Equal Employment Opportunity in Boston

PETER B. DOERINGER A N D MICHAEL J . P I O R E ”

Equal Employment Opportunity in Boston

THE VOCABULARY OF PUBLIC POLICY assigns various meanings to “equal employment opportunity.” In the context of this paper, the major concern is with racial employment patterns; the basic policy goal is to equalize the distribution of employment for blacks and whites. The policy instruments of primary consideration are short-run, designed to effect the employment opportunities of individuals already in or about to enter the labor market. They are of two kinds: (1) anti-discrimination programs and (2) manpower programs. A third range of programs are not considered here: those dealing with longer-run causes of employment disadvantage-Headstart, basic educational reforms, family service, and health programs.

Analytical Framework Dual labor market. In part, racial employment practices can

be understood in terms of a dual labor market.l Workers and jobs in the United States can be characterized as operating in one of two sectors of the labor market, a primary sector and a secondary sector.

The primary market offers jobs which possess several of the fouowing traits: high wages, good working conditions, employment stability and job security, equity and due process in the administration of work rules, and chances for advancement. The other, or secondary sector, has jobs which, relative to those in the primary sector, are decidedly less attractive. They tend to involve low wages, poor working conditions, considerable variability in employment, harsh and often arbitrary dis- cipline, and little opportunity to advance.2

Employers in the secondary sector customarily employ black or other disadvantaged workers. Because they c‘annot afford or do not require more

*The authors are Assistant Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

1Much of the analytical framework is derived from Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Amzlyski (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, forthcoming).

2See Michael J. Piore, “Manpower Policy,” in S. H. Bees and R. E. Barringer, editors, The State and the Poor (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1970).

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advantaged workers, direct employment discrimination tends to be muted. Moreover, since many jobs in that sector are unattractive and typically available to blacks, little would be gained from fighting discrimination there even if it were substantial. Second, the high unemployment rates among blacks and in the slums which have led many analysts to believe that any job would be an improvement appears in Boston to represent higher frictional unemployment caused by frequent turnover among workers in the secondary market. Because black workers are disproportionately concentrated in the secondary labor market, a part of the task of an equal opportunity policy is to free them from that market and enable them to gain access to jobs in the primary sector.

The other distortion in the racial distribution of employment opportunities is that, even in the primary sector, blacks tend to be confined to the less desirable and less remunerative positions. A policy of equality, therefore, also requires efforts to change the relative position of those blacks already attached to primary type employment situations. Both aspects of the equal opportunity problem require an understanding of the factors which generate the two labor markets, and, in the case of the primary market, which deter- mine movement within it.

InteTnaZ Eabor market. The dual labor market appears to be closely asso- ciated with the phenomenon of the internal labor market. Internal markets are administrative units within which the pricing and allocation of labor are governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures. These rules distin- guish between workers outside the market and those who have already gained access to them and accord to the latter certain rights and privileges relative to the external work force.3 The rules and procedures which govern mobility within internal markets define the degree of job security, the chances of advancement, and the extent to which due process prevails.

While it is not possible here to fully explore the factors which generate internal labor markets, they may be summarized as follows: (1) Workers favor internal labor markets because they offer job security and chances of advancement. (2) Employers favor such markets because they tend to reduce the costs of recruiting, screening, and training their work forces by reducing turnover and by permitting the development of more efficient techniques. It is to be emphasized that the principle benefits to both employers and employees are derived from the reduction in turnover.

The forces determining internal labor markets, and the rules which govern access to such markets and the allocation of jobs within them, create the

3 Doeringer and Piore, op. cit., Chaps. 1-2.

326 / PETER B. WERTNGER AND MICHAEL J. PIORE

distinction between primary and secondary employment. Secondary internal labor markets (and secondary jobs outside such markets) will be those in which employer investments in recruiting, screening, and training are small, and labor turnover is less important. Some secondary jobs lie outside any internal market, and the principles of labor allocation resemble much more closely the economist’s model of a competitive market in which jobs and workers are more or less interchangeable, Workers in such secondary employment are either less interested in security and advancement or are less able to impose their interest upon the structure of employment opportunities.

Enterprise and hiring hall markets. One further distinction is useful-that between enterprise and hiring hall markets. The former tend to dominate in manufacturing and for many clerical and white-collar jobs. Job security is provided by the rules governing internal allocation and great weight is generally given to seniority. Entry rules are not important in the provision of security. The employer is the more active actor in such markets and the union plays a relatively passive role. The union has little say in entry decisions, and in internal allocation decisions its role is confined to the negotiation of rules and the review of managerial decisions after they are taken.

Hiring hall markets dominate in construction and other industries where employment is of short duration. Here it is typically the union which defines and structures the market. In hiring hall markets, the rules governing entry are more important than internal allocative rules in generating racial employment patterns. It is through entry limitations that workers maintain their job security in contrast to enterprise markets where job security is provided by rules pertaining to the allocation of employees after they have entered the market. Depending upon the type of internal market, either the employer or the union will appear to be exercising principal control over employment opportunities and will therefore be singled out for civil rights complaint^.^

Causes and remedies. This analysis suggests the following categories of reasons for the differences in black and white employment opportunities: (1) blacks may be excluded because their labor turnover, individually or as a group, is so high that the employer is unable to recoup investments in recruitment, screening, or training; (2) blacks may be excluded because they- again either individually or as a group-are more expensive to recruit, screen,

4 While one party in an internal labor market wiU usually be the focus of civil rights action, it should be emphasized that the underlying structure of the market determines which party will be relatively more active and which more passive in the employment relationship. Differ- ences between the parties in this respect should not impIy Werent responsibilities, as is so often assumed to be the case.


or train; and (3) exclusion may occur because of the attempt of white workers to enhance their own security and advancement by the monopolization of jobs on the basis of race.6

This set of factors generating differences in the racial distribution of employment carries a corresponding set of remedies. There are those which (1) reduce turnover propensities; (2) lower the cost of recruitment, screening, and training; and (3) prevent the monopolization of jobs on the basis of race. A fourth category of remedy would seek to institute more discerning criteria for distinguishing among individuals so that the heavy reliance upon screening of applicants based upon gross distinctions (i.e., high school education, arrest records, and so forth, as well as race) could be reduced. It may be noted that all of these remedies carry costs either for the employer in terms of recruitment, screening, and training or to the white work force in terms of their job security and chances of advancement.

Policy instruments. It is important not to assume an easy correspondence between particular policy instruments and the categories used to analyze the structure of the problem. The major policy instruments have been manpower programs and the enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation. The differ- ence between the two instruments in terms of attacking the problem can be defined by reference to the rules of the internal labor market. Manpower programs are policy instruments designed to equip workers in one way or another to perform more successfully under a given set of rules. Anti-discrimination legislation is a policy instrument which acts by changing the rules.

Anti-discrimination legislation has carried in fact, if not in law, very weak penalties. The chief sanction has been the nuisance of investigations and the adverse publicity generated by governmental and community attention. Man- power programs involve a subsidy of the employment costs which practices to increase black employment almost always entail. As a result, manpower programs frequently encounter less resistance than do anti-discrimination legislation.

The Boston Labor Market: An Overview Population. Between 1960 and 1965, the population of the

metropolitan Boston area increased 9.3 per cent to 2,686,900 while popula-

5 The distinction between indiutduals and groups is essential to the analysis. Very few employment decisions are made on the basis of a careful examination of individual traits. More frequently, they are based upon examination of one or two easily identifiable traits which place the individual in one or another category. Employment decisions are then made on the basis of the probability that someone drawn at random from the category will possess certain individual traits. Race (and sex) are easily identifiable and are therefore convenient ways to group people.

328 / PETER B. DOERINGER AND MICHAEL J. PIORE

tion in Boston proper declined 21.9 per cent to 616,362.s Nonwhites comprised 13 per cent of the city’s population in 1960 and estimates place the current percentage as high as 20 per cent. About 5 per cent of the population in the metropolitan area is black. The minority population in the city is likely to increase during the next decade. Twenty-four per cent of the births recorded in Boston in 1966 were nonwhite compared to 16 per cent in 1961. The Spanish-speaking population has risen from a few hundred in 1960 to an estimated 28,000.

Employment and the labor force. Employment in the city of Boston is dominated by commercial and service industries. According to a 1966 survey, wholesale and retail trade accounted for about one-third of the city’s employment while finance, insurance, real estate, and miscellaneous services comprised an additional third. Manufacturing provides about 20 per cent of the employment in the city and a slightly higher proportion in the metropolitan area, and contract construction accounts for less than 5 per cent of the employment in both the city and the area. Consistent with national trends, service employment is increasing relative to manufacturing employment and white-collar employment is growing relative to blue-collar.

The labor market in general has tightened considerably since 1964. At the end of 1969, the unemployment rate was estimated at 3.2 per cent in the area and slightly over 4 per cent in the city.? Black employment varies considerably by industry. Among the 15 largest industries in the SMSA in 1966, the Negro employment rates in medical services, miscellaneous services, and food products were 7.2, 6.5, and 4.1 per cent, respectively. Among the low rank- ing industries were utilities (5 per cent), communications (1.2 per cent), transportation equipment (1.8 per cent), and printing and publishing (1.7 per cent).s

The occupational distribution of black employment is of course skewed towards low-skilled, low-paying occupations. In 1966, almost 40 per cent of the black employed in Boston were in service occupations as opposed to 9.9 per cent of the white employees. Almost two-thirds of the blacks were employed in service, laborer, and operative classifications, compared to slightly

8 Unless otherwise noted, data in this section is from The Boston Comprehensiue Manpower Plan, Fiscal Year 1970-Part A. This document relies heavily upon data from the Census, the Massachusetts Division of Employment Security, the Bureau of Labor Statistics Regional Office, reports of the Boston Metropolitan Area Planning Council, and the Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development.

7 Massachusetts Division of Employment Security, “Massachusetts Trends, in Employment and Unemployment,” various months.

SSpecial tabulation of 1966 EEO-1 data by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.


over one-quarter of the whitesSg Comparison of the 1950 and 1960 Census data for the area shows nonwhites making substantial occupational gains relative to whites in professional, technical, clerical, and skilled employment categories. Nonwhites also experienced relatively greater declines than whites in laborer, household worker, and service categories. According to a recent survey, the apparent gains between 1950 and 1960 were continued through 1968.1° Despite these gains, the nonwhite and white occupational distribu- tions in the Boston area remain far from equal.

This impression is reinforced by an unscientific sample of racial employment statistics from local companies and from discussions with local employers which indicate that they are gradually employing blacks in larger numbers during the sixties. These gains seem to have come more rapidly in blue-collar than in white-collar employment. With the exception of personnel and community relations functions, it seems that middle management in Boston remains largely white. Most of this evidence comes from middle and larger sized employers in the primary labor market, however, and it is difficult to assess the progress occurring among smaller employers in the primary labor market. Overall, there appears to be some progress, but it is slow.

It should be noted that all of this data is also subject to a less sanguine interpretation. The statistics constitute snapshot pictures of an occupational structure in a continual state of change. The pattern of change is one in which, generally speaking, new and expanding job categories appear at the higher status, more desirable end of the occupational spectrum pushing the older, stable, or declining categories downward toward lower status, less desirable position in the hierarchy. At the same time, the least desirable occupations become obsolete and disappear. Traditionally, this change in the job structure has been accompanied by the movement of whites into the expanding categories leaving the older, stable, and declining jobs vacant for blacks. Thus, blacks are always gaining access to new jobs, but their long-run position relative to whites does not change.

The secondary labor market. The aggregate labor market data presented above is consistent with the view that many blacks in Boston are employed in secondary jobs. Further evidence is available from a survey of both black and white workers seeking job referrals or training from Boston’s community action agency (ABCD) during 1967 and 1968. This survey found that unemployment was a less serious problem among the disadvantaged than unstable

9 Ibid. 1QFrom a special popuIation survey, Black and White in Boston (Boston, Mass.: United

Community Services of Metropolitan Boston, Research Department, 1968).


employment. With the exception of teenagers and women just entering the labor market, most of the disadvantaged had demonstrated their "employ- ability" by having held a job previously. Eighty-six per cent of the workers seeking job referrals or training from ABCD had previous work experience. Only 29 per cent of those surveyed had been unemployed for 15 weeks or more, and many of these were women returning to the labor force after not working for several years. However, over one-third of those with previous employment had remained on their previous job less than six months and only 20 per cent recorded continuous employment for two years or more. Placement data for the same group revealed a continuing pattern of high turnover-62 per cent of the placements did not remain employed for one month, and 80 per cent were no longer on the job after six months.11 Most of this turnover is reported as voluntary. In general, young workers and those on the lowest paying jobs were most likely to be unstable. Improved employment opportunities for these workers will depend upon the extent to which they can transfer from secondary to primary employment. Discrimination in housing, education, and employment is the most compelling reason for be- lieving that this transition will occur less readily for blacks than for whites.

This analysis suggests, despite a gradual trend towards improved black employment prospects in Boston, that there are strong economic and social forces maintaining unequal patterns of black and white employment. How- ever, an examination of those factors presumed to contribute to the observed improvement may suggest policy instruments for accelerating this trend. In the following sections the a u e n c e of (1) compliance activities, (2) labor market conditions, and (3) manpower programs in affecting patterns of black employment in Boston will be assessed.

Compliance Activities The major governmental agencies concerned with equal em-

ployment opportunity compliance in Boston are the Office of Federal Con- tract Compliance (OFCC) and the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis- crimination (MCAD)." The principal private organization active in this area is the New Urban League. This group works in an advisory capacity with OEO legal organizations and with the MCAD to obtain administrative or judicial relief against discriminating employers and unions. It also engages

11 See Peter B. Doeringer et al., LOW Income Labor Markets and Urban Manpower Pro- grams: A Critical Assessment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Ad- ministration, forthcoming).

12 The city of Boston has an O5ce of Human Rights and an Office of Contract Compliance which have responsibility for minority group employment problems within the city, but these agencies are too new to have established a record of enforcement or technical assistance.


in more militant forms of direct action, such as picketing, in conjunction with black student groups and the United Community Construction Workers, a black union claiming to represent 75 to 100 black journeymen.

Since last summer, the major focus of all these groups has been the construction industry. Hearings before the Massachusetts Advisory Committee to the United States Civil Rights Commission held in Boston last June her- alded this drive by surveying employment and compliance practices in construction. Coincident with these hearings the MCAD filed complaints against 25 contractors and unions. Since then, there have been a number of racial confrontations over construction at local universities. However, apart from investigations, legal maneuvering, and a great deal of speculation in the local press, these actions have produced little tangible achievement. The only formal compliance program in construction is the so-called “Boston Training Agreement” to provide training in the building trades for Boston’s Model City residents developed voluntarily by the building trades and contractors in 1968. Because of the attention given to construction industry problems in Boston, this sector will be examined separately below.

OFCC. As in other cities, the OFCC is understaffed with respect to its responsibilities. A single OFCC area coordinator directs compliance activities for the New England, New York, and Northern New Jersey region. The Massachusetts Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission found that most federal agencies have weak or nonexistent compliance programs, at least for federally assisted construction. Compliance plans have concentrated on procedures rather than specific performance goals, and, with the exception of the Post Office and the FAA, monitoring of plans has been irreg~1ar.l~ Local compliance personnel from the OFCC in Washington have been holding discussions with local organizations concerning Boston’s ver- sion of the “Philadelphia Plan,” but no details of the plan, if it exists, have been released. Recent press reports had been predicting the announcement of a “Boston Plan” by the OFCC sometime in January, but at the time of this writing (January 1970) there are reports that a plan relying on percentage employment targets for blacks on federally assisted construction is being postponed. Instead it is rumored that some form of area-wide training program will be deve10ped.l~

The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. One of the old- 13 See Statement of Reverend Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Chairman of the Massachusetts State

Advisory Committee, to the U.S. Commission on Civd Rights, on contract compliance in the construction industry in Boston-Press Conference July 17,1969 (mimeographed).

14 ‘‘Stall on Black Jobs Hinted,” Boston Globe, January 29,1070.


est state fair employment practices commissions in the United States, MCAD was established in 1946 under a broad statute prohibiting racial discrimination in employment and housing. In the employment area the statutory pow- ers of the MCAD are considerably stronger than its federal counterpart, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The MCAD can issue orders that are enforceable in the state courts. It can also initiate Complaints on its own motion and proceed to an investigation based on the complaint of a single commissioner. Despite this potential power, the MCAD has not until recently played an aggressive role in promulgating complaints.

Traditionally, individual complaints have formed the basis of most of the MCAD’s investigations. It has found, however, that case-by-case action on individual complaints is a laborious method for eliminating widespread discriminatory practices. Within the past year, coincident with new appoint- ments to the MCAD, it has become considerably more active. Its appropria- tion was increased from an average of about $222,000 in fiscal years 1967 and 1968 to about $631,000 for fiscal year 1970, permitting a substantial expan- sion of its field staff .16 Second, and probably more important, there has been a change in MCAD policy with respect to complaints. Under individual complaints, which typically involve discrimination in recruitment and hiring, the MCAD now seeks to investigate the full range of employment practices in hopes of remedying general practices having a discriminatory effect while also reaching the specific problem raised by the individual plaintiff. If effec- tive, this policy will require revisions in many of the allocative rules of primary internal labor markets.

Under a special grant from the EEOC, the MCAD has also initiated about 25 complaints against a target group of cwmpanies and unions. Target companies were selected according to factors such as size, proportion of minority employment, volume of government contracts, sensitivity to public opinion, and the reputation of their employment practices in the black community. Industrial diversification within the target group was also important.

As with individual complaints, the initial focus of the investigation was upon recruitment procedures and the hiring and screening criteria used to select applicants. It was apparent that these practices, as a group, exercised a profound effect upon the employment opportunities available to blacks. For example, a few of the companies had not given any thought to opening recruitment lines into the black community. Typically these companies would rely upon informal, word-of-mouth recruitment through their incumbent work force or else would advertise in suburban weekly newspapers. Testing

15 Massachusetts Financial Report for 1967 and 1968 and Chapter 452, Acts and Resolves of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1969.


procedures, personnel interviews, educational or experience requirements, and so forth also impeded the employment of many black applicants. Changes in hiring and recruiting practices, however, are not always sufficient to increase minority employment. In at least one company, the unattractiveness of entry job classifications and the low probability of promotion were posing serious retention problems among new minority hires. The MCAD, therefore, believes that in the future it will have to concern itself with promotion problems as well.

The compliance arrangements currently being sought by the MCAD are modelled after proposals prepared by the federal Equal Employment Oppor- tunity Commission. The key components are: (1) positive efforts to recruit minority workers including the listing of current and anticipated job vacancies with desipated public and private employment agencies with contacts in minority communities; (2) the abandonment, or more flexible use, of test scores and educational requirements in the screening process pending a demonstration that such criteria are related to job performance; (3) a five- day limit on the time between application and notification of personnel action; (4) the maintenance of an “aflirmative action file” consisting of minority applicants which have not been accepted or rejected;16 and (5) a review of the requirements for filling all jobs, both entry and promotions, within 90 days of signing of the compliance agreement.

To ensure implementation of compliance agreements the MCAD seeks to monitor progress through quarterly reporting requirements for a two-year period. The MCAD also hopes to establish the right to review the agreement, with the cooperation of the employer, and to obtain an advance commitment to modifications if the agreement does not yield results. Specific compliance agreements for the target group of companies are presently in the “negotiation” phase.

The construction industry. As indicated earlier, the construction industry has been the recent focus of civil rights groups in Boston, and it seems possible, given the Administration’s preference for “home grown” agreements, that an area-wide training plan will be negotiated with local contractors and the building trade unions. The “Boston Training Agreement” established in 1968 under which 200 workers were to be trained and employed as part of the proposed Model Cities program provides a precedent for such an agreement. The “Urban Housing and Model Cities Agreement for Boston and

16 See also, Alfred Blumrosen, “A Survey of Remedies for Discrimination in the Union and on the Job,” Proceedings of the 21st h d Winter Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 1968, p. 287. This file is to provide source of applicants for future vacancies and is to be consulted prior to using other sources.

334 ,/ PETER B. DOERLNCER AND MICHAEL J. PIORE

Cambridge,” as the training agreement is called, outlines several procedures for expanding minority group employment in the building trades. There are three categories of recruits for the program: (1) persons who are fully qualified laborers or mechanics; (2) persons with previous construction work experience but without full journeymen or laborers qualifications, and (3) persons with no previous construction industry work experience. Persons in the first category are to be paid the full journeyman’s rate and are presumably eligible for full union membership. Those in the second category are to receive wages comparable to apprenticeship rates for commensurate levels of skill and experience and are to receive priority in employment over those in category three. These “advanced trainees” are to be afforded training and employment opportunities sufficient to permit the development of full journeyman qualifications. Persons in the third category are to receive the start- ing apprentice rate at a minimum and are designated “trainees.” In addition, recruits who are qualified for apprenticeship training are to be assigned to a pre-apprenticeship training program operated as part of the agreement.

The unique feature of this arrangement is the alternative to apprenticeship that it provides as a means of gaining entrance into the building trades for persons not possessing traditional apprenticeship qualifications. “Trainees” are to receive counselling, orientation to the construction industry, and basic education where necessary. On-the-job training is to be provided to trainees in the same fashion as under apprenticeship training. The latter training, however, is limited to:

. . . rehabilitation work on residential structures in urban areas involving the use of governmental funds, in whole or part, or governmental guarantees, subsidies or low interest, in demolition, repair, alterations and rehabilitation operations, [and to] new construction of housing up to and including four stories, involving financial support of go~ernments.~‘

The agreement was to be implemented by two committees, one of which was to participate in the assessment of the previous work experience of applicants and to maintain responsibility for the orientation program. This committee was to be comprised of six members, drawn equally from the unions, the contractors, and the minority community.

The recruitment, formal training, and pre-apprenticeship training was to be provided by the Worker’s Defense League, an organization with experience in the preparation of minority workers for building trades apprenticeship.,, On-the-job training ratios varied by craft with most crafts contem-

17From the “Urban Housing and Model Cities Agreement for Boston and Cambridge” (mimeographed; emphasis added). Apprentices are not subject to this limitation.

18 See Edward C. Pinkus, “The Worker’s Defense League,” in Peter B. Doeringer, editor, Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).


plating a ratio of one trainee to three or four journeymen, except for the Plumbers and Gasfitters who stipulated a one to six ratio.

Although Model City construction funds never became available, the training procedures have been extended by agreement to a few other proj- ects. Currently 43 trainees, 108 advanced trainees, and 63 apprentices have entered the building trades through the Worker’s Defense League training program since November 1968. The largest number of trainees have been in the carpenters’ and ironworkers’ crafts, although other trades are represented. In the apprenticeship program, the largest black groups are the plumbers, pipefitters, painters, roofers, and carpenter^.^^ It has been argued that this program has made considerable strides in the face of the Model Cities funding problem, federal construction cutbacks, and the recent high interest rates. On the other hand, the rate of progress has not been sufficient to satisfy local civil rights activists who characterize the program as tokenism.

A more serious flaw in the agreement, however, is the restriction in the type of construction project for which trainees are eligible. Trainees can only be placed in low rise construction and rehabilitation sector without immedi- ate access to other types of public work or private construction, thereby di- viding the union-organized construction industry into two sectors. Continuity of work, which effects both income and breadth of training, is much more difEcult to ensure for trainees under such restricted employment arrangements than under a more comprehensive agreement.2O It appears that a single agreement covering both public and private construction within a labor market area and containing a training component-the apprenticeship program for those currently qualified to enter such programs, and a trainee program for those otherwise disqualified from apprenticeship-would be most desirable, Such a plan cannot be imposed by the government under current legislation, but it can be negotiated voluntarily.’l

Labor Market Conditions High levels of employment. The prosperity of the sixties has

presumably made a substantial contribution to whatever improvement has occurred in the labor market position of minority workers. National data

19 Based on data provided by the Worker’s Defense League. 20 Arrangements such as the “Philadelphia Plan” are limited to the “federally assisted” seg-

ment of the construction industry. Moreover, specifying employment “targets” without develop ing sup lemental training arrangements, may be so unrealistic as to invite mischievous game playinggy unions determined to defeat a program which they regard as a threat to their economic control of the industry’s labor force.

21 All the parties concerned seem to accept the idea that any such area agreement or “plan” for the construction industry will spec* exact figures for minority training and employment, whether they be termed “manning ratios,” “training slots,” ‘*quotas,” “targets,” or “goals.” The real conflict centers upon the magnitude of these figures. The deciding factor is likely to be the willingness of the federal government to withhold construction contracts. If the threat of such


comparing nonwhite and white incomes shows the greatest relative gains among blacks is occurring in the lowest income quintile, presumably reflect- ing the differential effects of the expansionary phase of the cycle upon black employment rates. However, these relative income gains diminish rapidly in each higher quintile, from which it can be inferred that upgrading is a more gradual process than employment.22 It seems sensible to postulate that some of this upgrading comes from increasing wage rates in the secondary labor market in which wage rates in the $1.80 to $2.25 range pred0minate.2~ The rest consists of blacks moving from secondary to primary employment and of the promoting of blacks already employed in primary internal labor markets. The dynamic of this process involves pressure from job vacancies in primary employment which cannot be readily filled from the customary sources of primary labor.

Employer attitudes. Apart from the construction industry, and the recent, but little publicized, MCAD “target” compliance program, there is little evidence that compliance efforts in Boston are becoming any more aggressive than they have been in the past. Federal contract compliance reviews are still viewed as more of a nuisance than a serious program and many employers are only vaguely aware of the MCAD’s activities. Nevertheless, there is a generally held belief among local businessmen that the pace of integration is quickening in Boston and that their own programs of equal employment opportunity are contributing to minority employment at a faster rate than labor market forces would dictate.

Manpower Programs There is a logical connection between manpower and equal

employment opportunity programs. This connection is most apparent where skill deficiencies or lack of labor market information are a barrier to expanding minority employment. Manpower training programs can remedy skill deficiencies and the outreach and referral activities of manpower agencies can be an important instrument in the placement of minority workers.

But it appears that manpower programs can also play a more subtle role in the process of changing minority group employment patterns. Employer participation in manpower programs and cooperative relationships with manpower referral agencies provide employers with both a supply of minority

sanctions is made credible, the admittance of substantial numbers of black workers to the industry is likely to be secured. If not, the outcome will depend solely upon negotiating skill, bluff, and political influence, and the numbers of blacks brought into the industry will be considerably less.

22 U.S. Department of Labor, special tabulation. 23 Boston Compehensiue Manpower Plan 1970, Part A.


workers and with tangible evidence of afErmative action. For example, the MCAD model compliance agreement suggests the listing of job vacancies with ABCD, the State Employment Service, and the New Urban League. Those employers previously following such procedures, however, will already have established a presumptive record of firmative action, even if their minority employment is low. Participation in the National Alliance of Busi- nessmen’s on-the-job training programs offers another illustration of such tangible benefits. The JOBS program in Boston has been a vehicle for training primarily black and Puerto Rican workers, and it has been the experience of the NAB staff that a major consideration among many employers consider- ing training contracts is their value in demonstrating affirmative compliance.

In addition to providing training and improving job performance, manpower programs can facilitate the introduction of minority workers into work situations where the incumbent work force, including supervision may be in- clined to resist integration. A training program can provide a nontraditional entry port which will permit the temporary modification in customary stan- dards of work performance and behavior without establishing the precedent that a long-term decision has been made to reduce labor force quality. The experience with the trainee in the construction industry, with vestibule training programs, and with training plans for the disadvantaged suggests that this interpretation has some merit.24

Systematic linkages between manpower programs and civil rights compliance have not been established in Boston, although the MCAD is now talking of encouraging such linkages. There is little experience upon which to draw in the Boston area, but two examples of manpower programs being established as a result of a complaint of employment discrimination are known to the authors, the Model Cities training program described above and a program involving the local transit authority (MBTA).26 These cases illustrate the general point that compliance activities tend to create a climate which encourages employers and unions to seek technical assistance and to participate in manpower programs and other activities to increase minority group hiring.

It is important that the influence of compliance activities and manpower

24 Doeringer, Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged. 25 Every two years the MBTA develops an applicant list for driver/collector positions. The

applicant list is ranked according to aptitude test scores, and the MBTA hires workers according to their position on the list until it is replaced. Because blacks consistently ranked at the bottom of the list, a complaint was filed with the MCAD alleging that the test was discriminatory. The MBTA responded by sponsoring a retest training program operated by a grass-roots Negro

sequent test. A request for a preliminary injunction was then submitted to the federal court to prevent the use of the test. The request has been denied, and the issue is temporarily moot. Julius Arrington et aZ., v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Civil No. 69-681-G, D. Mass., December 22, 1969.

organization. About 75 persons comp P eted the training program, but still ranked low on the sub-


programs be directed at changing the present patterns of labor force allocation in favor of opening up primary jobs to minority groups. Civil rights pressures work clearly in this direction and can serve to force manpower programs, which by themselves often operate only to increase the efficiency of the secondary labor market, to pursue a similar objective.

Conclusion This review leaves a very ambiguous picture. It is possible to

argue from the data that blacks have made substantial gains relative to whites in the percentage of the more desirable jobs which they hold in the Boston labor market. A review of practice and policy in individual companies can support this view. Most of the large or nationally prominent employers have instituted special programs to hire and train black or other minority workers; there is an increased sensitivity in all of these companies to the special problems faced by blacks within their establishments; and as one walks through local plants one does indeed find blacks in jobs where even five years ago they would never have been seen. These companies, and many black workers, do genuinely believe that substantial progress has been made.

On the other hand, it is also clear that much of the progress that was achieved in the sixties was the result of adjustment to a tight labor market. A number of the special manpower programs for black workers, and for their supervisors, have been directed at reducing turnover in relatively menial jobs such as warehouseman, laborer, kitchen worker, grocery clerk, and the like to which blacks have always had access. Blacks are undoubtedly somewhat better off in a market in which these jobs are plentiful, and possibly better off as a result of the special programs which occasionally accompany such employment, This, however, is not what is generally meant by equal employment opportunity and many of the gains which it represents will &sap pear as unemployment rises.

Some of the apparent upgrading of blacks within the occupational structures can also be attributed to the pressures of the tightening labor market of the sixties. To this extent, they constitute once and for all increases in black occupational status which may not be indicative of a continuing trend. More- over, these gains too are likely to be particularly vulnerable to a return to higher levels of unemployment.

A more difficult problem with the available statistics is to separate abso- lute from relative gains made by black workers. As was noted, changes in technology and product demand place the occupational structure of the economy in a continual state of flux. The transitional pattern of racial employment over time appears to be the movement of white workers out of the


declining or stable job classifications into the new, expanding employments, leaving the older and less desirable jobs for black workers. “Snapshots” of the occupational structure can therefore show black workers making substantial gains in some occupations where they have previously been under- represented while, in fact, they are simply marking time in an occupational structure which has a secular upward drift. There are firms in Boston where just this process seems to be occurring: traditionally Irish or Italian jobs are being opened to blacks, but the explicit or implicit quid pro quo has been the concomitant opening to these whites of higher status jobs traditionally reserved for Protestants. It may well be that this is all that the aggregate figures reveal.

An assessment of the pressures being brought to bear upon labor and management also leaves the prospects for equal employment opportunity ambiguous. At this time, the Administration appears determined to raise the level of unemployment, a policy which cannot but work against the advancement of black employment opportunities. One or two years ago, the fear of riots in the black ghetto was a major spur to equal employment opportunity programs, especially in the retail trades, utilities, and transportation companies which served the ghetto. That fear has now abated considerably. At one time, it was also possible to make some gains through moral suasion, but the power of persuasion appears to have abated as companies have become more aware of the full cost implications of proposed changes in their employment practices.

On the other hand, funding for manpower programs has expanded in Boston, and efforts to enforce equal employment opportunity through administrative pressure appear to be increasing at both the state and national levels. These pressures are not without their drawbacks, however. The federal government has vacillated considerably in the application of construction industry guidelines in Boston, thereby reducing the credibility of such pressure. Moreover, even consistently applied pressures can have perverse results. As one manager candidly put it: “The Negroes I hire have got to be more qualified than whites because the Negro will complain about promotion, and I can’t take any chances.” But if in the end the federal government does emerge with a finn policy, the MCAD develops an approach not de- pendent upon individual complaints, and real coordination is achieved with manpower programs, a substitute for the pressures of urban riots and tight labor markets may be fashioned. It would be mistaken, therefore, to con- clude a review of this kind on a completely pessimistic note.

Equal Employment Opportunity in Boston

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Transcript of Equal Employment Opportunity in Boston