Guidance and Justification in Particularistic Ethics

GUIDANCE AND JUSTIFICATION INPARTICULARISTIC ETHICS*

ULRIK KIHLBOM

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that, contrary to a common line of criticism followed byscholars such as Helga Kuhse, a particularistic version of virtue ethicsproperly elaborated, can provide sound moral guidance and a satisfactoryaccount for moral justification of our opinions regarding, for instance,health care practice. In the first part of the paper, three criteria forcomparing normative theories with respect to action-guiding power areoutlined, and it is argued that the presented particularistic version ofvirtue ethics actually can provide more guidance than the universalistictheories favoured by Kuhse and others. In the second part of the paper it isclaimed that universalist normative theories have serious problemsaccounting for the role that moral principles are supposed to play in thejustification, of moral opinions, whereas the present version of virtueethics accommodates a plausible alternative idea of justification withoutinvoking moral principles or eschewing objectivity.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that a chief physician is considering whether or not tocontinue the life sustaining treatment of a particular patient, orthat a national committee is investigating appropriate directionsfor human cloning research. Can an ethical theory provideethical guidance and means for justifying moral opinions insituations such as these? Many philosophers hold the view that

Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702Volume 14 Number 4 2000

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* The first part of this paper was read at the Swedish National PhilosophicalConference in Gothenburg 1999. I wish to thank Christian Munthe andTorbjoÈrn TaÈnnsjoÈ for useful comments there. I would also like to thank LarsBergstroÈm, Gunnar BjoÈrnsson, Janet Borgeson, and HaÊkan SalweÂn inStockholm, as well as Justin Oakley as referee for Bioethics, for valuablecomments on an earlier draft of this paper.

these are two criteria for all theorising in ethics. An ethical theoryfailing in these respects suffers from a theoretical, rather than apractical defect.

In her latest book, Helga Kuhse argues that care ethics cannotguide actions or justify moral opinions, since this approach doesnot depend upon moral principles: `If we want to remainparticipants in ethical discourse, we must engage in principledethical thinking'.1 Non-principled or particularistic ethicaltheories, such as care and virtue ethics, fall short of having twoof the most important functions of moral theories, according toKuhse.2 To have prospects of providing guidance and justifi-cation, an ethical theory must be universalistic ± it must containuniversal moral principles.

In this article I present a particularistic moral standpoint that,I will argue, has the resources to provide moral guidance andsound moral arguments in a public sphere such as medicine.Moreover, I argue that universalistic normative theories havesignificant problems in these respects.

In the first section of the paper, I distinguish particularisticethical theories from universalistic ones, and give a brief sketchof the virtue theory I have in mind. In the second section, Iarticulate a precise notion of `guidance', and argue that thepresupposed version of virtue ethics can provide more guidancethan a universalistic ethical theory. Kuhse's argument thatparticularistic theories cannot account for justification iselaborated upon and rejected in the last section.

Particularistic and Universalistic Ethical Theories

Most versions of virtue and care ethics are particularistic in thesense that they deny the existence of, or the possibility of stating,valid moral principles that are important to moral reasoning. Thedifference between different particularistic theories lies in theirpositive accounts of the nature of sound moral reasoning.

Particularistic ethical theories oppose universalist ones.3

Universalist theories propose the existence of moral principles

1 Caring Nurses, Woman and Ethics, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1997), p. 196.2 The term `theory' is here used in a loose sense. On a more strict

terminology, particularistic accounts of moral reasoning are probably nottheories.

3 Particularistic theories need not be, and I believe should not be relativistic.Robert M. Veatch seems to claim otherwise in his `The Foundations ofBioethics', Bioethics, 13, 3±4 (1999), pp. 206±217. I return to the question ofobjectivity at the end of this paper.

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that are essential to our moral practice. Moral principles purportto express certain factors that are always and necessarily morallyright- or wrong-making, or factors that always and necessarily havea certain moral relevance. Accordingly, universalistic theorieseither contain strict moral principles stating the sufficientconditions for moral rightness and wrongness, such as the act-utilitarian principle, or moral principles with some kind of primafacie or ceteris paribus clause, such as W.D. Ross's prima facieprinciples. Both kinds of principles hold, if true, universally andnecessarily. They are taken to be universal both in the sense thatthey are governed by a universal quantifier, and by containing noproper names or predicates with non-eliminable space-timereferences or references to any particular object.4 Principleshold necessarily by supporting their counterfactual conditionalsand subjunctives.

Moral principles might appear to be vital elements in aspectsof our moral practice. For example, Hare has claimed that moralprinciples are essential for moral learning, Kuhse that they arenecessary for guidance, and Rawls that they are indispensableparts in the justification of moral opinions. Moral principles maybe taken to be important in one, in several or in every aspect ofmoral reasoning. That is, a normative theory may be more or lessparticularistic or universalistic. Ross, for instance, was aparticularist on the question of how to acquire moral knowledgein a particular case, a point on which he differs from Kuhse.However, they are both universalists on the point of justification.

Kuhse discusses at least three related aspects of moral practice:guidance, moral deliberation and the justification of moralopinions, though she does not clearly distinguish between them.Due to limited space, this article will bracket the question ofmoral deliberation, and focus upon guidance and justification.

I suggest that an ethical theory might provide guidance inmorally puzzling situations where the agent does not know whatto do, situations in which it is hard to know how to act or how toreason, and where one is undecided. An ethical theory mightprovide justification, on the other hand, if it provides goodgrounds for a certain moral opinion. In practice, this is aquestion of providing reasons why an opinion is the right one.

4 See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press,Cambridge, 1971), p. 131±2, and Richard, M. Hare's `Principles' in Essays inEthical Theory, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989), p. 52.

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A Virtue Ethical Theory Outlined

The particularistic approach that I believe has the most virtuesand the least vices is a neo-Aristotelian approach that draws onthe work of John McDowell and others.5 Space allows only a briefoutline of the most important normative and meta-ethical claimsthis virtue ethical theory involves. I will start with the former kindof commitments.

Suppose that a certain nurse meets the moral ideal accordingto this virtue theory, and that she has, among other virtues, thevirtue of being caring. The normative focus on her characterrather than on her actions marks a difference between virtueethics and most universalistic theories ± primarily focused uponactions and their consequences. That an ethics of virtue takesmoral assessment of human character to be more basic thanmoral assessment of action does not imply that it has nothing tosay about moral rightness of actions. Right actions, on the presentview, are those that flow naturally from the morally valuable partsof the character of a virtuous person. However, actions are notmorally right because of, or in virtue of, being actions that would beperformed or judged as morally right by a virtuous person.6 Whatmake some actions morally right are the factors the virtuousperson perceives in the situation as morally relevant. For examplethat among other patients at the ward where the nurse works,there is a patient who one day has severe anxiety. Being morallycompetent, the nurse is sensitive to the moral requirement thisanxious state gives rise to ± she sees the patient's condition asmorally salient and stays with the patient, rather than sharing hertime more equally between all the patients.

5 See McDowell's Àre Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?',Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 52 (1978) pp. 13±29; `Virtue andReason', The Monist, 62, 3 (1979), pp. 331±50, and `Non-cognitivism and Rule-following' in Wittgenstein To Follow a Rule, eds. Holtzman & Leich (Routledgeand Kegan Paul, London 1981). Jonathan Dancy, Sabina Lovibond, DavidMcNaughton, Mark Platts and David Wiggins have proposed similar views.Aristotle was perhaps not as particularistic as some of the writers above haveinterpreted him to be, see e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 3 1147b4±6.

6 Rosalind Hurst seems to have such a interpretation of virtue ethics in mindsaying that Àn action is right if it is what a virtuous agent wouldcharacteristically (acting in character) do in the circumstances', and comparingthis claim with the utilitarian claim that Àn action is right if it promotes thebest consequence'. The latter, but not the former, is plausibly interpreted as aclaim about what makes an action morally right. See Hurst, `Normative VirtueEthics' in How Should One Live: Essays on the Virtues, ed. Roger Crisp (OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 1996), pp. 20 and 22.

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Since the nature of the morally relevant features cannot becaptured in terms of universal moral principles, we should try toacquire the morally valuable traits of character that enable us to besensitive to moral requirements: virtues. Being more or less non-virtuous and in need of guidance, we might take the actions of thevirtuous person as a guide of moral rightness. This normative viewis compatible with the use of quite general moral rules: rules ofthumb that do not hold universally or necessarily, but indicate thata certain kind of action is often wrong, or that a certain factor isoften a reason to perform a certain action. Such rules are results ofreflections on virtues, and not the other way around.

No definite list of virtues is provided here, and I doubt that anattempt to put forward such a list would be very fruitful. Thetraits that are morally good are most of those which, afterreflection, we actually think are good ± for instance, to be just,caring, considerate, to have the courage of your convictions, andperhaps most importantly, to know when it is proper to be eachof these.

To identify nurse A's trait of being caring as a piece of moralknowledge, the following must be true of A: She must be capableof reliably apprehending when an act of care is required, she mustbe aware of the factor(-s) that calls for the action in question. Anon-virtuous person in the same situation as A might of course alsosee that the patient is in severe distress, but does not see this as amoral reason to act as A, correctly, does. Thus, the virtue ethicalview sketched here involves a version of ethical realism and ethicalcognitivism. Moreover, it must be in virtue of A's recognition ofthe morally salient feature that she is motivated to act in a caringway. It is important that her cognition can fully explain her action± that there is no need for an extra motive to account for hercaring act ± if it is to be identified with virtue. That the virtuousperson acts on moral grounds distinguishes virtue from otherskills, and A from another person who acts in the same way as Abut for different reasons. Furthermore, that A sees that caringrather than justice, say, as morally required indicates that shepossesses all the relevant traits of a virtuous person. In other words,moral knowledge is, on the present view, ideally a single practicalcompetence, and not a bundle of disparate perceptual abilities,which may vary in magnitude. Nurse A will also have acquired herability by habituation, people are not born with the virtuousperson's sensitivity to moral requirements. Shaping this perceptualmotivational apparatus takes time and practical training.7

7 See McDowell, `Virtue and Reason', p. 331±34.



Using the term virtue ethics in the following, I refer to the viewsketched in this section.

GUIDANCE AND VIRTUE ETHICS

I interpret Kuhse's argument concerning guidance andparticularistic theories as a practical objection. That is, Iunderstand her criticism as a claim that without moral principles± without the universal pairing of non-ethical and ethicalproperties ± an ethical theory cannot provide moral guidanceand justification in concrete cases: cases that the agent meets byacquaintance rather than by description (using a somewhatextended version of Russell's terminology). Of course,particularistic theories are, for quite obvious reasons, probablynot very good guides in abstract thought examples. But thisshould not worry adherents of particularistic theories.

Criteria for Moral Guidance

Guidance is often said to be a question of providing advice on oranswers to moral problems. This is not very illuminating andthere is much to be said about this notion. Here I will limit myselfto three criteria by which two ethical theories can be comparedwith respect to guidance, viz.:

1. Scope.2. Determinism.3. Decisiveness.8

I take these criteria to be independent of each other and carryingneither initial weights nor mutual ranking. What I will say is that anormative theory, T1, provides more moral guidance in a givensituation than another theory, T2, if, ceteris paribus, it satisfies oneof these criteria to a higher degree than T2.

T1 has greater scope than T2 if it provides answers or advicerelative to a wider range of moral problems than T2. Moralproblems may be categorised according to the areas in whichthey occur, e.g., in medicine, law, politics or in private orpersonal circumstances. They may also be categorised according

8 I have borrowed this strategy from David Solomon. However, Solomonstates three quite different criteria and has no discussion on the comparison.Cf., his `Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 13,eds. French, Uehling Jr, and Howard. (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame,Ind, 1988), pp. 428±441. esp. p. 438.

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to the level at which they crop up, at a public or legislative level orat individual level. For instance, it might seem that utilitarianismprovides guidance in any area and at any level, while care ethics ismore limited in this respect by taking personal relations as apoint of departure.

T1 is more deterministic than T2 if it provides a more definiteand specific answer to the question of how one ought to act in aparticular situation, given relevant knowledge. Again, it might bethought that the utilitarian principle is more deterministic than aprima facie-principle of Ross' kind.

A normative theory satisfies the criterion of decisiveness to theextent that the agent(-s) can know how she ought to act in agiven situation. This last criterion is an epistemological one,while the second is rather an ontological or perhaps logical one.Act-utilitarianism seems, for instance, to be quite indecisive sinceit requires practically impossible knowledge about the long-termconsequences of several alternative actions.

Even though these criteria probably capture much of what hasbeen intended in the discussion of the action-guiding function ofnormative theories, they do not say anything about how much orin what way a given theory might provide guidance in a particularcase. Moreover, these criteria are not together sufficient forcomparing the guiding power of two ethical theories. Facing amoral problem, we are not only interested in a definite answer,but crucially in the right answer, or at least a kind of guidance thatis correct as far as it goes. Otherwise, there are many other pro-cedures we may turn to. To flip a coin or to consult a spiritualisticmedium might turn out to provide more guidance on thesecriteria than any normative theory. For this reason a normativetheory should also (at least) be normatively and psychologicallyplausible. There is, however, no room for discussing thefulfilment of these criteria in this article. In the following, thediscussion will concern the extent to which a given theory relativeto another satisfies the first three criteria given that the theory isplausible in these respects.

Scope

Virtue ethics has the same scope as any universalistic theory, or soI will argue. Again, this discussion concerns concrete cases. Insuch cases virtue ethics applies to the same range of moralproblems as universalistic theories.

A universalist would perhaps object that any particularistictheory concerns particular cases whereas some moral problems



concern future situations, situations only knowable by descrip-tion. It might be argued that public decisions, such as whether ornot to allow cloning of humans, leave no room for `seeing' orsimply realising what to do in a particular case. Dealing with suchproblems is a question of weighing different possible factorsagainst each other.

The virtue theorist's reply to this objection is that public moralproblems confront decision-makers here and now. The membersof the national committee or anyone else about to take a stanceon a question such as this, certainly is in a particular situation inthe relevant sense. A decision concerning, e.g., a law on humancloning, is a distinct and concrete problem with featuresknowable by acquaintance. The virtuous persons can see orjudge what is relevant without calculating or weighing differentmoral tendencies or values against each other. This notion ofmoral perception does not imply a swift or spontaneous passedprima facie judgement, quite the contrary. The virtuous personmust reflect thoroughly and cautiously upon the whole situation,e.g., considering the possible consequences of different options ±the kind of features that often are morally salient in a particularsituation.

Another, and perhaps stronger, objection to the claim thatvirtue ethics has the same scope as a universalistic theory, is thatvirtue ethics essentially concerns the development andflourishing of individual characters and how these individualsought to live their lives. Accordingly, virtue ethics would saynothing about how societies ought to be arranged or how groupsought to act. Universalist theories like utilitarianism and Rawls'theory of justice, on the other hand, seem perfectly adequate todeal with public moral questions.9

A reasonable response is that it is, crucially, individuals thatmake public decisions. Assuredly, it is often said that govern-ments or boards make decisions or have duties and responsi-bilities. To the extent that this is plausible, it seems reasonable toattribute motives and virtues to such groups. A society might, forinstance, be said to be more or less tolerant or a club to be moreor less generous. However, the moral terms of virtue ethics applymore correctly to the individuals making up such a group than tothe group itself. By considering different virtues and how thevirtuous person would act, public decision-makers may consultvirtue theory. Moral requirements apply, moreover, just as much

9 Kuhse advances a similar objection against care ethics, Kuhse, Caring, p.137.

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to such individuals in their public role. I.e., members of, e.g.,government or parliament ought to be scrupulously just, orconsiderate, towards the ones affected by their actions.

In the spirit of virtue ethics, it might furthermore be suggestedthat political actions should aim at the human good, which inpart is human flourishing or the development of virtues.

Determinism

It might seem that utilitarianism is more deterministic than aprima facie theory such as Ross', and that virtue ethical theory iseven less deterministic. However, upon closer consideration thisseems not to be the case. Surely, the act-utilitarian principle ismore deterministic than a prima facie-principle, the latter statingonly the sufficient conditions for moral tendencies, not theoverall moral rightness or wrongness. However, the relevantelements of comparison here are normative theories, not singlenormative principles. According to Ross, there is a definiteanswer in every situation as to how one ought to act, one's dutyproper, namely the resultant of the different moral tendencies atwork in the situation.10 All the theories are deterministic in thismetaphysical sense, including the virtue ethical view outlinedabove. On this view there is a definite answer in every situation.

It might now be assured that all theories say that the `moralworld' is deterministic. However, the objector might continue,neither the prima facie-theories nor virtue ethical theories aredeterministic in the sense relevant for moral guidance. Even ifthe prima facie-theory or the virtue ethical theory has a definiteanswer ± to do one's overall duty or to do what the virtuousperson would do ± it might be claimed that only theories withstrict moral principles, e.g. act-utilitarianism, provide an answerin terms of moral reasons. The utilitarian answer comes in termsof what makes the action morally right or wrong, and this is whereprima facie, and virtue theories, fail. With the utilitarian formulaand knowledge of all the facts, it is possible to infer what to dowithout any additional capacity, intuitive or other. Nounanalysed intuitive judgement or perceptual capacity isrequired to generate the answer given sufficient knowledgeabout the facts. Moreover, the two other kinds of theories saynothing generally about the element of intuitive judgement that

10 See chapter 2 in Ross's, The Right and the Good, (Clarendon Press, Oxford,1930), Robert Gay has this interpretation of Ross' theory in his `EthicalPluralism: a Reply to Dancy', Mind, 94, 374 (1985), pp. 250±62. esp. p. 255.



they take to be crucial and irreducible, or so the objection mightgo.11

However, in order to infer a practical conclusion, it does notseem necessary to have a principle prescribing what makes anaction right. With a major premise like `The action that ought tobe carried out is the action that the virtuous person wouldperform', and with knowledge of what the virtuous person woulddo, it is possible to infer what one ought to do. Virtue ethicsseems at least as deterministic in this sense as utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism gives an answer in terms of right-makingcharacteristics, but it seems to be false to claim that it is possible,in any mechanical way, to infer what to do from the utilitarianprinciple and the relevant facts in a concrete situation withoutmaking intuitive judgements. First, central notions such asàlternatives' and `consequences' must be interpreted whenapplying the act-utilitarian principle to a concrete situation, andthe way this is done will decisively affect the practical conclusion.Utilitarians and consequentialists have devoted much effort todiscuss these issues.12 There seems, however, to be no agreementon how to interpret a notion such as àlternative'. Second, even ifsatisfactory suggestions would be at hand here, the application ofany strict moral principle to a concrete situation requiresjudgements, which the utilitarian formula says nothing about.Something other than knowledge of the principle is needed tobridge universal principles and particular situations, a capacity tosee that a situation falls under the utilitarian principle. Invokingother principles leads to similar problems. On the point ofdeterminism, then, theories with strict principles are no betteroff than prima facie theories.

Furthermore, virtue ethics seems to be better off on this point.It has been claimed that virtue ethics says nothing about how thejudgements are to be made. Quite the contrary. The virtuesconcern how one ought to see the situation, an issue I move tonow.

11 I owe this objection to TorbjoÈrn TaÈnnsjoÈ. David McNaughton draws asimilar conclusion when defending Ross's theory in his Àn Unconnected Heapof Duties?', The Philosophical Quarterly, 46, 185, (1996), pp. 433±447. esp. p. 446.

12 An extensive discussion on the notion of àlternatives' started off withLars BergstroÈm's The Alternatives and Consequences of Actions, (Stockholm,Almqvist & Wiksell, 1966). For a summary of that discussion and a thoroughdiscussion on other notions such as `performability', òutcome', and àction',see Erik Carlsson's Some Basic Problems of Consequentialism, (Uppsala University,Uppsala, 1994).

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Decisiveness

Virtue ethics is more decisive than universalistic theories. Inconcrete situations, a virtuous person is in a betterepistemological position than an agent trying to apply auniversalistic theory.

It seems comparatively easier for the virtuous person todetermine whether she should be caring, just or kind, than foran agent equipped with, for example, preference-utilitarianismor Rawls' theory of justice to judge if a certain action maximisesthe over-all preference-satisfaction or puts the worst-off group ina better position. It is true that a virtuous person cannot capturehis capacity in universal terms, but having the virtues is to knowhow to judge or perceive the situation case by case ± and it is theconcrete cases that are important. Moreover, even we who aremore or less non-virtuous are able to learn such a concept as careby concrete examples of caring. We can agree on instances of actsof care, and provide reasons why certain acts are acts of care andothers not. On the other hand, to decide whether an actionmaximises the over-all preference satisfaction hardly seemspossible at all. Not only do we need to know the aggregatedamount of preference satisfaction a certain action will generateto the end of time, but we need to know the sum of preferencesatisfaction each alternative action in the situation would lead to,and compare these sums.13

It might more cautiously be claimed that moral theories do notdirectly provide definite answers to particular moral problems.Rather, the guiding role of normative theories takes the form ofadvice on how to reason or deliberate, not solutions in terms ofhow one ought to act in a particular situation.14 Kuhse seems toagree with this. She puts forward a Harean two-level conceptionof ethics, according to which we ought to instil relatively simpleuniversal moral principles into our motivational system. Thesehighly general principles are to be used for guidance at the`intuitive level' in common and fairly time-pressured situations.We should nonetheless be able to submit them `to criticalthought when that is appropriate and safe'.15 Critical moralthinking is, roughly, the act-utilitarian weighing-procedure of

13 For more criticism in this vein, see Lars BergstroÈm, `Reflections onConsequentialism' Theoria, 62, 2±3 (1996), 74±94, esp. pp. 81 and 88±89.

14 Beauchamp & Childress, among others, have this view on moral theories,see their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979),ch. 2.

15 Hare, Moral Thinking, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1981), p. 39.



determining which simple principle maximises preference-satisfaction in that situation. In line with this model, Kuhsesuggests that it is most important in medical care to internalisevirtues such as caring, but only if it can be supported by criticalthinking. We need a universal and impartial guide on this leveltoo.

I will return to the problem of justification in the next section;here it suffices to recognise that the two-level conception ofmoral thinking fails to solve the epistemological problemrelevant to guidance. The two-level suggestion is, in short, this:Since the comparison of the overall consequences of differentalternative actions in concrete situations is too difficult anddemanding, we ought to `develop the kinds of motivation thatmay well serve us best, over time'.16 That is, we should acquire theset of simple principles that, if we act upon it, maximises the sumof preference-satisfaction relative to other optional sets of suchprinciples. However, the problem of comparing the sum ofpreference satisfaction that a certain set of highly general moralprinciples used at the intuitive level will generate with such sumsother alternative sets of such principles would generate in thesame situations seems simply insurmountable, if at all intelligible.The problem has only been moved to another level, and becomeseven more difficult.

If an even more modest claim is put forward, e.g., thatutilitarianism gives advice in terms of where to look in hard cases,it is difficult to see that this would put universalistic theories in abetter position than particularistic ones.

However, there is (at least) one important argument againstvirtue ethics relevant to the comparison of universalistic andparticularistic theories on this epistemological criterion. It mightbe argued that virtue ethics seems to imply that it is impossible toreach a sound conclusion of what to do in a concrete situation bymoral reasoning, if you do not already have the virtues. Withoutthe capacity to apprehend what to do already installed in us, wecannot get to know what to do by consulting virtue theory. Tobecome a virtuous person we need to start early in life with theright kind of training. Those of us who missed or played truantfrom moral classes are forever morally blind. This, moreover,seems to be true for most of us. Only very few, if any, reallygraduated from ethical college and got their moral lenses. Thevirtuous persons are, on the other hand, hardly in need ofguidance of a moral theory. So virtue ethics cannot play any

16 Kuhse, Caring, p. 139.

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guiding role in morally difficult concrete situations in areas suchas medical ethics.17

This objection is not as forceful as it might seem. It rests onthree dubious assumptions: (i) that virtue is a question of all ornothing; (ii) that moral development stops at a certain and quiteearly time in life; and (iii) that virtue ethics is incompatible withthe use of moral rules.

The virtuous person is a moral ideal, which probably no oneever fully satisfies. This does not, however, imply that all of us arethoroughly non-virtuous and that the ideal of the virtuous personis too strong to be of any use. Some of us are closer to this idea ofmoral perfection than others, and most of us satisfy it to somedegree sometimes. It is, obviously, meaningful to talk aboutvirtues such as kindness, care, and so on. Secondly, there is noreason to assume that moral learning necessarily stops at acertain time of life. It is certainly the case that it sometimes does ±that people simply quit reflecting upon their own opinions andhow they relate to each other. However, it seems clearly possibleto continue the development of valuable character traits throughout one's life. There is nothing in virtue ethics that goes againstthis possibility. Thirdly, we might find ourselves in situationswhere it is quite obvious to us that we are, or will be, unable to dothe right thing from considering the situation only. I might, forinstance, know that if I go to that meeting tomorrow with thosepersons and there try to judge the situation, I would be unable toact justly ± which is what I ought to do. I might, quite unwillingly,realise that I will be blinded by my own desires or by my aversions,and will favour or disfavour one of the persons involved. In suchcases it might be better to follow a rule of thumb, saying whatfactors just actions often are grounded upon in situations of thatkind. It might be better in the sense that my action then is closerto how the virtuous person would act. These moral rules aregenerated from reflection upon virtues, and not universal moralprinciples.

The conclusion, then, is that at least one particularistic ethicaltheory ± virtue ethics ± is probably better suited for moralguidance than universalistic theories.

17 Both Jonathan Dancy and TorbjoÈrn TaÈnnsjoÈ raise this objection toMcDowell's virtue ethical approach, cf., Dancy Moral Reasons, (Blackwell,Oxford, 1993), p. 61 and TaÈnnsjoÈ , `In Defence of Theory in Ethics', CanadianJournal of Philosophy, 25, 4 (1996), pp. 571±593. esp. p. 578.



JUSTIFICATION

Kuhse claims that:

[N]urses [who] eschew all universal principles and norms . . .will not be able to participate in ethical discourse. They willnot be able to defend their own legitimate claims ± and themotto of the first Canadian school of nursing, `I see and I amsilent' will have continuing relevance for nurses.18

Explicit universal and impartial moral principles are, on thisthought, necessary for sound moral argumentation andjustification. Without moral principles, our reasons, if any, willbe capricious, misleading and incapable of guiding us towardsolutions of ethical dilemmas.19 Here I will discuss and rejectthree interpretations of this objection, and propose a positiveaccount of particularistic justification.

Kuhse discusses a case in which a nurse had cared over a longperiod for a severely aphasic and diabetic patient who sufferedfrom poor blood-circulation and who had little time left.Following an amputation of the leg at the hip, the patient hada deteriorating wound which needed regular dressing changes.Due to an additional lung problem, the patient could not getadequate pain medication and the dressing changes wereextremely painful. On the basis of the nurse's contact with thepatient, she firmly believed that he did not want to live anylonger, and she opposed the life-sustaining treatment theattending physician and head nurse had issued. The nurse haddifficulties, however, in providing reasons for her opinion. Shehad a problem with `translat[ing] [her] own moral experienceinto traditional moral language'.20 After several meetings withher superiors, she was removed from intensive care and placedon another unit. The patient died in pain a week later after beingresuscitated several times.

Supervenience and Determination

As with the nurse in this case, one may sometimes hold a moralopinion and have problems expressing one's reasons for the

18 Kuhse, Caring, p. 166.19 Ibid., pp. 152±166. It is not clear if Kuhse only has strict moral principles

in mind here or includes principles of prima facie-principles (in Ross's sense) aswell.

20 Ibid., p. 161. Kuhse quotes the nurse Randy Spreen Parker from Parker'sown `Nurses Stories', in Advances in Nursing Science, 13, 1 (1990), pp. 31±40, esp.pp. 31±34.

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opinion. Kuhse says, rightly, that we need to justify our moralopinions with reasons and that a mere opinion or `feeling' thatsomething should not be done does not suffice in a moraldiscourse. To give reasons for our moral opinions is a constitutivepart of our moral practice. Anyone failing to recognise this is notreally participating in a moral discourse. So far Kuhse's view is inagreement with the present particularistic theory which includesan acceptance of the claims that moral facts supervene upon non-moral ones, and that non-moral facts determine moral facts.21 Thelatter claim implies that non-moral facts may explain moral ones.If it was wrong to sustain the treatment, there were reasons forthis, e.g., that the patient had severe pain and ± even with lifesustaining treatment ± only a short time left. There were, hence,non-moral factors that made it wrong to prolong the treatment,factors accessible to both the nurse and her superiors.Furthermore, if it would be right to sustain the treatment inanother similar case, there must be some non-ethical, butethically relevant, difference between the two cases: the ethicalsupervenes upon the non-ethical.

The acceptance of supervenience and determination hasepistemological implications, though not universalist ones. Whatmakes something right or wrong is in principle accessible to us. Ifa normative view is reasonable, there are reasons for this view thatwe may acknowledge. It seems implausible that in a particularcase one may be convinced that something is morally wrongwithout being convinced that there are reasons for the wrongnessand without having any clue of what constitutes those reasons.

On the particularistic view developed here, being right inone's moral opinion usually involves apprehending the reasonthat something is morally right or wrong. The nurse did not justexperience the wrongness: full stop. She saw that the patientsuffered enormously. She was convinced that he did not want tosustain the treatment and he had only a short time left to live ±these were her grounds.22 It is one thing that she had a problemexpressing her reasons for her opinion in a meeting with hersuperiors, quite another if she had no reason at all.

Assume, contrary to fact, that she were able to express herreasons and did that roughly along these lines:

21 It is not important that the relata of these two dependence relations hereare kinds of facts and facts, respectively. They might be kinds of statements,truths, properties or predicates. In other words, the question of realism in ethicsis not at stake here.

22 In her report the nurse explicitly states these factors. Cf., Kuhse, Caring, p.161.



`The patient is in severe pain and suffers immensely, he won'tlive for much longer even with the life sustaining treatment,something he is well aware of. Knowing him well, I'mconvinced that he wants to end the treatment. This is whythe treatment ought to be ended.'

She sees the mentioned factors as sufficient reasons in thesituation without making explicit appeal to universal moralprinciples. We do not need to suppose that such are implicit inher reasoning (I will return to this last point later). The nurseneed not and should not be silent when asked for reasons for herparticular moral opinion. That there are reasons why an action ismorally right or wrong, is, then, a basic assumption in the presentparticularistic view on ethics. I believe that this goes for mostparticularistic theories, including care ethics.

Opinions and Public Reasons

Perhaps Kuhse would agree to this, but still claim that theexperience of the nurse is `private' and without any `persuasivepowers for others'.23 The suggestion is now that the nurse's wayof seeing things is subjective and cannot, even in principle, beshared by others: `[Only] a principled approach . . . can provideus with a common moral language and hence a method forseeking solutions'.24

This is not convincing. Her view is admittedly subjective, butonly in the trivial sense that it is hers ± she holds it. This does notmake it inaccessible to others. The factors the nurse appeals to asreasons can be shared or are public in that others may approve ordisapprove both of their existence and of their moral relevance.The suffering of the patient, his overall condition and so on, areaccessible and disputable to others than the nurse. That thesefactors make it wrong to continue the treatment is also debatable,by, e.g. pointing to the difficulty of determining the patient's owndesires or referring to the policy of the hospital. The nurse andher superiors share enough to have, at least, the prospect ofreaching an agreement. Contrary to Kuhse's assertion, thenurse's ability to articulate her understanding of the situation ±how particular factors make it wrong to sustain the treatment ±may certainly have argumentative and persuasive power onothers. It seems false that `To eschew all moral principles is to

23 Ibid., p. 162.24 Ibid.

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withdraw from moral discourse and to retreat into an essentiallydumb world of one's own'.25

Independent Principles and Justification

However, I believe that Kuhse should not be interpreted as justmaking a point about pragmatics or rhetoric. More plausibly, sheis making the epistemologically stronger claim that withoutuniversal moral principles justification of a moral opinion isimpossible. According to Kuhse, the nurse's opinion `need[s]testing against some standard that lies outside the experienceitself' to participate in moral discourse and to justify her opinion.We have no more than a clash of opinions unless we have accessto an order of reasons independent of our opinions. Kuhseclaims that to assess one view as sufficiently grounded or justifiedand another one as not, requires an independent epistemicauthority. Otherwise, relativism or scepticism threatens justaround the corner.

The idea of such an external and independent moraltouchstone is not easy to get a grip on, and it is not clear whichversion Kuhse has in mind. In any case I have three suggestions.

The first suggestion is that we need an order of reason, whichis wholly independent of human thought. I doubt this is whatKuhse is after. Such an order would simply not be intelligiblesince we lack any conception of it.26

Another possibility is that Kuhse is arguing for a weaker andmore reasonable coherentist idea. This is, roughly, the idea thatfor an opinion to be justified, it needs to cohere with one ormore universal moral principles independent of that particularopinion. In order to be able to justify her opinion that treatmentought to be ended, the nurse must back it with one or a set ofuniversal moral principles which she has independent reasons tohold ± reasons among which this particular opinion does notfigure. Logical, evidential and perhaps explanatory relationsmust hold between the moral principle(-s), her opinion aboutthe patient, and other elements in her system of opinions.Coherentist ideas of justification have a lot to say for themselves.However, first, this is barely what Kuhse has in mind, and second,the traditional coherentist idea seems to be too strong to be

25 Ibid.26 This is how Simon Blackburn seems to interpret and dismiss the idea of

an independent justificatory order of reason, cf. Blackburn, Ruling Passions,(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988), p. 135.



applicable to moral justification. I will take the former point nowand discuss the latter in a moment.

On most versions of coherentism in moral epistemology,moral principles are supposed to be revisable when checkedagainst the particular considered judgements one holds, and viceversa. The credibility of a moral principle becomes relative to theinitially held considered moral judgements and, perhaps, otheropinions the person holds. This leads Richard Hare and PeterSinger, among others, to conclude that coherentism makes thetruth of a moral theory dependent upon accordance withpeople's opinions, and, thus, to reject coherentism.27 They thinkthat, on this idea, principles offer no real independent test ofparticular judgements and lead to subjectivism or relativism.There is no hope of establishing that a theory is objectively validif particular considered judgements are assigned the epistemicrole of being standards against which moral principles are to bechecked. Instead, we should, on the Harean view, establish themoral principles that constitute the independent test of particu-lar moral opinions by conceptual and logical considerations only.No substantial, general or particular, moral judgements arerequired, or should be invoked, to secure their validity.

This idea seems indeed to be mirrored in the `minimumconception of ethics' that Kuhse suggests in her book. Closelyfollowing James Rachels and Peter Singer, Kuhse states a`minimum conception' of ethics. This is supposed to be `aformal view of ethics' that is compatible with `quite different[substantive] ethical theories'.28 On this conception, ethicalreasoning is, at least, reasoning from a universal standpointbacked by impartial reasons. To make use of impartial reasons isin Rachel's' words, which Kuhse cites with approval, `[to give]equal weight to the interests of each individual who will beaffected by one's conduct'.29 Obviously, this conception of ethicsis far from a minimal one, being a rough version of preference-utilitarianism in another guise.

Moreover, even if the consequentialist aspect and theutilitarian notions of interests and weighing would be left out,Kuhse's conception of ethics would still not be minimal in anyplausible sense. Kuhse seems to conflate impartiality and

27 See Richard Hare, `Rawls' Theory of Justice', in Reading Rawls, ed.Norman Daniels (Blackwell, Oxford, 1975), pp. 82±83 and 91, and Peter Singer,`Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium', The Monist, 58, 3 (1974), p. 494 and 516.

28 Kuhse, Caring, p. 83.29 Ibid., p. 87. The passage is from Rachels' book The Elements of Moral

Philosophy, 2nd edn (New York: MacGraw Hill, 1993), p. 13.

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universality ± they are characterised as one traditional idea inethical theory.30 This is unfortunate since, as many have pointedout, a universal moral principle might be partial, and a non-universal principle might be impartial.31 A universal principle iscommonly thought of as one that is governed by a universalquantifier and contains no proper names or predicates with non-eliminable space-time references. An impartial principle, on theother hand, is one, which allows no agent-relative reasons, i.e.,moral reasons which, say, you and not I may have since you, andnot I, have special relations to the people involved. Universality isa formal requirement, and far less controversial than the latter,morally more substantive requirement. The requirement ofimpartiality places a restriction on the content of ethics andprobably excludes most common sense moralities. The minimumconception above is both universal and impartial.32 Thisconception is not very fruitful since it defines away particularisticapproaches to ethics and makes claims like `without principledreasoning we . . . would be opting out of ethical discoursealtogether' tautological.33

Coherentism and Justification

I believe that formal and conceptual reflections should lead us toadhere to some version of the idea that moral supervene and isdetermined by the non-moral but hardly to such a substantialand controversial moral theory as preference-utilitarianism.Justification of a particular opinion must be an appeal, not tosomething outside our system of beliefs or to the opinion inquestion, but to other beliefs we hold and hopefully share withothers, and beliefs not, or at least less, currently in question. Thisincludes substantial moral beliefs. Justificatory standards arenative to one's context, constituted in part by consensus on

30 Kuhse, Caring, pp. 80±8331 Cf., e.g., Blackburn, Ruling Passions, p. 225. Rawls emphasises this

distinction Ð his term for universality, however, is `generality', and for whatis here called `impartiality' Rawls uses `universality', Rawls, A Theory of Justice,(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971), pp. 131±2.

32 However, defending universalizability, Kuhse allows universal and partialmoral principles. Kuhse says that: `The principle that a son has an obligation todo certain things for his mother . . . is not specific to a certain individual; rather,it holds for all individuals who find themselves in the relevant circumstances orrelationships', Kuhse, Caring, p. 125.

33 Ibid., p. 196. Here Kuhse follows Peter Singer who makes a similar movein the introduction to his Practical Ethics, 2nd edn (Cambridge Univ. Press,Cambridge, 1993), pp. 12±15.



certain matters and shared intentions and views. This is, in part,how they acquire their authority. In the case above, the nursetries to get others to approve of her way of seeing the situation ±that the patient's suffering, state, etc., makes it wrong to continuethe treatment. This is not to eschew objectivity. The nurse shouldnot be interpreted as making a point about the state of the publicopinion or what it should be. When asserting the sentence `Tocontinue the treatment at this stage is wrong', she is saying thatthe truth condition for that sentence obtains, and truth is in thissense independent of public approval. To question the existenceof independent criteria for moral truth is not to question theidea of moral truth.

To put justificatory standards within our system of opinions isnot, however, to single out a particularistic account ofjustification of moral opinions. A coherentist universalist, sucha Rawls, may of course agree to the above. To single outparticularism, the claim must be, first, that there are no universalcriteria for moral truth that are useful in practice, and second,that there are non-principled standards of justification availablein particular situations. The former point will be discussed nowand the latter in the next subsection.

My suggestion is that Rawls's kind of universalism is facing adilemma: either the principles must be spelled out and becometoo complicated, or they must be qualified by some kind ofproviso clause, which leads to an unattractive `atomism'. The firsthorn of the dilemma is that to be plausible at all, strict moralprinciples must be so specific that they will be impossible toinvoke in sound moral argument. A principle like `Do not lie'cannot reasonably be taken as a plausible moral principle. Highlygeneral and strict principles (such as the prima facie-principles ofHare's later writing) will not do.34 If this is accepted, it is hard tosee that the specification can be stopped at a point, whichmatches our cognitive capacities. Furthermore, even if we couldspecify all the conditions under which it is wrong to lie, such aprinciple would barely cover a sufficiently number of possiblecases to be useful.

34 A notable feature of Hare's earlier writing is that he says that a principlemay be so complex that it: `defies formulation in words at all', Hare, Freedom andReason (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963), p. 39. A particularist may, as farI can see, agree that there might be moral principles in the sense that our moralreasoning is governed by complicated and deep structures (perhaps analogousto Chomsky's grammatical rules) which escapes capturing in explicit universalterms. This notion of moral principles is irrelevant here since such principlesare not apt for guidance or justification.

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This leads to the second horn of the dilemma. Instead ofspecifying the conditions that follow after Ìt is wrong to lieunless . . .', the principle is qualified by a clause such as ceterisparibus or prima facie: Ìt is wrong to lie, ceteris paribus'. This is theidea that certain factors universally and necessarily have acertain moral relevance. Lying keeps its moral `pull' in everyparticular case, even if overridden by other stronger moraltendencies in that case.35 To assume that relatively simplefeatures (such as suffering or the satisfaction of a strongpreference) have a moral tendency of the same kind andstrength in every situation in which they occur, is to assume akind of almost mechanistic àtomistic universalism', that uponcloser examination does not seem to reflect how we normallyexperience moral demands.

The atomistic universalist might plausibly reject the idea thatthe strength of a given moral tendency is exactly the same in everysituation, and claim that its particular strength is determined inthe particular case. Once this step is taken, however, there seemsto be no reason not to take a further step and give up universalismaltogether. That is, if it is admitted that the strength of a moralreason is determined by other factors in the particular case, itseems plausible to admit that the moral relevance of a certainfactor is wholly dependent upon other factors in the situation.This would be to acknowledge that suffering might lose its rel-evance: that it is not universally and necessarily morally relevant.This is compatible with there being factors, which, as it happens,always have the same moral relevance. However, these features areprobably relatively few and not of importance in hard moralcases.36

On the version of virtue ethics defended here, the moralrelevance of a certain factor is dependent upon other factors inthe situation and how they are structured. A factor, which wasmorally relevant in one case, might lose its moral relevance inanother similar case ± it may, as McDowell puts it, be `silenced' bya new and morally salient factor. For instance, in a particularsituation it may no longer be morally relevant that you stronglydesire X, since this situation requires a just action, and to satisfy

35 Many have taken this position. I have already mentioned Ross, but see alsoBergstroÈm, `Reflections on Consequentialism', p. 84; Blackburn, RulingPassions, p. 308, and Philip Montague, Ìn Defence of Moral Principles',Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46, 4, (1985), pp. 643±54.

36 This is the crucial line of demarcation between universalism andparticularism. Again, this concerns relatively simple properties that are possibleto process cognitively.



your desire for X would not be just. Your preference is notkeeping its moral relevance in any quasi-hydraulic sense. Thevirtuous person has the capacity to judge which moral conceptapplies. She may, for instance, understand that you have thisstrong preference, but by considering the situation fully, she seesthat she ought to be just and not, say, generous.

Virtues and Justification

Let us return to the justification of the nurse's suggested defenceof her opinion. She claims that, taken together, the patient'ssuffering, his overall state, and her belief about his wish toterminate the treatment, constitute sufficient reasons for doingthis. How may the nurse's reasons be taken as non-arbitrary andher view as justified on the present particularistic view?

The grounds we have for deeming a view as right is, on thepresent suggestion, public agreement. An opinion is justified if itand its grounds meet public assent. However, to be reasonable,two qualifications must be made regarding the assent, and thosewho assent to the opinions and its grounds.

To begin with the latter: Without qualifications on those whoassent, a set of inexperienced persons who, in fact, are unable toimagine in what other ways the situation might be understood,could be judged sufficient for the task. Justification becomesimportant when we have morally controversial cases that plaus-ibly, can be seen in different ways. Relevant assent requirespersons who are imaginative, who can see the situation in otherways, how other features could be relevant, and in the light of thisconcur with the view of the nurse. Morally competent people arerequired for morally relevant assent.

The second qualification concerns the assent. It seems implaus-ible that the nurse's opinion is justified only if she actually getsmorally competent persons to agree. To be reasonable at all, thiscondition should hold counterfactually, i.e., if such persons wouldbe persuaded.

It might be objected that these qualifications make theaccount too strong in virtue of making a belief justified in thelight of the true beliefs of the morally competent persons. Butthe qualifications do not suggest this. Morally competent personsare fallible. They are not fully rational and informed archangels.They are real persons who are able to master the moralvocabulary.

Moreover, the force of reasons offered should not be equatedwith the persuasiveness of a particular way of seeing one

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particular situation only. That the nurse takes certain factors,rather than others, as salient in that particular situation sayssomething about the nurse's more general moral outlook or viewon how one should live. In part, this is what one manifests inone's judgements and actions, and this is what we ± the judges ±in part approve of when approving of her reasons.

This is how a virtue ethical approach allows for criticism ofparticular and general moral views. A particular moral view canbe criticised for not cohering with our more general moral views,and vice versa. The nurse might have convinced her superiors toshare her view by laying it out and step by step reminding them ofwhat they accept, in other similar cases and more generally.

To dispute the idea of universal justificatory standards isneither to deny objectivity, nor to dispute the existence ofjustificatory standards. Again, in constituting our justificatorystandards, public assent is not what makes something morallyright or wrong: it is not part of what makes a moral opinion trueor false. The account of justification presented outlined here is,relative to universalism, partly sceptical. It denies the possibilityof universal moral knowledge. To require an account of whatmakes competent people assent, or an independent test of moralknowledge is to require exactly what particularism denies ± moralprinciples. However, as I have argued, ethical guidance andjustification in concrete situations do not require such principles.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have outlined reasons for thinking that a particularist virtueethical theory has practical import in at least two aspects. I haveargued that a correct virtue ethics is a better action guide than auniversal normative theory (given that that is correct). However,this is not to say that such a theory can always give guidance to asatisfactory degree, or how a single agent should deliberate in aconcrete situation. Also, I have suggested a virtue ethical accountof justification of moral opinions and pointed out someproblems for traditional universalistic accounts of justification.

Department of PhilosophyStockholm University



Guidance and Justification in Particularistic Ethics

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