ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: THE CASEFOR COUNTERING TERRORISM IN KANO’S TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS

BY

PROF. SADIQ ISAH RADDA1 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY,BAYERO UNIVERSITY, KANO

e-mail: iraddasadiq@yahoo.comTEL: +234-8053204515 (MOBILE)

1 Prof. Sadiq Isah Radda is an Associate Professor of Criminology, Bayero University, Kano. His areas of interest are human rights, youth delinquent behaviours, corporate scandals/crime.

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BEING THE TEXT OF A PAPER DELIVERED AT A SEMINAR ON DOMESTICTERRORISM CAPTIONED ‘THE PLACE OF SECURITY AWARENESS AND SELF-PROTECTION FOR TOP GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES’ SEPTEMBER, 2012.

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ABSTRACTKano State is the most populous state in Nigeria. It is aprosperous state which makes it attractive to migrants.As a result of the vastness of Kano State, manyinstitutions have to created and maintained to cater forthe needs of the people. Among these institutions aretertiary institutions that offer training to Kano’steeming youths. On regular basis, these institutions arevery busy because of academic activities and constantsupervisory visits by top government officials.Therefore, enhancing security in Kano’s tertiaryinstitutions is crucial not only to protect governmentfunctionaries but also to protect students. This hasbecome significant because tertiary institutions are softtargets for terrorist attacks. The paper analyzes therole and importance of security awareness in theenhancement of security in government institutionsespecially Kano’s tertiary institutions. Also, it iscrucial because Nigeria is passing through trying timesowing to deteriorated security situation in the nationresulting in loss of lives and property coupled with fearand trauma. In many parts of the country human socio-economic and political activities have stopped or ontheir lowest ebb. Hitherto, criminal elements were thecause of Nigeria’s insecurity. Today, however, Nigeria’sinsecurity can be attributed to violent conflicts andterrorist activities affecting nearly all parts of thecountry. The paper examined the Nigeria’s securitysituation and the prevailing security situation intertiary institutions. Furthermore, the issue ofterrorism and its existence in Nigeria and the strategiesfor security consciousness that is imperative incountering terrorism in Kano’s tertiary institutions havebeen examined. Key Words: Security, Awareness, Terrorism, GovernmentInstitutions, Tertiary Institutions

INTRODUCTION

Kano State is the most populous state in Nigeria. It is a

prosperous state which makes it attractive to migrants. As a

result of the vastness of Kano State, many institutions have

to created and maintained to cater for the needs of the

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people. Among these institutions are tertiary institutions

that offer training to Kano’s teeming youths. On regular

basis, these institutions are very busy because of academic

activities and constant supervisory visits by top government

officials. Therefore, enhancing security in Kano’s tertiary

institutions is crucial not only to protect government

functionaries but also to protect students. This has become

significant because tertiary institutions are soft targets for

terrorist attacks. The paper analyzes the role and importance

of security awareness in the enhancement of security in

government institutions especially Kano’s tertiary

institutions. Also, it is crucial because Nigeria is passing

through trying times owing to deteriorated security situation

in the nation resulting in loss of lives and property coupled

with fear and trauma. In many parts of the country human

socio-economic and political activities have stopped or on

their lowest ebb. Hitherto, criminal elements were the cause

of Nigeria’s insecurity. Today, however, Nigeria’s insecurity

can be attributed to violent conflicts and terrorist

activities affecting nearly all parts of the country.

There is now an Unholy Trinity encapsulated in the convergence

of violent crimes, corruption and terrorism that can be called

Siamese triplets that often go together (Shelley, 2005;

Bergen, 2001). Some commentators like Sarup (2005) insist that

corruption increases terrorism. Contributing at a debate about

corruption in India, a judge, Justice Santosh Hegde opined

that “terrorism is caused by a disease called greed.”

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This paper examines the role and significance of security

awareness in promoting security in Kano’s tertiary

institutions which if carefully and properly promoted will be

imperative in countering terrorism in them. The paper contains

six sections including this introduction. The first section

looks at the Nigeria’s security situation. The second section

examines security situation in tertiary institutions. As the

third section deals with terrorism and its existence in

Nigeria, the fourth section offers strategies for security

consciousness that is imperative in countering terrorism. The

fifth section concludes the paper.

NIGERIA’S DETERIORATED SECURITY SITUATION

It is not an exaggeration to argue that there is grave

insecurity in Nigeria because the deterioration it is

palpable. The worsening insecurity in the country began in the

mid-1980s during the infamous Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida era.

The insecurity to lives and property arose due to incessant

ethno-religious violence. Although there are not accurate

statistical figures regarding the number of ethno-religious

conflicts and the losses there-from below is a conservative

figure of the conflicts that have, remotely, directly or

indirectly, worsened Nigeria’s security situation.

Selected Cases of Ethno-religious Conflicts in NigeriaS/N

DATE LOCATION PRINCIPAL ACTORS/VICTIMS

1. May 01, 1980 Zaria (KadunaState)

Disturbances in Zaria during whichproperty belonging to mainlyChristians were destroyed.

2. December, 18-29 1980

Yan-awaki Wardin Kano (Kano

Riots Maitatsine Sect. 4,177 peopledied. Extensive damage to property.

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State)3. October, 29-

30, 1982Bullunkutu,Maiduguri,(Borno State)

Violence by Kala-kato and MaitatsineSects. 118 people died. Extensivedamage to property was recorded.

4. October, 29-30, 1982

Kano (KanoState)

Muslim demonstrators burnt downchurches as a reaction to violencefrom the South.

5. February 27-March 5, 1984.

Dobeli Ward Violence by Maitatsine Sect where 568people died. Wanton destruction ofproperty was recorded

6. April 26-28,1985

Pantami Ward,Gombe (BauchiState)

Violence by Maitatsine Sect and 105died. Extensive destruction ofproperty was recorded.

7. March, 1986 Ilorin (KwaraState)

Muslims and Christians clashedduring a Christian procession atEaster.

8. March, 1987 Kafanchan(Kaduna State)

Clash between Muslims andChristians at the College ofEducation, Kafanchan. Loss of somelives and the burning of somemosques by Christians and nativeKajes.

9. March, 1987,2000 and 2011

Katsina,Funtua, Zaria,Gusau andKaduna

Wave of reprisal religious riots inwhich Muslims burnt down numerouschurch buildings and damagedproperties belonging to Christiansand native Kajes.

10.

February, 1988 Kaduna, KadunaPolytechnic(Kaduna State)

Religious riots, ostensibly amongstudents, destroyed the foundationwalls of the Christian chapel.

11.

April, 1991 Katsina(Katsina State)

Religious violence spear-headed byMalam Yahaya Yakubu, leader of thefundamentalist Shiite Sect inKatsina. It was protest over ablasphemous publication by Fun Times.Several lives were lost andproperty destroyed.

12.

April,1991,1995,2001, 2011,2012

Tafawa Balewa(Bauchi State)

The violence started as a quarrelbetween a Fulani man and a Sayawameat-seller in Tafawa Balewa. Itescalated into full blown violenceand later took the coloring of a

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religious war in Bauchi. Severallives were lost and property valuedover hundreds of millions Nairawere destroyed. Since then the areahas been characterized by tenserelations.

13.

October, 1991 Kano (KanoState)

A peaceful procession initiated bythe Izala Sect to halt Rev. ReinhardBonnke from having a crusade inKano later degenerated into a veryviolent and bloody religiousconfrontation. Thousands of liveswere lost and properties valued inmillions of Naira were destroyed.

14.

May, 1992,1999, 2011

Zangon Kataf,(Kaduna State)

A communal feud between the Katafsand the Hausas later took thedimension of inter-religious warbetween Muslims and Christians inother major cities of Kaduna State.Several lives were lost andproperties were destroyed.

15.

January, 1993 Funtua,(Katsina State)

The Kala-kato religious sectassaulted a village-head and burntdown a police vehicle. Lives andproperty were also lost.

16.

December, 1994 Kano, (KanoState)

Communal violence triggered by thebeheading of a Christian who hadallegedly desecrated the HolyQur’an

17.

May, 1995 Kano, (KanoState)

Communal violence triggered by aquarrel between the Hausa and Ibowhich led to the burning of houses,churches and shops and killing ofinnocent people

18.

July 22, 1999 Kano Hausa/Fulani youth took vengeanceon the killing of their kith andkin in Sagamu. Their target was theYoruba community even thougheveryone suffered loses.

19.

1987,February, 28,2000, 2002,

Kaduna (KadunaState)

Kaduna city exploded in violence asMuslim and Christian extremists andother hoodlums clashed over the

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2011 proposal to introduce Shari’a lawin the North only.

20.

April 14, 2000 Agyragu(NassarawaState)

Communal clash that started with aprotest against the location of aLocal Government Headquarters. Themilitant youth group started theriot and later took to the streetskilling people and destroyingproperty.

21.

July, 2000 Tsagari (KwaraState)

Clash between Tsagari and Sharecommunities of Kwara State whichclaimed several lives.

22.

September 8,2000

Kaltungo (GombeState)

A religious violence that wassparked off by the presence of theStates Shari’a ImplementationCommittee.

23.

October 17,2000

Ilorin (Kwara) A face-off between the militantmembers of OPC and Hausa/Fulanicommunity over the supremacy of theEmirate system in the State.

24.

October 21,2000

Minna (NigerState)

Violent ethnic crisis erupted afterthe OPC assaults in Kwara and LagosStates.

25.

December 2,2000

Hadejia(Jigawa)

A sectarian disturbance that wascaused by a debate between a Muslimand a Christian in Hadejia (JigawaState). There was wantondestruction of places of worship.

26.

June 28, 2001 Azara(Nassarawa)

An ethnic conflict between the Tivand the Azara indigenes. It startedwith gruesome killing of an Azaratraditional leader, and laterspread to the Tiv village, with theTiv community on the defense.

27.

September 7,2001-Date andveryintermittent

Jos (PlateauState)

A violent ethnic/religious crisisbetween the Muslim/Hausa Fulani andChristian/Indigenes. The subject ofdiscord between the JasawaDevelopment Association and PlateauYouth Council was over politicalappointment in Jos North a aChristian woman crossing a Friday

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prayer Congregation.28.

1976, 1977,1980, 1981,1990, 1991,1995, 2000,2001 and 2004

Kano (KanoState)

A peaceful anti-American protestover the bombing of Afghanistanwhich turned violent, taking ethnicand religious dimension. The seriesof conflicts have alwaysdegenerated into uncontrollableviolence which claimed lives anddamaged properties and places ofworship. Many a times the violencein Kano were reprisal attacks.

29.

Mid 1980s,October, 29,2001 andintermittent

Benue State An ethnic clash between Tivs andJukun/Fulani which was an extensionof the May 2001 clash and could belinked to the protracted dispute onland and supremacy between bothsides. Reports indicated that 16soldiers were killed which laterled to the gruesome revenge on theTivs by the Nigerian Army.

30.

November 2,2001

Gwantu A clash that started on a politicalground (over the relocation of LGHeadquarters) later took on ethno-religious dimension in which placesof worship were destroyed.

31.

December 30,2001

Vwag (PlateauState)

A violent communal conflict inVwang district between theindigenes and non-indigenes whichexploded in the backdrop of theSeptember 7 Jos crisis. It startedwhen an illegal group of 40 menattacked the District Head ofVwang. It also had religiouscolouration.

32.

2001 andJanuary, 18,2002

Awe (NassarawaState)

A renewed communal clash betweentwo indigenous communities in AweLocal Government Area of NassarawaState. The cause was not certainbut two people were killed andseveral others injured.

33.

May 2, 2000 Jos (PlateauState)

Another mayhem that followed PDPcongress but later took an ethno-

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religious colouration.34.

May 27, 2002 Fulani-IrigweCrisis (PlateauState)

An ethnic clash between theHausa/Fulani and the Irigweindigenes in Bassa, Plateau whichwas said to be a reprisal attack.

35.

June 1, 2002 Yelwa-Shendam(Plateau State)

A religious-cum ethnic fracasbetween the native people(predominantly Christians) andHausa settlers (predominantlyMuslims). This violence extended toabout four Local GovernmentCouncils in Southern Plateau.

36.

July 1, 2002 Wase (PlateauState)

The Yelwa-Shendam riots spilledover to Wase with loss of lives andproperty.

37.

July 1, 2003 Edo/Kogi State Communal clashes between bordercommunities in Edo and Kogi States,Ekepedo and Ogori, over landownership.

38.

January 1,2004

Ganye, (AdamawaState)

Clash between Fulani herdsmen andfarmers over grazing lands.

39.

January 1,2004

Yobe State Militant Islamic group operatingunder the name of Muhajirun launcheda Taliban-like attack on Police.Men of the Nigerian Army killedfive people and arrested severalothers.

40.

February 1,2004

Wase/Kanam(Plateau State)

Violent clash between Mavo andTaroh communities, which claimed 11lives. Suspected Taroh youth werealleged to have raided Mavovillages.

41.

February 2,2004

Wase/Kanam,(Plateau State)

Communal clash over land ownershipbetween Minda and Kparev groups.Several lives were lost.

42.

April 3, 2004 Makarfi, KadunaState

Religious protest in Makarfi townover the desecration of the Qur’anby a Christian teenager.

43.

April 11, 2004 Lantang South,(Plateau State)

Continued clashes that led to thesacking of Taroh villages inLantang South LGA by suspectedHausa-Fulani settlers.

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44.

April 26, 2004 Bakin Chiyawa,(Plateau State)

Renewed hostilities launched bysuspected displaced Fulaniherdsmen. The conflict was believedto be a spill-over of the ethno-religious crisis that has beenbedeviling southern Plateau LocalGovernment Area of Lantang Southand North, Wase, Kanam and Shendam.

45.

May 1, 2004 Yelwa -Shendam,(Plateau State)

A fresh ethno-religious mayhem thatclaimed over 650 lives and over 250women abducted by suspected Tarohmilitia.

46.

May 12, 2004 Kano (KanoState)

Kano mayhem following the Yelwa-Shendam ethno-religious crisis inPlateau. Non-Muslims were attackedin response to the Plateau crisis.Over 200 lives were lost and thetraditional ruler of the areadeposed.

47.

June 8, 2004 Konshisha/Gwer(Benue State)

Boundary disputes betweenneighbouring Konshisha and Gwercommunities. Thirteen lives werelost.

48.

June 8, 2004 Numan, (AdamawaState)

Ethno-religious crisis in Numanover the construction of a mosqueminaret over the Humma Bachama’spalace. Over 50 people were fearedkilled and the traditional ruler ofthe area deposed.

49.

August 3, 2004 Quanpam,(Plateau State)

Fresh outbreak of violence inLankaka village. Suspected armedmilitia from a neighbouring stateallegedly stormed the communitykilling two and razing twentyhouses.

50.

September 27,2004

Limankara,(Borno State)

A self-styled Taliban group hidingon the Goza hills and Madaramountains on the north-easternboarder with Cameroon raided apolice station killing officers andstealing ammunition.

51 Intermittent Ijaws and Communal clashes over land and

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. Itsekiris(Niger DeltaRegion)

other resources

52.

Intermittent Ijaws andIlaris(Niger DeltaRegion)

Communal clashes over land andother resources

53.

Intermittent Umeleri andUguleri(Niger DeltaRegion)

Communal clashes over land andother resources

54.

2000 Ilorin (KwaraState)

Attack on Hausa and Fulani peoplefor political and ethnic reasons,by the OPC.

55.

2000 Lagos State Attack on Igbos, Hausa and Fulanipeople for political and ethnicreasons, by the OPC.

56.

From the 1990s Ife-Modakeke (Ondo State)

Communal clashes over land andother resources

57.

2000 Lagos andShagamu

Attack on Igbos, Hausa and Fulanipeople for political and ethnicreasons.

58.

Intermittent North East andNorth West

Fight between farmers and herdsmenover grazing reserves anddestruction of farm produce

59.

2011-Date Maiduguri andMajor Cities inNorth East andNorth WestRegion

Violent attacks on the police,other security operatives andmembers of the establishment byJama’atu Ahlus sunna lidda’awati wal Jihad(Boko Haram) for the extra-judicialkilling of their leaders andillegal detention of many of themin which many lives and propertywere lost.

60.

From 2002-Date Igidi and IdomaConflict

Violent conflict between Igidi andIdoma people over land that leftmany people dead and propertydestroyed.

(Source: Radda, 2012:7)

It is these and many more undocumented conflicts that

deteriorated Nigeria’s security situation. Again, extremely

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poor official handling and resolution of the conflicts

reflected in unfair treatment of parties involved in the

conflicts have worsened the matter thereby compounding the

security situation of the nation. Progressively, more

violence, conflicts, hatred and disunity have come to pre-

occupy the lives of Nigerians. The failure of governance gave

rise to self-help security apparatuses based on ethnic and

religious divides. This ushered-in groups that can be called

political thugs, ethnic militias and religiously-inclined

sectarian movements like Boko Haram. Consequently, Nigeria

witnessed numerous kidnappings, assassinations, extra-judicial

killings, ethnic cleansings, sporadic shootings, bombings and

even suicide bombings. Below is a brief account of recent

bombings that have rocked many parts of Nigeria irrespective

of whether they were caused by Boko Haram or some dark-horses.

This is because it has been opined that:

This Boko Haram could possibly be a mix ofsome Christian and Muslim psychopaths whocan do any work for money in the samefashion as there are gangs of armed robberswith memberships cutting across religiousand ethnic lines.

(Sarki, 2012:1)

The incidences below are clear manifestations of the grave

insecurity in Nigeria:

1) A bomb planted at a Jumu’at praying ground in Fagge Kano

was defused;

2) Numerous and intermittent bomb explosions in Maiduguri,

Damaturu, Bauch, etc;

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3) Bomb explosions at Madalla resulting in reprisal attacks

consequent to loss of lives and property;

4) Bomb explosions at Wusa and Sabon Gari, Zaria resulting

in reprisal attacks at Gonin Gora consequent to loss of

lives and property;

5) Numerous bomb explosions in Plateau State consequent to

loss of lives and property;

6) There was an arrest of a suspect that sprayed bullets on

the Gombe Deeper Life Church worshippers;

7) There was Gombe township bombing;

8) Hassan Ojudu and Samaila Yakubu were arrested in Gombe

town with a vehicle loaded with explosive devices and

ammunitions;

9) Eight COCIN church members arrested with explosive

devices at the Miya-Barkatai branch of the church in

Bauchi State;

10) Eleven security officials arrested for supplying

arms to armed robbers in Zamfara and Sokoto States;

11) Miss Lydia Joseph attempted to burn down the St.

John Catholic church in Bauchi city;

12) Emmanuel King, the guy who disguised as a Muslim

wearing a turban and kaftan, attempted to bomb down the

Redeemed Christian Church of God in Yenagoa, the Bayelsa

capital;

13) On Tuesday 17th July, 2012 three rocket-propelled

grenades were fired at an Ismiyya School in Jos killing

five people and injuring children;

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14) Also, some persons were reported to have burnt down

a worship centre of the Church of God Mission

International in Port Harcourt, the Rivers State capital

as reported by the LEADERSHIP newspaper of Sunday,

January 15, 2012;

15) Madam Ruth attempted to bomb the ECWA church in the

Kalarin area of Kaltungo in Gombe State;

16) COCIN church headquarters was bombed in Jos;

17) The Special Task Force (STF) on security in Jos on

Sunday, March 25, 2012 paraded one Mr. Alex Danladi

alongside one Mr. Dung Bulus who was caught wearing army

camouflage t-shirt, cap and boot while parading himself

as a soldier.

18) Also, on Tuesday, March 27, 2012 the 2 Brigade,

Nigeria Army, Bori Camp, Port Harcourt paraded one Abba

Ibrahim allegedly caught with military uniforms and weeds

suspected to be cannabis. He was said to be a dismissed

military personnel and hails from Billiri, in Gombe State

and that at the time of his arrest he was standing trial

for another case of impersonation (see THE NATION

newspaper of Wednesday, March 28, 2012 page 57);

19) On January 11, 2012 two Nigerians named, Sunday Eze

from Anambra State and Samuel Taiwo from Ogun State and

some three Ghanaians were arrested in Ghana with some

heavy weaponry carefully concealed in a truck, which was

to be brought to Nigeria;

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20) On January, 20th 2012 multiple bomb explosions and

subsequent intermittent bomb explosion coupled with

gunshots were recorded in Kano;

21) On Sunday 29th April, 2012 unknown persons launched a

violent attack on Christian worshippers at the Old Campus

of Bayero University, Kano. The attackers used guns and

explosives to attack the worshippers at Theatres II, III,

the Institution’s Sports Complex and Faculty of Science.

As 18 people were killed, 23 were injured; the

Institution lost two Professors and a staff of the

payroll unit of the Bursary;

22) On Tuesday, April 10, 2012 a 38 year-old man named

Monday Davou was arrested while planting a timed

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or time bomb at the

Makera weekly market in Riyom Local Government Area,

Plateau State;

23) The DAILY SUN newspaper of Monday, February 20, 2012

on page 12 reported the arrest, in Akure, Ondo State, of

a gang of five armed robbers led by one Evangelist Wale

Adelu;

24) Similarly, the SATURDAY SUN newspaper of Saturday,

March 10, 2012 on page 10 reported that 11 cartons of

explosives imported from South Africa and “carefully

packaged to beat security checks” were intercepted by the

Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) at the Murtala Muhammed

International Airport, Lagos. The consignments were said

to be for “Miero Marble Granite and Stones Limited in

Kaduna State, with one Mr. Michael Awara Ernest as the

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representative to collect the explosives at the cargo

terminal;”

25) The THISDAY newspaper of Friday, January 13, 2012 on

page 6 culled a news report from the BBC in which a

British-based arms dealer, Gary Hyde, was being

prosecuted in a London court for unlawfully arranging the

shipment of about 80, 000 guns and 32 million rounds of

ammunition from China to Nigeria in 2007;

26) On Sunday, February 19, 2012 four persons were

arrested while trying to detonate explosives at the St.

Theresa’s Catholic Parish, High-level in Makurdi the

Benue State capital;

27) Between 2009 and 2012, more than 1,000 people have

lost their lives as a result of Boko Haram’s attacks in

Maiduguri, Potiskum, Damaturu, Jos, Kano, Gombe, Kaduna

and Abuja. In 2011 alone, Boko Haram attacked 115 times

with 550 deaths resulting;

28) On 3rd August 2012 Boko Haram members attacked a

military post killing six soldiers;

29) On 4thAugust, 2012 a suicide bomber targets the Emir

of Fika six people sustained various degrees of injuries.

30) On Monday 6th August, 2012 unknown gunmen killed 19

people including women and children at Deeper Life

Church, Okene, Kogi State;

31) On Tuesday 7th August, 2012 unknown gun men shot and

killed two Police Inspectors in Bauchi town; and

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32) On Tuesday 7th August, 2012 three unknown gunmen shot

and killed two soldiers on patrol in Okene, Kogi State

outside Okene Central Mosque as a reprisal attack.

According to el-Rufa’i (2012) ‘…at the crossroads that we have

found ourselves as a nation, where a sitting government has

shown no capacity and competence to confront [corruption and

terrorism], we must be blunt in evaluating what has gone wrong

– perhaps the moral outrage that results will be the basis for

action to change things for the better.’ This is because

terrorism and corruption are two words that now dominate our

headline news more than any others. Domestic terrorism has now

joined corruption as defining characteristics of the nation.

SECURITY SITUATION IN TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS

The general insecurity that affects the nation naturally

spreads and affects Universities due to the organic

relationship between the former and the latter. It was in

April 2012 that a violent attack with heavy weapons was

launched on Christian worshippers at Bayero University, Kano.

The attack shocked and traumatized the institution and the

Management. As a response to the sad event the authority

convened an emergency Management meeting on 2nd May, 2012

during which a committee to look into the attack was formed.

The committee assessed the security situation of Bayero

University, Kano and indeed many Universities. In general the

committee observed the following:

1. The porous nature of the Campuses threatens security.

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2. There is gross inadequacy of security manpower for daily

security operations and patrols along the perimeter walls

of the Campuses.

3. The security suffers from inadequate working equipments

thereby hampering their performance.

4. There is poor security awareness in the community.

5. There is apparent hostility exhibited by operators of

unauthorized structures around the institution’s

campuses.

6. Poor lightening of the Campuses threatens security.

Specifically, it can be observed that many Universities and

tertiary institutions in Nigeria face the following problems:

There is lack of Perimeter Wall in a substantial

portion of Institution’s land which encourages

trespass.

There is lack of perimeter wall in some Campuses and

where it exist, the perimeter wall is short and

vandalized.

There are too many pedestrian entrances.

There is an apparent lack of Guard House for use by

the security.

There are complaints of the poor human relations of

the security outfit.

TERRORISM AND ITS EXISTENCE IN NIGERIA

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The fact that terrorism is all over the world explains the

reasons for its varied perceptions in the world today. This is

because while some people can consider a group of individuals

and their actions as terrorist, others can consider it as

fighting for freedom. For example, such armed groups as Irish

Republican Army (IRA), FARC in Colombia, Tamil Tigers

Srilanka, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, Lord

Resistance Army in Uganda, Al-Shabab in Somalia and Al-qaida and

their actions a variously defined depending on the ideological

divide of the person. In Nigeria politicians and political

parties use violent groups as thugs to intimidate political

opponents in pursuit of political goals. For example, Kauraye,

Sara Suka, ‘Yan-daba, ‘Yan-Kalare, ECOMOG, the OPC, the Egbesu Boys,

MEND, etc have been used by politicians to terrorize opposing

views. Currently, Nigeria is confronted by the spectre of

violence unleashed by the radical and aggrieved Islamic sect

called Boko Haram. Suffice it to say that one’s freedom fighter

could be the terrorist in the eyes of another.

Terrorism can be simply perceived as the use of fear, violence

and intimidation in pursuit of political goals. It involves

paying supreme sacrifice like suicide bombing to press for

recognition, attention, concession, justice and equity. Again,

it can be used to send a message, to compensate for losses

suffered or to bargain from a point of strength.

Nigeria’s Terrorism Act, 2011 captioned An Act to Make Provisions

for and About Offences Relating to Conduct Carried Out or Purpose Connected

with Terrorism, 2011 Section 2 says:

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Act of terrorism means an act which is deliberatelydone with malice, aforethought and which: (a)mayseriously harm or damage a country or aninternational organization; (b) is intended or canreasonably be regarded as having intended to-(i)unduly compel a government or an internationalorganization to perform or abstain from performingany act; (ii) seriously intimidate a population;(iii) seriously destabilize or destroy thefundamental political, constitutional, economic orsocial structures of a country or an internationalorganization; or (iv) otherwise influence suchgovernment or international organization byintimidation or coercion; and (c) involves or causes,as the case may be- (i) an attack upon a person’slife which may cause serious bodily harm or death;(ii)kidnapping of a person (iii) destruction to agovernment or public facility, a transport system, aninfrastructure facility, including an informationsystem, a fixed platform located on the continentalshelf, a public place or private property, likely toendanger human life or result in major economic loss;(iv) the seizure of an aircraft, ship or other meansof public or goods transport and diversion or the useof such means of transportation for any of thepurposes in paragraph (b) (iv) of this subsection;(v) the manufacture, possession, acquisition,transport, supply, or use of weapons, explosives orof nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, as well asresearch into it, and development of biological andchemical weapons without lawful authority; (vi) therelease of dangerous substance or causing of fire,explosions or flood, the effect of which is toendanger human life; (vii) interference with ordisruption of the supply of water, power or any otherfundamental natural resource, the effect of which isto endanger life; (d) an act or omission in oroutside Nigeria which constitutes an offence withinthe scope of a counter terrorism protocols andconventions duly ratified by Nigeria. (3) an actwhich disrupts a service but is committed inpursuance of a protest. However, demonstration or

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stoppage of work is not a terrorist act within themeaning of this definition provided that the act isnot intended to result in any harm referred to insub-section (2) (b) (i), (ii) or (iv) of thissection, (Terrorism Act, 2011:2-3).

As stated in the American Executive Order 13224: Blocking Property and

Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or

Support Terrorism, the term terrorism means an activity that: 1.

Involves violent act or an act dangerous to human life,

property or infrastructure; and 2. Appears to be intended to

intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 3)to influence the

policy of a government by intimidation and coercion; or 4) to

affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,

assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.

It is these parameters that the US Department of State that

used to designate Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar and

Khalid al-Barnawi as terrorists. These three have been

included in the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists

under section 11 (b) of Executive Order 13224. This

designation ‘…blocks all Abubakar Shekau’s, Abubakar Adam

Kambar’s and Khalid al-Barnawi’s property interests subject to

US jurisdictions and prohibits U.S persons from engaging in

transactions with or for the benefit of these individuals.’

(See Executive Order 13224: Blocking Property and Prohibiting

Transactions with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or

Support Terrorism).

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As a result of the insecurity in Nigeria and spate of terror

attacks taking place Maplecroft, a British risk analysis and

mapping firm that publishes the Terrorism Risk Index (TRI)

ranked Nigeria 19th and at “extreme risk” of terrorism in 2011,

ahead of Israel (20th) but safer than Yemen, South Sudan and

India among others. With the escalation of attacks by Boko

Haram in the north, and resumption of threats and hostilities

by MEND in the Niger Delta, Nigeria is likely to jump to near

the top of the TRI soon, unless something concrete is done.

Our nation and citizens are in grave danger.Our unity in diversity is at the highestlevels of risk since independence. Thepossible break-up of Nigeria is beingdiscussed openly not only in the Villa, but invarious regional and cultural associationmeetings. Our democracy is in danger, and itsdesirable end canvassed by young people insocial media. The state no longer has monopolyof violence, and no longer in exclusivecontrol of our maritime borders. Weincreasingly resemble a failed state…(el-Rufa’i,2012:2).

TOWARDS A SECURITY CONSCIOUS COMMUNITY IN KANO’S TERTIARYINSTITUTIONS

The security challenges confronting Universities and other

tertiary institutions in view of the crime trend in Nigeria

today are enormous. These challenges are in many areas:

security at home; movement within the Campuses; kidnapping or

hostage-taking; encountering armed robbers and assassins at

home or in the other areas of the Campuses; sexual assault or

rape; cultism; drug abuse; usage of ATM Machines; fire23

outbreak and terror attacks (Ogwuche, 2010). Therefore,

security awareness in general and specific terms is required

in promoting security to lives and property on Campuses

especially because all the Universities share similar

libertarian values and architectural designs. For these

reasons and many others, security must be everybody’s

business: Institution’s Community Neighborhood Watch is

needed.

Below are some recommendations capable of enhancing security

and countering terrorism on Institution’s Campuses.

Generally, Institution’s authorities should:

1. Provide adequate wall fencing of all the Campuses

of the Institution.

2. Recruit competent and qualified security personnel

that can engage in patrol and intelligence

gathering.

3. Provide adequate working equipments for the security

personnel. These include boots, uniforms, whistles,

batons, motorcycles, patrol vehicles with revolving

lamps, telecommunication gadgets, torch-lights, etc.

4. Ensure constant training and retraining of the

security personnel in the Institution. Also, vetting

and re-vetting exercises on security personnel

should be sustained with the intent of improving

quality performance by security staff.

5. Massively produce and circulate posters and

pamphlets on security awareness in the institution’s

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community carrying such messages as ‘Assist Security

Agents to Assist You’ ‘Report Suspicious Movement

and Action In Your Area to Security Personnel’ ‘Keep

Away from Unattended Bags, Dustbins, Packages. They

may be Explosives’ ‘Watch-Out For Strange Container

that Appeared Suddenly in Your Locality’ ‘Avoid

Indiscriminate Parking in Your Locality’ ‘Stop

Unauthorized Persons From Public Facilities’ ‘Do Not

Loiter’ ‘This Area is Under CCTV’ ‘You are Being

Filmed’ etc.

6. Provide adequate security lighting on the Campuses.

7. Construct perimeter walls to secure Institution’s

Campuses and where it exist the height of the

perimeter wall should be increased with proper angle

iron, barbed wire and exterior plastering; and to

cut cost it can be topped with broken bottles.

8. Reduce the number of pedestrian entrances into the

Campuses.

9. Task all security personnel to perform better and

unsatisfactory performance should be appropriately

punished. Where security has been outsourced non-

performing security firms should be replaced with

more competent ones.

10. Dialogue with the operators of unauthorised

structures and communities around the Campuses with

a view to generating intelligence data from them.

11. Ensure that physical security is prioritized,

access control is effectively enhanced; movement in

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and out of the Institution is closely monitored.

People and vehicles including motor cycles should be

accredited and the possibility of restricting

movement of motor vehicles in the Institution’s

premises, within a fixed period, should be looked

into. Or in the alternative, all those operating

within the Institution’s premises should be

accredited, and kitted at their own cost.

12. Procure all the basic and necessary screening

equipment within the financial ability of the

Institution, and should be immediately put to use.

13. Ensure that all movement in and out of the

Institution is through the designated exits and

entry points; such designated points must be

effectively manned twenty four hours.

14. Deploy the services of Close Circuit Television

(CCTV) and observation points should be established

in strategic places on the Campuses.

15. Introduce mobile cleaning teams which should gather

intelligence data while performing their ‘duties.’

16. Functional and effective communication system

should be set up among the security operatives and

key principal officers on twenty four hour basis.

17. Designated parking lots should be introduced. Under

no circumstances should anybody be allowed to ride

his or her motor cycle or vehicle beyond the

designated parking lots.

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18. Organize, from time to time, lectures on security

awareness. This is particularly necessary because

security is every man’s business; therefore, we

should all put our hands on the table to secure our

beloved institutions.

19. Liaise with the government to develop a blue-print

with which to work with community leaders in Borno,

Yobe, Plateau, Kano and Kaduna States to identify

credible personalities for sincere discussions with

Boko Haram so that terror attacks can seize

especially because there is nowhere in the world

where insurgencies like Boko Haram have been defeated

purely through military force.

20. Also, the misrepresentation that Muslims are

terrorists needs to be corrected and erased in the

minds of sceptics due to its toxicity. Currently,

this is what is being done in America and elsewhere.

This is important because as posited by Albright

(2006) quoting Defence Department Advisory Board

thus: ‘Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather

they hate our policies. American actions and the

flow of events have elevated the authority of the

jihadi insurgents and tend to ratify their legitimacy

among Muslims. What was a marginal network [Al-

Qaeda] is now a community-wide movement.’

On their parts students are required to among other things to:

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1. Avoid travelling or moving about alone at night and they

should avoid dark, deserted and obscure areas of the

campuses;

2. Not to expose their personal belongings and such things

as keys, laptops, phones, cameras, room lockers and other

valuables to the temptation of other people;

3. Not to leave their rooms open and insecure irrespective

of the shortness of the time they are likely to spend

outside the rooms;

4. Be very conscious and sensitive to anything suspicious

[human or object] around them. Hence, they should raise

an alarm regarding suspicious people or items they have

noticed. For example, if a student finds his room door

tampered with, he should not enter the room until after a

security search is conducted;

5. Not to keep their whereabouts secret as proper

information about their movements enhances their and

other peoples’ security.

6. Not to be careless with electric kettles, boiling rings,

pressing irons, stoves, electric cookers, gas cylinders,

etc. They should ensure that wires and cords are in good

condition and are not hidden under rugs; and

7. Be very much aware of where fire-extinguishers and fire

emergency exits are located

CONCLUSION

The paper examined the role and importance of security

awareness in the enhancement of security on institution’s

campuses in Nigeria with a focus on Kano’s tertiary

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institutions. It has been argued in the paper that giving

security awareness a prime of place is imperative in

countering terrorism in Nigeria’s tertiary Institutions, Kano

state’s inclusive. It has been pointed out that the security

situation in the nation has deteriorated to a worrisome level

as lives and property are lost on daily basis coupled with

fear and trauma with negative consequence to human socio-

economic and political activities.

In the effort to analyze the role and significance of security

awareness in promoting security in tertiary Institutions

thereby countering terrorism on Institution’s Campuses the

paper examined the security situation of the country and the

prevailing security situation in tertiary Institution’s

Campuses; and there is a very serious cause for concern.

Furthermore, the issue of terrorism and its existence in

Nigeria and the strategies for security consciousness that is

imperative in countering terrorism have been examined from

which more safely is expected in Kano’s tertiary Institutions

and others in Nigeria generally.

REFERENCES

Albright, M and Woodward, B (2006) The Mighty and the

Almighty: Reflections on

America, God and World Affairs (HarperLargePrint,

HarperCollins, Publishers, New

York).

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Bergen, P (2001) Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of

Osama bin Laden ( Free Press,

USA)

e-lRufa’i, N (2012) ‘Between Terrorism & Corruption –

Implications For Nigeria’ Posted

online on May 4, 2012.

Radda, S.I (2012) The Need For Peace And Conflict ResolutionMechanisms For Sustainable Unity In Nigeria(An Unpublished Paper Delivered at a 5-Day Conference Organized by College of Administration and Management Studies heldat Hassan Usman Katsina Polytechnic, Katsina, 4th-8th June 2012, at Multi PurposeHall, HUK Polytechnic).

Sarki, A, (2012) ‘Is Boko Haram Real or the Metaphor of an

Agenda Against a Section of the

Country?’ Posted online on June 19, 2012 21:07:31

GMT+01:00.

See: Executive Order 13224: Blocking Property and Prohibiting

Transactions with Persons

who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism).

See: Terrorism Act, 2011 & Money Laundering Act, 2011, p2-3

Ogwuche, A.S (2010) Campus Security Manual (Ahmadu Bello

Institution’s Press Limited,

Zaria).

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