia. [online]

[Cit. 9.9.2011.]. Available at:

<http://www.pfendek.sk/files/Zanik_europskej_kultury_a_ civilizacie.pdf>

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GOMBÁR , C. (2000): O národe, etniku a štáte. Bratislava: Kalligram,

2000, 228 pp. ISBN 80-7149-2477.

HOBSBAWN, E. (2000): Národy a nacionalizmus od roku 1780. Brno:

CDK 2000.

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conflicts and their causes. [online]. Tokyo: Jyochi university, 2011 [cit.

2011-09-21]. Available at:

<http://www.dspace.khazar.org/jspui/.../136/1/Gursel%20G.%20Ismayilov.

doc>.

KALICKÝ, J. – RIEPL C. (2009): Strategic political thinking:

"American diplomacy in your hand". In Politické vedy. Vol. 12, No. 4,

2009, pp. 131-137. Banská Bystrica: Fakulta politických vied

a medzinárodných vzťahov UMB. ISSN 1335-2741.

KUCHARĈÍK, R. (2011): Pôsobenie Európskej únie na africkom

kontinente. In Medzinárodné vzťahy 2010: Aktuálne otázky svetovej

ekonomiky a politiky. Bratislava: Ekonóm 2011, pp. 402-408. ISBN 978-80-

225-3172-6.

MISCHNICK, R. (2006): Nenásilná transformácia konfliktov: Manuál

pre tréning trénerov. [online]. Don Bosco, 2006 [Cit. 10.9.2011.] Available

at: <http://www.trainingoftrainers.org/img/manual sk.pdf>.

SMITH, Anthony (2001): Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History.

Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. ISBN 978-07-456-2396-2.

ŃMÍD, T. - VAĎURA, V. (2007): Etnické konflikty v postkomunistickém

prostoru. Brno: CDK, 2007. 278 s. ISBN 978-80-7325-26-0.

TESAŘ, F. (2007): Etnické konflikty. Praha: Portál, 2007. 251 s. ISBN

978-80-7367-097-9.

TURTON D., GONZÁLES, J. (1999): EU Cultural Identities and ethnic

minorities in Europe. In EU Cultural Identities and ethnic minorities in

Europe. [online]. Bilbao : Universidad de Deusto, 1999 [Cit. 14.2.2011.].

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<http://www.humanitariannet.deusto.es/publica/PUBLICACIONES_PDF

/01%20Ethnic%20Minorities.pdf>.

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Ethnic minorities in Europe: The Basic Facts. [online]. Nottingham: Centre

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21.2.2011.]. Available at: <http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/min-eu.pdf>.

144

145

6 European Integration and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): The politics of conditioning

Anton VUKPALAJ 1

Abstract: EU lacked, until recently, a transitional justice policy.

Nevertheless, EU support for different transitional justice institutions has

been constant. One of these institutions has been the International Criminal

Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The strategy of the EU to push the

former Yugoslavian countries to cooperate with ICTY was that of “carrot

and stick approach”. The conditionning of the process of integration with

the prospect of joining the EU has been extremely effective to support

transitional justice in these countries, but it could not transform

fundamentally the issue of conflict in these countries.

Key words: International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia

(ICTY), European Union, NATO, former Yugoslavian countries, Dayton

Peace Agreement

European Union lacked, until recently, a transitional justice policy.

Catherine ASHTON launched in 2012 the Strategic Framework for Human

Rights and Democracy. This action plan states that a transitional justice

policy will be developed in 2014.2 Nevertheless, EU support for different

transitional justice institutions has been constant. One of these institutions

1 Assistant Professor Anton VUKPALAJ, PhD. is working at the Department of

Political Science, University of Prishtina (anton.vukpalaj@uni-pr.edu). 2 DAVIS, L. (2014): The European Union and Transitional Justice. Available at

<http://www.eplo.org/civil-societydialogue-network.html>.

146

has been the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia

(ICTY). This tribunal was created with resolutions 803 and 827, in March

1993, to investigate crimes committed during the conflicts in the former

Yugoslavia. EU supported this tribunal financially, but the main support has

been to push the former Yugoslavian countries to arrest and transfer to The

Hague their citizens, indicted for war crimes. This has been vital for the

ICTY who lacked a proper police to arrest and transfer the indicted persons

to The Hague. This was all the more important for the Tribunal who faced a

strong opposition in former Yugoslavian countries. This opposition was

particularly high in Serbia wherethe ICTY was considered to be an

instrument of the international community created to put pressure on Serbia.

This was the dominant opinion among Serbs in Bosnia, in Croatia and in

Serbia. Serbia considered ICTY as a political tool. Therefore, ICTY will

have a limited transformative capacity in this country. EU conditioning of

Serbia to cooperate with the Tribunal was, therefore, contributed to this

perception.3

The strategy of the EU to push the former Yugoslavian countries to

cooperate with ICTY was that of “carrot and stick approach”.4 EU fixed the

cooperation with the Tribunal as a precondition for these countries to

advance in their process of EU integration. European Union made its

membership offer to Western Balkans countries conditional on specific

democratic principles, most notably, full cooperation with the ICTY and

respect for the Dayton Peace Agreement.5The aim of this policy of

conditioning was not only to push these countries to make appropriate

changes for a postwar transition but also, to promote reconciliation between

the former enemies. The role of the EU became decisive after the regime

changes in Serbia and Croatia in 2000. Cooperation with ICTY became a

3 BRANIFF, M. (2011): Integrationg the Balkans, conflict resolution and the

impact of EU expansion. London: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd. 2011, p. 137. 4 BECHEV, D. (2006): Carrots, Sticks and Norm: the EU and Regional

Cooperation in Southeast Europe. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,

Vol. 8, No 1, April 2006, pp. 27-43. See also: CATTARUZZA, A. (2008):

L‟affirmation de l‟Union européenne dans les Balkans. Vers une politique

d‟intégration régionale… mais de quelle région? Strates revue, 2008, No 15, pp.

171-187. [Cit. 19.2.2013.] Available at <http:/strates.revue.org/6688>, p. 35. 5 MENZ, C. (2013): Explaining Croatia‟s (non) compliance wiht EU conditionality

on ICTY cooperation: Do external incentives make the difference? Hamburg:

Anchor Academic Publishing 2013, p. 6.

147

standard to measured “the willingness of candidates to participate

effectively in the European concert".6 EU integration process supposed

acceptance of transitional justice mechanisms that, in a long term, had to

produce a conciliatory nature in the Balkans. The difficulties that emerged

from a regional transitional justice project were supposed to transform the

understanding of the State functioning and responsibility. This pressure to

cooperate with the ICTY was an opportunity to promote Human Rights,

minority protection, the right of refugees and returnees etc.7 This was

supposed to allow Western Balkans societies as a whole “to examine the

causes and consequences of the past”.8 Therefore, postwar transitional

policy of the EU towards the former Yugoslavian countries was to

transform the conditionality of cooperate with the ICTY in conditionality

for these countries to deal with the past, through the organization of war

crimes trials in their own countries. EU created special initiatives in order to

promote transitional justice in the local level. Thus, for example, in 2009, it

established, in collaboration with the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY,

the EU/ICTY Project that had to strengthen the capacity of national

prosecutors to deal with war crimes in their own countries.9 EU supported

ICTY diplomatically too. It posed travel bans on persons who were thought

to assist ICTY indictees, to evade justice and freeze assets of the indictees

themselves etc.10

For example, Slobodan MILOŃEVIĆ‟s associates were

banned from entering the EU. Thirteen individuals were banned. In 2004,

this was done for Radovan KARADŅIĆ; in 2005 for the Croatian general,

6 HUBRECHT, J. (2005): Les mutations et les imbroglios de la justice post-conflit.

In ALIGISAKIS, M. (ed.):

Europe et sortie de conflit. Genève: Institut Européen de l'Université de

Genève 2005. 7 BLOCKMANS, S. (2008): Consolidating the enlargement agenda for South

Estern Europe. In BLOCKMANS, S. – PRECHAL, S. (eds.): Reconciling the

Deepening and Widening of European Union. The Hague: TMC Asser Press

2008, pp. 81-82. 8 Ibid.

9 BRAMETZ, S. (2001): The Legacy of the ICTY: Fair Trials and Cooperation with

Local Courts. In STEINBERG, R. H.: Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY.

Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001, p. 31. 10

GUIMELLI, F. (2011): Coercing, Constraining and Signaling: Explaining UN

and EU Sanctions After the cold War. Exeter: ECPR Press, University of Exeter

2011, p. 61.

148

Ante GOTOVINA. In 20011, EU adopted a blacklist in the European

Council concerning Ratko MLADIĆ‟s support.11

This study will focus on the role of the EU in the cooperation of former

Yugoslav countries with the ICTY. Serbia and Croatia are the two countries

that where conditioned by the EU. EU put pressure also on Bosnia and

Herzegovina but, an important number of questions linked with Bosnia‟s

cooperation with the ICTY,passed through the EU conditioning of Serbia

and Croatia.The reason is that a great number of indicted Bosnian Croats

and Bosnian Serbs had fled to Serbia and to Croatia, after they have been

indicted by ICTY. And most of them were arrested and delivered by these

countries. The last part of this study will focus on the impact of the Kosovo

independence on this process of cooperation of Serbia with ICTY and the

role played by EU to moderate the situation.

6.1 European Union and ICTY

Even if EU has been a strong supporter of the creation of the ICTY, it

didn‟t play an important role in the creation of this tribunal. Its role in the

creation of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2000 was

much more important. The reason can be explained by the contexts in which

the ICTY was created. ICTY‟s creation by the Security Council of the

United Nations was as result of EU-s incapacity to find a solution to the

war. Some of the main causes of this incapacity were the differences that

prevailed between the different EU member states. The ICTY was thought

initially by the West as a political tool rather than a transitional justice

institution. In the incapacity to stop the crimes and to find a viable solution

to the war, the West created this tribunal to prosecute persons responsible

for crimes committed against civilians. This is why this tribunal has been

often considered as the result of the bad conscience of the West, unable to

stop the crimes committed in Bosnia. EU will become, progressively, the

principalpolitical supporter of the ICTY. EU will play e key role in pushing

Serbia and Croatia (and Bosnia and Herzegovina) to cooperate with the

ICTY. Its role will become more important after regime changes in Serbia

11

Ibid.

149

and Croatia in 2000 and especially, after September 11 terrorist attacks in

New York when Americans started their progressive withdrawal from

Balkans, leaving primacy to the EU. The strategy of the EU, as the most

important financial supporter of the former Yugoslav countries, will put

condition to itseconomic support, with a full cooperation with the ICTY.

Nevertheless, the EU pressure on Serbia and Croatia to cooperate with

ICTY had started much earlier. In 1995, after the signature of the Dayton

Peace Agreement that put an end to the Bosnian conflict, the Tribunal put

pressure on Serbia and Croatia to deliver to The Hague, a great number of

Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats who were hiding in these two countries.

At that time, there were no Serbian or Croatiancitizens indicted for war

crimes. Asthe principal guarantors of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Serbian

and Croatian regimes thought themselves untouchable by the ICTY

indictments. Serbia and Croatia have represented Bosnian Serbs and

Bosnian Croats in Dayton and had taken responsibilities for its respect and

application. This was considered by the MILOŃEVIĆ and TUĐMAN

regimes as a sufficient argument to be spared from ICTY indictment.

Nevertheless, after NATO troops present in Bosnia started, in 1996, to arrest

and transfer to The Hague, persons wanted by the Tribunal, the ICTY

became more interested to understand what has been the role of these two

regimes in crimes committed in Bosnia. In the indictments against Bosnian

Serbs and Bosnian Croats, there were already many implicit references to

the leaderships in Belgrade and Zagreb, as being directly or indirectly

involved with war crimes committed in Bosnia. This question of implication

of Serbia and Croatia in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was discussed by the

judges of the ICTY during the first trial in the ICTY. The judges considered

that it was nevertheless imperative to specify what degree of authority or

control must be wielded by foreign State over armed forces, fighting on its

behalf in order to render international an armed conflict which is primafacie

internal12

. It was a question of the legal consequences of the characterization

of the conflict. This, because Serbia and Croatia constantly refused to

recognized their implication in Bosnia, pretending that it was an internal

conflict.

In 1997, EU started to put pressure on Serbia and Croatia to adopt the

necessary legislation for cooperation with the ICTY. These countries had to

12

Tadic (IT-(94-1) “Prijedor”. [Cit. 24.1.2015.] Available at <www.icty.org>.

150

adopt legislation in order to make it possible to transfer their citizens to The

Hague. This became an important subject in Serbia, after the indictment of

Slobodan MILOŃEVIĆ in 1999, and particularly after his regime fall in

October 2000. MILOŃEVIĆ was the first Serb from Serbia to be indicted by

the ICTY, in May 1999, during the air strikes of NATO against Serbia. He

was indicted with six other high Serb army and police generals for crimes

committed in Kosovo. After the regime change in Serbia, another group of

Serbians will be accused by the ICTY for crimes committed in Kosovo and

in Bosnia. Among them, Vojislav ŃEŃELJ, the head of the Serbian Radical

Party (SRS); Jovica STANIŃIĆ and Franko SIMATOVIĆ; the former

Serbian intelligence heads during the previous regime.

After 2000, European Union fixed the cooperation with the ICTY as a

measuring vector of the democratization of the Balkan societies.

Conditioning Balkan states to cooperate with the ICTY was fixed through

the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). This integration

process, initiated in 1999, with five Western Balkan countries, was

proposed on 29-30 April 1997 by the European Council. Some specific

criteria were laid which had to enable the integration of these countries in

the EU in a long term. These specific criteria were precised by the

conclusions of the European Council in June 1999; by the Summit of

Zagreb in November 2000 and by the Thessaloniki Agenda in June 2003.

Among these precisions, EU required completing of the Criteria of

Copenhagen; a full cooperation with the ICTY; the respect of Human Rights

and minorities and a full regional cooperation. Furthermore, these new

criteria enter fully the logic of pacification of the Balkan region. Thus,

cooperation with the ICTY had to be considered as an EU support for

reconciliation, pacification and Human rights. And the Council precised that

the lack to fulfill these criteria, authorize the European Union to suspend

any negotiation with these states.

6.2 EU conditioning of Croatia

The first country to accomplish its duties towards the ICTY was Croatia.

In December 2005, the last indicted Croat by the ICTY, Ante GOTOVINA,

was arrested and transferred to The Hague. Croatia had started its

151

cooperation with ICTY in 1997, when the first group of Bosnian Croats was

delivered to The Hague. A great number of Bosnian Croats had fled Bosnia,

after they have been indicted by ICTY, and were put under protection of

Croatian intelligence. The most important group known as the “Group of

Vitez” was delivered in august 1997. But TUĐMAN had delivered them

after a strong American pressure. The role of the EU was weak. The role of

the EU on the cooperation of Croatia with the ICTY became more important

after the death of Franjo TUĐMAN, in December 1999. In 2001,

TUĐMAN‟s party,the Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvatska

Democratska Zajednica-HDZ), lost the elections. This was the first time this

party was not in power after Croatia‟s independence. A new government

was created by a coalition of left and center left parties, leaded by the Social

Democrats of Ivica RAĈAN. RAĈAN was a strong pro-European and he

had fixed the objective to lead Croatia to EU. But his agenda will be

undermined by the ICTY who launched the first indictments against two

Croatian army generals: Ante GOTOVINA, the former chief of staff of

Croatian army and Rrahim ADEMI, another general of Croatian Army from

Kosovo. These indictments provoked a huge anti-ICTY sentiment in Croatia

because these Generals were considered as war heroes. They were accused

for war crimes committed against the Croatian Serb civilians, during the

operation Storm which allowed Croatia to recover the Serb controlled

Krajina region, in 1995. In August 2001, ICTY launched another indictment

against Janko BOBETKO, a retired Croatian army General who was

accused for crimes committed in the Gospić region during the war. Ivica

RAĈAN had to manage the public opinion which was predominantly

against the delivery of the Generals and also his coalition partners who

openly refused the delivery of generals. Ante GOTOVINA refused to

deliver himself to The Hague and entered clandestinity. He became even

more popular after he entered clandestinity. After these indictments against

the Croatian generals, the question of cooperation with the ICTY became

extremely politicized in Croatia. The nationalist opposition leaded by HDZ

took the opportunity to criticize the government and organized huge protests

in most of Croatian cities. The main argument was to refuse the delivery of

the generals to The Hague.

152

The extreme politicization of this issue contributed to the return of HDZ

to power in 2003.13

European Union‟s pressure on Croatia was constant, not

only to deliver the generals to The Hague but also to make the necessary

economic, political and administrative reforms as well as the return of

Croatian Serbs, expelled from Croatia in 1995. Croatian generals were

indicted for crimes committed during the operation Storm and their charges

were considered as an attack against the legitimacy of what they named “the

Homeland war”. This question was even more important if we consider that

Croatian democratic state was built on the basis of an official narrative

focused on the “Homeland War” and its heroes. The Croatian government

created a group of experts to analyze the concept of "joint criminal

enterprise" which appeared in the indictments against the generals.14

The

opposition leader, Ivo SANADER, “played a double game through political

rhetoric meant to appeal both the EU and the International Community as

well as to the party‟s right-wing, furious over the indictment”.15

But the

influence of the “European factor” was indeed evident in the party‟s

makeover and sizable shift in policy16

. However, the issue of cooperation

with the ICTY was extremely important for RAĈAN Government because,

Ivica RAĈAN wanted to open the negotiations to enter EU. Another

important question was Croatia‟s integration in NATO. Of the three

generals indicted for war crimes, only Rahim Ademi surrendered voluntarily

to The Hague. Ante Gotovina had entered clandestinity soon after he was

indicted and Janko BOBETKO was not delivered by Ivica RAĈAN who

managed to convince the Europeans (and the Americans) that the general

was ill and unable to face trial. He died in 2003 in his house. The relative

flexibility of the EU on RAĈAN‟s proposals and refusal to deliver Janko

BOBETKO was that, it didn‟t want to put to much pressure on the new

Croatian government because it had a lot of reforms to do and had not

sufficient support in the public opinion. In 2003, HDZ will come back to

power and in April 2004, EU will open the accession negotiations with

Croatia. But EU will continue to put pressure on the new government to

13

VUKPALAJ, A. (2010): Ex-Yugoslavie, De la guerre a la justice... op.cit. p. 168. 14

TESSER, L. (2013): Ethnic Cleansing and the European Union: An

Interdisciplinary Approach to Security, Memory and Ethnography. London:

Palgrave Macmillan 2013, p. 153. 15

Ibid. 16

Ibid., p. 154.

153

deliver GOTOVINA who was still at large. Ivo SANADER will deliver to

The Hague another group of Bosnian Croats, the former leaders of the self-

proclaimed Republic of Herceg-Bosna. EU had conditioned the negotiations

with a positive opinion of the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla Del

PONTE who after the delivery of the Bosnian Croats and two other Croatian

generals, Mladen MARKAĈ and Ivan ĈERMAK, gave a positive opinion

on Croatia cooperation with the Tribunal. Del PONTE avoided mentioning

Gotovina on her cooperation report, and Croatia became an official

candidate to enter the EU.

The GOTOVINA case will reappear in March 2005, before Croatia had

to sign its Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. After Del

PONTE gave a negative opinion on Croatia‟s cooperation, the European

Union suspended the signature of this agreement. Del PONTE accused the

Croatian Government lack sufficient will to arrest the army general and

accused the nationalists of the HDZ to obstruct his arrest. EU fixed autumn

as the next deadline to sign the SAA with Croatia and asked for concrete

measures to be taken by the Croatian administration. As a result, the

Croatian government conceived a new plan that was supposed to lead to the

arrest of GOTOVINA. This plan provided a close cooperation between the

Croatian general attorney, Mladen BOJANIĆ and the Hague Tribunal. This

had to prove the good will of Croatia to cooperate fully with the Tribunal.

The EU Commissioner in charge of EU enlargement, Oli REHN, declared at

this occasion that the non-arrest of Ante GOTOVINA obliged the EU to

postpone the signature of the agreement. He said that, Croatian state

institutions should have, at least, located Ante GOTOVINA. This

postponement provoked a huge reaction in Croatia. The Croatian Prime

Minister, Ivo SANADER, said he was “disappointed” and expressed his

discontent with this decision since, he said that the government had fully

cooperated with the Tribunal and denied that they have been in contact with

GOTOVINA.17

This postponement with contribute to raise euroscepticism

in Croatia.

Thus, in Mai 2005, only one month after this decision, 44% of Croatian

people were against the EU integration. The number of pro-Europeans was

42%. Croats were critical for what they considered as a « constant

17

Le Monde, 18 mars 2005.

154

suspicion » of Europe towards Croatia.18

In October 2005, the EU signed

the SAA with Croatia even if GOTOVINA was not arrested yet. But Carla

Del PONTE had given a positive opinion on Croatia cooperation with the

ICTY based on the cooperation plan and collaboration with the Tribunal.

Less than two weeks after the arrest of GOTOVINA in December 2005, the

American Senate recommended Croatia‟s admission in NATO as soon as

possible19

. Even if Croatian national leaders were aware of the common

national anti-ICTY stance, they maintained a moderate attitude and shared a

pro-European rhetoric, throughout the pre-accession period20

.

6.3 European integration and Serbia’s conditioning

European Union‟s conditioning to Serbia started very early too. This

pressure was intensified after the signature of Dayton Peace Agreement.

Serbia will not only be conditioned by the EU but also by the Americans.

Before the fall of the MILOŃEVIĆ regime, this pressure upon Serbia

concerned the delivery of Bosnian Serbs who were hiding in Serbia. Serbia

as a country with the greatest responsibility in the Balkan wars during the

1990 will have the greatest number of indicted persons by the ICTY. These

indicted persons were considered as “national heroes” in Serbia and ICTY

was considered as a biased tribunal whose primary aim is to judge Serbs and

be used as a political tool against Serbs. Therefore, cooperation with the

ICTY began only after the European Union and the United States officials

made it clear that closer relations with Serbia were dependent on the latter‟s

full cooperation with the ICTY.21

18

THOMAS, D. (2005): Bloquée aux portes de l‟Union Européenne. Le Courier

des pays de l‟Est, 2005/4-n°1050, p. 59. 19

RAMET, S. P. (2008): Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia at Peace and at War. Berlin-

Hamburg-Münster: LIT Verlag 2008, p. 219. 20

DALLARA, C. (2014): Democracy and Judicial Reforms in South-Eastern

Europe, between the EU and the Legacies of the past. New York: Springer

2014, p. 43. 21 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2006: Events of 2005. [Cit. 13.1.2015.]

Available at <www.hrw.org>.

155

The most important moment of Serbia‟s cooperation with the ICTY was

the arrest and transfer of Slobodan MILOŃEVIĆ to The Hague.

MILOŃEVIĆ was delivered at the end of June 200122

. MILOŃEVIĆ was

indicted in May 1999, during the NATO campaign against Serbia with six

other high Serbian officials. He was the first Head of state to be indicted by

an international criminal tribunal. After his transfer in The Hague, he

became the first Head of State to be judged by an international criminal

justice institution. MILOŃEVIĆ‟s arrest and transfer to The Hague marked

also the implication of the EU in Serbia‟s post MILOIŃEVIĆ era. EU

promoted the cooperation with the ICTY as a transitional justice institution

which was supposed to promote constitutionalism in Serbia in the broader

sense. The aim was to shows some willingness to move forward with

respect to issues or state‟s responsibility, breaking with the previous regime

and also addressing the role of nonstate actors as to accountability. This

would reinforce local justice processes and point in a new direction as to the

commitment to protect minorities23

. Therefore, soon after Slobodan

MILOŃEVIĆ‟s transfer to The Hague, the President of the EU Commission,

Jose Manuel BARROSO, declared that this transfer proves the

determination of the new Serbian government to achieve full cooperation

with the ICTY. Nicholas BURNS, the US under Secretary for Political

Affairs, mentioned that: “we have been explicit with Belgrade; constructive

engagement in the Kosovo status process, full cooperation with ICTY (...),

and a constructive regional role, notably in Bosnia, would help clear the

path to EU and NATO membership”.24

Nevertheless, the EU pressure on

Serbia after the fall of MILOŃEVIĆ was moderate. The pressure put upon

Vojislav KOŃTUNICA, a nationalist leader who criticized the Tribunal had

to do with the risk that Serbia be isolated and turns towards Russia. And

another cause of this moderation was the question of Kosovo that was in its

22

VUKPALAJ, A. (2010): Ex-Yuogoslavie, de la guerre a la justice…op.cit. p.

273. 23

TEITEL, R. G. (2014): Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays.

Oxford: Oxford University

Press 2014, p. 198. 24

DEYRUP, I. (2007): La position des Etats-Unis : l‟impatience de parvenir a un

règlement. In LIZIN, A.-M.: Kosovo, l‟inévitable indépendance. Bruxelles:

Éditions Luc Pire 2007, p. 37.

156

road to declare independence.25

There are the reasons why, during the

months that followed the immediate fall of MILOŃEVIĆ, in October 2000,

EU avoided to mention the Hague tribunal. The EU commissioner Chris

PATTEN declared in October 2000 that the EU financial support for Serbia

will not be conditioned by the transfer of Slobodan MILOŃEVIĆ in The

Hague. Europeans (and Americans) where much more interested to support

the democratic transition than to ask Serbia to deliver the indicted persons to

the ICTY. This doesn‟t mean that this question would be avoided, but it had

to be careful to the sensitive political situation and the conflict between

coalition partners of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). Vojislav

KOŃTUNICA, a constitutionalist, was a convinced anti-ICTY. He declared,

soon after he was elected that he was not going to cooperate with the ICTY.

He will have difficulties to communicate with the Tribunal‟s Chief

prosecutors. He declared constantly that cooperation with The Hague

Tribunal was not a priority for Serbia. On the contrary, the other strong man

of the Serbian transition, Zoran DJINDJIĆ was more pragmatic and saw an

opportunity to get rid of MILOŃEVIĆ by delivering him to The Hague. But

this question was complicated since, in Serbia, the Hague Tribunal was

extremely unpopular. DJINDJIĆ saw also the opportunity to gain the

support of the EU and USA by delivering MILOŃEVIĆ to The Hague.

But the arrest of MILOŃEVIĆ was not the end of Serbia‟s cooperation

with ICTY. Important fugitives of ICTY were hiding in Serbia. Among

them, the most popular were Radovan KARADŅIĆ and Ratko MLADIĆ,

the former political and military leaders of Bosnian Serb accused for

massive crimes in Bosnia. After MILOŃEVIĆ‟ delivery to The Hague, the

role of the EU will be crucial for the delivery of the other persons indicted

in Serbia. Thus, in December 2005, the EU “recompenses” Serbia with the

signature of Stabilization and Association Agreement after Serbian

government played a constructive role in cooperation with the ICTY. 14

persons were delivered to The Hague during the period 2001-2005. But, in

May 2006, the EU interrupted its negotiations with Serbia because of the

negative report of Carla Del PONTE on Serbia‟s cooperation with the

25

SEBASTIAN, S. (2010): The Balkans, European Inducements. In YOUNGS, R.:

The European Union and

Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment, Baltimore, John Hopkins

University Press 2010, p. 45.

157

ICTY. In her report, she declared that "the inability of Serbia to arrest the

other fugitives is worrying" and mentioned also the other difficulties the

tribunal faced with Serbia such as the obstruction of Serbian authorities to

obtain the required documents for trials etc. Nevertheless, even if EU

interrupted the negotiations, it didn‟t interrupt the financial and technical aid

necessary to continue the reforms. These aides were only reduced.

However, the negotiations interruption with Serbia will cause concern for

Europeans who were looking to find a solution to arrest Ratko MLADIĆ

who has been the main cause of negotiations interruption. This became

more problematic after Kosovo was moving towards independence. The

isolation and Kosovo independence could reinforce radical forces in Serbia

and push Serbia to approach further with Russia. Vojislav KOŃTUNICA‟s

government lacked a majority in the Serbian parliament and was ruling with

the support of ŃEŃELJ‟s Radicals and that of the Socialist Party of Serbia

(SPS).

At the time the negotiations with Serbia were interrupted, six ICTY

fugitives were still at large. Five of them were in Serbia: Goran HADIĆ,

Radovan KARADŅIĆ, Ratko MLADIĆ, Zdravko TOLIMIR, and Stojan

ZUPLJANIN. Vlastimir DJORDJEVIĆ, the former police general accused

for crimes committed in Kosovo was supposed to be in Russia. But

Radovan KARADŅIĆ and Ratko MLADIĆ were the most wanted fugitives

especially after the death of Slobodan MILOŃEVIĆ in The Hague, in July

2006. In December 2006, The Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla Del

PONTE declared that «if the Serbian government really wished it, it could

very well arrest Ratko MLADIĆ, who had never ceased to benefit the

Army‟s protection and that the arrest of these fugitives is a question of

political will. She accused Serb authorities for lack of cooperation. This

pressure put upon Serbia will result with the arrest of Radovan KARADŅIĆ

in May 2007. A few months earlier, another Bosnian-Serb army general,

Zdravko TOLIMIR was arrested. Serbian authorities had arrested him in

Novi Sad but they had delivered him to Bosnian Serb authorities to deliver

him to The Hague. TOLIMIR was considered as a key person for the

organization of Serbian army crimes dissimulation. He organized the

dissimulation of thousands of dead bodies of people killed in Bosnia and in

Kosovo. In Srebrenica, he was accused to have reopened the mass graves

and buried the victims‟ bodies in secondary graves, along Drina River.

158

The arrest of Radovan KARADŅIĆ was considered as a sufficient

argument that proved Serbia‟s good will to cooperate with the ICTY.

Several EU countries considered that EU should continue integration

negotiations even if Ratko MLADIĆ was still at large. They considered that

this would be a support for the government of Serbia, but behind this

support, there was the Kosovo Question that pressured EU in this direction.

The European Commission President, Jose Manuel BARROSO, speaking of

the arrest of Radovan KARADŅIĆ, the war architect of ethnic cleansing

declared that: “this is a very positive development that will contribute to

bringing justice and lasting reconciliation in the Western Balkans”.26

But,

notwithstanding Serbia‟s capture of war crimes suspect Radovan

KARADŅIĆ in July 2008, the issue of cooperation with the ICTY will

continue to interfere with Serbia‟s European aspirations. European countries

will be divided too, over the proceeding with Serbia. This ambivalence will

cause that even if EU decided to sign an SAA with Serbia in April 2008, EU

member states required the arrest and transfer to The Hague of Ratko

MLADIĆ for the ratification of this agreement. The Netherland, in

particular, blocked the implementation of the interim trade agreement

attached to the SAA until December 2009, when the ICTY Chief

prosecutor, Serge BRAMMERTZ, confirmed that Serbia‟s cooperation with

the Tribunal was progressing. The implementation of this agreement was a

prerequisite for moving ahead with Serbia‟s integration process.27

Despite

Serbia‟s cooperation with ICTY, observers agree that the EU strategy of

conditioning the progress of ex-Yugoslav countries rewards joining the

union on their cooperation with the ICTY “has been a key tool in ensuring

that perpetrators of war crimes committed during the Balkans wars face trial

and victims see justice”.28

26

TEITEL, R. G. (2014): Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays,

op. cit. p. 197. 27

YOUNGS, R. (2010): The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A

Critical Global Assessment. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 2010, p.

43. 28

TEITEL, R. G. (2014): Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays.

op.cit. page 197.

159

6.4 Serbia and ICTY after Kosovo’s independence

Kosovo declared its independence on February the 17th 2008. At that

moment, four war crimes suspects were still at large and were hidden in

Serbia. Among them, the most popular was Ratko MLADIĆ. But, the

declaration of independence of Kosovo will have a direct impact on Serbia‟s

cooperation with ICTY. Serbia will progressively pass this question to a

second plan. It will have also a direct impact on war crimes trials in Serbia.

The majority of trials for war crimes in committed in Bosnia and Kosovo

and which were ongoing in Serbian courts will be transformed on cosmetic

trials. This will be “a revenge” of Serbia over the International

Community‟s support for the independence of Kosovo. EU had prepared to

this situation almost a year before. Thus in June 2007, four months after

Kosovo declared its independence and was recognized by the most Western

states, the EU officials made e declaration that "full cooperation with the

ICTY was no longer a prerequisite to continue accession negotiations”.29

In

May 2008, European Commission will offer a Roadmap on Visa-free Travel

to Serbia, the first state from the Western Balkans to be given a concrete

plan for visa liberalization.30

This agreement will lose its earlier

conditionality on full co-operation with the ICTY as a pre-condition for

further integration. This will be done before legislative elections will take

place in June 2008. EU hoped to boost the chances of the pro-EU political

formations to win the elections. Nevertheless, EU has been criticized for its

policy of not putting pressure on Serbia.

Human Rights organizations will continue to require Serbia‟s

conditioning with cooperation with ICTY. Their arguments will be that this

will encourage extreme nationalists who adamantly and openly defend the

Serbian “war heroes”. But EU wanted to reassure Serbia on the accession

road to EU, and allow bringing Kosovo to independence without physical or

psychological resistance on the Serbian side. During the election campaign

29

RAJKOVIC, N. M. (2012): The politics of international Law and Compliance,

Serbia, Croatia and the Hague Tribunal. New York: Routledge 2012, p. 90. 30

NOUTCHEVA, G. (2012): European Foreign Policy and the Challenges of

Balkan Accession, Conditionality, legitimacy and compliance. London:

Rutledge 2012, p. 78.

160

of 2008, EU officials abstained from any statement that would condition

Serbia with delivery of War crime suspects. EU was aware that such a

conditioning or even debate would serve radicals to win the elections. The

question of Kosovo was already a hot question and was already a risk. Any

mention of ICTY would complicate the situation. Shortly after a new

government was created, EU called for a restart of Stabilization and

Association agreement. The strategy of EU was to avoid conflicts and

promote peace and stability in the region. This policy of simultaneity will

continue until EU will be able to propose to Kosovo and Serbia access to

EU. Bringing Serbia and Kosovo together in the EU was considered as the

only way to address a number of unresolved differences. After decades of

silence, it is only in the context of EU accession aspirations that these

countries have indicated willingness to engage regarding their past. The

cooperation with the ICTY has become one of these questions where

countries dealing with their state‟s past grievances reflect on their

democratic potential for the future-although dealing with war crimes may

well be easier than showing such capacities exist to deal with conflicts in

the here and now. Bur more fundamentally, it is predicated on the view that

justice is the path to transformation in the treatment of transnational peoples

in the region.

Conclusion

After the regime changes in Serbia and Croatia, the issue of cooperation

with the ICTY has shaped the pace and nature of integration with the EU.

Successive governments in Serbia and Croatia, since 2000 have very often

used nationalism to justify their indecisiveness. On major questions

concerning transitional justice, there has been no clear break within the

political elite of these countries.31

Thus, even if the prospect of closer

integration with the EU has encouraged these countries to cooperate with

the ICTY. Nonetheless, the unpopularity of this Tribunal in Serbia (and

Croatia) after the regime changes was very high. In Croatia, because of the

indictment of the highest army generals and the contest of the narration of

31

See: BRANIFF, M. (2011): Integrating the Balkans… op. cit., p. 137.

161

the “homeland war”, in Serbia because of the transfer of Slobodan

MILOŃEVIĆ and the huge number of indicted Serbs, years, public and elite

support for the ICTY has remained low. This indicated that although these

countries have been transformed, it continues to be not sufficient. Therefore,

even if the conditionning of the process of integration with the prospect of

joining the EU has been extremely effective to support transitional justice in

these countries, it could not transform fundamentally the issue of conflict in

these countries. As far as public opinion is concerned, this process of EU-

forced cooperation with the ICTY has been rather controversial and

unpopular issue, although, less in Croatia than in Serbia.

Assistant Professor Anton VUKPALAJ

Assistant Professor of Political

Science at the University of Pristina

(Kosovo). He studied Political

Science, Political Sociology,

Comparative Politics and European

Integrations at the French

university of Sorbonne (1994-

1999), University of Paris 10

(1999-2004), and Institut des

Science Sociales du Politique (2004-2008). He has published

numerous papers and has researched and published extensively on the

Western Balkans. His PhD thesis on the International Criminal

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was published by the

Michel Houdiard Editeur, publishing house, in France, in June

2010. He worked as a freelance scientific collaborator at the Institut

des Sciences Sociales du Politique (ISP) in Paris since October

2004. In 2011 he became an associated member of ISP. During the

academic year 2011-2012 he became Lecturer at the University of

Pristina, Department of Political Science, and was elected Assistant

Professor in 2013.

162

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165

7 Multi-ethnicity in the Western Balkans. Kosovo as a successful story.

Arton MUSLIU

Abstract: The wars in western Balkans have been due to territorial and

ethnic motives. The dissolution of the former Socialist Federative Republic

of Yugoslavia was accompanied by bloody wars that were ethnically

motivated by politics led by hegemonic Serbia. The real reason of these

wars was the hegemonic politics of Serbia‟s president MILOŠEVIĆ. He

dreamed the Greater Serbia1 project and that‟s why he fought in almost all

over former Yugoslavian territories. While the desire of the other

Yugoslavian countries was achievement of the independence through the

peaceful dissolution of the Yugoslavian federation. Ethnic groups in former

federation claimed the creation of their national states. There were typically

two political options, whether to allow them create their own state, which

could reflect the very idea of Yugoslavian confederation or save the

country‟s unity and keep domination of Serbia over other nations.

Key words: multi-ethnicity, hegemonic aspirations, self-determination

Ma. Sc. Arton MUSLIU studied at the International Law Department of the

Faculty of Law, University of Prishtina (artonmusliu@gmail.com). 1 Political project of Greater Serbia begun with "Nacertanje" of Ilija GARAŃANIN,

in 1844. This project was continued by Vuk Stefanović KARADŅIĆ, Nikola

STOJANOVIĆ, Vaso ĈUBRILOVIĆ who presented a memorandum on the

removing of the Kosovo Albanians, in 1937. While the memorandum of the

Academy of Sciences and Arts of Serbia, whose president was Dobrica ĆOSIĆ,

in 1986, was the basis document for the Greater Serbia and its hegemony

against other nations of the former Yugoslavia. For more see: BLITZ, Brad K.:

War and Change in the Balkans - Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006. See also: Victor MEIER: Fundi i

Jugosllavisë- Goditja në Kosovë. Lubjanë: Liria 2006.

166

Introduction

Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, Macedonians and Albanians in Kosovo were

seeking for respect of principle of the inviolability of borders. So, they had

no territorial claims on other neighboring territories. From the very

beginning, those entities were promoting the idea of equality and what was

later known and promoted by ex communist leader Josip BROZ TITO,

“Brotherhood and Unity”. Apart from this idea, it was only Serbia who

followed another political discourse, the one with ethnic purposes. Serbia

claimed territories in Croatia and didn‟t take them. It wanted in Bosnia and

Herzegovina and took them through the creation of the separate unit of the

Republic of Srpska. Also, hegemonic and genocidal Serbia through the

military means occupied Kosovo but because of the internal as well as

external reaction, didn‟t succeed. Definitely, it was the international

community which prevented Serbian hegemonic aspirations; otherwise the

map of the western Balkans without international community‟s intervention

would look like differently. Therefore, Serbia did not stop indeed; they tried

to find some other ways to achieve her ambitions through other options,

namely legal option. In this way, Serbia filed a question to the Badinter

Commission whether the Serb populations in Croatia and Bosnia and

Herzegovina, as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, have the right

to self-determination? Of course, the answer was negative because the

European Community was determined for the territorial nature of

constitutional self-determination. This kind of self-determination ignores the

ethnic claims and enables the multiethnic or multinational states. It is known

that in the multiethnic states there is majority and national minorities or

minority peoples. I would finally say that in Bosnia there are a minority

people of Serbs, as well as the minority people of Albanians in Macedonia.

Also, I would say that there is a national minority of Serbs, Turkish, Roma,

Egyptians in Kosovo, as well as, national minority of Albanians in Serbia,

the national minority of Croats in Bosnia and the national minority of Serbs

in Croatia.

167

7.1 The creation of multi-ethnic states

The process of decolonization, designed by the international community,

in most cases produced heterogeneous states. The right of self-

determination, accompanied by the principle of Uti Possidetis, prevented the

creation of the pure ethnic states. In Africa for example, only four out the

approximately fifty states that have emerged from the process of

decolonization have homogeneous population. These are: Swaziland,

Lesotho, Botswana and Somalia2.This principle was applied in same way

also in the process of dissolution of the former communist federations,

including the former federation of Yugoslavia.

It was considered a successful history in Africa; by the way this

precedent was applied further in 1990 - in the case of dissolution of the

former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia3. But while in the

process of the decolonization there was no conditions for achievement of

independence,in the case of the dissolution of these federal states there were

some conditions that should be fulfilled in the way to achieve the

independence. According to the „Guidelines for the Recognition of New

States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union‟, date 16 December 1991,

Member States of the European Community recognition of new states of

Yugoslavia conditioned by the installation of the rule of law, democracy and

human rights and by guarantee of the rights of ethnic and national groups

and minorities in accordance with the commitments made in the framework

of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe4.

Thus, European Community through the Peace Conference on

Yugoslavia established the Badinter Commission, whose role was to verify

whether Croatia and Slovenia, but also other Yugoslavian republics have

fulfilled the conditions for recognition. This commission was led by Robert

BADINTER, a French lawyer. In general terms the Badinter Commission

2 EMERSON, Rupert (1960): Nationalism and Political Development. The Journal

of Politics, Vol. 22, No. 1, February 1960, p. 3-28. 3 HASANI, Enver (2010): Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and

International Stability: The Case of Yugoslavia. Prishtina: Buzuku 2010, p. 51. 4 RAIĈ, David (2002): Statehood and the Law of Self–Determination. The Hague:

Kluwer Law International 2002, p. 355.

168

used the international principle of Uti Possidetis which reflected the

conversion of the administrative boundaries to the state borders. According

to the commission, the right for statehood belongs only to the federal

republics which were: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina

and Macedonia5. Kosova of that time was ignored because, according to

Robert BADINTER, it was not a federal unit/entity of the federation.

In the second opinion the commission expresses the attitude that the

creation of new states should not reflect the modification of existing borders

at the time of independence. The Commission was asked from Serbia in

this way:

“Does the Serb population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as

one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, has the right to self-

determination”?

The commission in the second opinion decided that:

a). In whatever circumstance, the right to self-determination should

not affect the modification of existing boundaries at the time of

independence (UTI Possidetis Juris), unless States agree otherwise .

b). When a country has more than one ethnic, religious or linguistic

group, they have the right to be recognized under international law.

Norms of international law require respect for the rights of minorities.

This requirement is for all the territories of the republics in which there

are minorities.

c). Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina should be

offered every right that has to do with minorities and ethnic groups on

the basis of international law and the provisions of Chapter 2 of the

draft - Convention of 4 November 1991, of the Conference on

Yugoslavia , which is accepted by these republics.

d). The Republics should provide to the members of these minorities

and ethnic groups all human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized

by the international law, including the right to choice the nationality6.

So, we can say that in the case of dissolution of the former federal state

of Yugoslavia the ethnic requirements were ignored. That‟s why there was

5 PELLET, Alain (1992): The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, A

Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples. 3 EJIL (1992) 178, p. 184. 6 Ibid. p. 184

169

territorial self-determination. The territorial self-determination used in

western Balkan7 countries devised multiethnic states. Functioning of the

multiethnic states, notably in the western Balkan states, is very complicated,

at the same time is a challenge for the European community. But while this

is the only approach of the international community we should try at the

same time to retain the international stability and to protect the rights of

ethnic groups in the multiethnic states. In this line, Anna

MOLTCHANOVA proposes a treatment of minority nationalism that

preserves the stability of multinational states8. An important author of

international law, Antonio CASSESE in his book „Self-Determination of

Peoples‟ explains the role of the minorities within states. According to him;

“First, a satisfactory treatment of minorities is based on the imperative

condition that internal self-determination for the whole population shouldbe

realized. That the whole population of the state that minorities live be

granted the continuing right freely to chose its rulers through a democratic

process is a (necessary but not sufficient) pre-condition for full respect of

the rightsof minorities. This fundamental concept was recently spelled out in

the Report of the CSCE Committee of Experts on National Minorities,

adopted on 19 July 1991”9.

To protect the minority group rights he proposes three opportunities.

According to him it is for the minority group to declare what type of

protection they want:

1. Autonomy

2. Regional Self-Government

3. Participation in the national decision – making process10

Anyway this was also the vision of the European community. States in

western Balkans are created on the territorial basis, ignoring ethnic

issues.This type of European community policy was expressed from Javier

7 It is thought to the countries that have emerged from former Yugoslavia except

(Slovenia), plus Albania. 8 MOLTCHANOVA, Anna (2009): National Self-Determination and Justice in

Multinational States. Springer Science + Business Media, Vol. 5, 2009, p.197 . 9 CASSESE, Antonio (1999): Self-Determination of People: A legal Reappraisal.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, p. 351.

10

Ibid. p. 352.

170

SOLANA, European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign

and Security Policy at the time of NATO bombing campaign over Serbia in

1999. He said that:

“What makes NATO so united in this crisis is the fact that in Kosova our

long term interests and our values converge. For behind the plight of the

Kosova‟s there is even more at stake: the future of the project of Europe.

The conflict between Belgrade and the rest of the international community

is a conflict between two visions of Europe. One vision-Milosevic‟s vision-

is a Europe of ethnically pure states, a Europe of nationalism,

authoritarianism and xenophobia. The other vision, upheld by NATO and

the European Union and many other countries, is of a Europe of

integration, democracy and ethnic pluralism. This is the vision that has

turned Europe and North America into the closest, most democratic and

prosperous community ever built...If this positive vision of Europe is to

prevail, if Europe is to enter the 21st century as a community of states

practicing democracy, pluralism and human rights, we simply can not

tolerate this carnage at its centre‟11

.

But, despite the 78 days bombing campaign by NATO, MILOŃEVIĆ‟s

regime killed thousand ofinnocent peoples, deported about one million

ethnic Albanians and raped about twenty thousand Albanian women.

According to Noel MALCOLM:

” By 20 April 1999 it was calculated that nearly 600,000 refuges had left

Kosova in the previous four weeks: 355,000 were in Albania, 127,500 in

Macedonia, 72,500 in Montenegro ad 32,000 in Bosnia. This was in

addition to an estimated 100,000 who had left during 1998. And inside

Kosova, according to NATO spokesman, there were five large pockets of

„displaced‟ Albanians, representing a total of 850,000 people12

.

11

LATAWSKI, Paul – SMITH, Martin (2003): The Kosovo crisis and the

evolution of post cold war- European security. Manchester: Manchester

University Press 2003, p.164. 12

BLITZ, Brad K. (2006): War and Change in the Balkans - Nationalism, conflict

and Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, p. 153.

171

The escalation of situation in Kosova was also an important issue in the

European Council meeting held in Berlin on 24 and 25 March 1999.

According to the meeting outcomes:

“Since the outbreak of hostilities in Kosovo in March 1998 around 440

000 people, more than one fifth of the population of Kosovo, have lied or

been displaced. There are new victims every day. The civilian population is

the target of the hostilities”13

.

Despite these war crimes and genocide, that was manifested by the

massive violations of human rights of ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, the

newest state of the southeast Europe didn‟t revenged against the ethnic

minorities in general and against the Serb minority in particular. Besides

this Kosovo‟s society has told that Kosovo is not going to forget the past but

no way will revenge for war crimes that happened between 1998-1999 in

this area of western Balkans.

7.2 Kosovo minority treatment Kosovo after the war was administered by the 1244, Resolution of

Security Council of the United Nations Organization. Until 2008 Kosovo

representing bodies in the international relations were mixed. While

Kosovo did not participate on the Summit of Zagreb in 200014

, the

Thessaloniki Summit was the first large scale EU event in which “Kosova‟s

political leaders” were present. In attendance at this summit was the former

Head of UNMIK15

, Michael STEINER, Kosovo‟s President, Ibrahim

13

Bulletin of the European Union, No. 3, 1999, p. 20. 14

Note: After the removal of MILOŃEVIĆ on 24 September 2000, the EU held a

further summit to commence this more intense strategy. At the Zagreb summit

in November 2000, post-Milosevic, the EU reaffirmed the European perspective

of the countries participating in the stabilization and association process and

their status as potential candidates for membership in accordance with the Feira

Conclusions. For more see: BRANIFF, Máire: Integrating the Balkans, conflict

resolution and the impact of EU expansion. London: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd.

2011. 15

United Nations Mission in Kosovo.

172

RUGOVA, and the Prime Minister, Bajram REXHEPI16

. In this context by

the “Thessaloniki‟s agenda for Western Balkans”, approved by the heads

EU states, people of a multiethnic and democratic Kosovo will have their

place in Europe.17

More than this, minorities by the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova

and The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement18

, which

became part of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, has guaranteed

representative rights in the public institutions. The preamble of Constitution

of the Republic of Kosovo amongst others says:

“Determined to build a future of Kosovo as a free, democratic and

peace-lovingcountry that will be a homeland to all of its

citizens....Committed to the creation of a state of free citizens that will

guarantee the rights of every citizen, civil freedoms and equality of all

citizens before the law”19

.

16

Kosovo-EU Relations: The History of Unfulfilled Aspirations-Lost opportunities

in Kosova‟s European integration process. Prishtina: Kosovo Foundation for

Open Society 2013, p.9. 17

The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans (2006). [Cit. 12.1.2015.]

Available at

<http://www.westernbalkans.info/htmls/page.php?category=391&id=419>. 18

Note: The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosova Status Settlement, or

Ahtisaari Plan, presents the most formal proposal for resolving the Kosova

situation. The former Finnish Premier Marti AHTISAARI, who won the Nobel

Peace Prize, was appointed as Special Envoy from the United Nations in order

to mediate a peace settlement between Republic of Kosovo and Serbia. At the

end of the process of the negotiations between two sides he came to his

proposal. On 26 march 2007, The Secretary- General submitted a report of his

Special envoy to the Security Council . In this report AHTISAARI say‟s that:

Taking into account the recent history of Kosova, Kosova‟s reality today and

considering negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the

most sustainable solution for Kosova is supervised independence for an initial

period by the international community ". For more see: LANDIS, Dan -

ALBERT, Rosita D. (2012): Contribution of the U. Schwegler and L.R. Smith.

Handbook of Ethnic Conflict – International Perspectives. Springer Science +

Business Media 2012. Also see: The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. ICJ

Report 2010. Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php

?p1=3&p2=4&code=kos&case=141&k=21&p3=0>. 19

Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.

173

Article 3.1 of this Constitution expresses the liberal European vision for

a multiethnic society. It emphasizes:

“The Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian

and other Communities, governed democratically with full respect for the

rule of law through its legislative, executive and judicial institutions”20

By the way, Kosovo has consolidated the legal framework related to the

rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities. This is said at the

Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement between the

European Union and Kosovo, in December 2012. According to this

document:

“....Over the past three years, the functioning of democratic institutions

and the respect for the rule of law have been consolidated. The necessary

institutions have been established.... The constitution of Kosovo and the

overall legislative framework provide guarantees for basic human rights

and the protection of minorities. Although Kosovo is not a member of the

UN or the Council of Europe, its constitution stipulates that key UN and

Council of Europe conventions and protocols are directly applicable in

Kosovo and take precedence over Kosova's legislation. Over the past three

years, Kosovo has taken steps to implement theseprovisions in practice.....

The legislative framework for the protection of minorities is in place,

including constitutional guarantees.

According to Kosovo's constitution, the Council of Europe Framework

Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is directly applicable

in Kosovo. This framework Convention was decided to be drafted at the

Vienna meeting by the Heads of States and Governments of the Council of

Europe in October 1993. At the Vienna meeting it was decided that a legal

instrument would be drafted with regard to the protection of national

minorities.21

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National

Minorities22

offers the equal treatment of minorities and majorities before

20

Ibid 21

SHAW, Malcolm N. (2003): International Law. Fifth Edition. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press 2003,

p. 341. 22

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was drafted

by the Ad Hoc Committee for the Protection of National Minorities, of the

Council of Europe. It was adopted on 10 November 1994 and opened for

174

the law. In this document the essential elements of national minority‟s

identity are considered to be religion, traditions, language, and cultural

heritage23

.

This document is the first legally binding multilateral instrument devoted

to the protection of the national minorities24

. But it is interesting the fact

that the framework Convention contains no definition of the notion of

“national minority”. According to the General Considerations of the

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the

paragraph 12, “it is impossible to arrive at a definition (national minority)

capably mustering general support of all Council of Europe member

states”.25

But the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe has

provided an explanation related to the notion of „national minorities‟.

According to Malcolm N. SHAW, Recommendation 1201 (1993) adopted

by the Parliamentary Assembly and reaffirmed in Recommendation 1255

(1995) suggest that the notion „national minorities‟ refers to persons who

reside on the territory of the state concerned and are citizens of it; maintain

longstanding, firm and lasting ties with the state; display distinctive ethnic,

cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; are sufficiently

signature by the member states on 1 February 1995, in Strasbourg. The

Convention came into force on 1 February 1998. For more see: SHAW,

Malcolm N.: International Law. Seventh Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press 2014. Also see:

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTM

Content?documentId=09000016800c10cf>.

23

MOLTCHANOVA, Anna (2009): National Self-Determination and Justice in

Multinational States. Springer Science + Business Media, Vol. 5, 2009. 24

Note: In sense of the right for self- determination, national minorities differ from

the minority people. While the national minorities are excluded from the right of

the self-determination, the minority people may have this right under special

circumstances which are accompanied by huge violations of human rights. Also

these two notions differ from each other because the national minorities are

inferior numerically compared with the majority. While the minority people

compared with the national minorities remain a bigger community and populate

a compact territory within the state. For more see: RAIĈ, David: Statehood and

the Law of Self–Determination. The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002. 25

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, General

Considerations. Available at

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMConte

nt?documentId=09000016800c10cf>.

175

representative, although smaller in numbers than the rest of the population

of that state or of a region of that state; and are motivated by a concern to

preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including

their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language26

.

According to the article 1 of this framework Convention:

“The protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of

persons belonging to those minorities forms an integral part of the

international protection of human rights, and as such falls within the scope

of international co-operation”.

By the way let us summarize that Kosovo remains a model in the

treatment of national minorities. Relying to the exPresident Ahtisaari‟s

Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement the Serb

minority in Kosovo is positively discriminated. They have the right to have

universities and hospitals. Their cultural heritage is protected by the central

institutions, as well as, they are represented in two levels of governance.

Persons belonging to minorities are well represented in the Assembly and in

political functions at the governmental level. With strong international

support, Kosovo has continued offering the possibility of return for

displaced persons. Overall, over 23,000 persons belonging to minorities,

most of them with the Serb national background, have returned to Kosovo

since 2000. Kosovo has also started implementing decentralization,

including the establishment of new municipalities with a majority of

minority population...”.27

Out of around 30 municipalities in Kosovo, 10 of

them are ruled by Serbs. These rights are not recognized bySerbia for the

Albanian national minority over there. That‟s why it is not accepted the fact

that Serbia took the status of Candidate Member from the EU at the time

when there are major violations of the rights of the Albanian minority in

Serbia, foreseen by the Framework Convention for the Protection of

26

SHAW, Malcolm N. (2003): International Law. Fifth Edition. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press 2003,

p.343. 27

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the

Council on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement

between the European Union and Kosova, p. 7-9. Available at:

<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/ks_feasibili

ty_2012_en.pdf>.

176

National Minorities and The European Convention for the Protection of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of the Council of Europe.

It used to be continuously presented into the academic as well as

political discourse that independence of Kosovo will be used as precedent

for other countries in the region, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina and

Macedonia as countries lacking political and ethnic stability. Bosnians could

use the Kosovo‟s model to split up the country as it remains to be fragile

even two decades after the conflict with the division between Federation of

Bosnia and Republic of Srpska28

. Macedonians will do the same as there are

still hot and sensitive ethnic issues country is going through. On the

contrary, Kosovo as a multiethnic state has shown that the coexistence of

different ethnic groups is possible. Thus the integration of national

minorities in Kosovo‟s‟ public and political life is a fact that the newest

state in western Balkans is a safe country with European future, where all

ethnicities feel equal and safe.

Finally, it is to be said that the only way to maintain the stability within

the western Balkan states is the self-governance for the national minorities.

Stability in the Western Balkans countries, especially in those countries

where there are national minorities and minority peoples, is possible only by

the quality of the rights granted to them. Under the provisions of

international law, minorities should enjoy their religious, linguistic, and

cultural rights within the state, as well as their traditions. This is the

multiethnic concept of states which is designed by the international

community. Anyway we should consider that any violation of the rights of

minorities in any country of the western Balkans could lead to the escalation

of the overall situation in this part of Europe.

28

Note: Republic of Srpska did not exist in the former federation of Yugoslavia.

There is an agreement between many scientists and politicians that such entity

was created based on the genocide and bloodshed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

177

Conclusion

Let me finally conclude by saying that Kosovo, as a newest state in the

Europe, is a successful model of international concept of multiethnic state

where minorities feel safe and equal by the majority.

This was also the decisive direction of international law. Because the

creation of states on territorial bases was seen by the international

community as something that would bring peace and stability in this part of

Europe. Multiethnic concept of states which derived by dissolution of

former federations, also from the process of decolonization, brought a new

order of functioning within the states. These multiethnic states which are all

over the world promoted stability in international community. At least this

is the fundamental approach of international community. But these

heterogeneous states are potential source of instability if the rights of

national minorities and minority peoples within states will be ignored.

There are such a huge number of these national minorities and minority

people within states that any attempt to violate the rights of them will cause

turbulences and wars. Therefore the international and European community

is committed in the protection of political and civil rights for the national

minorities and minority people within states. These rights have to do with

the participation of the national minorities and minority people in the

political life at one side, and at the other side these minorities the respective

states should grant the rights which has to do with their language, religion

and culture. Every other approach is in contrary to the basic international

and European community documents.

Anyway Kosovo, as a multiethnic state in western Balkans, presents a

country in which all the citizens are equal before the law. At the same time

the minorities enjoy the rights which are provided by the fundamental

documents of international law and European law. In this regard Kosovo

remains a model of multiethnic state of western Balkans. As a sui generis

case, which is treated by the international community, this country is

successful story of coexistence with minorities. With all, with no

distinction. Kosovo now is a stability factor in western Balkans in

particular, and in the southeast Europe in general. But let us conclude that

this stability is on the air while the Republic of Kosovo will go ahead in the

integration process in the European Union. We can not forget the fact that

178

the integration process of the European Union, despite difficulties, has

reduced the expansionist nationalism of many states. At the same time this

development accompanied by the growth of obligations that states took in

the area of human rights and minorities. By the way national minorities, as

Serbs in Republic of Kosovo, and minority people, as ethnic Albanians in

Macedonia, are integrated well in the political life, as well as Serbs in

Kosovo and Albanians in Macedonia enjoys the rights foreseen by the

fundamental instruments of international law. So, multiethnic states in

western Balkans, especially Republic of Kosovo, reflects the area where for

the moment the nationalists‟ feelings are neglected. These feelings could be

activated whenever if there are tendencies for the violation of human rights,

especially the rights of minorities. People within state can live in peace only

by respecting the identity and rights of each other.

Ma. Sc. Arton MUSLIU

Arton MUSLIU was born on 26 April

1983 in Viti, now Republic of Kosovo.

He finished the Faculty of Law at

University of Prishtina and earned his

Bachelor degree of Law on 30 September

2008. He also finished his Master studies

where he obtained the title: Master of

Juridical Sciences in International Law at

University of Prishtina, Faculty of Law. During his master studies his

scientific and research work was focused in international relations

and international law. His research work in the Master dealt with the

“Right of the People for Self-determination”. He is author of many

articles and columns in newspapers in Kosovo.

179

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181

8 The Impact of the Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute on Integration of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU and NATO

Martin BALCO 1

Abstract: The name dispute between the Hellenic Republic and the

Republic of Macedonia over the denomination "Macedonia" has been a

major foreign policy obstacle to integration ambitions of the Republic of

Macedonia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation. Initially a historical bilateral dispute thus gained wider

political, economic and security dimensions. The article characterizes and

analyzes the substance of the dispute, its history and impact on the Republic

of Macedonia. The long-term dispute has been causing instability in the

Republic of Macedonia and not solving it ultimately carries risks with

implications for the wider region. In the current situation of Greek

unwillingness to retreat and the absence of pressure from the international

community on Greece it is likely that smaller and economically weaker

Macedonia will have to give way. However, this is unlikely for several

reasons for the time being.

Key words: Macedonia, the Hellenic Republic, European Union

1 Mgr. Martin BALCO, PhD. is working at the Ministry of Foreign and European

Affairs of the Slovak Republic in Bratislava. He is a graduate of the Faculty of

Political Science and International Relations, MBU in Banská Bystrica,

Slovakia (balco.martin@yahoo.com).

182

Introduction

The Republic of Macedonia2 has a relatively short history of its own

statehood. It came into existence as an independent state in modern history

in 1944 when the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of

Macedonia proclaimed the People's Republic of Macedonia as part of the

People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since 1963 renamed as the

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The end of the bipolar division of

the world in the late 20th century is on the Balkan Peninsula associated

mainly with the dissolution of Yugoslavia which was accompanied by a

bloody civil war and the emergence of six (seven if we count Kosovo3)

successor states. One of them was the Republic of Macedonia which

declared independence from Yugoslavia on 8 September 1991. Since then

Macedonia has faced many serious challenges on both the domestic and

international fronts. The process of consolidation of the newly formed state,

including international recognition, was not easy, especially due to

opposition of the Hellenic Republic (further referred to as Greece) to the

name, symbols and certain constitutional provisions of the newly

independent state. Even though the Arbitration Commission of the

Conference on Yugoslavia (commonly known as Badinter Commission)

rendered an advisory opinion in favour of recognition of the Republic of

Macedonia in January 1992, the European Community consented to delay

its recognition in order to secure Greece´s consent to the Maastricht Treaty

and to support a united European front at the time when Common Foreign

and Security Policy was coming into existence. The recognition was thus

delayed for more than a year, but, in the end, Macedonia obtained it in a

roundabout way by petitioning the Organization of United Nations (UN) for

2 The Slovak Republic recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its

constitutional name and this denomination is used in this article. The Republic

of Macedonia acts in international organizations under the name of Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) due to Greek objections to its

constitutional name. In bilateral relations, however, majority of UN member

states recognized Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name. In this

article, unless indicated otherwise, the name Macedonia refers to the Republic

of Macedonia when discussing history since 1912 and to the larger historical-

geographical region when used in earlier historical contexts. 3 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with

UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

183

membership, a case unique in the UN history. Macedonia was admitted to

the UN on 8 April 1993, however, "being provisionally referred to for all

purposes within the United Nations as "the former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia" pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the

name of the State."4

There has been little progress in the issue since and the entanglement

over the name between Greece and Macedonia (name or naming dispute as

referred to in the literature) has thus entered its third decade. In the opinion

of Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of

Oxford A. TZANAKOPOULOS, "It is a dispute in which national(istic)

sentiment runs high on both sides, and this has caused it to be blown out of

all proportion and to have lingered for way too long."5As a result,

Macedonia's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures has

been stalled and the dispute is a major obstacle thereto apart from internal

problems of Macedonia. Greece has namely been vetoing Macedonian

efforts to integrate into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), conditioning further progress of Macedonia´s

integration by resolving the name dispute.

8.1 Historical background of the Greek-Macedonian name dispute

The roots of the current dispute over the name have their foundations in

the development of the historical region of Macedonia and in different

interpretations of historical and social events by nations inhabiting this area

over the centuries. As the Editorial Board of the anthology of academic

articles The Name Issue Revisited puts it, "The appearance of the Republic

of Macedonia as an entity in international relations revived the forgotten

„Macedonian Question‟ and rekindled disputes amongst neighbouring

4A/RES/47/225, 1993. [online]. General Assembly of United Nations,1993. [cit.

2014-12-20].<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r225.htm>. 5 TZANAKOPOULOS, A. (2011): Legality of Veto to NATO Accession: Comment

on the ICJ‟s Decision in the Dispute between fYR Macedonia and

Greece [online]. Blog of the European Journal of International Law [Cit.

20.12.2014.]. Available at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/legality-of-veto-to-nato-

accession/>.

184

countries over questions related, directly or indirectly, to the history of the

wider region of Macedonia as well as for legitimacy in using the

Macedonian name and state symbols."6

Geographic delimitation of the historical-geographical region known as

Macedonia has been changing over time. At present, it can be characterized

as a territory including the northern part of Greece, the territory of the

Republic of Macedonia, the south-western part of Bulgaria, the eastern part

of Albania and the southern part of Serbia. The present-day Republic of

Macedonia is therefore located on a small part of the territory of historical

Macedonia, known as Vardar Macedonia. The ethnic composition of the

population of the region changed significantly over the centuries. Ethnic

origins of ancient Macedonians are unclear and a subject of contention. As

the researcher´s note in the Encyclopaedia Britannica states, "Historians are

divided into two principal camps: those who believe that evidence indicates

the ancient Macedonians were Greek (e.g., Nicholas G. HAMMOND,

Robin Lane FOX, and Ian WORTHINGTON) and those who believe either

that evidence is inconclusive or that it indicates that the ancient

Macedonians were not Greek (e.g., Eugene BORZA, Ernst BADIAN, and

Winthrop L. ADAMS)."7 Along these lines, according to many Greek

historians, ancient Macedonians were of Greek origin. These conclusions

derive from both militarily and politically successful reign of Philip II. of

MACEDON and his son Alexander the GREAT in the 4th century BC who

identified themselves as Greek and spread Hellenistic culture. According to

the Greek interpretation, this fact proves the Greek origin of ancient

inhabitants of Macedonia from which they derive also the exclusive right to

use the name Macedonia and symbols from this period. On the contrary,

according to the Macedonian interpretation, supported by other historical

6 DZUVALEKOVSKA CASULE, M. (2012): The Name Issue Revisited: An

Anthology of Academic Articles. Macedonian information centre 2012. 503 p.

ISBN 9989207283. 7 DANFOTH, L. (2014): Macedonia: a contested name [online]. Encyclopaedia

Britannica [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1515349/Macedonia-a-contested-

name>.

185

sources, ancient Greeks did not consider the population of Macedonia (i.e.

ancient Macedonians) Greek or even peers and called them barbarians.8

In the course of history, a multitude of nations and nationalities inhabited

the region of Macedonia and during ancient, medieval and modern times,

the territory of Macedonia was under the influence of several empires -

firstly the Roman Empire, then the Byzantine Empire, later medieval

Bulgarian and Serbian Empire and after the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, it

came under the administration of the Ottoman Empire for more than five

centuries. The complex historical development of this area, multitude of

nationalities and relatively frequent changes of administrators of the

territory became the basis for future territorial claims of the Balkan states on

the region of Macedonia, based on (pseudo)historical lines of their own

statehoods with the territory of Macedonia. Relatively newly consolidated

states of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia divided the territory of historical

Macedonia after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The so-called Aegean

Macedonia went to Greece, Pirin Macedonia to Bulgaria and Vardar

Macedonia went to Serbia. The present-day Republic of Macedonia was

constituted on the territory of Vardar Macedonia after the Second World

War.

A relatively late constituting of the present-day Macedonian state is

connected with the specific character of the Macedonian national revival in

comparison with national revivals of other nations on the Balkan Peninsula.

National revivals of the South-Eastern Europe nations in the 19th century

had generally three basic characteristics in common - firstly consciousness

of existence of "their own" medieval states, secondly distinct language and

thirdly "national" religion. However, these factors were hardly applicable in

the case of population of the region of Macedonia. At the turn of the 19th

century, one part of the population accepted Bulgarian national identity

whereas another part accepted Hellenic identity. A large portion of the

population, however, remained ethnically indifferent. In the 19th century,

Serbian influences began to show and the process of the Albanian national

awakening accelerated at that time, too. The territory of Macedonia, at that

time still a part of the weakening Ottoman Empire, thus became a place of

clashing of agitational efforts of these nations. Conflicting efforts of the

8 ROSŮLEK, P. (2008): Struĉná historie států. Makedonie. Praha: Libri 2008. 130

p. ISBN 9788072773428

186

Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches can also be pointed out

and the situation was similar in the field of education where the individual

states started founding schools on the territory of Macedonia with the aim of

Hellenisation, Serbianisation or Bulgarisation of the local population.

Despite these efforts, majority of the rural population still remained

ethnically indifferent and the denomination "Macedonian" indicated rather a

geographical or administrative reference than ethno-political.9 In the case of

Macedonia, it is therefore more appropriate to speak of a creation of a

nation rather than of a national revival, even though majority of

contemporary researches recognize that all modern nations are recent

constructs. As Czech historian P. ROSŮLEK states, "creating of the

Macedonian national identity and of its story is to be understood in the

context of the Balkan neighbours. It was designated later and as a defensive

reaction to agile nationalist policies of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia as well as

numerous Albanian population."10

The distinct Macedonian identity began

to emerge progressively in the late 19th under the influence of the ideology

of Macedonism (sometimes referred also as Macedonianism) and the

prominent proponents of a separate Macedonian nation, such as Georgi

Pulevski or Krste Petkov Misirkov.

The year 1943 was crucial for the creation of the modern Macedonian

state and nation. At the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the

National Liberation of Yugoslavia it was established that a federal

Yugoslavia was going to be created after the end of the Second World War

and Macedonians would be one of six constituent nations in the new

Yugoslavia, having their own republic.11

The main aim of creating an

independent Macedonian state which did not have a tradition in the

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia)

9 ROSŮLEK, P. (2008): Struĉná historie států. Makedonie. Praha: Libri 2008. 130

p. ISBN 9788072773428. 10

ROSŮLEK, P. (2014): Antická dimenze Makedonské identity, spor o název země

s Řeckem & Albánci v Makedonii. In Bezpeĉnostné fórum 2014. Banská

Bystrica: Belianum 2014, p. 609-620. ISBN 978-80-557-0678-8. 11

Deklaracija Drugog zasedanja Antifašistiĉkog veća narodnog osloboĊenja

Jugoslavije, 29. novembar 1943.[online]. Arhiv Jugoslavije [cit. 2014-12-

20].<http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/sr-

latin/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akti_jugoslavij

e/deklaracija_drugog_zasedanja_avnoja.html>.

187

was to help build a separate Macedonian nation, allowing for the

elimination of Bulgarian influence in the region and for possible territorial

aspirations towards Aegean and Pirin Macedonia.12

The Constitution of the

Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) as a part of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia entered into force on 1 January 1947. During the existence of

Yugoslavia, "despite frequent irritants from the local government, press, and

radio in Skopje, Athens had never raised any objections to the constitutional

framework of the FSR of Yugoslavia, nor had it ever questioned its internal

administrative structure of federate republics. Indeed, a Greek consulate

general continued to function in Skopje, maintaining normal de facto

relations with the authorities of the Republic, although officially it was

accredited to the federal government in Belgrade."13

The declaration of independence of the Republic of Macedonia from

Yugoslavia from 8 September 1991 constituted a new chapter in the history

of the area. Under Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of

Macedonia, the Republic of Macedonia is a sovereign, independent,

democratic and social state.14

Immediately after the declaration of

independence Greece opposed recognition of the newly formed state due to

denomination "Macedonia" in its name which - according to Greek

interpretation - is solely Greek heritage. Moreover, Greek officials claimed

that the new constitution implies a security threat and possible territorial

pretensions of the new state against Greece, particularly the Greek northern

region of Macedonia. According to the Constitution, Macedonia would

"assist and make links with Macedonian nationals in neighbouring

countries. Greece interpreted the wording as having secessionist

12

ROSŮLEK, P. (2008): Struĉná historie států. Makedonie. Praha: Libri 2008. 130

p. ISBN 9788072773428, p. 46-48. 13

It is important to note, however, that on the other hand, "official Greek policy,

supported by all major Greek political parties, rejected the existence of a

“Macedonian” nation. This denial, however, did not negate the existence of a

separate Slavic people in the SRM, but objected to its Macedonian name which

was considered a constituent element of Greek cultural heritage." See: KOFOS,

E. 2014. Greece' s Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy over FYROM‟s

Independence and Recognition [online]. Myriobiblos [Cit. 20.12.2014.]

Available at <http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/english/kofos_adven

ture_1.htm>. 14

Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. 1991. [online]. The Assembly of the

republic of Macedonia [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.sobranie.mk/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-macedonia.nspx>.

188

undertones."15

As a result of international pressure, two amendments to the

Macedonian Constitution were adopted in 1992. According to Amendment

1, paragraph 1 "The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial claims against

any neighbouring state" and Amendment 2, paragraph 1 states that "The

Republic of Macedonia will not interfere in the internal affairs of other

states."16

Greece also contested symbols of the new state - mainly the Vergina Sun

(also known as the Vergina Star) pictured on the flag, regarded by Greeks a

symbol of ancient Macedonian kings and purely Greek national symbol.

Greek-Macedonian relations further deteriorated despite Macedonian

concessions and culminated in early 1994 when Greece imposed a unilateral

economic embargo on the Republic of Macedonia. The blockade was lifted

after the intervention of the international community after eighteen months,

but cost the Macedonian economy "an estimated US$2 billion."17

On 15 September 1995, the Interim Accord between the Hellenic

Republic and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was concluded.

Both sides committed to a compromise - Macedonia to change its state

symbols and Greece to recognize the state under the provisional name of

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and not to impede the entry of the

state into international organisations. Weak diplomatic relations were also

established.18

The agreement established a fundamental framework, or a binding code

of conduct, that regulates relations between the two countries to this date,

with occasional accusations of violations from both sides. Relations

between Greece and Macedonia improved and intensified after 1995 which

15

ALIC, A. (2007): Greece-Macedonia: Sticks and stones [online]. International

Relations and Security Network. [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Articles/Detail//?id =53418&lng=en >. 16

Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. 1991. [online]. The Assembly of the

republic of Macedonia [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.sobranie.mk/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-macedonia.nspx>. 17

Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. 1991. [online]. The Assembly of the

republic of Macedonia [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.sobranie.mk/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-macedonia.nspx>. 18

Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and the FYROM. 1995. [online].

United Nations [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.hri.org/docs/fyrom/95-27866.html>.

189

was reflected in an increase in bilateral trade and Greek foreign investments

in Macedonia. While the Interim Accord brought some relaxation in the

bilateral relations, the dispute about the name of Macedonia remained

unresolved. The Interim Accord namely limited itself to binding both parties

to continue negotiations under the auspices of the UN in order to solve the

name dispute.

8.2 Integration process of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU and NATO in the shade of the name dispute

The European Union is currently the strongest economic integration in

the world. It has managed to meet most of its strategic objectives since its

foundation in 1957 (at that time called the European Economic Community)

- to build a customs union, common market and monetary component of the

economic and monetary union. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EU

membership became a strategic foreign policy goal for the countries of the

former Eastern Bloc. The reasons were not only economical, but also

political. Although the states of former Yugoslavia cannot be counted as

states of the Eastern bloc due to a specific and unique position of

Yugoslavia during the Cold War, we can certainly observe the compliance

of the goals of the states of both groups in the area of foreign policy. For

these states, the EU has become not only a symbol of economic growth, but

also an imaginary comeback to Europe from which they had been separated

after the Second World War. All former Yugoslav countries have defined

integration to the EU as their primary foreign policy goal. Slovenia

successfully joined the EU in 2004 and it took nine more years until Croatia

joined the Union as its 28th member on 1 July 2013. Macedonia together

with Montenegro and Serbia have acquired status of candidate country to

the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are listed as potential

candidate states.

Macedonia submitted the application to join the EU on 22 March 2004,

following the signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and

the Agreement on Trade in 2001 (Macedonia signed such agreements as the

first of the Western Balkan states). Macedonia turned in the application for

190

EU membership in 2004 and obtained the status of candidate country, an

imaginary second step on the path to the EU, on 16 December 2005. The

European Commission subsequently recommended the opening of accession

negotiations on 1 October 2009. Despite the fact that the European

Commission‟s annual progress reports since 2009 have consistently

recommended the opening of accession negotiations, this has not yet

happened due to the Greek opposition. Even though Greece agreed under

the Interim Accord of 1995 not to object to the application by or the

membership of Macedonia in international organizations under the name of

FYROM, it has been blocking its progress in the integration process to the

EU since 2009. It conditions the unlocking of the process by resolving the

name dispute. The EU holds ultimately a similar view, having made it clear

to Macedonia that the dispute must be resolved before the start of accession

negotiations, as the EU will not allow this (bilateral) dispute to become an

internal problem of the whole Union.19

Macedonia has thus found itself in a

stalemate.

The situation is similar in Macedonia´s aspiration to join NATO.

Membership in NATO (perhaps only with the exception of Serbia) has

similar postulates for the countries of the former Eastern Bloc and former

Yugoslavia as in the case of integration into the EU - the closure of the past

and orientation towards the West, with new security guarantees. Countries

aspiring for NATO membership are expected to meet certain political,

economic and military criteria which are set out in the NATO´s

Membership Action Plan. The consent of all NATO member states is also

necessary for the start of the negotiations. At the 2008 Bucharest summit,

NATO's invitation to the Republic of Macedonia was blocked by Greece.

As the Bucharest Summit Declaration states "an invitation to the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually

acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached."20

19

ECHO, S. (2012): No Breakthrough in Macedonia Name Talks[online]. Balkan

Insight [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/no-breakthrough-in-macedonia-name-

talks>. 20

Bucharest Summit Declaration [online]. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [Cit.

20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm>.

191

Macedonia subsequently filed an application for a ruling by the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of Greece´s actions at the

summit with regard to interpretation and implementation of the Interim

Accord. International Court of Justice ruled in December 2011 that "the

Hellenic Republic, by objecting to the admission of the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia to NATO, has breached its obligation under Article

11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995."21

This

decision, however, has had no effect on the revision or modification of the

Greek stance and has not caused any shift in the dispute. It is mainly the

result of the fact that the ICJ granted the declaratory relief sought by

Macedonia, but refused to order Greece to refrain from similar conduct in

the future, as demanded by Macedonia. According to A.

TZANAKOPOULOS, "This was because Greece‟s good faith was to be

presumed - there was no reason to suppose that a State will repeat conduct

found to have been wrongful."22

Although the EU and primarily the Organization of United Nations

(since 1993) undertook several activities towards resolving the dispute,

there has been little progress to date and despite regular UN-mediated

meetings, the parties have not reached an agreement regarding the name of

the Republic of Macedonia. Two special UN mediators, Cyrus VANCE and

Matthew NIMETZ (since 1999) have come up with several compromise

proposals since, such as the Republic of Upper Macedonia, Republic of

Northern Macedonia, New Macedonia or Republic of Vardar Macedonia,

but without much success. A great impediment is the Greek requirement and

insistence on the use of a possible new name erga omnes, i.e. both in

bilateral and multilateral relations and for internal use in Macedonia which

is inadmissible for Macedonia.

Moreover, after the armed conflict in Macedonia with the Albanian

minority in 2001, Macedonism became more assertive and an official

ideology of the ruling elite. A few years later in response to Greece‟s

21

No. 2011/37. 2011. [online] International court of justice. [Cit. 20.12.2014.]

Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16841.pdf>. 22

TZANAKOPOULOS, A. (2011): Legality of Veto to NATO Accession: Comment

on the ICJ‟s Decision in the Dispute between fYR Macedonia and Greece

[online]. Blog of the European Journal of International Law. [Cit. 20.12.2014.]

Available at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/legality-of-veto-to-nato-accession/>.

192

blocking of Macedonia‟s NATO accession, the policy of antiquisation

(antikvizacija) backed by the nationalist ruling party VMRO-DMPNE was

put in motion. It includes the renaming of public sites after ancient

Macedonian personalities (e.g. Skopje´s "Alexander the Great" Airport) and

the transformation of public spaces through the erection of monuments and

statues from antiquity and the Middle Ages (disclosure of a monumental

statue of Alexander the Great in the main square in Skopje). Antiquisation

has been intended to put pressure on Greece as well as for the purposes of

domestic identity-building. Obviously, it has been interpreted as an act of

provocation in Greece.

Although the economic crisis has created space to exercise pressure on

Greece in the negotiations on this issue after 2008, this possibility has been

left unused by the international community. The 2011 article in The

Economist explains possible reasons thereof: "With Greece now surviving

on European loans, some spy an opportunity for its EU creditors, many of

whom find Greek intransigence tiresome, to demand more flexibility over

the long-running dispute. But that looks naive. Spyros Economides, an

academic at the London School of Economics, says that no pressure has

been put on Greece to let Macedonia begin EU accession talks, and he does

not expect any now. The euro crisis means that enlargement is hardly a

priority for Europe. Indeed, many countries are quite happy to find any

excuse not to pursue it. Greek objections over Macedonia's name will do

nicely."23

Conclusion

Position of the Republic of Macedonia in international relations has been

complicated from the outset: Greece vetoes international acceptance of

Macedonia‟s name, Serbia denies the autonomy of its church, and Bulgaria

(while accepting Macedonia as a state) denies the existence of a

Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation.24

However, it is the long-

23

Call it what you want. 2011. [online]. In The Economist. [Cit. 20.12.2014.]

Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/21541400>. 24

Macedonia's Name - Why the Dispute Matters and how to Resolve it. 2001.

[online] International crisis group. [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

193

standing and seemingly dead-locked dispute with Greece over the name that

causes most serious difficulties for the Republic of Macedonia. It presents a

major obstacle for deeper integration of Macedonia both to the EU and

NATO with all the consequences. In the context of the accession to the EU,

it is important to mention that in addition to the Greek attitude, Bulgaria has

also expressed complaints in relation to Macedonia´s bid for the EU

membership and vetoed the opening of accession negotiations with

Macedonia in 2012 alongside Greece. On that occasion, Bulgarian Prime

Minister B. BORISOV accused Macedonia "of stealing from Bulgaria's

history and badmouthing his country."25

With regard to the integration to

NATO, Greece has also been blocking the invitation to the organization

despite the fact that Macedonia meets the accession criteria. The 2011 ICJ

ruling did not affect the decision taken by NATO Allies at the Bucharest

summit in 2008. The statement by the former NATO Secretary General

Anders Fogh RASSMUSSEN on ICJ ruling noted: "We agreed that an

invitation will be extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been

reached. This decision was reiterated at subsequent summit and ministerial

meetings."26

Despite the fact that the international community has been trying to

mediate the dispute practically from its inception, the unresolved name issue

appears to be irreconcilable for the time being. On the one hand, we can find

the reasons for the failure in intransigence of both sides, with Macedonia

refusing to abandon its constitutional name and Greece refusing to accept it

under any conditions. On the other hand, the blame lies also with the

international community. Their efforts have not been so as intensive as for

example significant activities of the EU in mediating the Belgrade-Prishtina

dialogue. As S.A. SOFOS notes, "The international community has tried to

<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=28041

&lng=en>. 25

Bulgaria vetoes Macedonia‟s EU accession talks. 2012. [online]. Euractiv [Cit.

20.12.2014.] Available at <http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/bulgaria-

vetoes-macedonia-eu-acc-news-515809>.

26

Statement by the NATO Secretary General on ICJ ruling. 2011. [online]. North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-50672CA8-1A1DD013/natolive/news_81

678.htm>.

194

facilitate a compromise between the parties; but their efforts have largely

been detached from the pragmatics underlying the dispute and have often

ignored the complex social dynamics at play ... The name issue has been

addressed in an unimaginative and highly legalistic way, stripped of its

dynamic and continuously evolving nature, thus revealing the dearth of

conceptual, methodological and practical rigour in our approaches to

conflict transformation in the region."27

In spite of its seeming insignificance, the dispute has easily intoxicated

the public in both countries, with the intolerant nature of the dispute being

reflected even in literature, theatres or sports. "There is little by the way of

geopolitical strategy in the dispute, but local politics certainly plays a key

role, with neither side willing to back down from their hard-line stance now

that the public has been consumed by the fires ... The nature of the dispute is

illustrated by the fact that it has done nothing to hinder the two countries'

excellent trade relations."28

It is important to note, however, that the dispute

about the name of the Republic of Macedonia constitutes just one dimension

of a broader, multi-layered latent conflict, "one that touches so much upon

the fundamentals of the two societies involved that, it is argued, we are

facing an intractable conflict."29

The ongoing discussion only hints at many

nuanced issues and interpretations in the centre of this controversy.

Further delay in resolving the issue (and thus in Macedonia´s

membership of NATO and the EU) may have serious negative implications

for the future of Macedonia. Public support for the EU entry in Macedonia

has been decreasing because of the long stagnation in the integration

process which burdens inter-ethnic relations between Macedonians and

Macedonian Albanians that have been relatively fragile following the 2001

conflict. For the Albanian political elite in Macedonia is not joining the EU

and NATO because of the unwillingness to change the name of the country

27

DZUVALEKOVSKA CASULE, M. (2012): The Name Issue Revisited: An

Anthology of Academic Articles. Macedonian information centre 2012. 503 p.

ISBN 9989207283. 28

ALIC, A. (2007): Greece-Macedonia: Sticks and stones [online]. International

Relations and Security Network. [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail//?id=53418&lng=en>. 29

DZUVALEKOVSKA CASULE, M. (2012): The Name Issue Revisited: An

Anthology of Academic Articles. Macedonian information centre 2012. 503 p.

ISBN 9989207283.

195

unacceptable. The country also faces serious economic difficulties and the

delay has exacerbated the sense of resentment among Macedonians.

It is likely that in the absence of pressure of the international community

on Greece, smaller and economically weaker Macedonia will have to give

way. However, this is not likely to happen as long as the nationally oriented

right led by the popular party VMRO-DPMNE is in power. However, the

question is how would the majority of Macedonian population react if the

political elites agreed to change the name of the country. According to the

president of the World Macedonian Congress T. PETROV, any change in

the name of Macedonia would mark the final change, or even denial of the

Macedonian nation as a whole, its language and identity, and so it sees also

the majority of Macedonians.30

30

TRAJKOVSKI, M. (2012): A new effort in Macedonia, Greece name dispute

talks[online]. SETimes. [Cit. 20.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/feature

s/ 2012/11/27/feature-03>.

196

Mgr. Martin BALCO, PhD.

Martin Balco earned his master´s degree

(M.A., 2011) and doctorate (PhD., 2014)

in international relations at the Faculty of

Political Science and International

Relations of Matej Bel University, Banská

Bystrica, Slovakia. During his PhD.

studies, his scientific and research

activities focused on South-East European

countries, primarily on the issues of the

countries of former Yugoslavia. Last year,

he successfully defended his dissertation

thesis "Slovaks of Vojvodina in the

context of realization of minority rights in

the Republic of Serbia" at the Department

of International Relations and Diplomacy of the Faculty, currently

awaiting a book release. In order to complement his studies, he

travelled frequently to the countries of South-Eastern Europe,

completed several internships (e.g. at the Office for Public

Procurement of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign and

European Affairs of the Slovak Republic) and undertook study and

research stays at the University of Cologne, University of Belgrade

and University of Dubrovnik.

197

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200

201

9 Lobbying à l´Union Européenne

Karolina TICHÁ

Abstract: The article addresses to the concept of regulation of lobbying in

the EU context. Its objective is to map the existing regulatory efforts, both in

the EU institutions as well as in selected member states. Its purpose is to

compare different approaches and reveal the most contentious points. The

aim of further description and comparison of Canadian and American

experience is to notice the positives and negatives that come with the

regulation of lobbying in practice. In conclusion, the summarized findings

are presented as a potential source of inspiration, which Croatia as the

other Western Balkans countries can use in the future.

Key words: lobbying, Union européenne (UE)

L´Introduction

Le lobbying est un phénomène qui fait partie de la vie politique et

sociale actuelle. Il joue un rôle positif parce qu´il améliore la connexion

entre les droits civils et politiques. Il permet aux citoyennes de ne pas

seulement jeter une fiche de vote mais de participer plus à la formation

politique. En plus, le lobbying présent un moyen de représentation d‟intérêts

particuliers qui s´imposent difficilement dans le dialogue politique. Grosso

modo il contribue à la réduction du déficit démocratique à la formation de la

politique de l´UE. Mais il est toujours perçu comme quelque chose d‟illégal

ou de nuisible pour les affaires publiques.

Mgr. Karolina TICHÁ, M.A. is graduate student at the Faculty of Political Science

and International Relations, MBU in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia

(karolina.ticha@umb.sk).

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L´actualité du sujet choisi est aussi soulignée par l´attitude des médias

qui apportent les informations des lobbyistes avec une connotation négative

et qui habituent à confondre le mot « lobbying » avec la corruption ou les

pratiques déloyales.

En cadre des pays des Balkans de l‟Ouest, cette incohérence notionnelle

est plus forte. La perception du lobbying par rapport à la conception du bon

gouvernement est assez difficile dans la culture politique de ces pays-là. Au

contraire, en fonction de la mondialisation progressive, tous les pays seront

forcés de régler ce phénomène au niveau national aussi que d‟influence des

groupes de pression étrangères.

Il est aussi évident que l´augmentation du taux des groupes d´intérêts et

de la professionnalisation de ses activités est ce que l‟on voit comme le

miroir de la société actuelle – sa fragmentation et son hétérogénéité.

9.1 Le caractère unique du Lobbying à l´Union européenne

Le Lobbying à l´UE est unique par son caractère et aussi plus difficile

qu´au niveau nationale. C´est grâce à de multiples niveaux de formation des

affaires publiques que l´UE est un espace où des acteurs qui vienne

d´environnement historique, institutionnel et culturel différent, se

rencontrent. Chaque acteur du lobbying apporte sa propre expérience et sa

propre compréhension d´intérêt publique. L´ambiance concurrentielle est

forte ce qui cause le développement de formes de lobbying, de stratégies

sophistiquées et de meilleur orientation en arène de l´UE.

Le citoyen courant peut avoir à l´esprit la question « comment est-il

possible d‟influencer le processus législatif, les décisions adoptées en

dehors des structures votés et institutionnalisés1, de même que s´assurer que

le lobbying ne devienne pas un privilège de bourgeois ? »

1 Voir: ZHAO, CH. (2007): Deliberation or Bargaining? An Analysis on the

Convention on the Future of Europe. Working Paper Series on European

Studies 2007.

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De sorte qu´il y a toujours des trous dans la compréhension du rôle de

lobbying. Pour l´amélioration de cette situation, il faut intelligiblement

changer la connaissance du lobbying. La façon par laquelle on peut

l‟atteindre, est de voir la détermination, les limites précises et les règles du

jeu - en d´autre terme la régularisation.

L´ambition de cet article n´est pas de présenter une analyse accaparante

mais plutôt systématiser les points de vue concrètes et les règles adoptées

pour qu´on puisse estimer le système de régularisation établi dans les

institutions de l´UE.

Par conséquent, il faut commencer à l‟exploration de l´état actuel de la

régularisation du lobbying dans les institutions de l´UE aussi que dans les

Etats membres choisis pour comparer les attitudes différentes et découvrir

les points ou il y a le plus de contentieux. Ensuite on va continue la

description d´expérience américaine et canadienne sur laquelle on a essayé

d´attirer l´attention des avantages et des inconvénients que la régulation du

lobbying apporte. Et enfin, on a voulue évoquer la considération de la

possibilité de l´application des formes et des moyens de régulation pour

l´eurolobby curent et lesquels peuvent assurer l´effectivité la plus probable.

Il apparait que la définition de lobbying fondée sur la distinction de la

corruption est insuffisante. Le lobbying joue un rôle irremplaçable dans le

processus de la création des affaires publiques. De nos jours, il devient aussi

une profession courante pour beaucoup de personnes. Donc si on veut isoler

les connotations négatives qui sont évoqué pour quelques hommes politique

ou citoyens, il faut se focaliser sur sa mise en place dans la vie juridique et

le paramètres des règles du jeu.

Toutefois ce n´est pas si simple. Chaque brouillon de la régulation autant

d‟avantages que d‟inconvénients. Ces ambivalences sont renforcées par le

fait que le lobbying (comme la profession) sort du secteur privé mais il est

complètement orienté vers la formation des affaires publiques – leur

formulation, implémentation et réalisation. Le lobbying crée un pont entre le

gouvernement et les citoyens. C´est pourquoi chaque aspiration de la

régulation de lobbying apporte plusieurs points de contentieux qui sont

déterminés par l´effort d´atteindre à la plus grande transparence possible et

au renforcement de la démocratie du processus de décision.

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Initialement, on a procédé à cet article avec un peu de naïveté quand

on a pensé que l´on puisse décrire et comparer plusieurs types de systèmes

de régulation du lobbying et successivement extraire le meilleur de ce qui

pourrait être applicable dans le cadre de l´UE. Comme il est apparu, une

réflexion approfondie sur des éléments de la régulation évoque de plus en

plus des questions.

D´une part, la régulation seule compte un pas en avant qui supporte la

transparence et l´ouverture du système politique. En plus, pour le public, la

légitimité du lobbying est en relation directe avec son expression législative.

D´autre part, la régulation du lobbying porte plusieurs risques qui peuvent

signifier l´approfondissement de déficit démocratique à l´UE.

De nos jours, il n´existe pas un seul modèle approuvé de la régulation du

lobbying qu´on puisse pratiquer dans toute son ensemble. En confrontant

des connaissances théorétiques avec les expériences des états choisis, on a

identifié les points concrets qui posent les problèmes les plus graves pour la

régulation du lobbying.

9.2 La diversité des acteurs du lobbying L´un (qui est dans le contexte de l´UE plus visible que dans un autre

lieu) est la capacité de contenir la diversité des acteurs du lobbying et

successivement la définition qui correspond à la nature de tous ces acteurs.

Pour le brouillon de l´autorégulation, ce problème est insignifiant, parce que

les sujets du lobbying déclarent eux mêmes et ils s´engagent volontairement

à l´exécution des règles et aux obligations.

L´institutionnalisation du lobbying signifie la confirmation de son

importance et de sa forte position. Cependant la coopération entre la

Commission européenne (Commission) et les lobbyistes n´avait pas été

contrôlé jusqu´au début des années 90. Pendant longtemps, la Commission

prenait une attitude réservée et se confiait à l´autorégulation pour protéger

de bonnes relations avec les groups d´intérêts. La Commission voulait

garder « la porte ouverte » donc elle transmettait la responsabilité aux

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lobbyistes et elle-même n´abordait pas des mesures radicales2. Elle l‟a fait

jusqu´à obtenir la pression de Parlement européen (Parlement).

Mais dans les années 90, une attitude indifférente était typique du

Parlement qui éditait les cartes pour l´entrée aux bâtiments du Parlement

seulement sur la base d‟une demande personnelle.

Les premiers changements ont été subi après l´acceptation de Ford de

donner des renseignements car ayant toujours évité la nécessité de définir

« qu´est-ce que le lobbyiste exactement ». D´après ces renseignements, le

registre des personnes qui exigent l´accès répétitif au Parlement, a été mis

en place. La situation actuelle avec la définition, quand la Commission et le

Parlement utilisent « Transparency Register » (depuis 2011), est très

similaire. « Transparency Register » distingue seulement 6 catégories de

sujet de lobbying3:

(1) les lobbyistes professionnels et les sujets de droit qui pratiquent

le lobbying,

(2) « in-housse » lobbyistes,

(3) les organisations non-gouvernementales

(4) les « think-tanks » et les institutions académiques et de

recherche

(5) les organisations qui défendent l´Eglise et la communauté

religieuse

(6) les organisations qui défendent le service public et territorial

On observe que la détermination exacte des personnes lobbyiste devient

l´objet de plusieurs renouvellements des normes du droit aux Etats-Unis et

au Canada ainsi que la raison de l´inefficacité de la régulation du lobbying

en Hongrie, en Lithuanien et en Pologne.

La faute qui apparait la plus souvent, c´est l´omission des « in-house »

lobbyistes, les sujets de droit qui pratiquent le lobbying et les organisations

2 Voir: CHARI, R. – MURPHY, G. (2007): Examining and Assessing the

Regulation of Lobyists in Canda, the USA, the EU institutions, and German: A

Report for the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local

Government. Dublin, 2007. 3 Voir: 2010/2291(ACI) (2011): European Parliament/European Commission

Agreement: transparency register for organisations and self-employed

individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy implementation. Brussels:

EC/EP 2011.

206

non-gouvernementales où au contraire les normes de droit se concentrent

seulement aux lobbyistes professionnels.

Les seules définitions utilisées (qui sont souvent inspirées par le modèle

américain) se distinguent d´après quelque critères : la position géographique

de l´état, la tradition du système démocratique, la culture politique,

l´environnement institutionnel ou l´approche au « public affaires

management » etc. Les complications sont causées par l´extension de la

définition qui est soit assez vaste et la définition ne contribue pas à la

transparence, soit très restreinte donc beaucoup des acteurs du lobbying sont

omis. Bref la bonne définition est la condition primaire pour une régulation

du lobbying qui soit utile, fonctionnelle et réussie.

Une partie de la définition fait aussi une liste des métiers auxquels on a

interdit de faire du lobbying. Habituellement, il s´agit des destinataires de

lobbying pour éviter les conflits d‟intérêts. En même temps, cette liste crée

l´effet inverse c´est-à-dire qu‟elle empêche le mécanisme de « revolving

doors ». Pour cela la loi fixe un délai de protection (au Canada c´est 5 ans)

durant lequel les anciens fonctionnaires publics (les membres du Parlement

et des ministères, leurs consultants et assistants) ne peuvent pas entrer dans

la vie public comme les lobbyistes. La limitation de leur retour, est vu

comme une façon de mettre en place des obstacles contre une connexion

incontrôlée entre le lobbying et la formation des affaires publiques.

Si on sait déjà qu‟on peut identifier les lobbyistes et les destinataires de

leurs activités, car on dispose de quelques moyens de régulation.

Concrètement c‟est : une obligation d´enregistrement et d´information, un

code éthique, un système de sanction, une autorité exécutant de la

surveillance et plus efficacement tous doit être « contenu » dans la forme

législative.

Premièrement, l‟obligation d´enregistrementne pose pas de problème.

Bien sûr, il y a des opposants qui disent que la création des registres

obliges à mettre des obstacles à la participation de la société civile et crée

une perturbation de l´accès équitable aux fonctions publics. On peut

supposer que l´instauration de l´obligation de s´enregistrer porte

l´augmentation des dépenses à lobbying ce qui peut causer des

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complications aux petits groupes ou aux organisations nouvelles4. Disant

par ses adversaires, que la régulation du lobbying aide à l´identification des

lobbyistes solvables de même que des projets politiquement lucratifs.

Néanmoins selon les recherches d´OECD, la plupart des sujets de

lobbying à l´UE qui sont interpellés (entre lesquelles sont représentés des

organisations non-gouvernementales en majorité) ne considère pas la

registration obligatoire comme une complication ou un problème marquant5.

La vague d´indignation se lève avec la liste de donnés que les lobbyistes

sont obligés de déclarer et publier. Le but de la collecte de ces informations

est l´assurance de la visibilité et la plus grande transparence possible. Sans

compter qu´il faut garantir que l´environnement concurrentiel (dans le cas le

lobbying qui sort du secteur privé) ne sera pas déséquilibré.

D´autres choses sont présente notamment la découverte des données

financières c´est-à-dire des revenus et des dépenses consacrés aux activités

du lobbying. Cela est habituellement une source de conflit entre les

lobbyistes professionnels et les organisations non-gouvernementales. Dans

le cas de lobbyistes professionnels ou les représentants du secteur privé, on

peut voir la publication des donnés financières comme un endommagement

de la sécurité des clients du privé est ce qui sort du traité entre le client et le

lobbyiste. Donc les lobbyistes font face à un choix difficile – pour la

protection de leurs clients, ils ne peuvent pas participer à déceler des

données financières car qu´ils peuvent être soupçonnés d‟un manque de

confidentialité et en plus, perdre des clientes actuelles ou potentielles.

Même si les lobbyistes décident de publier leurs transactions financières, ils

peuvent rompre les conditions du traité concernés les informations

confidentiels des clients.

La possibilité d´instauration des registres est liée avec la nécessité de

l´impartition explicitement où on doit se registrer. Cela peut commencer

après une signature du traité (entre le lobbyiste et son client), après le

premier contact entre le lobbyiste et le fonctionnaire public, jusqu´à

4 Voir: CHARI, R. – HOGAN, J. – MURPHY, G. (2011): The Legal Framework

for the Regulation of Lobbying in the Council of Europe Member States.

Strasbourg, 2011. 5 Voir: OECD. GOV/PGC(2009)9. Lobbyists, government and public trust:

Promoting integrity by self-regulation.Paris, 2009.

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atteindre un contenu déterminé des activités de lobbying ou éventuellement

après qu‟on dépasse une limite financier consacré au lobbying. Au moyen

de ces paramètres, on peut réguler soit l´accès au lobbying soit les activités

concrètes.

Le system de régulation aux Etats- Unis est plus concentré sur les

activités des lobbyistes qu´à l´accès dans la profession (comment il y a au

Canada) et en même temps joue un rôle important pour les limites

financières. A la dernière réglementation HLOGA (Honest Leadership and

Open Government Act, 2007), les limites financiers déterminés pour la

registration ont été réduits de 50 % (en comparaison avec des limites

initiales) de même qu´il est obligatoire de publier la liste des contributions

données pour la campagne électorale au niveau fédéral.

Sur la description du modèle canadien, on peut démontré l´application

du system de la registration obligatoire et unifié ce qui est concentré dans

l´accès au lobbying, pas ses aspects financiers. Ce qui est d‟une grande

importance car c‟est ce qui joue aussi sur l´obligation des lobbyistes de faire

connaître des informations assez vastes et détaillées sur le but de leurs

activités (cela fait partie du renouvellement de Lobbyists Act en 2008).

Concrètement, cela signifie que les lobbyistes doivent publier:

- le nom de leurs client et tous les sujet qui peuvent

potentiellement profiter (directe ou indirecte) du lobbying

effectué au nom de ce client,

- le nom du projet, de la loi, de la politique, de la subvention, de

la décision etc. dont les intentions ils vont faire du lobbying,

- l´existence éventuel de contributions financières réservées à

l´organisation qu‟ils défendent,

- les organes d´administration publique qu‟ils vont contacter.

En comparaison, « Transparency Reigster » utilisé actuellement à l´UE a

toujours un caractère volontaire et exige des sujets registrés :

- le report annuel des revenus et des dépenses liés au lobbying et

concentrés aux organes, agences ou instituions de l´UE,

- toutes les sources financières reçues de l´UE pendant l´année

dernière après la registration

En général, les registres peuvent être complétés par les codes de

l´honneur ou professionnels. D´une part, ces codes font partie du concept

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principale de l´autorégulation. D´autre part, ils peuvent faire une impression

fonctionnelle considérable ou sans effet. Avant tout, les codes ont un

caractère éducatif et ils doivent contribuer à une meilleure réputation des

lobbyistes dans les yeux du public et des fonctionnaires publics, comme les

professionnelles qui sont fixés par les règles éthiques. En même temps, les

codes doivent servir comme une liste de principes que les lobbyistes sont

obligés de suivre dans la vie quotidienne. De ce point de vue, les codes sont

une question de prestige de la profession.

Dans le cas de l´UE, les règles éthiques qui sont bien formulées et

formalisées, sont une partie inséparable de la création d‟une politique

démocratique et transparente. Voilà pourquoi, « Code of conduct » est une

condition pour la régistration dans le « Transparency Register ». A l´UE les

codes ont leur tradition6. Donc les lobbyistes en sont habitués et par leur

intermédiaire, ils représentent la responsabilité et l´honnêteté au travail et

dans d´autres principes splendides. En plus, chaque organisation qui accorde

le patronage aux lobbyistes professionnels dans l´espace européen (SEAP,

EPACA, AALEP etc.), conditionne son adhésion par l´obligation de

respecter des standards de l´honneur.

Cependant, l´instauration de registres et des codes de l´honneur ou

professionnels n´est pas suffisant. Pour qu‟ils ne deviennent pas les moyens

d‟une fin en soi, il faut les ajouter par un system de sanction et le plus

efficacement par une autorité qui va effectuer la surveillance. Par exemple,

aux Etats-Unis, l´institution qui contrôle le lobbying au niveau central

manque toujours. En revanche, au Canada, le Bureau indépendant du

commissaire du lobbying fonctionne depuis 2008 et ce bureau exécute

l´administration d´un registre et il est autorisé à initier une enquête si il a un

soupçon

de la violation de la loi ou des règles liés à la registration. Ensuite, on peut

trouver ici une liste de délits que le lobbyiste peut commettre7:

- offrir des informations fausses,

6 Voir: McGRATH, C. (2008): The development and regulation of lobbying in the

new member states of the European Union. Journal of Public Affairs, No. 5,

2008.

7 Voir: Lobbying Act, 2008, Article 14 – Offences and Punishment, Paragraphe 1.

210

- offrir des informations imprécises,

- offrir des informations faussées,

- n´offrir aucunes informations.

Cette liste de délits est fournie par un system de sanctions des amendes

financières jusqu´à un emprisonnement.

Dans le cas de trois états membres de l´UE, en Lituanie, il y a un registre

de lobbyistes qui est administré par La haute Commission éthique qui est

autorisée à suspendre des activités de lobbying de personnes qui ont violé

une loi. D´après la définition lithuanienne légale de lobbying, la registration

est obligatoire seulement pour les sujets, pour lesquelles le lobbying est une

activité commerciale et encore, la loi couvre uniquement le lobbying

législatif. C´est pourquoi la régulation de lobbying ne jouie pas d‟un grand

succès ni d‟une grande efficacité.

En Hongrie, avant l´adoption de la régulation légal du lobbying, il y a eu

une instauration la régistration facultative. Les sujets registrés ont reçu

régulièrement des cartes d´invitations pour les sessions parlementaires et

des débats sur la législation préparée dans les secteurs différents. Selon la

loi de 2006, tous les lobbyistes doivent être inscrits dans le registre

(actuellement administré par le Bureau central de la justice) et publier (pat

trimestre) des rapports qui contiens8:

- les noms de leurs clients,

- la fréquence de leurs activités de lobbying,

- tous les moyens utilisés,

- la liste de tous les fonctionnaires publiques qu‟ils ont contactés

pendant les trois derniers mois.

Des législateurs hongrois ont aussi pensé au system du contrôle

réversible. Donc les rapports de lobbyistes sont comparés avec les rapports

similaires, publiés par les institutions touchés. Donc le Bureau central de la

justice peut initier une enquête seulement en cas de disparité entre ces deux

rapports. Au moment de la violation de la loi, le Bureau central de la justice

peut expulser le lobbyiste du registre pour une période de 1 à 3 ans ou

8 Voir: POGATSA, Z. (2006): The law on lobbying in Hungary, and its effects.

Europeum: Institut for European policy 2006.

211

infliger une amende financière. La Hongrie a toutefois aboli la loi de

lobbying au janvier 2011.

La Pologne a incliné à la création de « Registre de lobbyistes

professionnels » comme une couverture avec la plus haute transparence. Le

registre exige des lobbyistes polonaises seulement les informations9 de

bases de sorte qu´ils jouissent d‟un plus grande nombre de sujets registrés

qu´en Lituanie ou en Hongrie. Son administration est complètement dans les

mains du ministère de l´Intérieur qui a droit d´infliger (de nouveau) une

amende financière10

. De manière semblable à la Hongrie, la responsabilité

de publier les contacts avec des lobbyistes est transmit aux fonctionnaires

publics qui doivent aussi décrire le taux d´influence qu´un lobbyiste a eu sur

la forme finale d‟une loi/décision.

Malgré tous les efforts dépensés en Lituanie, en Pologne ou en Hongrie,

on peut constater que la régulation du lobbying a plus compliqué la situation

de lobbyistes professionnels que tirer le lobbying d´une zone grise.

Un de but de cet article est d‟évaluer si les attitudes et les mesures

adoptés aux états membres sont plus faibles, ou comparable ou si ils

excédent l´état de régulation appliqué aux institutions de l´UE.

Tant que l´UE a 27 états membres, on se permet d´assurer qu´il y a 27

attitudes différentes au lobbying et à leurs régulations. Pour une meilleure

orientation et pour avoir la possibilité de comparer, on a choisi une

distinction dans 3 groupes:

(1) Les états sans une loi ou un modèle légal de régulation du

lobbying.

Ce groupe est la plus grand – il est représente par 15 états.

Toutefois ca

ne signifie pas que le lobbying n´existe pas ou ne fonctionne pas

ici.

(2) Les états avec une forme de régulation indirecte. Ce sont les

états qui

9 Voir: GALKOWSKI, J. (2008): Polish Lobbying Law – Towards Transparency.

Paris: 2008.

10

Voir: MAKOWSKI, G. Regulation of Lobbying in Poland. Prague: Europeum,

Institute for European Policy, 2011.

212

pratiquent des registres volontaires, des codes de l´honneur ou

professionnels ou un contrôle minimal de l´accès des groupes

d´intérêts aux fonctionnaires publics.

(3) Les états qui ont adopté une loi de lobbying. Il est surprenant

que les états qui pratiquent la régulation directe soient tels,

qu‟ils ont une histoire totalitaire et qu‟ils n´ont pas beaucoup

d´expériences avec lobbying moderne et dans cas on peut

supposer que la perception du lobbying est assez différente

qu´au niveau de l´UE.

9.3 L´évolution de la culture politique est nécessaire

Cette diversité des attitudes témoigne d´une indifférence tant de l´UE

que des états membres. Ils veulent se combattre par une grande

transparence, contre la corruption et contre le clientélisme.

Il est difficile de dire clairement si les états membres devancent ou

s‟ils ont du retard sur les institutions de l´UE. La régulation légale du

lobbying

existe seulement dans les quatre pays (Lituanie, Pologne, Slovénie et

Grande Bretagne) où elle n´apporte pas un effet attendu et elles sont

détentrices de plusieurs défauts et « loopholes ». La variante la plus efficace

pour les états membres, c‟est qu‟il rassemble les formes de la régulation

indirect11

ou les paramètres des règles (utilisé p.e. en Allemande, en France

etc.).

Pourtant cette attitude suppose un certain degré d´évolution de la

culture politique qui est fondé sur les valeurs libérales et pluraliste et sur la

morale ainsi que sur la croyance d´utilité d‟un dialogue ouvert entre les

fonctionnaires publics et les représentants des différents intérêts qui sont

considérés comme des experts portant des informations de qualité.

11

Voir: CHARI, R. – HOGAN, J. – MURPHY, G. International Trends in

Lobbying Regulations: Lessons Learned for Ireland. Dublin, 2010.

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En même temps, il faut ne pas oublier si les paramètres sont très rigides

ou incompatible, le lobbying peut devenir une profession d´élite qui sert

exclusivement aux intérêts particuliers. C´est-à-dire que le lobbying

n´accompli plus sa fonctionne d´origine et il peut troubler la perception de

la légitimité des décisions politiques.

En d´autres termes, il est possible de créer un pluralisme élitaire ou une

institutionnalisation de l´environnement fortement concurrentiel dans lequel

l´accès aux fonctionnaires publics est limité par un nombre de joueurs

stratégiques. Le système reste toujours ouvert mais il est restrictif au sens

que les sujets du lobbying doivent suivre des règles rigides ou d´autres

exigences que tous les acteurs ne sont pas capables de satisfaire.

La crainte de cet effet et le fait de rompre des assemblages avec des

représentants d´intérêts a été notable dans le cas ou la Commission a d´une

part supporte des efforts du Parlement de réguler le lobbying mais d´une

autre part reste dans l´application d´un modèle d´autorégulation.

Néanmoins, quand la base de donnés CONNECS a mis en service (la

version dernière en 2001), c´était la Commission qui avait avantagé des

groupes d´intérêts plus grands et plus stables pour limiter le taux augmenté

de lobbyistes. Par conséquents, cela mène à un développement du lobbying

secondaire, cela signifie que des groupes d´intérêts pratiquent du lobbying

aux sujets qui ont un accès plus facile à la Commission.

D´abord, on peut voire le lobbying comme une « main-d´œuvre » bon

marché pour les institutions de l´UE grâce auquel elles obtiennent des

informations nécessaires. Ensuite, il est aussi vrai que dans les secteurs de

l´agriculture ou de l´industrie, les portes sont plus ouvertes pour les joueurs

financiers forts. Et enfin, l´UE garde l´existence (c´est-à-dire l´UE supporte

financièrement) des organisations qui sont matériellement ou

personnellement faibles mais qui représentantes des intérêts spécifiques

(plus souvent non-lucratifs).

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La conclusion

Pour conclure, il reste une question s´il y a un system de régulation qui

est lié à tous les acteurs divers du lobbying dans l´UE et qu‟en même temps

il peut être compatible avec une gamme hétérogène d‟intérêts imposés. Au

point que, pour éviter un pluralisme élitaire qui puisse empêcher certains

intérêts de participer, la régulation soit concentré sur les moyens, les

méthodes et les techniques que les lobbyistes et les groupes d´intérêts

appliquent dans la vie professionnelle quotidienne. Ainsi que pour

l´augmentation de la transparence et de la légitimité du processus de

discisions, il faut fixer des règles à deux parties – les expéditeurs et les

destinataires des activités du lobbying.

La pratique montre qu´aucun des modèles de la régulation (pas même les

américains) ne fonctionnent sans fautes, pour la première fois sans craintes

on peut dire que le lobbying de l´UE et sa régulation sont une avancée pour

le futur. Bref on ne peut néanmoins pas oublier que chaque forme de la

régulation adoptée sera influencée (plus ou moins) par les lobbyistes.

Des expériences des Etats membres aussi que d‟attitude choisie par les

institutions européennes particulières, tous les deux peuvent fonctionner

comme une source d‟inspiration surtout pour la Croatie. Dans les années

prochaines, on suppose que l‟UE dégage une pression sur des Etats

membres à créer d‟une forme nationale de régularisation du lobbying, dans

l‟intention de reconnaître le lobbying à l‟outil légitime de la politique

publique.

215

Mgr. Karolina TICHÁ

PhD. Candidate

Department of Political Science

Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations

University of Matej Bel, Slovakia

Kuzmányho 1, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

Karolina is graduate student from

Faculty of Political Science and

International Relations, MBU in

Banska Bystrica, where she is a full

time PhD Candidate at the

Department of Political Science and

the editor of the Journal Political

Sciences as well. On principle of

double Master‟s degree, she also

graduated from University of

Versailles St-Quentin-en-Yvelines in

France, in branch of study the

Analysis of conflicts and violence. During her studying, she attended a

semestral scholarchip at the University Paris West Nanterre La Dèfense and

several internships (Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic,

Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, Ministry of Interior of the

Slovak Republic, nonprofit organization Schola Empirica in the Czech

Republic). Her dissertation and scientific and research activity as well

focuses on the political science„s context and aspects of the public policy

making process with the emphasis on lobbying.

216

La bibliographie

CHARI, R. – HOGAN, J. – MURPHY, G. (2010): Regulating lobbying:

A Global Comparison. Dublin: International conference „International

Trends in Lobbying Regulations: Lessons Learned for Ireland“ 2010.

CHARI, R. – HOGAN, J. – MURPHY, G. (2011): The Legal

Framework for the Regulation of Lobbying in the Council of Europe

Member States. Strasbourg: CoE 2011.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2011): European Parliament/European

Commission Agreement: transparency register for organisations and self-

employed individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy

implementation. 2010/2291(ACI). Brussels: EC/EP 2011.

GAŁKOWSKI, Juliusz (2008): Polish Lobbying Law – Towards

Transparency. Afyonkarahisar: Korel Thermal Hotel - International

symposium 2008.

Lobbying Act (2008): Article 14 – Offences and Punishment, Paragraphe

1.

MAKOWSKI, G. (2011): Regulation of Lobbying in Poland. Prague:

Europeum, Institute for European Policy 2011.

McGRATH, C. (2008): The development and regulation of lobbying in

the new member states of the European Union. Journal of Public Affairs,

No. 5, 2008.

OECD (2009): Lobbyists, government and public trust: Promoting

integrity by self-regulation. GOV/PGC(2009)9. Paris: OECD 2009.

POGATSA, Z. (2006): The law on lobbying in Hungary, and its effects.

Prague: Europeum, Institut for European policy 2006.

ZHAO, CH. (2007): Deliberation or Bargaining? An Analysis on the

Convention on the Future of Europe. Working Paper Series on European

Studies 2007.

217

10 L´influence de la question du Kosovo sur l´eurointégration de la Serbie (2008-2012)

Hana VERMEŠOVÁ

Abstract: The article deals with the mutual relation of the Kosovo policy of

the government of Mirko CVETKOVIĆ and the integration of the Republic

of Serbia to the EU. Its main objective is to analyse the most important

events that have in large measure influenced this relation. The article

consists of two chapters. The first chapter deals with the position of Serbia

on the reconfiguration of the UNMIK as well as with the „legal battle for

Kosovo“ in form of the defence of Serbian attitude in front of the ICJ. The

chapter is concluded by the adoption of joint euro-Serbian draft of the

Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN that provided the platform for

the dialogue Belgrade-Prishtina. The second chapter analyses the outcomes

of so-called “technical phase “of the Dialogue (2011-2012), which had

significant impact on granting of the status of candidate country to EU to

Serbia.

Key words: the Republic of Serbia, Kosovo, integration to EU,

reconfiguration of UNMIK, advisory opinion of ICJ concerning the

independence of Kosovo, Dialogue Belgrade-Prishtina, granting of the

status of EU candidate country to the Republic of Serbia

L´Introduction

Pendant le 20ème

siècle, la Serbie a connu un développement politique

compliqué, marqué par des changements fréquents de sa structure politique.

En 1918, la Serbie est devenue un symbole d´intégration des slaves

méridionaux sous Le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes (en 1929

Mgr. Hana VERMEŃOVÁ, M.A. is graduate student at the Faculty of Political

Science and International Relations, MBU in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. e-mail:

hana.vermesova@gmail.com.

218

surnommé dans Le Royaume de Yougoslavie). En 1946, la ville de

Belgrade est nommé capitale de la République fédérative populaire de

Yougoslavie, qui a en 1963 obtenu le préfixe «socialiste». Au cours des

années quatre-vingt-dix, le régime a perdu son caractère socialiste (1993-

2003), et en 2003 Le Communauté d'États de Serbie et Monténégro est crée.

En 2006, la Serbie a commencé sa propre indépendance unitaire.

Après la chute du régime autoritaire de Slobodan MILOŃEVIĆ, la

Serbie était gouverné par six gouvernements, qui se sont efforcés à

moderniser le pays dans tous les domaines. L´histoire politique moderne est

marquée par deux événements importants : par la dissolution de la

Yougoslavie et par la déclaration d´indépendance du Kosovo. Ces actes ont

confirmé la division du spectre politique sur des partis politiques

modernistes, c'est-à-dire réformistes, qui protègent la perspective Serbe

européenne, et des partis traditionalistes, posent la portée sur la conservation

du Kosovo dans le cadre de la Serbie. L´eurointégration et «la question du

Kosovo» sont devenues des domaines-clefs dans la vie politique serbe1.

Le but de l´article est d´analyser des événements de la politique

intérieure (de la Serbie) et internationale, qui ont influencé la relation

mutuelle de la «question du Kosovo» et l´eurointégration de la Serbie. Par

l´analyse des ces événements l´auteur essaie de présenter l´hypothèse selon

la le gouvernement de Mirko CVETKOVIĆ (2008-2012) s´efface ses

intérêts par rapport au Kosovo en faveur de l´eurointégration de la Serbie.

La deuxième hypothèse prévoit que l´UE conditionne l´eurointégration de la

Serbie par la reconnaissance du Kosovo de facto, par des accords conquits

en dialogue Belgrade - Pristina.

L´article est divisée en deux parties. La première chapitre élabore la

politique du gouvernement du Mirko CVETKOVIĆ par rapport au Kosovo

jusqu´a 2010 en présentant la politique «le Kosovo et l´Union Européenne»

1 Note: Cette prémisse est supportée par la proclamation du programme

gouvernemental de 2008 où l´eurointégration repose sur la première place, et la

conservation de l´indépendance territoriale sur la deuxièmes. «La

gouvernement Serbe nouvelle ne va jamais reconnaître l´indépendance du

Kosovo» Voir: Ekspoze predsednika Vlade Republike Srbije Mirka Cvetkovića.

2011. Beograd: Vlada Republike Srbije 2011. [Cit. 14.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vlada/>.

219

(1). Cette partie analyse le point de vue serbe sur la reconfiguration de la

Mission d'administration intérimaire des Nations unies au Kosovo

(MINUK) et «la bataille juridique» pour le Kosovo sous la forme de la

défense devant la Cour internationale de justice (CIJ), terminée par la

décision subséquente en faveur de Pristina. La proposition serbe de la

résolution de l´Assemblé générale des Nations Unies (qui permettait la

discussion sur le statut du Kosovo en assistant des Nations Unies) a été

changée après l´intervention européenne. C´est l´UE qui est, d´après cette

résolution «mutuelle», le médiateur dans le dialogue courant. La deuxième

partie se concerne sur le dialogue Belgrade - Pristina «technique» (2011-

2012), qui peut être considéré comme une nouvelle étape dans les relations

entre la Serbie et les représentants de Pristina sous la surveillance de l´UE

(2). Bien que le but des négociations soit d´améliorer les relations entre ces

deux entités, elles aboutissent à la crise du Kosovo du Nord. La chapitre est

clôt par la décision du Conseil européen par rapport à l´attribution du statut

de candidat à l´UE à la Serbie. L´obtention du statut de pays candidat en

2012 est synonyme du bilan politique du gouvernement de Mirko

CVETKOVIĆ. Également il faut considérer le prix payé pour cette réussite.

Cet article est une étude de cas «case study», avec un thème concret.

L´emphase est mise sur des relations causales, qui ont affecté la vie

politique serbe. Pendant la recherche, l´auteur a utilisé des proclamations

officinales (gouvernementales, européennes, onusiennes) et des journaux

(Politika, Danas, Veĉernje Novosti, Blic, B92). Pour des raisons de

simplification, au lieu de Kosovo et Métochie ou la République du Kosovo

on utilise le terme «Kosovo». Il faut souligner le fait que l´auteur respecte la

position slovaque officielle par rapport au Kosovo selon laquelle la

Slovaquie considère le territoire du Kosovo et Métochie comme partie

intégrale de la Serbie en suivant la Résolution de l´Assemblé générale de

Nations Unies 1244/1999.2 Pour nommer la République du Kosovo et ses

organes, on utilise le terme neutre «l´administration de Pristina».

L´article offre une caractéristique simple de la situation politique en

Serbie (2008-2012) dans des relations «la Serbie- l´UE - le Kosovo».

2 Voir: Vyhlásenie NR SR k rieńeniu budúceho ńtatútu srbskej provincie Kosovo.

2007. [online]. Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 2007. [Cit. 4.12.2014.].

Available at www.nrsr.sk/web/dynamic /Download.aspx?DocID=250260>.

220

10.1 La politique du gouvernement de Mirko Cvetković par rapport au Kosovo - la politique «le Kosovo et l´Union Européenne»

Le gouvernement de Mirko Cvetković a été institué après des élections

avant terme en 20083. Le programme du gouvernement, présenté le 7. juillet

2008, proclame «la future européenne de la Serbie, sa pleine intégration

dans l´UE» comme la priorité la plus importante. «Il est indispensable de

réaliser des réformes pour se rapprocher de l´UE dans les domaines

politiques, économiques et judiciaires en même temps». Deuxièmement, «le

nouveau gouvernement ne va jamais reconnaître l´indépendance du Kosovo

et Métochie. La Serbie, en coopération avec d‟autres autorités des pouvoirs

va prendre tous les moyens juridique et diplomatique pour conserver le

Kosovo et Métochie dans le carde de la Serbie»4. Immédiatement, le

nouveau gouvernement a commencé la lutte diplomatique contre Pristina et

en même temps, il devait faire face à l´installation de la mission EULEX

dans le territoire du Kosovo.

3 Note: La crise politique en Serbie a été évoquée par la déclaration d´indépendance

unilatéral du Kosovo en 2008. Le chef du gouvernement de ce temps-la Vojislav

KOŃTUNICA a refusé de signer l´Accord de stabilisation et d'association

(ASA) avec l ´UE parce que beaucoup des Etats membres ont reconnait Kosovo

comme un pays indépendant. Au contraire, président de la Serbie Boris TADIĆ

et son Parti démocratique (qui était en coalition avec le Parti démocratique de la

Serbie de KOŃTUNICA) ont proclamé la signature indispensable malgré la

situation internationale. Le chef du gouvernement a annoncé des élections avant

le terme et on a crée le gouvernement de fonction, qui a signé l´ASA. Voir:

TADIĆ, B. 2011.Ne odustajemo od EU. In Politika 2011. [Cit. 14.12.2014.]

Available at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/200741.lt.html>. 4 Voir: Ekspoze predsednika Vlade Republike Srbije Mirka Cvetkovića. 2011.

[online]. Vlada Republike Srbije, 2011. [Cit. 14.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vlada/>.

221

10.1.1 La reconfiguration de la MINUK d´après «les conditions serbes», vraiment une victoire diplomatique?

La mission EULEX Kosovo (European Union Rule of Law Mission in

Kosovo) a été créée par l´Action commune de l´UE 2008/124/CFSP du 4.

février 2008. L´article 1 constitue la mission EULEX, qui va assister aux

institutions du Kosovo, aux entités judiciaires et aux agences de

renforcement du droit, qui soutient la création d´un système judiciaire

multiethnique. L´assistance aux institutions du Kosovo dans tous les

domaines concernant le droit, la garantie des droits sauf l´orientation

politique et la lutte contre la corruption ont été proclamé comme des buts de

la mission.5 La création de la mission EULEX prévoit la cession de

certaines fonctions de la MINUK, alors on peut parler de sa reconfiguration.

Ce procès évoquait la polémique dans la société politique serbe dès

l´établissement de la mission EULEX en février 2008, quand les

préparations pour l´arrivée ont commencé, à ce temps-la sauf l´acceptation

du côté serbe. Les partis de l´opposition - le Parti démocratique de la Serbie

et le Parti radical serbe ont insisté pour que l´acceptation de la

reconfiguration présente la marche à la reconnaissance du Kosovo. Le

Président TADIĆ et le Parti démocratique ont déterminé la reconfiguration

par l´accomplissement des conditions serbes, dans lesquelles les plus

importantes sont celles de la validation du mandat de la mission EULEX par

le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, ainsi que la confirmation de sa

neutralité, en respectant la Résolution 1244/1999.6 «La ligne rouge» serbe

est présentée dans «l´accord de six poids» du Secrétaire général des Nations

unies BAN Ki Moon, qui a énuméré des domaines dans lesquels la mission

EULEX serait opérée (la police, la justice, le douane, les frontières, la

protection des objets culturels et cléricaux, le transport et la

5 Voir: Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law

Mission in Kosovo. 2008. [online]. European Council, 2008. [cit. 14.02.2014.].

<http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/docs/JointActionEULEX_EN.pdf>.

6 Voir:TADIĆ, B. 2008. Euleks samo uz uslove Beograda. In Politika.online. 2008.

[Cit. 14.12.2014.].Available athttp://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Tadic-

Euleks-samo-uz-uslove-Beograda.lt.html>.

222

télécommunication). Selon cet accord, la mission EULEX est subordonnée à

la Résolution 1244/1999 et dispose d´un statut neutre.7 A la fin, la

reconfiguration était approuvée par le Conseil de sécurité le 26. novembre

2008 en prenant en compte «l´accord de six poids»8 Un jour de plus, le

gouvernement de la Serbie a également accordé la reconfiguration de la

MINUK.9

Au début, la mission EULEX devait faire face à plusieurs des problèmes.

La réception des fonctions a montré sous-dimensionnement personnel et

professionnel. La disposition des fonctionnaires d´EULEX s´est affrontée

avec le refus des Serbes du Kosovo, qui ont rejeté la coopération dans le

champ douanière.10

En Serbie l´ installation de la mission EULEX selon des conditions

serbes a été proclamée comme une victoire diplomatique. La mission a

obtenu un statut neutre, qui est devenu l´objet de la critique de l´opposition.

Elle demande l´administration stricte de la Résolution 1244/1999, qui

considère Kosovo dans le carde de la Serbie, et pour ça la neutralité est en

fait sa négation. Au contraire, le statut neutre de la mission est convenant

pour Pristina, qui a après la pression international finalement accepté cette

reconfiguration de la mission selon la Résolution 1244/1999.

En fait, la mission EULEX commencerait probablement à fonctionner,

avec ou sans l´accord serbe. Alors, l´acceptation serbe était seulement «pro

forma» et sa mise en place finale peut être considérée comme une

concession serbe.

7 Voir: Beograd ĉeka da Brisel ubedi Prištinu. 2008. In Politika.online. 2008. [Cit.

14.12.2014.]. Available at http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Beograd-

cheka-da-Brisel-ubedi-Prishtinu.lt.html>. 8 Voir: SC/9512 Kosovo situation calm, but political transition following

declaration of independence more complex than expectedSecurity Council told.

2008. [online]. New York: UN Security Council 2008. [Cit. 14.12.2014.].

Available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2008/sc9512.doc.htm>. 9 Voir: Usvojen zakljuĉak o prihvatanju principa iz Izveštaja generalnog sekretara

UN. 2008. Beograd: Vlada Republike Srbije 2008. [Cit. 14.12.2014.].Available

at<http://www. srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=99016>. 10

Voir: CEROVINA, J. - MARINKOVIĆ, A. 2009. Srpske opštine prepreka za

Euleks. In Politika 2009. [Cit. 14.12.2014.]. Available at

http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/96487.lt.html>.

223

10.1.2 Un désenchantement par l´avis consultatif de la Cour Internationale de la Justice et la résolution de l´Assemblé générale de Nations unies euro-serbe «mutuelle»

Après février 2008, des efforts diplomatiques serbes se

concentraient sur le projet de la Résolution de l´Assemblé générale des

Nations Unies par rapport à l´avis consultatif de la Cour Internationale de la

Justice (CIJ). L´ Assemblée générale a adopté la Résolution n°63/3 le 8

octobre 2008, dans laquelle on demande l ´avis consultatif sur la question

formulée par Belgrade : «La déclaration unilatérale d‟indépendance des

institutions provisoires d‟administration autonome du Kosovo est-elle

conforme au droit international ?». Au début, la Serbie a considéré

l´acceptation de la Résolution sous cette forme comme une victoire

démocratique. «La Serbie a montré, que dès ce jour, elle peut utilisé plus de

moyens diplomatiques dans le combat pour la question du Kosovo», dit le

Ministère des affaires étrangères Vuk JEREMIĆ.11

La présentation des opinions devant la Cour s´est passée en décembre

2009. La Serbie s´efforçait de démontrer que la déclaration d´indépendance

unilatérale du Kosovo est illégitime et contraire au droit. «Dans la

Résolution 1244/1999, le territoire du Kosovo est défini comme partie

intégrale de La République fédérative yougoslave, de laquelle la Serbie est

un Etat successif … La Résolution 1244/1999 présume, que le statut

définitif du Kosovo sera le résultat d´un consensus politique. Les Albanais

kosovars ne disposent pas d´un droit d'autodétermination…Les auteurs de la

déclaration d´indépendance unilatérale du Kosovo sont inférieurs à la

Résolution 1244/1999 et aux règles de la MINUK, qui ont été violés…

L´administration internationale a été établie par la Résolution 1244/1999 et

on ne peut pas l´annuler unilatéralement. La déclaration d´indépendance du

Kosovo n´est pas une solution finale de statut du Kosovo»12

11

Voir: Uspeh Srbije u UN. 2008. In Politika 2008. [Cit. 14.12.2014.]. Available

athttp://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Uspeh-Srbije-u-UN.lt.html>. 12

Voir: CR 2009/24 Public sitting on the Accordance with International Law of the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-

Government of Kosovo. 2009. The Hague: International Court of Justice2009.

224

La représentation de Pristina a opéré avec l´argument, que «la question

du Kosovo» est un cas sui generis. «Il n´y a pas de doutes que le Kosovo est

un Etat souverain et indépendant, la déclaration d´indépendance est le

résultat naturel du développement politique. La Résolution 1244/1999

n´empêche pas à la proclamation d´indépendance et le retour à l´ordre avant

mars 1999 est impossible»13

Parmi d´autres, l´opinion serbe était supportée par la Russie, la Chine,

l´Espagne, l´Argentine. Au contraire, par exemple des Etats Unis,

l´Allemagne, la France et la Croatie ont soutenu Pristina. La décision était

historique pas seulement pour la Serbie, mais pour la Cour elle-même - pour

première fois, elle a disserté sur l´égalité de la sécession d´une partie du

territoire d´un Etat souverain. La décision peut devenir le précédent dans le

droit international.

Le 22. juillet 2010 «La Cour a conclu que l‟adoption de la déclaration

d‟indépendance du 17 février 2008 n‟a violé ni le droit international général,

ni la résolution 1244/1999/ du Conseil de sécurité, ni le cadre

constitutionnel. En conséquence, l‟adoption de ladite déclaration n‟a violé

aucune règle applicable du droit international… La résolution 1244/1999

n‟excluait pas l‟adoption de la déclaration d‟indépendance du 17 février

2008, ces deux textes étant de nature différente: contrairement à la

résolution 1244/ 1999, la déclaration d‟indépendance constitue une tentative

de déterminer définitivement le statut du Kosovo»14

Par cette constatation, la position de la Résolution 1244/1999 a été

affaiblie. Elle contribue au dialogue à long terme, mais ne définit pas la

solution finale pour Kosovo. Selon la Cour, la Résolution 1244/1999 ne

contient aucune clause, qui interdit la déclaration d´indépendance. La

Cit. 01.12.2014.] Available at <http://www.icj-

cij.org/docket/files/141/15710.pdf>. 13

Voir: CR 2009/25 Public sitting on the Accordance with International Law of the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-

Government of Kosovo. 2009. The Hague: International Court of Justice 2009.

[Cit. 01.12.2014.] Available at<http://www.icj-

cij.org/docket/files/141/15712.pdf>. 14

Voir: 141/2010 Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale

d´indépendance relative au Kosovo. 2010. The Hague: International Court of

Justice 2010. [Cit. 01.12.2014.]. Available at <http://www.icj-

cij.org/docket/files/141/15988.pdf>.

225

formulation de la question elle-même est devenue l´objectif de la critique -

la question était formulée rigoureusement et la Cour ne s´occupait pas avec

le fait, si la République du Kosovo dispose des éléments d´un Etat. Il est

vrai que la réponse sur la question posée est négative, toutefois l´avis

consultatif ne détermine pas que la Déclaration du 17. février 2008 est

conforme au droit international. Sur la question stricte, la Cour a rendu un

avis «neutre».

La décision de la Cour était une déconvenue pour la Serbie. «La caisse

de Pandore a été ouverte. La Serbie participera activement au débat devant

l´Assemblé générale des Nations Unies. Je suis persuadé, que l´Assemblé

générale va conclure que la sécession n´a pas rendu l´Etat aux Albanais

kosovars», le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a constaté.15

Immédiatement après la présentation de l´avis consultatif, le

gouvernement serbe a commencé à préparer le projet de la Résolution de

l´Assemblé générale des Nations Unies, qui a été présenté le 28 juillet 2010.

Le texte du projet constate que la CIJ n´a pas confirmé le droit des Albanais

kosovars de la déclaration d´indépendance et la sécession unilatérale n´est

pas la solution acceptable pour des question territoriales. C´est seulement le

dialogue pacifique qui va résoudre toutes les question ouvertes.16

En fait, ce

projet de la Résolution laisse le statut du Kosovo ouvert. Le Royaume Uni

s´éreintent cette formulation en critiquant le non-engagement l´UE et les

pays de Kvinta (le Royaume Uni, la France, l´Allemagne, l´Italie, des Etats

Unis). Comme a dit Philippe PAREM, le représentant du Royaume Uni

dans les structures onusiennes : «Cette discussion doit être fermée. Le

Kosovo est un Etat reconnu et ce procès est irréversible … Si la Serbie veut

ouvrir cette problématique, elle va directement confronter des Etats qui ont

15

Voir: JEREMIĆ, V. 2010.„Pandorina kutija” otvorena, idemo u UN. In

Politika2010. [Cit. 18.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/143447.lt.html>. 16

Voir: BAKOVIĆ, B., CEROVINA, J. 2010. Srbija razgovara: Kakvi su dometi

srpske kosovske politike. In Politika 2010, Vol. CVI, No. 34746, p. 4.ISSN

0350-4395.

226

reconnu le Kosovo…. et c´est contre les intérêts des citoyens du Kosovo, et

de la Serbie aussi. »17

Des Etats membres de l´UE ont, directement ou indirectement, demandé

à la Serbie de retirer ce projet de la résolution. La visite non-officielle du 26

août 2010 en Serbie de Guido WESTERWELLE, le Ministère allemand des

affaires étrangères est considèré comme «la dernière mise en garde» pour le

changement du projet. «Le Dialogue entre Belgrade et Pristina est

indispensable, c´est une chance d´améliorer la vie ordinaire. Dans l´UE,

nous pensons que cette chance est dans les conférences à Bruxelles, pas à

New York »18

Avant le voyage en Serbie, WESTERWELLE a admit que la

confrontation et l´ouverture du statut du Kosovo peut menacer

l´eurointégration de la Serbie.19

Pendant sa visite officielle à Belgrade le 31

août 2010, le Ministre des affaires étrangères britanniques William HAGUE

a répété cette position européenne.20

Au début du septembre 2010, le changement du projet a été annoncé. Le

côté serbe a reformulé le texte original en coopérant avec l´UE. Le nouveau

projet n´utilise pas les termes «la sécession unilatérale», les négociations sur

«des questions ouvertes» sont changé pour le terme de négociations sur

«des questions de la vie». La résolution «mutuelle» convoque au dialogue

pour chercher la solution acceptable et met l´accent sur le rôle de l´UE dans

ce procès. Le projet a été approuvé par l´Assemblé générale le 9 septembre

17

Voir: S/PV.6367 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim

Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2010/401). 2010. New York: UN Security

Council 2010. [Cit. 01.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-

8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20spv6367.pdf>. 18

Voir: VESTERVELE, G. – TADIĆ, B. 2010.Budućnost Srbije u EU. In Politika

2010, Vol. CVI, No. 34771, p. 1,5. ISSN 0350-4395. 19

Voir: VALTER, L. 2010. Borba za Kosovo ili perspektiva EU. In Danas 2010.

[Cit. 01.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/borba_za_kosovo_ili_perspektiva_eu.56.

html?news_id=197975>. 20

Voir: TADIĆ, B. 2010.Srbija spremna na kompromis sa EU Hejg: Najlakši

kompromis – povlaĉenje rezolucije. In Politika. 2010, Vol.. CVI, No. 34776, p.

5.ISSN 0350-4395.

227

2010.21

La Résolution ouvre la plateforme pour le dialogue Belgrade-

Pristina courant.

Bien que le président TADIĆ ait défini la résolution «mutuelle» comme

le résultat de la coopération et du consensus entre la Serbie et l´UE, la

pression européenne sur la Serbie afin de changer le texte est flagrante. Les

commentaires quotidiens des politiques européennes (qui ont reconnu le

Kosovo), qui ont incriminé la politique serbe par rapport au Kosovo et leurs

avertissements avant le ralentissement du procès d´eurointégration, et les

visites de WESTERWELLE et Hague elles-mêmes, sont les preuves de cela.

Le changement du projet serbe de la résolution de l´Assemblé générale

est, après l´acceptation de la reconfiguration de la MINUK, le deuxième

retrait significatif de la Serbie dans sa politique vers le Kosovo au profit de

l´eurointégration du pays.

10.2 L´étape nouvelle dans des relations entre la Serbie et les représentants de Pristina sous la surveillance de l´UE

Le dialogue Belgrade-Pristina est fondé sur la Résolution de l´Assemblé

générale des Nations Unies n° A/RES/64/298 laquelle présume que «le

dialogue lui-même serait un facteur de paix, de sécurité et de stabilité dans

la région. Il va supporter la coopération, atteindre le progrès dans la voie

vers l´UE et en même temps, il va améliorer la vie du peuple»22

.

Les buts proclamés du dialogue sont défini généralement et ils

s´orientent sur la coopération régionale. Le programme n´incorpore pas

l´ouverture du statut du Kosovo. L´administration du Pristina refuse

21

Voir: Generalna skupština UN jednoglasno usvojila Rezoluciju Srbije o Kosovu.

2010. In Politika. 2010, Vol. CVI, No. 34785, p. 1, 5.ISSN 0350-4395. 22

Voir: Resolution A/RES/64/298 - Request for an advisory opinion of the

International Court of Justice on whether the unilateral declaration of

independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international law. 2010. New

York: UN General Assembly 2010. Cit. 1.2.2014.] Available at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/298>.

228

strictement toutes discussions sur le statut du Kosovo du Nord, habité par

des Serbes.

Borislav STEFANOVIĆ a été nommé chef de l‟équipe serbe pendant les

négociations, Edita TAHIRI est la représentante de Pristina. Le diplomate

britannique Robert COOPER a été commissionné par l´UE comme le

personne interposée. Les sujets du dialogue n´étaient pas connus au début.

Pristina, sauf le manque du soutien politique domicile, devait faire face à

l´accusation internationale, présentée dans le rapport de Dick MARTY, un

diplomate suisse, qui a été élaboré pour l´Assemblée parlementaire du

Conseil de l´Europe. Dans le «Traitement inhumain de personnes et trafic

illicite d‟organes humains au Kosovo» MARTY accuse l´Armée de

libération du Kosovo (son chef ancien Hashim THACI maintenait premier

Ministre du Kosovo) de la procédure pénale grave, qui se passait au Kosovo

et l´Albanie septentrionale.23

La mission EULEX a commencé

l´investigation préliminaire.

Bien que la coalition gouvernementale serbe avait été préparée à

négocier, l´administration de Pristina n´est pas unifiée. Après l´échec

pendant le vote sur la résolution par rapport au dialogue dans le parlement

de Pristina, le gouvernement a décidé que l´accord gouvernemental est

suffisant. La participation finale de Pristina au dialogue est le résultat de la

pression européenne.

10.2.1 Le dialogue Belgrade – Pristina, la coopération

désirée ou forcée ? Les négociations du dialogue Belgrade-Pristina ont commencées en mars

2011 et pendant l´étape «technique», neuf ronds du dialogue sont passés. En

fait, les sujets des négociations copient «les six poids» du secrétaire

générale des Nations Unies.

23

Voir: Resolution 1782 (2011):Investigation of allegations of inhuman treatment

of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo. 2011. Strasbourg:

Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe 2011. [Cit. 1.2.2014.]. Available

at <http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta11/

ERES1782.htm>.

229

Les premiers résultats concrets ont été présentés après le cinq rond du

dialogue au début de juillet 2011 dans le domaine de la liberté du

déplacement, des livres de maître, de l´évidence des voitures et de

l´utilisation de la carte d´identité et du passeport. Par rapport à la liberté du

déplacement, des habitants du Kosovo peuvent voyager en Serbie avec des

documents de l´administration de Pristina (en passant le frontière

administrative, ils vont obtenir un document du Ministère des affaires

intérieurs serbe, qui confirme, que des documents de Pristina servent

seulement pour l´identification et n´ouvrent pas le statut du Kosovo.) Les

Serbes du Kosovo du Sud 24

peuvent se déplacer sans passeport du Kosovo

(qui est exigé par l´administration de Pristina), des cartes d´identité de

Pristina sont suffisantes. Même si STEFANOVIĆ a considéré ces agréments

comme «le mode, qui ne reconnaît pas le Kosovo et résoudre des problèmes

des peuples ordinaires»25

, des Albanaises Kosovars ont obtenu la possibilité

de voyager en Serbie avec des documents de Pristina. De plus, des équipes

ont mises d´accord sur l´utilisation des cartes d´identité, pas strictement des

passeports, mais ça, en même temps, signifie l´attribution des cartes

d´identité de Pristina aux Serbes du Kosovo, ce contre quoi les Serbes du

Kosovo du Nord ont protesté.

Sauf les premières résultats du dialogue, le juillet 2011 est marqué par le

début de la crise au nord du Kosovo. La crise a commencé par l´introduction

de l´embargo de Pristina sur le commerce serbe26

le 20 juillet 2011.27

Quelques jours plus tard, l´administration de Pristina a essayé d´occuper des

frontières administratives par les douaniers de Pristina. Les Serbes du

Kosovo ont répondu par l´élévation des barricades sur les endroits les plus

24

Note: Les Serbes du Kosovo sont concentrés surtout au nord de Kosovo. Dans le

reste du territoire, ils sont dispersés dans les enclaves, entouré pas des habitants

majoritaires albanaises. 25

Voir: Dogovor o dokumentima i tablicama. 2011. In Veĉernje Novosti, 2011. [Cit.

14.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.69.html:336474-Dogovor-o-

dokumentima-i-tablicama>. 26

Note: Pristina a argumenté que c´est seulement un acte de réciprocité. L´embargo

sur le commerce du Kosovo est en force en Serbie. 27

Voir: Dijalog Beograda i Prištine odloţen do septembra. 2011. In Politika. 2011,

Vol. CVII, No. 35092, p. 5. ISSN 0350-4395.

230

importantes qui mènent vers la Serbie. Plusieurs des perturbations et conflits

entre la KFOR et les Serbes du Kosovo sont passés.

En août 2011, la chancelière allemande Angela MERKEL pendant sa

visite officielle de la Serbie a souligné, que la crise au Kosovo du Nord (à

cause de la quelle le dialogue était arrêté) ne contribue pas au procès de

l´eurointégration du pays. «C´est indispensable d´acquérir le progrès dans le

dialogue …. la mission EULEX doit être permit d´exercer son mandat sur

tout le territoire du Kosovo. En même temps, il faut s´approcher à

l´abolition des institutions parallèles au Nord du Kosovo»28

. Elle a posé des

demandes nouvelles par rapport à l´eurointégration29

- la coopération avec

Pristina, la dislocation complète de l´EULEX et l´abolition des institutions

de Belgrade au Nord du Kosovo.

Au cours du sixième rond du dialogue subséquent à septembre 2011, les

partis ont conclus sur la question douanière. L´administration de Pristina va

utiliser le terme «Le Douane Kosovar » mais sans éléments d´Etat.

L´abolition d´embargo de Pristina sur le commerce serbe est devenu la

condition de Belgrade. Par contre, Pristina a essayé d´installer à nouveau la

police douanière aux frontières administratives Jarinje et Brnjak au Kosovo

du Nord. Les Serbes ont répondu avec le renforcement des barricades.30

Début octobre 2011 la KFOR a ouvert la frontière administrative Jarinje

pour les piétons, le transport routièr et le marchandise non-commerciale (en

assistance de la mission EULEX et des douaniers de Pristina) mais des

routes venant et allant vers les frontières sont bloquées.31

Cette situation

instable n´a pas aidé à donner une image positive de la Serbie devant la

publication de l´Avis de la Commission sur la demande d'adhésion de la

Serbie à l'Union européenne en octobre 2011.

28

Voir: TADIĆ, B. 2011. Srbija ţeli da reši konflikte na zapadnom Balkanu.;

Merkel: Napredak u dijalogu s Kosovom pa status kandidata. In Politika. 2011.

Vol. CVII, No. 35127, p. 1, 5.ISSN 0350-4395. 29

Note: L´Allemagne dispose d´une position clée dans l´UE. 30

Voir: Tahiri: Prihvatanje peĉata – priznavanje Kosova. 2011. In Politika, 5

September 2011. [Cit. 25.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/190187.lt.html>. 31

Voir: RADOMIROVIĆ, B. 2011d. Srbi sa severa neće ni srpske carinike na

prelazima. In Politika, 2011. [Cit. 25.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/193779.lt.html>.

231

Selon l´Avis de la Commission sur la demande d'adhésion de la Serbie à

l'UE «le pays aura accompli de nouveaux progrès substantiels en ce qui

concerne la priorité essentielle suivante: réaliser de nouvelles avancées sur

la voie de la normalisation des relations avec le Kosovo, dans le respect des

conditions du processus de stabilisation et d'association, en respectant

pleinement les principes de la coopération régionale inclusive; en respectant

pleinement les dispositions du traité instituant la Communauté de l'énergie;

en trouvant des solutions pour les télécommunications et la reconnaissance

mutuelle des diplômes; en continuant de mettre en œuvre de bonne foi tous

les accords conclus et en coopérant activement avec la mission EULEX

pour que celle-ci exerce ses fonctions sur l'ensemble du territoire du

Kosovo.»32

Malgré le fait que les politiciens serbes ont apprécié l´avis

positivement, il détermine l´attribution du statut de pays candidat par le

retour au dialogue, lequel dépend de la volonté de Pristina.

Belgrade a immédiatement changé sa politique par rapport aux

barricades. «Les barricades ont empêché l´installation des institutions de

Pristina au nord du Kosovo, mais il est temps pour un processus politique

maintenant», dit STEFANOVIĆ pendant le huitième rond du dialogue du

30. novembre 2011. Pendant ces négociations, l´accord sur la liberté du

déplacement a été atteint. Selon cet accord, on va créer les contrôles sur des

frontières administratives Jarinje et Brnjak communes. Les policiers serbes,

les officiers de la mission EULEX, les représentants de Pristina vont y

assister, les douaniers de Pristina vont servir d‟observateurs. On va rater des

éléments d´Etat.33

Les Serbes du Kosovo ont refusé d´accepter cet accord,

car selon d´eux c´est la reconnaissance du Kosovo de facto.

Bien que les Serbes essaient d´accomplir des conditions dérivées de

l´avis, en décembre 2011 «le Conseil européen charge le Conseil de vérifier

et de confirmer que la Serbie a continué de faire preuve d'un engagement

crédible et de progresser dans la mise en œuvre de bonne foi des accords

32

Voir: Мишљење Комисије о Захтеву Србије за чланство у Европској унији.

2011. СОМ (2011) 668.{SEC (2011)1208}. Брисел: Европска Комисија 2011.

[Cit. 01.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/eu_dokumenta/misljenje_kandidatur

a/misljenje_ek _2011.pdf>. 33

Voir: Stefanović: Barikade su ispunile cilj. 2011. In Blic, 4 December 2011. [Cit.

01.12.2014.]. <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/293683/Stefanovic-Barikade-

su-ispunile-cilj>.

232

conclus dans le cadre du dialogue, qu'elle est parvenue à un accord

concernant une coopération régionale ouverte à tous et qu'elle a activement

coopéré avec la mission EULEX et la KFOR afin de leur permettre

d'exécuter leurs mandats. À la lumière de cet examen, le Conseil prendra en

février 2012 une décision sur l'octroi à la Serbie du statut de pays candidat,

une confirmation devant intervenir à cet égard lors de la réunion du Conseil

européen en mars.» 34

Ça signifie la mise en action du résultats du dialogue.

Le président TADIĆ a constaté, que «la politique du Kosovo et de l´UE

n´a pas digérer une défaite. La Serbie ne peut, ni abdique pas de la future

européenne. Je suis persuadé que nous allons obtenir le statut la prochaine

fois.»35

Le vice-président du gouvernement pour intégration européenne a

démissionné. L´autre vice-président du gouvernement Ivica DAĈIĆ: «C´est

évident qu´on demande à Belgrade - il faut reconnaitre le Kosovo. Ne nous

mentons pas et ne nous parlons des contes. C´est requiert.»36

Président

TADIĆ a confirmé des mots de DAĈIĆ, mais la Serbie n´a pas accepté cette

condition.37

Les représentants de la coalition ont commencé pour le premieère fois à

parler de la condition de la reconnaissance du Kosovo en changement pour

le statut du pays candidat (l´opposition relève sur ce fait depuis longtemps).

Ces discours peuvent être considérés comme «l´excuse» devant les électeurs

dans le domaine de l´eurointégration. Le but est de montrer, que le pays est

prêt mais des conditions politiques pour l´attribution du statut sont

incomptables avec l´intérêt d´Etat, alors avec la question du Kosovo.

34

Voir: Мишљење Комисије о Захтеву Србије за чланство у Европској унији.

2011. СОМ (2011) 668. {SEC (2011)1208}. Брисел: Европска Комисија

2011. [Cit. 01.12.2014.]. Available

at<http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/eu_dokumenta/misljenje_kandidat

ura/misljenje_ek _2011.pdf>. 35

Voir: Tadić: Ne odustajemo od EU. 2011. In Politika,2011. [Cit. 01.12.2014.].

Available at http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/200741.lt.html>. 36

Voir: Daĉić: Od Beograda se traţi da prizna nezavisnost Kosova. 2011. In

Politika, 2011. [Cit. 01.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/201130.lt.html>. 37

Voir: Tadić: Traţili su da priznamo Kosovo, nismo prihvatili. 2011. In Blic, 13

December 2011. [Cit. 01.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/295624/Tadic-Trazili-su-da-priznamo-

Kosovo-nismo-prihvatili>.

233

10.2.2 La conclusion du Conseil européen - le bilan politique du gouvernement cessant

Après le sommet du Conseil européen du 9 décembre 2011 et la non-

attribution du statut de pays candidat à l´UE, la Serbie se concentrait à la

conclusion de l´accord par rapport à la représentation régionale du Kosovo.

Le dialogue était important surtout pour la Serbie car l´attribution du statut

est déterminé par le progrès dans le dialogue. Par rapport aux autres

conditions du Conseil européen, les résultats du dialogue sont entrés en

force à la fin du décembre 2011, le retour de la mission EULEX était

partiellement permit le 22 février 2012 sous la condition de non-

participation des douaniers de Pristina.38

Pendant le neuvième rond du dialogue, les parties ont conclus le

compromis sur la représentation de Pristina dans le champ régional.

L´administration de Pristina va se présenter comme Kosovo, avec la

référence suivante : «ce nom ne détermine pas le statut du Kosovo, il est

conforme à la Résolution 1244/1999 et à l´avis consultatif de la Cour

International de la Justice sur la déclaration d´indépendance».

STEFANOVIĆ a noté que cette formulation est une victoire diplomatique

de Belgrade, parce qu‟on a réussi à omettre le terme de « déclaration

d´indépendance du Kosovo». Selon lui, cet accord est conforme à la

constitution serbe, et comme ça la Serbie a rempli les conditions

européennes.39

Même si Belgrade a réussi à remplir cette condition

politique, Pristina a gagné la possibilité de se présenter par elle-même sur le

champ régional, alors de facto se représenter comme un Etat indépendant.

Le résultat positif par rapport au statut du pays candidat était, jusqu´à le

neuvième rond du dialogue, improbable mais l´accord sur la représentation

régionale de Pristina a avancé la position serbe.

C´était la session du Conseil de l´UE, qui a précédé au sommet du

Conseil européen et sa recommandation positive considérée comme «avant-

38

Voir: RADOMIROVIĆ, B. 2012. Usmenim dogovorom Euleks ponova na severu

KiM. In Politika 2012. [Cit. 28.12.2014.]. Available at

<http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/208739.lt.html>. 39

Voir: Dogovoreno predstavljanje Kosova. 2012. In Politika, 2012. [Cit.

28.12.2014.]. Available at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-

dana/209505.lt.html>.

234

attribution» du statut. Pendant la discussion, la Lituanie, la Pologne et la

Roumanie ont exprimé des objections. En conclusion, «le Conseil a examiné

si la Serbie a continué de faire preuve d'un engagement crédible et a

progressé dans la mise en œuvre de bonne foi des accords conclus dans le

cadre du dialogue entre Belgrade et Pristina, elle est parvenue à un accord

concernant une coopération régionale ouverte à tous et si elle a activement

coopéré avec la mission EULEX et la KFOR afin de leur permettre

d'exécuter leurs mandats; le Conseil a conclu que tel est le cas. À la lumière

de cet examen, le Conseil recommande d'octroyer à la Serbie le statut de

pays candidat et attend avec intérêt que le Conseil européen confirme cette

décision lors de sa réunion de mars».40

Au sommet du 1. - 2. mars 2012,

«Le Conseil européen fait siennes les conclusions sur l'élargissement et le

processus de stabilisation et d'association que le Conseil a adoptées le 28

février 2012 et convient d'accorder à la Serbie le statut de pays candidat.»41

Les représentants de l´UE et des pays membres de l´UE ont salué

l´attribution du statut de pays candidat à la Serbie, dont signifie la

confirmation du chemin européen de la Serbie et du bilan des réformes

exercées. En Serbie, le président TADIĆ a souligné, que la politique «le

Kosovo et l´UE» a réussi à l´examen international.42

Dans le domaine de l´intégration, le statut de pays candidat représente

une étape importante. C´est non seulement le bilan positif de la politique du

gouvernement de Mirko CVETKOVIĆ par rapport á l´eurointégration, mais

on a effectué la phase primaire du but tracé par le premier Ministre du

gouvernement démocratique Zoran ĐINĐIĆ. De l´autre côté, c´est le

processus des négociations d´adhésion qui est vraiment important, parce que

40

General Affairs Press Release.6854/12.2012. Brussels: Council of the European

Union 2012. [Cit. 12.12.2014.] Available at

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/EN/genaff/

1282 71.pdf>. 41

Závery Európskej rady 1. a 2. marca 2012. EUCO 4/12.2012. Brusel: Európska

rada 2012. [Cit. 3.3.2012.]. Available at

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata

/SK/ec/128558.pdf>. 42

RADIĈEVIĆ, N. 2012. Srbija postala kandidat za ĉlanstvo u EU. In Politika,

2012. [Cit. 12.12.2014.]. Available at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-

dana/210265.lt.html>.

235

le statut est connu comme «la salle d´attende de l´UE», qui est la situation

de la Macédoine et la Turquie.

La Conclusion

Dans les relations euro-serbe on peut observer trois grands problèmes

politiques - la critique de l´UE par rapport au régime du Communauté

d'États de la Serbie et du Monténégro, la coopération serbe avec le Tribunal

pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie et des positions différentes vers le

Kosovo. De nos jours, la Serbie et le Monténégro sont des pays

indépendants, la coopération avec le TPIY est conclu (par l´arrestation de

KARADŅIĆ, MLADIĆ et HADŅIĆ). La question du Kosovo reste la

dernière, et le plus grand défi dans la relation mutuelle.

La déclaration d´indépendance du Kosovo en 2008 a donné lieu à des

élections avant terme, qui ont créée le gouvernement de Mirko

CVETKOVIĆ (2008-2012) avec la politique «le Kosovo et l´Union

européenne». Parfois, il n´est pas facile de savoir ce qui est prépondérant.

L´hypothèse primaire qui présuppose le retrait de la politique

gouvernementale par rapport au Kosovo au profit de l´eurointégration du

pays s´est confirmée. La reconfiguration de la mission MINUK et le début

du dialogue Belgrade - Pristina sont les événements les plus importants. La

victoire diplomatique sous la forme de reconfiguration sous les conditions

serbes est ambigüe. La mission EULEX a commencé les préparations même

sans le conseil serbe, alors l´acceptation supplémentaire était utilisée pour la

présentation d´une victoire devant la société serbe et international. De facto,

c´est la concession serbe au profit d‟une meilleure position pour

l´eurointégration. La pression européenne sur le changement de la

proposition serbe de la résolution de l´Assemblé générale des Nations Unies

(qui ouvre le statut du Kosovo) et la résolution «mutuelle» suivante (qui

donne la plateforme pour le dialogue contemporain) est la deuxième

démonstration que l´eurointégration est pour le gouvernement de Mirko

CVETKOVIĆ prioritaire.

La deuxième hypothèse, rattachée à la pression de l´UE sur la Serbie par

rapport à la normalisation des relations Belgrade - Pristina en utilisant le

236

dialogue pour améliorer la position serbe dans l´eurointégration, est

confirmée aussi. Le dialogue est le résultat de la résolution euro-serbe

mutuelle, dont l´UE est le médiateur. En octobre 2011, le progrès au

dialogue est devenu l´autre condition politique dans le processus de

l´eurointégration de la Serbie. Bien que des agréments conclu entre

Belgrade et Pristina ont aidé au statut de pays candidat, comme ça la Serbie

reconnait le Kosovo de facto.

C´est difficile d´évaluer si la politique pro-européenne du gouvernement

de Mirko CVETKOVIĆ est avantageuse pour le pays. Sans aucun doute,

l´attribution du statut de pays candidat est une réussite mais il faut regarder

des circonstances dans lesquelles il a été obtenu.

Mgr. Hana VERMEŠOVÁ, M.A.

Hana Vermesova received M. A. in

"International relations" from the Faculty of

Political Science and International Relations

of the University of Matej Bel in Banska

Bystrica in Slovakia (2012) and in "Analysis

of conflicts and violence" from the

University of Versailles St-Quentin-en-

Yvelines in France. Currently she is a PhD.

candidate at the Faculty of Political Science

and International Relations UMB in Banska

Bystrica. During her studies, she participated

in research programs in Belgrade (2010,

2011), Bordeaux (2011) and Dubrovnik

(2013) and completed internships at the

Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of

the Slovak Republic and at the Embassy of the Slovak Republic in

Belgrade. Hana focuses in her research and scientific activities on the

contemporary political development of Western Balkan countries, notably

on triangle Serbia-European Union-Kosovo which she analyses in her

dissertation thesis "Factors influencing political decision-making process in

Serbia".

237

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242

243

11 Kosova in Former Yugoslavia and Its Way to the EU Integration: Perspectives and Challenges

Afrim HOTI

Abstract: Republic of Kosovo is one of the newestlegitimately born

countries in the world. The country proclaimed its independence justfew

years ago,with the main aim of becoming part of the European Union as

well as of reaching the international integration through membership on

world‟s most powerful organizations and forums such asthe European

Union, United Nations, World Bank, the Council of Europe, NATO, World

Economic Forum, and so on. Since its beginnings as an independent

country, Kosovo hasdealt with serious challenges along with various

obstacles and difficulties on getting the proper country representation

onlobbying for worldwide countries recognition; on building alliances and

foreign affairs with other countries; constructive neighboring environment;

as well as domestic problems which needed proper strategy of improvement

and responsive implementation plan toward it, such as lack on rule of law

and democracy application, non efficient public administration and weak

judiciary system, large network of organized crime, greatrate of corruption,

and so on. This article tempts analyzing and identifying key challenges that

country faces, on its path toward the European integration process. The

problem of such lack on country‟s recognition, a problem that penalizes

Kosovo on such integration process, is not a lone one. There are other

major causes of problems which contribute on country‟s lack on that

regard. The only sure fact is: there will be no EU perspective for Kosovo, as

far as country will not build the proper mechanisms and tools on fully or

partially fulfilling the preset criteria and standards for EU accession.

Afrim HOTI, PhD., Assistant Professor, Head of Department of Political Science,

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Prishtina, Kosovo. e-mail:

afrimhoti@hotmail.com, afrim.hoti@uni-pr.edu.

244

Key words: Republic of Kosovo, Kosovo independence, security and

stability

Introduction

Kosova is a new independent and sovereign state. It declared the

independence on 17th of February 2008 and is recognized

1 by roughly 110

countries worldwide. The proclamation of country‟s independence raised

two fold opinions; not only on regional perspectives, but on the international

also. Western powers led by United States of America and most powerful

EU countries, clearly stated that this step of Kosova authorities might be a

step for strengthening the regional security and stability. On the other hand,

there were opposing countries, influenced from Serbian authorities and

supported by Russian Federation which were against the declaration of

Kosovo Independence. They proclaimed that the independence of the

country will seriously damage the security and stability in the region and

wider. Moreover, according to these opposing forces, the independence of

Kosovo is not a Sui Generis case, and moreover it can cause the precedent

of new conflicts on other regions worldwide.

As the Balkan region aims the EU perspective, the new indications show

that several important steps have been taken fromWestern Balkan countries

in the direction of improving fair neighborhood relations among them.

Kosovo is continuing to be part of these initiatives and contribute to the

region. At the regional summit2 held in Prizren, Kosovo, in 2010, all

Kosovo neighboring countries representatives, apart from Serbia, clearly

proclaimed that the independence of Kosovo is an action which contributed

1 Note: 23 out of 28 European Union members recognized Republic of Kosova so

far. Even those who are refusing to do so, develop to some extent normal

relations with the country. Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Romania and Cyprus are

still resisting recognizing the country‟s independence but, apart from the last

one, all recognize the Kosovo passports and other documents issues by Kosovo

authorities. 2 The summit was held in Pristine on 20

th of September 2010 in which took part the

Heads of the Committees of Foreign Policy of the Parliaments of Kosova,

Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey.

245

to the security and stability of the region, and that Kosovo‟s perspective is

similar to other countries, which is the path toward EU integration.

Moreover, they lobbiedon international actors, so to recognize the

legitimacy of Kosovo‟s Independency. “We do express our statement that

independence of Kosova became a stability factor in the region, opening

new perspectives for the regional and European integration, and within this

aim we do call the neighboring countries as well as others to recognize the

independence of Kosova3.

11.1 Short historical background on Kosova

History of Kosova is more complex than it seems to be during previous

centuries. Since nineteenth century and onwards, the opposing national

actions of the Albanian and Serbian inhabitants of Kosova province

increasingly shaped the history of this state. Viewed by the perspectiveof

each party, the province was associated by historical events, considered as

fundamental for the development of each party‟s national identities. Seen by

Albanians part view, Kosovo played a vital roleon development of the

Albanian nationalism. At that time, in one of its southern cities of Kosovo,

Prizren, the Albanian national identity experienced a significant increase. In

Prizren, during one of the countless crises of South East Europe,which

involved biggest European powers, the Albanians established, on June 10,

1878, a political organization called the „League of Prizren,4 The League,

however, played an important part onfostering the Albanian national

identity5.The Serbians on the other part have historically considered Kosovo

as the structure of their medieval Serb Kingdom; a land of monasteries,

castles and the resting place of great kings.6 The legends and myths

3 Point 4 of the Summit Final Declaration.

4 LATAWSKI, P. – SMITH, M. (2003): The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of

post cold war - European security. Manchester: Manchester University Press

2003, p. 4 5 ZAVALANI, T. (1969): Albanian nationalism. In SUGAR, P. – LEDERER, I.

(eds): Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press

1969, p. 61–66. 6 LATAWSKI, P. – SMITH, M. (2003): The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of

post cold war- European security. Manchester: Manchester University Press

2003, p. 4.

246

associated with Prince Lazar, the Serbian leader at Kosovo Polje, who

played a role on linking relationship bridges between medieval kingdom and

on establishing a modern Serb national consciousness of nineteenth century

and onwards7.

Kosova, as a country which was so essential on views,for

Serbian and Albanian national identity, would certainlybecome a

contested territorial piece. When suchkind of nationalistic conflicts

happen, the demography has a crucial role in formulating claim and

counter-claim8. The ethnographic composition of Kosovo and its

evolution, since nineteenth century, form an important setting to a

contemporary conflicts arena between Albanians and Serbiansfighting

for getting the control over it. By the last quarter of the nineteenth

century, the population of Kosova had an Albanian majority, while

the Serbians became a sizeable minority9. Nowadays, the rate of

population remainssimilar, where the majority community is

Albanians, by covering over 92% and Serbians5%.

11.2 Kosovo amid political and legal

developments under Former Yugoslavian Federation

The developments of Kosovo during the period of former Yugoslavia

were filled with ups and forths, as regards of the Albanians view,since the

majority of them greatly associated their life destiny to the destiny of

Kosovo. Since the idea of Great Yugoslavia was fading down in all its

components, by notexcluding Kosovo issue.At that period,a new area of

politicsin FYI appears, an era which will be associated to the Europe fate in

the following years, historically acknowledged as the Europeanization era.

7 See: ANZULOVIC, B. (1999): Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide.

London: Hurst and Co. Ltd., 1999.

pp. 11–31. See also: JUDAH, T. (2009): The Serbs: History, Myth and the

Destruction of Yugoslavia. 3rd ed.

New Haven, Yale University Press. 2009. pp. 29–47. 8See: MALCOLM, N. (2002): Kosovo: A Short History. Pan 2002. p. 193.

9 See: Ibid. p. 195

247

It was the Kosovo that the compromise first broke down, and Kosovo

became the burial ground of the Yugoslavian ideal. Early in March 1981,

a student protest against deprived conditions at Pristina‟s university campus

escalated into a huge street demonstration of thousand students. Two weeks

afterward, disturbances erupted again, on the occasion of the torchbearers‟

relay, an event organized annually by the Socialist Youth Alliance to

celebrate Yugoslavian unity, and at this time thousands of industrial

employees came out into streets in support to such event. Tanks were sent

in, but the revolt was spread into other towns. Kosovo came under a curfew,

and a state of emergency was declared. Calls for „Kosovo‟s Republic‟

brought in security forces, in a major operation to suppress the province10

.

Kosovo illustrates the maxim that revolutionary situations can arise

when hopes of improvement arise, and that only by expressing frustration.

The reforming years dug its fruitsfirstly in University of Pristina, as an

autonomous institution (1970), and in the Constitution of 1974 established

Kosovo as a constituent member of the federation, by liberating the

province from its direct subordination by Serbian Assembly in Belgrade.

Within the provincial party‟s organization, Albanians reached to made

significant triumphs: by the end of the 1970-s they reached to havearound

70 percent of the membership level, and an akin proportion on provincial

police (but not of the S. D. B., which was administered of Serbs and

Montenegrins). Economic development limped far behind. Most of

Kosovo‟s Albanians lived in extended families engaged in traditional

peasant farming on smallholdings. Only 12 per cent of the total population

was employedby social sector, and the unemployment rate was three times

higher than the Yugoslavia‟s average, at the level of over 40 percent. It was

a case of rough development on a grand scale11

.

10

See: BENSON, L. (2001): Yugoslavia: A Concise History. Basingstoke,

Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

2001, p. 136 11

See: Ibid, p. 137.

248

11.2.1 Political discourse

On former Yugoslavian political scene, there were two antagonistic ideas

or theories about the legal and political position of the federation. The first

one was the Centralist Theory, which was supported mainly by Serbia and

the second was the Decentralist Theory, which was supported and promoted

by other nations of former federation by aiming to gain the same political

position within the federal state.

1. Centralist Theory (1945–1966) Was a theory promoted by Serbians,by intending the domination of

Serbians over other nations in Yugoslavia. The fall of Aleksandar

RANKOVIĆ marked descend of this political theory. MILOŃEVIĆ tried to

restore the theoryby the end of 80‟s and beginning of 90‟s.

2. Decentralist Theory (1966–1990) This theory was promoted by Former President Josip BROZ TITO under

the principle of “Brotherhood and Unity” aiming to reach the equal position

of all Yugoslavian entities. The failure of this theory brought into

Yugoslavian agenda the dissolution of federation, as final and only

alternative.

11.2.2 Constitutional discourse

Constitutional developments in former Yugoslavian Federation were

quiet dynamic. Everything started with the first Constitution of 1946, were

Kosovo‟s existence was declared legally, as a unit/region but its political

status was advanced into a status of the province, with a second countries

constitution of 195312

and the third one of a 1963. According to David

RAIĈ, “Kosovo, from this legal framework won significantly”. Albanians

from Kosovo, directly benefited by this policy. Kosovo from being a

“region” was declared a “province” similar to Vojvodina, which was used to

be since 1945, and both gained political status of federal units”.

Developments in Kosovo after 1966 for Albanians in Kosovo, according to

12

See: RAIĈ, D. (2002): Statehood and the Law of Self–Determination. Martinus

Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, p. 345.

249

Raif DIZDAREVIĈ, marked the beginning of Renaissance Period13

.

Kosovo‟s constitutional position was advanced through the constitution of

1974, where for the first time the province took the status of constituent

element of federation, to be followed by the disagreements in federal level

and constitutional changes at the end of 80‟s, where MILOŃEVIĆ tried to

restore the Serbian domination in Yugoslavia, whose target was the

abrogation of Kosovo‟s 1974 autonomy. Undeniably, he abrogated the

aforementioned autonomy, and replaced itwith that of 1989, adopted it

without the approval of Kosovo, and absolutely under the military pressure.

This marks the moment of separation from the Republic of Serbia and of

instituting Kosovo structures, on the vision of establishing an independent

state, whose objective could be the integration into the EU.

11.3 Kosovo Nowadays – different political contexts

11.3.1 Regional context

State-building politics of Kosova during the 1990-s were based on non-

violent resistance, despite the continuing persecution, and repression caused

by the Serbian regime and by systematic human rights violation. Despite

Kosovo‟s efforts for peaceful solutions, in 1998, Serbia began an army

conflict in Kosovo, just after it has finished three aggressive wars in

Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the beginning of the

war in 1998, Serbia implemented the genocidal policy, which had applied

previously in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This war was characterized by mass

homicides of Albanian civilians, destruction of properties, mass raping and

deportation of almost a million people, which represented more than half of

Kosovo‟s population. This genocide was an implementation in practice of

the official political platform of the Serbian State14

. In the latest ICTY

13

See: DIZDAREVIĆ, R. - HADŅIHASANOVIĆ, Aziz - HADŅIHASANOVIĆ,

Asja (2000): Od Smrti Tita do Smrti Jugoslavije: svjedoĉenja. Sarajevo:

Biblioteka Refleksi Svjetlost 2000, p. 329. 14 Note: There were many projects composed on the idea of creating Great Serbia

starting from "Nacertanje” followed by many others drafted by Serbian authors

like Ilia GARAŃANIN, Vuk Stefanović KARADZIĈ, Nikola STOJANOVIĈ,

Vaso ĈUBRILOVIĈ and many others. While the memorandum of the Academy

250

deliberation, a senior military general of Serbian army admitted that the

state of Serbia has sponsored the violence and crimes committed in

Kosovo.15

It used to be continuously presented into the academic as well as

political discourse, by those against the independence idea, that

independence of Kosovo will be used as precedent for other countries in the

region, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, as countries

lacking political and ethnic stability. Bosnians could use the Kosovo‟s

model to separate the country, as it remains fragile even after two decades

following the conflict, to separate the country on Federation of Bosnia and

Republic of Srpska16

. Macedonians wouldconsider the same idea, as there

still exist some unclosed and sensitive ethnic issues that the country has.

The ethnic separation appears to be the case which might happen, and

eventually the Kosovo‟s independence could have some negative impacts,

in terms of provoking such political trend in the region. Nevertheless,

crucial for the regional context, is the fact that Republic of Kosovo is

recognized by all neighboring countries, excluding Serbia and Bosnia, and

this political act of Kosovo is clearly reflecting and contributing on peace

and stability of the entire region.

11.3.2 European context

The European Union is built on the common values of the European

countries. It is built to improve peace and security in Europe, also to

guarantee fundamental European values, such as peace and security over the

continent, respecting the international law, the human rights and the

of Sciences and Arts of Serbia, whose president was Dobrica ĆOSIĆ, in 1986,

was the basic document for the Greater Serbia and its hegemony against other

nations of the former Yugoslavia. For more see: BLITZ, B. K. (2006): War and

Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation. Cambridge:

CUP, 2006. Also see: MEIER, V. – LELO, E. (2007): Fundi i Jugosllavisë -

Goditja në Kosovë. Lubjanë: Liria, 2007. 15

See: Position Paper Recognition. [Cit. 1.2.2015.] More available at <www.

http://www.mfa-ks.net/>. 16

Note: Republic of Srpska did not exist in the former federation of Yugoslavia.

There is an agreement between many scientists and politicians that such entity

was created based on the genocide and bloodshed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

251

minorities‟ rights, building democratic institutions and securing state‟s

borders. Nowadays, EU is present in Kosovo through: European

Commission Liaison Office in Kosovo, Special Representative of the EU,

EULEX and Member States representations through Embassies or Liaison

Offices.17

Lessons learned during the war in Bosniapushed EU to think

more seriously and to reflect quicker in order to avoid potential crisis within

continent and beyond. After the failure of European community in

protecting its common values in Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Union

was determined to not allow a new failure in Western Balkans. These

beliefs were proven to be right, by the action of NATO intervention in

Kosovo, few years after. During a meeting in Berlin, the European

Council18

openly and on aunified voice emphasized:

“... Europe cannot tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in its midst. It

cannot be permitted that, in the middle of Europe, the predominant

population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and subjected to

human rights abuses. We, the countries of the European Union, are under a

moral obligation to ensure that indiscriminate behavior and violence ... are

not repeated. We have a duty to ensure the return to their homes of the

hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons. ... We are

responsible for securing peace and cooperation in the region. This is the

way to guarantee our fundamentalEuropean values, i.e. respect for human

rights and the rights of minorities, international law, democratic institutions

and the inviolability of borders.19

The fact that Kosovars were continuously in the side of peace and

democracy was reflected also during the war period, and during the peace

negotiations in Rambouillet. Rambouillet negotiations were held in a

17

See: Kosovo and EU, European Union Office in Kosovo / Special Representative

of the European Union in Kosovo. Prishtina: Kosovo National Council for

European Integration. (Cit. 20.1.2015.) Available on:

<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/index_

sq.htm>. 18

Note: A special European Council meeting, chaired by Mr. SCHRÖDER,

President of the Council and Chancellor of Germany is held in Berlin on 24 and

25 March 1999. In this meeting two statements on Kosovo are adopted. Other

declarations adopted deal with the Middle East peace process and enlargement,

and the trade and cooperation agreement with South Africa. For more see:

Bulletin of the European Union, 3 – 1999, p. 21 19

See: CARLSNAES, W. - SJURSEN, H. – WHITE, B. (2004): Contemporary

European Foreign Policy. London: Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage

Publishers, 2004., p. 134

252

conference where super world powers were gathered,in order to discuss on

finding a political resolution for Kosovo war. These powersdemonstrated

their commitment on building peace in Kosovo and region as well as on

pushing the countries in conflict toward reconciliation and EU integration.

The Kosovars, during these dialogue series,were expressed completely pro a

peaceful solution by eventually signing the Rambouillet Accords. Kosovars

attitude toward such delicate process was and is crucial, as it has showntheir

aximum restraint.20

Anyway, Kosovo‟s objective remains its full integration

into the European Union, NATO and permanent friendship with theUnited

States of America. An important act toward that objective remains the

establishment of good neighborhood relations of Kosovars with neighboring

countries. Even that still exist a lot of political obstacles of the country, both

capitals, Pristina and Brussels have opened their cooperation paths to follow

up and to integrate Kosovo into the EU structures. Statehood of Kosovo

seen on regional perspective continues to be contested by Serbia and Bosnia

and Herzegovina. The second ones impacted by the Serbian entity in the

country. The rest, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Slovenia,

recognized Kosovo and developedinterstate friendships, diplomatic

relations, business partnerships, academic joint programmes and students

exchange, and so on, with the Republic of Kosovo. Seen on the European

level, there still existsome disagreements, which in perspective seem to be

unsustainable.

In 2000 the EU decided that Western Balkans21

needed a new

comprehensive policy approach. In such case, EU would continue to deploy

their foreign policy and crisis management instruments, in order to promote

regional stabilization of Balkan, but they would also keep the promise for

establishing an association; integrating the Western Balkans countries

gradually into European structures. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern

Europe was implemented after. In the spring of 2000, the EU met in Feira,

Portugal, to discuss the European perspective of the Western Balkans

countries. This perspective would be implemented through the

Stabilization-Association Process. The success in this process would be

20

See: Bulletin of the European Union, No. 3, Brussels: 1999, p. 21. 21

Note: It is thought to the countries who have emerged from former Yugoslavia

except (Slovenia) and Albania.

253

measured through signing the Stabilization-Association Agreement, and

more, its implementation is a precondition for full membership in the EU

that would happen later. A similar perspective was repeated in 2014 Berlin‟s

Conference22

for Western Balkans where at its Final Declaration was

emphasized: “The Final Declaration emphasizes that all the countries of the

Western Balkans will have an opportunity to join the European Union, if

they meet the conditions for accession. It also states that, the region has

already made great achievements as regards creating stability, developing

good neighborly relations, and modernizing government, society and the

economy”23

.

Earlier than the independence of Kosovo, the EU‟s perspective was in

shadow, since Kosovo‟s representing body of international affairs, were

mixed. While Kosovo did not participate in Summit of Zagreb in 200024

, the

Thessaloniki Summit was the first large scale EU event in which “Kosovo‟s

political leaders” were present. Attendant at this summit was the former

Head of UNMIK25

, Michael STEINER, Kosova‟s President Ibrahim

RUGOVA, and the Prime Minister of Kosovo Bajram REXHEPI26

. EU

perspective for Kosovo was confirmed by the “Thessaloniki‟s agenda for

Western Balkans”, approved by the leading EU states where it was said that,

people of a multiethnic and democratic Kosovo will have their place in

22

Note: The Western Balkans Conference in Berlin was attended by representatives

of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. 23

See: Westbalkan konferenz. (Cit. 4.2.2015.) Available at

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa

/WestlicherBalkan/AktuelleArtikel/140828_Westbalkan konferenz.html>. 24

Note: After the removal of Milosevic on 24 September 2000, the EU held a

further summit to commence this more intense strategy. At the Zagreb summit

in November 2000, post-Milosevic, the EU reaffirmed the European perspective

of the countries participating in the stabilization and association process and

their status as potential candidates for membership in accordance with the Feira

Conclusions. For more see: BRANIFF, M. (2011): Integrating the Balkans-

Conflict resolution and the Impact of the EU expansion. I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd,

2011. 25

See: United Nations Mission in Kosovo. 26

See: Kosovo-EU Relations: The History of Unfulfilled Aspirations? Lost

opportunities in Kosovo‟s European integration process. Pristina: the Kosovo

Foundation of Open Society, 2013, p. 9.

254

Europe.27

Most significantly the Stabilization and Association Process gave

the country the perspective of future membership in the EU28

. The key

meeting was the EU-Balkans Thessaloniki Summit, held in June 2003,

where was clearly stated that the future of the Balkans would be in the EU,

and that progress toward such direction would be depending on the

fulfillment‟s level of the preconditions and requirements that are applied to

other candidates29

.

The Balkans is an enclave within the EU‟s borders, which neither

foreign nor internal ministries can neglect this fact for a long time, giving its

potential both for helping and for hindranceof the EU‟s security. Seen on

regional and wider prospect, the EU integration is the only option. The

states of Turkey and Russia offered and continue to occasionally offer

Kosovo, opportunities for diplomatic proximity, but not in economical

aspect level, financial aid or political support, as the EU offers. Croatia‟s

accession into EU, in July 2013 brought another member who could be a

strong advocate for the region, and could help pushing forward the EU

enlargement process, but as it was later proved, it still has many potential

bilateral disputes between former Yugoslavian countries.30

Anyway, in terms of moving forward aiming the integration into the EU

structures, Kosovo has lots of remainedwork to be done. In 2013, thirteen

years after the beginning of SAP, Kosovo has not done any official action

27

See: The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans. 2006. (Cit.30.1.2015.)

Available at

<http://www.westernbalkans.info/htmls/page.php?category=391&id=419>. 28

Note: The war in Kosovo led to the substantial evaluation of enlargement of

security and geopolitics which somehow provoked a accelerated change, not to

say the EU discourse at the high level negotiations in Helsinki, on December

1999. Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Malta started their membership

negotiations in February 2000. Because of failing to comply with the EU

standards and criteria‟s EU is refusing the membership negotiations with other

countries. Anyway, in March 2001, there was an agreement with Turkey as a

initial phase for negotiations which will be followed by the Thessaloniki

Summit in 2003, where the green light for the EU perspective was given to

Western Balkan countries, including Kosovo. For more: WEIDENFELD, W. –

WESSELS, W. (2004): Europe from E to Z – An EU Integration Guide. Bonn:

Europe Union Verlag GmbH, 2004, p. 429. 29

See: BLITZ, B. K. (2006): War and Change in the Balkans - Nationalism,

Conflict and Cooperation. Cambridge: CUP, 2006, p. 102. 30

Ibid, p. 109 – 111.

255

towards a SAA. However, it is informally included in this process of

membership, through some forms of “dialogues”. Compared to other

countries of the region, Kosovo has never participated equally in the

Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.31

Twenty-three out of twenty-eight

EU countries recognized Kosovo‟s independence so far. There is still some

unfriendliness approach toward such recognitionof five remaining EU

actors, such asof Spain, Cyprus whereas Greece, Romania and Slovakia

seems to be in the rights track, as they do not directly recognize the country,

but they show some indication of cooperation and an de facto recognition. It

is considered that these countries will make a decision on recognition

almost immediately. Because of the lack of unified voice of EU members,

on recognizing Republic of Kosovo‟s Independence as a group; the majority

of EU members have already, individually, recognized this new born

country. There are five EU members remaining to recognize the

independence‟s as a legitimate act,which is believed to happen quickly,

since this whole process reflects alsoon the EU integration processes, for the

EU membership in general. The best way to outline this is the Stabilization

and Association Process, where differently from the standard procedures

applicable to other countries, including Kosovo neighbors; a “sui generis”

procedure was introduced and allowed by the EU treaty, solely for Kosovo

case32

. It existsa common believe that the lack of recognition by these

countries, is mostly linked to their internal composition and conflicts, rather

than directly to the issue of Kosovo‟s independence as an act. Yet, the

importance of this resistance to recognize the country should not be

neglected; in particular the one of Spain and its influence blocked the Latin

American countries on recognizing Kosovo‟s Independence. If Kosovo

would have the Spanish support, the country could move forward and

improve its position into the international community directly, and would

31

See: Kosovo-EU Relations: The History of Unfulfilled Aspirations - Lost

opportunities in Kosovo‟s European integration process, Pristina: Kosovo

Foundation for Open Society, 2013, p.7. 32

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013): Recommendation for the Council decision

authorization to open the negotiations for the Stabilization and Association

Process between the European Union and Kosovo.

Brussels: European Commission, 2013. (Cit. 30.1.2015.) Available at:

<http://ec.europa.eu/

enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/ks_recommendation_2013_en.pdf>.

256

“soften” relations with its neighbor, Republic of Serbia, concurrently.

Besides, the EU integration is an irreversible process. Considering this

membership prospect as a strategic objective, after the proclamation of the

independence, the country has putted the aim to be integrated into EU, as on

top of the agenda. In order to accomplish such an objective, there are a lot

of mechanisms, local and international, which are working on fulfilling the

present criteria, starting from compliance and harmonization of Kosovo

legislation with the EU Acquits. Inside Kosovo‟s Government framework, a

particular ministry was established on that purpose, recognized as Ministry

for European Integration of the Republic of Kosovo, by covering several

departments which deal with specific issues of the EU integration process of

the country. Parallelly, within the Kosovo Assembly, a functional

Committee for EU Integration has been established. Aiming the

consolidation of activities and strategic orientations towards the EU, the

country‟s President, within its competencies, has established the National

Council for EU Integration33

. The entire structure of Kosovo institutions,

are established in line to the EU level like ministries as well as the

decentralized municipalities, in order to meet the criteria and conditions set

for becoming candidate country.

But, at the same time, these are not the only criteria‟s to be met as a

country, as, like most of the Western Balkans countries are facing more

other challenges, also. Same as other countries in transition, in South East

Europe, Kosovo is facing lots of challenges:

- Lack of rule of law,

- Democratization of the society and protection of human

rights,

- Protection of national minorities, their treatment and

integration into the state structures,

- Establishment of the security sector institutions,

- Cooperation with the international actors in the country to

address issues like corruption, organized crime and so on,

- Democratic and parliamentary oversight of institutions is at

an early stage of development.

33

For more look at: National Council for European Integration. (Cit. 30.1.2015.)

Available at <http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=1,138>.

257

Based on the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo minorities are

treated according to the highest European standards. Article 3 of the

Constitution, which relates the issue of Equality before the Law, among

others stipulates that:

“The Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society, consisting of Albanian

and other Communities”34

In October 2012, the Commission issued a Feasibility Study for SAA

involving EU and Kosovo. Study revealed the reality that Kosovo is mostly

ready for opening Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations, in

addition suggested to the European Commission to prepare the Directive on

the questioned agreement, at the time when Kosovo would have taken some

concrete positive actions on the following issues:

Rule of law,

Public administration,

Protection of minorities and

Commerce.35

In the context of the Council Conclusions of February 2012, the

Commission made a Declaration stating that "the Commission's Feasibility

Study will examine whether the political, economic and legal criteria for a

Stabilization and Association Agreement are fulfilled. The launch of the

Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with

Kosovo is without prejudice to the legal status and Member States' positions

on the recognition of Kosovo".36

According to the Feasibility Study for a

Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Union and

Kosovo:

34

Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. 35

HOTI, A. (2013):. Mesimdhenes ne Departamentin e Shkencave Politike ne

Universitetin e Prishtines. Marreveshja Stabilizim Asociim për Kosovën.

Prishtine:. Instituti i Kosovës për Administratë Publike, 2 dhe 3 Maj 2013. 36

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012): Communication from the Commission to

the European Parliament and the Council on Feasibility Study for a

Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Union and

Kosovo. (Cit. 30.1.2015.) p. 2-3. Available on:

<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/

2012/package/ks_feasibility_2012_en.pdf>.

258

“Kosovo's political system is based on the principles of a parliamentary

democracy. These principles are enshrined in its constitution and legal

framework. Over the past three years, the functioning of democratic

institutions and the respect for the rule of law has been consolidated. The

necessary institutions have been established.... Kosovo has gradually

strengthened its structures dealing with European integration processes”.

The question is how long the process of accession might take. Following

the Croatia membership into EU onlast year, it is likely for a long gap to be

created, until any other country could be ready for membership. Montenegro

and Serbia will be in constant membership negotiations for years until now,

with an unlikely membership before 2020. Albania is distant from meeting

the conditions on good governance or economic reform, although Bosnia

and Herzegovina still has severe problems with rule of law which will

postpone negotiations with EU on membership. Until the question of

country naming is solved between the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia and Greece, there is no hope on positive steps toward next

stage37

.

11.3.3 International context

Russian Federation, as natural Serbian ally, promised in 1999, following

the end of the Kosovo‟s War that it will be constructive in the process of

resolution of Kosovo‟s problem. The history has shown that what they

declared and what they stand for proved exactly the contrary. Russians did

not play any constructive role; they did exactly the contrary from how they

were declared, becoming an obstacle for the whole political process. Russia

blocked political initiatives taken by western countries, meant to address

and close up the problem. In order to “justify” the fear, they declared the

similarity of Kosovato territories like some Caucasus, Georgia regions and

lately comparing its situation to the current developments in Ukraine38

,

Russia provoked the promulgation of independencies of these regions

37

GRABBE, H. (2013): Conclusions. In PRIFTI, E. (ed.): The European Future of

the Western Balkans. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies 2013,

p. 111. 38

Georgian regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia promulgated their respective

independencies and were recognized by the Russian federation. Russian

justified it with the “Kosovo precedent”.

259

following the recognition of them, all as an answer to Kosovo‟s

independence.

Conclusion

State-building process in Kosovo remains in an early and transitional

stage. Despite the fact that there is a progress and few success stories of the

country, there is still a distant walk ahead,in order to achieve EU and

international standards and values. Nevertheless, democracy has marked a

significant progress,in comparison to the earlier period. Rule of law remains

among the primary country‟s objectives and it imposes a lot of tasks and

obligations on the local as well as international level. Economic

development seems to take an advantage in terms of the country‟s agenda,

especially after the proclamation of independence.

Statehood of Kosovo in the region continues to be contested by Serbian

neighbors and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is impacted by Serbian entity

inthe country. The rest, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia

did recognize and develop friendship, diplomatic and good relations with

Republic of Kosovo. At the European level, there is still a resistance which

in a perspective seems not to be sustainable. Anyway, this is a European

process and will remain as such having Kosovo included into all EU

structures and processes. Country is challenged by many obstacles but at the

same time there is no doubt that has an EU perspective.

State recognitions followed by the legal opinion of the International

Court of Justice for Kosovo confirmed in the best way the existence of the

country as well as its birth in compliance with the international law.

Finally, Kosovo issue reflects the unique case of international relations

where international community through recognitions and international

justice through the legal opinion of ICJ on Kosovo, come together. The

“battle” continues as per to or not to recognize the country. This, at the same

time is the European interest.

260

Assistant Professor Dr. Afrim HOTI

Afrim Hoti earned his master‟s degree (M.A.

2002) at the University of Sarajevo/Bologna

on Human Rights and Democratization in

South East Europe, a program supported by

Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

European Commission. His focus of master

research was on Specifics of Power in

Kosovo under International Administration

from Human Rights Perspective. He finished

his PhD studies also (2013) at the University

of Hamburg/Sofia, on the Globalisation as

Factor of Security. He is author of two

publications so far. The first one is “Protection of Rights in Kosovo – Two

legal studies to evaluate the level of compliance of the domestic legislation

and practices with the applicable international standards”. This publication

was supported by the Madrid Chamber of Advocates and University of

Cantabria from Spain. Second publication is his book with the title

“Principle of Self-Determination and Its Evolution in International Law”.

He also published in several newspapers in Kosova and abroad. Mr. Hoti

has worked so far in different institutions in Kosova like as Advisor at the

Kosova Parliament, Government as well as Special Chamber of the Kosova

Supreme Court. He was continuously involved in different international

projects with USAID, EC, UNDP and so on. He took part in many

international conferences in and out of Kosova. Lectures at different

universities in Kosova and the region. Lecturing in Pristine University since

2004 whereas in October 2013, is elected as Assistant Professor at the

Department of Political Science of the University of Pristine. Currently is

the Head of Department. He is co-editor of this monograph.

261

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Afrim HOTI – Igor KOSÍR et al.

European perspectives of the Western Balkans countries I Prishtina 2015

Kolegji AAB in cooperation with Institute for Promoting European Values in

Bratislava, Slovakia, University of Prishtina, Kosovo, as well as

Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

1st edition, 670 original copies Printing: Katalogimi në botim – (CIP)

Biblioteka Kombëtare e Kosovës “Pjetër Bogdani”

327(4/9:497)(063)

European perspectives of the Western Balkans countries /

editors Afrim Hoti, Igor Kosír. – Prishtina : AAB College, 2015. –

libra ; 21 cm.

[Libri] I. - 264 f.

Preface : f. 5-6 1.Hoti, Afrim 2. Kosír, Igor

ISBN 978-9951-494-52-6

ISBN 978-9951-494-53-3