Ethical Contextualism and Personal Justification

ETHICAL CONTEXTUALISM AND PERSONAL JUSTIFICATION

Ethical Contextualism and Personal Justification

William Paul Demsar

Saint Theresa International College

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Abstract

In this paper I argue against a contextualist account of personaljustification. I begin by delineating personal justification fromdoxastic justification. Personal justification, typically emphasized by epistemic internalists, evaluates agents. Doxastic justification, typically emphasized by epistemic externalists, evaluates the beliefs of the agent. I argue that the analogy between ‘wrong’ and ‘personally justified’ is so strong that the respective contextualist accounts must stand or fall together. Therefore, since contextualist accounts of ‘wrong’ fail, so must contextualist accounts of ‘personally justified.’ I take no position regarding the proper role of the notions of personal anddoxastic justification with regard to the theory of knowledge, but simply conclude that any theory committed to a contextualist account of personal justification is inadequate. I conclude with some brief thoughts on the kinds of theories that are ruled out by the arguments of this paper.

Keywords: ethical contextualism, contextualism, personal justification

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ใใใใใใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ ‘ใใใ’ใใใ ‘ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ’ ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ “ใใใ” ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ “ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ” ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ

ใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ ‘ใใใ’ ใใใใใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ ‘ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ’ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ: ใใใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใใ ใใใใใใใใใใใใใ

Ethical Contextualism and Personal Justification

Introduction

I will begin in Section 1 by distinguishing between personal

and doxastic justification. I will be primarily concerned with

the former notion of justification. In Section 2 I will argue

that contextualism fails to give an adequate account of ‘wrong’.

I will then argue that ‘personal justification’ bears a strong

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analogy to moral terms like ‘wrong’. I will argue that this

analogy is so strong and relevant that contextualist accounts of

‘wrong’ and contextualist accounts of ‘personally justified’ must

stand or fall together. In Section 4 I will argue that

contextualism cannot give an adequate account of personal

justification. I hope to show that one cannot be a contextualist

about personal justification. The role these two notions of

justification play in a proper epistemic theory is a widely

disputed matter. Personal justification plays an essential role

in some epistemic theories. Other philosophers find no place for

it at all in their epistemology. I don’t, at present, wish to be

party to this dispute. I only want to point out that personal

justification is not amenable to a contextualist treatment.

Section 1: Personal vs. Doxastic Justification

One of the main concerns of contemporary epistemology has

been to lay down the independently necessary and jointly

sufficient conditions for knowledge. Knowledge, whatever it is,

is some sort of relationship between a person and some true

proposition. Whatever one believes about the nature of that

relationship, belief and truth seem to be an evident and

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essential part of it. The problem is that these conditions are

not jointly sufficient for knowledge. Imagine, for example, the

crazed lunatic who believes he has predictive powers and

prognosticates that the Cardinals, against all odds, will win the

World Series. The crazed man is mistaken about his special

powers, and in fact his belief that the cardinals would win was

produced by some completely random flight of lunatic fancy, but

it happens to be true that the Cardinals win the World Series. It

is very clear that the man, despite his mistaken belief that he

knows that the Cardinals will win, does not know. The problem is

that the man’s belief was accidental, and we require more of

knowledge than accidentally true belief.

The goal of any justification condition(s) in an epistemic

theory is to rule out accidentally true belief. Once one thinks

about what beliefs are, it becomes apparent that there are two

ways to do this. Beliefs are something we have, but believing is

something we do. Because we have some control over the formation

of our beliefs, we have an epistemic responsibility. Accordingly,

we can rule out accidentally true beliefs by evaluating the

actions of the believer. On the other hand, because beliefs are

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something we possess, we can rule out accidentally true beliefs

by evaluating the belief. In his (1992) article, “Personal and

Doxastic Justification in Epistemology”, Mylan Engel

distinguishes between these two accounts of justification as

follows:

(JR1) S knows that p only if S is epistemically justified in

believing that p.

(JR2) S knows that p only if S’s belief that p is

epistemically justified (p. 133).

He goes on to note that much of the contemporary debate between

externalists and internalists has failed to distinguish between

these two differing notions, and to argue against the equivalence

of (JR1) and (JR2). I will summarize his arguments to this

effect. What I am arguing against here is what Dr. Engel refers

to as the equivalency thesis: “(ET) S is epistemically justified

in believing that p iff S’s belief that p is epistemically

justified” (Ibid). (ET) cannot be true because both sides of the

biconditional “have different domains of evaluation”, and “don’t

even purport to be about the same thing” (p. 135). The right

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hand side of the biconditional is about beliefs and the left hand

side is about agents.

The only reason to think (ET) true would be to think that an

agent and a belief cannot be evaluated separately, but as an

example from Dr. Engel makes clear, this is simply not the case.

It will serve to quote him at length:

Consider the case of Sally the misinformed Logic student. Sally is told by her incompetent logic instructor that modus ponens is an invalid argument form. Not realizing her instructor’s incompetence, she comes to regard modus ponens as an invalid form. One day, in a moment of wanton logical abandon, she comes to hold a belief on the basis of a modus ponens argumentwith obviously true premises. Here we have a situation where Sally’s belief is perfectly reasonable (since it follows from obviously true premises), but Sally is unjustified in believing it (because, given her situation, she is being epistemically irresponsible in using modus ponens). Thus, her belief is evaluated positively, while she is evaluated negatively, in direct contradiction to the claim that beliefs and believers cannot be evaluated independently (p. 136).

So, the differing “domains of evaluation” for (JR1) and (JR2)

“intuitively, spell out different requirements” (ibid), and the

only real reason for thinking (ET) to be true was the mistaken

idea that beliefs and believers cannot be evaluated

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independently. Just as a good person can do a bad thing, a

justified agent can hold an unjustified belief, and vice versa.

Consider again the following case: Clair is kidnapped by aliens

and implanted with a special microchip that reliably calculates

extremely large numbers. Upon her return, a jealous mad scientist

kidnaps her and the following choice is forced upon her. Clair is

told, “If you calculate correctly the following sum within 5

seconds, you will be given one billion Baht. If you calculate the

number incorrectly, then you will pay with your life.” He does

give her one out. When she sees the number, if she acts quickly

enough, she may bow out by saying, “I don’t know” and praising

the superior genius of the mad scientist. Clair is then given a

mathematical problem that would be clearly impossible for any

normal human being to quickly calculate. Just as she sees the

number, and for reasons completely unknown to her, she feels

supremely confident that she knows the answer. She abandons

herself to the strange intuition, says the correct answer, and

collects her winnings. Now, according to many theories of

knowledge, Clair’s belief was justified. It was, after all, the

upshot of a reliable belief producing mechanism. But we may still

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ask if she, as an epistemic agent, behaved appropriately. Perhaps not,

for, from her point of view, the answer that popped into her mind

might as well have been a guess. She had no reason at all to

trust her intuitions regarding such matters. If we evaluate this

case using (JR1), which evaluates the agent, we might well

conclude that she does not know the answer to the question. If we

were to use (JR2), which evaluates the belief of the agent, then

we might conclude that Clair does know the answer.

Cases where agents seem blameless, but their beliefs flawed

seem just as easy to come by. Consider some classic Gettier case.

There is a thermometer on the wall that reads 32 degrees and it

is, in fact, 32 degrees. Paul forms the belief, on the basis of

looking at the thermometer, that it is 32 degrees. Unbeknownst to

Paul, the thermometer is broken and just happens to be stuck at

32 degrees. Most of us have the intuition that he does not have

knowledge. This is not, however, because he has flaunted some

epistemic duty. It was entirely reasonable for him to form the

belief he did. Rather there was a problem with the belief. It

wasn’t hooked up to the available evidence in the right way. So

here we have a case in which we evaluate the agent positively and

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the belief negatively. Let us again evaluate the case using (JR1)

and (JR2) respectively. Clearly Paul is epistemically justified

in believing that it is 32 degrees. On (JR1) we might conclude

that he knows. But is his belief that it is 32 degrees justified?

Probably not, so, given (JR2) we might well conclude that he does

not know.

Although the notions are often conflated, (JR1) seems to

“capture something central to internalism”, and (JR2) “seems to

capture something central to externalism” (ibid, 134). Thus, the

proper epistemic role of (JR1) and (JR2) remains a hotly debated

issue. I have no dog in that fight, but for the remainder of this

paper I will be concerned primarily with personal justification

as expressed in (JR1). I will argue that this notion of

justification cannot be contextualized.

Section 2: Contextualism about ‘Wrong’

The most important feature of our moral language is that of

it’s being prescriptive. When we ask if an action is right, we

want to know something about how a person ought to act. Consider

the absurdity of the following sentence ‘you were wrong to do

that, but you should have done it.’ This essential prescriptivity

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is the cornerstone upon which contextualist theories of moral

language are dashed.

In his article, “Knowledge, Context, and the Agent’s Point

of View”, Timothy Williamson gives us the case of Clare. Clare

is in a situation requiring practical reasoning, and is trying to

decide whether or not to leave her job for reasons of moral

principle. She wants to know if it would be right to leave her

job or not. “She thinks ‘If it would be wrong for me not to

resign, I will resign; if it would not be wrong for me not to

resign, I will not resign. But would it be wrong for me not to

resign?’” (103). There is, however, no easy answer to Clare’s

question. In fact, there are many considerations in favor of it,

and there are many considerations against it. When she thinks of

those negative impacts of her resignation, she is inclined to

think her resignation wrong. When she thinks of the good impacts

her resignation may have, she is inclined to think that it is the

right thing to do. Enter the contextualist, who quickly explains

to Clare what her problem is.

“Do not worry. You are mistaken in supposing that thereis a disagreement between what you think when you think‘It would be wrong for me not to resign’ and what you

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think when you think ‘It would not be wrong for me not to resign’. Both thoughts are true. The sentence ‘It would not be wrong for me not to resign’ expresses different propositions as uttered in different contexts. Sometimes, the considerations in favor of resigning are more salient to you; that creates a context in which ‘It would be wrong for you not to resign’ expresses a truth, to which you are disposed toassent. At other times, the considerations against resigning are more salient to you; that creates a context in which ‘It would be wrong for me not to resign’ expresses a truth, to which you are disposed toassent. You have no need to reject one of these two thoughts.” (103)

First of all, could we really blame Clare if in some fit of

stressed exasperation she remonstrates, “Now what the hell good

is that going to do!” You see, Clare does not need to explain

away her conflicting intuitions. What she really wants is an

answer to the practical matter at hand, namely what action she

should perform. The answer to the practical question lies in the

answer to the question of whether or not the proposition

expressed by the sentence ‘It would be wrong for me to resign’

[A], in her context of resigning or not resigning is true. This

proposition, “the agents proposition”, is the only proposition

that can help guide Clare’s decision (ibid). Anyone, Clare

included, who uses A to express a proposition other than the

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agent’s proposition is no longer talking about the relevant

issue. The propositions expressed by A in those contexts in which

Clare turns about during her deliberations cannot help her answer

the relevant practical question. The point is that to give the

contextualist answer to a practical moral question is “to loose

sight of the meaning of the question” (105). Contextualism

contributes nothing to our moral deliberations. It gives us no

guidance as to which actions we should take.

Second, I think there is also a sense in which the question

itself, the question of whether or not it is wrong for Clare to

resign, becomes meaningless or trivial on the contextualist

reading. If Clare is the only member of her conversational

context, then it is her deliberations for or against resigning

that create a context in which A is true or false. But then it

will be true that whatever she decides about the truth or falsity

of A will be the case. There is a sense in which Clare cannot be

wrong about A, for if she decides that the sentence is false,

then it will be because she has created a context in which that

sentence is false. If she decides that it is true, then it will

be because she has created a context in which A is true. It seems

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that the contextualist treatment of Clare’s dilemma will commit

them to the truth of the following: ‘If Clare decides that

sentence A is true then it is true. If Clare decides that

sentence A is false then it is false.’

Third, I think it is worth pointing out how strange Clare’s

situation really is. Clare, a competent speaker of the language,

a competent moral agent, and a competent thinker, is not only

attempting to solve her moral dilemma by asking a totally

irrelevant question, but is agonizing over the answer to a

question that is trivial. There is something counterintuitive

about the truth or falsity of A having no bearing on Clare’s

practical situation. There is also something counterintuitive

about A’s answer being in some sense trivial or meaningless. But

there is something even more counterintuitive about Clare’s

agonizing over such a question as if it will help her to decide

whether or not to resign. The contextualist needs give some

explanation for how such a profound error could occur in a

competent moral agent and a competent speaker of the language.

We have seen that (1) contextualist considerations of moral

terms like ‘wrong’ do nothing to solve the relevant problem. They

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fail to give an account of the primary feature of our moral

terms, that of their prescriptiveness. (2) It trivializes the

very question that Clair is asking. (3) It ascribes a very

profound and counterintuitive error to competent moral agents and

competent speakers like Clare.

Section 3: Personal Justification as a Prescriptive Notion

The most distinctive feature of personal justification is

that it is about the actions of the believer. There is a very

strong case to be made that personal justification is a normative

notion akin to moral notions. Or let us say rather, that

‘personally justified’ is analogous to ‘wrong’. There are at

least two distinctive features of such normative terms. They

present us with a criterion by which to praise or blame the

agent, and they are essentially prescriptive. Normative language

tells us what we ought to do. It is obvious that we praise moral

agents who are virtuous, and blame those who are not virtuous.

Equally obvious is that when we say that an action is wrong for

an agent, we are saying that he ought not to do it. Our moral

terms tell us how we ought to act. Likewise, our normative

language of epistemic justification reflects those standards by

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which we either praise or blame an epistemic agent, and also the

standard governing our epistemic conduct.

Consider, for example, the following exchange:

Joe: I believe the moon landing was a hoax.Bob: Why?Joe: My Grandma told me so.Bob: Rubbish, you’re being irrational.

It is obvious that Bob means to criticize Joe for believing,

merely on the basis of his Grandmother’s testimony, something for

which there is so much counterevidence. Joe would not, for

example respond, “Why thank you Bob!”, nor would Bob follow up

with a pat on the back and a non-sarcastic “Good job Joe!” More

likely than not Joe will be offended and try to defend himself,

or embarrassed and recant. Equally obvious is that Bob intends to

say that believing in such a way is something that Joe ought not

do. Consider, for example, the implausible sentence ‘You are

irrational to believe that, but you ought to believe it.’

Our language of personal justification has the same purpose

as our moral language. Our standards governing epistemic duty are

those by which we either praise or blame a particular epistemic

agent. The language that reflects that standard is also

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prescriptive; it tells us how we ought to act in regard to

believing. When we ask if an agent was personally justified what

we really want to know is if they have done their epistemic duty.

There is then a direct analogy between ‘justified’ in the

relevant sense, and ‘wrong’ in the moral sense. Contextualist

accounts of moral language and contextualist accounts of personal

justification must stand or fall together. I argue that they must

fall.

Section 4: Contextualism and ‘Personally Justified’

Let us return to personal justification. In the last section

I argued that ‘personally justified’ is analogous to moral terms

like ‘wrong’. It reflects a standard by which we praise or blame

epistemic agents, and it is prescriptive. When we ask if a belief

is rational to hold, what we want to know is if we ought to hold

it. In fact, I propose that we can think of personal

justification as a sort of epistemological ethics. Business

ethics are rules governing conduct in business; medical ethics

are rules guiding conduct in the practice of medicine.

Epistemological ethics are considerations that govern our actions

as epistemic agents. Personal justification, and the language we

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use to describe it, ought to guide us in our practice of forming

and holding beliefs.

Now consider an epistemic agent, Bob, who is trying to

decide whether a particular belief is rational. He wants to know

whether or not he is personally justified in believing that God

exists. He thinks to himself “If I am justified in believing

that God exists, then I will believe that God exists. If I am not

justified in believing that God exists, then I will not believe

that God exists. But am I justified in believing that God

exists?” He agonizes over the question. He thinks about evil and

is convinced that God could not possibly allow such turpitude.

But then he thinks of Craig’s cosmological argument and

Plantinga’s two-dozen or so arguments in favor of theism. He

becomes convinced that it is rational to believe that God exists.

Then he considers Findlay’s paradox and Grim’s arguments against

omniscience, and considers that it would be irrational to believe

that God exists in light of those arguments. Enter the

contextualist:

“Do not worry. You are mistaken that there is a disagreement between what you think, when you think ‘I

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am justified in believing that God exists’, and when you think ‘I am not justified in believing that God exists.’ The sentence ‘I am justified in believing thatGod exists’ expresses different propositions in different contexts. Sometimes the considerations in favor of believing that God exists are more salient to you. This creates a context in which the sentence ‘I amjustified in believing that God exists’ expresses a truth, to which you are disposed to assent. Sometimes the considerations against believing that God exists are more salient to you. This creates a context in which the sentence ‘I am not justified in believing that God exists’ expresses a truth, to which you are disposed to assent. You have no need to reject one of these two thoughts.”

If the contextualist solution to Clare’s problem was obtuse,

problematic, and utterly unhelpful, it is equally so in Bob’s

case. The contextualist has done nothing to answer the question

of whether or not Bob ought to believe that God exists. Not only

so, but it has made nonsense of his question, for there is a

sense in which he cannot be wrong about it. Furthermore, if the

contextualist is right, Bob is agonizing over a question that

cannot possibly help him decide his case. Contextualism is

therefore unable to give an adequate account of personal

justification. Terms that are intended to be prescriptive, as is

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‘justified’, cannot function in that role and have semantic

values that are context sensitive

Conclusion

My argument, informally, has been as follows: ‘personally

justified’ and ‘wrong’ bear a strong and relevant analogy. The

predicate ‘wrong’ cannot be contextualized. Therefore, the

predicate ‘personally justified’ cannot be contextualized. I want

to conclude with some brief thoughts about the possible

implications of this conclusion. In most internalistic theories

of knowledge, (JR1) plays an important role. Thus, an internalist

might take this paper as a good reason to reject epistemic

contextualism. Likewise, an epistemic contextualist might well

take it as a reason to reject (JR1), and thus internalism.

Furthermore, the above arguments cut against certain

contextualist theories of knowledge. Any contextualist has to

answer the question of what causes the shifts in context that

change the truth-values of knowledge ascriptions. As Jonathan

Shaffer (2005) puts it, the contextualist needs to explain “which

epistemic gear the wheels of context turn” (p. 1). A

contextualist treatment that attempts to cash out context shifts

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by contextualizing ‘personal justification’ or some other co-

extensive predicate is ruled out by the above conclusion (ibid,

p. 4). Or consider, for example, some Williamsonian analysis of

knowledge in which knowledge is the primitive concept that is

then used to define related and ostensibly normative notions of

justification (Williamson, 2000, pp. 1-20). Suppose that the

primitive predicate ‘knows’ is, for some reason or other, context

sensitive. It is natural to think that this theory might imply

that ‘justified’ is also context sensitive. My arguments would

tell against such an account, or, at least, place some

constraints on it. These considerations are by no means

exhaustive. I only want to gesture at the way in which the

arguments contained here might gain traction in wider debates in

epistemology.

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References

Engel, Mylan, Jr. (1992) Personal and Doxastic Justification in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies vol. 67:133-150,

Jonathan Schaffer. (2005) What Shifts? Thresholds, Standards, or Alternatives? In Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (eds.) Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning and Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williamson, Timothy. (2000) Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williamson, Timothy. (2005) Knowledge, Context, and the Agents Point of View. In Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (eds.) Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning and Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Ethical Contextualism and Personal Justification

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