75

FROM THE EDITORIAL DESK

The advent of the British in Northeast India in the 1820s had brought far-

reaching economic, social and political transformations. The first-ever rail line

used for hauling coal and other heavy freight was also built in the 1880s. As a

result a large number of migrant workers were recruited from different parts of

the colony to work in tea plantation, coal mining and administration, and some

had even taken up trade and commerce.

One of the most significant political impacts was the reorganisation of

Assam. The merger of Cachar, Sylhet and Goalpara in 1874 coupled with the

important role held by the Bengali community in the colonial administration

facilitated the expansion and consolidation of their language in Assam. The

Bengali language first became Assam’s court language, and finally the language

of education. Such development came into conflict with the Assamese, the

region’s largest linguistics group. The struggle for self-assertion was later

won by the Assamese who sought to make Assamese language the language

of education and administration.

When the British rule came to an end the colony was divided in which a

border bisects and encircles a region historically known as Bengal. It uprooted

many people from their homes because the allocation of territories took place

mainly on religious considerations. Hundreds of thousands of people were

relocated to those places they considered safe for themselves. At the time of

1971 War that turned East Pakistan into an independent country of Bangladesh,

many people fled to India for their safety and security in which some of them

had not gone back.

Beyond these political episodes, the cross-border migration continued

largely towards India, usually compelled by economic reasons. Most of these

migrants provided cheap labour. They were largely poor people and illiterate,

ready to do jobs but the native workers rejected.

In the post-independence period, the anti-immigration forces had gained

strength in Northeast India and became the center-stage of local politics.

Unfortunately, the total number of migrant population could never be

ascertained. The available estimates vary from few lakhs to several millions.

After the Assamese retained control of the state government in Assam, they

used all options they could to further expand and consolidate their language in

the education and administration in the state. Ethnic groups who were also

concerned about their language and culture accused the policies of the state

government as “excessive.” Thus one of the most significant impacts of Assam’s

76

anti-immigration movement was the socio-political polarization along the ethnic

lines. The Bodos made the slogan of “divide Assam fifty-fifty” for the formation

of a new state.

The societal conflict arising out of immigration has sharpened the conflict

between different ethnic groups. The issue has been excessively politicised

through vote-bank politics thereby dividing the people along the communal

lines.

On the other hand, the central government’s perceived inaction has

alienated sections of the population. Ethnic groups have been accusing the

government of not taking the problem seriously thereby contributing for their

alienation from the country’s mainstream. Thus the alienation has become one

of the root causes of armed conflict. In the Northeast unabated immigration

constituted a problem because the fear of recent immigrants outnumber the

native population, as had happened in Tripura. The immigrants are accused of

taking jobs from the native workers by providing cheap labour. They are also

accused of illegally occupying the government land, the forests and the land

that the tribal people had occupied for centuries.

The current debate on immigration in Northeast India rarely acknowledges

the contribution these immigrants have made in the development of their host

society. Several studies have also projected migration reaching a dangerous

point. Few studies have found out that the issue has been grossly exaggerated

in public debate.

Under pressure from below the central government has taken up several

steps. It includes among others the enactment of special legislations for Assam

such as the erstwhile IMDT Act and the fence construction along the border,

border roads and floodlighting. But these actions have not been fully effective.

On the contrary, we are now living in a globalised world where there are

more migrants on the move than ever before. It is sometimes said that we are

living in the “age of migration.” This is also true to Northeast India since it is

now both the migrant-receiving and the migration-sending place. Interestingly,

if migration has increasingly become the livelihood strategy for a large number

of people across the globe, it has the potential to generate conflict. This is not

strange to India in general, and Northeast India in particular.

Thus what appears absolutely rational at the global level cannot be so at

the local level. Keeping this note in mind, the Eastern Quarterly has decided

to carry an issue titled MIGRATION, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT on the subject.

Meeting this objective involves (a) demystifying migration by tracing historical

facts of migration starting from global to national and finally, about the Northeast,

and on how migration becomes a threat to communities; (b) migration and

77

economic push and pull factors; (c) modern state and need for policy

intervention, and (d) migration and ethnic conflict. Eastern Quarterly has

managed to get several papers discussing these themes.

In the first article “Homeless in Homelands,” Samir Kumar Das has re-

imagined geography of Northeast India by considering North Bengal as “an

integral part of extended Northeast,” though not conventionally understood.

His paper reflects that the city of Siliguri seeks to drive home two rather

overlapping sets of arguments: First, the city has historically been the shelter

of people constantly on the move which has given the city its transit character.

Hence instead of calling it a city of migrants, it will be more apt to describe it as

a town in transit with the implication that it is the city that moves with its

moving population and loses fast its potential of becoming anyone’s home as

stable abode. Second, the city at the same time has become the site of contesting

homeland claims for its attraction mainly as an entrepot of trading. Yet, such

homeland claims often resulting in ethnic violence has ironically been

accompanied by persisting homelessness in the town.

In the following article “Illegal Bangladeshi Migration into the Northeast:

Policy Making, Politics and Hurdles,” Bibhu Prasad Routray describes illegal

migration from Bangladesh as a range of negative connotations on the region.

The paper examines the role of different actors, political considerations at play,

and the external influences in shaping policies. The paper also argues that in

spite of the impracticality of establishing a zero-influx regime, the government

has continued to pursue a policy which primarily hinges on investing in border

control mechanisms. Concurrently, the numerical strength of the migrant

population has converted it to be an inevitable source of electoral strength.

The weakness of the opposition political parties to provide a counter narrative

and the acceptance of the economic utility of the migrants at the popular level,

further nullifies the possibility of any future scenario where presence of migrants

is controlled and is along the terms defined by the state.

Bitasta Das in “Presence of Illegal Immigrants in Contemporary Assam:

Analyzing the Political History of the ‘Problem’,” argues that the approach of the

state in resolving the complex issues of Assam through quick-fix measures

such as releasing developmental package and coercing through military deploy-

ment need an immediate revision. The malady lies manifolds – economic

exclusion and lack of integration of all the ethnic groups into the national

matrix. The fear of being overwhelmed by the immigrants is far from being

obscure in such a situation. Flaring of repercussion in other parts of the country

due to developments in pockets of Assam, there are evidences enough to prove

that the malady of Assam has not remained a localized “problem.” It calls for an

immediate review of the Indian policies regarding migration and labour laws.

78

M. Amarjeet Singh, in his article “The Politics of Recognition: Miration,

Identity and Conflict,” looks at how the societal conflict linked to large-scale

migration has caused conflict between different communities including armed

conflict between government and various groups of rebels. Singh examines

the processes through which the migration has promoted the development of

exclusive identity politics and critiques the existing policies. He concludes

that if India continues to insist only on border policing, border patrolling and

border fencing, the aspiring migrants will come through other ways. He argues

to accept the existence of different kinds of push-and-pull factors forcing

people to migrate.

Marchang Remeingam in “Unemployment, Job Aspiration and Migration:

A Case Study of Tangkhul Migrants to Delhi” analyses the linkages between

the problem of educated unemployment among Tangkhuls in Manipur and

their migration to metro cities. He argues that the high prevalence of educated

unemployment and limited job opportunities in Manipur is the major factor

that pushes them to migrate. The migration, however, lessens the problem of

unemployment from Manipur in general and the Tangkhuls in particular.

The KALEIDOSCOPE consists of an article by Santosh Hasnu titled “Alibis

of Conquest: Colonial Takeover of Kachari Customary Polity.” He looks at how

East India Company engaged with the indigenous custom and tradition in

Cachar while intervening in royal succession disputes. With Kachari King

having no heir after his death in 1830 and lack of clear law of primogeniture, the

British intervened into the internal affairs of the kingdom. Hasnu argues that

the process of investigation was not just a depiction of pre-existing political

institutions, but it mirrored a series of rationalised bureaucratic process of the

British political administration. These enquiries inevitably questions the role

of the colonial state in handling customary practices and written records.

In the Take Two, Soibam Haripriya provides a critical review of the previous

issue titled “CHRISTIANITY IN NORTHEAST INDIA.” She observes that the articles

range from investigating the advent of Christianity to a more contemporary

prism of looking at the electoral politics and conflict management. These articles

depart from the oft repeated binaries of savage-civilised, primitive-modern,

wild-tame, oral-textual, etc. She draws out the significance of these articles in

the changing social and political nature of Northeast India.

We sincerely regret the delay in publication of Eastern Quarterly, and we

are trying hard to cope up with backlog issues. We hope that the articles will

generate further engaged debates.

79

Theme Articles

Eastern Quarterly

Vol. 7, Issues III & IV, Autumn & Winter 2011, pp. 79–89

Homelessness in Homelands

SAMIR KUMAR DAS

The re-imagined geography of Northeast India could include the present

North Bengal. Reflection on the city of Siliguri shows two rather overlapping

sets of arguments. First, the city has historically been the shelter of people

constantly on the move, and second, the city has become the site of contesting

homeland claims.

The paper, based on a series of studies conducted fairly recently in various

parts of northern West Bengal, focuses not so much on the Northeast as it is

conventionally understood but on North Bengal – as an integral part of what

I prefer to call the extended Northeast. Now that India’s Northeast has been

subjected to a series of policies commonly known as “Look East” and India is

poised up for looking East by way of connecting herself with the “powerhouse”

economies of Southeast Asia via the Northeast, the entire geography of the

Northeast is re-imagined in a way that its contours spread across the region

both inwards as well as outwards. As a result – and as I have argued elsewhere1

– the region is now said to include North Bengal – separated by the Siliguri

Corridor (also known in strategic circles as the “Chicken Neck”) that at its

widest is only a narrow 21-kilometer stretch of land precariously connecting

the so-called Indian “mainland” to the Northeast. The corridor serves as the

critical, arterial link with “mainland” India. The re-imagined geography of India’s

Northeast today includes North Bengal though not officially; and this paper

proposes to concentrate on North Bengal only in the sense in which it is

presently re-imagined as an integral part of the extended Northeast. Eastern

Quarterly refers generically to the East without having to resolve where the

East ends and the Northeast begins and vice versa.

More precisely, the paper reflects on Siliguri – the largest city of North

Bengal and seeks to drive home two rather overlapping sets of arguments:

One, the city has historically been the shelter of people constantly on the

80

move which has given the city its transit character. Hence instead of calling it

a city of migrants, it will be more apt to describe it as a town in transit with the

implication that it is the city that moves with its moving population and loses

fast its potential of becoming anyone’s home conventionally understood as a

relatively stable abode where the family lives like what Hegel calls “an

individual.” In migration studies, people are assumed to move – not the space.

One wonders whether the space too undergoes tectonic shifts when people

living here are in constant flux. Insofar as the town is in perpetual transit, many

of its people remain homeless without being seen as such. When the earth

moves, the shaking of a single home hardly attracts attention. Two, the city at

the same time has become the site of contesting homeland claims for its

attraction mainly as an entrepot of trading. Yet, such homeland claims often

resulting in ethnic violence has ironically been accompanied by the persisting

homelessness in the town.

FROM A CITY OF MIGRANTS TO A TOWN IN TRANSIT

Much of the rapid increase in population of North Bengal, as a Planning

Commission document notes, is “not the result of natural growth alone but

because of significant migration.”2 Dasgupta3 points out how the phenomenal

increase has also pushed up density of population. Siliguri is the most

“urbanised city in North Bengal”4 having hosted the bulk of the immigrants.

From a village of a few thousand people in the 1940s, it has grown into a

bustling and the most populous city of North Bengal. The Outline Plan of

Siliguri also notes with concern that it has around it “many undeclared urban

pockets experiencing fast urbanization.” The city is witnessing a rapid

expansion of its population particularly in recent years. According to the 2001

census, the number of residents was 1,220,275 while another estimate made in

2008, puts the figure at staggering 1,559,275.

Siliguri is said to have “accommodated the bulk of the migrants.”5 According

to a sample survey conducted back in 1990, amongst the immigrants, 60 per

cent come from East Pakistan/Bangladesh, while 17 per cent come from Bihar

and 8 per cent happen to be Marwaris mainly controlling the wholesale trade.

The rest 15 per cent come from various parts of South Bengal or Assam. 20 per

cent of those involved in wholesale trade are returnees from East Pakistan/

Bangladesh and as high as 70 per cent of them are Hindi-speaking people

coming mostly from the Hindi belt of North India. The rest 10 per cent have

migrated from Assam and South Bengal. The wholesalers, as the survey pointed

out, are tied together by strong kinship bonds, which make it practically

impossible for others to freshly enter into the business. They are also said to

81

be in possession of very high amount of liquid cash – much of which is derived

as profit from their trade in Siliguri, which they do not either spend or invest in

the city. It has all the signs of an enclave economy. The city has a very high

concentration of retail trade and the rate of concentration is unmatched by any

other city in West Bengal.

Nearly 11 per cent of the migrants in the sample of slum-dwellers immigra-

ted with their family after being evicted from their homes primarily for economic

reasons; 33 per cent reported political disturbance as the cause of their migration

while 49 per cent are economic migrants who came to Siliguri in search of better

jobs.6 The highest percentage of migrants came from Bangladseh. The relatively

poorer states of Bihar, Jharkhand and Odisha have accounted for as much

migration as those from neighbouring Bangladesh.7 Waves of migration from

East Pakistan/Bangladesh and the neighbouring states of the Northeast since

the days of partition (1947) caused – primarily though not exclusively – by

political instability and ethnic violence brought in post-Independence era

thousands of uprooted people to Siliguri. Masses of repatriated Burmese also

made Siliguri the shelter after their influx in 1967. Another study on slum-

dwellers roughly endorses the same ethnic composition of the migrant

population of Siliguri mentioned above.8 Siliguri as a result has become a city

of migrants and as Chatterjee puts it “a cosmopolitan town in letter and spirit.”9

North Bengal in general and Siliguri in particular have always been in

transition but especially so after the partition of India in 1947 after which it

became completely landlocked. It stands right at the cusp between the

“mainland” and India’s Northeast. Its close proximity with the international

borders with Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan makes it one of the easiest

destinations of the immigrants coming from across the international borders

and the rest of India. The entire area has a long history of migration and what

today is known as North Bengal, as Suniti Kumar Chatterji tells us, always

served as the transit point of one of world’s greatest migratory routes from

South to Southeast Asia and vice versa. Violence and insurgency in most of

the states of the Northeast until very recently, coupled with the construction

of big dams and commissioning of other development projects have been

responsible for pushing out large chunks of people from the region - many of

whom have made their way to various parts of North Bengal. Urban ecology

and social profile of the region have been changing fast while studies in

migration are slow in adapting to the newly emergent reality. Studies by Van

Schendel or Samaddar – significant as they are in terms of the milestones of

scholarship they have set for us – have largely been unable to trace the flow of

“border economy” beyond the border and borderlands – into Siliguri for

instance. Border economy does not remain confined to the border or borderland

82

but seeps into the mainland and brings about transformations in the economies

of the mainland and mainland cities.

Siliguri stands therefore as a “link,” as Munshi emphasizes. He quotes

from a Government of West Bengal document published in 1994:

[T]he area (foothill region of Darjeeling-Himalayas, the author) has always

been bridge-builder between North Bihar and Assam with its present road

and rail transport nodes around a newly enlarged old rail head facing the

Himalayas of Siliguri. The staging point between Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling

after 1947 Bengal partition, became a case of urban capture. Its broad gauge

rail terminal named New Jalpaiguri in deference to the much older town close

by to the South was aligned to take the sweep of the North Bihar-Assam rail link

built in the late 1940s: its proximity to the roads up to Teesta to Kalimpong

and Tibet and to Sikkim, as well as to the Duars and Terai (and hence to the

Morong tract of Nepal) led to the alignment of the National Highway from

Bihar to Assam and improvement of roads into Darjeeling hills.10

Siliguri as a microcosm of North Bengal lacks the industrial fundamentals.

The urbanization of Siliguri is not matched by any corresponding industriali-

zation. The five districts of North Bengal contain 17 per cent of the total

population of West Bengal as per the 1991 census but only 5.3 per cent of the

total industrial workers. North Bengal accounts for only 1.2 per cent of total

fixed capital and only 3.2 per cent of the total value added in the state. According

to an estimate, about 95 per cent of the industrial workforce still lives in South

Bengal while only 5 per cent employed mostly in small industries is located in

the 5 districts of North Bengal. The pace of industrialization in Siliguri is slow

and tardy. The total number of industrial units actually fell from 174 in 1971 to

162 in 1985. Lack of industrialization has made Siliguri “a market town.”11 It has

become a centre for wholesale trade since 1960. There are three retail shops per

100 people – compared to 0.21 in Delhi – the highest in West Bengal.

According to the 1991 census, 21.57 per cent of Siliguri’s population lives

in slums and “a majority of them (80 per cent) are migrants.”12 The migrants are

spatially segregated. While the partition (1947) refugees are more or less well-

settled living at the heart of the city, the urban poor are settled in squatter

colonies along the railway tracks and relatively dry river beds.

Now that the city of Siliguri has been expanding phenomenally and

gobbling up the outskirts like a gigantic shark, the erstwhile tea gardens on the

fringe have to make room for highrises, swanky shopping malls, huge housing

complexes and vertical skyscrapers. Tea – once considered as the backbone of

North Bengal’s economy – has long ceased to be a viable industry thanks to

the competition faced from such countries as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Kenya

83

and others, the lack of fresh investment that requires to be made for introduction

of new technology and replantation and the accumulating liabilities the

company owners have incurred over the years and maybe a host of many other

factors.13 Of the approximately 150 tea estates located in the district of Jalpaiguri,

only 25 have their head office in the district. The agency houses have already

established their head office in Kolkata.

Tea industry, by all accounts, was profitable in the pre-globalization era –

even in the 1980s. According to an estimate of 1984, respective rates of profit

for sugar, tobacco, textiles and tea were 9.7, 8, 7 and 33 per cents. The

profitability of tea industry attracted new investments and new areas were

brought under tea plantation even in the 1990s. North Dinajpur records the

highest with 30,000 acres being added to the total area under plantation. Next

to follow were Jalpaiguri with 15,000 acres and Darjeeling with 10,000 acres. In

total, about 60,000 acres were freshly brought under tea cultivation by fair

means or foul – whether by grabbing tribal land and land under Teesta Barrage

area or the fenced land of the border areas or by simply getting land “vested”

by manipulating land records. Partha Sen cites the example of Kachugach

village where tribals have been forcibly evicted from their land:

Kachugach village is situated in Kuorgaon mouza under Islampur police

station. Immediately after the partition about one hundred tribals named (sic)

Dhanesh Kisku, Rengta Hembram, Thakur Hasda, Subal Hasda, Lio Kisku

etc. came from East Bengal, occupied about 60/70 acres of vest land and

some retained land (JL No 29, Khata No 79, 579, 144, 796, 140, 529 etc).

But during the survey settlement their names were not mentioned - neither in

13 nor 23 Column. On the contrary names of Samir-ud-din, Jabbar Ali, Sk.

Muhammad, Hazrat Ali etc were mentioned. On receiving complaint the

Tribal Welfare Department tried to reach an amicable settlement on 01.12.88

at Kachugach Primary School. In presence of the JLRO and KGO it was

decided other than retained land, vested land should be distributed to the

tribals. But the decision was not carried out. Ultimately Samir-ud-din, Jabbar

Ali with the tacit support of the pradhan of Govindapur Panchayat sold the

land to a tea planter. In this way the tribals were evicted. It is learned from

Adibasi Krisi Jami Raksha Committee (Committee for the Protection of the

Land of the Tribals, the author) that near about 4,500 acres of tribal land in North

Dinajpur have been illegally occupied by the Tea Planters. In Malda district

a vast amount of tribal land has been illegally transferred to non-tribals.14

All this came as a boon in the era of globalization when land kept hitherto

under tea plantation is rapidly turned into money earning realties.15 In so far as

the tea gardens became increasingly non-viable, the gardens on the fringe of

the city were the first to bear the brunt. Chandmoni Tea Estate is the classic

84

example. Dipankar Chatterjee – Managing Director of the Luxmi Tea Company

– that bought the land – makes the point: “The Chandmoni Tea Estate was a

loss making company with huge liabilities. We could not turn the company

into a profit making one and have decided to convert 400 acres of tea garden

into real estate.”16 At one level, the workforce was increasingly casualized so

that there were only few permanent workers left who would be required to be

compensated when the company was liquidated. At another, the company, as

Dasgupta points out, forced “voluntary retirement” on the tea labour. In a

letter dated 5 January 2006, the General Manager of the Chandmoni Tea Estate

writes: “By signing on the duplicate of this letter, you are to admit what is

stated herein and commit to vacate your present labour house, dismantle the

same, vacate the premises and make it free from all encumbrances within 31

October 2005.” Interestingly they were asked to sign the letter post facto and

the same letter made it mandatory on the part of the tea labour to accept “the

voluntary retirement scheme” without being given any choice of not accepting

it. As it declares: “You will be paid voluntary retirement compensation as per

the said scheme with other terminal and statutory dues payable to you as per

the terms and conditions of employment applicable to you.”17 What Dasgupta

calls “Chandmoni capitalism” is the story of primitive accumulation, of how tea

labour is expropriated, evicted, pauperized, cut down from below the level of

subsistence and thus pushed into hunger, penury and death through rampant

use of violence and coercion.

The fortunate few erstwhile labourers of Chandmoni Tea Estate who could

be absorbed in the newly set up Uttaorayan Housing Complex on the same

land as sweepers, guards, chowkidars, housemaids, caretakers, etc. are allowed

to stay inside of what once used to be a thriving tea garden complain of being

constantly “watched” and kept under surveillance by the employers.18 Although

they were not evicted themselves, staying put in the same place after the “death”

of the tea garden implies a loss of home at home in this instance. Home, as they

understand it, is not simply a plot of land, a hut, a building or a house where one

lives with a family, but a space “invested with hope” that makes one feel at home.

The report also points out how most of the tea workers were casualised and

never rehabilitated and some of the permanent ones were taken to a distant tea

garden of Subalbhita and were “torn from their social fabric.”

The closure of Chandmoni Tea Estate on the outskirts of Siliguri led to

massive eviction and displacement of erstwhile tea labourers many of whom

were reduced to casual workers before it was shut down. Today the city stands

as a stark reminder of the contrast between those who can afford to own homes

as prime property in the plush housing complexes and those who have been

rendered homeless while making way to the changing landscape of the city.

85

Siliguri thus has two sets of immigrants pitted as it were against each

other. On the one hand, those who have their stake in booming wholesale and

retail trade and make liquid money from out of it and siphon it away to their

homes located outside North Bengal and those who are constantly rendered

homeless by the “changing” city. While elaborating on the vision, the company

brochure entitled Uttarayon – The Township tells us: “We believe a strong,

stable and secure home is the answer to many problems we face today.” But

the answer of “a strong, stable and secure home” poses more questions than

it answers to those whom it renders homeless. The Chandmoni Tea Estate

Anti-Eviction Joint Action Committee raised the demand of a judicial inquiry

into the land deal whereby land is said to have been undersold and acquired,

flouting all rules and promises and the death of two tea garden workers in

police firing while protesting against the acquisition of their plot of land as late

as in November 2011.19

The new rich of Siliguri who live their settled life within the plush housing

complex live without having to depend on the urban amenities of life usually

provided by the state and its agencies. These are, as Benedict Anderson calls,

“sacred spaces” which have effectively severed their connection with the

town. As a result, the living conditions in Siliguri, as Roy and Saha point out in

their paper published in 2011, are dismal.20 A recently conducted doctoral study

reveals that while the people in transit create pressure on municipal facilities

(like provision of public toilets, access to safe drinking water etc), Siliguri as a

city suffers from poor living conditions precisely because people “living” here

do not have a sense of belonging to it and the “lack of genuine belongingness

may grind Siliguri down.”21 People of this nature are displaced and remain

homeless – notwithstanding that they live here and are never physically evicted.

The city, for all practical purposes, has become the heart of a thriving

“border economy.” A good percentage of Siliguri’s population remains in transit

having their links with other places. Many of them come, strike their deals, do

business and entertain themselves away from their prying homes, enjoy and

take full advantage of the anonymity of the city and go back, only to return

again after a while and repeat the process. The heavy cash flow, thanks to the

otherwise booming “border economy,” capital gains earned from insurgency

being the only industry in some of the states of the Northeast and ploughed

back into the economy by the insurgents and ex-insurgents, rehabilitation

packages offered by the Government to the surrendered militants and many

more – has not contributed in any significant way to the “health” of North

Bengal’s economy. Siliguri’s urban landscape, for instance, embodies the stark

contrast between a deep sense of lack and bliss of fulfillment at the same time

– the yawning gap between lack of urban planning and amenities, of health

86

and sanitation services, of roads and public transport – of that bare minimum

that urban living in India offers and the sense of self-fulfillment and comfort

that the “sacred spaces” of well-protected, fortress-like housing complexes

offer to the nouveau riche – to those who can afford to own them, without

having to depend on the municipal corporation for water supply and sanitation,

state electricity board for supply of electricity and any of the government

agencies for any of the essential services. They have the money to buy these

services and price them beyond the reach of the urban poor. The starred

apartments of internationally mobile middle class and the new rich of Siliguri

that remain vacant here reportedly serve as places of conduit where trafficked

women – themselves in transit – are called to entertain their affluent customers

in transit and money quickly changes hands. All in Siliguri are in transit – the

wholesalers, the retailers, the military and the security forces, the railway men,

the customers and entertainers, the tea planters and the tea labour flushed out

from the city limits and many others. The cash flow that gets injected into the

economy of North Bengal may not have its source in the area, yet comes, gets

spent and multiplied and then flies away. If North Bengal has followed a

neoliberal path of development, then it has joined the path only from the

margins with many of its peculiarities distinct from those of the mainland.

Siliguri therefore is in the midst of a perpetual transit for its new rich have

been losing fast their sedentary character and have become internationally

mobile having their connections mainly with the neighbouring countries who

are continuously on the move and the vast army of the urban poor and the

underclass constantly losing or under the threat of losing their home. In a

society that itself is in transit, displacement is unlikely to get noticed – far less

to become a public issue. As we argued, when the earth shakes, the shaking of

a single home more often than not gets unnoticed. Both are homeless – not

however in the same way. The city of Siliguri fast loses the potential of being

home to either of them.

The city, to my mind, resembles what Gupta calls a “non-space”22 – a space

where people of diverse cultural backgrounds participate with the difference

that unlike other “non-spaces” like international airports and interstate

highways, hardly there are any established rules and protocols that govern

this city as a whole. Siliguri is a non-space in the sense that it is segmented into

diverse sectors and within each of its economic and social sectors separate

rules and protocols apply. Rules and protocols are specific to each of these

sectors and have evolved as a means of privileging certain ethnic groups and

communities over others. The retail and wholesale trade, for example, are

governed by strong kinship networks which make it difficult for the outsiders

to make any headway. The evidently ethnic nature of tea labour is yet another

87

example, which again makes it difficult for others to make an entry into that

sector. Nor is it possible for the discarded tea labour to enter into any other

sector of Siliguri’s economy. The rules and protocols seldom cut across these

sectors and are not common to one and all. Gupta however prefers to define

“non-space” as one in which rules and protocols cut across the groups and

communities inhabiting it and are common to all of them. Siliguri does not seem

to have any common set of rules and protocols, but resembles a “non-space”

insofar as people of one sector encounters and interacts with those of another

much in the same way as unknown passengers meet at the transit lounge of an

international airport.

HOMELANDS WITHOUT HOMES

Ironically, Siliguri is the site of contending homelands without being anyone’s

home. Insofar as the importance of Siliguri as the largest and fastest growing

entrepot of North Bengal is recognized, the city becomes the pivot in the

imaginative geography of all homeland claims and demands. But as our study

emphasizes, the city is fast losing the potential of being their home. After all

what is “Gorkhaland” or north of West Bengal (North Bengal) without Siliguri,

as much as what is Punjab or Haryana without Chandigarh or India without the

“emerald crown” of Kashmir? Studies conducted on the border town of Moreh

in Manipur on the Indo-Myanmar border point out how the town provides the

turf on which ethnic wars are fought for establishing and perpetuating control

over it by “subduing” others, through the exercise of sheer violence and force

– thanks to its rising importance as a strategic node through which both licit

and illicit trade is conducted.23 The town itself provides the battlefront.

Much in the same manner, North Bengal has been sitting on powder keg

for long, waiting to blast at any moment – as far as a huge body of homeless

population – whether at home or evicted from there – is concerned. Siliguri

does not have any history of ethnic violence. The clash that shook Siliguri on

28 September 2007 points simultaneously to the paradox of fragile peace on the

surface and the fissure that runs deep into Siliguri’s social landscape. Siliguri

has been a city of contesting homeland claims. On the one hand, Gorkha

Janmukti Morcha (GJM) makes the claim of including some of the mouzas of

Siliguri under the jurisdiction of the Gorkha Territorial Administration (GTA).

On the other hand, pro-Bengali organisations like the Jana Chetna Manch and

Jana Jagran Manch have been formed and are opposed to the inclusion of

these mouzas in GTA. Hand in hand with it, the ultra right Amra Bangali branches

are reportedly spreading across North Bengal. Arun Ghosh and Dilip Deb,

members and leaders of the Jana Chetna in Bagdogra on the outskirts of Siliguri,

88

point out: “How does one distinguish between the Nepalese from Nepal and

those from Darjeeling? We have seen thousands of Gorkhas from Bhutan coming

here (Siliguri, the author) and settling down over the years. How can they

decide our destiny now? We have resolved not to allow any activity here that

will disrupt our livelihood. All communities have been living here for generations

in peace and harmony. This is at stake now.”24

The situation reached a flashpoint when the trouble occurred on the first

day of a two-day bandh called by Amra Bangali and other organisations in

protest against the GJM’s call for an indefinite bandh to highlight its statehood

demand that began on 11 June 2008 in the evening. Violence that threatened to

snowball into an ethnic conflict erupted in different parts of Siliguri as people

belonging to the two communities, hurled brickbats at each other. Some were

armed with cleavers and swords. Prohibitory orders under Section 144 Cr PC were

imposed in parts of Siliguri as well as in Malbazar (near Siliguri) in the Dooars

where trouble broke out and vehicles carrying tourists were attacked allegedly

by GJM supporters. The Army was alerted and jawans of the Sashastra Seema

Bal (SSB) patrolled the streets of Siliguri and its adjoining areas in West Bengal

following clashes between those for and against the GJM’s demand for a separate

state, comprising the Darjeeling hills and some areas contiguous to it.

It is truly an irony that Siliguri provides the site of contesting homelands

without being anyone’s home. If Edward Said can raise the question of “what

is home without homeland?,”25 Siliguri’s attraction as homeland lies precisely

in its transit character – its permanent homelessness. Is permanent homelessness

the precondition of making the homeland claim?

[Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations from original non-English

sources are mine. – The author]

NOTES & REFERENCES

1 Samir Kumar Das, “India’s Look East Policy: Imagining a New Geography of India’s

Northeast,” India Quarterly, 66(4), December, 2010, pp. 343–58.

2 Report on Comparative Backwardness of North Bengal Region sponsored by Planning

Commission. New Delhi: Institute of Applied Manpower Research, 2002, p. 10.

3 Manas Dasgupta, Udarikaran, Unnayan O Uttarbanga (in Bengali) (Liberalization,

Development and North Bengal), Kolkata: Boiwala, 2004, p. 11.

4 Archana Ghosh, S. Sami Ahmad and Shipra Maitra, Basic Services for the Urban

Poor: A Study of Baroda, Bhilwara, Sambalpur and Siliguri, New Delhi: Institute of

Social Sciences/Concept, 1995, p. 189.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 210.

89

7 Ibid., p. 213.

8 Sumana Saha and Mousumi Bhattacharya, Urban Basic Services: The Experience of

Siliguri (report of a Research Project sponsored by ILGUS and UNICEF), Darjeeling:

University of North Bengal, 1993, pp. 26–27.

9 Siba Prasad Chatterjee, Known Yet Unknown Darjeeling/Siliguri: Facts and Figures.

Siliguri: Kashi Nath Dey, 1997, p. 48.

10 Government of West Bengal, (1994), Introducing West Bengal quoted in Sunil Munshi, “Urbani-

sation in the Eastern Himalayas“ in Karubaki Datta (ed.), Urbanisation in the Eastern

Himalayas: Emergence and Issues. New Delhi: Serials Publication 2006, pp. 3–10.

11 Archana Ghosh, S. Sami Ahmad and Shipra Maitra, Basic Services for the Urban

Poor: A Study of Baroda, Bhilwara, Sambalpur and Siliguri, p. 193.

12 Ibid.

13 Manas Dasgupta, Biswayan Bharat O Uttarbanga, Kolkata: Deep Prakashan, 2003,

pp. 177–204.

14 Partha Sen, “Separatism in North Bengal: Adding to Tribal Woes,” Frontier, Vol. 43,

No. 40, April, 2011, p. 18.

15 Manas Dasgupta, Uttarbange Cha Silpe Bartaman Samasya, Kolkata: Boiwala,

2006, pp. 169–71.

16 See, “Chandmoni Tea uprooted for Siliguri’s first township,“ Business Standard,

January 5, 2004.

17 Manas Dasgupta, Uttarbange Cha Silpe Bartaman Samasya, p. 147.

18 Saswati Biswas, Development Project and Project-Affected Women: A Study of Former

Women Workers of Chandmoni Tea Estate (mimeo), Siliguri: University of North

Bengal, n. d. p. 37.

19 See, “Demand to probe tea land deal,” The Telegraph, November 18, 2011.

20 Tamal Basu Roy and Sanjoy Saha, “A study on factors related to urban growth of a

municipal corporation & emerging challenges: A case of Siliguri Municipal Corpora-

tion, West Bengal, India,“ Journal of Geography & Regional Planning, Vol. 4(14),

2011, pp. 683–94.

21 Chinmayakar Das, People, Governance and Development: A Study of Siliguri Mu-

nicipal Corporation, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Political Science,

University of North Bengal, 2012, p. 345.

22 Dipankar Gupta, Cultures, Space and the Nation-State: From Sentiment to Structure.

New Delhi: Sage, 2000, p. 22.

23 See, Dulali Nag, Local Dynamics, Universal Context: Border Trading through Moreh,

Manipur, Policies and Practices 5, Kolkata: Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group,

2005. Also see, Chitra Ahanthem, “Sanitized Societies and Dangerous Interlopers:

Women in a Border Town called Moreh,“ in Endangered Lives on the Border:

Women in the Northeast, Policies and Practices, 33, Kolkata: Mahanirban Calcutta

Research Group, 2010, pp. 17–30.

24 Subrata Nagchoudhury, “For a Home and an Identity,” The Indian Express, June 15, 2008.

25 Edward W. Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays, New

Delhi: Penguin, 2001, p. 177.

90

Eastern Quarterly

Vol. 7, Issues III & IV, Autumn & Winter 2011, pp. 90–103

Illegal Bangladeshi Migration into the

Northeast: Policy Making, Politics and

Hurdles

BIBHU PRASAD ROUTRAY

Illegal migration from Bangladesh over the decades has converted the

numerical strength of the migrant population into an inevitable source of

electoral strength. The weakness of the opposition political parties to provide

a counter narrative, and the acceptance of the economic utility of the migrants

at the popular level, nullifies the possibility of any future scenario where

presence of migrants is properly addressed.

INTRODUCTION

While little unanimity exists on the extent of illegal migration of Bangladeshi

nationals into India’s northeast, some convergence of views on the impact of

such population movement on demography, economy and shrinking resources

in the region is noticeable. Irrespective of the divided opinions on the

commitment of the ruling regimes to deal with such illegal migrants and the

feasibility of the measures adopted to stop the influx, there is unanimity of

sorts among the different stakeholders that such migration, unless stopped,

will destabilise the fragile region even further. The issue of continuing influx of

foreigners also highlights the intricacies of policy making, the specific role of

actors, enablers and the external influences facilitating or inhibiting formulation

of a coherent policy.

The paper attempts to critically analyse official policy making with regard

to dealing with illegal migration from Bangladesh into the Northeast. It analyses

the role of the different actors in the policy making architecture, examines the push

and pull factors and the impact ability of the peripheral actors in the decision

making apparatus. While the paper makes cursory reference to other states of

the northeast, bulk of the analysis pertains only to the state of Assam. The

91

paper also focuses mostly on the contemporary official policies on migration, espe-

cially that of the Congress Party-led governments in the state as well in New Delhi.

The paper argues that the official policy dealing with illegal migration from

Bangladesh is based on the premise that a complete halt to migration is a desirable,

yet unachievable goal to pursue. Hence, political prudence and electoral

expediency leads the ruling regimes in New Delhi as well as Assam to use the

migrants as a source to gain political strength. As a result, the policy making

with regard to migration while investing in the gradual strengthening of the

infrastructure on the Indo-Bangladesh border directed at preventing further

migration and also in mechanisms to identify such illegal foreigners, does little

in terms of deporting them back to Bangladesh. The paper further argues that

this policy, which has been critiqued by the community-based organisations

and also has been the source of periodic upheavals/riots in states like Assam,

has been provided with a soft landing by a popular acceptance of migration as

a fait accompli in Assam. As a result, demands and periodic upheavals

demanding the identification and deportation of the migrants coexist with a

political as well as economic expediency to benefit from their presence.

THE IMPACT

Bangladeshi migrants, trickling into the Northeast, primarily through Assam’s

porous borders, happened prior to India’s independence. The movement

continued following the partition of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan

in 1947, after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 and thereafter. They have

been alleged to have taken away jobs, occupied land and changed the

demography of the state’s districts. While statistics on the jobs taken away

and land occupied by the migrants are not available, the increase in the Muslim

population in some of the districts in the state is cited in support of the claim of

the inceasing migration from Bangladesh.

Table 1: Variation of Muslim population in Assam from 1941-2001 (In percentage)1

*No Census took place for Assam in 1981.

Undivided District

1941 1951 1961 1971 1991 2001

Lakhimpur 4.98 4.66 5.64 4.59 5.96 6.52 Sibsagar 4.82 5.82 5.83 5.27 6.36 6.95 Nowgong 33.76 34.18 33.74 31.32 35.77 38.42 Kamrup 29.07 29.29 29.36 31.33 32.87 34.91 Darrang 16.42 17.03 19.35 16.19 22.22 25.20

Goalpara 46.23 42.94 43.32 42.25 46.91 51.31 Cachar 42.48 38.49 39.19 39.88 43.02 45.47

92

What is apparent from the cited official data on undivided districts in

Assam is that the Muslim population (presumably due to the population influx

from Bangladesh) has risen consistently over the decades. Other sources,

however, point at a more alarming rise in Muslim population. For example, a

report submitted by Lt. General Srinivas Kumar Sinha, who served as Assam’s

governor between 1997 and 2003, for the President of India had said the Muslim

population of Assam rose by 77.42 per cent between 1971 and 1991, compared

to 41.89 per cent for the Hindus. The comparative pan-India increase in the

Muslim population during that period was 55.04 per cent. The report had

prophesised that except in Sibsagar district the indigenous Assamese people

would not find themselves at home in Assam. It further warned that “if the

present trends are not arrested, the indigenous people of Assam would be

reduced to a minority and there may, in course of time, be a demand for the

merger of Muslim-dominated bordering districts with Bangladesh.”2

On August 28, 2000, an affidavit filed by the Assam government stated:

There are three districts in Assam which have borders with Bangladesh, viz.

Karimganj, Cachar and Dhubri. All India percentage of decadal increase in

population during 1981-1991 is 23.85 per cent whereas the border districts

of Assam, namely, Karimganj, shows decadal increase of 42.08 per cent,

Cachar district 47.59 per cent, and Dhubri district 56.57 per cent. From the

above it can be assumed that the infiltration of foreigners from Bangladesh

contributed significantly to the sharp increase of population in Assam.3

Similarly, the Gauhati High Court in July 2008 said that “Bangladeshis

would soon become kingmakers in Assam and that the state government had

failed to solve the problem of illegal migration.”4 Further, in 2008, the

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs said in its report that the

“large presence of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants poses a grave threat to the

internal security.” Thus, in spite of the claims by the Assam government headed

by the Congress party that migration from Bangladesh has stopped – the

negative impact of migration, consequent rise in Muslim population in Assam

and its negative impact has been fairly well recognised.

The increase of Muslim population has also been cited as the reason for

many of the riots between different indigenous tribes and Muslims in the state.

Starting with the 1983 Nellie massacre in which Lalung tribals attacked

Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants in Nagaon district resulting in the deaths of at

least 2191 people, riots have claimed lives and produced a large number of

internally displaced people in various districts of the state. In July and

August 2012, Muslims and Bodo tribals clashed in four districts of Assam in

which “77 people lost their lives, 5367 houses were burnt and 47,936 families

93

had been affected. Men, women and children from 244 villages filled in the 340

temporary relief camps.”5 Prior to that, in 2008, a similar communal flare-up

resulted in the loss of 55 lives and displacement of 200,000 people. The reasons

of such regular clashes have been attributed to migration, pressures on land

and shrinking resources.

PILLARS OF THE OFFICIAL POLICY

Amid the pulls and pressures of decision making between the primary and

secondary actors and the other stakeholders, four critical pillars of the official

policy with regard to migration is discernible. These pillars while explaining the

constraints of policy making, also provide a peep into the labyrinth of strategic

thinking behind particular decisions, processes of bargaining between the

actors involved and external influences that shape official decisions.

Absurdity of a Zero-Influx Regime

Rates of success of governments worldwide to stop illegal migration through

an array of technological, infrastructural, legal and bilateral or regional

cooperative mechanisms have been unsatisfactory. Whereas the United States

has struggled to stop immigration from Mexico even after investing huge sums

on strengthening the border control mechanisms, conflicts in Asia and Africa

have pushed millions of people away from the badlands to Australia and the

European nations. Only a fraction of these people have been legal immigrants.

In this background, to assume that the Indian government would be successful

in establishing a zero-influx regime along the 4096.7 kilometre long complex

Indo-Bangladesh border6 appears, from a policy making point of view, an

unachievable goal to pursue.

Such realisation has been seconded by expert opinions, recommending

methods other than border fencing to deal with migration. Among such advices

which have received maximum attention is the “work permit system,” which

would allow Bangladeshis to be legally employed in India. Experts believe that

the work permit system would directly address the illegality of migration and

the related components which “drives the related economy underground,

placing it in the hands of organised criminals, corrupt officials and unscrupulous

politicians who can exploit the vote banks it creates. It also deprives the central

and state governments of sources of revenue they would have enjoyed had

migrant economy been above-ground.”7 Experts believe that the work permits

can transform the nature of migration by encouraging high-skilled migrants

and allowing low-skilled seasonal migrants a pathway to return to Bangladesh.

It has been commented that with porous borders, there is no way migration can

94

be checked and this will be accentuated with environmental refugees. At best,

one can ensure illegal migration becomes legal, instead of wishing the problem

away.8

The work permit system move, however, has faced opposition from various

sections within the Northeast and outside. These stakeholders point at the

absurdity of legalising Bangladeshi labour in India, where millions are

unemployed. Political parties within the Northeast fear that the influx of

additional migrants will threaten social equilibrium in the region. Such local

opposition has militated against the acceptance of the unfeasibility of fencing

as an instrument to stop migration, lest this be construed as a policy that

promotes influx. Thus, no regime either in New Delhi or Assam has ever

highlighted the limitation of pursuing this approach.

Even then, in 2001, a Group of Ministers (GoM) on national security reforms

in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, under the chairmanship

of L K Advani, had recommended a work permit system “to curb illegal migration

and to begin this with Bangladesh and Myanmar nationals.”9 While the NDA

government’s acquiescence to a work permit system appeared a pragmatic

way out of the influx quagmire, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)

government headed by the Congress Party in New Delhi and the Congress

Party-led coalition government in Assam appeared to opt for a fencing-centric

system to deal with the problem.

Table 2: Progress in Fencing the Indo-Bangladesh Border (Length in Km.)10

The UPA government does not have a known position on the work permit

system, although in statements made in the Parliament it has stated that it is

studying GoM recommendations made during the NDA government’s tenure.

What, however, apparent is that the UPA too shares a similar scepticism in the

effectiveness in the border fencing mechanism, although it, like the NDA

government, has refrained from expressing it openly. For example, speaking in

the Lok Sabha in September 2012, then Minority Affairs minister Salman

Khurshid said that the government does not have specific details about the

Undivided District

1941 1951 1961 1971 1991 2001

Lakhimpur 4.98 4.66 5.64 4.59 5.96 6.52

Sibsagar 4.82 5.82 5.83 5.27 6.36 6.95 Nowgong 33.76 34.18 33.74 31.32 35.77 38.42 Kamrup 29.07 29.29 29.36 31.33 32.87 34.91 Darrang 16.42 17.03 19.35 16.19 22.22 25.20

Goalpara 46.23 42.94 43.32 42.25 46.91 51.31 Cachar 42.48 38.49 39.19 39.88 43.02 45.47

95

magnitude of illegal migration from Bangladesh to India as it takes place

clandestinely. He accepted that the migrants manage to “infiltrate into the

country despite checks and control” at the international border.11 In the same

month, Minister of State for Home Affairs Mullappally Ramachandran, while

replying to a question on the estimated number of illegal Bangladeshi migrants

in Assam, provided a detailed rationale:

There are reports of illegal infiltration/immigration of Bangladeshi nationals

who manage to infiltrate into the country in spite of checks and control at the

international border, particularly through few patches where fencing is not feasible

due to difficult terrain and riverine areas. As this activity takes place clandes-

tinely, no specific details are available about the magnitude of this illegal

migrants staying in India including north-eastern states as well as in Assam.12

Such official admission appeared to have been guided by the opinions of

the border guarding forces. In one of the rare occasions of admission of the

limits of the fencing, the Director General of the Border Security Force (BSF) U

K Bansal said in August 2012, “In this year 15,000 Bangladeshis have been

pushed back. But the border is complex that I can’t say with confidence that

there is zero entrance through the border from Bangladesh. Complete sealing

of the border with Bangladesh is not easy without great human hardship.”13

As a result, the policy of fencing appears to be continuing as a measure only

to deter and not prevent influx.

Identification & deportation snags

The problem of identifying the immigrants and deporting them back to

Bangladesh has been frequently cited as the limitations of pursuing a pro-

active policy on migrants. The achievements of the governments in Assam –

both Congress and the opposition Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) – in this regard

remained far from satisfactory. The subsequent section in the paper would

deal with this aspect. However, one of the frequent justifications for its below-

par achievements in deporting the migrants provided by the Congress

government has been the lack of cooperation from Bangladesh. Chief Minister

Tarun Gogoi has frequently cites the absence of any extradition treaty with

Bangladesh as the major impediment in this regard. He stated, “Bangladesh

refuse to acknowledge that these foreigners are their citizens and even talk

about involving a neutral party in settling citizenship issues of such people.”14

This narrative of Bangladesh’s reluctance to taking the immigrants back,

however, appears to be merely anecdotal and unsubstantiated. The response

of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Lok Sabha indicates that Dhaka does not

have an official policy in this regard. For example, on 22 May 2012, in response

Undivided 1941 1951 1961 1971 1991 2001

Sibsagar 4.82 5.82 5.83 5.27 6.36 6.95 Nowgong 33.76 34.18 33.74 31.32 35.77 38.42 Kamrup 29.07 29.29 29.36 31.33 32.87 34.91 Darrang 16.42 17.03 19.35 16.19 22.22 25.20

Cachar 42.48 38.49 39.19 39.88 43.02 45.47

96

to a question “Whether the Government of Bangladesh has officially refused

to acknowledge the illegal migration of Bangladeshis into India?” Minister of

State for Home Affairs, Mullappally Ramachandran answered in the negative.15

Further the fact that BSF has managed to deport a number of illegal migrants to

Bangladesh in the past years further goes against the narrative of Dhaka’s

refusal to acknowledge migration and its opposition to accepting the deported

migrants.

Politics over migrants

The Congress Party while maintaining a “tough” position on migration also

professes to protect the genuine Muslim citizens of India from being harassed

and deported after falsely accused of being an illegal migrants. However, the

measures to protect the Indian Muslims from harassment through legislations

have also amounted to creating barriers in identifying and deporting the migrants

themselves. This has fuelled the suspicion of “vote bank politics” being played

by the Congress. Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi insists that Muslims do not vote

en bloc for the Congress:

They never voted more than 50 per cent. Out of 26 [‘Muslim dominated’

seats in an Assembly of 126], the maximum (former Chief Minister) Hiteswar

Saikia got was 15 … Second highest I got that time they were with me in

2001. I won 13 of the seats; the other 13 were individuals with the Samajwadi

Party [sic], independents, etc.16

Gogoi insists that the formation of the Muslim organisations like the All

India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) have consolidated Muslim votes. The

fact, however, remains that attempts by the Congress Party to woe the Muslims

has included measures that inhibit identification and deportation of illegal

migrants.

Experts agree that the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) [IMDT]

Act, enacted in 1983 remained, till its 2005 annulment, one of the most lopsided

pieces of legislations that deterred processes for identification and deportation

of the illegal migrants. The Congress Party, however, not only remained an

avowed supporter of the IMDT Act, but initiated a range of measures to bring

the Act back through the back channel after its repeal. In an affidavit filed on

August 8, 2001, the Congress government in Assam maintained that “the IMDT

Act is constitutional and there is no question of either repeal or striking down

of the Act.”17 Three years later, in November 2004, the UPA government in New

Delhi too filed an affidavit, revoking the one filed by the previous NDA regime.

The new affidavit stated that on reconsideration the central government had

taken a decision to retain the IMDT Act in Assam.

97

In 2005, the Supreme Court struck off the Act calling it “the biggest barrier

to deportation.” A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court pointed out that

the Act created “innumerable and insurmountable difficulties” in identification

and deportation of illegal migrants. The bench noted that though enquiries

were initiated in 3,10,759 cases under the IMDT Act, only 10,015 persons were

declared illegal migrants and only 1,481 illegal migrants were physically expelled

up to April 30, 2000.18 Again in 2006, the Supreme Court defrocked the UPA govern-

ment’s attempts to bring back the scrapped IMDT Act through the back door.19

It struck down an Assam-specific notification issued under the Foreigners’

Act that put the onus of proving a person a foreigner on the complainant.

In this background, the 2009 statement of then Union Home Minister P

Chidambaram appeared to be a rethink of the Congress policy on migrants.

Chidambaram told during an interview, “If he is a Bangladeshi he has no

business to come to India unless he has a valid visa. He has no business to live

here unless he has a resident permit, and no business to work here if he has no

work permit.”20 However, the statement had been made in the immediate

aftermath of the October 30, 2008 serial explosions in Assam which claimed 77

lives and left about 300 people injured. The preliminary suspicion of the

intelligence agencies had been directed at the Bangladesh terrorist outfits like

the Harkat-ul Jihadi-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B). However, with the passage

of time the Congress Party appeared to have reverted to its old position.

Political statements during communal flare-ups in Assam, between the

indigenous tribal groups and Muslim populations, provide opportunities to

different actors to reiterate their stand on the migrants. The 2008 riots between

the Adivasis and the Muslims and the 2012 riots between the Bodos and the

Muslims were two such occasions. Where as the BJP, the AGP and the Bodo

organisations termed the flare-ups as violence between the Indians and the

Bangladeshi foreigners, the Congress Party continued to describe the Muslim

victims of the riots as “settlers.” Its position remained unchanged even after

the media reports21 indicated that about 500 Muslim victims of the riots staying

in different relief camps in Dhubri district had gone missing and were suspected

to have crossed over to Bangladesh after authorities started verifying

antecedents of the victims.

Narrative of declining influx

The fourth pillar of the Congress government’s policy on migration is based

on a questionable narrative of drastic reduction in the level of migration.

Irrespective of the significant rise in Muslim population in the state vis-a-vis

the Hindus, both the state government and the UPA government at the centre

maintain that the level of influx from Bangladesh has sufficiently declined.

98

Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, a known protagonist of the “significant

decline in the influx” theory, insists that the problem of illegal migrants, “is not

as grave as many would like the outside world to believe.”22 During a media

interview after the communal flare-up in Bodoland districts in July–August

2012, he said,

I have all along been saying that migration is on the decline. Where does

migration take place? Where there is ample job opportunity, where there is

land that is available. Today, land availability is not there. Earlier, why did

they come? Today, [that is] why they do not come?23

A similar statement was also made by then Union Home Minister P

Chidambaram during a visit to Assam in the aftermath of the July 2012 riots

in the Bodoland area. Chidambaram said, “Assam’s border is a difficult

border. There is no denial that illegal migration takes place from Bangladesh.

But influx has come down sharply.”24 Gogoi ascribes the rise in Muslim

population to illiteracy and not migration. He said during an interview, “It is

because of low literacy, illiteracy. Illiteracy is there, most of the Muslims are

illiterates. Every family has six, seven, eight, nine, 10 members. It is because of

illiteracy.”25

FRAILTY OF THE SECONDARY ACTORS

The previous section examined the constraints as well as the inclinations of

the ruling regimes to pursue a particular policy with regard to migration. This

section would analyse the role played by the secondary actors – opposition

political parties, civil society groups and the host population – in policy making.

It is being argued that the political infirmity of the secondary groups as well as

the acceptability of the Bangladeshi migrants in Assam and other states of the

Northeast has provided a soft landing for the political regimes to pursue a

migration policy of its own choice.

Notwithstanding the anti-migrant stand of the political parties like the BJP

and the AGP and the vocal student organisations like All Assam Students

Union (AASU), their ability to influence policy of the Congress government

has remained vastly limited. The AASU, in particular, has organised intermittent

anti-migrant movements in the state. It has carried out periodic state wide

Short Message Service (SMS) campaign asking the Assamese population to

refrain from employing Bangladeshis as labourers. Both the BJP and the AGP

have periodically accused the Congress Party of being pro-migrant. However,

apart from transitory value, the overall domination of the Congress Party in the

state assembly, uninterrupted since 2001, has limited the ability of the opposition

99

to influence policy making. Two additional factors appear to further strengthen

the position the Congress Party in the state.

Firstly, as pointed out in the earlier section, in spite of their known anti-

migrant position, the achievement of the AGP in its tenure as the ruling party in

the state and the BJP as the government in New Delhi in identifying and

deporting the illegal migrants remained fairly obscure. The AGP, headed by its

leader Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, was in power in Assam on two occasions in

1985 to 1990 and again during 1996 to 2001 bring up. The AGP was also a junior

partner in the BJP led-NDA regime which served as the ruling coalition in New

Delhi between 1998 and 2004. The following table demonstrates that even with

a favourable political climate and anti-migrant agenda, the number of migrants

identified and deported during the AGP and the NDA rule was hardly significant.

Although the number of cases referred to the IMDT Tribunals appeared to

have increased substantially during their tenure, the number of people declared

as foreigners remained miniscule. Also, the actual number of deportations,

subsequent to such declaration, remained fairly low.

Table 3: Identification and Deportation of Illegal Migrants26

The Congress Party has used this data both to underline the “genuine”

difficulty in identifying and deporting migrants and to dispel the accusation of

it being pro-migrants. Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi’s following statement

provides a critique of the AGP’s achievements: “When the AGP was in power

and they had a chance to prove they were different. They could have registered

cases [against foreigners living here]. Why did they not do it?”27

Secondly, the abhorrence towards the migrants at the popular level appears

to have been overshadowed by the economic utility. It is a well accepted fact

that Bangladeshis are employed as low-paid labourers in states like Assam,

Nagaland, Meghalaya and Manipur. The thriving service sector and the real

estate boom in the north-eastern region have produced a great demand for

labour. Compared to the unskilled labourers from other Indian states, the

Bangladeshis come cheap and provide a fiscal rationale for employment. As a

result, to shun the migrants completely is not a viable proposition either for the

Period Cases Referred

Cases Disposed

Cases Pending

No. of persons declared as

Foreigners

No. of deportations

1985-90 22682 6486 16196 6724 521 1991-95 3488 7335 12349 2577 792 1996-2000 17693 4420 25552 902 179

2001 to July 2005 68998 5780 88770 2643 55 Total 112791 24021 88770 12846 1547

100

construction industry, business houses or individual households. The

AASU’s SMS campaign against the migrants, in this context, has limited

acceptability. Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi emphasised the following point

during an interview:

To construct your house, to buy chicken, you are dealing with migrants.

Now they are all foreigners and they are engaging them! Those who are

agitating on this issue, whether AGP or BJP leaders, their pandals, their

houses were also constructed by them … In the peak [of the anti-foreigners

agitation], I myself saw the AGP building was constructed by them, those

who they allege are illegal migrants. We do not say [this].28

Thirdly, the somewhat constrained acceptance of the migrants is further

reflected in the statement of the insurgency movement that arose out of the

anti-foreigners agitation in Assam in the 1980s and also in literary organisations

with wide appeal in the Assamese society. The United Liberation Front of

Asom (ULFA), in the early 1990s, asked the Assamese population to recognise

the contribution of the Bangladeshi population to the native society. While

the ULFA’s change of position was the result of its relocation into Bangladesh,

even the premier literary organisation Assam Sahitya Sabha (ASS) appeared to

toe a similar line in 2002. In its special annual session on February 11, 2002, the

ASS President Homen Borgohain declared that the Assamese Muslims of East

Bengal origins are an integral part of greater Assamese society. Noting that

“immigrants” constitute a fourth of Assam’s total population, the ASS president

urged for reconciliation between the various communities in the state.29

It can, thus, be argued that the seemingly pro-migrant policies of the

government are an extension of the tolerance of the Assamese society towards

the migrants. Migration appears to have been fairly well accepted as a fait

accompli by the Assamese population. The economic sense of employing the

migrants coupled with the failure of the successive regime to identify and

deport them has ensured their economic integration with the Assamese society.

The social integration, though, remains an incomplete project.

CONCLUSION

With the passage of time, the complexity of policy making with regard to illegal

migration continues to be further accentuated. While in its earlier phase, it

required simple determination of the regime to cleanse the land of most

foreigners, the durability of problem now negates the effectiveness of any

such simplistic endeavour. The political weight of the migrants and the

inclination of the regimes to exploit that in a highly polarised milieu, precludes

101

the possibility of any future scenario where the presence of the migrants can

be controlled and is as per the terms laid down by the state.

As emphasised earlier, while illegal migration can certainly be deterred, its

complete prevention is an unrealisable objective. Within this narrow window

of opportunity, governments need to strive to control the presence of the

foreigners on India’s soil. Amid several suggestions that have been provided,

one that recognises both the pregnable nature of any border control mechanism

and the economic utility of the migrants appears to be the most useful. Sanjoy

Hazarika suggests the following,

We need to follow the system already in place in Meghalaya, where immigrants

are only allowed to work and not own land or property. At the same time,

they will not be given voting rights so that politicians cannot exploit the

situation. This will also help solve the immigrants’ problems as they will be

able to earn a livelihood.30

Whether any regime in future can garner the political will and strength to

work towards such a scenario and mobilise support within the region to that

effect would remain something to watch out for.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1 Government of Assam, White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, Guwahati: Home and

Political Department, October 20, 2012, p. 45.

2 B.S. Raghavan, “The Killing Fields of Assam,” Hindu Businessline, August 15, 2007,

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/article1666479.ece.

Accessed on October 31, 2012.

3 Abir Phukan, “Price of Inaction,” Frontline, vol. 29, no. 16, August 11–24, 2012,

http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2916/stories/20120824291601700.htm. Accessed

on October 12, 2012.

4 This statement was made during the judgment in the case involving Mohammad

Kamruddin alias Kamaluddin in July 2008. 52-year old Kamaluddin, holding a Paki-

stani passport was believed to have entered Assam through Bangladesh. He not only

lived in Moirajhar village in Nagaon district long enough to father six kids, but went

on to contest Assam state assembly elections in 1996 from Jamunamukh constitu-

ency. Kamaluddin had been deported to Bangladesh twice but returned with little

difficulty to his wife Dilwara Begum. See Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Migrants or Set-

tlers?,” Geopolitics, vol.3, No.4, September 2012, pp. 64–66.

5 Government of India, Statement of Home Minister in Rajya Sabha on Recent Violence

in Assam, Press Information Bureau, August 9, 2012, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/

PrintRelease.aspx?relid=85875. Accessed on October 31, 2012.

6 The complexity of the border is narrated in a handout of the Union Ministry of

Home Affairs. It reads, “The entire stretch consists of plain, riverine, hilly/jungle

102

and with hardly any natural obstacles. The area is heavily populated, and the cultiva-

tion is carried out till the last inch of the border at many stretches.” See, Manage-

ment of Indo-Bangladesh Border, Union Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of

India, http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/BM_MAN-IN-BANG(E).pdf. Accessed on November

4, 2012.

7 Nitin Pai, “Fixing the Migration ‘Problem’,” Business Standard, July 30, 2012.

8 Bibek Debroy, “Work permits for Bangladesh,” Indian Express, December 3, 2010.

9 Nitin Pai, “Fixing the Migration ‘Problem’.”

10 Management of Indo-Bangladesh Border, Union Ministry of Home Affairs.

11 “No details about magnitude of illegal migration from Bangladesh, says govern-

ment,” Economic Times, September 6, 2012, http://articles.economictimes.

indiatimes.com/2012-09-06/news/33650226_1_illegal-migration-illegal-migrants-

assam-chief-minister. Accessed on October 31, 2012.

12 Minister of State for Home Affairs, Mullappally Ramachandran, Answered to Unstarred

Question No. 3792, Lok Sabha, Indian Parliament, September 4, 2012.

13 I.P. Singh, “Can’t assure zero entrance through Bangladesh border: BSF director

general,” Times of India, August 29, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/

2012-08-29/india/33475262_1_punjab-frontier-bsf-dg-bsf-director. Accessed on

October 28, 2012.

14 K. Anurag, “Infiltration not the biggest issue in Assam: Gogoi,” Rediff, October 20,

2012, http://www.rediff.com/news/report/infiltration-not-the-biggest-issue-in-assam-

gogoi/20121020.htm. Accessed on November 5, 2012.

15 Mullappally Ramachandran, Minister of State for Home Affairs, Government of

India, Answer to Unstarred Question No. 7435, dated May 22, 2012 by Chandrakant

Bhaurao Khaire.

16 Siddharth Varadarajan, “Migration in Assam is on the decline,” The Hindu, Septem-

ber 10, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/article3878211.ece.

Accessed on October 30, 2012.

17 Abir Phukan, “Price of Inaction.”

18 “IMDT Act is the biggest barrier to deportation, says Supreme Court,” The Hindu,

July 14, 2005, http://www.hindu.com/2005/07/14/stories/2005071405551200.htm.

Accessed on November 4, 2012.

19 “Apex court bars back-door entry of IMDT Act,” Economic Times, December 6,

2006, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2006-12-06/news/

27459228_1_illegal-immigrants-imdt-act-tribunals. Accessed on October 23, 2012.

20 Sunetra Choudhury & Kishalay Bhattacharjee, “Congress changes stance on

Bangladeshis,” NDTV, 13 January 2009, http://ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/

story.aspx?id=NEWEN20090079926&ch=633674792148370000. Accessed on

October 31, 2012.

21 “500 inmates in Assam camps flee to Bangladesh fearing verification,” Indian Ex-

press, September 12, 2012, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/500-inmates-in-

assam-camps-flee-to-bangladesh-fearing-verification/1001705/. Accessed on Octo-

ber 2, 2012.

22 K Anurag, “Infiltration not the biggest issue in Assam: Gogoi.”

103

23 Siddharth Varadarajan, “Migration in Assam is on the decline.”

24 “Assam ‘most complex state’ administered in the country: P Chidambaram,” Economic

Times, July 30, 2012, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-07-30/news/

32942433_1_assam-chief-minister-ethnic-clash-tarun-gogoi. Accessed on October

29, 2012.

25 “‘Illiterate’ Muslims bearing more children: Tarun Gogoi,” Economic Times, September

10, 2012, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-09-10/news/

33737229_1_tarun-gogoi-muslim-community-muslim-population. Accessed on

November 2, 2012. Gogoi’s comments received criticism from several political

parties and Muslim organisations.

26 White paper on Foreigners’ Issue, p. 18.

27 Siddharth Varadarajan, “Migration in Assam is on the decline.”

28 ibid.

29 Quoted in Bibhu Prasad Routray, “The Healing Wounds of Migration in Assam,”

IPCS Article No. 714, March 13 2002, http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/the-heal-

ing-wounds-of-migration-in-assam-714.html. Accessed on November 3, 2012.

30 Puja Pednekar, “Land alienation at the root, say experts,” Daily News & Analyses,

October 8, 2012, http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_land-alienation-at-the-

root-say-experts_1750047. Accessed on November 6, 2012.

104

Eastern Quarterly

Vol. 7, Issues III & IV, Autumn & Winter 2011, pp. 104–13

Presence of Illegal Immigrants in

Contemporary Assam: Analyzing the

Political History of the “Problem”

BITASTA DAS

The approach of the Indian state in resolving the complex issues of Assam

through development and military means requires immediate revision. The

problems faced by the state are no more localised, but carry national and

global significance.

Assam witnessed yet another progression of violence in July–August 2012.

About a hundred people lost their lives, several brutally wounded, villages set

ablaze and thousands were displaced in a mere 30 days time. To rein in the

deteriorating law and order conditions, the Union Home Ministry authorized

Assam government to deploy as many as 116 companies of central armed

police forces comprising of altogether 11,600 personnel. The central government

grasping the magnitude of impairment announced a special assistance to the

tune of Rs 300 crore; of which Rs 100 crore was for relief and rehabilitation,

another Rs 100 crore for development programmes in the riot-affected areas

and an additional fund of Rs 100 crore under Indira Awas Yojana for the riot-

affected areas.

However, what surfaced as a political quandary was the unprecedented

repercussion of this violence in other parts of the country. The political jeopardy

ensued a conundrum in deciphering and understanding pertinent questions

regarding the state and law, security and rights and status of citizenship and

foreigners in the country. The violence in Assam which had its epicentre mainly

in only three districts of Bodoland Territorial Area Districts – Chirang, Dhubri

and Udalguri – propelled an unheard of cataclysm in the major cities of the

country. In Mumbai two persons died and 46 were injured when a protest

against Assam riots turned violent. Demonstrators torched vehicles, pelted

105

stones, forcing the police to fire in the air and use batons to disperse the

unruly mob. But what perhaps can be regarded as one of the drastic failure of

the state in the recent times towards securing faith in the law among the citizens

was the exodus of the people of north-eastern states from Bangalore in the fear

of retaliatory violence against them. The mass panic that spread virally through

SMSes and social media led thousands to leave their jobs and studies and flee

for life as the state in futility struggled to assure security to the people.

Newspapers and television flashed news and visuals of hundreds of people

waiting anxiously in the railway stations to make their journey of over 68 hours

back home.

The fact that the violence in Assam is not merely a localized, isolated

occurrence but has deeper rooted historical and political underpinning, have

been laid open by these recent incidences. The specific violence is rather

symptomatic of possibilities that have been persistent since a very long time

and have not been translated in understanding the north-eastern region of the

country in proper light. A revisit of the indices of the cause provides

opportunities to unravel the issues that have clamored within the political and

social fabric of Northeast India.

REVISITING THE INCIDENT

The present conflict was sparked off on July 20, 2012 when unidentified

assassins reportedly killed four Bodo youths at Joypur Namapara in Kokrajhar

of Bodo Territorial Area Districts. In apparent response to this, unidentified

gunmen opened indiscriminate fire at Duramari village predominated by the

Bengali-speaking Muslim population, which killed one and injured five. This

triggered of a violent outbreak in Kokrajhar and spread to Chirang, Dhubri

and Udalguri districts. Mobs burnt down houses, forcing thousands of people

to flee. In this violent outbreak which continued for about a month, official

figures said around a hundred people were killed, of which three died in

police firing, over four lakhs people were displaced, rail services throughout

Bodoland Territorial Area Districts were disrupted and there was a complete

breakdown of law and order situation. The state enforced indefinite curfew

from time to time and a large number of special security personnel were

engaged to restrain the violence. The army staged flag marches in violence

affected and sensitive areas.

A rapid glance at the opinions raised during and after the incidence of the

present violence forefronts that the malady is far from being transitory and

envelopes several critical layers that lurk at the face of the region. The local

and the national media reported the news under two general perceptions, as

106

the communal riots and (which is more commonly used to describe the conflicts

in the north-eastern states) ethnic conflicts. Hagrama Mohilary, the chief of

Bodo Territorial Council, declared that illegal immigrants were involved in the

clashes. Calling it a political conspiracy to destabilize the council, he demanded

immediate sealing of India-Bangladesh border. Tarun Gogoi, the Assam’s

chief minister, vehemently denied the involvement of foreign national. He said

that it was an outcome of a sense of deprivation and conflict of interests

among different communities. He told the press that such issues could be

addressed only through development, which was their priority.1

L.K. Advani, the senior Bharatiya Janata Party leader, categorically stated

that Assam was not facing Hindu versus Muslim conflict. Rather it was a

conflict between Indian nationals versus foreigners. He accused both the

central and the state governments of colluding with the infiltrators from

Bangladesh. Several organizations including O-Boro (non-Boro) Surakshya

Samiti urged the state’s Chief Minister to review the agreement signed between

the government and Bodo rebels in 2003. According to them, the agreement,

which they called a “Himalayan blunder” has provided political encouragement

to the Bodo chauvinist forces to launch ethnic cleansing drives.

UNRAVELING THE PROBLEM

Assam has been a locale of continuous violence after independence. The fact

that colonial Assam was divided into five different states testifies that there

has been instability in accommodating and integrating the various ethnic groups

within the new political framework. The trajectory that led to the formation of

Bodoland Territorial Area Districts, an autonomous region, itself lays out many

enmeshed issues prevalent in the region. The Bodos are the largest plain tribe

in Assam. There had been a feeling of exclusion and negligence among them

since a long time. “Economic, cultural and political marginalization” of tribals

by the Assam government and the growing threats of land encroachment from

“outsiders,” especially the immigrants population from Bangladesh (then East

Pakistan), were among the reasons which led the All Bodo Students’ Union

(ABSU) and Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) raised the demand of

carving the union territory of Udayachal for the Bodo people, first in the late

1960s. During the anti-foreigner Assam movement, many of the Bodo youth

sided with All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) in the demand for detection

and deportation of illegal immigrants from Assam. But when the post-Assam

Accord enthusiasm waned, the tribals began to perceive that the Assam Gana

Parishad (AGP) government’s stance towards the safeguard and development

of the tribals was not much different from the previous governments.2 As

107

disenchantment spread among the Bodo youth, the ABSU took over the

leadership and launched a movement in 1987 for the creation of separate Bodo

state, “Bodoland.” In addition to this, there was the rise of a number of Bodo

rebel groups like the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Bodo

Liberation Tiger (BLT). In period that followed, the Bodo inhabited area became

an arena of violence and lawlessness. Finally by July 1999, the BLT declared

unilateral ceasefire in response to the central government’s appeal for talks. In

2001, the BLT gave up its demand for a separate state and reconciled itself to

the politico-administrative arrangements for autonomy under the Sixth Schedule

of the Indian constitution.3 This led to the signing of a Memorandum of

Settlement for the creation of Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in February

10, 2003 between the representatives of central government, state government

and a BLT delegation. The violence that occurred in July-August 2012 in the

Bodoland Territorial Area Districts is in fact perceived as a direct response to

the uncontrolled settlement of illegal immigrants in spite of securing a political

territory exclusively for themselves by the Bodos.

According to an Assam-based sociologist, the foremost factor that lies in

the background of the recent violence is the massive change in Assam’s

demographic landscape which has made the Muslim migrants of East Bengali

(and later Bangladeshi) origin a dominant force in the state at the expense of

the progressive marginalisation of the indigenous communities.4 The issue of

immigration in the north-eastern states in general and Assam in particular has

attained a magnanimous attention within the public discourse and politics.

The issue, however, cannot be called contemporary.

TRACING THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION IN ASSAM

Two of the most important developments that occurred in the political history

of Assam in the first decade after independence were the incorporation of the

Sixth Schedule and settling of refugees from Pakistan (formerly East Bengal).

Gopinath Bordoloi, the then Chief Minister of Assam, advocated for the

protective clauses of the Sixth Schedule.5 Bordoloi-led Assam government,

however, fell-out with the central government, particularly with the then Prime

Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, over the question of settling further refugees in

Assam. Nehru threatened to cut central assistance by saying that, “if Assam

adopts an attitude of incapacity to help solve the refugee problem, then the

claims of Assam for financial help (would) obviously suffer.”6 This was despite

the fact that Bordoloi drew attention of the central government towards the

growing pressure of the state’s cultivable land and the existence of as many as

1.86 lakhs landless Assamese peasants. This was also against the backdrop of

108

the central government refusal to the plea of Bordoloi government to consider

Assam as a special case because of the extractive nature of the colonial

economy, which had drained the region of its rich natural resources without

any input of capital. Moreover the partition had severed the trade of the

Northeast region with rest of the country and also the age-old economic relation

with East Bengal. Underdevelopment, poverty and the increasing pressure on

the cultivable land from the immigrants were some of the major factors that

intimidated the inhabitants of Assam.

The origin of the immigration, however, can be traced back to the colonial

period. The continuous treatment of Assam as a land frontier of Bengal and

colonial policy that encouraged immigration from the densely populated Bengal

to scarcely populated Assam7 had since then instituted a tussle among the

people of Assam and the Bengali speakers. The economic transformation that

took place due to introduction of modern industrial agencies – tea plantation,

petroleum drilling, setting up of the railways, etc. initiated an economic force

that gave further impetus to immigration. The migration that took place during

the British period, created competition for new political and economic

opportunities, thrown open for the public. The people of Assam became highly

apprehensive about the “educated Hindu Bengalis,” the “hardworking Bengali

Muslims” and “the enterprising Marwaris.”8 Also, under the British rule, during

1826–1874, Assam was made a new division of Bengal Presidency. The lower

rung of this order of administration almost wholly comprised of Bengali Hindus

was imported mainly from Sylhet. It was then that the colonial rulers established

Bengali as the official language of Assam.9 The Assamese intellectuals

vociferously demanded that Assamese should be reinstalled as the official

language in the administration and education of Assam. This was finally

conceded in 1873. The boundary altercation between the states of Bengal and

Assam continued till the independence. But the most significant corollary of

this experiment with the boundary has been creation of the binary categories

of the indigenous and immigrants that till the present time have vexed the

socio-political health of Assam.

ARTICULATION OF “THREAT” FROM ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

S.L. Shakdher, India’s Chief Election Officer, on the eve of state elections in

October 1978 stated as follows:

I would like to refer to the alarming situation in some states, especially in the

north-eastern region, wherefrom reports are coming regarding large-scale

inclusions of foreign nationals in the electoral rolls. In one case, the population

109

in 1971 census recorded an increase as high as 34.98 per cent over 1961

census figures and this figure was attributed to the influx of large number of

persons from foreign nationals. The influx has become a regular. I think it

may not be a wrong assessment to make that on the basis of the increase of

34.98 per cent between two census, the increase would likely to be recorded

in the 1971 census would be more than 100 per cent over 1961 census. In

other words, a stage would be reached when that state may have to reckon

with the foreign nationals who may be in all probability constitute a sizeable

percentage if not the majority of population in the state.10

This declaration in many ways affirmed the growing fear in the psychic of

Assam’s population about the presence of overwhelming number of illegal

immigrants. Subsequently, the six year long anti-foreigner movement was

launched demanding the detection of the illegal immigrants and their deletion

from the electoral rolls and deportation from Assam. The movement was

ostensibly an upsurge of the “people of Assam” against the foreigner, citizens

against the non-citizens; and indigenous against the foreigners. The native

Assamese speakers, who started the movement, were supported throughout

the Brahmaputra valley by tribes like the Bodo, Tiwa, Mising, Rabha, etc. The

various sections of the population irrespective of their affiliations responded

to the call and actively participated in the movement to drive out the illegal

immigrants. Assam movement was, at the foremost, a protest movement against

what was alleged to be a de facto policy of the Indian government of admitting

and enfranchising “foreigners.” The agitators called it as “Assam’s last struggle

for survival” against the “cultural, political and demographic transformation”

of Assam by the onslaught of unchecked immigrants, which threatened to

“reduce the indigenous to minorities in their own land.”11 In the words of Prafulla

Kumar Mahanta, one of the leaders of the movement who eventually became

the chief minister of the state, the “malady” of immigrants was as follows:

The tussle has been in existence since a long time and has gathered cancerous

roots. But the position has materially changed since 1979. The usurpation

has been duly noticed and the dimensions or erosion and corrosion have been

fully appreciated. The avowed objectives to cure the malady have been

defined and the battle-lines are already drawn. The battle is going to be

fought on all sectors—constitutional, legal, social, administrative and even

military, if need arises. Actually, this tussle should have never occurred. But

as the battle has been imposed, it shall have to be repelled with all the might

that we can muster. Once it is won, it is all the better for the nation and for

the people of Assam.12

The leaders of the campaign argued that immigrants from foreign countries

– mostly from what was then East Pakistan and then became the sovereign

110

state of Bangladesh, and some from Nepal – unless were explicitly given

citizenship status in India, were ‘foreigners’ or illegal aliens. It was alleged that

these ‘non-citizens’ were inappropriately enfranchised and were included in

the electoral rolls. Along with the cultural and political threats posed by the

immigrants, the movement also was instigated by economic reasons, as the

immigrant communities were believed to have attained a strong hold on the

jobs and businesses of Assam. This movement is also important not only in

the milieu of Assam, but also in the entire north-eastern India as it catapulted

a host of anti-immigrant strikes all over the zone.13

The directorate of economics & statistics of the government of Assam

has revealed that in 1950–51, per capita income in Assam was 4 per cent above

national average. In 1998-99 it came down to 41 per cent below the national

average. While the Indian economy grew at 6 per cent over 1981 to 2000, the

Assam’s State GDP grew only 3.3 per cent. Though the growth rate of the

Indian economy accelerated in the 1990s over 1980s, Assam’s economy

decelerated in the 1990s. The general public and public discourse relegate

this economic retreat and large-scale underdevelopment and poverty to

lack of industrialization and infrastructure, and pressure raised on land and

jobs by the unchecked immigration.14 It is, however, important to review the

relegation of economic backwardness and formulation of threat from

foreigners in proper light.

In The Assam Movement: Class, Ideology and Identity (1994), Monirul

Hussain explained that the real motive of Assam Movement was to curb the

emergence of the new political power – left-of-centre to which large section of

the state’s tribal natives and immigrants of East Bengal origin had began to

align themselves. The movement, according to him, was to polarize the

constituents of the new political alignment that was emerging as an alternative

to the ones, which represented the Assamese middle-class elite.15 Nilim Dutta16

maps the decadal population growth rate of Assam since 1951, as per the

Census of India. He explained that the decadal growth rate of population of

two districts of Assam, Dhemaji and Karbi Anglong have been twice that of

Assam and substantially higher than even the “Muslim majority border district”

of Dhubri. Yet, the Muslim population in Dhemaji and Karbi Anglong is

minuscule. The Hindu population in these two districts is 95.94 per cent and

82.39 per cent respectively; scheduled tribes constitute 47.29 per cent and

55.69 per cent of their population respectively. Muslim constitute merely 1.84

per cent and 2.22 per cent respectively of their total population, in spite of

having consistent high decadal growth rates – Dhemaji touching 103.42 per

cent during 1961–71 and Karbi Anglong having a similar high of 79.21 per cent

during 1951–61. He concluded that there could be reasons apart from illegal

111

immigration or having a Muslim population behind a high decadal growth rate

of population.

Even if the Census records revealed disparate information, the overwhel-

ming perception of presence and threat from illegal immigrants has progressively

seeped in the psyche of the people of Assam. In the public sphere within

Assam often resentments are expressed towards the increasing frequencies of

flash floods. The increased devastation and the rise in loss of life and property

caused by the flash floods in recent times are commonly believed to be due to

the unplanned and unchecked settlement in the river basin.

The emergence of All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) headed by

minority leader Badruddin Ajmal as the main opposition party in 2011 Assam

Assembly elections has further deepened the suspicion of the Assam masses

regarding the growing influence of the immigrant community in the state.

AIUDF’s unabashed promotion of “Muslims for the rights of Muslims” is

regarded as its success campaign on one hand, and aggravated the communal

divide on the other, pushing the Congress party into an alliance with the Bodo

People’s Front (BPF) and drawing the contours of a complex and loaded

situation.17 It is, therefore, not the official figures but the mundane experience

and observation and socio-political developments that have played roles in

articulating the “threat” from the foreigners.

WAY BEYOND

The north-eastern states connected to rest of the country by only a “chicken

neck” corridor shares common geographical situation of bordering other

countries. Besides sharing 4,096 km long border with Bangladesh in the west,

the states of the region also share significant area of border with Bhutan,

China and Nepal in the north and Myanmar in the east and south. Unmanaged

border are susceptible to threats by being points of ingress and egress. India’s

borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan are highlighted with difficult

terrain of forest, rivers and mountains, which makes the guarding even more

challenging. The socio-political development in one of the states of the region,

Tripura is used as a common anecdote to articulate the fear from foreigners.

Tripura is surrounded by Bangladesh in the north, south and west. The politics

and culture of this state has been completely inundated by the migrant

community from Bangladesh pushing the local tribal population to a mere 30

per cent. On the other hand, Meghalaya whose southern border runs entirely

along Bangladesh has expediently developed tenancy law to oversee the influx

of migrant labourers into the state by stringent registration and cross-checking

of their antecedents. Assam falls in between Tripura and Meghalaya in terms

112

of its social and political future. The approach of the state in resolving the

complex issues of Assam through quick-fix measures of coaxing by releasing

developmental package and coercing through military deployment needs an

immediate revision. The malady lies in manifolds – economic exclusion and

lack of integration of all the ethnic groups into the national matrix. The fear of

being overwhelmed by the immigrants is far from being obscure in such a

situation. Flaring of repercussion in other parts of the country due to

developments in pockets of Assam are evidences enough to prove that the

malady of Assam has not remained a localized “problem.” The “problem” calls

for an immediate review of the Indian policies regarding migration and labour

laws. Renowned economist Ashok V. Desai, in a public talk,18 expresses the

need to embrace an open and more relaxed trade laws between India and

Bangladesh if the illegal entry to the north-eastern states is to be curbed. This

will not only disable the burden of polarization by immigrants to this region

but also the pressure on land and job will be lessened. It remains to be seen if

the Indian state will adopt such an indifferent approach for long-term resolution

or imitate its myopic relief responses of the past.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1 A Correspondent, “Violence not communal: Gogoi,” Assam Tribune, July 28, 2012.

Available at http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=jul2812/at06 (Ac-

cessed November 21, 2012).

2 S.J. George, “The Bodo Movement in Assam: Unrest to Accord,” Asian Survey

34(10), 1994, p. 880.

3 This is a provision in the constitution of India as to the administration of tribal areas

in the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, which allows constituting

autonomous district and autonomous regions for the tribal groups.

4 Chandan Kumar Sharma, “Assam burning,” The Pioneer, August 4, 2012. Available at

http://www.dailypioneer.com/sunday-edition/sundayagenda/middle-india-agenda/

85432-assam-burning-.html (Accessed on November 22, 2012).

5 Though he hoped that, in the long run, the tribal communities while maintaining

their cultural identities, would strengthen the political and cultural unit of Assamese

nationality.

6 Quoted in Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality,

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999, p. 85.

7 Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself, Assam and the Politics of Nationality, 1999, p. 64.

8 H. Srikanth, “Militancy and Identity Politics in Assam,” Economic and Political

Weekly 35(47), 2000, pp. 4-5.

9 This was done, as the Assamese saw it, under the influence of the Bengali petty officials

of the East India Company who argued that Assamese was not an independent

language but only a dialect of Bengali.

113

10 Quoted in Monirul Hussain, Assam Movement: Class, Ideology and Identity, New Delhi:

Manak Publications (in association with Har-Anand Publications), 1994, p. 102.

11 The anxiety that stimulated the commencement of the Assam movement has been

compiled through many personal interviews with participants of the movement,

from the casual participants to the most ardent agitators. Some of them are: Dhruba

Prasad Baishya (25.09. 2008), presently a member of BJP, was Chairman of AGP

ministry in 1985. Jugal Kishor Mahanta (17.12.2008) participated the movement

and surrendered ULFA member. Madhab Baishya (17.12.2008), student participant

of the Assam movement who led the oil blockade in the 1980s. Finally, Rukmini

Choudhury (27.11.2008), a student participant.

12 Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, The Tussle between the Citizens and Foreigners in Assam,

New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1986, p. 117.

13 “The anti-foreign movement spilled across the borders of Assam into the nearby

states of Tripura and Manipur. In Tripura indigenous tribal groups launched violent

attacks against Bengali settlers, who, by now, outnumbered the locals and controlled

the state government. And in neighbouring Manipur, Manipuri students attacked

Bengalis, Biharis, Punjabis, and the numerous and increasingly prosperous Nepali

dairy cattle farmers. India’s entire northeast has been fragmented by the migrant-

ethnic issue.” See, Myron Weiner, “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-

Immigrant Movement,” Population and Development Review 9(2), 1983, p. 287.

14 “Economic Development of Assam,” The Assam Chronicle, December 15, 2010.

Available at http://www.assamchronicle.com/node/27 (Accessed on December 11,

2012).

15 Monirul Hussain, Assam Movement: Class, Ideology and Identity.

16 A Correspondent, “The Myth of the Bangladeshi and Violence in Assam: Nilim

Dutta,” Kafila, August 16, 2012. Available at http://kafila.org/2012/08/16/the-myth-

of-the-bangladeshi-and-violence-in-assam-nilim-dutta/ (Accessed on December 11,

2012).

17 Seema Chishti, “Assam in the centre,” Indian Express, August 17, 2012. Available at

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/assam-in-the-centre/989232/2 (Accessed on

December 11, 2012).

18 “Large-Scale Economics: Epochs, Economics and Empires,” public talk at Centre

for Contempoary Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, August 25, 2012.

.

114

Eastern Quarterly

Vol. 7, Issues III & IV, Autumn & Winter 2011, pp. 114–27

The Politics of Recognition: Migration,

Identify and Conflict

M. AMARJEET SINGH

If migration ensures livelihoods to those who migrate, it can also be a poten-

tial source of conflict. In Northeast India where the native population see

large-scale migration into the region as potential threat to their livelighood,

societal conflict linked to this has caused larger unrest among communities.

To this extent, identity politics has emerged at an alarming rate challenging

the government to control cross-border migration.

INTRODUCTION

Migration is commonly known as the permanent/semi-permanent change

of residence, usually across some types of administrative boundary.1 It depends

on, and brings in, different kinds of issues related to demographic, economic,

social and political dimensions. Over 740 million people migrated inside their

own country, while over 200 million did so across national borders.2 An

increasing number of countries are now either the places of origin, transit or

destination for migrants.3 It is therefore rightly said that the division between

sending and receiving countries is no longer relevant because the distinction

between countries representing “push” factors and those representing “pull”

factors become questionable, since most countries simultaneously display

both.4 The migrants were also said to have gained higher income, better access

to education and health care, and better prospects for their children.5

Migration, particularly across national borders, takes place under different

kinds of restrictions because the national borders form the clear link between

geography and politics. On the one hand, the governments of labour-sending

countries consider the migration of their high-skilled workers into another

country as brain-drain and national loss, but encourage the unskilled ones to

do so because the latter are expected to bring remittances, new skills and so

on. On the other hand, the governments of receiving countries welcome high-

115

skilled workers, but not the unskilled ones. Thus, the context of their reception

in the host countries is low receptivity, permitted, but not actively encouraged,

and privileged reception.6 Nonetheless those who cannot fulfill the requirements

to migrate legally resorted to different means, including entering a country

illegally without any documents or overstaying a legally obtained visa. It is

however difficult to construct a typology of such migration or terminology to

use due to the complexity of the issue and diverse contexts in which it occurs.7

Ironically, it gains prominence in public discourse because the political process

of state building, which defines the extent of the state’s territory, its national

space, and so nationality and membership are defined. Thus migration control

becomes a tool of demarcation and enforcement of their crucial means. And

yet, irregular migration is reported in many countries, including India, thus

supposedly defying their self-contained autonomy.8 It has become an inherent

aspect of global migration9, and has been studied and interpreted within the

nationalist frameworks.10

THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

The regular interaction between the Northeast and the rest of India intensified

following the introduction of modern administration by the British colonial

rulers in the 19th century, which also brought considerable transformations in

the region’s economy and politics. As a consequence, the region rapidly became

a great destination of migration. A large number of trained manpower was

recruited, mainly from the areas historically known as Bengal, to assist the

British officers in the day-to-day administration. Since the tea plantation and

other industries were started in large scale the workers were recruited, again

mainly from the areas historically known as Bengal. Similarly, the availability of

cultivable wastelands attracted the peasantry from the densely populated

neighbouring districts of Bengal like Mymenshingh, Bogra, Rangpur and Pabna

to Assam in large numbers in the 20th century.11 They brought superior

cultivation techniques including multiple cropping and introduced poultry

farming. They also introduced a number of vegetables and crops including

jute hitherto unknown in Assam or other parts of the region.12

During that time, major changes in Assam’s administrative boundary also

took place. Between 1826 and 1873 it was administratively attached to Bengal,

and in 1874 it became a province formed by incorporating Cachar, Sylhet and

Goalpara. The provinces of Bengal and Assam were reorganised in 1905 into

the provinces of East Bengal and Assam, and Bengal, respectively. It was

annulled six years later whereby Assam retained the provincial status, and

eastern and western parts of Bengal were reintegrated.

116

Further, the prominence role played by the Bengalis in the colonial

administration helped the expansion and consolidation of Bengali

language in Assam too. It became the court language and the language of

education, between 1837 and 1874, much against the wishes of the

Assamese, the Assam’s largest linguistic group. Although the Assamese

language gradually replaced the Bengali language, the conflict between

the two linguistic groups had somehow begun in Assam.

The partition of India was not a smooth affair at all, and the territorial

disputes and communal riots caused forced migration of hundreds of thousands

of refugees and migrants to safer places. The number of migrants other than

refugees, who migrated from East Pakistan into Assam, was estimated to be

about 500,000.13 Then, during the 1960s a large number of refugees came to

India following the alleged religious persecutions and the construction of

Kaptai Dam in Chittagong Hill Tracts of East Pakistan. Further the trend

continued during the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971 (it led to the demise of

united Pakistan, hence East Pakistan turned into an independent state of

Bangladesh) in which some of them reportedly settled down in different states,

namely West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura. There has been a one-

way flow of migration from East Pakistan/ Bangladesh to India. This was driven

purely by the economic considerations. Sanjoy Hazarika rightly says that since

1971 the Muslim migration into West Bengal and Assam continues unabated.

The current migrants who are largely Muslims migrate for economic reasons,

such as land scarcity, drought, flooding, penury and debt whereas, the migrant

Hindus do so because of religious persecution, riots, fear of insecurity, and

threat to life and property.14

At this point, we may recall the underlining factors behind the one-way

flows of migrants and refugees spanning over several decades. Bangladesh is

one of the most densely populated (964 persons per sq. km. in 2011) and also

one of the poorest countries in the world. Natural disasters such as flash flood,

riverbank erosion and landslide regularly destroy lives and properties in the

country. The afore-mentioned factors virtually compell many of its citizens

to migrate either internally or internationally, and hence many of them

landed at the nearby towns and villages of India through irregular means.

India is also a poor country; it is about 22-times bigger than Bangladesh. It

has an average population density of 382 persons per sq km in 2011, which

is further lower in its Northeast, from 13 persons per sq km in Arunachal

Pradesh to 340 in Assam. Around the time of the partition of Bengal, the

region was relatively a land of plenty. Moreover, the inhabitants of the region

were not so familiar to work in new residential areas and communities. They

were also not familiar with certain occupations and hence rejected them.

117

In such situation, the main assets the migrants brought to the region used to

be cheap labour, willingness to work harder and loyalty. The migrant workers

who were poor and illiterate were happy to work in agricultural fields, as

household labor, as rickshaw pullers and other sort of manual labourers.

Finally, apart from sharing long land border, India and Bangladesh share a

historical and cultural tie that helps to evolve various kinds of social networks

for migration.

The exact population of migrants, legal or otherwise, could not be

ascertained because neither India nor Bangladesh felt the necessity of

maintaining reliable records. The available estimates goes up to 15 million

migrants. These estimates are often politically motivated. The Assam

government from time to time maintain that “there is no definite information

as regards the exact number of foreigners residing in Assam,” “the exact number

of foreigners who entered Assam after 25th March 1971 is not known” or “the

exact number of foreigners and illegal migrants in Assam cannot be estimated

as it is a fact of history and continuous process.” On the other side of the divide,

the statements coming out from the Bangladeshi officials are: “there are no

Bangladeshi refugees in India any more,” “there is no question of our taking

any people back,” “it is an internal problem of India,” “under no circumstances

accept any of the evicted persons,” and so on. As a result border confrontation

took place whenever Indian border guards tried to deport those people they

officially claimed as “Bangladeshis.”

Migration from Bangladesh has been cited as the main cause of higher

population growth in states having common border with it. Assam has witnessed

a decadal population growth rate higher than the all India average during

the major part of the 20th century. The higher growth of Muslim population

in Assam has been extensively debated. Some say that it is due to

migration from Bangladesh, while others say that it is due to higher illiteracy

among them. However, according to Tarun Gogoi, Assam’s chief minister, it

is not due to migration from Bangladesh, but because Muslims are illiterate

and hence their population is increasing fast.15 However, the Assam

government confesses that migration continues to pose a “disturbing and

alarming situation” in the state with its continuation even in normal times.16

There were also allegations of the manipulation of the voters’ lists in the

state to enroll the recent migrants and other refugees. In Assam, about 50

assembly constituencies had reported 20 per cent increase in voters between

1994 and 1997, while the national average was just 7.4 per cent. The higher

decadal population growth rate of the state has been attributed to migration

from outside Assam. The decadal growth of Assam since 1901 is given in the

following table.

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Table 1: Population trends in Assam and India

* Interpolated, #Provisional

Source: White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, p. 39, Government of Assam, 2012.

The influx of refugees and migrants had reduced Tripura’s tribal population

into a minority, turning it the only state in India that has transformed from

being a predominantly tribal to a non-tribal state. The scheduled tribes

constituted about 31.1 per cent of its population of 3.2 million (2001 census),

while six decades ago they constituted about 50 per cent of the population.

One of the chief reasons why migration is seen as a threat in Northeast India

unlike other regions or cities is that most ethnic groups are small and localised.

And, hence, they never expect to compete with the migrants who came from

the densely populated areas. For instance, the larger linguistic group migrants

are considered a potential threat to their well-being and culture. The native

population fears competition with migrant workforce in trade and business.

In an apparent attempt to deal with such situation of migrants, the Assam

Official Language Act, 1960 made mandatory the use of Assamese for all or any

of the official purpose in Assam. It was taken up much against the wishes of

other communities. The central government intervened with Lal Bahadur Shastri

as the mediator and the issue was partly resolved. However, about a decade

later, in 1972 Gauhati University resolved to make Assamese the medium of

education in colleges under its jurisdiction. One could not rule out the pressures

used, and the instrumentalization of government for the interests of any

community. In the 19th and early 20th centuries Bengali Hindus used the

provincial government to consolidate their shares/positions in the educational

system. In 1930s and 1940s, when electoral politics were introduced, the Bengali

Muslims won control over the then government and attempted to use their

Year Population (in lakh) Percentage decadal Variation

Densi ty (person p er sq km)

Assam India Assam India Assam Ind ia 1901 33 2384 0 0 42 77 1911 38 2521 17 5 .8 49 82 1921 46 2513 20.5 0 .3 59 81 1931 56 2789 19.9 11 71 90

1941 67 3186 20.4 14.2 85 103 1951 80 3611 19.9 13.3 102 117 1961 108 4392 35 21.5 138 177 1971 146 5481 35 24.8 186 177 1981 0 6833 0 24.7 0 230

1991 224 8463 24.2 23.9 286 267 2001 286 10270 18.9 21.5 340 325 2011 312 12102 16.9 17.6 397 382

119

positions to facilitate migration of Muslims into Assam. After independence,

Assamese tried to consolidate their position in the economy and social system.17

Once the language question was partly resolved situation was shifted to

issues of Bangladeshi migration into Assam. The death of Hiralal Patwari (then

a member of Lok Sabha of India’s parliament), representing Mangaldai

constituency) in 1979 necessitated holding of by-election which set in motion

events leading up to the Assam’s anti-foreigner movement. It was alleged that

a large number of names of suspect nationalities was included in the voter’s list

of the Mangaldai constituency. Consequently, the agitations were started

demanding recounting of the citizenship of those living in Assam on the basis

of the National Register of Citizens. It was prepared during the Indian Census

of 1951. The movement came to an end following an agreement, popularly

known as the Assam Accord. The central government promised to take actions

to identify and deport all noncitizens, officially known as “foreigners” and

protect the cultural identity of the “Assamese people.” The agreement fixed

March 24, 1971 as the cutoff date for the identification and deportation of

foreigners from East Pakistan into Assam. It also provided for citizenship to

those who came to Assam between January 1, 1966 and March 24, 1971 after

defranchising for a period of 10 years subject to registration. Thus, it was

written in the agreement that those who crossed international border into

Assam without proper legal documents after March 25, 1971 are the illegal

immigrants; but all those who came before this deadline became citizens through

the legal process akin to naturalization.

After the signing of above agreement in 1985, leaders of anti-foreigner

movement floated Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), a political party. Those who

opposed the said agreement floated United Minorities Front (UMF), also a

political party. The AGP had promised to fully implement the promises of the

said agreement, whereas UMF was against their implementation. The AGP

won the legislative elections held in 1985 and 1996, respectively, but failed to

arrive a consensus on this contentious issue. On the other hand, those who

advocated an armed struggle against Indian state formed an armed group called

the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). Its supporters and workers

believed that if they indulged in violence the government would be compel to

act against illegal migration. Likewise the opposition to the large-scale influx

of refugees and other migrants from East Pakistan had turned into another

armed conflict in the neighbouring Tripura state. The refugees and migrants

had already overrun Tripura’s tribal people; about 0.6 million Hindu Bengali

refugees reportedly fled East Pakistan to Tripura between 1947 and 1971.

The government rehabilitated refugees, some were enabled to settle down

with financial assistance and some other settled by giving land.18

Year Population (in lakh) Percentage decadal Densi ty

1901 33 2384 0 0 42 77

1921 46 2513 20.5 0 .3 59 81 1931 56 2789 19.9 11 71 90

1951 80 3611 19.9 13.3 102 117 1961 108 4392 35 21.5 138 177

1981 0 6833 0 24.7 0 230

2001 286 10270 18.9 21.5 340 325 2011 312 12102 16.9 17.6 397 382

120

However, this scheme of government and politics of the parties

concerned had alienated tribal people from their land and forests. The tribal

people got the real shock when Bengali and English were made official

languages of Tripura in 1964, while Kokborok, the language of Borok people,

was accorded second official language status in 1979 (currently, Bengali and

Kokborok are two official languages in Tripura). This led to the emergence of

few armed groups in Assam and Tripura against the “foreigners”; they began

as a smaller subset of individuals within the larger anti-foreigner movement,

yet those willing to pursue more radical strategies opted violent means.19 The

United Liberation Front of Asom is said to be the armed wing of the Assam’s

anti-foreigner movement with a secessionist agenda.20 Thus, the broader

movement against migration could generate newer challenges. Rightly, Samir

Kumar Das commented that although immigration remained at the heart of most

conflicts in the region, the transformation of these conflicts into insurgencies,

particularly in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam and Tripura coincided

with “a radical reinterpretation of their respective histories in which the Indian

state is considered as external agent, and often a colonial power.”

It is also important to examine how some migrant groups were seen

more problematic than others. Those who were engaged in professions

considered less lucrative could be least threatening to the native population,

while those who held government jobs and also actively participated in local

politics became the source of local concern. The Assamese fear of losing their

cultural autonomy dated back to 1837 when Bengali was introduced as the

language of education and administration. The Assamese historical narratives

typically refer this period as a dark period of Assamese language, literature and

culture.21 Here, religious grounds came into play the politics of inclusion and

exclusion. Perhaps the Hindu-Muslim discourse in the rest of India come into

play in situation like this. The Bengali Muslim migrants were treated as more

problematic than their Hindu migrants; former were sometimes branded as

illegal migrants and the latter as refugees. Reason being that some of the

violent incidents that took place during the anti-foreigner movement in Assam

had largely targeted Muslims.22 Such incidents even caused insecurity among

those (e.g. the Bengali Muslims) who were in the process of assimilation to the

larger Assamese society, as this process was halted23 despite their active

participation in the anti-foreigner movement.24

POLITICS AFTER ANTI-FOREIGNER MOVEMENT

The anti-foreigner movement had heralded a contested future of Assamese

identity. There emerged several ethnic groups that interpreted the “Assamese

121

people” as category that excluded them and, hence, a fear of their well-beings.

For Bodos, who identified as non-“Assamese people,” the Assam Accord was a

tool of protection of the Assamese’s cultural identity and an act of imposition of

Assamese language and culture on them.25 The Bodos started a statehood

movement that brought about limited autonomy to four contiguous districts of

Kokrajhar, Baska, Udalguri and Chirang known as Bodoland Territorial Area

District (BTAD). The region now enjoys limited autonomy under sixth schedule

of the Indian constitution to fulfill economic, educational and linguistic

aspirations, preservation of land rights, socio-cultural identity of the Bodos and

infrastructure development.

But this settlement opened up series of violence, rather than taking care of

so called “non-Assamese” people’s fear. The conflict between Bodos and

Muslims occurred in July-August 2012 that claimed over 80 people and

temporarily displacement of about 5 lakh people. Adding to the complexity, there

emerged politicization of the issue in front. The leaders of Bodoland People’s

Party, the ruling party in BTAD felt that violence was a conspiracy to destabilize

Bodoland Territorial Council. They stated that it was incited by “foreigners” and

accused “illegal immigration” from Bangladesh as the root cause. On the other

hand, the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF), the Assam-based political

party, accused Bodoland Territorial Council of promoting violence against the

Muslims. The party alleged that it was aimed at driving out the non-Bodos from

BTAD. The party further said that the Bodos, which constitutes only about 29

per cent of the total population, wanted to control the area. Since then, the

BTAD area had witnessed several bloody conflicts between Bodos and Muslim

settlers on one side and between Bodos and Adivasis, on the other.

The Bodos believed themselves as the earliest inhabitants in Assam and

they have been apprehensive of the unabated migration of numerically large

migrant people. They allege that a large number of Muslims are illegal

Bangladeshi migrants who have settled in lands “belonging to the Bodos.” It

was thought that this further increased land alienation of tribal people.26

However, non-Bodo groups claim that they are also the original inhabitants of

the area. They have been opposing BTAD agreement that is alleging as

favouring the Bodos who constitute about 25 to 30 per cent of the total

population.

The recent violence between Bodos and Muslims has far reaching impact

beyond Northeast. Since the violence was projected as an assault against the

Muslims unspecified miscreants had succeeded in spreading rumours of violent

attack against the people of the region residing and studying in various cities

of the country. The rumors forced thousands of students and workers to flee

from Bangalore, Hyderabad and Pune to their natives’ places. A faction of

122

ULFA reacted and warned actions against “Indians” in Assam if “atrocities” of

the Assamese people did not stop in other parts of the country. It also charged

Badaruddin Ajmal, the leader of AIUDF, of spreading communal hatred for his

statement about the killings of Muslims in Assam.

POOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Several measures have been implemented to prevent irregular migration into

Assam and to identify and deport those suspected to be “noncitizens.” But

their implementation has been poor. The central government promulgated an

ordinance in 1950, soon replaced by the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam)

Act, 1950, which came into effect from 1950. Its mandate did not include the

refugees who fled from Pakistan to Assam. During the Census of 1951, a national

register of citizens was prepared under the directive of the union ministry of home

affairs containing information on relevant particulars of each and every person

enumerated. The government issued a statutory order called the Foreigners

(Tribunal) Order in 1964 and hence foreigners’ tribunals were constituted so

that the case of suspected foreigners could be heard in the court. The tribunals

established after 1964 became dysfunctional between December 1969 and

March 1973 on the ground that “most of the infiltrators had been deported.”

Interestingly, the tribunals were reconstituted in 1979.

In 1983, the parliament passed the Illegal Migrants (Determination by

Tribunals) Act, 1983, applicable only to Assam, to identify and deport the

noncitizens. By contrast the Foreigner Act, 1946 was in force in the other

states of the country. The said Act defines “foreigner” as those who illegally

settled down in Assam after March 25, 1971, and the onus of proof lies with the

complainant. The Foreigners Act puts the onus on the accused to prove his/

her Indian nationality. Hence, in 1983, IMDTs were established under the said

Act. After the Assam Accord was signed the foreigners’ tribunals co-existed

with IMDTs. While IMDTs looked into cases of suspected foreigners of the

post March 25, 1971 stream, the foreigners’ tribunals were entrusted with the

responsibility of disposing of cases pertaining to pre-March 25, 1971 stream of

suspected foreigners. In 2005, the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals)

Act was declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court of India citing inability to

identify and deport the foreigners. Thereafter, the Foreigner Act was

reintroduced in the state. Consequently, the 21 IMDTs were wound up and

replaced by 21 new foreigners’ tribunals. As a result, after 2005, 32 (21 new & 11

existing) foreigners tribunals were functioning. In most cases it was found that

the suspected noncitizens detected by the foreigners’ tribunals went untraced

after they were detected. To impose restrictions in the movement of the “detected

123

foreigners” and to ensure that they do not perform the act of vanishing, the

government has set up detention centres to keep them till they are deported to

their country of origin.27

Further, the construction of fencing, roads and floodlighting along the

India-Bangladesh border has begun, but at a slow pace.28 The purpose, the

government claims, is to prevent cross-border migration as well as other trans-

border crimes. However, all is not well. Mr. Bhumidhar Barman, then a minister,

told the Assam legislative assembly in February 2011 that only 219 foreigners

could be deported from Assam between 2001 to November 2010, while over Rs

330 million was spent to maintain the foreigners’ tribunals.29

The measures were implemented following the public pressure, and hence

the historical, economical, geographical and cultural connections between

Bangladesh and India were not taken into account. During the colonial period

migration into Assam was encouraged. When the British allocated territories

and permitted the creation of India and Pakistan a large number of people did

not approve the border because they felt that it was imposed upon them without

their consent by a great power. Hence it implies an example of a conspicuous

discrepancy between cultural and political borders. The people divided by the

border has close historical ties, hence they would definitely like to remove the

restrictions created by the border. Several border issues also remain unresolved,

and yet both countries are least interested to settle. These lead to regular

cross-border confrontations.

Further, this border traverses through forests, lowlands, rivers and human

settlements. These factors certainly make border management a difficult task.

Moreover migration is a self-sustaining diffusion process30 that depends on,

and creates, social networks. The citizens’ registration is also not properly

done both in India and Bangladesh, and hence the distinction between citizens

and noncitizens is not so easy.

The issue is highly politicised in India in which political parties accused

each other of indulging in vote-bank politics. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)

and AGP accused Congress party of encouraging migration to build up its

vote-banks. On the other hand, Congress party accused BJP of communalizing

the issue. The local political leaders had also indulged in charges and

countercharges.31 There were also differences at the highest level of the

government. A report authored by Ajai Singh, Governor of Assam, in 2005 was

labeled as a “worthless document based on hearsay” by Tarun Gogoi, the

chief minister. The latter alleged that the report created confusion among the

people. In the midst of these claims and counterclaims the central issue remains

sidelined. The public opinion has also polarised on this issue. When the Illegal

124

Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act was overruled by the court, several

Muslim advocacy groups expressed fear of harassment of the members of their

community by the local police on the pretext of the detection of suspected

foreigners. On the other hand, others welcomed the court verdict.

The preservation and updating of the national register of citizens is one of

the promises of the Assam Accord. However, it remains unfulfilled largely

because of political compulsion and vested interests.32 Moreover, the task will

be tougher because of the partial or non-availability of the said register and the

electoral roll of several districts.33

Further, corruption at the local administration also hampers the

implementation of the existing laws and schemes because the aspiring migrants

can easily bribe the state officials including the border guards. As a result the

migrants could fraudulently acquired residence and other identity documents

such as ration cards, birth certificates, driving licenses and voters’ identity

cards. The possessions of these documents naturally qualify to be the citizens

of India. As Schendel puts it, “India could not implement the laws and the

schemes that it devised because its registration of citizens was inadequate, it

employed too few border guards to monitor the schemes, it could not trust

those guards and other state personnel to put the interest of the state before

their self-interest, and it failed to check Indian citizens who encouraged illegal

immigration and registration.”34 Finally, Bangladesh denies the presence of its

citizens in India. This makes India’s effort extremely difficult. For instance,

Hussain Muhammad Ershad, the former president of Bangladesh, stated in an

interview in August 2012, “We don’t accept that people have migrated from

Bangladesh to India on a large scale because our people are poor but your

people aren’t very rich either. Some people from Bangladesh might go across

for work – but every big country face this. You cannot say this is a migration

problem. Some people might come here for work and become permanent

inhabitants, over time. But again, this is not on a large scale.”

CONCLUSION

The discourse on migration generally ignores the achievements and

contributions of the migrant population towards the development of the region,

instead they are projected as the threat. The migrants also suffer due to the

official positions taken by India and Bangladesh. Efforts to control illegal

cross-border migration remain highly ineffective in India, and will remain so in

the absence of a political consensus on the issue. But, the reality is that

unabated migration has enormous demographic and social implications capable

of creating tensions and conflict between migrants and natives, and more so

125

among the natives. Campaign against cross-border migration in India divides

its people on communal lines. Nonetheless, we are now living in the age of

migration where there are more migrants on the move. Since migration cannot

be simply stop through police, patrolling and fencing, it is necessary to devise

alternate policies keeping in mind the historical ties of the sending and receiving

places. Such policies will help protect the interests of both migrants and

nonmigrants. If India continues to insist only on border police, patrolling and

fencing, the aspiring migrants will come through other ways. What is important

is to accept the existence of different kinds of push-and-pull factors forcing

people to migrate.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1 William B. Wood, “Forced Migration: Local Conflicts and International Dilem-

mas,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84(4), 1994, pp.

607–34.

2 UNDP, Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming barriers: Human mobility

and development, New York: UNDP, 2009, pp. 1–2.

3 Berne Initiative, Managing International Migration through International Coop-

eration: The International Agenda for Migration Management, Berne: Berne Initia-

tive, 2004, 2–8.

4 Franck Duvell, “Irregular migration: a global, historical and economic perspective,”

in Steven Vertovec (ed.), Migration, 2, New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 289–310.

5 UNDP 2009, pp. 1–2.

6 A. Portes, and J. Böröcz, “Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on

Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation,” International Migration Review

23(3), 1989, pp. 606-630.

7 E.M. Brennan, “Irregular Migration: Policy Responses in Africa and Asia,” Interna-

tional Migration Review 18(3), 1984, p. 409.

8 Lydia Morris, “Globalization, Migration and the Nation-State: The Path to a Post-

National Europe?” The British Journal of Sociology 48(2), 1997, pp. 192–209.

9 Franck Duvell, “Irregular Migration: A Global Historical and Economic Perspec-

tive,” in Franck Duvell (ed.), Illegal Immigration in Europe: Beyond Control,

Houndmills: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2005, p. 16.

10 Willem van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South

Asia, London: Anthem Press, 2005, pp. 2–3.

11 Government of Assam, White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, Guwahati: Home & Police

Department, 2012, p. 5.

12 Government of Assam 2012, p. 5.

13 Government of Assam, 2012, p. 6.

14 Sanjoy Hazarika, Stranger of the Mist: Tales of War & Peace from India’s Northeast,

New Delhi: Penguine Books, 1995, p. 29.

126

15 “Are there any takers for Gogoi?s ‘illiterate Muslims’ remark?,” Sentinel, September

12, 2012

16 Government of India, Economic Survey of India, 2009–10, New Delhi, 2010.

17 Myron Weiner, “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-Immigrant Movement,”

Population and Development Review 9(2), 1983, pp. 279–92.

18 Subir Bhaumik and J. Bhattacharya, “Autonomy in Northeast: The Hills of Tripura and

Mizoram,” in Ranbir Samaddar (ed.), The Politics of Autonomy: Indian Experiences,

New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005, pp. 216–41.

19 M. Jennifer Hazen, “From Social Movement to Armed Groups: A case study of

Nigeria,” in Keith Krause (ed.), Armed Groups and Contemporary Conflicts:

Challenging the Weberian State, London and New York: Routledge, 2010, pp.

81–82.

20 S.K. Sinha, “Security and Development in the Northeast: A case of Assam,” in

Rakhee Bhattacharya and Sanjay Pulipaka (eds.), Perilous Journey: Debates on

Security and Development in Assam, New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2011, pp.

27–37.

21 Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 71.

22 The killing of about 1819 people, mostly Muslim peasants, in an attack by certain

communities in and around Nellie village in February 1983 has alienated the Mus-

lims. The victims had merely voted in the legislature assembly election held in 1983

defying the poll boycott called by those demanding the holding of that election on

the basis of a revised voters’ list.

23 ANS Ahmed and Adil-Ul-Yasin, “Problems of identity, assimilation and nation build-

ing: a case of the Muslims of Assam,” in Girin Phukan and NL Dutta (eds.), Politics

of Identity and Nation Building in North-East India, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers,

1997, p. 148.

24 Udayon Misra, “Immigration and Identity Transformation in Assam,” Economic

and Political Weekly 34(21), 1999, p. 1269.

25 M. Amarjeet Singh, “Challenges before Bodo Territorial Council,” Economic and

Political Weekly 39(8), pp. 784–85.

26 The Assam government under chief minister Gopinath Bordoloi had taken steps for

the creation of “belts” and “blocks” for tribals and backward classes by amending the

Assam Land and Revenue Regulation Act, 1886, by adding Chapter X in 1947. The

creation of tribal belts and blocks had a direct relationship with the large-scale

migration from East Bengal. (See for details, “Large-scale immigration led to cre-

ation of tribal belts and blocks,” Sentinel, September 21, 2012).

27 Three detention centres have been set up at Goalpara, Kokrajhar and Silchar. About

118 foreigners were said to be staying in those centres (as on 15/10/2012).

28 The 4,100 km long India-Bangladesh border touches Assam, West Bengal, Meghalaya,

Tripura and Mizoram. The border with Assam has a length of 267.30 km, out of this

223.068 km is the land border and 44.232 km are river stretches and other non-

feasible gaps across the river border.

29 “Rs 33 cr for deporting 219 foreigners,” Assam Tribune, February 11, 2011.

127

30 D.S. Massey, et al, “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,”

Population and Development Review 19, 1993, p. 449.

31 According to media reports, Hagrama Mohilary alleged that Badruddin Ajmal was

facilitating the entry of illegal migrants into India. Ajmal formed Assam United

Democratic Front (now All India United Democratic Front) in 2006 to fight for the

rights of the Muslims. He represents Dhubri in Lok Sabha. (For further see, “Deter-

mination of infiltrators faces strong resistance from minorities,” Times of India,

August 20, 2012, p. 8).

32 Kalyan Barooah, “Concern over influx from Bangladesh,” Assam Tribune, November

9, 2012.

33 “Hurdles in NRC update process,” Sentinel, August 27, 2012.

34 Willem van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South

Asia, p. 222.

128

Eastern Quarterly

Vol. 7, Issues III & IV, Autumn & Winter 2011, pp. 128–139

Unemployment, Job Aspiration and

Migration: A Case Study of Tangkhul

Migrants to Delhi

MARCHANG REIMEINGAM

The high level of unemployment and limited job opportunities in Manipur

amidst the social and political unrest are the major factors that compel

migration into metropolitian cities. Migration to Delhi, despite social

discrimination and other problems, shows the gravity of unemployment from

Manipur in general, and the Tangkhuls in particular.

INTRODUCTION

Unemployment denotes a condition of joblessness and the existence of a reserve

labour time available for utilization. The unemployed are out of work full-time

and are seeking/available for work. But the terms seeking/available for work

are hard to define. Person may be available for work next week, or tomorrow,

but not today.1 The existence of educated unemployment is attributed to the

too literary character of education. Educated unemployed are those persons

who have attained an educational level of secondary and above and attained

age of 15 years or above and are seeking or available for work.2 Young people

who had prolonged their studies for a longer period were more likely to have

higher aspirations. Young people have become more ambitious and better

qualified, while their employment opportunities have narrowed.3 Moreover,

Blaug, et al has mentioned that there has been a “widespread and persistent

upgrading of minimum hiring standards in India.”4 This suggests that the better

educated must, after varying periods of unemployment during which aspirations

are sealed downward, take jobs requiring lower levels of education.5

Over a period of time, the young job-seekers adapt to the nature of the

labour market faced by them and adjust their aspirations and work preferences.

Individual’s job preference is influenced by income expectation, location of

129

proposed employment, nature and status of the job, short-term and long-term

prospects, etc.6 or levels of pay and travelling distance for employment.7

Unemployment rate falls as the person grow older due to the increase in

economic responsibility. Normally the youth who are educated can remain

unemployed by depending on family income. Puttaswamaiah ascertained that

educated unemployment is presumably a consequence of the general impression

among the public that investment in education by an individual should yield a

return in terms of remunerative job; search of job suited to the particular type

of education received; and decline in acceptance of job other than office jobs.8

Migrant, according to the Census of India, is a person if the place of birth

(POB) or place of last residence (POLR) is different from the place of enumeration.

A person is considered as a migrant by POB if the place in which the person is

enumerated during the census is other than the person’s POB. And a person is

considered as migrant by POLR, if the place in which the person is enumerated

during the census is other than the person’s place of immediate last residence.

Migrants defined on the basis of POB or POLR are called the lifetime migrants

because the time of their move is not known.9 Migration is to “achieve maximum

individual satisfaction through obtaining better employment or wage or security

or environment.”10 Meanwhile, numerous studies in Britain have found that

the propensity to migrate increases with rising educational qualifications.11

The paper analyses the issues concerning unemployment, job aspiration

and migration from Manipur to Delhi in recent decades. And its result based on

secondary data from National Sample Survey and Indian Census is attempted

to validate using primary data for Tangkhul migrants from Ukhrul district of

Manipur to the national capital Delhi.

DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

The paper explores the problem of unemployment, which acted as the cause

for migration with empirical evidences from secondary data sources such as

NSS, Census and primary data. Unemployment, usual principal status, is

analysed for Manipur in relation with the national average based on NSS data

from 1993–94 onwards. To some extent an attempt is made to link the study of

unemployment with migration phenomenon from Manipur to the national capital

region Delhi based on the available census data since 1981. To validate, to

some extent, secondary data pertaining to the unemployment and migration

issues a primary data pertaining to Tangkhul migrants from Ukhrul district of

Manipur to Delhi in the year 2007 is examined. The primary data was collected

from a survey, conducted by this author, using structured and semi-structured

questionnaire in 2007. A stratified and simple random sampling technique was

130

adopted in selecting the sample. The sample population is taken from twenty

villages of origin from Ukhrul district on the basis of their population size in

Delhi based on the census of Tangkhul Katamnao Long Delhi (TKLD)12 during

2004–05. According to TKLD census, Tangkhuls have migrated from ninety-

nine villages from the Ukhrul district to Delhi. These villages are categorised

into three groups for sample selection such as large, medium and small on the

basis of their population size in Delhi.

In the present study, fifteenth and five villages were drawn randomly from

the large and medium population in Delhi respectively. With the help of contact

addresses given in the TKLD census a comprehensive survey was conducted

covering three hundred and twenty three respondents. It also ascertained the

“new comers” (newly arrived Tangkhuls in Delhi) with the help of “old timers”

(older Tangkhuls in Delhi) of the sample villages. And during survey it was

observed that some of migrants had already left Delhi.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND JOB ASPIRATION

In spite of several efforts, in a labour surplus economy like India many people

remain unemployed and continue to search (or to be available) for employment.

Some may be chronically unemployed and some intermittently unemployed

due to seasonal fluctuations in the labour market.13 Any change in the condition

of business, transport and industry reflects to urban employment level.

Agricultural unemployment is the major problem in rural areas. The problem of

unemployment is more severe in urban areas as the rate of unemployment was

considerably higher in urban than rural areas in Manipur (which follows the

national pattern for both the gender throughout the period). This is due to a

large participation in economic activities as part-time workers, particularly in

agriculture sector in rural areas. Unemployment problem is more sever in urban

areas due to rise in educated people and migration from rural to urban areas for

non-agricultural job. The dominance of organised sector for employment where

normal entry age for job is at mid-20’s resulted to more unemployment among

the urban people. Furthermore, Hazra has pointed out that “it is the failure of

the organised sector to absorb labour at a significantly increased rate which is

one major reason for the persistence of various types of unemployment within

the organised sector.”14 In Manipur the problem of unemployment has hit

harder in rural areas as the rate of unemployment has gradually increased from

1.9 per cent during 1993-94 to 4.2 per cent during 2009-10 for rural males. It has

also increased for rural females to a similar extent. In urban areas, it has increased

from 1993-94 to 1999-00; however, considerably declined thereafter particularly

for females as presented in Table 1.

131

At the national average, the rate hovers around 2 per cent for rural males

throughout the period. For rural females, it has increased gradually till 2004–

05, however, slightly declined in the following period. In urban areas, it has

declined from 4.5 per cent in 1993–94 to 3.0 per cent in 2009–10 for males.

Similarly, for urban females, it has declined by about one percentage point

during the same period. In general, unemployment has declined in the recent

period particularly in urban areas. In the nineties, unemployment problem was

less severe for females as compared to males; however, it has emerged that

females faced more problem of unemployment in the recent years in rural areas

of Manipur following the national pattern. In urban areas, at national level,

unemployment problem continues to be more severe for females than males as

the rate continues to be considerably higher for females. Manipur also follows

the national pattern from 1999–00 up to 2004–05; however, it fold back to the

nineties pattern of lesser severity of unemployment problem for females as

compared to the males in 2009–10. It is due to the increased in out migration

towards big cities like Delhi where opportunities are considered abundant.

Table 1: Usual Principal Status unemployment rates and educated unemployment

rates (15 years and above) for Manipur and India

Source: NSS 50th Round (1993-94) Report No. 409, 55th Round (1999-00) Report No.

458, 61st Round (2004-05) Report No. 515 (1) and 66th (2009-10) Round Report No.537.

Concurrently, children contesting in educational system and their

aspirations have increased. The longer stay in what may be called the

educational contest, due to the rising income of parents, has resulted to a

considerable increased in the proportion of educated. According to a report of

NSS 2004-05, little more than 18 per cent of the rural people, against about 36

per cent in urban areas, had completed secondary and above educational level.

Despite the rapidly rising literacy rate, majority of the literate remained

uneducated particularly in rural areas resulting to unemployment due to non-

employability or non-availability of job. Nevertheless, people are voluntarily

M anipur/ India

Year

Unemployment rates Educated unemployment rates

Rural Urban Rural Urban

Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female

Manipur

1993-94 1.9 1.1 5.3 4.4 6.5 6.1 10.2 10.1 1999-00 2.4 2.5 7.4 10.3 6.3 13.1 11.4 19.3 2004-05 2.0 1.2 5.3 8.2 6.5 8.6 8.5 14.6 2009-10 4.2 4.4 5.2 4.6 6.8 15.3 6.3 7.2

India

1993-94 2.0 1.4 4.5 8.2 8.8 24.9 6.9 20.6 1999-00 2.1 1.5 4.8 7.1 6.8 20.4 6.6 16.3

2004-05 2.1 3.1 4.4 9.1 5.9 23.1 6.0 19.4 2009-10 1.9 2.4 3.0 7.0 4.1 15.7 3.8 13.9

132

unemployed due to their higher aspiration and preference of salaried job and

place of work. The limitation of employment generation in the organised sector

creates the problem of educated unemployment. As Parthasarathy and Nirmala

commented, the “educated seek employment mainly in the public/private

organized sector.”15 This is true in the case of Manipur where the educated set

targets and aspires for jobs – mostly a secured government job. As Gumber has

also remarked that the “educated persons look for specific kinds of employment

opportunities and remain unemployed till they get such work.”16

The problem of educated unemployment originated from the system of

education and the rapidly changing employment structure. According to

Puttaswamaiah, the “theoretical bias in Indian educational system results in

most of our educated job-seekers having very little aptitude and technical

qualifications for various types of works.”17 However, in recent times, the

system has been reoriented and restructured to some extent as the economy

demands. Yet, the system is of much speculation that schools have “failed to

build bridges with employers” and have “failed to produce youngsters who

are employable.”18 Significantly, NSS data shows that educated unemployment

rate was more or less stable at about 7 per cent for the rural males of Manipur

throughout the period. In case of rural females, it has increased considerably

in the nineties indicating the rate of out-migration and employment generation

in the state is unable to meet the ever-rising demand for job. However, to some

extent the state was relieved from the problem of female educated unem-

ployment problem as the rate declined to 8.6 per cent during 2004–05. The

situation worsens in the following period as it considerably increased to 15.3

per cent. Its increased is due to the slow employment generation and increased

in seeking formal job as the level of education increases besides an increased

in the agriculture density.

The problem of educated unemployment in Manipur was more severe in

urban areas till 2004–05, which is against the national pattern. Later, it became

milder in urban areas as the rate shows considerably lower in urban areas for

females in particular. In the nineties, it has increased; however, later it has

rapidly declined in urban areas due to the result of out-migration in search of

job among the educated as their aspiration does not fit in the existing labour

market reality in Manipur. To an extent, the problem of urban educated

unemployment is a spill-over effect of the same from rural areas. The decline in

the rate is because after spells of unemployment the educated unemployed

after experiencing greater difficulty in finding the aspired job often “obliged to

trade down and accept second or third best job.”19

Notably, at the national level, educated unemployment rate has declined

throughout the period for males in both the areas. Large private investors were

133

attracted in the period of economic reform in the nineties, which boost the

economy through employment generations in the country. The rate has also

declined in the nineties; however, increased in the latter period for females. It

has declined considerably in the recent period in both the rural and urban

areas partially due to the implementation of various central programmes and

schemes of employment. The problem is more severe in rural areas particularly

among females with a high prevalence of unemployment rates due to restriction

in migration. The concentration of formal jobs in urban areas, which are mostly

sought and aspired by the educated, also attributed the situation. Formal jobs

in rural areas are generally very limited. The situation highlights the preference

and aspiration of formal job arises due to increased in educational level. In

addition, it is attributed by the sizable returned migrants to their rural origin

after they failed to get job in urban areas, withdrawal of financial support by

their family or return for social obligation like marriage as they grow older.

Return migration flow generate when a person in general and workers in particular

who have just migrated are extremely likely to move back to their original

location.20

During 2009–10, unemployment problem in Manipur is more severe than

national level for males in both the urban and rural areas. This situation arises

perceivably due to a sizable number of return migrants to their native state

amidst a growing number of unemployed among the non-migrants.

Unemployment problem can be reduced by increasing seats in higher

educational institution; create, support and promote self-employment; or

promote migration. According to Parasuraman Nair, the “nature of formal

schooling in India is not particularly job-oriented and hence more and more

educated end up unemployed.”21 In Manipur like in any developing nations,

“each worsening of the employment situation calls forth an increased demand

for more formal education at all levels.”22 For the Indian educational system is

envisaged to restructure towards job-oriented system. The educated

unemployed mostly seek for a specific kind of job particularly in organised

sector unlike the general unemployed. In order to reduce the problem of

unemployment the unemployed should try to fit in or accept the available job

rather than waiting for a particular job which are limited and time consuming.

Educated unemployment rate was considerably higher than the general

unemployment rates for Manipur as well as India for both the gender in both

the areas. Parthasarathy and Nirmala ascertained that the “educated seek

employment mainly in the public/private organized sector.”23

Employment opportunities are booming in specific regions due to the

increased inflow of capital markets as the country’s economy becomes stronger

and stabilises. In the process the tendency to migrate or transfer labour from

134

the less developed regions such as Manipur towards big cities like Delhi in

search of job has increased. In recent years “new employment opportunities

are coming up in selective sectors and in a few regions/urban centres.”24 The

economy of Manipur should be stabilised, developed and plan for greater

employment generation by creating a conducive environment for private

investors.

Yet, majority of the unemployed still aspire for the so-called government

job as they consider it as a real and only job, which gives economic security

and social status. While contractual and casual work has increased even in the

government sector. Government do create jobs but far lesser than the rapidly

increasing supply of labour. Arguably, private sector employees are more

efficient and productive than the government counterparts. Disinvestment of

public holdings is a valid example. Arguably, large numbers of government

sector employees in Manipur are a “slack” where their contribution to the state

income is negligible. As a consequence the state is developing at the pace of

a snail resulting to slow employment generation, which rendered people to be

unemployed and induces to migrate from the state in search of aspired

employment corresponding to their educational qualifications. Ironically,

Government in Manipur provides majority of the formal jobs partially due to

the existing unfavourable socio-political problems, whereas private investors

are averting the risk to establish their business.

MIGRATION FROM MANIPUR

Over the years migration from Manipur is increasing in order to maximise one’s

economic and social well-being. Faggian and McCann stated that “people

migrate to maximise welfare.”25 This is true in our case study. The prevailing

unfavourable social, economic as well as political conditions of the state acted

as the push factors of migration. In 1981 a total number of 787 migrants (by

place of last residence with all-duration of residence) have migrated from

Manipur to Delhi. This number has increased to 1266 in the following decade,

and then further increased to 5481 in 2001 (according to the Census of India).

The opening up of new employment opportunities in the national capital region

Delhi acted as the pull factors. Migration is rapidly growing even from the

remote areas due to the increased in access of communication technology

creating a phenomenon of chain migration. Chain migration can be defined as

that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are

provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment

arranges by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants.26 In

addition, their nature of hospitality, dutiful or accent of English facilitates in

135

getting a job relatively easier in hospitality services, shopping malls or customer

care services. The tendency to migrate is greater for males than females as the

sex ratio of migrants was low at 748 in 2001. Migrants from Manipur, by POLR

with duration of residence of 0–9 years, to Delhi were mostly youth in the age

group of 15–29 years at 64 per cent (against 30 per cent of youth in the total

population in Manipur) in 2001. Employment and education dominates the

reason for migration among the migrants (by POLR with all-duration of

residence) from the state particularly for the males.

The trend implies that the rising unemployment partially act as the cause

for migration. People from Manipur tend to migrate to Delhi as the system of

education and the job opportunities are enormous in and around Delhi. The process

continues in the form of “repeat” migration. This form of migration is generated

when the migrants are likely to move onward to still other locations.27

Interestingly, many people across all communities from the state are venturing

into various types of businesses and generate some employment avenues in

Delhi in recent times.

ASPIRATION OF TANGKHUL MIGRANTS TO DELHI

Tangkhuls, mostly youth, are increasingly migrating from Ukhrul district of

Manipur to Delhi. There is a growing number of educated youth in the district,

who constitutes about 30 per cent of district population. Lack of adequate

educational infrastructures and problems of growing unemployment at home

has driven many to choose Delhi for their career and jobs. To them, Delhi is the

centre that facilitates better educational system and employment opportunities.

About 96 per cent of the migrants fall in the age group of 15–29 years. They

mostly migrated after the completion of at least matriculate exam. The process

of migration was largely a chain migration because most of them already have

their relatives or at least known persons in Delhi who provides basic

requirements and facilitates in finding accommodation, admission or even job

at the time of migrating to Delhi. Family members, relatives and friends who

have previously migrated may provide information about their present locations

to persons residing in their former place of residence. Former migrants may

also provide temporary food and shelter as well as ease social transition. Such

cases have been studied and proven elsewhere also.

Most of the migrants were recent migrants who have come in recent years

for education and job. Only few of them were found married and the rest were

living in rented houses either with their family members or relatives. They later

stayed with their family members/relatives for easy social networks and less

financial costs of living. Most of them studied arts followed by science,

136

commerce and vocational subject. Majority of them graduated in degree courses

in humanities and social sciences that do not give easy placements for jobs.

One of their main aspirations is to get government job after degree courses.

Therefore, most males after completing their education continue to stay back

in Delhi and prepare for civil service and other competitive examinations.

The male workers largely are found working in BPO sector (call centres),

which fetches relatively higher salary for the fresh graduates. Whereas females

who are mostly in their late teens and early twenties migrated specifically for

employment after completing their higher secondary education; this indicates

that females do not continue to study, but seeks employment at a younger age

(compared to males) due to either domestic economic pressures or their

reluctance to pursue higher studies. They mostly work in private shops, hotels,

restaurants, parlours and alike constituting about 62 per cent of the workforce.

It is also interesting to notice that there is a sea change in the concept of job

among the Tangkhul females. They work in retail shops, malls, hotels,

restaurants, front desk private offices or in BPO sector (call centres). It was

also evident that females make a profound contribution by financing their

sibling’s educational expenses. Female graduates are mostly employed in call

centres indicating that increased in educational level enables to meet their

aspirations in terms of earning.

The work participation rate was about 48 per cent for females against a

lower rate of about 31 per cent for males. This difference is due to variation in

the flexibility in choosing job, reluctance to continue after secondary education,

different aspirations for government jobs and domestic and individual economic

pressures. It portrays a loosening notion of dependence on males, narrowing

down of gap in earning and demonstrating capabilities. It exhibits the neglected

value of household works performed in terms of money value. The females

who worked in the above sectors are found financing their sibling’s education

and preparation for civil service and other competitive examinations. However,

the high WPR of females do not suggest there was a male child preference for

education because it was evident that the sex ratio of Tangkhul students in

Delhi was high. It was due to the prevalence of high unemployment rate among

the males.

The problem of unemployment was more severe for the males as the rate

of unemployment, measured between the ratio of persons seeking/available

for work among the non-workers (unemployed) and the labour force (workers

plus unemployed), was prevailing at about 40 per cent against about 18 per

cent for females. It is due to high preference, expectation and aspiration of job.

The question of employability due to too general educational background is

the other reason. They prefer employment in public sector, which will give a

137

sense of permanency and security, with about 46 per cent, than private sector

than self-employment. Most of them are seeking employment for more than

half year suggesting the difficulty in getting a job due to tougher competition.

The above condition suggests an approach of education to a professional and

job-oriented education.

Many of the employed were unsatisfied with their present job; about 34

per cent of the employed were seeking for new jobs because they consider that

their present works are not remunerative enough, unpleasant working hours

and mainly due to the desire of a permanent government job. Amidst the existing

labour problems the Tangkhul society recognises government job as a real and

only job, which gives economic security apart from gaining social status.

Undoubtedly, migration from the district is due to the problem of unemployment

in Manipur, which could be validated as most of the employed people opined

that they were willing to transfer to Manipur if the employment opportunities

are given there. In addition, a study by Lakshminarayana ascertained that

migrants “wait for an opportunity to come back to their home state, even for a

lesser salary.”28

CONCLUSION

Unemployment problem is alarming particularly among the educated in Manipur.

As a result, they are increasingly migrating to metropolis like Delhi in search of

better employment opportunities. The availability of wide range of formal and

informal sectors for salaried jobs, both in public and private sectors, pull these

migrants. This is due to inadequate employment opportunities in Manipur and

rising job aspirations in terms of secured government jobs. The high prevalence

of educated unemployed amidst the increasing job aspirations and limited job

opportunities in the state apart from social or political unrest is the major

factors that push them to migrate. Unemployment problem is mitigated by out-

migration from Manipur especially among the Tangkhuls. However, migration

is not favourable in the area of migration destination because it raises the

problem of unemployment in it. Generally, an increase in educational attainment

raises the aspiration of the young educated unemployed, while there emerges

narrowing down of employment opportunities and upgrading of minimum hiring

standards. As a result, the unemployed scale down their job preferences and

aspirations; and adjust to accept jobs of lower grade irrespective of the sector

of employment. The rising level of educational attainment has raised the

propensity to migrate. Migrants are mostly young, educated, unmarried and

optimistic, who are in search of better opportunities. The student migrants

after completion of their studies continue to seek employment either through

138

appearing in competitive examinations or work in the private sector due to

financial pressure. The problem of educated unemployment, among the

Tangkhuls, is that most of them opt for educational streams that are not job-

oriented or professional. Among the Tangkhul workers, majority of the males

work in call centres against the majority of the females working in hospitality

sector, malls and parlours. The level of unemployment is acute for males as

they aspire and seek for permanent and secured government jobs through

competitive examinations which requires a longer time. Employment level is

considerably higher for the females when compared to the males, although a

patriarchal social system prevails in the region. This shows the complexity of

relationship between the available job avenues and individual aspirations.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1 Peter Sinclair, Unemployment: Economic Theory and Evidence, New York: Basil

Blackwell Ltd., 1987, p.1.

2 Government of India, Employment and Unemployment Situation in India 2009–

10, Delhi: MOSPI, NSSO Report No. 537(66/10/1), 2011.

3 Kenneth Roberts, Youth and Leisure, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1985,

p. 131.

4 Mark Blaug, et al, The Causes of Graduate Unemployment in India, London: Penguin

Press, 1969, p. 5.

5 Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World, Delhi: Orient

Longman, 1991, p. 339.

6 Marga, Youth, Land and Employment, Colombo: Marga Publication, 1974, p. 19.

7 Kenneth Roberts, Youth and Leisure, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1985,

p. 135.

8 K. Puttaswamaiah, Unemployment in India: Policy for Manpower, New Delhi: Oxford

and IBH Publishing Co., 1977, pp. 100–01.

9 Pravin Visaria, “The Level and Pattern of Economic Activity by Migration Status in

India,” Demography India 9 (1&2), 1980, p. 2.

10 A. Solucis Santhapparaj, “Job Search and Earnings of Migrants in Urban Labour

Market: A Study of Madurai Metropolis,” The Indian Journal of Labour Economics

39(2), 1996, p. 269.

11 As cited in Guy L. Cote, “Socio-economic Attainment, Regional Disparities, and

Internal Migration,” European Sociological Review, 13(1), 1997, p. 56.

12 One of the Naga student bodies, of the Tangkhul Naga community who predomi-

nantly hail from Ukhrul district, is the Tangkhul Student Union Delhi. It conduct

census covering only Tangkhuls in National Capital Region Delhi to record some

basic socio-economic profile with irregular interval.

13 Government of India, Employment and Unemployment in India, Delhi: Department

of Statistics, NSSO Report No.409, 1997, p. 129.

139

14 Hazra Suzan, “Employment in India’s Organised Sector,” Social Scientist 19(7),

1991, p. 40.

15 G. Parthasarathy and K.A. Nirmala, “Employment and Unemployment of Youth,”

The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 43(4), 2000, p. 691.

16 Anil Gumber, “Correlates of Unemployment among the Rural Youth in India: An

Inter-State Analysis,” The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 43(4), 2000, p. 659.

17 K. Puttaswamaiah, Unemployment in India: Policy for Manpower, New Delhi: Oxford

and IBH Publishing Co, 1977, p. 100.

18 Keith Watson (ed.), Youth, Education and Employment – International Perspectives,

London: Croom Helm, 1983, p. 6.

19 Kenneth Roberts, Youth and Leisure, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1985,

p. 135.

20 Borjas J. George, Labor Economics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005, p. 319.

21 P.S. Nair, et al (eds.), Indian Youth: A Profile, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1989, pp.

114–16.

22 Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World, Delhi: Orient

Longman, 1991, p. 339.

23 G. Parthasarathy and K.A. Nirmala, “Employment and Unemployment of Youth,”

p. 691.

24 Amitabh Kundu, “Mobility of Population,” in Kaushik Basu (ed.), The Oxford Com-

panion to Economics in India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 353.

25 Alessandra Faggian and Philip McCann, “Human Capital Flows and Regional Knowl-

edge Assets: A Simultaneous Equation Approach,” Oxford Economic Paper 52, 2006,

p. 480.

26 John S. MacDonald and Leatrice D. MacDonald, “Chain Migration Ethnic Neighbor-

hood Formation and Social Networks,” The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 42(1),

January 1964, p. 82.

27 Borjas J. George, Labor Economics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005, p. 319.

28 H.D. Lakshminarayana, College Youth: Challenge and Response, Delhi: Mittal

Publications, 1985, p. 83.

140

Kaleidoscope

Eastern Quarterly

Vol. 7, Issues III & IV, Autumn & Winter 2011, pp. 140–48

Alibis of Conquest: Colonial Takeover of

Kachari Customary Polity*

SANTOSH HASNU

Lack of political heir, contestations among several claimant princes, and

presence of the powerful British led to a different dynamics never witnessed

before in the history of royal succession of Cachar kingdom. The role of the

British not only intensified, but process of appointment of the new king as

well as functioning of the subsequent darbar, was shaped by colonial politics

and bureaucratic mechanisms.

This paper attempts to study the role of the East India Company in the native

political affairs to the extent of interpreting the indigenous customs and tradition

in Cachar as could be witnessed at the time of royal succession disputes.

When the Raja of Cachar, Govind Chandra, was murdered in April 1830, the Raja

left behind no male heir to the throne. And there was no clear law of primo-

geniture. Under such circumstances, conflicting interpretations of local custom and

usages emerged among the contenders to the Kachari throne. Strong contenders

included Govind Chandra’s widow, the hill chief Tula Ram (who claimed the

support of the Forty Sengphongs1), and the Manipuri Raja Gambhir Singh.

Cachar became a British protectorate soon after the first Anglo-Burmese

war. After the ruling prince Govind Chandra’s death, the British East India

Company invited written petitions (arzees) from all claimants to the vacant

throne. There were three strong contenders to the throne. The Company

investigated into the legality of each claim. The process of investigation was

not just a depiction of pre-existing political institutions but it also mirrored a

series of rationalised bureaucratic processes that were marked different from

preceding strategies of rule. These enquiries inevitably led the colonial state

to interfere in the complex issues of customary practices and written records

related to royal successions. Lieutenant Thomas Fisher, who took temporary

charge of administration of Cachar state commented at this point, “the

141

destruction of all records has rendered inquiry into the ancient laws a matter of

uncertainty and judging from the diversity of opinions on the subject among

the Cacharees.”2 The British were intrigued by the alleged existence of the

Forty Sengphongs, who were elderly electors of the throne according to a

version of the local custom. A Kachari informant called Kartic Ram maintained

that the right of nominating a new prince was vested in the muntaries alone

although the election was said to be made by the Forty Sengphongs.3 Aged

around sixty to seventy years, Kartic Ram held a responsible office under Raja

Govind Chandra.

The hill Chief Tula Ram of North Cachar presented his case on the basis of

oral customary practise of the Forty Sengphongs. This was contrary to the

royal court in plains Cachar that patronised literate Bengali culture. But the

oral culture had to be presented to the colonial state in the form of written

petition called arzee. This was because the colonial state privileged writing

over orality while assessing conflicting claims to the Cachar’s throne. The

Company sought references to the Sengphong traditions (to validate verbal

claims) in written Bengali records such as the royal chronicle of Manipur. Ajay

Skaria argues the ideology of writing as more stable and less arbitrary than

those embodied in oral traditions or pre-colonial forms of writing, which he

called, “the rhetoric of fixity.”4

DIVERGENCE CONTEXT OF CLAIMANTS, COLONIAL INTERPRETATIONS

By the eighteenth century, writing acquired significance for the Dimasa state

particularly in Plains Cachar after the advent of literate Bengali Brahmins in the

royal court circles. Along with the shifting of Dimasa capital from Maibang (in

Hills Cachar) to Khaspur in Plains Cachar, there started a surge of Bengali

Brahmana influence in the royal family.5 The Dimasa royal family and aristocracy

patronized Bengali language and literature. The language of land grants,

appointment of officials, correspondence, statutes and ordinances was Bengali.

Raja Krishna Chandra and his brother Govind Chandra were known for their

contribution to the Bengali literature.6 Raja Krishna Chandra composed a song

in Sanskrit intermixed with a form of developing Bengali in 1780.7 The penal

code introduced by Govind Chandra in 1817 was in Bengali with parallel Sanskrit

in Bengali character.8 Thomas Fisher, however, observes that the Kachari

language was unwritten and the Kachari state use Bengali for all official

transactions. This circumstance, to Fisher, greatly increased the difficulty of

all attempts to trace the origin of the people through the indigenous

medium.9Although the Kachari language may be non-literate, the Kachari state

did possess a literary tradition by adopting Bengali.

142

But the dominance of literate Bengali culture in Plains Cachar was not well

received by the Dimasa population in the Hills Cachar, which acted as a

custodian of oral customary practices of the Dimasa people. The advance of

the Brahmanism among the Dimasa aristocracy was not favoured by most of

the Dimasa elements. The first reaction of this was manifested in the revolt of

Kahidan, who held a post in Hills Cachar and attempted to form an independent

kingdom.10

However, the oral traditions and political interventions from the Hills Cachar

never got mention in the Bengali sources. At the later period, the revolt of

Kahidan was continued by his son, Tula Ram. The revolt led to the emergence

of written petitions (arzees) addressed to the British Company. In 1829, the

raids committed by Tula Ram and his men led the Cachar Raja Govind Chandra

to petition the Commissioner of Sylhet. The arzee was submitted to the

Commissioner of Sylhet by Mukhtar (official post) on behalf of the Cachar

state; it was complaining that Tula Ram had appropriated to his use the revenue

of the major parts of Cachar. The letter to the Commissioner also accompanied

the arzee presented by the Amla of Dharampur.11 These arzees nonetheless

added to the colonial knowledge of the Cachar (and its internal problems). The

written arzees sent to the British Company served as useful tools through

which colonial knowledge of Cachar came to be acquired.

The Forty Sengphongs submitted the petition (arzee) to the Company

Government claiming their right to elect a Prince.12 However, relying on written

sources such as the Royal Chronicle of Manipur (Cheitharol Kumbaba), the

British were not prepared to accept the legitimacy of the oral testimony of the

Forty Sengphongs. It was argued that the Manipuri Chronicle made no mention

of such a Dimasa institution although there were several other references of

connectivity between Cachar Princes and Kings of Manipur through

matrimonial alliances.13 Lieutenant Gordon, the Political Agent of the Company

Government in Manipur wrote to Fisher that the Manipuri record traced the

origin of the ruling family of Cachar to an equally remote period and although

they give no precedent yet they afford abundant materials for inferring what

would have been the course pursued in the establishment of a new Raja. In the

case of the royal line being extinct, the most powerful chief, like any most

powerful prince would have ever done, possessed the throne for himself by

violence without any consideration of right whatsoever and would then have

exacted submission by force and terror.14 Thus, based on the above reading of

relevant literary record, the Company Raj concluded that the alleged right of

the Forty Sengphongs to elect a new Raja was dubious claim and should it

ever exist, it was said to be obsolete15 due to disuse. Rightly, Neeladri

Bhattacharya argues that while a dialogue with native informants was seen as

143

essential to the production of authentic knowledge, such extreme dependence

was experienced by the British as a form of disempowerment.16

After his enquiries, Thomas Fisher gave the following three possible ways

to interpret the institution of Forty Sengphongs in pre-colonial Cachar:

(a) First, the royal line of Kachari state had never gone extinct until the

death of Raja Govind Chandra and no occasion had arose for the election of a

new ruler;

(b) Second, only in later years did the law of primogeniture came into

being, but in the past succession was decided by a chief of the royal clan who

was strong enough to seize the throne probably by force, and exact an

acknowledgement of his title from the muntaries and sengphongs; or

(c) Third, in the history of Kachari rule, a free and fair election had never

been the means by which a prince asserted his right over the throne.17

Fisher gives the above interpretations on the basis of evidence that the

Kachari people gave their obedience to the new king, on the condition that he

belonged to the royal line. To him, had it been a customary practice of choosing

of a new king by an assembly of the muntaries and the sengphongs, this

practice of choosing on the royal line would have been discontinued. In

addition, the practice of electing king by the above assembly could not be

revived due to the fact that there were no longer muntaries of rank and the

sengphongs appeared to have been scattered; it would be impossible to collect

the needed “thousand families” some of whom had retreated to the mountains

under Tula Ram’s rule.18

Hence, the (response and) petition of the Forty Sengphongs for reviving

the custom can be seen as a confrontation and contestation of the Company’s

claim to superiority. The justification provided by the colonial officials for their

intervention was that the revival of this particular custom was not likely to be

attended with any benefit; it was considered that this could be a source of

intermediate civil war, fought with probable danger with the colonial ruler as

well. The Company further contended that internal or external commotion would

ensure that no power was paramount. The only way to ensure their supremacy

would be to form an administration best calculated to encourage cultivation of

the lands and the commerce and civilization of its inhabitants.19 Epitomizing

the best values of British governance and economic development, the Raj felt

that British paramountcy in Cachar would be established gradually through a

process of the “civilising mission.”

The Company, as a result, advised Thomas Fisher to remain in-charge of

Cachar with powers of a Political Agent, civil, criminal and financial, subject to

the Commissioner of the Division. He was directed to draw up such local rules,

144

as his experience might suggest, for the purpose of collecting revenue. He was

left unfettered by existing customs further than he might find them applicable

conveniently and making the necessary alterations gradually rather than

violently.20 Though the British Raj denied the legitimacy of local customs and

institutions, they were more than willing to adopt local customs pertaining to

revenue collection since it was more convenient for them to use local

intermediaries in the newly acquired revenue-producing territory. This colonial

strategy was not specifically meant for ruling Cachar only. According to Thomas

Metcalfe, there were primarily two areas that concerned the British Raj at that

times when it came to governing their various colonies: the first belief was the

establishment of British imperial rule through the implementation of rule of law

to lend legitimacy to its military power; the second area of concern was how to

appease the indigenous populace and to what extent their local customs and

traditions could play a role in the British administration.21

However, reinterpretation of customs was not a one way process: colonial

to native subjects. It also allowed the native to negotiate with colonial authority.

Apparently, the diverse claimants to the throne of Dimasa state after Govind

Chandra’s death was also structured by the new interpretations of Dimasas’

custom. And such interpretation was not completely a legal-rational process.

Rightly, in her recent work on Goalpara, Sanghamitra Misra points out that the

colonial project was shaped in varied encounters with the colonised that

involved frequent circumvention and contestation of the state’s claim to

superiority. She argued that the reinvention of custom emerged as a powerful

political weapon for communities resenting their reduction to the status of

agrarian dependents, opening up new spaces for negotiation and conflict with

colonial state.22 In another work on exploring the colonial state’s attempts to

determine the “legitimate rights” and “claims” of the local powers in Goalpara,

Sanghamitra Misra notes that the colonial officials relied on the sanads to

determine whether a particular tributary was independent or an integral part of

the Bhutan kingdom. Due to the colonial administrator’s unfamiliarity with the

system of authority reflected in these sanads, various contradictory

interpretations emerged.23

But interpretation was not just a matter of looking justifiable or provable

evidences (in records, chronicles etc), but more a process of deciding which

interests or which claimants served the colonial rule. Tula Ram’s claim to the

vacant throne was favourably considered by the colonial authorities on grounds

of expediency rather than those of hereditary right, although he pretended that

he descended from a royal lineage. However, he was left with an undisputed

possession by the Government of the mountainous region (North Cachar hills)

by the treaty of 1829 which included nearly all that his supposed ancestor ever

145

possessed. He accepted any arrangement that did not deprive him of the quiet

enjoyment of his hill tract.

Though he claimed descent from royalty, however, the plains people of

Cachar dismissed his claim and they remembered him being a lowly minister

under Raja Govind Chandra. Flatly contradicting his claims of royal blood,

colonial enquiries allegedly revealed Tula Ram to be the son of an ordinary

slave girl. Moreover, the British Raj felt that, if somehow they were to recognize

Tula Ram’s claims, it would lead to further problems as several other contenders,

all claiming royal heritage, would seek to claim the vacant throne. The local

people themselves believed that Tula Ram had played a major role in the murder

of their Raja Govind Chandra, and this accusation reduced the eligibility of his

claim to the throne.24

The British demolished all rival claims to the gaddi of Cachar by

questioning the authenticity of the Forty Sengphongs, and the pedigree of the

hill chief Tula Ram who was an alleged criminal. Adding to Fisher’s enquiries

and conclusions, David Scott (Agent to the Governor-General, North Eastern

Frontier) finally surmised that the divided allegiances of the various Kachari

tribes (one half aligned with Govind Chandra and the other half with Tula Ram)

as a sign of the weak hold of the electoral custom insisted by the Forty

Sengphongs. If the people’s consent were to be taken, the Raj felt that it would

be almost certain that they would elect Tula Ram. Further, the Raj holds a

strong suspicion against Tula Ram of having instigated Gambhir Singh to

murder Raja Govind Chandra.25

Nevertheless, the British colonizers justified the annexation of Cachar,

and insisted that they were acting in the best interest of the Kachari people.

W. Cracraft, Officiating Agent to Governor-General suggested to the Company

Government that they should at once declared their intention of retaining the

sovereignty and administration of Cachar in their own hands and permanently

attached it to their territories excepting Tula Ram’s territory.26 Eventually, the

colonial logic dictated that Governor-General in Council assumed the right to

regulate the future administration of Cachar.

CONCLUSION

The royal succession disputes opened the door for colonial interference in the

internal affairs of Cachar by seducing local rajas and chiefs to conclude strategic

treaties. Meanwhile, literate Bengali Brahmins became the cultural brokers

between the colonial state and the local society. They used their literary skills

to write royal land grants since late eighteenth century and they found additional

demand for their skill in drafting petitions (arzees) on behalf of different claimants

146

to the disputed Dimasa throne during the 1830s. To enrich their repertoires of

rule, the British continually expand their pool of local knowledge through

official enquiries. Acting on their new knowledge of the Cachar country, the

Company officials ridiculed the internal confusion and the inability of their

informants to agree on what the traditional custom was, i.e. whether it was the

law of primogeniture or the democratic election by the Forty Sengphongs.

Therefore, the British managed to dismiss with ease any claim to the vacant

throne of Cachar either as illegitimate or baseless. Predictably, the Company

Raj advanced its own claim to be the ‘legitimate’ ruler of Cachar through indirect

mechanism of control.

Thereafter, the exhaustive investigations of Company officials into local

practices, as seen in the enquiries and investigation made by Thomas Fisher

and the various exchanges between him and David Scott reflected their

attempts at establishing “colonial legality” in the arbitration of Dimasa

succession dispute. Neeladri further argues that the native voice was inscribed

within imperial discourse, but it was constrained, regulated and ultimately

appropriated and that, colonial relationship with native tradition was more

complex, ambiguous and varied – spatially and temporally. Not all native voices

could be easily accommodated within the imperial discourse on customary law,

nor all the evidence was always recognized.27 Henceforth, colonial knowledge

and enquiry into local political institutions and customs for royal succession

helped the Company Raj in advancing their own claims of legitimacy to rule

colonial Cachar.

* This paper was presented at the National Seminar on “Problematizing Comparative

Indian Literature” organized by the Department of Modern Indian Languages and

Literary Studies, University of Delhi, 22nd–23rd February, 2012. I am thankful to Dr.

David Vumlallian Zou for his suggestions and comments.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1 The term sengphong refers to the “male,” i.e. patrilineal clan and the Dimasa have

preserved it to this day. The ruling clan of the Kachari or the so-called Hidimba state

in Assam was the Dimasa and were also called as Kacharis.

2 National Archives of India (hereafter NAI), New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceed-

ings, May 7-21, 1832, Document No. 100, To the Agent to the Governor General,

N.E. Frontier from Lt. Thomas Fisher, Sept 27th of 1830.

3 This can also be corroborated from the Arzee of Forty Sempongs to the Agent of the

Governor-General, NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 17–21,

1832, Document No. 82.

147

4 Ajay Skaria, “Writing, Orality and Power in the Dangs, Western India, 1800s–1920s,”

Shahid Amin and Dipesh Chakrabarty (eds.), Subaltern Studies IX: Writings on South

Asian History and Society, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.13–58.

5 S.K. Barpujari, History of the Dimasas (From the earliest times to 1896 A.D.),

Autonomous Council, N.C. Hills District (Assam), Haflong, 1997, p. 65.

6 J.B. Bhattacharjee, “Dimasa State Formation in Cachar,” in Surajit Sinha (eds.),

Tribal Politics and State System in pre-colonial Eastern and North Eastern India,

1987, pp. 177–211.

7 Nalindra Kumar Barman, The Queens of Cachar or Herambo and The History of the

Kachchhari, Silchar: R.R. Printers, 2007, pp. 162–63.

8 J.B. Bhattacharjee, “Dimasa State Formation in Cachar,” pp. 177–211.

9 “Memoir of Sylhet, Cachar and Adjacent Districts by Captain Fisher formerly Super-

intendent of Kachar and Jynta,” Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol IX, Part II,

July–December, Calcutta, 1840, pp. 808–43.

10 Edward Gait, A History of Assam, Calcutta, 1906, p. 309. Also see Barman, The

Queens of Cachar or Herambo and The History of the Kachchhari, pp. 169–70.

11 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No.

83 A Govind Chunder to Commissioner of Sylhet, dated 9th paus 1750. Also see J.B.

Bhattacharjee, Cachar Under British Rule in North East India, New Delhi: Radiant

Publication, 1977, pp. 48–49.

12 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No.

82. Arzee of Forty Sempongs to the Agent of the Governor-General, 24th kartik

1749.

13 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No.

100. To the Agent to the Governor General, N.E. Frontier by Lt. Fisher, Sept 27th

of 1830. For instance, Raja Krishna Chandra of Cachar was married to Indu

Prabha, the daughter of Manipur Raja Madhu Chandra. And after the dead of Krishna

Chandra, Govind Chandra had married the widow of his elder brother, Indu Prabha.

See Barpujari, History of the Dimasas (From the earliest times to 1896 A.D.), 1997,

pp. 67–69.

14 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No.

100.

15 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No.

98: To Chief Secretary to Government, Fort William by W. Cracroft, Officiating

Agent to Governor General, March 22, 1832.

16 Neeladri Bhattacharya, “Remaking Custom: The Discourse and Practice of Colonial

Codification,” in R. Champakalakshmi and S. Gopal (eds.), Tradition, Dissent and

Ideology: Essays in Honour of Romila Thapar, Delhi: Oxford University Press,

1996, pp. 20–51.

17 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No.

100, To the Agent to the Governor General, N. E. Frontier by Lt. Fisher, Sept 27th

of 1830.

18 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No. 100.

148

19 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No.

98: To Chief Secretary to Government, Fort William by W. Cracroft, Officiating

Agent to Governor General writing on 22nd March, 1832.

20 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No.

98.

21 Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections, India in the Indian Ocean Arena 1860-

1920, New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2007, p. 17.

22 Sanghamitra Misra, “Law, Migration and new subjectivities: Reconstructing the

colonial project in an eastern borderland,” Indian Economic and Social History

Review, 44 (4), 2007, 425-61.

23 Sanghamitra Misra, “Changing Frontiers and Spaces: The Colonial State in Nineteenth-

century Goalpara,” Studies in History, 21 (2), 2005. NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political

Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No. 100: To the Agent to the Governor

General, N.E. Frontier by Lt. Fisher, September 27, 1830.

25 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No:

99, David Scott to G. Lwinton, Chief Secretary to Government, October 13, 1830.

26 NAI, New Delhi, Foreign Political Proceedings, May 7–21, 1832, Document No.

98: To Chief Secretary to Government, Fort William by W. Cracraft, Officiating

Agent to Governor General, Political Agents Office, N.E. Frontier, Khanamook,

March 22, 1832.

27 Neeladri Bhattacharya, “Remaking Custom: The Discourse and Practice of Colonial

Codification,” pp. 20–51.

149

Take Two

Eastern Quarterly

Vol. 7, Issues III & IV, Autumn & Winter 2011, pp. 149–51

Christianity: A New Nation

Five papers scrutinizing Christianity from the lens of regional, temporal as well

as electoral politics make for an interesting read in the previous issue of Eastern

Quarterly titled – CHRISTIANITY IN NORTHEAST INDIA. The five papers span an

entire range of themes beginning from the advent of Christianity to what could

be thought of as a more contemporary prism of looking at the electoral politics

and conflict management even though the issue of conversion still holds

importance albeit not in the usual binaries of savage/civilised; primitive/modern;

wild/tame; oral/textual, etc. Thus, the question of why this particular issue has

been taken up at this point in time has been answered through the various

themes taken up by the authors who took a route quite distinct from the usual

binaries. After a careful reading of the papers and their thematic contents, this

reviewer drew a kind of link parallel to the western notion of science as the

repudiation of superstitions and myths besides the efforts of many to treat

theology as one of the robust scientific discipline.

Joy L.K. Pachuau in her paper on “Christianity in Mizoram: Some Historio-

graphical Considerations” dealt with the location of the early writers of Christian

history as either from schools of theology, affiliated to Churches or see

themselves as “adjuncts and proponents of Christianity.” History writing from

this location looks at Christianity as a driving force behind the change from old

ways to new modern rational practices. While the en-masse conversion to

Christianity had earlier been attributed to divine intervention, latter scholars

including Pachuau had questioned this perspective and made attempts to

explore new ways of looking at the causes for conversion. The idea of a religious

identity being entwined with that of an ethnic identity as the primary appeal

towards conversion has been suggested here. The paper departs from the oft

repeated logic of the advent of Christianity having brought the fruits of

modernity.

Adakho Poji K. however seems to locate himself closely to the early

writers of Christian history that was described by Pachuau. It could be said

that there is a reflection of a subtle prejudice in the way one thought that the

society would remain stagnant and isolated if not for the intervention of

Christianity or any other institutionalised religion. This is however not to say

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that the interaction between the institutionalised religion and earlier practices

have not brought forth new systems and practices. One would have opted for

a more nuanced narrative on the interaction between the evangelist and

imperialist. The consequences that the process of modernisation had in

traditional societies had also not been dispassionately discussed at length.

George T. Haokip’s paper seems to juxtapose the modern state with

Christianity. The idea of separation of the state and the church has been a long

drawn debate all over the Christian world. How the Kuki worldview negotiated

with that of Christianity in the context of conflict resolution though being one

of his main propositions seems not well carved out. Questions that he raised

on how the religion helped in preservation of identities and cultural tradition

(even though he points to negotiation processes with existing values) still

remains unanswered. The idea of power nexus and struggle between the power

holders in traditional society and new stakeholders associated with the

institution of the Church has been alluded to but not taken up to arrive at a

refined conclusion.

D. Michael Lunminthang Haokip’s work could also be looked at from the

same angle with the previous papers as it places the teaching of religion in

the framework of a state. Both the latter papers more than suggest the

invigorating spirit of the gospel and looked at the religion as an agent of

change. However, Haokip’s points out that the multifarious nature of issues

riddling the region as being too encompassing for any religion to have a scope

to intervene. His exasperation with religion not being able to bridge the

boundaries of ethnicities, language and clanship seems innocuous. This

seemed an inversion of the feminist question as to why women cannot be

mobilised as women and not separated by the various other identities of class,

caste, religion etc. While Haokip puts this as “questions of the maturity of the

region on religion” one is unsure whether this could be a parameter to judge

religion or make a statement on the all pervading murkiness of the electoral

processes.

The interaction between various missions and the British administrators

beyond those necessitated by requirements of permissions and paperwork

has not been explored. Imperialism and evangelism could be a good trope to

explore, though not a new idea. The ways in which each found the other useful

especially in the field of educating ‘natives’ and the ways in which each keeps

the establishment alive could also be one way of placing the history of conver-

sion though this idea cannot be limited solely to Christian conversion alone.

The idea of simple natives being “civilised” by the missionaries remove

any sort of agency from the people who might have continued in the same vein

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without Christianity as the agent of change as suggested in some of the articles

seemed a little farfetched. The interaction between the idea of an indigenous

tribal identity and that of modernization brought forth by Christianity seems a

fruitful theme to discuss as the argument now seemed to tilt towards a Christian

indigeneity. Education as the route of proselytisation has been alluded to but

not tackled headlong. Also, it would be interesting to see the role of women in

the Church, whether the breakdown of the earlier power nexus from the

traditional religious institution to the institution of Christianity had an

emancipatory role on the status of women or not. This however is missing in all

the five papers.

The idea of conflict resolution and Christianity as discussed in one of the

papers also brings to mind a separate context i.e. of the Nagas, the newer forms

of identity movements that make use of religion in mobilisation for a new form

of nationalism – a nation for Christ. Changing social and political nature of

states in Northeast India indicates that it is a good time to take up an issue on

Christianity.

SOIBAM HARIPRIYA

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Book Review

Eastern Quarterly

Vol. 7, Issues III & IV, Autumn & Winter 2011, pp. 152–55

Revitalizing History

N. Joykumar Singh, Religious Revitalization Movements in Manipur, New

Delhi: Akansha Publishing House, 2012, Rs.750/-, pp. 193, ISBN:

8183703046

History writings of the 20th century Manipur were full of contradictions, full of

controversies and full of conflicting views. It was the first half of the century

when the British colonial rule (princely state) gave birth to a new breed of ideas

that contradict with the age-old feudal ideology. It was a time when the kings

– once called Lainingthou – became powerless in their own State. The Maichous

and Mainous of the then political system were replaced by new class of

intellectuals who got higher education outside the State. Some of them were

the native vanguards of the British colonial rule, some were influenced by

Indian freedom struggle in a way or another. They started looking for every

possible way to find a difference from India and westernization.  In search of a

new identity, some found at a point of time when the Meiteis became Hinduized.

Some found a future state of affairs in which Manipuris were liberated from the

British colonialism. Still some preferred to integrate with the Indian freedom

movement under M.K. Gandhi. They were all out to negate the then existing

system of feudalism and colonialism. That sense of negation to the then

exististing system in which the king is powerless helped create a double burden

on the people of two masters – the king and his master.

The Meiteis developed close contact with the Bengalis in a colonial setting.

The peasantry based Meiteis of Cachar felt alienated when the Bengalis played

an upper hand in the colonial administration in Cachar after the Kingdom of

Cachar was defeated.  Further the Bengali chauvinism of linguistic and religious

superiority compelled some Meiteis to reevaluate Hinduization which was

practised in Manipur. The two points of time are, however, different. When the

Meitei society embraced Hinduism in eighteenth century, the King of Manipur

could defeat internal and external forces and could make the State emerge as a

stronger Manipur consisting of various religious, ethnic groups. The king did

not force other ethnic groups to merge into the Meitei caste system which was

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newly created. The king had a strong sense of self-confidence and was a true

sovereign power. But when some of the twentieth century Meitei intelectuals

tried to re-assess this historical moment – of religious synthesis to Manipuri

Vaishnavism – the king of Manipur had limited powers, checked by the indirect

British Colonial presence. The people of Manipur were in confusion to choose

their way out of the colonial yoke.

The responses to colonial rule were of different shades. Political responses

were loud and clear, though there were confusion among the newly emerging

middle class. The cultural responses that had been discussed in the book are

of two kinds – one that originated in Manipur mainly against the king’s religious

atrocities; and the other that originated from Cachar where the Meiteis

developed a sense of hatred to Bengali chauvinism. These responses were

confined only in the religious domain. There is another dimension of cultural

response targeting westernization. This third dimension of cultural response

is less deliberated by the people as well as.

The historians pay much attention to what they term as “revivalism”and

“revitalization.” The history of revivalist writings shows that such writings

deal mainly with the one, founded by Naoria Phulo. There are only a few

detailed and systematic works on the movement, which originated in Manipur

as a response to the direct atrocities of the kings and his men. Like many other

historians, Naorem Joykumar, in this book enquires into the issue of cultural

challenge. He analyses the history and society of the colonial period to the

tune of Antony Wallace and his idea of “revitalization.” Joykumar assumes (a)

the historical event in early 18th century of Hinduization was part of Indian

colonialism; [cf. even if it was colonialism, this colonialism was dislocated by

Burmese occupation and British colonialism]; (b) there was decline in the socio-

cultural growth of the Manipuris in subsequent years; [cf. the cultural

experiments of the 18th and 19th centuries had no parallel in the history of

Manipur and North East India]; (c) there was no sense of patriotism and

nationalism before the movement of revitalization started in second quarter of

the 20th century; [cf. the patriotic and nationalistic feeling of Rajarshree

Bhagyachandra, Gambhir Singh, Tikendrajit, Thangal and many more were of

the period between Pamheiba and Naoria]. These assumptions are not fullproof

as many other historians have contrary assumptions in dealing with these

historical events. The subjectivity operates very obviously in history writings

while dealing with the events of 18th to 20th centuries.

Naoria Phulo is one of the history makers in the first half of the 20th

century. He started his religious movement in Cachar. His ideas are subscribed

by some of the Meiteis – in Cachar and Manipur. His call for awakening is all

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about new search of old religion. Acknowledging Naoria’s deeds in the history

of Manipur, the author takes up Naoria Phulo and his movement as case history

in examining/understanding the historical happenings of the twentieth century.

He tries to examine Naoria Phulo to show how a social movement originated

from religious domain. He further concludes on the transformation of anti-

Hindu feeling to anti-India movement. As he considers only one factor in

shaping anti-India attitude (or movement), one may think of his treatment of

the nexus between religion and insurgency, anti-Hindu and Manipuri nationa-

lism (of Manipuri insurgents) as oversimplification of a complex social

condition of feudalism, colonialism, synthesized Manipuri Vaishnavism and

de-sanskritization. His method of looking into this complex from a single social

parameter may not be subscribed by many thinkers. They may raise eyebrows.

There are several questions. For instance, What was the driving force for anti-

colonial movements like the Kuki Rebellion, and the Nupi Lans? How do the

insurgent groups look at religion in a state like Manipur where there are several

religious groups? Are there not many forerunners of insurgent leaders who are

non-Meiteis whose dream was for a brighter Manipur? There are Bamon

insurgent leaders. And is anti-Mayang similar to anti-Hinduism? These

questions may help in understanding how anti-India feeling was shaped in the

colonial history. Why did the religious movement attract only a section of

population? Why did majority of the people, who are equally subjected to

religious atrocities in Maharaja Churachand’s times, failed to accept the new

religious movement under Naoria Phulo?

The author rightly highlights the debate between the existing Hindu

ideology and the newly emerging contra-Sanskritization ideology. The

ideological debate could not touch the course of political movements as the

religious debate did not question the existing colonial administration; rather

the new religious movement was mainly anti-Brahmanical (anti-Bamon or anti-

Hindu). The anti-colonial political stream started from Kuki Rebellion that gave

political consciousness among the people to opt for political violence as a

means to achieve their political ends. The other in the line were the Nikhil

Manipuri Mahasabha movement and Communist movement led by Hijam

Irabot followed by insurgency movement. The genealogy of insurgency evolves

to anti-India feeling. This generates its own cultural trajectory.

These movements are beyond the religious domain. The movement of

new religion or revivalism of pre-sanskritized religion was obsessively

concerned with the religious events of early 18th century. It did not address

what Anthony Wallace terms “individual stress” – the stress arising out of the

existing system at the individual level. The author attempts to explain in the

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theoretical framework of Anthony Wallace, but he does not explain the real

condition of individual stress in the colonial Manipur. The basic needs and

individual stresses under colonial rule are beyond the agony of “religious

identity” or anti-Bengali chauvinism. The historical analysis of the entire 20th

century demands examination of these needs and stresses. Religious events in

chronology is not an answer to the question of revitalizing the distorted culture

of the period. Historical treatment of colonial stress demands more in-depth

study of the entire society and the state system. The economic exploitation

and administrative imposition are more important. The individual stress,

consciousness of people’s political inability and their conscious movement to

free themselves from the colonial control are some of the key areas that need to

be examined. The contemporary stress-producing conditions are manifested

in terms of economic disruption, military defeat, natural disaster, or other

catastrophic events. This leads to the collapse of the “mazeway” previously

adhered to by individuals who recognize the dominant culture’s (here the

colonial culture, not pre-Pamheiba culture) inability to provide an alternative.

“Mazeway” is the mental image of society and its culture.

Naorem Jokumar’s eyes are filled up with the images of Naoria Phulo in

different capacity. To him, Naoria is a visionary and practical man who could

change the entire religious thinking of the Manipuris (sic.). No doubt, Naoria’s

movement is one of the unique movements in Manipuri history. But this

movement is not the solution, or part thereof, to the colonialism. Theirs was to

de-sanskritize the Manipuri religion (culture for that matter). In a situation

where Hinduism was synthesized with the age-old Meitei religious thought

and practices, the “nationalism” of the Manipuris (a polyglot, multi-ethnic,

multi-religious identity) goes beyond the religious boundaries. Manipuri

nationalism is not based on language, religion and race. Its base is common

historical experience. The metamorphosis of Naoria’s religious movement to

Manipuri insurgency cannot be, methodologically speaking, ascertained with

personal interviews with a couple of insurgent leaders. It needs a thorough

examination of two historical processes for a correlation in a colonial context.  

MC ARUNKUMAR

156

MRF ACTIVITIES

Manipur Research Forum organises seminars, conferences, lectures, workshops,

film screening, etc. at New Delhi, and sometimes in parts of Northeast India.

Monthly activities / Special events

March 2011 (Three-day colloquium)

Topic: “Militarism and Future of Democracy in Manipur”

Organizers: Manipur Research Forum, Imphal–Delhi; Department of

Philosophy, Manipur University; All Manipur Working

Journalists’ Union, Imphal; Human Rights Alert, Imphal; and

Indian Council of Social Science Research – NERC, Shillong

Venue: Senate Hall, Manipur University, Canchipur, Imphal

June 2011

Speaker: Naorem Jhullon, Senior Member, RUFOW

Topic: “Universal Worldview of RUFOW in the Time of Conflict”

July 2011

Film Screening: South of the Border

Director: Oliver Stone

Discussant: Mónica Amador Jimenez, CSSP, JNU

September 2011

Film Screening: Heart to Heart

Director: B. Sanzu

Producer: Dr. Radhesyam Oinam

September 2011

Book Release: Anthology of Poetry titled Tattooed with Taboos

Writers: Chaoba Phuritshabam, Shreema Ningombam and Soibam

Haripriya

Discussants: Anuradha Ghosh, Ashley Tellis and Bhagat Oinam

Those who are interested in presenting papers on various aspects of Northeast

India may write to <mrfd.quarterly@gmail.com>