Ethnicity and Economy The collection of papers presented at the conference “Ethnicity and Economy...

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Centre for Independent Social Research ETHNICITY AND ECONOMY Edited by Olga Brednikova, Elena Chikadze, Viktor Voronkov. Preface The book in front of you is the collection of papers chosen from the presentations delivered at the Conference on “Ethnicity and Economy in Post-Soviet Space”. Held in September 1999, the conference per se is an extremely important event. Unlikely Western countries, where studies of ethnic and migrant economy have long become a tradition, and their discourse has a certain history, Russia has witnessed the discussion of these vital global issues for the first time. At the same time the peculiarities of East-European society and its transitions make it necessary to introduce some changes into theoretical concepts, which were based on, the studies conducted in the West. The papers presented at the conference have revitalized the discussion around such concepts as the entrepreneurial activity of some ethnic groups (“ trading minorities” according to Sombart), Veber’s cultural tradition in the research of ethnic entrepreneurship, the two approaches we believe to be out-of-date. The materials published in this book serve as a new impulse for the discussion of reactive cultural context (i.e. cultural components formed as a reaction to the new environment which legitimize the community members’ choices of coping strategies), as well as for further discussion of the reactive ethnicity theory (according to which all ethnic economy is the result of reactive ethnicity), and resource theory, which is rather popular in the West and which views all demographic, cultural, social and economic features of an ethnic group as its resources. The articles comprising this book reflect a rather broad spectrum of research carried out in recent years. This holds true in respect to the issues of “ethnic economy” as it is (ethnic niches, complimentary economy), as well as other topics such as the connection between migrant economy and ethnicity, and entrepreneurial networking in autochthonous milieu, economy based community building, the existence

Transcript of Ethnicity and Economy The collection of papers presented at the conference “Ethnicity and Economy...

Centre for Independent Social Research

ETHNICITY AND ECONOMY

Edited by

Olga Brednikova, Elena Chikadze, Viktor Voronkov.

 

Preface

The book in front of you is the collection of papers chosen from thepresentations delivered at the Conference on “Ethnicity and Economy inPost-Soviet Space”. Held in September 1999, the conference per se isan extremely important event. Unlikely Western countries, wherestudies of ethnic and migrant economy have long become a tradition,and their discourse has a certain history, Russia has witnessed thediscussion of these vital global issues for the first time. At thesame time the peculiarities of East-European society and itstransitions make it necessary to introduce some changes intotheoretical concepts, which were based on, the studies conducted inthe West.

The papers presented at the conference have revitalized thediscussion around such concepts as the entrepreneurial activity ofsome ethnic groups (“ trading minorities” according to Sombart),Veber’s cultural tradition in the research of ethnic entrepreneurship,the two approaches we believe to be out-of-date. The materialspublished in this book serve as a new impulse for the discussion ofreactive cultural context (i.e. cultural components formed as areaction to the new environment which legitimize the communitymembers’ choices of coping strategies), as well as for furtherdiscussion of the reactive ethnicity theory (according to which allethnic economy is the result of reactive ethnicity), and resourcetheory, which is rather popular in the West and which views alldemographic, cultural, social and economic features of an ethnic groupas its resources.

The articles comprising this book reflect a rather broad spectrum ofresearch carried out in recent years. This holds true in respect tothe issues of “ethnic economy” as it is (ethnic niches, complimentaryeconomy), as well as other topics such as the connection betweenmigrant economy and ethnicity, and entrepreneurial networking inautochthonous milieu, economy based community building, the existence

of “trading minorities”, ethnic interactions in businesses andmarkets. The authors of presented papers have different theoreticviews and use different approaches in their studies. At the same timeit is obvious that the majority of them prefer by far quantitativesociological methods, which can’t but rejoice the hearts of theconference organizers – the stuff of the Centre for IndependentSociological Studies (CISS), which has been working in the mode of“understanding” sociology for a long lime.

The papers presented by the CISS reflect the research carried out inthe framework of the project “People from the Caucasus in a bigRussian City: Integration under the Condition of Xenophobia”1

The project focused primarily on migrant economy, its formation andfunctioning, on the connection between entrepreneurial nets andethnicity and on the relations of the people from the Caucasus withthe hosting majority.

We express our profound gratitude to the Open Society Institute(Soros Foundation) and The K and J. MacArturs Foundation forsupporting our conference. We are also grateful to the Open SocietyInstitute (Soros Foundation) for its assistance in the publication ofthis book.

December, 1999

Translated by M.Badkhen

 

 

CONTENT

Viktor Diatlov. “Commercial Minorities” of the Foreign East: SomeApproaches for the Ethnic Conflicts Study in the Modern Russia

Sergei Аbashin. Ethnicity Concepts and Economic Strategies in the CentralAsian Community

Natalya Kosmarskaya. "Ethnicity" and "Career". Russian-speakers’Economic Integration in Post-soviet Kirghizia

Viatcheslav Valitov. Ethnic Networks or Informal Relations

Andreas Kapphan. Russian Entrepreneurs in Berlin: The Role of Ethnicityand Opportunity Structures

Tsypylma Darieva. Managing Identity: Some Insights into post-SovietRussian Language Media in Berlin

 

“CAUCASIANS IN PETERSBURG” (PROJECT OF CISR)

Victor Voronkov. Is there such a Thing as Ethnic Economy?

Olga Brednikova, Oleg Pachenkov. Ehnicity of “Ethnic Economy”: EconomicImmigrants to St.Petersburg

Elena Chikadze, Sergei Damberg. Armenians in the Shoe Business of St-Petersburg

Oksana Karpenko. “These Guests Seem to Exercise Control over all Current MarketTrade”: the Concept of “Ethnic Economy” in the Light of Russian Press

 

List of contributors

SERGEI ABASHIN, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of theRussian Academy of Science,

Department of Middle Asia and Kazakhstan

Leninskii prospect, 32-А, 117334, Moscow, В-334, RUSSIA

tel.: +7(095)938 5415 (office), +7(095)472-27-05 (home)

fax: +7(095) 938 0600

e-mail: [email protected]

 

OLGA BREDNIKOVA, Centre for Independent Social Research

P.O.Box. 55, 191002, St. Petersburg, RUSSIA

tel./fax: +7(812) 321-1066

e-mail: [email protected]

 

ELENA CHIKADZE, Centre for Independent Social Research

P.O.Box. 55, 191002, St. Petersburg, RUSSIA

tel./fax: +7(812) 3211066

e-mail: [email protected]

 

SERGEI DAMBERG, Centre for Independent Social Research

P.O.Box. 55, 191002, St. Petersburg, RUSSIA

tel./fax: +7(812) 3211066

 

TSYPYLMA DARIEVA, Institute for European Ethnology, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, FU Berlin, Centre of Marc Bloch

Schiffbauerdamm 19, D-10117 Berlin, GERMANY

tel.: +49 (30) 308 74 298

fax: +49 (30) 308 74 301

e-mail: [email protected]

 

VIKTOR DIATLOV, Department of History, Irkutsk State University,RUSSIA

Tel. (3952) 396029

fax: (3952) 332399

 

ANDREAS KAPPHAN, Humbold University Berlin, Department of SocialScience

Hagenauer Str. 15

10435 Berlin, Germany

tel: + 49 30 209 34 324

fax: + 49 30 209 34 213

e-mail: [email protected]

 

OKSANA KARPENKO, Centre for Independent Social Research

P.O.Box. 55, 191002, St. Petersburg, RUSSIA

tel./fax: +7(812) 3211066

e-mail: [email protected]

 

NATALIA KOSMARSKAYA, Department of CIS countries, Institute ofEastern Studies,

Russian Academy of Science and Centre for Civilisational andRegional Studies, RUSSIA

fax: +7(095) 310 6357

e-mail: [email protected]

 

OLEG PATCHENKOV, Centre for Independent Social Research

P.O.Box. 55, 191002, St. Petersburg, RUSSIA

tel./fax: +7(812) 3211066

e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

 VIACHESLAV VALITOV, Ulianovsk State University,

RUSSIA

e-mail: [email protected]

VIKTOR VORONKOV, Centre for Independent Social Research

P.O.Box. 55, 191002, St. Petersburg, RUSSIA

tel./fax: +7(812) 3211066

e-mail: [email protected]

Viktor Diatlov

“COMMERCIAL MINORITIES” OF THE FOREIGN EAST:

SOME APPROACHES FOR THE ETHNIC CONFLICTS STUDY

IN THE MODERN RUSSIA

The existence of the religious and/or ethnic minorities,specializing in trade, (in general sense - in free enterpreneurship)is a world-wide phenomenon. As a rule, not only migrants, but alsotheir descendants are aliens, as far as the local majority isconcerned. In this sense, a special role of Caucasian and Chinesediasporas in the modern Russia is not an exception, but a continuationof a rather numerous typological series. The comprehension of theirexperience would be very useful for understanding the situation inRussia.

Naturally, there are great distinctions between the separatecomponents of this series. These distinctions are conditioned mostlyby the sociocultural characteristics and the peculiarities of thehistorical development both of these groups and host societies.

Russia is unique in this sense, because the transition to the marketpractice occurs in the urban industrial (postindustrial) society withcorresponding sociocultural characteristics of the population. At thesame time, Russia has much in common with the foreign East countriesin the context of the problem to be considered1. It is, e.g. a timecoherence between the process of forming market relations, and theestablishment or radical transformation of the state system, as wellas with a search of new identity and as a result, the development ofnational feelings and the aggravation of conflicts.

At an empirical level, in routine consciousness, the very fact ofthe existence of such groups, the specificity of their structure andactivity, life style, value orientations and the specific relationswith surrounding groups were registered long ago. This was promoted bythe fact that the “commercial minorities” were an object of rapt andjealous-hostile attitude.

However, for a long time these qualities were associated (and areoften associated) with their concrete bearers, and were ascribed totheir “origin”. A scientific comprehension of the phenomenon startedfrom the same statements. The first hypothesises and generalconclusions were made on the basis of Jewish material.

V. Sombart considered the market specialization and enterpreneurialspirit to be an extraordinary manifestation of their sociocultural andreligious specificity. “The modern capitalism in itself is nothing butthe emanation of the Jewish spirit”, he wrote (Sombart, 1912:52).

However, in the 20th century, the European scientists were convincedthat the Jews as a “commercial nation” were not an exception, the“Jewish phenomenon” being not unique. The popularity of the phenomenonin different societies indicates the public necessity and demand forsuch groups and the existence of a social-economic niche, that wasfilled. K. Marks was the first who assumed this and noted that thevery existence of traditional agricultural communities demands anappearance of special “commercial nations” (Marks, 1954).

Later on, the famous sociologist G. Simmel arrived at this notionand said in his essay “An Alien” (1908) that in whole of the worldhistory, a merchant is always an alien, and an alien is almost alwaysa merchant who is to be an alien. That is why in agricultural society,he is an alien not as an individual, but as a part of a national,religious or caste group (Simmel, 1971:143-150). There were someprofessions, spheres of employment and social roles, which werepreferred to leave for “aliens” in the traditional society with itscomplicated, rigid hierarchy and differentiation of labor, provided bythe law and custom.

On the other hand, the conception of M. Weber of the stimulatingrole of the very position of the discriminated, not enjoying fullrights low-status minority in business seems to be rather productive.

When analysing the system of relations called by G.Furnivall“pluralistic society” (Furnivall, 1967:304), one can mention the“symbiosis” term which is appropriate in this context. It alsostipulates very close social links, the integration of the groupsunder consideration into the united system of social hierarchy with aset of strictly fixed mutual rights and obligations (Wertheim, 1964;Dishen, 1984:233).

It is the relations of symbiosis, that can explain the fact that the“commercial minorities” - scanty, low-status, politically weak andunprotected, rich (or seemed to be rich) groups - showed an amazingsustainability, an ability to survive in the world which did notguarantee life safety and property for all, and for them inparticular. The rotation was taking place permanently: families, clansand communities were being replaced by the others.

“Commercial minorities” played an important role in the times ofmarket transformations. As hereditary bearers of the market values,professional skills and life style, they created a reserve for theimpetuous and rapid spurt: great capital, an ability and striving forits advantageous using, experience, knowledge, relations, effectivelyworking infrastructure, where goods, credits and business informationwere circulating.

Moreover, the impulses of market transformation, its philosophy,experience and mechanisms came (and often were imposed) from theoutside - from the advanced in this sense Western countries. Thisprocess, especially its early stages, needed a kind of a “junction”,with a help of which the traditional societies could be connected tothe world economy most effectively. “Commercial minorities”, withtheir market mentality, an ability in adaptation, which was developingover the centuries, an aptitude for coping with new realities andtheir great experience of organic existence in the heterogeneousethnic, cultural and value milieus, came to be ideal candidates forthis.

The discussion on the objective public claiming for the “commercialminorities” brings to a question: which groups and because of whatcircumstances can appear in their role? This question is still open.As it was mentioned above, at first the answer was searched in somenatural, initial characteristics of particular groups (Jews, first ofall). The increase in the number of minorities called into questionsuch an approach.

However, there must be an inclination, an aspiration and areadiness, so as to become a “commercial minority”. This is obviousfrom the cases when foreign national immigrant minorities rush toother spheres of employment. One can mention the Gypsies, whosucceeded in finding there own niche in Europe and who overstep itslimits rather unwillingly. The level of commodity-monetary developmentand business mentality in the “historical homeland” is, as a rule,higher than in the host society.

Apparently, not only the situation in the host society and someinitial qualities of the groups under consideration actively influencethe formation of “commercial minorities”, but also the qualities andfeatures which the latter acquire in the process of adaptation. It is,in the first turn, a aforementioned position of an “alien”, anoutsider. It can be based upon different circumstances: non-autochthonity, sociocultural, religious and nation distinctions. Inany case they exceed the limits of social connections and obligations.

The life in a host society predefined the qualities, contributing toa business success. These qualities are clearly demonstrated byimmigrant communities. The very fact of migration, meaning “a leap inthe dark”, the isolation from the family and the accustomed way andrhythm of life, raised dramatically the value of such human qualitiesas mobility, dynamism, enterprise, the ability to adopt to the new andchanging circumstances of life. To survive in a foreign and hostileworld and to achieve a success, it was necessary to learn quickly thelanguage and the customs of a host society, to acquire acquaintances,connections, contacts. The mandatory qualities of the members of“commercial minorities” are the ability to live in a foreign world, toshift easily from one conditions to others, from one language toanother, the readiness to master new things.

The corporative and communal mode of life was a guarantee of theirsurvival and identity preservation. It seems to be a keycharacteristic of the groups under scrutiny. It was simply impossibleto survive in an alien surrounding without uniting with a group,without the branched system of norms, rules of behavior, institutions,networks, the strong hierarchy and patronage structures, a strongmutual control and severe sanctions to infringers. This status was notthe object of a free choice. The communal mode and the groups’hierarchy were the universal way of the traditional societyorganization. It referred to a host society as well as a society oforigin. Primarily, a host society treated the migrants-”aliens” as agroup, and they had to correspond to this attitude.

Corporativism and communal solidarity were not only the exclusiveand natural form of the life organization, not only the criterion ofthe survival in an alien and hostile world and the means ofintegration in a host society, but also the important precondition ofa business success. Commercial and financial structures functionedeffectively in the frames of the communities and on their basis.Sometimes they embraced great distances, concentrated the amount ofresources, enormous for their time. Being an effective economic unit,the family clan could include bankers, traders-wholesalers,manufacturers and Cheap Jacks. Goods, finances and informationcirculated along this chain. The credit inside a community wasconsidered especially important. As a rule, it was given withoutbacking - the best guarantee was a mutual bail of families and clansand the possibility to apply the severest sanctions to unfairpartners, right down to boycott and ostracism. In case of need therewas always a possibility to concentrate all the community resourcesfor the realization of large projects.

Only family, clan and community could provide a certain level ofsocial stability by means of charity and mutual aid. Communitiessupported widows, orphans, lonely elderly people, they financed theeducation of poor but talented pupils and students. A beginner, whohad been professionally trained at the relatives’ enterprise, couldreceive from them an interest-free credit to start a business.

The important function of a community was also the moral approval ofthe business efforts of the community members and the elaboration andmaintenance of the system of values. A community accumulated andtranslated the experience of generations, including a businessexperience. Only being a member, one could feel protected, supportedand understood.

The history of “commercial minorities” shows that the very fact oftheir existence becomes a powerful conflict factor. There have beensignificant changes in the intensity of conflicts, their forms,manifestations, the composition of participants, the real reasons anduttered accusations. At the same time, there are some generalcharacteristics, dispersed in space and time through the diversity ofcertain situations and the experience of different groups.

The socio-cultural distance was a sufficient reason formisunderstanding and the clashes with minorities. Differentappearance, life style, a type of behavior, different religion,language, customs and traditions are being often interpreted as achallenge and threat. It becomes especially evident in the cases whenminorities are new comers, when they are not rooted in a host society,when their alien nature has not yet become customary, recognized andlegitimated. .

The economic specialization of minorities was also a great conflictpotential. The trade itself is a conflict source, in spite of itsindubitable and recognized utility. It always seems to a purchaserthat the goods are too expensive, and a seller swindles him for hisown benefit.

Trade, finances, handicrafts are not only economic branches. It is aseparate world with its own value system, the type of economicbehavior, professional and public skills, a special life style. Thisworld can be called a business world. It was and still is in aconflict with a patriarchal world. The business world rates highly theentrepreneurial abilities, dynamism, the ability and desire to makemoney; in this world money serve a criterion of success. From thepositions of the patriarchal world, the business world looksheartless, fussy and unfair. Trade is not considered to be a valuable

and socially significant occupation. It is rather a way of wastingtime, the life at the expenses of the others, the unfair distributionof wealth. It is not occasional that in a contemporary Russian societythe phrase “nobody works, everybody trades” has become a daily lifeexpression. It is the remains of an ancient, deep-rooted point ofview, the evidence of a patriarchal layer in social psychology.

The market transformation in a host society, when a formerpatriarchal majority tries to join the entrepreneurial professions andthe life style, opens a new conflict dimension. The specialization of“commercial minorities”, their unique knowledge and experience, theirpsychology, value orientations, material sources, communalinfrastructures - all these factors gives them an advantage incompetitive activity, leaving very little chances to the beginners.

Many politicians and statesmen have quickly understood that theproblem of “commercial minorities” can be effectively used as aninstrument of political mobilization in the struggle for power. Thehatred to these groups became an important means of nationalconsolidation and a tool to overcome internal contradictions. Forthose who were in power these groups appeared to be useful as a“scapegoat”, an easy and visible cause of all troubles. There is aclear pattern: the issues of “Asians”, Jews, Armenians etc. becomeshighly problematized in the times of instability and economical andpolitical crisises.

A widespread way was to create the intolerable conditions, squeezing“commercial minorities” out of a country. These measures includeddifferent law limitations, administrative cavils and discrimination ina public life and economic activity. The authorities did not payattention or openly encouraged the chauvinistic hysteria whichunavoidably led to open conflicts.

However, supporting this tension, the authorities are willing toprovide “commercial minorities” with legal guarantees (to easecitizenship conditions, to remove the limitations of rights) and withthe favorable conditions for economical activity. For the minoritiesit opens the perspectives of integration in a local life and localeconomic structures. The capitals becomes legalized, their exportdiminishes and the long-terms investments raise. It is economicallyprofitable, it also gives an opportunity to demonstrate the loyalty toa new home country by contributing in the economic development and tominimize the competition with local business circles.

It is necessary to emphasize once more that the scales and the racesof this process are strongly dependent on the degree of stability and

security in a country. Foreign traders leave their new homeland veryreluctantly. To make them do this, it is not enough to have a set ofdiscriminatory and restrictive measures. They can consider thisextreme option only if there is a real threat to their lives, i.e. thesituation of a mass pogrom or the real danger of it. The reasons forthis attitude are clear: it is an emotional attachment to the placeswhere they and their parents were born and grew up; a rationalunderstanding that nobody is waiting for them in their historicalhomeland. And above all, there is a clear realization that they wouldnot have such a profitable business at any other place.

Thus, the foreign traders have learned how to act effectively notonly in fairly favorable conditions, but also in the risk situations.It is obvious that in the latter case they do not care much aboutperspectives. The aim is to get as much profit as possible in theshortest period of time and to transfer the incomes abroad or to turnthem in the “shadow economy” spheres. There is no question of payingtaxes and long-term investments. The experience has showed that allobstacles and limitations are quite easy to overcome. The mechanism todo this is corruption. The more a number of state restrictions on theactivities of “commercial minorities”, the more it tries todiscriminate them, the stronger the corruption system becomes. At thesame time, such an approach does not meet the interests of the groupsunder consideration. Economically and socially they are interested instability, security, protection and the maximal legality of theirbusiness.

The “commercial minorities” have demonstrated their utility in thenew conditions of the national state building and marketmodernization. So they have provided themselves with a possibility tosurvive and function. The experience of a modern Russia shows theirpioneering role in the market economy.

The future of “commercial minorities” can be forecast, relying onthe experience of postindustrial societies. In the process of theirmarket development the public demand for the groups, specializing incertain business spheres, had disappeared. Society became atomic, isgot rid of the community style as a main principle of its structure.In other words, in this quality “commercial minorities” concludedtheir function and moved to the periphery of a public life. However,it does not mean the disappearance of ethnic or religious communities.

It is interesting that “commercial minorities” continue to exist inpostindustrial societies as some marginal phenomenon. However it isnot caused by the demand of a host country, it is dictated by theneeds of the new immigrants’ groups. Corporativism and the community-

based business become an effective mechanism of their adaptation andintegration in an alien world. Usually it is typical for the newcomers from the societies where community institutions are welldeveloped, first of all, for the migrants from the Eastern countries.The USA experience has showed that this situation is changing. Thus,the phenomenon of “commercial minority” can become only the stage inthe life of a diaspora in the postindustrial world.

These findings rise the question of the perspectives of thisphenomenon in Russia. On the one hand, our society is industrial and,in some aspects, postindustrial, but on the other hand, it has justentered (or it is coming back) the way of market development. It seemsthat the question of the existence and functions of “commercialminorities” remains open.

Traslated by D.Safronova

References

Deshen, S. (1984) Urban Jews in Sherifian Morocco //Middle EastStudies. Vol.20. N.40. P.223

Furnivall, J.S. (1967) Netherland India. A Study of Plural Economy.Cambridge

Simmel, G. (1971) The Stranger. In: G.Simmel. On Individuality andSocial Forms.Chicago. P.143-150

Wertheim, W. (1964) East-West Parallels: Sociological Approach toModern Asia. The Hague. P.36-82

Weber, M. (1972) Protestantskaya etika. Moskva: Akademiya Nauk, In-tnauchnoi informatsii po obschestvennym naukam

Diatlov, V. (1996) Predprinimatelskie menshinstva: torgashi, chuzhakiili poslannye Bogom? Simbioz, konflikt, integratsiya v stranakhArabskogo Vostoka i Tropicheskoi Afriki. Moskva: bez izdatelstva

Sombart, V. (1912) Evrei i hoziaistvennaya zhizn'. SPb

Marks, K. (1954) Vvedenie (Iz ekonomicheskikh rukopisei 1857-1858godov). In: K. Marks i F.Engels. Sochineniya. 2-e izd. V. 12. P.709-738

Sergei Abashin

ETHNICITY CONCEPTS AND ECONOMIC STRATEGIES IN THE CENTRAL ASIANCOMMUNITY

Modern science admits two basic concepts of “ethnicity” as aphenomenon. Different notions of the correlation between ethnicity andeconomy correspond to them. The first point of view stipulates thatethnicity should be considered as intrinsic, even a biologicalproperty that predetermines the propensity of a person to enter intothis or that sphere of economic activity. According to the secondpoint of view suggesting the opposite, ethnicity is a constructcreated by the state, mass media, public opinion. It has been imposedon a person and symbolically attributes this or that economic niche tohim/her. There is third point of view: ethnicity is one of theinstruments or resources for achieving results in economic activity.In reality, this description of ethnicity is not an independentconcept. Ethnicity can be an instrument both as an inherent property,and as a construct imposed from the outside.

The idea of “ethnicity as intrinsic property” has been prevalent inRussian science in recent decades. It remains very popular at present,especially among researchers dealing with empirical material, ratherthan among theorists. Such views form the basis of the “ethnostheory”, which was created in the 1960-80-ies in Soviet ethnography.According to this theory, “ethnicity” is a fundamental category of theindividual as a social and even biological creature. Thus, anymanifestation of human activity can be considered in an ethniccontext.

In 1980-ies, numerous disciplines with the prefix “ethno- “ startedto appear within the framework of “ethnos theory”: ethno-demography,ethno-history, ethno-geography etc. It was at that time that “ethno-economy” was declared to be a newly created discipline. Its point wasto find an “ethnic” component in economic activity and to substantiatethe autochthonal economic preferences of different “ethnoses”. In thecontext of “ethno-economy” the economic strategies of a person or asocial group are predetermined by the ethno-cultural and ethno-socialcharacteristics of the society to which they belong.

I use the case of Central Asia in an attempt to show theerroneousness of such statements. According to a number ofresearchers, the economic strategies of native inhabitants of CentralAsia (Uzbeks, Tadjiks etc.) are inserted in a “traditional” model.This model supposes a strong influence of milieu upon a person'schoice of “traditional”, i.e. characteristic for particular ethnicculture, spheres of professional activity such as agriculture, foodand light industries etc.(Perepelkin, 1987). In contrast to theeconomic strategies of indigenous people, those of the Russianpopulation of Central Asia refer to the contemporary model, which

means independence from the opinions of other people and orientationto one's own interests. All this directly influences the choice ofindustrial, strongly mechanized and individualized professions.

In the literature relating to the present-day economy of CentralAsia, one can often meet statements such as: “...the Uzbeks, by virtueof their tradition oriented towards small-scale commodity productionand cotton-growing, neither had nor have any inclination for otheroccupations...” (Kultchik, 1995). Or another quotation: “...Moreattractive (for indigenous peoples of Central Asia - S.A.) were thespheres of economic activity, engagement in which contributed topreservation of traditional values and orientations, - it wasagriculture, first of all” (Alexandrov, 1999).

These statements are based, in particular, on official statistics ofpopulation distribution by different branches of the national economy.Thus 40 % of the employed population in Uzbekistan work inagriculture, the same number - in the sphere of services, 20% - inindustry and construction. In Turkmenistan - 44%, 40% and 16%,accordingly. The biggest proportion of people working in agriculture -59% - is in Tadjikistan, including 27% in the sphere of services and13% in industry and construction. In all republics, aboriginalpopulation prevails in agriculture and the sphere of services, incontrast to industry and construction, where new comers from theEuropean part of the former USSR prevail. Actually, the quota ofindigenous peoples in industry is smaller than that in the nationalstructure of the population. Thus, at the end of the 80-ies the quotaof Uzbeks in industry of Uzbekistan equaled 53%, in construction -50%, in transport and communication - 55%, whereas the quota of Uzbeksin the total population exceeded 70%. In Turkmenistan, the quotas ofTurkmenians in the afore mentioned branches amounted to 53%, 54% and48%, accordingly, the proportion of Turkmenians in the totalpopulation exceeding 75%. In Tadjikistan, the correspondingproportions of Tadjiks were as follows: 48%, 48% and 57%, the quota ofTadjiks in total population exceeded 65% (the numerous Uzbek communityis not taken into account in this case). These data are usuallyinterpreted as evidence of the “ethnic” preferences of differentnations.

In my opinion, the phenomenon of relative, but not absolute,statistical correlation between “nationality” and the “sphere” ofnational economy is entirely unconnected “ethnic” or “traditional”preferences. This is the result of a quite concrete socio-economic andpolitical choice, which was made in the 20th century. I will singleout one of the consequences of this choice. To ensure economic

independence for the USSR, the Soviet government was consciously readyto establish a cotton monopoly in Central Asia. Unlike, for example,grain farming, cotton-growing requires great labour outlays, thereforethe Central Asian population was retained in rural areas by variouscompulsory measures. All Central Asian industry and urban culture werealso created by means of the compulsory displacement of the peoplefrom the European part of the USSR, where these people, apropos, werejust being released from agriculture. In other words, the stateprovided conditions for the conservation of one group in the“agrarian” sector and for rapid migration of another group from the“agrarian” sector to “industrial” one. The situation which at presentis considered as an indicator of “ethnic” distinctions, has developedonly in the 20th century and even more recently - in post-war years,i.e. in 1940-1970-ies. It was the very time when mutual stereotypesinterpreted as “national” (or “ethnic”) were forming, and either a“traditional” or a “modern” character was being attributed to economicstrategies. The Uzbeks, Tadjiks and other peoples of Central Asiabecame “backward”, “traditional”. They are regarded as adherents of“collectivism”, who are deeply attached to the land. In other words,they accepted all those characteristics which as far back as 20-30-ies, could be applied to Russians, Ukrainians etc., as to the Frenchand Germans at the end of the last century.

In fact, the present situation in Central Asia has fundamentallychanged in comparison to the situation encountered two or threedecades ago. The figures showing the distribution of Central Asianpopulation by branches of national economy today conceal quite adifferent reality. Closer study of employment shows that the data onpeople engaged in agriculture are of a rather fictitious character.

I will cite data related to the “Mindon” unitary area. It is apopulated locality situated in the Fergana valley. At the beginning of1991, the “Mindon” population ran to 11 thousand, including around 5thousand people who were considered to be able-bodied. About 2,7thousand people among these five thousand were officially employed atthe local collective farm “Dimitrov”. In 1990, about 200 peopleformally registered as collective farmers did not work there a singleday. In other words, 2,5 thousand people worked on the collective farmin fact, that makes 50% of the able-bodied population of “Mindon”unitary area. About 2 thousand collective farmers were registered asmembers of cotton-growing brigades, i.e. they worked directly inagriculture. The rest (500 people) belonged to managerial personnel,technical workers, the staff of kindergartens and nurseries etc. Whatis most curious is that among two thousand members of cotton-growingbrigades only 60 persons worked more than 300 days per year. Others

had fewer working days: 600 people worked less than 50 days per year.The overwhelming majority of the collective farmers were engaged incollective-farm production not more than 2-3 months per year. The restof time these “workers” of agrarian sector did not work anywhere, orwere partially engaged in individual farming, or unofficially workedin various non-agrarian branches.

Another argument for the adherence of the aboriginal population ofCentral Asia to agrarian production is the important role played bythe household plot of land in providing the family income. There is anopinion that work on a plot “...gives the family an income exceedingits earnings in the public sector...” (Alexandrov, 1991); villagers inCentral Asia “...do not have ...any other sources of existence...”except for six or eight 'sotka's of land (a hundredth of ha)(Kultchik, 1995); “... The individual farm in Central Asia haspractically become the main source of income for a considerable partof the population...” (Tcheshko, 1990).

Also in regard to this matter, researchers quite often operate withstereotypes instead of facts. Agricultural production has naturallimits of growth. At the end of the last century, one individual farmin Mindon controlled approximately 5-6 Hectares of all irrigatedlands, including private and collective-farm ones. Even one takes intoaccount the increase of profitability per unit of irrigated area, itis obvious that opportunities to earn a living in agrarian productionhave been gradually narrowed for the last 100 years. It means that atpresent the population is forced to search for work outside Mindon.The structure of incomes of one Uzbek family (6-7 persons) at thebeginning of 1990-ies looked approximately as follows: income fromhousehold plot and domestic crafts (animal husbandry, sericulture)made 35-45%, the same accounted for incomes from “social production”(including 15% in collective-farm production and 20-30% in otherbranches); social welfare and private earnings made up the rest.

Characterizing the family budget, one should take into account notonly how income is made up, but also economic behaviour of the peopleand the motives behind their economic activity. In the past alleconomic life was associated with land: landless and land-poor peopletried to spend the money they earned for renting land and for furtherpurchases of the latter, in order to become land owners. At present,the situation differs. A person who has a stable source of incomeoutside agriculture, has no desire at all to invest all the money inpurchasing land and getting involved in agricultural production.

The facts cited, in my opinion, prove that at present the indigenouspeoples of Central Asia no longer have a limited number of professions

related to agriculture that does not exist any more. Thus, there areno “traditional” or “ethnic” economic niches which the nativepopulation aspires to occupy according to “ethno-cultural” motivation.

The above facts prove that “ethnic” distinctions in Central Asia aregradually being obliterated. This process is connected with thechanging socio-economic and political situation in today's CentralAsia. Between 1970 and 1980 the cotton monopoly was graduallydisappearing, agrarian overcrowding reached an extreme and theaboriginal population of Central Asia started “leaving” the agrariansector for other branches of the national economy, the Russian-speaking population started departing and so on.

At the same time, the new “ethnic” distinctions were developingrather beyond the borders of Central Asia. They are connected withsubstantial changes in economic strategies of indigenous Central Asianpeoples. In particular, the migration flow of the Central Asianpopulation to Russia increases. By this, I mean, in particular, theseasonal migration. Official statistics hardly register this form ofmigration, thus the latter stay beyond the researchers' “field ofvision”. According to some estimations, up to one third of the adultmale population of Tadjikistan annually go in search of paid workoutside the republic. The same process is developing in Uzbekistan andin other regions of Central Asia.

In Russian society migrants occupy the niches created by theeconomic situation in Russia. This relates, first of all, to trade andthe service sector which are the most profitable sectors of theeconomy. In addition, many comers from Central Asia are engaged inrapidly developing construction. A certain number of Central Asianmigrants find jobs in industry, oil and gas-fields. Criminality,mainly drug trafficking, is most attractive for migrants. I would liketo emphasize once again - the above mentioned economic niches are mostprofitable and are occupied by migrants from Transcaucasia, Moldova,Ukraine, Byelorussia and even by those from more distant countries -Korea, China, Vietnam.

I did not conduct any special research on the position of migrantsfrom Central Asia in Russia. I could, however, present some ideas onethnicity in the context of new economic strategies of native CentralAsian peoples. This might be of some interest to those who investigatethe Central Asian inhabitants outside Central Asia.

There is a concept that asserts ethnic preferences in economicsphere to be stipulated by “cultural comfort”, easier mutualunderstanding within particular “ethnos”, by certain “clan”

obligations, corporate interests which prevail over a person etc. Allthis seems to predetermine a preference for compatriots when formingeconomic niches with the regard for “ethnic factor”. Actually, it isthe very “instrumentalism” which was spoken of above, though presentedby the supporters of the “intrinsic ethnicity” concept.

Such reasoning, however, incompletely reflects the reality. Theterms “mutual understanding”, “comfort”, “clan” are taken from quasi-scientific romanticism or acute political publicism rather than fromthe arsenal of modern scientific concepts. A person quite often avoidshis/her “owns” and prefers to cooperate with “aliens”, with whomhe/she is not bound with any additional obligations and with whom itis easier to achieve the results. In any event, the thesis about thehomogeneous national structure of “ethnic groupings” has long belongedto myth and does not reflect the real state of things. As it is wellknown, despite their “ethic name”, these groupings are sure to joinrepresentatives of different nationalities, including those of thecountry or region where the group in question acts.

On the other hand, even when the grouping is perceived as one’s“own”, the perception is stipulated by kinship, commune and religiousfactors, rather than by ethnic ones. “Ethnic” character is more oftenascribed to these groups from outside, i.e. by the social environmentin which they were placed. In this case, the question should be put asfollows: why are “ethnic” definitions used in Russia for namingmigrants? I am convinced that the problems of “ethnicity and economy”,“ethnicity and criminality” should be studied in the context of theformation of ideology in the present-day Russian bureaucracy,including, for example, the militia, special services etc.

There is another curious phenomenon to be singled out. Central Asianmigrants often conceal their own nationality, ascribing the otherethnicity to themselves. One should remark that national or ethnicself-consciousness in Central Asia is a late phenomenon. Actually itwas formed in the 20th century. Formerly the local population wascharacterized by multistage, hierarchic self-consciousness wheretribal, regional, sectarian and social identities got mixed up. Up tonow, many groups perceive themselves as depending on situation; eitheras Tadjiks or Uzbeks, Turkmenians or Uzbeks, Kirghiz or Uzbeks and soon. Bi- or trilingualism (if we take into account the Russianlanguage, formerly spread on a large scale) are kept up. Besides, ifwe consider personalized relationships, it is the origin of a personthat is of importance for Central Asian inhabitants, not thenationality which is written down in his/her passport.

The most obvious reason for concealing one's own ethnicity is a wishto keep up one's trade mark. In Russia, for instance, it is usual tosay “Uzbek plov”, though not only Uzbeks cook pilaw. Similar examplesare “Uzbek cuisine”, “Uzbek tiubeteika (skull-cap)”, “Uzbek melons”(or “melons from Tashkent”, though those melons were not brought fromTashkent at all) and so on. A wish to maintain a positive image ofthis or that nationality might be another reason for concealing one'sethnicity. The most famous case is connected with Central AsianGypsies, who played the role of Tadjik refugees. One can assume, thatUzbeks, Arabs and other minor national groups from Tadjikistan havealso called themselves Tadjiks. It was useful at one time, when theattitude to refugees from Tadjikistan in Russia was sympathetic.

Thanks to newspapers and law-enforcement agencies, a negative imageof the Tadjik-drugdealer has been created. I remember one provocativeincident that I saw on TV. On “TV-6” channel's program “Road Patrol”,a high-ranking militiaman had this to to say about the matter: verysoon, all Tadjiks will be imprisoned for drug-trafficking. It isobvious that the Tadjiks of Uzbekistan, for example, will prefer tocall themselves Uzbeks, so as not to be associated with such a deeplynegative image. In these cases, adoption of ethnicity is merely a wayto avoid any unpleasant consequences that might result from thenegative image of this or that nationality in Russia. Many more suchexamples could be adduced.

Summarizing, I would like to emphasize once again that the conceptof “intrinsic ethnicity”, which we regard as rather logical andnatural, disintegrates on closer inspection. More convincing, in myopinion, is the concept of “constructing ethnicity”. I will cite somebasic aspects of this concept.

First – an individual has a complex self-consciousness incorporatinga number of different identities, which he/she can choose, change, oreven create. A person is not intrinsically ascribed to any“nationality”. Second - the interpretation of “ethnicity” changes overtime. The epoch changes, as well as the conditions of life, and thecontent of any “ethnic self-consciousness” concept also changes. Third- the process by which “ethnicity” is formed is strongly affected bythe state, mass media and stereotypes from everyday life. Researchersinvolved in study of the creation or “constructing” of “ethnicity” arethemselves not far removed from it. This means, that the science bearsresponsibility for all it does. However, it is a topic for anotherdiscussion.

Traslated by O.Kirillova

References

Perepelkin, N. (1987) K voprosu ob etnokulturnykh faktorakh trudovoideyatelnosti rabotnika sovremennoi promyshlennosti // SovetskayaEtnografiya. N 2. P. 83-88

Kultchik, Ju. (1995) Respublika Uzbekistan v seredine 90-h godov //Issledovaniya po prikladnoi i neotlozhnoi etnologii. Dokument N 90.Мoskva

Alexandrov, Ju.(1991) Sredniaya Asia: spetsificheskii sluchaiekonomicheskoi slaborazvitosti // Vostok. N 5. P. 142-154

Alexandrov, Ju. (1999) Byvshii Sovetskii Vostok // Sotsialnyi oblikVostoka. Мoskva

Cheshko, S.V. (1990) Tsentralnaya Asia i Kazakhstan: sovremennoesostoyanie i perspektivy natsionalnogo razvitiya // Rasy i narody.Vyp. 20. Мoskva

Natalya Kosmarskaya

“ETHNICITY AND “CAREER” RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS’ ECONOMIC INTEGRATION INPOST-SOVIET KIRGHIZIA

It is widely known the kind of serious difficulties of adaptationmillions of Russians and Russian-speakers have been facing in thenewly independent states (NIS) after the break-up of the USSR. In theeyes of many academics, the mass media and public opinion, the maincause of these difficulties is derived from the fact that all the“compatriots” are Russians whereas power is concentrated in the handsof the titular ethnic groups – the Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Estonians, etc.So, the roots of existing tensions and conflicts have been taken as“ethnic”, as conflicts between ethnic groups. Not surprisingly theterms “ethnic” and “ethnicity” have been the favorites in thevocabulary of the bulk of publications devoted to “Russians outsideRussia” (ethnic discomfort, ethnic discrimination, ethnic migration,etc.).

However, another interpretation might also be relevant: what lookson the surface like “ethnic” confrontation is to a large extent aconflict of social groups engendered by a radical redistribution ofpower and the restructuring of the Soviet socio-political hierarchy.

In the period of the Russian and mainly Soviet Empire Russians,together with members of other ethnic groups falling within thecategory of Russian-speakers, not only made up the backbone of localindustries, education services, health services, etc., but were also

the bearers of the center’s ideology and policies. The Russians’leading position at all levels of the ruling structures had been thuspredetermined. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situationchanged radically – Russian-speakers have found themselves at thelower and sometimes the lowest levels of the socio-political pyramid,with all the obvious losses to their status and welfare. The above-proposed “non-ethnic” interpretation of the causes and consequences ofthese losses is most applicable, in my opinion, to the situation inCentral Asia – the “imperial” balance of power was here supplementedby the “senior and junior brothers” complex still alive in the publicmind.

An important “formal” argument is worth mentioning which questionsthe correctness of treating the factor of “ethnicity” as the corefactor in the relationship of the new states with the Russian-speakersresiding on their territory. In strict terms, the latter is not anethnic group but, if Central Asia is taken as an example, aconglomeration of communities with many rapidly changing identities.Elements of “Soviet” identity go hand in hand with Russianism(obruseniye) which is manifesting itself in these people’s adherence toRussian culture and a perception of Russian as their mother-tongue. Atthe same time, the revival of ethnic values in the post-Soviet periodhas been contributing, for non-Russians in the first instance, to agrowth of ethnic aspirations on the emotional level and/or to a highlyrationalized construction of ethnicity (for Germans and Jews). So,given the Russian-speakers’ community in terms of past and presentsocial roles and interests, it could be more correct to take them asan ethno-social group alienated from power by the ruling regime, whichis represented mainly by the titular ethnos.

It is hardly important for ordinary people in what capacity they areat risk of being discriminated against. However, if scholarlyexpertise and political decisions are concerned, the proposed “non-ethnic” approach looks more productive than an emphasis on a clash ofexclusively ethnic interests. First, this allows the avoidance ofpoliticization of the public discourse on the “compatriots issue”being severely influenced by parties of nationalist orientation.Second, similar to any other situation when a conflict of interestscan be rationalized, a good opportunity opens for “bargaining” inorder to establish mutually accepted rules of the game both at theinter-state, inter-group and inter-personal level. Third, the problemsof Russian-speakers in the NIS, which are hardly of a uniquecharacter, could be treated within the much wider context of thetransformation of post-Soviet societies, and through this lens thefactor of ethnicity, playing some role on every territory including

Russia itself, will turn into just one of the components of a painfuladaptation process.

The following is an attempt to apply the above-mentionedconsiderations to how the economic integration of Russian-speakers’has been developing, if at all, in post-Soviet Kirghizia. The paper isbased on empirical research conducted in 1996, 1998 and 1999 (surveysof the Russian-speakers in Bishkek, expert interviews and in-depthinterviews with the so called successful integrators).

Little is known about the lives of Russian-speakers in the nearabroad, and this is in striking contrast with the scale ofsociological study of adaptation modes in post-Soviet Russia. Thoughout-migration from the NIS has considerably slowed down in recentyears, Russian scholars, as well as the press, still link Russian-speakers’ living conditions to the migration process. Researchinterest focuses on potential migrants and, putting it in a moregeneralized way, on the push factors (ethnic in the first turn) anddisintegration trends in the Russian-speaking communities. The socalled “migration approach” dominates political and academic thinking,by which Russian-speakers have no future in these areas. Grounds forthis conceptual bias are numerous and deserve special consideration. Ishould mention the lack of funds for extensive field-work; seriousunderdevelopment of qualitative sociology and, due to this, emphasison survey methods; prevalence of primordialist concepts of ethnicityand, last but not least, the high political sensitivity of theresearch issues under consideration.

In accordance with the “migration approach”, the Russian-speakers ofthe NIS are not living a normal life but are just living out theirdays there, with practically no chances for economic integration andsocial promotion. To illustrate this, the following example will berelevant in this article devoted to Kirghizia. This is how G.Pyadukhov, a Kirghizstani analyst, commented at the Moscow CarnegieCentre seminar on the tangible slowing down of migration to Russia:“Everybody who could leave, who had money, relatives,connections, – they have already left. Those who have stayed aremostly old people or poor families without any resources forresettlement. Successful integration is open only for that tiny percent of Russian-speakers who flourish in business. Migrationexpectations are still very high” (Sotsialno-politicheskaya, 1997). Itis worth noting here that no empirical grounds for this conclusionwere presented, nor can it be supported by any of my own field-workmaterial.

What is described by G. Pyadukhov is really a perspective of theRussian-speakers’ hopeless marginalization, and “business prosperity”is not used quite correctly here as a measure of success. Business isa risky sphere of activity, and not so many people “flourish” in iteven in highly developed economies, not to say transitional post-Soviet societies. That is why, in my opinion, “success” and “career”should be treated in broad terms – the starting positions of formerSoviet citizens have been greatly undermined by the collapse of thesocialist economies and by the instability of those societies they areliving in now. Thus, it is not the ‘fantastic flight’ of the so callednew Russians which is meant by “success” but the lack of a humiliatingdependency on the poor state “pocket” and the materialization in“acceptable” living standards of those new rights and libertiesprovided by the market. In this respect, a more reliable criteria of“successful integration” to be applied to the post-Soviet statesshould be the following: personal satisfaction with the job availableand/or family well-being, an optimistic estimate of family economicperspectives, perception of life conditions as “settled” (ustroyennayazhizn’). Respectively, upward social mobility under these conditionsshould not only be taken as Soviet-like promotion (salaries of schooldirector or head physician do not differ much from those of anordinary teacher or doctor), but, in the first instance, employment inthe organized private sector, even if this demands, not infrequently,a drastic change of profession and type of activity.

Turning to the empirical data, I would like to emphasize that theRussian-speaking community of Kirghizia is rapidly differentiatingaccording to a wide range of characteristics of “being”,“consciousness” and behaviour. A visible line, for instance, dividesthose “willing to stay” (these are people who have consciously chosento stay in Kirghizia, and they are far from being in a minority) and“willing to leave”(these are people who would prefer migration toRussia but have not got adequate resources for resettlement). Thus,the first group members are not only more positive in their evaluationof their family’s material status, both in terms of the past and thefuture, but are also more optimistic about the country’s economicfuture which is perceived through the prism of personal gains andlosses (see Appendix, table 1). Similarly, there exists a tangible gapbetween the groups in the share of respondents who felt (or had feltbefore) discriminated on ethnic grounds : 20.2 per cent among those“willing to stay” and 29.3 per cent among those “willing to leave” in1996 and, respectively, 16.6 and 47.1 per cent in 1998.

Responses to a similar question, though not appealing directly topeople’s personal experience, are also illustrative (see Appendix,

table 2). The question was put in the following way: “What is mostimportant, in your opinion, to make material and social gains inmodern Kirghizia?” The majority of respondents consider “money” (57.5per cent) and “connections” (56.0 per cent) as crucial factors of life“success”; these ideas are very close, as results of a survey inRybinsk testify, to mass perceptions of “success” and “socialsecurity” in modern Russia. A factor of an ethnic nature (“to beKirghiz”) is mentioned much less frequently (32.6 per cent); moreover,reactions of those “willing to stay” are more biased towards a non-ethnic interpretation of “success”: in their opinion, the major role,besides “money” and “connections”, is played by good education (32.1per cent against 20.0 per cent of those “willing to leave”); only 23.0per cent of the “stay group” members admit the importance of beingKirghiz (in comparison with almost twice this number amongst membersof the “leave group”). “Good proficiency in Kirghiz” is also taken bythe first group as an important resource for promotion (20.9 per centagainst 9.5 per cent for those “willing to leave”), a result beingquite explicable by their integration intentions. Interestinglyenough, none of the thirty two respondents who have chosen option“other” (almost all of them want to stay in Kirghizia) have presentedethnically-oriented arguments; in contrast, they mentioned the skillsand talents which are in demand under the market economy (“the mainthing is the strong intention to work”; “you should have a good headon your shoulders”; “to be a professional in your business”, etc.).

Strictly speaking, all this illustrates quite a trivial thing: therealities of life are perceived differently by people depending ontheir individual socio-demographic status and material well-being, onthe psychological traits of their personality, social capitalaccumulated, etc., etc. These “life realities” embrace, among others,the ethnic composition of society and the role played by ethnicdifferences. Undoubtedly, under extraordinary circumstances like anacute phase of inter-ethnic conflict, ethnicity turns into a mainregulator of peoples’ attitudes and behaviour. However, under normalsocietal conditions, let it be an ethnocratic society, the factor ofethnic affiliation starts to loose its predominating and self-sufficing importance. This tendency manifests itself in a subjectiveperception of the “ethnic” which has been shown above; anothermanifestation lies in the selectivity of the impact of ethnicity onpeople’s (Russian-speakers in our case) behaviour in general and ontheir adaptive strategies in particular, and it provides certainperspectives for their “success” through entering already existingeconomic niches and/or the formation of new ones. This is alsodemonstrated by the Russian-speakers’ experiences in Kirghizia.

The post-independence period has witnessed a sharp redistribution ofeconomic and political power between the two major ethno-socialgroups. The policy of ousting “Russians” from administrative andmanagerial positions and other spheres where they had dominated(health protection, education, culture, etc.) intensified sharply.Nowadays the access of non-Kirghiz to cushy jobs in the state sector(banks, tax and customs services, state apparatus, legal system,internal affairs) is seriously restricted. It is in this very areawhere discrimination against the Russian-speakers is most sharplyfelt. The majority of those respondents who reported infringementalong ethnic lines (slightly above a quarter in both samples) and thenreplied to an open-ended question about the causes and manifestationsof discrimination, mentioned barriers to social promotion, inadequateestimates of their professional skills, difficulties in getting awell-paid and prestigious job.

Nevertheless, the ethnic overtones of these changes and their scaleshould not be absolutized. What is often overlooked is that thedramatic fall of living standards of the post-Soviet states populationhas been provoked mainly by the “shock” character of the marketreforms, which has been aggravated for Russian-speakers by thecollapse of the huge military-industrial complex in the NIS where theydominated. In this light, the economic hardships of the ordinarypeople in Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, etc., let them be Kirghiz,Russians, Kazakhs or Ukrainians, – do not differ much from those ofthe bulk of Russian families. Moreover, returning to the presentsituation in Kirghizia, the regime has reached a certain saturationlimit of its power (though different in every sphere of socio-economicactivity), followed by an understanding about what scale of oustingRussian-speakers would be reasonable, especially from lower andmedium-level positions of power. Thus, empirical data testifies thatnon-Kirghiz are not met less frequently in these positions thanKirghiz, and that many Russian-speaking bosses work in the statesector of economy.

My research findings suggest that, as far as Russian-speakers areconcerned, a kind of rationalised system of norms, unwritten rules andnewly-born traditions has gradually appeared, similar in some sense tothat much more rigid scheme of roles’ distribution which existed inthe Soviet Union (the first boss is “local”, his/her deputy isRussian). Certainly, how this system is functioning in the relatively“closed” state sector differs substantially from its manifestations inthe relatively “open” private sector of economy. In view of thelimited volume of the paper, just a few examples will be presented,although there are plenty of them.

One of the interviewees (metis) who held a high position in theMinistry of the Interior for some time after independence, but was aprofessional pensioner at the time of interviewing, told about hisattempts to push one of his former subordinates (Russian) up to aposition of deputy head of the ministry department. The boss whom headdressed replied that this step would not be “accepted” as one of hisdeputies was Russian and the head of the most important affiliationwas Russian as well.

Another example touches upon the competition between Russians andKirghiz for prestigious jobs in the private sector. One of theexperts, a well-known linguist (Kirghiz) complained that her nephewwho had graduated from the Turkish university and had been fluent inEnglish, Turkish and, certainly, Russian, could not find a good job inthe “firm”. The main problem was his poor command of the Kirghizlanguage. In response to my question: “But what should Russians dounder these conditions?”, she replied “The demands they should satisfyare quite different”.

Here is a more general characteristic of the new tendencies in thelabour market presented by the “Res Publica” newspaper issued inBishkek: “Many so called “new Kirghiz” lost a lot of money at thestart of their business through placing relatives at the key positionsin their firms and companies. But you will get nothing out of yourkinsmen – neither can action be brought against them, nor racketeerssent to collect debts. The barriers do not exist between relativeswhich should naturally divide a boss and subordinate. That is why theemployers prefer to hire professionals nowadays”.

The above-described tendencies developing from above, are going handin hand with the efforts Russian-speakers are developing themselvesfrom below. The private sector which is not so strictly politicisedhas been serving as the main domain for these activities. Thisconcerns not only the so called “shuttle” trade, a risky and unstablebusiness, but first of all “organised” business requiring a highstandard of education and professional skills. A part of the Russian-speakers did not miss their chance. For instance, as the surveyresults of 1996 indicate, one of the essential differences betweenthose men “who wanted to stay” and those who “wanted to leave” was inhow they adapted in the troubled period of socio-economic transition.Thus, compared with the “leave group”, amongst men who “wanted tostay” almost two times less were not satisfied with their jobs and twotimes more were employed in the “organised” private sector withrelatively high and regularly paid salaries. Of course, only a fewpeople become owners of a big and prosperous business, especially as

business activities are developing under the conditions of a “wild”post-Soviet market. However, according to estimates of the above-mentioned interviewee from the Ministry of the Interior, Russian-speakers comprise about a third of the hundred “big” businessmenworking in Bishkek. Here is another estimate, concerning small andmedium-size businesses. Twenty nine firms out of fifty turned out tobe run by Russian-speakers and to have a majority of Russians in theirstaff in a random sample of private enterprises selected from thoseadvertising their activities in Bishkek newspapers (autumn 1999).

The complicated and contradictory collisions of the socio-economicpromotion of Russian-speakers in the NIS should, certainly, undergofurther extensive research; nevertheless, the presented empirical dataand conceptual considerations provide, in my view, adequate testimonythat a totally pessimistic approach, and linking analysis only (orbasically) to the ethnic factor, are hardly relevant here.

Appendix

Table 1. Russian-Speakers in Bishkek: Living Standards’ Dynamics in the Post-SovietPeriod (estimates of respondents “willing to stay” and “willing to leave”), %, 1998

How did change your material well-being if comparedwith the “Soviet times”?

Options to choose would like to stay inKirghizia

(N =187)

would like to goto Russia

(N=105)

went better 18,2 7,6

went slightly worse 27,8 31,4

went seriouslyworse

36,4 46,7

nothing has changed 11,8 7,6

hesitating toanswer

5,9 6,7

100,0 100,0

How did change your material well-being during the last

2-3 years?

Options to choose would like to stay inKirghizia

(N =187)

would like to goto Russia

(N=105)

went better 22,5 11,4

went slightly worse 24,1 21,0

went seriouslyworse

20,3 29,5

nothing has changed 29,4 31,4

hesitating toanswer

3,7 6,7

  100,0 100,0

  

What is your forecast for the nearest future? Materialwell-being of my family

Options to choose would like to stay inKirghizia

(N =187)

would like to goto Russia

(N=104)

will go better 17,1 8,7

will go worse 7,0 26,0

will godramatically bad

2,1 1,0

it will stay thesame

32,6 22,1

hesitating toanswer

41,2 42,3

  100,0 100,0

What is, in your opinion, present socio-economicsituation in Kirghizia?

Options to choose would like to stay inKirghizia

(N =187)

would like to goto Russia

(N=104)

good 2,7 1,0

satisfactory 47,1 29,5

bad 32,6 38,1

very bad 7,5 20,0

hesitating toanswer

10,1 11,4

  100,0 100,0

 

Таble 2. Russian-Speakers in Bishkek: Views of Crucial Factors ofSocio-Economic Promotion,

%, 1998

What is most important, in your opinion, to make material and socialgains in modern Kirghizia?

Options to choose

(up to 3 options could bechosen)

The whole ofthe

sample

wouldlike

to stay

wouldlike

to leave

1. to have a “big boss”among

friends or relatives

(II) 56,0 (II) 55,1

(I) 58,1

2. to be a Kirghiz byethnicity

(III) 32,6 (IV)23,0

(III)50,5

3. to be well-educated (IV) 27,7 (III32,1

(V) 20,0

4. to be successful inbribing

4,9 4,8 5,7

5. to have a lot of money (I) 57,5 (I) 59,9 (II) 57,1

6. to be a part of acertain Kirghiz clan

17,2 13,9 (I) 23,8

7. to have land, house,etc. in private

property

11,4 11,2 10,5

8. to have good proficiencyin Kirghiz

(V) 18,2 (V) 20,9 9,5

9. to have access to thecriminal world

5,8 4,3 8,6

10. to have a “money-making” profession

16,2 16,6 (V) 16,2

11. other 8,6 11,2 2,9

 References

Mezentseva, E., Kosmarskaya, N. (1998) Beg po zamknutomu krugu. Uroven'zhizni, mentalnye ustanovki i sotsialnaya mobilnost' zhiteleiRossii // Mir Rossii. № 3. P. 141-158

Kosmarskaya, N. (1999a) Khotyat li russkie v Rossiyu? (sdvigi vmigratsionnoi situatsii i polozhenii russkoyazychnogo naseleniyaKirgizii). In: V dvizhenii dobrovolnom i vynuzhdennom. Postsovetskiemigratsii v Evrazii / A. Viatkin, N. Kosmarskaya, S. Panarin (eds).M.: Natalis. P. 180-188

Kosmarskaya, N. (1999b) “Russkie v Tsentralnoi Azii” - bolnoi vopros?Naskolko i dlya kogo? // Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz. № 5(6). P.31– 34

Sotsialno-politicheskaya (1997) situatsiya i polozhenie novykhdiaspor v Kazakhstane i Kirgizii: vzglyad ottuda. BibliotekaMoskovskogo tsentra Karnegi. SM-Mig/97-2. P. 14

Viacheslav Valitov

ETHNIC NETWORKS OR INFORMAL ECONOMY

This article is based on the data obtained during the semi-formalized interviews with businessmen and directors of enterprises inUlyanovsk. I will consider how ethnic communities are related to theeconomic processes going on in the city. The issues relating to theinformal economy will be paid a special attention. The growth of theinformal economy is accompanied by the resistance to the liberalreforms being carried out by local authorities.

Nowadays personal networks take on special significance as theyunderlie a “network capital” which seems to be a necessary conditionfor the functioning of enterprises and commercial structures. Underthe strong influence of informal economic processes the networkcapital becomes an important economic resource in a provincial city.According to our informants, about 40-50 percent of all unaccountedcash turnover goes for covering the expenses related to thebureaucratic apparatus.

There are three typical features characterizing the relationsbetween the network capital and ethnic communities:

1. Quantitative variation of communications on the matter ofeconomic relations (Siu-Lun, Salaff, 1998). The higher the statusof the subject of communication (a family, for example) is, thegreater the number of social networks which can be mobilized byimmigrants and economic communities.

2. Qualitative variety concerning the use of the networks byethnic communities. A personal social capital is often consideredand used as the capital belonging to the whole community.

3. Some communities aspire to establish more “dense”relationships with bureaucratic apparatus in order to get anaccess to a higher and broader level of social networks.

Following the traditions of Bourdieu and Coleman (Bourdieu, 1986;Coleman, 1998), these characteristics allow us to consider a socialnetwork as a form of the social capital. Bourdieu defined the socialcapital as the “resources based on the related relations and therelations in the group of membership” (Bourdieu, 1986:4). At that, hedoes not specify that an individual or a group always have someadditional possibilities or a choice. Coleman used this conception ina broader sense, including responsibilities and expectations,information channels and social norms (Coleman, 1998:95). In my study

I focus on mobilization of personal networks which are used to obtaineconomic profit.

According to my hypothesis, entrepreneurs are limited in theirchoice of the style of network building. The choice depends, first ofall, on existing family networks and the prevalent limitations on themarket, which define the character of the networks (in particular, thepotential of ethnic communities). The activity on the market can besuccessful if the relations outside the family and other weakconnections are being flexibly used as a basis for the building or astrategy for the choice of a future model of the network behavior. Thechoice of the network character is defined by the economic behavior,because it determines the access to the sources of information andprovides an economic subject with significant autonomy. This can leadto the creation of the networks using “structural holes”, or of thenetworks based on the weak points of existing legislation (Burt, 1992;Siu-lun, Salaff, 1998:361). Burt claims that this “optimization” ofnetworks has two distinctive principles. The first principle is theefficiency of the contact and the recognition of relations with otherclusters as leading to the establishment of indirect relations. Thesecond principle is, the achievement through the differentiation ofprimary and secondary contacts, the focusing on the recourcesproviding the maintenance of the achieved status (Burt, 1992:21).

Let us consider the communities’ role in the establishment of therelations between entrepreneurs and officials. The communities ofUlyanovsk have been formed not only as cultural centers, but also -even primarily - as the organizations oriented on commercial activity.In 1990, on the wave of a growing interest in the problems of theSoviet Germans, the document “On organization of the activity on theresettling of Soviet Germans in Ulyanovsk region (Oblast’)” wasadopted (Istoriya, 1993:299-300). The business relationships whichwere formed at that time between the representatives of the Germancommunity and the Oblast’ authorities have been maintained untilnowadays. They acquire a special role in situations of registration orobtaining a license on the right to sale or the right on commercialactivity. In the words of our informant (commercial manager of a TVcompany), “there are joint-stock companies where the founders are not only us (theGermans - V.V.), but also some people from administration although primarily we wereestablishing them only to help the Germans who were coming back to their former places”.The Tatar community provides additional evidence of how socialorganizations are used as a basis for the establishment of commercialfirms serving the interests of local authorities but not the aims ofthe organization itself:

“The money collected on publishing a newspaper has disappeared from a safe. As we havefound out, they were “required” as there was a need to buy something... And our people couldnot refuse... But how could one to refuse? (An entrepreneur).

Our informants maintain that there exists a historically formeddivision of the Germans in Russia between the Germans of Povolzhie and“the Germans from the center”. Primarily the core of the Germandiaspora in Russia was composed of the highly skilled specialists fromthose invited by the Government to serve in administration bodies, inthe army, in the institutes of science and culture and industry.Settling mostly in large cities, first and foremost in Moscow andSt.Petersburg, these migrants from the German lands did not establishany ethnic contacts with the German peasants-colonists who started tomigrate to Russia in large numbers in 1763. Moreover, they eventhought of themselves as of a different ethnic group.

The Germans, in contrast to other ethnic communities, feelthemselves stigmatized not only in relation to the local inhabitants,but also to the Germans living in St. Petersburg, Moscow or in theBaltic States. Their contacts are oriented to a large extent onGermany, the Germans in Povolzhie and those who still live in theregions of repatriation. “I don’t know how to help the Germans in general, but whensomebody from the community addresses us with a request to help those who have stayed“there”, I always help them. This is what the community is needed for”. The Germancommunity assists its members also in obtaining licenses, doing it forfree or almost (conditionally) for free. Thus, the community is beingincluded in economic life.

The communities help in establishing primary relations between anentrepreneur and power structures. The maintenance and furtherdevelopment of the relations is a responsibility of the entrepreneur.According to the entrepreneurs’ evaluations, there are the fixed taxesof consisting of bribes set up in relationships with bureaucraticstructures. An entrepreneur cannot dictate the conditions to anofficial, there are thus the relations of dependency: “In principle now it isimpossible to make money without people from power. To make profit it is necessary to look for“needed” people (a commercial director).” One of the entrepreneurs haspointed out that “if earlier when the firm was in the stage of its foundation, there weremany officials who were taking little, now the number of “taking” officials has decreased butinstead they ask for more”. There is a tendency among Russian entrepreneurs toskip duplicate structures and “to enter into direct contacts” with officials.German entrepreneurs address the community in order to solve theirproblems: “I understand that in some situations I might have to pay, but I cannot...But if youshare your problems with the committee, the questions will be solved in a few days”; “probably,

there is some agreement between our community and local authorities, not to interfere in ouraffairs”.

Ethnic communities are engaged not only in organization of the links“an entrepreneur/an official”, but also in the relationships “anentrepreneur/an entrepreneur”. They help in minimizing the risks.

In the majority of cases the infringement of business agreements isconsidered to be connected with the lack of good faith of a partner,in particular, of those belonging to a different ethnic group. Forinstance, Russian businessmen talked about the infringement ofobligations from the Tatars’ part. After a few deals with the Tatars,they try to avoid any business contacts with them. An entrepreneur ,dealing with the software installing, related that “it is desirable to establishbusiness relationships with relatives or good acquantances people. I had agreed with a Tatar tolook for an order, I made a deal, and he was responsible for a “rough work” only, to finish apacket ... The program packet itself was also installed by me. But then he claims that the mainamount of work has been done by him, and we have to divide not 50/50, but 30/70 . I told him,I am sorry but I am not working with you any more”. At the same time, it is easierand more profitable to work with “the Asians’ or “the Caucasians”: there isa chance to “push down defective goods /../ They will swallow up everything”. Howeverit is not a case of swindling a partner. The cases of the infringementof business contracts vanish away when the selection of partners hasbeen completed and the circle of persons becomes narrow: “The relationshipshave been closed into a reliable and well familiar network”.

The role of the German community in the formation of businessnetworks is especially evident between the members of the communitythemselves, as there are no unfamiliar people or those who want tostart own business from zero: “We all know each other, we have no new people”.This also characterizes the German community as a closed structure,where the main activity aims not at the obtaining maximal profit, butat the minimization of risks.

The Tatar community has got a different character. Firstly, thereare always new members who are being included ( in most of the cases,but not necessarily) in trade relations. The recruiting of new membersgoes on all the time. In the beginning they are being monitored, theywork as assistants, and then the “new” people can think of startingtheir own businesses. Secondly, the Tatar community is rather open,although the leaders of the community do try to resist the entering ofnew immigrants from rural regions. Still, due to family relations thenew comers might have, at least, some guaranteed earnings.

The functioning of business networks is based on continualmonitoring supported by additional informal relations and services. If

the relationships outside of business are finished, there is a dangerthat the business relationships will be over, too. One of ourinformants ( a director of wholesale shop) told: “I was addressed forrecommendations/.../ My former acquaintance had asked them for a credit. I would haverecommended her earlier, but now I did not. I simply don’t know her any more”.

On the other hand, the network capital is a resource on the labormarket (Lin, 1982). In this case, it appears as an unstructuredresource, accessible for an individual through the system of his/herpersonal networks (Davern, 1997:290). An entrepreneur will have betterchances to get an access to labor resources, addressing not onlyofficial organizations, but also having opportunities to look for thelabor force informally. In this case social networks play a doublerole: they are involved not only in the search for the labor force,they are also helpful in providing the jobs for those who have justarrived, often without signing a contract: “My acquaintances phoned andasked me to place their relation on a job. They told me that he had just arrived and could notfind a job, not having an official registration... He worked in my firm for three months, but wedid not sign a contract”...

The network also provides its members with information aboutvacancies and possibilities to find specialists for less money. Ethniccommunities can also play a mediating role, although entrepreneurs aremore inclined to rely on other sources (stable business networks) andto consider the community’s offers as forced steps: “Sometimes we have toturn specialists down. I have already promised to take an accountant. True, she is only studyingand workingin my firm now” told a German informant, who had given a job bythe community’s request.

The business relations in a firm reflect rather the personal styleof the manager, than any ethnic influence. Only one informant ( arepresentative of the Tatar community) admitted that he had dismisseda Russian and had taken a Tatar instead, although both workersdiffered very little.

Considering ethnic networks as a resource for the successfuldevelopment of commercial enterprises we are able to describe thefunctioning of some processes in the informal economy and the reasonsfor their emergence. At the same time, the research data do not allowus to prove the hypothesis about the formation of economic behavior ona basis of ethnic priorities. Ethnicity as one of the factors of thebusiness network formation becomes actualized only at the stage ofstarting an enterprise. Business networks are based to a larger extenton market mechanisms, on the striving for minimizing risks. To getadditional profit entrepreneurs are forced to come to an agreement

with officials. At the same time, ethnic identity plays a certain roleon a labor market and in informal employment.

Translated by E.Nikiforova

 References

Bourdieu, P. (1986) The Forms of Capital. In: I.Richardson (ed.).Handbook of Theory and research for sociology of Education. NY:Greenwood Press. P. 1-17

Burt, R. (1992) Structural Holes: The social Structure of Competition.Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Coleman, J.S. (1998) Social capital in the Creation of Human Capital //American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 94. №1. P.95-120

Davern, M. (1997) Social Networks and Economic Sociology // TheAmerican Journal of Economic and Sociology. Vol.56. №3. P.287-301

Lin, N. (1982) Social resources and Instrumental Action. In: P.Mardsen(ed.). Social Structure and Network Analysis. Beverly Hills, Sage.P.131-145

Siu-lun, Wong & Salaff, J.W. (1998) Network Capital: Emigration from Hong-Kong // British journal of sociology. Vol. 49. №3. P.358-375

Istoriya (1993) rossiiskikh nemtsev v dokumentakh 1763-1992 gg.Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi institut gumanitarnykh programm

Andreas Kapphan

RUSSIAN ENTREPRENEURS IN BERLIN: THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY ANDOPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

The active discussion on ethnic entrepreneurship, going on in socialsciences, is caused by the numerous examples of successful ethnicbusinesses. However this success is not evident and it is not true forall ethnic groups. Thus, the discussion is focused on the followingquestions. why is ethnic business often so successful, what are themost successful groups, and what are the resources they can rely on?

The emergence of ethnic businesses in the big cities of immigrationcountries has been studied mostly in the American context. To describethis phenomenon both categories, “ethnic resources” as well as “ethnicnetworks” have been usually employed. These terms might be useful inthe analysis of the ethnic business’ success but in fact there is nosocial group totally deprived of “networks” and “resources”. Doimmigrants then have more networks and ethnic resources than other

groups? Are they more flexible in using their resources? The firstanswer could be that the migrants usually do not have the same accessto economic resources and cultural capital, available for the rest ofthe population. Therefore they have to rely on a social capital,networks and ethnic solidarity. According to this argument, the lackof the access to other resources and to the labour market are thestimulus to actualise ethnic resources.

In order to explain the phenomenon of the ethnic business I wouldlike to refer to the scheme of Waldinger et al 1990. He points out twoimportant aspects: 1) the opportunity structure, which means a legalframework and the possibilities to enter the local labour market; italso includes the skills of the labour force and the demand on thelabour market; and 2) the specific ethnic strategies and resourceswhich ethnic groups can rely on to overcome the difficulties ofadaptation and discrimination practices. The ethnic resources includenetworks, solidarity, entrepreneurial traditions, the access to thecheap labour force, the knowledge of the needs of ethnic consumers.

The migrants from the former Soviet Union is a good case to studyentrepreneurship in the context of opportunity structures and ethnicresources. Out of 3.5 millions inhabitants of Berlin nearly 100.000are the Russian-speaking migrants from the former Soviet Union whocame in the nineties. They belong to different ethnic groups, theyhave brought different skills from their home countries. But as theyall came to Berlin in the same period, they are dependent on the samelabour market restrictions. Therefore, the different schemes of howthese groups use opportunity structures and ethnic resources might beidentical. In my paper I would like to consider the case of the“Russian” entrepreneurship in Berlin. My findings are based on theresearch, carried out in 1996. I am going to present a brief overviewon the Russian shops in Berlin and the strategies which are used byentrepreneurs to initiate entrepreneurial activities.

The migrants from the Soviet Union represent the most growing groupof immigrants in Berlin in the nineties. Their number has risen from abit more than 1000 people (excluding the military forces) to 100.000.This includes nearly 30.000 citizens of the countries of the formerSoviet Union, 30.000 ethnic Germans (repatriated, “Aussiedler”) and,according to different estimations, from 15.000 to 40.000 undocumented“illegal” migrants.

The prevailing ethnic group are ethnic Germans, the migrants whohave come mostly from the Asian part of Russia and Kazakhstan. Men aremostly professionals in construction and technical jobs, women areengaged in services and office jobs. They obtain the German

citizenship, they have equal rights and no restrictions in the accessto the labour market. Unfortunately, there is very few data on thisgroup because in the statistics they are not mentioned separately.

About 5 to 10.000 migrants are the Jews according to their gate ofentry. There is a law which allows people of Jewish nationality andtheir relatives from the former Soviet Union to come to Germany asrefugees. As a rule, they lived in the big cities of the European partof Russia and of the Ukraine. The majority of them have a higheducation and worked in highly skilled professions. They havepermanent residence permit and no restrictions in the access to thelabour market or to the special programs for unemployed people.

The rest of the migrants – legal or illegal – are different in termsof their country of origin and skills. The important fact is thatthese groups do not get an access to self-employment immediately whenthey arrive in the country; for them it is possible only after aboutfive years of official residence. For our case study they are notimportant.

In the nineties Berlin is experiencing a deep economic crisis.Production industries are dismissing about 50% of their workers whileservice industry is not growing either. The result is a growing numberof unemployed. The lack of jobs in the production industries has aparticular impact on the migrants, because for the last 150 years thissphere has provided a starting point for the migrants’ careers. Theonly growing segments on the labour market are very simple and low-paid service jobs on the one hand, and high skilled services on theother hand. However to get the latter, it is necessary to have a goodcommand in the German language and to know cultural traditions. As aconsequence of these economic processes, the rate of unemployment hasbecome extremely high among the migrants arrived in the nineties. Thiscaused the question: are there entrepreneurs among the Russianspeaking migrants?

The research project on the Russian entrepreneurship was carried outin the beginning of 1996. The analysis of the Russian newspapers inBerlin and the first meetings with informants allowed us to make out alist of shops and small businesses hold by the Russian shopkeepers. Wewere asking the shopkeepers if they knew other shops hold by Russians;we were also looking at announcements in the shops and in newspapers.We started our survey with an interview questionnaire and asked themthe following questions:

1. Where they came from, how and when they arrived in thecountry.

2. When and why they started their business, what they didbefore.

3. How they got the money, where they have their products fromand who their clients are.

4. How their business is going, what their problems and plansfor the future are.

However after two unsuccessful attempts we decided to change themethod. One shopkeeper refused to participate in an interview. He toldus that he had never done something like this before and he was verysuspicious and afraid of the Russian Mafia and the German securityservice. The second interview was very short and very official. We hadabout 15 questions and the answers were very short, only “yes” and“no”. After these failures we decided just to go in the shops and tohave an informal chat with the shopkeepers, showing our interest inthe shops and their owners and asking where they came from, how theycame to the country and so on. Of course, sometimes we did not get allthe information we wanted. But this method appeared to be moresuccessful.

We found the surprisingly high number of 60 shops run by the Russianspeaking shopkeepers in Berlin. These shops can be found all over theinner-city districts, but there is a remarkable concentration in thedistrict of Charlottenburg. Nearly all shops were opened by the Jewishmigrants from Russia and Ukraine, who came to Berlin between 1990 and1992 and started their own businesses after two to four years of beingunemployed. As a rule, these people had not have any experience inbusiness before.

We can distinguish three major strategies of how the Russianshopkeepers score a success in business:

1. The “exotic” trade. These shops sell audio- and – videoproduction, books and other things, imported from Russia and othercountries of the former USSR. As a rule, an owner of such a shop doesnot speak German, and all the clients know Russian. All theannouncements are in Cyrillic. These shops fill in a niche for theethnic community because these products are not available in Germanshops. In the Russian-speaking community everyone knows them,including ethnic Germans. This business demands big investments,however the profits are also high. It is obvious that to run such abusiness it is very important to know the demand of the clients and tohave the stable social networks in the country of origin. Thisbusiness provides opportunities for the upward social mobility through

shifting to the wholesale trade. The shops of this type are highlyconcentrated in Charlottograd/ Charlottenburg but the clients comefrom the whole city.

2. In most of the inner city-districts there are small food shops,cobblers (shoe makers and repair) or tailors. Their clients are mostlyGerman, but also Turkish, Yugoslav and Russian, i.e. all people livingin a neighbourhood. These businesses resemble the enterprises of theJewish migrants in New York in the beginning of the XX century. Theowners of these shops are relatively young, between 30 and 40 yearsold and well educated, there are also many women. This trade does notneed a significant capital. The shopkeepers regard their business as astepping-stone in their career: they gather information, skills, learnthe language in order to get known how things are working in Germany.Their business is an effort to achieve the social mobility andincrease a social status, however this way is rather hard. In oursurvey the number of these shops are only about one third. In factthere are much more but they are not so easy to find.

3. Other business activities of the migrants from the former USSRare restaurants, cafйs and music-bars as well as hair dressers andcar-garages. They address different clients, Russian as well as Germanand offer special services so that people come from different parts ofthe city. Most of these shopkeepers are skilled in the job they do.They have already worked before in similar jobs in their country oforigin. In these businesses the investments are high, as the equipmentis more expensive than in other business activities. To be successful,this business needs good networks and contacts within an ethnic group.The shopkeepers have to know their potential clients and investors.Most of the shops have the assistant workers who are usually Russianor Ukrainian Jews.

These three types of the Russian shops in Berlin describe differentstrategies in the ethnic business. These strategies show thatentrepreneurship can not be found only in ethnic niches. Furthermore,a lot of shopkeepers see their job as a way to skill themselves.

But there are new questions arising out of these empirical findings.The first question is: why do not ethnic Germans open their ownbusinesses? In our case study we found only one. The ethnic Germansuse the same shops than other Russian speakers but they themselves donot get involved in any business activities. Most probably, it happensdue to their German ethnic identity, as they want to be accepted asGermans and, therefore, they do not build their own communitystructures. There is a discussion among this group if it is necessaryto build up some community institutions. But in fact there are no

institutions, representing this group. Thus, ethnic networks are notwell developed.

The second question is: what is more important for the migrants’entrepreneurial activity, ethnic networks or the labour marketrestrictions? Our case study has shown that ethnic structures andnetworks do exist and, moreover, they are very important. Theinformation about the shops and entrepreneurial activities of themembers of the ethnic group is circulating in the community. But it isknown that there are a lot of entrepreneurs who could not succeed intheir business. Sometimes they switch to the wholesale trade. Othersare forced to close their businesses.

Does ethnic entrepreneurship guarantee the upward social mobility?Is ethnic business always successful? To answer this question we cango back to the scheme of Waldinger. In my introduction I mentioned theargument of Waldinger that ethnic business depends on opportunitystructures and ethnic resources. To summarise all what I have saidabove, I will specify the different factors which influenceentrepreneurship in the case of Berlin.

First of all, the legal status of a migrant is important. Forinstance, the Germans and the Jews have an opportunity to find a job,whereas other groups of Soviet migrants have very little chances.However it does not fully explain the difference between the Jewishand the German migrants.

The skills brought from a home country are not so important for thechoice of the sphere of an entrepreneurial activity. Most of themigrants have not had any entrepreneurial experience. Some have workedin the sphere of trade before but nobody run his/her own business inthe Soviet Union. Probably, some individual decisions to start abusiness can be explained by the fact that trade is considered to bethe traditional sphere of occupation for the Jews, however I would notrely on this argument.

The labour market restrictions seem to be very important to explainthe phenomenon of ethnic entrepreneurship. In most of the cases,looking for an appropriate job, the shopkeepers had tried many otheropportunities. Finally, the opportunity to have his/her own businessappeared to be more attractive than to be employed in an unskilledlow-paid job. For the German migrants it was a little bit easier tofind a job. They are not that pretentious since their educationallevel is not that high and they did inspire to get academic jobs.

The migrants networks are being developed in the context of theethnic community structures. Thus, the Jews and other Soviet migrantsrely on their ethnic networks to a larger extent than the ethnicGermans. On the other hand, their networks are possibly weaker interms of the access to other segments of the labour market.

Most of the shops address the specific demands of the migrants. Itgives an opportunity to occupy a certain economic niche. The ethnicbusiness formation then plays a central role in the constitution of anethnic community and the appearance of ethnic demands.

It seems to be very important that the migrants can find certainniches in the labour market and /or in business. In Eastern Berlin,for example, there has been a lack of small grocery shops. Now theirnumber is increasing because of the Jewish migrants, competing withsimilar Vietnamese, Turkish and German businesses. In Western Berlinthe competition with the Turkish shops is too intense, so it is easierto work as tailors or cobblers. Regarding the theoretical scheme ofWaldinger, this means that the ethnic business is being developed ineconomic niches. But it can be successful only thanks to the strongethnic networks which guarantee information, clients and cheap labour.

References

Waldinger, R. (1986) Through the Eye of the Needle: Immigrants andEnterprise in New York's Garment Trades. New York & London: New YorkUniversity Press

Tsypylma Darieva

MANAGING IDENTITY: SOME INSIGHTS INTO POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN LANGUAGEMEDIA IN BERLIN

A new social phenomenon is emerging in post-Soviet Russian speakingimmigrants communities in Berlin: the rapid expansion of “Russian”immigrant media for the newcomers which emphases hybridity and bloodrelations of readers actually based on supra-ethnic sense of Soviet-Russian identity. The main interest of this paper is to explain thereasons for this growing popularity of ethnic media among theheterogeneous Russian-speaking population in Berlin, and to show howthey negotiate the image of a new collective identity with inclusivegroup definition as “Russians of Berlin”. Both of the two main ethniccategories of these immigrants – Russian Germans and Russian Jews –fit into inclusive notion of “Russians”. These media practices can bedefined as a mixed form of profit-oriented ethnic business and non-profit moral institutions which claim to stand for the formalorganised cultural “community” of Russian-speakers. In the first part

of this paper I will give a short overview on migration backgrounds ofRussian-speakers in Berlin in terms of ethnicity and their generaleconomic situation .In the second part I will discuss the mediainvolving strategies of the readership and modes of internaloperation.

 Migration background

The recent post-Soviet immigration to Germany is a mostly legallysanctioned exodus of the citizens of the now former Soviet Union andis limited to only two Soviet nationalities – Germans and Jews. Itmeans that the post-Soviet immigration to Germany was sanctioned byethnic identifications such “ethnic Germans” and “Soviet Jews”. Afterthe German reunification 1990 and the easing of emigrationrequirements in the Soviet Union, about 85.000 Russian speakersarrived in Berlin building two juridical categorical migrant groupsethnic German Aussiedler and Russian JewishKontingentflьchtlinge. While Aussiedler or Russlanddeutsche are seenby the German government as historical co-ethnics, Jewish people wereinvited as a means of moral reparation of the German national history.In comparison to growing instability in Russia, the early problematicethnic identification of being Jewish or ethnic German provided,through the migration, an explicitly economic value. It was directlyrelated to the access to financial advantages and basic life insurancesuch as regular welfare income, paid flat and language courses inGermany. The consequence of this German migration policy was theprivileged juridical positioning of Russian-speakers in comparison tothe other migrant groups in Germany- the issues of residence permitswithout limitations and the access to German citizenship. And thisfact is related to the next common peculiarity of Russian speakingmigrants. As the result of the already mentioned legal positioning andof support programs, Russian-speaking migrants economically deal with“specific” static life conditions after the migration. It means theregular use of the complex state life support programs by migrants.Such conditions can lead to limiting initiative and entrepreneurshipactivity in the new place, as it was characterised by immigrantsthemselves “it is the comfortable pillow of the welfare state”. Inspite of privileged status, the occupational integration of theimmigrants of the 1990s into the German labour market can hardly becalled successful. According to internal data of self-estimation, 60%of post-Soviet immigrants in Berlin still live on state welfare. Thisdespite that fact that the overwhelming majority of adults have highereducation or technical training, which, as a rule, is only partiallyrecognised by the receiving authorities. In Germany the foreignqualifications the immigrants attained in the Soviet Union are often

devalued. In fact, it is the most important problem the migrants face.But a considerable number of immigrants broke out of the passivity byestablishing their own businesses, mainly related to transnationalimport-export trade connections and to the Russian ethnic consumermarket. At the same time the first Russian language weekly newspaperhas appeared on the press market in Berlin. The Russian languagenewspapers in Berlin have demonstrated remarkably early development ofthe own communication channels. Within the last five years, localRussian language newspapers in Berlin have begun to boom and they seemto follow a successful media strategy of incorporation into thereceiving countries.

 Success and limits of Russian language press

The first Russian language newspaper “Evropazentr”, the Russianspelling of a well-known shopping and office centre in West Berlin,was first published in May 1993 and still circulates with 30.000copies all around Germany (see: Darieva/Schьtte, 1997). In thefollowing three years, two more Russian weekly papers appeared,“Russki Berlin” and “Novaya Berlinskaya Gaseta” with a circulation of16.000 and 13.000 copies, respectively. Now the media market inRussian language includes more than 20 different weekly and monthlyperiodicals, as well as two regular TV programmes in Berlin. The mostpopular and successful immigrant press items are still Berlinnewspapers such as “Russki Berlin” (today with circa 50.000 copies)and “Evropazentr”. Both newspapers invariably run 18-24 pages and havenational circulation in Germany among nearly the same readership. Interms of political orientations there is no fundamental differencebetween “Ecropazentr” and “Russki Berlin”. They seem to take a neutralposition toward the national policy of the host country and explicitlyprovide a pro-integration strategy of incorporation into the receivingcountry. The production and the circulation of foreign language pressin Germany is generally free. Therefore Russian language newspapersare sold on numerous newspapers stands in public places throughoutGermany. However, it is hardly possible to observe any Russianimmigrants buying the paper or reading them in public places such asthe underground or cafes. It is related to the fact  that as a ruleRussian speaking readers subscribe to one or two newspapers and readin private spheres.

Conceptualising the role of ethnic media in relationships betweenmigrant group and the host society, sociologists have viewed the dualrole of the ethnic media (Riggins, 1992). The dual role serves twocontradictory purposes: to contribute to ethnic cohesion and culturalmaintenance, what can be considered as separate loyalty, on the one

hand, and to help members of minorities to integrate into a largersociety, on the other hand. In the case of Russian languagenewspapers, it can be hardly estimated as expression of anoppositional political ideology or of resistance to assimilation toGerman mainstream culture. We deal here instead with the process ofnetworking among newcomers and the search of identity related toimplicit counter-reaction in terms of ethnicity.

Consequently the initial aim of the ethnic media is to inform and toserve the needs of a specific immigrant group forming in this way akind of economic niche without direct competition with mainstreammedia. The main content of Russian language press consists ofpractical information on social and legal behaviour norms in officialinstitutions of the receiving country, and political and cultural newsfrom the country of origin. The third category of information of theRussian ethnic media go beyond delivering news in the native language.More than 35% of the newspaper as well as of broadcasts are used forcommercial needs. In recent years, the branches of this subculturehave grown stronger and encompassed a greater number of activities. Onthe economic side, it includes numerous small businesses, mosttypically food and book stores, small trades in reconstruction andrepair shops, car maintenance, medical and personal services andconsulting. By informing geographically dispersed Russian-speakingimmigrants of specific events for Russian tastes as well as commercialsales and news, the media is producing a new field of businessnetworking and building personal network up a family crises. It isnecessary to emphasise that there is no centralised communityorganisation with its own governance among Russian-speakers in Berlinand they live predominantly dispersed in the city. The internalcoherence and ethnic solidarity among Russian-speakers is challengedby different migration statuses, ethnic divisions, occupational andgeographical distinctions. Perhaps the only collective productrepresenting migrants as a group is the regular local Russian languagemedia. The symbolic identification of “community” ocurres on the meta-level, when elements like the common myth of origin – and sharedmemories might deliver enough bonding facilities for such level ofcommunity activity like media.

Returning to the contents of newspapers, in many cases, thecommercial advertisements reveal the invisible map of the immigrantsettlement more fully than does the rest of the paper. For example,addresses of Russian food store “Gastronom Zarya”, diverse book storesand so forth, show that there are at least three places where Russianspeakers concentrate in Berlin – districts like Charlotteburg,Schцneberg and Marzahn. The advertisements also reflect to what extent

an economic specialisation among Russian-speaking entrepreneurs hasdeveloped. Large number of  advertisements for travel agencies,lodging houses and car maintenance, shows that there is a great demandfor these services, especially for those who have no command of theGerman language. We can see that there are a large number of recentarrivals from Russia, as well as the increasing role of ordinarymigrants in making transnational small and middle size businesses,organising an exchange of material and cultural goods within theRussian-speaking diaspora.

 “Our motherland is the Russian language”

The obvious commonality of the Russian media is the use of theRussian language as well as of old Soviet-Russian cultural patterns tointerpret the new social conditions. What is typical is the explicitbroadly conceptualised inclusive definition of a we-group whichdefines the potential audience as broadly as possible by incorporatingdifferent ethnic and social ways of belongings, and not only newcomersbut also marginally assimilated people.  “Our motherland is Russianlanguage”, the central motto of the Russian language media recruitingstrategy, seems to be really a flexible symbolic variable formobilising clientele among groups of both Russian Jews and RussianGermans.

In this way Russian language media offer new forms of participationin public “community” life as well as social control for newcomers, sothat media can play a major role in reshaping relationships hencesocial and cultural identities. In this context I should mention theexisting cultural gap between Russian speaking Jews and German Jews,and between native Germans and Russlanddeutsche. Social divisions andconflict situations are to be found in official institutions,especially in the Jewish Congregation of Berlin between newcomers andold settlers. Russian Jews seem to have a rather different perceptionand sense of being “Jewish” especially in the everyday ethnic culturalpractice. It can be explained in the following terms. While GermanJewishness is concentrated in the practice of public demonstration ofreligious identity (publicly visiting the synagogue, celebratingtraditional Jewish holidays) the Russian Jews perceive it as a privateand family affair invisible to outsiders, and in this way lacking inmanifesting collective Jewish rituals. As a result the “real” Jewishethnic-religious identity of newcomers was questioned by the receiving“co-ethnics”, who drew a strong social ethnic boundary labeling themas “Russians”. The reaction of newcomers is precisely commented by oneco-producer of a Russian language television program in Berlin: “TheJewish Congregation (Gemeinde) does not help us, Russian speakers,  in

cultural matters at all. It would have been better to open aninsurance for legal fees than to pay the membership fees”.

Similar dissociative tendencies we can observe in the relationshipsbetween Russlanddeutsche and Germans. Poor command of German languageand a traditionalist pattern of cultural values as well as a scantyexperience of urban life style result in avoidance of contact withnewcomers by native Germans. Moreover similar to the experience ofRussian Jews, the “real” German identity of Aussiedler was questionedby German society and main-stream media discourses classifying them inthe abusing category of “foreigners or Auslдnder”. Thus, althoughpost-Soviet migrants travel to Germany as Germans or Jews they arriveas “Russians”.

 Ethnic Brokers

A. came to Berlin from Odessa in 1991 on a tourist visa because he“just wanted a change of place”. As a person of Jewish origin, hereceived the immigration status of quota refugee” and stayed inBerlin. “I knew even back then that Germany accepted Jews andtherefore I brought all my documents with me”. In Odessa, he hadworked as a technical manager in a state-run shipping business. InBerlin A. earned his living first by playing piano in a music cafe.Later A. was able to earn his first “serious capital” thanks to hisearlier contacts with successful businesses in Russia and Ukraine. Atthe same time he learned German. In his German language course, A. metmany other “Russians” who had “many of the same questions and answers”regarding their new home.  “We found ourselves in this social networkthat was like a young pioneer camp. The leader came and told us howand what we had to do. There was such an enormous need for informationthat we wanted to convey our life experiences to the new arrivalsthrough a newspaper. My friends, a couple, with whom I shared a flatin Heim (transitional housing units for refugees and returnees) hadexperience in journalism and we decided to publish a Russiannewspaper”. A. invested the capital (110,000 Mark) he had earnedthrough import-export business into the founding of the publishinghouse and the Russian newspaper editorial board.

  B. and C. came to West Berlin in 1990 from Charkov (Ukraine) on apackage visa for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR.  They arrived“in an old car that they lived out of for the first few weeks”.  C. isa sociologist and Russian; B. is a musician and Jewish.  B. quicklyfound, like A., a job playing piano at a big hotel, while his partnerearned her living by cleaning.  At the same time, B. applied for anunlimited residency permit on the grounds of his “Jewish nationality”.As his wife, C. also received the unlimited residency status in

Berlin, as well as welfare benefits.  Two years later, B., “like manyother Russians”, joined an import-export business trading in everydayconsumer goods.  After 1995, as the “import-export business in Russiabecame monopolized by large enterprises, “the couple began searchingfor another employment niche. “Occupationally, we have focused on thesphere of culture, so we came up with the idea: why not try somethingwith Russian TV”?  Funded partially with their own capital, B. and C.started a family-operated Russian television broadcast.  “Through ourRussian language television broadcast we want to help immigrants findtheir own social niche in Berlin”.

The above mentioned externally ascribed homogenous etiquette as“Russians” becomes actually accepted by many Russia-speakers as acultural part of their identity. Moreover, active immigrants revealedin this cultural phenomenon their successful business formula,stressing in their production concepts the common usage of Russianlanguage among post-Soviet migrants as a core of a group identity.This view seems to correspond to social reality. Russian language,being more than a social resource for solving family everydayproblems, becomes a flexible collective marker of identification informing social networks. Further, norms about sharing knowledge orkeeping it in secret for sale – thus making it an economic good –constitute codes of a communication strategy which make a language arelevant tool for social action. The entrepreneurs of Russian languagemedia in Berlin claimed for newspapers as well as themselves the roleof “ethnic brokers” who manage collective immigrant issues andsensitive migrant experiences due to their own professional degree ofadaptation in the new social environment.

In Cohen`s study on urban ethnicity in the USA, ethnic brokers areregarded as successful migrants who negotiate within a specific localethe relationships between immigrant communities and the major society(Cohen, 1974). Further, conceptualising international labourmigration, ethnic brokers were classified as gate keepers who operatenot only in a specific locale, but also across the national boundariesand recruit further migrants from the former home land (Goss &Lindquist, 1995). The pattern of the developing brokerage observedamong the self-organized Russian-speaking media institutions is moreof a mediator in relation to the host society and the immigrant grassroots. It is a private ethnic entrepreneurship which does notnecessarily pretend, at least now,  to set up a strategic politicalpower in terms of brokers who control the rate of immigration. Therole of mediator in this case means that media producers are not justjournalists but  they are attempting to take the role of local brokers

of information and entertainment as they claim to manage specificadaptation patterns of new comers.

This type of entrepreneurs serve as  mediators who promote theirindividual or family interests within the imagined “ethnic group”through its possible solidarity and finally use this clientele as aresource in economic relationships to outsiders. (Hannerz, 1974:56).

In the case of the Russian media enterprises, media producers in itsinitial phase of business establishment rely upon the members of theirkin as a source of labour, not necessarily being professionals in thecommunication business. According to the findings collected during myfield work, it is obvious that the key position is occupied by thebounding couple or closed relatives. In fact, this family-basedstrategy offers a relatively high degree of economic security andminimises risk, lends more resources for internal operation.Concerning the composition of the entire staff, Russian mediaenterprises are characterised by flexible size and relatively highdegree of fluctuation. This can be explained by two factors: the firstis related to the German labour market system and particular supportprograms to lower unemployment. As far as I could discover, one of thecommon forms of employment among the immigrants today is throughspecial state immigrant-aid programs (Hilfe zur Arbeit). Such state-sponsored programs provide employees at low cost or no cost to theemployer, in fact sponsoring his or her organisation. According to therule of such aid- programs the only obligation is to provide anoccupation for one year and in this way give the employee anopportunity to develop his or her skills in a special branch ofactivity. This practice is quite popular among small to mid-sizeRussian-speaking entrepreneurs. The second factor is the internalorganisational framework of Russian language media institutions. Theseindependent media organisations are typically structured as informalassociations rather than formal bureaucracies. Much of the work atdifferent levels is done often on a volunteer basis or by unpaid orirregularly paid part-time staff, in particular among Russiantelevision organisations. The “free-lance” model offers an opportunityfor people living on welfare to earn additional pocket money. Sinceroles and regulations inside of media institutions are quite flexible,there is likely to be little task specialisation. Individuals hired tofill one role may find themselves working at a variety of functions.“We are friends here and try to help each other. We work in theatmosphere of mutual replacement. If we have urgently to distributeour newspapers, it means that each person of our team does it togetherwith others. And if I need more people, one phone call is enough and

tomorrow 10 people stand here and pack newspapers” – commented theeditor of one Russian Berlin newspaper.

Following this explanation, indeed the informal character of ethnicmedia seems to be one of the advantages of employers. In addition, weobserve informal non-commercial exchange operations even betweendifferent business units. It is not unusual for Russian language mediato arrange mutual barter agreements concerning advertising services.For example, the practice of advertising exchange between one Russiantelevision program and a Russian newspaper in Berlin provides aspecific form of economic solidarity “ty mne – ya tebe” (I help you -you help me). This barter exchange of services without financialoperations can be typically classified to the old Soviet practice ofinformal exchange and social networking blat (see Ledeneva, 1997). Thenature of the practice of informal exchanges of services, observed inthe Russian immigrant “community”, is similar to this reciprocalrelationship in the former Soviet Union. As “large parts of thepopulation were active in distributing by means of exchange theproducts and services they had access to as a result of theiroccupation…Social networks (blat) were much more important than theyare in Western capitalist society and of greater significance for asatisfactory existence (Doomernik, 1997:63). Russian-speakingimmigrants seem still to regard social networks as economic resourcesusing informal forms of provisioning and employment.

Under these circumstances the Russian immigrant media seems to havesuccessfully mobilised the concept of “Russian community”, offering inthis way for their consumers an additional social field of adaptationto Germany on one hand, and the instrument for maintaining of Russianlanguage in diaspora, on the other hand. Modern technologies allow themedia producers to start up newspapers and television studios withrelatively little expenditure and, in many cases, little professionalknowledge. Finally, it should be stressed  here that the successfulfeatures of Russian language media face certain risks. Claiming to bea cultural representation of the whole “Russian community”, which isethnically and socially  heterogeneous, small media may not be equallyresponsive to all segments of the “community”. There is the risk thatopinions of some other segments are not represented enough or overrepresented due to limited informal networks of producers. Furthermorethe fact, that the newness of information of weekly newspapers can beoften exhausted quite quickly makes the existence of media in long-term perspective fragile.

  I have tried to illustrate in this chapter cultural practices ofRussian-speakers in Berlin such as media, which taken as a whole,

constitutes in the new place a significant resource for the flexiblesocial organisation of new immigrants in the urban context. My pointwas that the inclusive character of the Russian language mediaidentity strategy in Berlin creates a specific notion of the “sharedfate of integration” for their heterogeneous consumers whichsymbolically blurs highly formalised ethnic boundaries between Jewishquota refugees and Russian-German Aussiedler (Russlanddeutsche).Summarising, two major factors that influence the existence of Russian language communication channels in Berlin (Germany) in generalare: the discovery of specific Russian consumer market in  Germany,and the presence of certain personalities, active immigrants-intellectuals, who are eager to play the role of intermediary betweenimmigrant grass roots and the receiving society.

 

References

Cohen, A. (1974) Urban Ethnicity. London

Darieva, Ts., Schьtte, G. (1997) Exkurs: “Evropacentr - Eine Yeitung in Berlin” - oder“Russiaschsprechende aller Nationalitдten, vereinigt euch!” In: Oswald, I. Voronkov, V. (Hg.)Post-sowjetische Ethnizitдten. Ethnische Gemeinden in St. Petersburg und Berlin/Potsdam.Berlin. S.213-221

Dietz, B. (1995) Zwischen Autonomie und Anpassung. Russlanddeutsche inder ehemaligen Sowjetunion und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschalnd.Berlin

Doomernik, J. (1997) Adaptation Strategies among Soviet JewishImmigrants in Berlin. In: New Community. Vol. 23. S. 59-73

Goss, J., Lindquist, B. (1995)Conceptualizing International Labor Migration:A Structural Perspective // International Migration Review. Vol. 29.Summer 1995. P. 317-357

Hannerz, U. (1976) Ethnicity and Opportunity in Urban America. In:Abner Cohen (ed.) Urban Ethnicity. London. P. 37-76

Kessler, J. (1997) Jьdische Immigration seit 1990. Resьmee einer Studieьber 4000 jьdische Migranten aus der ehemaligen Sowjetunion inBerlin// Zeitschrift fьr Migration und soziale Arbeit.. N.1, S. 40-47

Ledeneva, A. (1997) Practices of Exchnage and Networking in Russia //Soziale Welt, Heft 2. P. 151-170

Mьnz, R. & Ohliger R. (1999) Deutsche Minderheiten in Ostmittel. UndOsteuropa – Aussiedler in Deutschland. Eine Analyse ethnisch

priviligierter Migration. In: Kaelble, Schriewer (Hg.) Diskurse undEntwicklungspfade. Der Gesellschaftsvergleich in den Geschichts- undSozialwissenschaften. Frankfurt, S. 217-268

Oswald, I., Voronkov V. (1997) (Hg.) Post-sowjetische Ethnizitдten.Ethnische Gemeinden in St. Petersburg und Berlin/Potsdam, Berlin

Park, R. E. (1923) Immigrant Press and its Control. Chicago

Sollors, W. (1986) Beyond Ethnicity. Consent and Descent in AmericanCulture. Oxford

Tress, M. (1995) Soviet Jews in the Federal Republic of Germany: theRebuilding of a Community. In: The Jewish Journal of Sociology. Vol .37, N. 1, P. 39-54

Voronkov V., Chikadze E. (1997) Leningrad Jews: Etnicity and Context. In:V.Voronkov & E. Zdravomyslova (ed.) Biographical perspectives on post-socialist societies. P. 74-79

“CAUCASIANS IN PETERSBURG” (PROJECT OF CISR)

 

Victor Voronkov

IS THERE SUCH A THING AS ETHNIC ECONOMY?

In this paper I’d like to sum up the results of the research projectwhich was carried out in 1997-1999 by the Centre of IndependentSociological Studies with the support of the Open Society Institute(Soros Foundation). The research had several focal points, the mostimportant being entrepreneurial networks in migrant (I deliberatelyavoid the term “ethnic”) communities in Russia. In Europe and NorthAmerica this sort of studies have already become a well establishedtradition, but the peculiarities of Russian society and itstransitions call for several changes to be made in general theoreticconclusions of western sociologists.

Our research is based on two case studies, designed as long termparticipant observations in the studied milieus. The gained materialwas later supplemented by problem-oriented interviews with therespondents. I want to emphasize that the above mentioned researchprocedure has been worked out by our group in the course of manyprevious projects. We did our best to understand our informants sothat we can adequately describe the rules regulating their activityand the life of their milieu. As a rule, usual interviews (not tospeak of the formal surveys and questionnaires!) do not give a clearunderstanding of the milieu in question and its internal rules (if itis not the researcher’s own big city intelligentsia milieu). Instead,researchers have an illusion of understanding and ascribe their ownmeanings and senses to the words of the informants. As a resultartificial facts are fabricated. For this reason our research wasprimarily founded on the classical participant observation. Our choiceof the target group (Azerbaijani green grocery traders at the farmers’market and Armenians engaged in shoe production and shoe repairbusiness) reflected the presumed stereotypes widespread amongsociologist as well as among lay people. Although we never stop toemphasize that not to be trapped by any of the existing scientificpreconceptions researchers should try to avoid all sorts ofassumptions and preliminary knowledge. In this case, however, we hadto start from somewhere.

Our cautiousness towards ethnic identity and the role it plays inthe choice of life strategies is explained by our previous experiencein studying ethnicity and ethnic communities. We regard ethnicity asthe process of group identity formation by means of ascribing certain

features to community members and to the others. It is a typicalconstruct and can’t be described in “material” or cultural terms. Atthe same time the implied concept of broad communities becomes theground for collective action. (More on this topic can be found in ourbook “Konstruirovanie, 1998). As a consequence, we hold that ethnicgroup is not a stable entity, to which an individual can objectively“belong” or not “belong”. Under certain conditions individual ethnicidentity is likely to become particularly actualized and to startplaying a major role in defining individual social activity. In mostcases, however, ethnic identity is formal and doesn’t affectindividual daily practices. Besides, there are quite a few people whohave no ethnic identity at all.

Most research projects start by assuming that a particular socialnetwork has a certain ethnic meaning, and proceed by looking forcontent indications, thus describing an ethnic community which hasbeen predefined in advance. The majority of researchers drew theirconclusions from statistical data and survey results. Thus theresearch objects and their boundaries were pre-determined and dealtwith as statistical groups. In contrast, we tried to find out whethera person belonged to this or that ethnic group, since the boundariesof these groups are in most cases completely indefinite. The weakerthe identity indicator, the further from the existing ideal code (“areal Armenian is the one who”...), the more difficult it is to definewhether or not the individual belongs to a certain ethnic group, thevaguer its boundaries. Another weak point of the ethno-sociologicalstudies is that in most cases they concentrate mainly on the attitudesof the informants and not on their real behavior. The cultural gapthat exists between informants and sociologists makes it extremelydifficult to interpret the responses of the interviewees in general,but even if we ignore this problem, we still will be speaking onlyabout their attitudes. At the same time attitudes do not alwayscorrespond directly to behavior. (Armenians, for example, are alwayseager to speak about Armenian solidarity, but as we have discoveredduring our research, it is not always present in their everydaypractices.)

We did not assume our informants to be Armenian or Azerbaijanithough in most cases that was how the dominant culture representativesperceived them. From the objective point of view they were Armenianand Azerbaijani migrants. But it was for us to discover whether thesepeople used ethnic categories to identify both themselves or theirbusiness (or any other social network) partners. Thus we did notrelate such issues as trust and solidarity in migrant networks to

ethnicity, as it is often done in other studies. And only now that ourstudy is finished are we ready to discuss this question.

Drawing on our understanding of the Soviet society, which, ofcourse, is far from complete, we can describe the starting point ofour analyses as follows: In the big cities of the pre-reform Russia(the USSR) there were no, and probably couldn’t be any, ethniceconomic networks. There is no doubt that enormous groups of migrantsfelt marginal, but the routs of their integration into society wereregulated and organized by the state, these routs by no means beingethnic.

There were two objective reasons for the emergence of ethnicentrepreneurship. First of all the reforms opened the market space forprivate initiative. Every citizen of the ex-Soviet Union experiencedquick social changes. The old system of references fell apart, theprevious economic strategies failed and the old norms and values didnot work any more. Under these conditions people lost their sense ofstability, the familiar picture of the world fell apart. To someextent we might say that all the population experienced a migrantcomplex - everyone turned out to be an emigrant in one’s own country.New market opportunities (entrepreneurship) multiplied by the need tolook for new coping skills resulted in the enormous outburst ofentrepreneurial activity.

This activity, however, did not have any special ethnic colors. InRussia ethnic constructing has certain peculiarities, which are dueto: 1. the existence of a strong Soviet identity; 2. the liquidationof ethnic communities in big Russian cities in the 30-ies, and thedestruction of the mechanism by which ethnicity is passed down to thenext generation in the process of socialization; 3. peculiarities ofthe current transition of the Soviet society. The previous nationalpolicy carried out by the state and aimed at the formation of theunified Soviet “ethnicity” turned out to be rather successful. Atpresent the residents of big Russian cities whose passports state thatthey are Armenians, Jews or Azerbaijanis engage in the entrepreneurialprocess not as the representatives of their ethnic groups (and again,their own ethnic identity is of not much importance) but as “Russians”(or Russian citizens).

For this reason it is extremely difficult to interpret the datacollected by Radajev (Radajev, 1993) in his Moscow study where hestates that the entrepreneurial activity among non-Russian, andespecially among the Jews and the people from the Caucasus, (Armeniansfirst of all) is higher than among ethnic Russians. All hisrespondents were Moscow residents and belonged to the dominant urban

culture, their formal ethnicity, most probably, did not play any role,so they would hardly be motivated towards any ethnic solidarity, andit would be difficult to discover any ethnic networking. For the samereason it is unlikely that any social network (including Mafia) couldbe identified as ethnic without some special research. In other words,I insist that when determining the “ethnicity “ of any social(economic) network formed nowadays by the post-Soviet people we shouldnot rely on the official ethnicity ascribed to them by the SovietState.

Another reason for ethnic enrepreneurship is the mass migration fromthe ex-Soviet republics caused by wars, ethnic conflicts and economicdifficulties which most of these areas suffer. The most numerousmigration of the post-Soviet period was registered in the end of the80-ies from Azerbaijan and Armenia. Masses of refugees who managed “tocatch hold “ on a big Russian city stimulated further chain migration.As a result, the number of migrants from these republics in St.Petersburg grew several times.

These refugees and forced migrants had to face all the traditionalrefugee problems well described by social scientists from Chicagoschool. The state was unable to take on the responsibility for theirintegration. Cultural differences between these people and thedominant majority of a big city were easy to notice. In this case,however, the cultural gap was not so much due to their ethnicity butrather to the discrepancy between urban and rural cultures. Thislatter difference has always been present in Soviet and post-Sovietsocieties and has been so big that in the two Russian capitals ruralpopulation might be regarded as a specific ethnic group.

These are the conditions under which migrant networks are beingformed. They take care of the newly arrived, help them to settle down,find a job and share the experience, which might be useful. Incontrast with Soviet times new migrants have the opportunity tointegrate into the society through ethnic communities avoiding all thehardships of individual integration. Thus the prototype of a communityemerges. It primarily attracts recent migrants, and it would seem thatthese are the people who having a resource of ethnic solidarity shouldhave created ethnic niches in economy. In fact, ethnic networks doappear, but there are many reasons to insist that their functioningare not directly linked with ethnicity. The results of our researchshow that in the studied migrant milieu ethnic solidarity is eitherabsent completely or is, indeed, very limited. These facts areconfirmed in the works of German researches (Erichsen, 1988; Heckmann,1993). On these grounds we believe that most of American explanatory

models of reactive cultural context, reactive ethnicity, resourcetheory of ethnic entrepreneurship, which focuses on ethnic solidarityas the main resource, should be reconsidered.

Under current historical conditions the cultural tradition of ethnicentrepreneurship research dating back to Max Weber is obviously out-of-date. Another factor at work here is globalization: societies cometo be more and more alike, some cultural patterns of the migrantgroups are similar to those of the hosting society, we can’t explaineverything by their pre-migration experience, and sometimes it is hardto define what was present before and what was acquired after themigration. This is especially true in Russia since if we ignore theeffects of the specific Soviet modernization and its national policyit is extremely difficult to interpret adequately the collectedmaterial.

In Russian cities there is one extremely interesting feature in thedevelopment of social networks which might appear ethnic at firstsight. Most of the time within the same ethnic minority population twovery different parallel communities are formed quite often not havingany connection with each other.

One of them is usually the above mentioned self-organizing newmigrant network based primarily on economic relations. The other is asort of middle class club for those who have been living in the cityfor a long time and are well integrated into the urban community.These people have turned their ethnicity into a hobby and sometimeseven into a profession and have monopolized the public space claimingto represent their ethnic group in general. Quite often thisrespectable community distances itself from its old compatriots, andthe everyday practices and occupational structure of its members arenot different from those of the other educated city residents. But itis in this milieu that the real ethnic networks emerge on the groundsof cultivating and exploiting of the ethnic capital (ethnicentrepreneurship). If we try to describe this situation by means of ausual explanatory model it may seem paradoxical: Migrant networks arenot ethnic while the respectable citizens construct new ethnicity andorganize “ethnic” community, including ethnic economic networks.

It may happen that in the course of the market reform “ethno-economic” processes in Russia will begin to resemble those which weobserve in the West. If Russia becomes a hosting country the migranteconomic niches of the people from the foreign countries not belongingto the ex-Soviet republics (first of all from China) will develop. Butin view of what was said above, the nearest future will hardly witness

any substantial community building by our ex-compatriots from the CIS.To sum up I would like to present several points for discussion.

1. Immigrant economy in Russia is not ethnic. Ethnicity is ascribedto it by researchers and by the representatives of the dominantmajority. As a rule, migrant network participants do not regard theworld in ethnic categories, and ethnicity does not play anysignificant role in their integration strategies. Economic networksare not constructed around ethnicity but rather to meet the criteriaof the market: they aim to maximize the profits while minimizing therisk (level of trust, opportunities for control). Moral standards ofthis sphere imply that relatives and compatriots do have someadvantage over the others, but they are not extended to therepresentatives of the same ethnic group.

This state of things is the result of the profound influence of theSoviet socialization under the condition when all the mechanisms forthe transmission of traditional values were destroyed. The stateindoctrinated the same rules for all the players on the territory ofthe country while at the same time proclaiming diversity. Diversitybeing promoted in public sphere, the real everyday practices of peoplebecame more and more universal. Actually, the differences between ex-Soviet people are so insignificant (they have even been members of oneparty!) that they do not have enough incentive to start constructingtheir peculiarity.

2. We can’t rule out that in principle ethnic economy does exist. Atthe same time when we examine the studies which are usually referredto as the proof of its existence we see that ethnicity was ascribed tothe informants (respondents) in advance. We should be extremelycareful using the concept of “ethnicity” in this sort of discussion ingeneral. It is possible to imagine, though, that under certainconditions while pursuing their political interests the communityelite may run any social relations ethnic. If at a certain point theimmigrant community elite needs ethnic resource the economy willbecome ethnic. This is why it is possible that we can speak of ethniceconomy in the USA, less so in Europe, but in Russia it is somethingto be discovered while studying Chinese, Vietnamese or Afghancommunities.

3. The existence of economic links between the representatives ofthe “parallel community” who have long integrated into the dominantsociety can not serve as the proof of ethnic economy, since for themsolidarity is determined by the needs of the market and not byethnicity. At the same time it is not impossible that under certainconditions economic and social capital of ethnic professionals from

“centers for national culture” may be joined by cheap immigrant labor(of their “compatriots”). Then the severe exploitation of thenewcomers may wear a disguise of ethnic solidarity, and we may be ableto observe the real case of ethnic economy.

4. Ethno-social studies in the post-Soviet space provide us with newmaterial which is extremely helpful in understanding the difficultiescaused by the use of ethnic categories in the description of socialand economic processes. As soon as the researcher takes off the“ethnic” glasses it becomes clear that the majority of the studiedprocesses can well be explained outside the concept of ethnicity.

I would go even further by expecting that the development of thesociety and of social science will encourage us to give up on usingethnic categories (the same way as we gave up using the concept of“race”). It is crucial to understand that any emphasis on ethnicityescalates social tension. Public discussion of any social issues interms of ethnic problems inevitably brings about racism

Translated by M.Badkhen

References

Erichsen, R.. (1988) Selbstaendige Erwerbstaetigkeit von Auslaendern inder Bundesrepublik Deutschland am Beispiel der Tuerken //Informationsdienst Auslaenderarbeit. N. 3. S. 21-27

Heckmann, F. (1991) Ethnische Kolanien // Oesterreichische Zeitschriftfuer Soziologie. N. 3. S. 25-41

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Radaev, V.V. (1993) Etnicheskoe predprinimatelstvo: mirovoi opyt iRossiya // Politicheskie issledovaniya. № 5. С. 79-87

Olga Brednikova, Oleg Pachenkov

ETHNICITY OF “ETHNIC ECONOMY”: ECONOMIC IMMIGRANTS TO ST.PETERSBURG

This paper is based on the research focused on the principles offorming social networks by economic migrants. We will try to regardthe existing concepts critically, and to reflect upon the ethnicity of“ethnic economy”.

Economic immigrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia, who wereengaged in trading at St.Petersburg markets, were the object of ourstudy. The target group incorporated people, who had lived in

St.Petersburg for at most three years. That allowed us to understandbetter the life strategies and the mechanisms of immigrants'integration. Taking into account the specific of the object, weconsider the participation observation to be the most acceptable andadequate method of the research. We observed and, as far as possible,participated in various spheres of everyday life of our informants(the work in the market place, the daily routine, mutual relationswith the officials etc.). So that was an attempt to receive theinterpretation of the events by their participants, rather than justthe participation and observation of what was going on.

Ethnic Economy

Ethnic economy is a conceptually developed topic of the westernsociological discussion. There are several classifications oftheoretical approaches to the analysis of this phenomenon; thevariants of the most widespread approaches can be found in works byLight (Light, 1984) and Waldinger (Waldinger, 1986). We will notconsider them, since in the course of such a discussion we coulddigress from the subject. We will also afford not to take into accountthe out-of-date (in our opinion) approaches, such as, for example,cultural-historical one.

The modern concepts of ethnic economy originate mainly from thecontention that immigrants, belonging to the minority in the hostcountry, encounter a particular situation which is disadvantageous, onthe one hand (as the position of any minority). On the other hand,immigrants have additional resources which are usually called“ethnic”. According to Light, ethnic resources are those, which arebased on the identification of a person with ethnic community (Light,1986:21).

“Ethnic” resources not only allow immigrants to find dwellings, tosettle down etc., but also determine their economic strategies. Thisphenomenon is defined as “ethnic economy”: “the economy is ethnic because itspersonnel are co-ethnics” (Light, Karageorgis, 1994:649). It is supposed,that the people, as representatives of ethnic minority, have anopportunity to be united on the basis of the common (shared) ethnicityand to be engaged in joint business activity. This also implies thatthey trust each other, just because they belong to the same ethnicgroup. The trust based on the shared ethnic identity allows them toestablish “ethnic” social (economic) networks, facilitates theinformation circulation within these networks, reduces probabletransactional costs connected with mistrust (for example, the activityof middlemen in the role of guarantors in business, becomes excessive)(Light, 1986:22).

Thus, the existing concept of “ethnic economy” rests to aconsiderable extent upon the concept of ethnicity, and proceeds fromthe ethnic belonging of individuals involved. At the same time, it iscompletely unclear, how and also by whom the ethnic belonging ofindividuals is defined (1) and what the influence of ethnic belongingon the economic behaviour of these individuals is (2).

According to the results of a number of studies, the ethnicbelonging of an individual is determined by the researcher on thebasis of his/her “natural guidelines” (the term introduced byG.Garfinkel) and the “objective” criteria. In our opinion, suchapproach is based on common knowledge, rather than on scientific one.Secondly, it does not take into account the discussion on thecharacter and nature of ethnicity (See, e.g.: Voronkov, 1998; Winer,1998; Tishkov, 1997 and alt.).

As regards the influence of ethnicity on economic activity of anindividual, it is obvious, that researchers who adhere to theaforementioned definition of ethnic economy, neither put such aquestion, nor try to answer it: they are not concerned with thesubjective factors of immigrants' activity. They are aware that if animmigrant is Chinese (for them this is an “objective” feature),his/her economic behaviour will correspond to that of Chinees, i.e.he/she will cooperate with other Chinees. In empirical research, suchresearchers try to find (and get found, as a rule) only theconfirmation of the correctness of their contemptions.

Our research, on the contrary, suggests the “understanding”definition of “ethnic economy”, as an economy involving individuals, who subjectivelyconsciously pattern their economic behaviour on their own ethnicity, subjectivelycomprehended, and on the ethnicity of those with whom they cooperate.

On the basis of such approach, we subject to criticism the thesisabout the existence of “ethnic economy” in the migrants milieu whichwe investigated. Our study has shown, that the orientation towardsethnicity in the community of recent economic migrants is of situativecharacter and is not determinative in a choice of life strategies(including employment). In reality, particularly in business sphere,migrants, often belonging to different ethnic groups and being just“friends”, “colleagues”, “neighbours” etc., help in business and trusteach other, rather than “co-ethnics”. This supposes, that the sharedethnicity, “objectively” existing from the point of view of an alienobserver (researcher), in reality could hardly be a factor whichmigrants are subjectively guided by in their economic activity.

Social Networks of Economic Immigrants

Having ignored the ethnicity aspect, we made an attempt to explorethe mechanisms which provide immigrants' survival under disadvantageconditions. Recent economic immigrants, whom we studied, substantiallylack for potentials, including those of social networks. By socialnetworks we mean, following a number of the authors, the “stable models ofimmediate interaction among the people” (Rona-Tas, 1999:396). Under theconditions of social vacuum, immigrants launch establishing socialnetworks, increasing thus their social potential. The new social linksallow them to settle down: to find dwellings, jobs, to place childrenin schools, to enjoy medical services etc. In economic life, socialnetworks give immigrants an access to finances, jobs and, what is mostimportant, to information. According to the majority of Westernresearchers dealing with migration issues, the informal relationsestablished on the basis of social networks are one of the mostimportant factors determining the way of life of migrants'communities. Secondly, these relations constitute the main advantageof immigrants over the local majority in the sphere of economy(Waldinger, 1986).

Western researchers, however, tend to associate migrants' networkswith ethnicity. As it was mentioned above, we do not adhere to this pointof view. We tried to analyse the structure of social networks of ourinformants, the conditions for the creation, development, and the wayof interaction within these networks. This analysis has resulted inthe selection of five main factors determining, in our opinion, thestructure and composition of migrants' social networks. We singledthem out conditionally, as follows:

Easiness (simplicity, lack of problems),

Rationality (benefit),

Trust,

Pressure from the outside (forcing out),

Space.

Since the social networks are the steady interactions between thepeople, these five factors were selected as a result of the analysisof migrants' social actions and interactions, according to thecriterion: “to cooperate with whom...” (it is easily, favourably todeal with, you trust or must trust and, finally, you interact inspace). In our opinion, these very factors (eventually not only thesefactors - it is, however, the point of further research) structure themigrants' activity, and are the basis for the creation andexploitation of social networks. We will detail the description (see

below) of the mechanisms of the organization of migrants' life,according to these five principles .

Simplicity/Complexity. Immigrants prefer to cooperate with ones whom it iseasier to communicate with, whose actions and behaviour are clear andprognosticative. In this case, the language is of great importance:poor knowledge of Russian by immigrants, as well as the ignorance ofimmigrants' native language by the local inhabitants, impede theinteraction between the immigrants and the local population.

Azeris will cooperate and/or communicate with other Azeris not forthe reason that they are both Azeris, but because for them it iseasier to understand each other, as they speak the same language. Atthe same time, in case of need (the necessity, as a rule, is ofeconomic character), migrants can interact whatever language theyspeak: we observed a number of cases when Azeris and Tadjiks, Tadjiksand Moldovians, worked together as partners. Amongst themselves,Tadjiks, Azeris and Moldovians communicate in Russian, because Russianis the sole common language allowing them to keep up a communication.Despite the fact, that the language is one of the main components ofthe concept of “ethnic group” (Smith, 1986:27), one should notoverestimate the significance of an ethnic component. We tend tostress the practical role of the language for migrants: as a tool ofcommunication, necessary for interaction, rather than as a marker ofsocial (ethnic) boundaries.

A “simplicity” of interaction can also be examined in the context ofbehavioural prognostications. The people usually exploit so-called cultural patterns of behaviour. On the one hand, the knowledge of thesepatterns by both parties simplifies the interaction with one's “own”and impedes the interaction with the representatives of the “alien”culture. On the other hand, one can suppose that the notion about theunpredictability and, hence, the danger of the “alien” culture isoften over-exaggerated because of our incomprehensibility of theircultural behavioural patterns. The closer observation has shown, thateducation, the experience of being a migrant, either urban or ruralsocialization etc. often play much more important role, than anyhypothetical belonging to this or that “culture”. Any highly-educatedAzeri, who is, for example, a professor, the lecturer and specialistin the Azerbaijan culture, living in St.Petersburg, can easily find a“common language” with another Petersburg professor, rather than witha recent migrant from any village in Azerbaijan. De facto, such stateof things demarcates rigidly the community of recent economicimmigrants self-employed at St.Petersburg markets, and therepresentatives of the high-ranking “Azeris” engaded in intellectual

labour and successfully integrated into the society (whereas thetheory of cultural patterns of behaviour, which is primordialistrather than socializationed one, implies the existence of the rigidboundary between “Russians” and “Azeris”). Hence, dealing withcultural patterns of behaviour too, one should not overestimate therole of ethnicity. Though the culture, alongside with the language, isundoubtedly considered to be one of the basic components of thephenomenon of “ethnic group” (Smith, 1986:26); we conclude, that acompletely different, not “ethnic”, measurement of cultural patternsof behaviour turns to be significant for migrants.

Rationality (benefit). Economic immigrants cooperate with ones whom it isbeneficial to deal with - this criterion often becomes a decisivefactor when seeking workers, partners or suppliers. Thus, thepreference for cheap labour predominates over co-ethnics, other thingsbeing equal; the goods are usually bought at a lower price and aresold at a higher one etc. Economic migration is aimed at rapidenrichment and a relative stability of income. Therefore, it is theeconomic activity, that becomes a basis of forming social networks.The relationships amongst economic migrants are established on thebasis of the principles of economic rationality. In the case ofindividual strategies of migrants, when the latter become competitors,each of them tries to sell the goods to other “co-ethnics” at a pricethat is higher than a purchasing one. Our informant, a Tadjik whoearned a living by cooking meal for marketeers, bought vegetables forcooking from Tadjiks, i.e. from his co-ehtnics. He told us, that theirprices were higher than the wholesale ones, though lower than theretail prices.

On the other hand, in the course of the study, we could observe thecases of cooperation between Azeri immigrants and the localbusinessmen. In the scientific literature on ethnic business, it isusual to describe such cooperation as a cooperation with other ethnicgroups. However, our research experience has shown, that it was amutually beneficial cooperation of professionals, rather than thecooperation between the representatives of different ethnic groups.Ethnicity as such does not influence the economic migrants' preferencefor business partners, completely different factors being of greaterimportance. The example of such cooperation on the basis of solelyeconomic principles of mutual benefit, is the relations between small-wholesale dealers - the inhabitants of the Leningradskaya oblast', andthe Azeri retail sellers. This situation can be represented as aninteraction between  a) Russians and Azeris, b) immigrants and thelocal inhabitants, c) small-wholesale dealers and retail sellers. We

believe, that the third interpretation describes the real situation onthe market most adequately.

Trust/Control. Economic immigrants cooperate with ones whom they trust.Researchers pay a special attention to the trust, considering it to bea “hard currency” of social networks, as “the trust gives rise to theinteraction” (Rona-Tas, 1999: 402). According to the results of ourobservation, the boundaries of trust, however, often coincide withthose of control: you may trust the one who can be controlled. Therefore,migrants prefer to lend the money to the one who can “be reached”: forexample, who works in the same market. In this case, ethnicity is ofno importance: Tadjik can lend the money to Azeri, the latter orMoldovian - to Tadjik etc. The important condition for this is thepossibility to exert pressure on the debtor, in case of non-fulfilmentof his/her obligations. First, such pressure can be direct, proceedingfrom the co-presence in the market space. Secondly, the pressure canbe exerted through the threat to spread one's bad reputation amongstother marketeers, i.e. within the whole network. Other example of thecombination of trust and control is shown in the mechanism oftransferring the money earned by immigrants to their families whostayed in their native land. For some reasons, such transfer of moneyis made through social networks, rather than through official post oras bank transfers. The money is usually sent through familiars who aregoing home. However, also in this case, immigrants prefer to passmoney with the one who is easily reachable, i.e. who can be controlledin the case of an attempt to take another's money - this would oftenhappen among migrants. The control supposes an opportunity ofapplication of effective sanctions in regard to the infringer of theagreement and migrant's ethics. A relative, on whom it is possible topress through other relatives, who would be subjected to condemnation,or be deprived of any support from the members of the relevantnetwork, can act as a controllable person. A person who isincorporated in the same social network can play the same role. Inthis case, an infringer runs risks that his/her bad reputation couldcirculate amongst all the participants of the network. This woulddeprive him/her of the support within this network, i.e. actuallywould deny the assess to this resource (it was written above, that theinvolvement in social networks is practically the sole migrants'capital, hence the loss of the latter is rather objectionable forthem).

Physical space. Economic immigrants cooperate with ones whom theyinteract and/or co-exist with in space: with those who are in themarket, namely with customers, traders and attendants; and with the

hosts of the dwellings rented, i.e. with ones who are placed in “theirspace”.

The shared space, in which various migrants' groups and therepresentatives of the local population coexist, represents a certainframework, in which any interpersonal interaction is developing. It is the co-presence in space that gives immigrants an opportunity to findcommercial wage-workers, business partners, creditors, suppliers ofgoods, etc. Our informants found the sellers just in that way: amongthe people, who come to the market in order to find a job, knowingthat sellers are often required there. Our informants found suppliers,buyers and partners among the people, with whom they interact inspace, rather than according to the “among co-ethnics” criterion. Soone of our informants from Tadjiks found the potential partners andcreditors among his clients when he was working as a cook in one ofthe city markets. He has found a room to rent also through market-women who were immigrants from Moldova.

We observed a great number of cases when immigrants, interactingwith the people in a particular physical space - namely, in markets, -established contacts, formed social networks, and got an access tovarious resources. Certainly, there is no sense to separate thephysical space from the social one: physical space is a metaphor ofsocial space where social distinctions act as objects (Bourdieu, 1993:36-37). Basing on this contention, the analysis of physical spaceallows us to make conclusions about the character of social phenomenaencountered in this space. However, it is necessary to examine closelythe characteristics of these social phenomena: what dimention ofsocial space is most significant. We suppose that concerning economicimmigrants, the occupational-economic dimention is not inferior toethnic one, and is often more significant.

Pressure from the outside. The pressure from the outside establishes certainframework, within which immigrants are forced to live, for lack ofresources to overstep it.

As it was mentioned above, the life of immigrants is influenced bytheir presence in certain physical space, which, undoubtedly, reflectsthe relationships in the social space. To make the description of lifeof immigrants from the Caucasus full, one should supplement the socialand physical space with the legal one. The point is that immigrantsare being ejected to a particular space in three dimentions: legal,social and physical. Thus, the prejudiced attitude towards immigrantson the whole, and from “southern” regions in particular, alongsidewith the uselessness and complexity of bureaucratic procedures on thelegalization of migrant's status, result in the concentration of the

majority of migrants in the illegal space. The discrimination ingiving an employment to immigrants (in addition to the shortage ofsocial and financial capital) forces them to be grouped in particularfields of self-employment, such as fine and wholesale retail. Theiremployment in particular sphere of business leads to their physicalconcentration within the city markets and outskirts.

The existence in all these spaces is interrelated: each of theminfluences others and is in their own turn subjected to theirinfluence.

The pressure from the outside is closely connected with the processwhich can be called “imposing ethnicity” (the term suggested byD.Dragunskii, 1993). Naturally, one cannot negate that immigrants'behaviour is in one way or another connected with ethnicity andreflects the belonging or ascribing oneself to a particular ethnicgroup. However, our study has shown that the cases of accentuation ofethnicity are, as a rule, initiated from the outside. For example,xenophobia of the local population is at the bottom of defining“aliens” in the terms of ethnicity, and sets up a rigid externalboundary. Thus, the local population, including the people for whomthis identity is of no importance, perceive all migrants fromAzerbaijan, Tadjikistan and other republics of the Caucasian andTranscaucasian regions as “Azeris” or “Caucasians”.

There is no doubt that each of the indicated components, structuringthe existence of our informants in the conditions of migration, is notsufficient of itself for any concluding explanation of immigrants'life - these components support each other and should be considered asinterrelated.

Conclusion

One can see that we did not inscribe “ethnicity” in the list of keyfactors of the organization of immigrants' social networks. There isno doubt that an ethnicity element should not be completelydisregarded. However, for our informants, ethnicity is not soimportant reference point in their economic behaviour. This becomesobvious, if we digress for a while from the contentions accepted apriori in the scientific community. These contentions suggest theexistence of “ethnic economies” and the importance of ethnicity forimmigrants' strategies, and apply, first of all, to the analysis ofthe actual activity of immigrants. As a result of the study, we hascome to conclusions, which can be summarized as follows: 1) Socialnetworks of immigrants from the Caucasus to St.Petersburg, inparticular of economic character, were hardly organized by the

ethnicity criterion. This implies, that these social networks were notcreated consciously by social agents, who would subjectively patterntheir actions on ethnic belonging of those, with whom they cooperated(co-ethnics); 2) In comparison with ethnic identity, the position ofeconomic immigrants is much more important in these relations. Itmakes immigrants set up their social networks, being guided bysimplicity and convenience, utility, trust/control and otherprinciples described in this paper.

Translated by O.Kirillova

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Elena Chikadze, Sergei Damberg

ARMENIANS IN THE PETERSBURG SHOE TRADE

The objects of our attention in the process of field research wereArmenians who are engaged in the footwear business. The research wasconducted using the method of participant observation in productionand repair workshops of Petersburg and recorded in diaries. In somecases the observation was supplemented by in-depth interviews; aseries of expert interviews was also carried out.

Today, according to the estimates of our informants and severalexperts, up to 70% of those employed in the supply, small-scalemanufacturing, and repair of shoes are Armenians. What is behind thesestatistics? Does this mean that we can speak of ethnic enterprise? Thematerial that we assembled does not fit entirely into any one of theconcepts of Western sociology concerning ethnic enterprise (forexample, Light, 1984; Waldinger, 1986, etc.). However, it is not our

objective in this report to enter into a scholarly discussion or toelaborate our own concept – the framework of the work and in a certainsense the narrowness of the field do not permit us to do this. Weconsider it more important here to describe the market niche that westudied and to show what role ethnicity plays in this business, whichwe, adhering to the constructivist theoretical tradition, understandas a social construct (Voronkov, Oswald, 1998).

The social-economic situation in Russia in the late 1980s and early1990s led to the emergence and intensive growth of private productionand repair of shoes. On the one hand, this was encouraged by thepopulation's increasing demand for this kind of production andservice. The footwear industry of Leningrad and the Leningrad Regionin the 1980s was wholly concentrated in a unified organisationalstructure - LPO “Skorokhod”, whose production in the consumer marketwas rated very low, so that shoe manufacture went into decline earlierthan most other trades and in the new economic conditions turned outto be altogether non-competitive. Shoe repair was in the jurisdictionof the shoe company “Neva”, workshops were included in one of itsbranches, stalls in another (the so-called “cold” repair). Theirnetwork was unevenly developed. In the absence of imports thesituation was aggravated by the total deficiency typical of the Sovieteconomy.

On the other hand, the processes of this period became theconditions for the most important factors of private production totake shape: new economic legislation and privatisation providedfreedom of enterprise, hyperinflation led to the appearance ofnecessary free capital, and mass migration and the structural crisisof state industry satisfied the demands of small business for freework-power, including a qualified work force.

Until the mid-1990s, that is, until the influx of cheap importedfootwear onto the Russian market, there was intensive development inthe sphere of repair and small-scale manufacture of shoes. This nichewas filled by people seeking (often forced to do so) new economicstrategies. The Armenians comprised a significant part of these – boththose who had settled in Petersburg earilier, and new migrants.According to the testimony of our informants, at that time thisbusiness was very profitable: “I was simultaneously involved with planning work,and the store was also a shoe workshop, and when I took a look, in general, the shoe workshopbrought in perhaps no less income that any other business” (from an interview with a“Petersburg” Armenian, owner of several workshops). Our informantsascribe the saturation of the market to the second half of the 1990s:

the profitability of the business fell and its intensive growthceased.

It must be emphasised that the manufacture and repair of shoes, as arule, are non-intersecting spheres, which were formed independently ofeach other. Each of these types of work requires different resources,and a person's choice of one of them depends above all on whichnetworks he is integrated into.

Shoe repair as a trade does not presuppose, first, a prolongedspecial training (all the informants said that two weeks was themaximum period for learning it), and second, significant initialcapital. This attracts to repair work the first forced migrants –Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, whose resources are very limited.

In order to enter this market niche, above all it is necessary tohave connections within the sphere of shoemakers already functioningin the city: it is necessary to have somebody to teach one the trade,“put him in place”. As a rule, our informants used for this thenetworks of relatives or, more rarely, of people from the samedistrict. Properly speaking, the resources that the networks possessdetermine, and at the same time restrict, the migrants' choice ofspheres of activity: “What else is there to do? I won't become a stevedore. Either I makeglass /the informant's profession in his homeland – the authors/, or I'lllearn what they can teach me. I can't go up to any passerby, let's say, and say: “What work doyou do? Teach me your trade”… My brother says: I'll teach you, and you'll work, you'll learn, I'llget a stall for you” (from an interview with a refugee from Azerbaijan).

We know of cases when ethnicity was used as a resource at the stageof integration into the economic niche. Thus, for example, ourinformant (a “Petersburg” Armenian, proprietor of a workshop),responding to a request for help, several times hired refugees fromAzerbaijan, including those who did not have a trade. But theexperience was so unsuccessful that later the decision was taken “not tohire Armenians”. When it is necessary to hire personnel now the ownerturns to a school that trains specialists in repair work.

We suppose that this is a specifically “Armenian” situation. Thepoint is that the events that shook Armenia and Armenians at the endof the 1980s – the ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan, the earthquake inArmenia – made ethnic identity topical, mobilised and consolidated theArmenian community in Leningrad, while the idea of solidarity laid atthe base of the communal collective identity that had been developed(Brednikova, Chikadze, 1998:231-234; Voronkov, Oswald, 1998:22-24).Therefore the expectation of trust, based on ideas of ethnicsolidarity, was inherent in the actions of several of our informants,

especially those who earlier in their economic practice did notencounter fellow countrymen, that is, “Petersburg” Armenians. Thispermitted migrants to use ethnicity as a resource.

Later, the expectation of trust collapses, and ethnic solidarity issupplanted by professional rationality: “I can trust my brother, he trusts me, youunderstand. Whoever he might put in this place, he can't trust him, life's like that. Not becausethe person is bad... well, money is money. An Armenian was sitting here up to now, he left. Nowwe just chased out an Armenian from another spot. Well, he just drinks” (from aninterview with a “Petersburg” Armenian).

Informants chose different strategies depending on resources andpersonal inclinations. Some, having become owners of a workshop orstall, stopped repairing shoes themselves, expanding the business tothe establishment of a small network of workshops (in the language ofour informants this is called “getting up from the stall”). Others, asbefore, are engaged in the trade, while sometimes as renters, and notowners of stalls.

Today the repair of footwear has ceased to be such a profitablebusiness as in the first half of the 1990s: “With each year it gets worse andworse, much worse... I understood that the shoemaking business soon will simply beunnecessary, you understand. Why, because now /…/ they've filled the market with Chineseshoes that cost 25.000 /the interview was conducted in 1998 – the authors./.A person doesn't come to me, doesn't give a heel, you understand, for 12.000, if he can get 13and go to buy new shoes. And rich people, first, they don't come often, second, even if they dogive shoes for repair, after all they're like this: they wear them awhile, they replaced the firstheels, they already throw out the second ones, as was said, that's all. And then, a normal persondoesn't go to such a stall, he goes to a good workshop. He pays money and he's going to thinkthat they'll do good work for him there. /…/ You've been sitting here an hour already, exactly.Did even one person come? No. And that's the whole job. And earlier, /…/ four years ago, when Isat here I came here at 6:00 in the morning, in order to get through what I took on the daybefore… But now that's all over”. This quote is from an interview with a refugeefrom Azerbaijan working in a stall. Matters stand differently withworkshops not only for the reason indicated by the informant – theybring in greater income also because of the variety of servicesoffered. Work in a stall, especially for recent migrants, who haveproblems with housing, today has become a peculiar trap: the earningsare scarcely enough to resolve urgent problems, but “to get up fromthe stall” is impossible without capital being brought in, and it isrisky in the current situation of brutal competition.

At present, “Armenian” workshops and repair stalls existindependently of each other. Likewise, incidentally, thenon-”Armenian”, with the exception of stalls of the Central District,which are in the possession of the former director of the

corresponding branch of the “Neva” company, but if desired, they canalso be bought out. The networks existing among them are less ethnicin essence than professional, familial, and territorial - thoseworking not far removed from each other can turn to one another forhelp (for example, when some kind of material is needed): “Unfortunately, itturns out so that contacts with newly arrived Armenians /are not formed/...either we'vebecome Russianised, or they want too much right away, but the contacts don't turn out. Andtherefore it's better, as it's said, to maintain relationships... outside the working environment,let's say” (from an interview with a “Petersburg” Armenian, the owner of aworkshop).

Making shoes, as different from repair, requires first, major start-up capital, second, more significant entrepreneurial skills, andthird, access to such manufacturing resources as highly qualifiedpersonnel, supplies and sales channels.

Our research gives grounds to assume that the first private shoefactories in Petersburg were founded by “Erevan” Armenians (“Ingeneral, at the start Erevan Armenians made the shoes, and the Bakunians were inrepair. Q:And at the start – when was that? A: Ten years ago, I think /in 1988/” - froman interview with a refugee from Azerbaijan). The point is thatArmenian shoes were one of the best of the domestic products. In theperiod when the commodities market was extraordinarily meagre, theexport of Erevan shoes to Russia became a profitable form of business.The family of one of our informants earned a living in just this wayin the early 1990s: they broght shoes from Erevan, and then sold themin Syktyvkar, where the scarcity of shoes was more severe than inLeningrad. Therefore it seems natural that it was primarily emigrantsfrom Armenia who had access to necessary manufacturing resources.Making shoes in Petersburg was much more profitable, attracting Erevanspecialists with their experience, skill, and techniques.Unfortunately, these factories have a more closed character and wewere unable to gain access to them.

Inclusive observation was carried out in three shops, organised byArmenians who came from Azerbaijan and Georgia in the early 1990s.They are located on the territory of a military scientific researchinstitute, where two more shoe factories are situated (the owner ofone is a “Georgian”, the other a “Russian” woman who worked in thisbranch in Soviet times) and a wholesale store that sells rawmaterials. The owners of all five shops together with their companionsform a commercial company, and their network has a territorialcharacter. The members of the community are integrated into otherbusiness networks, not always intersecting each other.

The territorial company that was studied forms a unifiedcommunicative space, where rules are worked out and entrepreneurialpractices are coordinated. For example, here there are usuallydiscussions of which sales channels are most successful, which modelwill be most in demand this season, etc.

The positions of entrepreneurs in the company are defined above allby their professional roles and authority, and do not depend on theirethnic group. Migrant entrepreneurs were integrated into professional,originally poly-ethnic company not as a group, but individually.

The factories that we observed belong to small business. As a rule,they employ no more than 15-20 people, while in view of the seasonalcharacter of the shoe market itself, the number can be reduced severaltimes in mid-season. In part the equipment was acquired at large stateshoe enterprises after being written off and in part was stolen orillegally purchased directly from employees of these stateenterprises. Such opportunities appeared as a result of thebankruptcies of state shoe companies of the region (if not de jure,then de facto), which struck practically every one of them. In otherwords, the enterprises are fitted out with old and very worn-outequipment, so that manual labour remains dominant. One shop puts outno more than two or three models of shoes per season, does not haveits own regular channels of supplies or shoe sales, which directlyindicates the trade borders of the niche. The proprietors of the shopsare practically excluded from the networks of entrepreneurs engaged insales or production of raw materials.

According to Western studies of ethnic economy (for example, Light,Karageorgis, 1994, etc.), entrepreneurs often use migrant compatriotsas a work force. We observed a contrary picture: with a singleexception, there were no Armenians among the workers; as a rule,personnel are recruited from the staff of the former state shoecompanies. Our informants explain this in different ways. One of theexplanations emphasises the special aspects of the migrant'ssituation: he has (especially when a refugee is involved) specifickinds of expenses (for example, the need to rent accommodations), andconsequently the need for higher pay.

Another explanation concerns mainly the problem of familial andfriendship relations. It is considered that a relative or compatriothired for a job will strive to become a partner, not obeyinginstructions and thus emphasising his exclusive status among theemployees. Therefore there is an effort to avoid hiring him, but atthe same time they might give all kinds of support to him when heopens his own business. Thus, according to some of our data, the

practice of start-up credit is taking shape in the professionalcommunity. At first glance, a paradoxical situation emerges: they donot hire him as a worker, but they give credit. However, this has itslogic: on the one hand, as a creditor, the entrepreneur in hisproduction work does not become dependent on friendhsip or familialrelations; on the other hand, just these relations serve as amechanism of control over the funds that are made available. Thuseconomic interaction is based on trust because of familial,friendship, or compatriots' relations, and ethnicity here does nothave influence by itself.

Generalising the observations presented, it is possible to say thatthe economic strategies of our informants are based on principles ofmarket rationality. Precisely these principles regulate the use asresources of familial and compatriots' networks that are taken asethnic networks. In the meantime, ethnicity itself could play the roleof a resource only in the stage of their integration into the businessnetwork – and exclusively thanks to the special situation in which theArmenians found themselves because of the events in the Caucasus,which were spoken of above. But then ethnicity did not define theeconomic practices of the “Armenians”. Today it has been practicallyforced out of them.

Translated by A. Haun

Literature

Light, I. (1984) Immigrant and Ethnic Enterprise in North Ameriсa //Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 7. Number 2, April

Light, I., Karageorgis, S. (1994) The Ethnic Economy. In: N.Smelser &R.Swedberg (eds.) The Handbook of Economic Sociology. PrincetonUniversity Press. P. 647-671

Waldinger, R. (1986) Through the Eye of the Needle: Immigrants andEnterprise in New York’s Garment Trades. NY: New York University Press

Brednikova, O., Chikadze, E. (1998) Armyane Sankt-Peterburga: karieryetnichnosti. In: V. Voronkov and I. Oswald (ed.) Konstruirovanieetnichnosti. Etnicheskie obshchiny Sankt-Peterburga. St. Petersburg:“Dmitrii Bulanin”. P. 227-259

Radaev, V. (1993) Ekonomicheskoe predprinimatelstvo: mirovoi opyt iRossiya // Polis. № 5. P. 79-87

Voronkov, V., Oswald, I. (1998) Vvedenie. Postsovietskie etnichnosti. In:V. Voronkov and I. Oswald (ed.) Etnicheskie obshchiny Sankt-Peterburga. St. Petersburg: “Dmitrii Bulanin”. P. 6-35

Karpenko Oksana

“These guests seem to exercise control over all current market trade”:

THE CONCEPT OF “ETHNIC ECONOMY” IN THE LIGHT OF THE RUSSIAN PRESS

The paper presented is an analysis of the variety of journalists'interpretations of the situation that has developed around theCaucasian dealers in the Russian markets. Attention was concentratedon the fact, that the recognition of the burst of “Caucasians'“migration to “Russian” cities in the 1990-ies and the disproportionatenumber of “Caucasians” in the Russian markets has resulted indiametrically opposite estimations of these factors:

At present, our city has been overrun with Caucasians. These guests seem toexercise control over all current market trade; they behave discourteously, thriftilyand moreover, commit various crimes. Is it possible to put an end tothis? (“Smena”, 16.12.95, “Quota of “Caucasian” criminality isnegligible”).

Few understand, that “the Azerbaijani dealers' stranglehold” is beneficial forRussians (“Obschaya gazeta”, 29.10-4.11.98, “The war betweenLenkoran and Spanish tomatoes on the Moscow market”).

As the study has shown, the authors of both points of view areunited by the accentuation of the nationality of the market dealersand the notion about the existence of ethnic groups, therepresentatives of which have “natural propensity” to trade. Theircontentions correspond to the principles of Soviet multiculturalism; theontological status of ethnicity being out of dispute. Ethnicboundaries separating dealers in the market are beyond any doubt, thedealers from the Caucasian republics are associated, as a rule, with a“different” (ethnic) culture, (quasi)ethnic groups (“Caucasians”,“Azeris” etc.); a nonexistent cultural homogeneity is ascribed in thiscase. However, the descriptions of the position of “Caucasians” inhost (our) society, of their economic actions and motivation differstrongly. In the first case, the conflict between the principles offunctioning the “civilized” market and those of the organization ofwork by “Caucasians” is identified. In this case, the descriptions arebased on the idea that “Caucasians” use “ethnic” resources for theformation of (semi)criminal structures and the establishmentof domination in trade. In the second case, “Azeris’” actions aredescribed as normal market behaviour, when their “ethnic” skills raisethe successfulness of their activity, the fruits of success being usedby all participants of market interaction. In this case, the trade in

itself - as an occupation – is considered to be an individualstrategy, rather than a collective one.

Henceforth, I will present in detail these two forms of description,in order to show the discursive means used by the authors of thearticles to inform the readers about the existence of “Caucasians”(“Azeris”) as particular groups of greenery dealers in the Russianmarkets.

1. “These guests seem to exercise control over all current market trade; they behavediscourteously, thriftily”.

The main metaphor organizing the discursive space, in this case, isthe metaphor of “home”; the emphasizing and polarized representation(Djik, 1999) of “hosts” (“inhabitants”) and “guest” (“aliens”)encountering. “Guests” are described as “uninvited”, not adequate tothe expectations of “hosts”; they try to modify the power relations, inorder to command “hosts”. The maintenance of a proper order, in thiscase, supposes the protection of the “hosts'“ right to establish therules of the game in their own territory and to demand the observance ofthese rules from “guests” (not excepting coercion).

The “host's” interpretation of an image of “newcomers from theCaucasus” suggests the definition of the latter as an alien element,whose presence does not meet the requirements of our society. Moreover,it constitutes a great menace to its existence. The menace impliespredictable disequilibrium (demographic, cultural, criminal, economicetc.) in their favour.

Turning to some aspects of the polarized representationof us and them, I intend to show how the ideas about the undesirabilityof their presence in our society are formed and how the necessity ofcoercion towards them is grounded.

First, let us consider, how they are characterized:

They capture what belongs to us by right. They have usurped and“divided” our cities and markets; they lay our dealers under tribute.Because of them, the prices in the markets are higher, than could bewithout them. By organizing a network of subpurchasers whouse uncivilized methods (i.e. various forms of extortion), they haveestablished the dictates of prices. By forced collecting of goods,they misappropriate the profit from trade, which belongs to localproducers.

- “…they cause a situation of increased criminal danger” (Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, 27.10.1999). Their inclination to criminal

actions is explained by the specificity of development of their ethnicculture (morals), in which both the power methods of solving problems,and negative attitude towards aliens would seem natural:

Risk, audacity and vehemence have come in blood and flesh with a southernman. Boys, especially those who are mountain-dwellers, are usually trained tohandle guns and cold steel earlier than they learn to read. In the territories withlack of soil, or where the soil is exhausted, special morals are formed: to procureliving by force methods, is regarded as a merit, rather than a shame. Especiallyfrom aliens(Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, 27.10.1999).

Moreover, their number converting to criminal activity is connectedwith the crisis in newly independent republics, where “thousands ofpeople came to be “forced out into

criminality”. The market places are at the same time an outlet fordrugs and weapon. Criminal earnings are intended for the fighting (inChechnya) brothers (Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, 27.10.1999).

- They belong to quite different, non European, cultures which areless civilized (“patriarchal” and cannot accommodate themselves tourban life. They live in clans, are traditionally dependent on theirown community and are inclined to demonstrative consumption, to “showoff”. Our and their notions about “what is good” differ strongly.

Most immigrants from the Caucasus are patriarchal peasants at heart. It hasalways been very hard to survive in mountainous lands, especially living alone. Inaddition, the life of many peoples is restricted by very complicated (from theEuropean point of view) behavioural norms regulating almost every step andevery word. As a result, from the early childhood, the comers from the Caucasusrigidly regulate the norms of behaviour in friendly milieu. As to the surroundingswhich are treated by them as hostile (Moscow, for example), they try to produce afavourable impression. For Europeans, the manner to “show off” seems to beshocking: all these restaurants, boxes with champagne, scattering of money (eventhe rest of it) by sower's gestures and so on (Izvestiya, 15.07.99).

- They are not accustomed and do not wish to accommodate themselvesto our culture, they keep to the habitual behaviour of their “ethnicnative land”, ignoring its non-conformity with the newconditions. They tend to isolation, limiting their social contacts withco-ethnics (“clans”), do not show activity in search of social links,which would allow them to be integrated into our society.

Preferring to contact with marginal population or with the people ofno standing, they form inadequate representation of us and our culture.

As to their attitude towards Muscovites (including those, on whom“Caucasians'“ well-being depends, e.g.: buyers in the market), it has unfortunatelybeen formed as a result of their communication with the loaders and prostitutes.This adds neither respect nor love to the Slavic culture and way oflife (Izvestiya, 15.07.99).

- They despise us, they exploit our weak points and introduce theirown rules in our territory. They have no respect for our women, theyregard them as objects of their desires. They use them as both vendorsin the markets and sexual objects.

- In their sexual behaviour, they are active and aggressive.Regarding our women, they do not observe any restrictions on sexualbehaviour, whereas such restrictions do exist in their “ethnicmotherland”.

- They live and trade, mostly illegally, in our territory, they do notwish to obey general rules, as they consider the observation of ourrules to be humiliating for them. The problems, arising as a resultof their illegal status, are solved in the “traditional” way (popular intheir motherland), i.e. by bribing police and officials.

The principles of “Caucasian'“ social organization allows them, incontrast to other participants of market interaction, to use non-market mechanisms of price control and force methods of influence uponcompetitors. In the market, “Caucasians” act as a particularcorporative monopolistic group pursuing its own interests and neglectingthe interests of other parties. The market comes to be a place, where“Caucasians” dominate over us. Because of theircollectivestrategy, their power potential - as of participants of exchange(collective strategy) - considerably exceeds our (individual)opportunities for resistance. The basic concept of the representationof “guests” is a concept of real or potential threat. Thepeculiarities of their culture provoke the non-observance of our normsand laws by them and threaten the preservation of the orderestablished by us.

In this situation, we play a permanent role of victims of aggressionfrom the outside (“occupation”):

- By tradition, we are tolerant and behave correctly. We arecredulous and indulgent. We apply force only in cases when we arecompelled to react upon the aggression from their party and toprotect our national dignity. Such an attitude is an attribute of acivilized European mentality.

By tradition, Russia (and St.Petersburg in particular!) has been a home for thepeople of different races and creeds. However, if a visitor comes to your place onlywith the purpose of enriching himself at your expense, and in no time declaresthat he is the host - to put such a guest in his place, is a matter of honour ofeveryone who respects himself. (Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti.27.10.1999).

- We are not racists, we acknowledge the distinctions among the“Caucasian” cultures. We live in a multinational society and respectthe traditions of each of culture.

The words “persons of the Caucasian nationality” jar upon us, - the fighters withethnic criminality say with indignation, - Such nationality does not exist at all! Likethere are no European, Asian or American nationalities. There are Chechens,Dagestanians, Ingoushes, Osetians – the peoples with their own history, culture,national features and traditions. Until all of us do not understand this, do not takethis into account in our work, we can do irreversible harm, instead ofgood (Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti. 27.10.1999).

- We aim at an objective image of their presencein our territory. They impede us by forming closed communities accordingto an ethnic criterion, thus creating a parallel “Caucasian” world. Weare compelled to use statistic data and information obtained from the“competent sources” - mainly, the representatives of law-enforcementagencies, who exercise control over them and have adequateinformation.

- Our negative attitude towards them is objectively substantiated,though we admit that one should constrain emotions. We condemn thepeople's especially aggressive demonstration of xenophobia (pogroms).

- Our resources are insufficient for solving the problems by“civilized” methods. We are compelled to infringe “human rights”,entirely because of regular infringement of our rights by them.

As one can conclude from the above, it was they who became theoriginators of conflicts between us and them. They do not (can not anddo not want to) adhere to our (civilized) norms of life, they threatenthe existence of our society. The discrimination (both institutionaland daily) from ours is a feedback effect upon the “impudence” and“aggression” demonstrated by them. They become victims of their own(ethnic) norms of behaviour, which they can not and do not want toabandon.

Such a polarized image of the parties of interaction allows to use ametaphor of “war” for the description of mutual relations. This “warof liberation” in the interests of “hosts” is conducted by the

representatives of law-enforcement agencies, delegated with the powerto protect our “home”. On the whole, such an image of the parties ofinteraction legitimizes force actions. In this context, theinfringement of the Russian and international laws and agreements isjustified; such infringements are considered rational behaviour incertain circumstances.

2. ““...Stranglehold of the Azerbaijani dealers” is beneficial for Russians”.

A few texts deal with the above interpretation. Most of such textsare given in the form of interviews with the official representativesof so-called ethnic minorities. According to the First Vice-PrimeMinister of the Government of Azerbaijan Abbas Abbasov, the currentposition of “Caucasians” in the Russian cities is in many respectsdetermined by our common “Soviet” past. All of us have been integrated inthe community of the “former Soviet people” and united by the“friendship of nations”. For the description of this community, ametaphor of “old friends” is used.

It is supposed that the planned economy has created prerequisitesfor the establishment of sustainable links between consumers in theRussian cities and agricultural producers in the republics of theformer USSR (including Azerbaijan). At that time, a system of socialprotection of the dealers in the markets had developed. The processeswhich occurred in the early 90-ies resulted in the destruction of theformer institution of the Soviet collective-farm market, a stablesystem of delivery obligations being broken. This negatively affectedboth producers in the republics (because of marketing difficulties)and consumers in the Russian cities (because of the deficiency ofagricultural products). The high level of competition on theinternational agricultural market has forced producers (dealers) toreturn to the domestic (CIS) market, since their attempts to introducethemselves at international level were not a success. However, in newconditions, it is hardly possible to trade in one's own products,because of the problems encountered on the NIS frontiers. “Azeris”have established contacts with foreign suppliers and have organized atrade in import vegetables and fruit, which are more expensive. Inprospects, they intend to change-over to their own production, which ischeaper and of higher quality. The terms of such reversion, however,depend to a considerable extent on solving a number of inter-statepolitical and economic problems (e.g.: Russia-Azerbaijan frontierregulations).

The economic success of “Azeris” in the Russian markets in currentsituation is a result of competitive struggle. The victory was gained

by those who came to be most business-like and thoroughly investigatedthe local structure, peculiarities and needs of the region.

“Caucasian” (“Azeri”) market dealers not in the least endanger thehost society. Moreover, they are of real benefit to it, as they supplythe local inhabitants with vegetables and fruit, provide them withjobs, render financial support to our infrastructure etc.) Theirpotential can be used by the authorities for the further developmentof the economy of the Russian regions.

It is well-known, how many Russians are fed by Azeri dealers. Besides, the latterpay for residence permits, registration, a place in the market, meals, transportand renting apartments. One can see what amount of currency it makes up.However, up to now, there is no political leader in Russia, who could use thepotential talent of our compatriots efficiently (Obschaya gazeta, 29.10-4.11.1998).

They are hardly protected from racket and illegal actions(“bespredel” - lawlessness) of the representatives of law-enforcementagencies, who “at any moment can lay a person on the dirty ground,beat him for anything, or fabricate a criminal case” (Obschaya gazeta,29.10-4.11.1998).

The author of the aforesaid quotations agrees with some factorsexcusing “hosts'“ strategy, i.e. mass immigration to Russianmegapolices from the Caucasus and Transcaucasia; the assertion that“Azeri” control all the greenery market and the “flower business” etc.However, the author suggests that the reasons and results of theseprocesses should be interpreted differently and described in neutralterms, positively estimating the “Azeris’” presence in the cities andemphasizing rather similarity, than distinctions.

*****

So the first of the examples adduced deals with the discriminativediscourse prevailing in the official press. It suggests a “convincing”description of “facts” or opinions suggested by “competent agencies”.Such descriptions makes the reading public conclude that “guests fromthe South” are to blame for most difficulties. The assertion of groupsolidarity (“we are the owners”, we are Peterburgers”, we areEuropeans” etc.) in these cases represents itself as a sloganmobilizing for the struggle against “unbidden guests”. In this case,special attention is given to the difficulties caused by the presenceof a great number of immigrants to Russian cities. At that, migrants'positive influence on the life of the city is ignored, though it issupposed. The authors do not acknowledge any accusations in racism.

They are well-protected from them, since in Russian discourse, anarrow definition of racism (as an ideology suggesting the biologicalsuperiority of one races over others) prevails.

As the research has shown, there are various mechanisms ofdiscursive reproduction of ethnophobia and racism. They have nothingin common with the reactionary nationalistic movements, as well aswith the concept of biological predominance. The polarized “hosts” /“guests” representation given above is one of such mechanisms used bythe official (“democratic”, “independent”) Russian press. It promotesthe reproduction of “cultural racism” (Dijk, 1999). Its adherentswould never enter any extremist grouping, moreover, they openlydeclare their negative attitude towards the latter. At the same time,they white-wash ethnic (race) discrimination.

“Hosts'” discourse represents a modern version of racist ideologybased on the notion about the collision between cultural-homogeneous“hosts'” and “guests'” communities in our territory. These communitieshave different rights in this territory.

One should remark, that the texts suggesting alternative (positive)estimations of “Caucasians'” presence in the Russian markets, veryseldom appear in press. In such articles, there are no oppositions“we” - “they”, the question is about mutually advantageous cooperationbetween two equal partners. Unlike “host's” strategy, all thatunites us is emphasized in this case. In the market, all of us enter intorelations of more or less equivalent exchange. However, thealternative sense of this interpretation is seeming in many respects.All attempts to prove that “Azeris” meet the interests of the “localpopulation” could hardly shake the “hosts'“ version of the situation.The journalist, when putting questions, uses the “hosts'“ lexicon: “Isthere any danger that a great number of aliens will become one morefactor of destabilization in Russia?” A respondent does not reject thevery formulation of the question and answers it easily, as he has notfound any discriminative sense there.

On the whole, “the representative of the Administration ofAzerbaijan” holds an opinion, that people working in the market, are“homo ethnicus”. In spite of the fact that the result of the meetingof the “Azerbaijani” dealers with “local (Russian) population” isestimated positively, such point of view, however, paves the way forxenophobia.

Translated by O.Kirillova

References

Djik, T.A.van (1999) Ideology. SAGE Publications