Southeast European and Black Sea StudiesVol. 10, No. 4, December 2010, 385–409

ISSN 1468-3857 print/ISSN 1743-9639 online© 2010 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/14683857.2010.529991http://www.informaworld.com

Early preferences of national political parties in the EU for Turkey’s accession

Filippa Chatzistavrou*

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, GreeceTaylor and FrancisFBSS_A_529991.sgm (Received 19 October 2009; final version received 20 September 2010)10.1080/14683857.2010.529991Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies1468-3857 (print)/1743-9639 (online)Original Article2010Taylor & Francis1040000002010

This paper addresses the issue of early preferences of national political parties inthe EU regarding Turkey’s accession. Two main hypotheses are proposed. First,national moderate parties contribute mainly to the de facto transformation of theaccession in an ‘open’ process by developing volatile attitudes. Second, in the caseof moderate parties, volatile attitudes and concrete political discourses onTurkey’s accession are mainly determined by explanatory factors other thanideology (structural and strategic factors).

Keywords: Turkey; accession process; political parties; partisan preferences;European Union

Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) has gradually emerged as a highlycontroversial issue. The European Council’s decision of December 2004 to openaccession negotiations with Turkey sparked an elite-level partisan debate on theTurkish accession. From the very beginning of the negotiation process, this issueentered the national debate. National political parties in the EU expressed their pref-erences and adopted a clear or ambiguous stance.

This particular issue is intrinsically linked to the European enlargement policy andEU policy towards accession countries. Is the prospect of Turkish accession subsumedunder the traditional form of EU enlargement policy or does it initiate a new form ofenlargement and, in turn, reflects the difficulties facing national political parties topropose a coherent and positive conception of EU membership? In fact, national parti-san preferences constitute an essential component in order to understand if and inwhich way the nature of Turkish accession process has been transformed.

According to the traditional form of EU enlargement policy, accession process isconsidered as a linear process binding upon new members once initiated. In this case,the interested candidate state operates under the regime of ‘adjustment capacity’,which has as its main target the integration of a set of juridical, political, and regulat-ing rules. Imposing and/or tactfully assimilationist, the traditional accession mecha-nism organizes the relation between the EU and the candidate state on an unequalbasis setting as its cornerstone the accession itself. EU integration goals are going tobe accomplished, through the negotiations for the accession process and not so muchby the accession itself. The question arises whether there has been a substantial changein the nature of this linear process in the case of Turkey.

*Email: filippa@eliamep.gr

386 F. Chatzistavrou

While member states’ governments solemnly approved the opening of negotia-tions with Turkey, national political parties were highly divided in their preferences.The vote to open negotiations in the European Parliament (EP) was emblematic ofintra-party and inter-party strife, and foreshadowed the tensions that will emerge in thefuture (Soler i Lecha 2005).1 Undoubtedly, the distinctive feature of these negotiationsbetween the EU and Turkey is that following a proposal by German politicians,2 theprocess towards accession has become ‘open’, introducing the idea of multiple alter-natives to membership. Consequently, a large number of national parties have beeninclined to subvert the binding process by adopting vague positions towards Turkey’sEuropean prospects. However, such an open-ended process raised some political andlegal problems as the article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as amendedby the Lisbon Treaty, refers to the membership as the only outcome of negotiationsbetween the EU and candidate countries.

This paper addresses the issue of early preferences of national political partiesregarding Turkey’s accession, thus attempting to explain the de facto transformationof the accession process in an ‘open’ process. For that purpose, a map of the partisanpreferences’ at the early stage of the negotiation process is drawn to present inter-partisan and intra-partisan discrepancies and to identity the ‘heavy trends’.

The present paper proposes two main hypotheses. First, national moderate partiescontribute mainly to this de facto transformation of the accession process by develop-ing volatile attitudes, while extreme political parties adopt a clear attitude using stablepolitical discourses. The fluidity of moderate parties’ positions is measured by esti-mating the extent of intra-party dissent within them or identifying the discrepanciesbetween moderate parties with the same political affiliation.

Second, in the case of moderate parties, volatile attitudes and concrete politicaldiscourses on Turkey’s accession are mainly determined by explanatory factors otherthan ideology (structural and strategic factors). The national context is an equally impor-tant factor for revealing some EU countries as vectors of a more integrated approachto EU borders policy. Nevertheless, the ideological volatility of a large number ofmoderate parties in the other member states substantiates that major partisan structuresface difficulties to propose a coherent and positive conception of EU membership.

Mapping national parties’ early preferences in the EU on Turkey’s accession

Studies have already shown that European integration has had a significant impact onnational policy. Leonard Ray’s findings of an expert survey on party positions on theissue of European integration indicated that the parties become increasingly pro-Euro-pean over the period 1984–1996 and that intra-party divisions, although increasedduring this period, appear less prevalent than commonly believed (Ray 1999). Accord-ing to some studies, European integration has shaken the traditional cleavages andideological or political lines, leading ultimately to a restructuring of the nationalparties (Mény and Syrel 2002). Other studies explain that political parties acrossWestern Europe have been driven by similar historical forces to take position on Euro-pean integration (Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002). Recent studies have shown thatEuropean integration as a centrist project was supported by moderate parties anddisapproved by extreme parties (Marks et al. 2006).

A macro-analysis of partisan preferences of the EU Member States3 allows one thehand to measure the extent of partisan consensus or disagreement that emerged, andon the other hand, to evaluate the impact of the partisan balance of power on Turkey’s

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application. The research work focused on party preferences on comparing partieswithin EU member states and across countries for a limited number of time points(Castles and Mair 1984).

We privileged a spatial map as a visual representation4 (see Appendix 1, TableA1), by representing party preferences on Turkey’s accession as part of a map wheresome parts are closer to some others. The mapping of partisan structures allows us toclassify the different positions – positive, negative and divided or uncertain attitudes5

– and indicate cases of cleavage between political parties with similar politicalaffiliation or cases of intra-partisan schism.

From a methodological point of view, we took into account the parties with acertain political representation and/or parliamentary presence in the political land-scape of EU member states. The inventory of partisan preferences, relatively static bynature, is based on political discourse, as expressed in official statements, in partymanifestos or in the press at one relatively short period in time, i.e. during the firstyears after the opening of negotiations (time T1: 2005–2007). Due to the irregularityof the timing of election across EU countries, the party manifesto data that have infor-mation about EU enlargement and Turkey accession are used as party ideologymeasures thus summarizing party preferences (Laver and Garry 2000).

Undoubtedly, the political discourse is a difficult object to understand, not measur-able, irregular and non-objectivized (who speaks, in what context, what is the time-line). In this sense, the mapping of partisan preferences is not intended to inform onthe dynamics of positioning in order to identify eventual changes or to follow theevolution of the discourse between two periods of time. In other words, our aim is notto highlight the stability of partisan attitudes, but rather to outline the ‘heavy’ trendsin partisan preferences after the opening negotiations with Turkey. Furthermore,according to a probabilistic perspective, this approach is reasonable since it is likelythat ideology is relatively stable in the short run (Laver and Garry 2000).

In this context, we distinguish three ‘position tendencies’ (see Figures 1 and 2).The first tendency is related with the volatility of partisan preferences in mainstreamparties (conservative parties, Christian democratic parties, liberal parties and socialdemocratic parties). We observe a second tendency which manifests a transnationalquasi-consensus, quite expected, among extreme protest political parties (far right,extreme left and non-communist left). Finally, a third tendency is related with atranspartisan consensus within some EU member states.6Figure 1. Allocation of national parties’ preferences on a sample of 22 EU countries.Source: Author.Figure 2. Indicator of degree of accession by party family.Note: The above figure is constructed on the basis of information contained in Figure 1 and Table 1A according to the method of balances of opinions. The information contained in this figure can lead to a synthetic indicator of the degree of partisan accession by country or by party family. It ranges from +100 when the parties are unanimous in favour at −100 when the parties are unanimously against it. The value 0 corresponds to a balancedsituation between for and against. Each party is indexed according to its position: −1 for a refusal, 0 for a divided or uncertain positioning, 1 for a positive positioning. The average of these indexes multiplied by 100 provides the average indicator shown above. In the countries where several parties represent the same party family, their position is synthesized by averaging the index The weighted indicator assigned a variable weight to the variousnational parties, proportional to the size of the population of their country. For example, the positive attitude of the French, Spanish and Italian communist parties regarding Turkish accession takes over the Portuguese, Greek, Irish and Latvian refusal. The balance of opinion is calculated on the basis of the number of countries where a partisan position has been identified (for instance 13 for extreme right and 22 for conservatives). For more details,see Appendix 1, Tables A1 and A2.Source: Author.

The ideological volatility of preferences in moderate parties and the open-ended accession process

Partisan attitude towards European integration is a reliable indicator to differentiatebetween moderate parties and protest parties. Studies reveal acute polarizations (infavour or against) which are based on ideological dichotomies. The Europeanizationof right-wing extremism has taken place particularly in Austria, Belgium, France,Germany, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands (Gaxie and Hubé 2008).

According to the theory of social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), theideology of a party, once stabilized, is the main variable that determines the parti-san attitudes. Once this theory is mobilized, we observe that ideological representa-tions create clear polarization between the supporters and the opponents of Turkishaccession, that is negative or positive attitudes towards Turkish accession (declaredattitude). In fact, what has emerged is a struggle within the EU between advocates

388 F. Chatzistavrou

of a more inclusive organization, and a far more cautious position that arguedboldly against the case for Turkey’s entry in the EU. This polarization was estab-lished on different ideological representations and expressed in related politicaldiscourses.

In measuring party ideology we were obliged to choose an appropriate set of cate-gories that capture left–right dimension. We identified ideological categories compris-ing left and right ideology or demonstrating either pro-right or pro-left tendencies.Discourses on Turkish accession according to ideological categories comprising leftand right ideology are displayed in Table 1.

Partisan polarization as a source of explanation for mainstream party action meetsunstable ideological principles. In fact, intra-partisan polarization and inter-partisandivergences between affiliated parties reinforced volatility (see Appendix 1, TablesA1 and A2) and contributed to the gradual establishment of the ‘open’ character of theaccession process and, as a result, to the compression of the binding prospects on theone side and the failure of the conditionality principle, on the either side. Therefore, asort of negative conditionality was promoted. On the contrary, stable politicaldiscourses are being mainly used by extreme parties.

Without any doubt the political affiliation structures party positions at the first levelof reading, and, consequently, partisan positions are biased, in favour or against. Thecleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan remain important for party choice, and thesocio-historical tradition of each country will explain partisan preferences. Furthermore,recent studies proved that national electorates reinforced the complexity of politicalidentities because of the significant stabilization of the Western European electoratesduring the past century (Bartolini and Mair 1990). In this regard, the political affiliationinforms us especially on the stability and homogeneity of partisan preferences.

Regarding Turkey’s accession, the left–right cleavage provides a good referencepoint in the case of extreme protest parties. In fact, their attitudes are trench, quite

Figure 1. Allocation of national parties’ preferences on a sample of 22 EU countries.

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homogenous and in line with their broader perceptions towards European integration.In fact, paradoxically, the liberal internationalist argument claiming that the EUpossesses a dynamic absorbing ability or, at least, an ability of diverse or decentralizedforms of integration has led to the reinforcement of extreme positions with intenseethnocentric or Eurocentric characteristics.

The parties of the extreme right, extreme left and reformist left, although forcompletely different ideological motives, convey clear preferences on Turkey’s acces-sion through sovereignist or alter-Europeist discourses. For example, the positions ofcommunist parties are well settled, despite a bias ‘for or against’ in their midst. Thisphenomenon called ‘balanced transnational consensus’ can be explained primarily bythe ideological shift of some communist parties which recycle arguments ‘for’ offeredby other left or centre-left parties. Thus, the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), theFrench Communist Party (PCF) or the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR)clearly illustrates this phenomenon. They adopt a social libertarian position in favour

Figure 2. Indicator of degree of accession by party family.Note: The above figure is constructed on the basis of information contained in Figure 1 andTable A1 according to the method of balances of opinions. The information contained in thisfigure can lead to a synthetic indicator of the degree of partisan accession by country or by par-ty family. It ranges from +100 when the parties are unanimous in favour at −100 when the par-ties are unanimously against it. The value 0 corresponds to a balanced situation between forand against. Each party is indexed according to its position: −1 for a refusal, 0 for a divided oruncertain positioning, 1 for a positive positioning. The average of these indexes multiplied by100 provides the average indicator shown above. In the countries where several parties repre-sent the same party family, their position is synthesized by averaging the index. The weightedindicator assigned a variable weight to the various national parties, proportional to the size ofthe population of their country. For example, the positive attitude of the French, Spanish andItalian communist parties regarding Turkish accession takes over the Portuguese, Greek, Irishand Latvian refusal. The balance of opinion is calculated on the basis of the number of coun-tries where a partisan position has been identified (for instance 13 for extreme right and 22 forconservatives). For more details, see Appendix 1, Tables A1 and A2.

390 F. Chatzistavrou

of the accession of Turkey and stand apart from the traditional socio-economic protec-tionist perception of other Communist parties adopting an unfavourable position.

Specifically, the PCE, mentioned above, is the third largest political organizationin the country. Its position ‘for’ can be explained by the fact that it is member of thecoalition Izquierda Unida (IU; United Left) bringing together various left-winggroups.7 In France, the PCF and the LCR have a fairly moderate profile as they operateon a political space where the reformist left (Greens, the left wing of the SocialistParty) is not strongly present. Despite its neo-communist profile, the Czech Party of

Table 1. Political discourses and partisan preferences.

Ideological representations and partisan preferences Discourses on Turkey’s accession

Left Right

Type 1:National-Soverainisma (against)

Uncertain situation of human rights, historical revisionism, not effective secular state (polity discourse)

Type 2:Soverainism (national or European) (against)

National-based conception of the EU, historical, geographical and geopolitical conception, Christian and ethnic Eurocentrism (culturalist and civilisationist discourse)

Type 3:Political liberalism (in favour)

Democratization of Turkey, towards a Turkish rule of law, response to US domination (globalist discourse)

Type 4:Economic liberalism (in favour)

New market, concomitant economic growth, political stability and regional security demographic contribution, cultural diversity, improvement in transatlantic relations, positive side-effects on energy policy (neo-liberal and liberal internationalist discourse)

Type 5:Institutional protectionism (against)

Type 6:Institutional protectionism (against)

Development of a political Europe with strong institutions (‘European regime theory’), heavy financial transfers (structural funds), Turkish voting weight (institutionalist discourse)

Type 7:Socio-economic protectionism (against)

Destabilization of the labour market, open borders, immigration, rising crime (localist discourse)

Type 8:Socio-economic protectionism (against)

Neo-liberal project (cheap labour and low social protection) (economic anti-liberal discourse)

Type 9:Social libertarianism (in favour)

Proletarian solidarity, peoples’ rights in the EU, anti-racism, new anti-liberal project for the EU, the return of immigrants to their origin countries (socio-mondialist discourse)

aWhen soverainism gets closer to not assumed nationalism, it is against free trade and globalization andembraces an anti-globalist Left conception. However, Right soverainism is not opposed to liberalcapitalism.

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Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM)8 showed full support towards Turkey’s accession. Thegrowing gap between the important electoral power of this party and its weak politicalrole could explain its position.

The relevance of the ideological divide right/left for Turkish accession as a cata-lyst for the structuring of positions is relatively ineffective in moderate parties. Thequestion here is whether there is preference concordance between moderate partieswho are competing for very similar electorate. The preferences of national moderateparties in the EU on this issue present a quite complex reality that only marginallyintersects with parties’ political profile.

Concerning some moderate parties in the EU countries, mobilized representationsregarding Turkish accession blur the ideological divide and transcend the left–rightsplit. When partisan preferences are enough unstable or divided (disparity of percep-tions between fractions of the same party or inter-partisan divergences across partieswith similar political affiliation), ideology cannot sufficiently explain partisanpostures. This observation ties in with the idea that party preferences on Europeanintegration cannot be translated into stable partisan cleavages, which means that theymay change (Neumayer 2006).

Intra-partisan divisions or fractures are expressed either by the formation of internalcleavages (a wing or a fraction express its disagreement with the official line of theparty) or by the spreading of a vague position publicly (often leading party personalitieshold ambivalent discourses which cast doubt on their position). More the phenomenonof intra-partisan fracture is present, less the inter-partisan national debate seemsintense. There is thus a kind of trade-off. In this context, ideological polarizationsbetween moderate left-wing and right-wing parties declined seriously and strategicpostures are upgraded at the expense of stable positions (phenomenon of non-attitude;Converse 1964).

Moderate left- and right-wing parties build their preferences upon the samediscourses. Political parties of Western Europe are particularly emblematic of thisphenomenon. Here we can speak of a relative reduction of the gap (Schmidt 2006)between the European debate on Turkish membership and national politics. Of course,the relative diversification of positions within the same political families may berelated in part to variations in the political families’ ideological profiles across EUMember States. For example, conservative parties of northern Europe cultivate muchless the nationalist inclination than those of Southern Europe. Similarly, social demo-cratic parties in the South have a much more ‘smooth’ profile than those of northernEurope (Marks and Wilson 2000).

Without putting into question the translation of social cleavages into partydiscourses on Turkey accession, we could assume that social cleavages and ideologi-cal lines constitute a framework within which other explanatory factors come intoplay. Even if the question of Turkish accession can be primarily an issue of ideology,in the case of moderate parties other explanatory factors can be perceived as evenmore decisive in order to understand their preferences on Turkey’s accession, andthus, explain party ideological volatility.

Political platforms in Europe (EPP and PES)9 largely disguise several contradic-tions and ambivalences around which national political debates about Turkey canrevolve. This phenomenon crosses a couple of moderate parties. Indeed, dividing linesare perceptible within Conservative, Christian Democrat or social democrat circles.

In the case of social democratic parties, in the early launch of negotiations, theywere greeted with encouraging Turkey’s candidacy by adopting favourable postures.

392 F. Chatzistavrou

The official position of the Party of European Socialists (called currently ProgressiveAlliance of Socialists and Democrats) was mainly favourable. But once the EU hasentered the negotiation phase chapter by chapter, and according to the political situa-tion, sometimes fragile in some EU countries, this favourable position became muchmore fluctuating.

This observation counts for some influential moderate left-wing parties in WesternEurope, namely the French, German, Dutch and Danish social democratic parties.This ‘dominant minority’ adopted a more conditional posture, revealing ‘new’ cleav-ages that transgress the traditional pattern of polarized partisan politics.

Parties disposing of a uniform and ‘settled’ position (favourable or unfavour-able) use clear discourses, guided mainly by their political sensitivity (culturalist,protectionist or globalist discourse). Regarding non-trench party positions, affiliatedparties or party factions mobilize different discourses to support their position (seeAppendix 1, Table A3).

Christian Democrats, also some branches of social democratic parties, put forwardthe culturalist discourse. Social Democrats and conservatives promote a favourableposition based on the same discourse about liberal and pluralistic values of Europeancivilization (Spain and Italy). The Italian right does not consider that there is an incon-sistency between the European values and Turkey’s entry.

In the same way, fractions within some social democratic and conservative partiessupport a negative position which is based on the same institutionalist discourse(Germany and Hungary). Belgian Flemish Liberals and Flemish Socialists are inagreement for using the globalist and neo-liberal discourse. Within the Dutch LiberalParty (VVD), a fraction based its position on the liberal internationalist discourse,while the other one destabilized that position by putting forward the institutionalistdiscourse.

Within the moderate right-wing parties, a fraction can argue for the neo-liberaldiscourse, while the other one may use the sovereignist or culturalist discourse (DanishLiberals [Venstre], French Right, German Liberals [FDP]). In view of the liberaldiscourse of a faction of the French Right (UMP), which supported the accession, asM. Barnier, the other faction within the party and various centrists, heirs of ChristianDemocracy (New Centre and a fraction of Modem),10 positioned themselves unfavour-ably, by favouring an institutionalist and polity discourse. Their opposition to Turkey’sentry is fed by fear that the Union becomes a geopolitical space instead of movingtowards a political structure around the Franco-German axis (Lequesne 2006).

The institutionalist discourse expresses fear of further enlargement without thestrengthening of European institutions. This discourse on the perspective of ‘federal-ization’ is particularly symbolic after the inter-governmental turning of the EU sinceMaastricht. It was often used by Jean-Louis Bourlanges (New Centre), FrançoisBayrou (Modem) or Alain Lamassoure (UMP).11 In the contrary, the polity argumentputs in doubt Turkey’s ability to fully adopt the principles of the Western democraticmodel. J.-P. Raffarin (UMP and New Centre) used the culturalist discourse repeatedly.Otherwise, the culturalist argument is mentioned only tacitly, because it reflects thepositions of the national right and extreme right.

Explanatory factors affecting ideological volatility of moderate parties

Using a multi-factor analysis, we aim to explain non-trench partisan preferences andto detect different uses of discourses in order to clarify the political landscape. In order

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to understand partisan mobilization and investment practices, whenever ‘positiongaps’ are recorded, we are introducing additional parameters structuring party posi-tions and affecting ideological volatility. In this way, we are putting forward a multi-factor approach where partisan preferences on Turkish accession are analysed withregard to multiple factors such as strategic behaviour, the country’s partisan structureand the overall national context. These parameters overlap partially with explanatoryfactors already mobilized in studies on party positions (Marks, Wilson, and Ray2002), but focusing on our specific topic of study.

Partisan structure

The country’s partisan structure may explain positions that disrupt traditional parti-san configurations. The partisan structure refers to the size of a party and its way offunction, the more or less increased personalization of a party leader, the more or lessmulti-partisan character of a national party system and the culture of coalitiongovernment.

In fact, the most intense discussions on accession took place less between govern-ment parties and more within them. Disagreements among Belgian Christian Demo-crats have been observed. The Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V)12 have beenopposed to membership, while the Francophone Christian Democrats (CDH), morecentrist, remained uncertain refusing to speak out for or against. CD&V adopted thesame position as the Flemish nationalist (N-VA, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie). Bothparties, members of the coalition government followed the election of 2007, were infavour of a privileged partnership. CD&V put forward a culturalist discourse, butwithout using it as a prerequisite to support the exclusion of Turkey from the EU.

Belgian Liberals were also divided. The French and Flemish Liberals (VLD) werein favour of accession,13 while the Francophone liberal and Christian democratic partycalled Reformist Movement (MR; Member of the European Liberal Democrats,ELDR), despite the positive behaviour of some of its members,14 reflected a confusedposition and stressed on the importance of the Armenian issue.

Among the moderate left-wing parties in Poland, since 2006, the Democratic LeftAlliance (SLD)15 joined the big coalition of left between two parties, Labour Union(Unia Pracy (UP), succeeding Solidarno ), and the Social Democratic Party (Socjal-demokracja Polska (SDPL), founded in 2004 by dissidents of the SLD).16 SLDaffirmed a long-standing position clearly in favour of accession (liberal discourse).17

In this context, M. Belka’s support over Turkey, as long as he was Prime Minister,remained constant. In October 2005, after the formal opening of negotiations, A.Rotfeld, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time (SLD), in a statement highly pro-Turkish, criticized the EU for its ambiguous position on the matter. In July 2005, theVice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. Truszczy ski (SLD), has criticized the Austrianproposal for a privileged partnership (Bielecki 2005).

On the contrary, the two allies of the Coalition (UP and SDLP) moved towards amore reluctant position, considering nevertheless that any mention to Christian valuescould only have divisive effects within the context of Turkish accession. In terms ofPolish foreign policy, geopolitical reasons had led some of the moderate left partyelites to discuss this question by relating it to the accession of Ukraine. In fact, it hasbeen considered that the Turkish accession should be supported under the conditionthat it would constitute an accelerator for the accession of Ukraine.

sc

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394 F. Chatzistavrou

Strategic behaviour

The strategic behaviour of parties is determined in relation to partisan competition. Theinstrumentalization of an issue transforms positioning in a strategic tool of partisanrealignments between parties (Neumayer 2008). This trend of instrumentalization ofan issue by political parties is a ‘collateral’ effect of the Europeanization of partisancompetition at national level (Hix 1999). As European integration, Turkish accessionhas also become an important reference point in determining party positions in nationalarenas, thus structuring, more or less, the national game. The intra-party cleavages, thedivergence of positions between parties with similar ideological orientation or theconvergence of positions between parties with different political affiliation are oftenexplained by strategic reasons. Through the logic of strategic behaviour, we seek aboveall the interests that motivate positioning. Adopting a non-trench position, can be justone way to participate in the public debate by trying to pay the lower cost. The phenom-enon of partisan cosmopolitanism has also its importance. It concerns privileged rela-tions between certain political parties from different countries and may lead someparties to have fluctuating positions.

With the exception of Austria and the Netherlands, where coalition governmentshave been negotiating since 2004 due to internal divisions on this issue, the explana-tion of strategic behaviour is functional.

Once the Danish Liberal Party (Venstre) joined the government coalition betweenthe Danish Conservatives and the extreme right (Danish Popular Party), intra-partydivergences came out.18 Similarly, the Dutch Christian Democrats (Christian Demo-cratic Appeal, CDA), have participated in both government coalitions following theelections in 2003 and 200619 (the first coalition was a liberal alliance of centre-right,while the second one was closer to the centre and centre-left). Before the openingnegotiations with Turkey, this party had developed a position distinct from the postureof Christian Democrats in Germany and Austria, mainly based on liberal values. Butat that time of the first coalition government of 2003, the party has experienced inter-nal divisions due to reservations expressed by some of its members/ministers towardsthe prospect of opening negotiations. These reservations were based on the culturalistargument, but thanks to the intervention of influential persons in the party, its officialposition remained closed to the liberal line (human rights in Turkey, democratizationand economic reforms).20

Although for other reasons, reservations were expressed by the other member ofthe coalition, the liberal conservative party called People’s Party for Freedom andDemocracy (VVD, a party with a neo-liberal and liberal internationalist orientation,and with key subject the management of migration). In 2002, VVD had voted againstthe setting of a date for the opening of negotiations by putting forward the issue ofhuman rights in Turkey. In fact, behind this explanation was hiding the argument ofinstitutional protectionism of the EU. Since 2004, the party, as a member of thegovernment coalition, has adopted a strategic approach ‘strict but fair’ in order to bein line with government’s position.21

The Dutch Labor Party (PvdA) considered that before any enlargement adequateinstitutional reforms should be undertaken. His positioning was directly inspired by itsdelicate relationship with the other members of the government coalition followingthe elections in 2006. While the party of Christian Democrats (CDA), as we havealready seen, adopted a cleavage positioning, the other member of the coalition calledChristian Party (CU) expressed an unfavourable position.

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Another illustrative example is the case of the Portuguese Social Democratic Party(PSD), which has moved from the centre-left towards the centre-right. Being amember of the government coalition with the CDS/PP in 2002, PSD has alsoexpressed doubts. Before being appointed to the European Commission in 2004, M.Barroso (PSD) was the Prime Minister of this elected government in 2002 and hadposted a prudent behaviour on this issue. But, once he has been appointed to theEuropean Commission, he aligned his position.22

The Portuguese Green Party (Os Verdes) adopted the same negative position as thePortuguese Communist Party, his main ally in the elections of 2005. The strategic alli-ance between the two parties since 1987 (Unitarian Democratic Coalition [CDU])23

could explain Greens’ positioning. As far as concerns German Greens, they were infavour of opening negotiations with Turkey, but the close relationship of the partywith the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) had repercussions on the evolu-tion of their position.

In Eastern and Central Europe, the volatility has also been observed and has beenillustrated mainly through confused and unstable positions. Here the space of centre-right and right-wing politics is often shared by a higher number of moderate partiesthan in Western Europe. The left-wing parties are less present than in Western Europe,which could explain why the extreme right parties of Central and Eastern Europe havethe tendency to adopt ‘softer’ positions once they are involved in a coalition govern-ment. The fact that these parties can more readily participate in coalition governmentsis also connected to the specificity of the partisan structure of these countries.

In Latvia, while the centre-right party called New Era adopted a position againstaccession,24 the conservative People’s Party, as a member of the governing coalitionof centre-right in 2006,25 declared its favourable position. The Prime Minister A.Kalvitis (People’s Party) called for an acceptable compromise between all MemberStates in order to ensure the negotiation process, especially in relation to the imple-mentation of the Ankara Protocol and to the Cyprus issue.

In Hungary,26 the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ, a conservative nationalparty of the centre-right) kept a vague position on this issue. Party members made refer-ence to a ‘special relationship’ without explicating the idea of belonging to Europe. Infact, they were in similar position with the German Christian Democrats. During the2006 elections, the Alliance of Young Democrats, in order not to compromise itsgovernment’s role, was keeping all options open aiming at adopting the position mostpopular in the electorate, or at least avoiding any conflict with the public opinion.

Uncertain and ambivalent positions conveyed also by the two main parties inSlovakia. The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party (SDKU) andthe Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), although very enthusiastic about the pros-pect of enlargement to the Western Balkan countries (e.g. Croatia) or potentially toUkraine, had much more fluctuated positions on Turkey: some were more favourable,others showed some restraint.27 The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) certifiedin his pre-election manifesto during the 2006 elections that ‘… the KDH supports EUenlargement to countries that share common European values … the KDH will supportthe enlargement to the Balkans, but it will not approve the expansion beyond theborders of Europe …’ (Bilcik and Vilagi 2007). According to this party, a partnershipbetween the EU and Turkey would be the most appropriate solution.

The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, with a social-liberal orientation) followedthe European agenda in the matter. As a member of the government coalition – a coali-tion of 2002 and 2006, composed of MSZP and the Alliance of Free Democrats

396 F. Chatzistavrou

(SzDSz, with a liberal orientation) – conveyed a vague position regarding Turkishaccession. In fact, until October 2004, there was no official position of the Hungariangovernment. Only after the Commission has recommended the opening of negotia-tions, the government has followed the line of Brussels.28 Reservations concerning thisattitude were expressed by some parliamentarians.29 This led the party not to speakclearly on this issue in order to avoid intra-party division. This positioning hides thereal priority for the majority of Hungarian partisan elites. This is the European perspec-tive of Croatia.30 During discussions for the opening of negotiations in 2005, theHungarian Foreign Minister, F. Somogyi (MSZP), had even made a proposal to precedefor symbolic reasons the opening of negotiations with Croatia by one with Turkey.

In this landscape, exception makes the Polish support of centre-right and right-wing parties on Turkey’s accession. It is a strategic element of Poland’s foreignpolicy, irrespective of changes in the political arena. During the elections of 2007, theChristian Democratic and liberal conservative party Civic Platform (PO) had joinedthe People’s Party (PSL), a Christian democratic and agrarian party. Following therequest from President Lech Kaczynski, they form a coalition government withDonald Tusk (PO) as a Prime Minister. It was a pro-European coalition that pledgedits full support on Turkish membership. The Democratic Party (PD), founded as asocial-liberal party by Marek Belga in 2005, followed the same line. This strategicbehaviour of Polish centre and right-wing parties draws attention to the important roleof Turkey in ensuring European security and Poland’s energy safety.31

The position of Poland’s controversial Law and Justice Party (PiS), a nationalconservative and populist party, is an illustrative example. Law and Justice Party hasofficially opposed Turkey’s accession. After the national elections of 2005,32 Law andJustice Party was the dominant party of the right-wing coalition government. Duringits mandate, the Polish party adopted a ‘softer’ position for strategic reasons byrespecting the political line of its predecessors, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).33

Once again, it is about positioning, which, for electoral reasons, is seeking todisqualify the opponent to the government. Often, strategic positioning for politicalparties is a way to expand their influence in the national political scene or to repositionthemselves in the competition in order to get a better distribution of resources, buildalliances or ameliorate networking between parties. Extreme parties may as well followthe same tactic in order to enter the domestic political scene. For instance, althoughthe German left Party Die Linke offered conditional support to Turkey, this partycreated political dissonance through its leader Oskar Lafontaine who has repeatedlyexpressed its rejection. This uncertain partisan position may be explained by the gradualhardening of attitudes among Germany’s political parties towards Turkey’s accession.In European countries where immigration from Turkey is high (Germany and the Neth-erlands), citizens as well as parties may be considered hostile to the Turkish accession.In other terms, a high level of concentration of Turkish migrants is likely to contributeto overall negative feelings about this candidacy (McLaren 2007; Vreese, Boom-gaarden, and Semetko 2008), and exert considerable influence on the domestic partypositions concerning this specific issue. Moreover, as a result of the country’s partisanstructure, the party Die Linke occupied a large part of the political space at the extremeleft, which allows it to diversify its discourse according to strategic imperatives.

The strategic dimension of party positions is essentially related with inter-partisangames. In Germany, low public support for Turkey’s accession has obviously animpact on party positioning. In general, the strategic dimension of party positions isrelatively little echoed in public opinion developments in the other member states. The

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 397

degree of public support on Turkey’s accession, without being disconnected, consti-tute only a second-order explanatory factor in explaining the differences in positioningof national parties between EU countries (Kentmen 2008) (see Figure 3).Figure 3. Correlation between party positions and public opinions.Sources: Eurobarometer survey 2005 – public opinions on Turkey’s accession and author’s data on party positions.

National context

For some countries, Turkish membership is a national issue beyond ideological orstrategic considerations. The assessment of Turkey’s efforts towards meeting theaccession criteria varies depending of the importance of the issue in the nationaldebate. Thus, according to the national context, the question of Turkish accession maybe peripheral or central in the national debate. Some countries are more motivated bythe weight of their bilateral relations with Turkey, while others perceive the geopolit-ical importance of Turkish accession to the EU. Bilateral relations with Turkey can berather intense for variables reasons (geostrategic interests, economic motives, histori-cal ties, sociographic evolution, etc.). In fact, some countries incorporate Turkey’saccession into state policy (geostrategic interest for Greece and Spain, economic inter-est for Italy and Spain, liberal political vision based on the doctrine ‘the EU as a globalactor’ for the Nordic countries).

Figure 3. Correlation between party positions and public opinions.Sources: Eurobarometer survey 2005 – public opinions on Turkey’s accession and author’sdata on party positions.

398 F. Chatzistavrou

Actually, this question is assessed differently depending on the seniority ofmember states in the EU. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the leftistparties adopt a less critical position towards European integration than their partnersin Western Europe (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). This trend also affects their posi-tion with respect to the Turkish accession. Therefore, it is unavoidably linked to thedynamics of EU enlargement policy. Recent member states (Sweden, Finland, Estoniaand Slovenia) have a less strong sense of belonging to Europe than member states inWestern Europe. From their perspective, enlargement prospects provide an opportu-nity for strengthening the EU role at the regional ant international level. On thecontrary, transpartisan consensus on Turkish accession within senior member states(Italy, Greece and Spain) is mainly based on specific policy considerations regardingbilateral relations between each of them and Turkey.

In the countries where elites achieved favourable consensus on the issue, ideolog-ical homogeneity constitutes the principal characteristic of partisan preferences.Britain, Sweden, Slovenia and Spain reached broad transpartisan consensus whicharoused for quite different reasons for each country. This applies also for Italy,Greece, Estonia and Finland with small but not significant deviations (see Figure 4).Figure 4. Party accession degree by country.Note: See methodology box in Figure 3; This figure presents observed data (Appendix 1, Table A1) and descriptive statistics (Appendix 1, Table A2) by country. The position of extreme parties is weighted by half compared to more moderate parties, whose position is less ‘automatic’.Source: author Party positions in these countries, almost institutionalized, may be relatively littledisturbed by negative attitudes, mostly circumstantial, of extreme political parties.Among all these countries, some of them dispose of a party system structured in sucha way that marginalizes extreme protest parties on both sides of the political spectrum(Great Britain and Slovenia). In other countries, the party system did not crystallizethe conflict over the Turkish question (Sweden, Spain and Italy).

Figure 4. Party accession degree by country.Note: See methodology box in Figure 3. This figure presents observed data (Appendix 1,Table A1) and descriptive statistics (Appendix 1, Table A2) by country. The position of ex-treme parties is weighted by half compared to more moderate parties, whose position is less‘automatic’.

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 399

Paradoxically, by promoting Turkish membership as a state policy (transpartisanconsensus at national level), border countries to the north, south and east of the EU(Britain, Italy, Spain, Estonia, Finland, etc.) contribute to Europeanizing the debateand to bring forward a new geostrategic polarization ‘borders or inside countries’.

Beyond national interest issues and the importance of bilateral relations with Turkeyfor these countries, this transpartisan consensus on Turkish membership probablyconveys a common conception of ‘porous’ borders of the EU (Zielonka 2006). Thesecountries, vectors of an integrated approach to EU borders policy (Bechev and Nikolai-dis 2007), refocus attention on the European dimension of the issue. On the contrary,the ideological volatility of a large number of moderate parties of inside countries (andnot border countries) reveals one of the main threats the EU is facing: the looseningof the European identity and therefore, difficulties in defining EU membership.

In conclusion, the different forms of mobilization of discourses show that a signif-icant number of national moderate parties in the EU faced difficulties to propose acoherent and positive conception of EU membership. In fact, no discourse embracesas a whole the geographic, historical and societal complexity of Euro-Turkish rela-tions. Only to truly pose the problem of the political orientation of the integrationprocess could neutralize the effect of the partisan ‘break up’, but also the contradic-tions in national strategies towards EU enlargement policy on Turkey. The constella-tion of micro-partisan positions reduces the ideological polarization ‘for or againstaccession’ and weakens the original dilemma between the essentialist and constructiv-ist representation of Europe.

This partial ‘de-ideologization’ of the issue also affects the political design of EUenlargement policy in general. Non-trench positions of moderate parties disguise thefact that some political forces put in doubt Turkey’s capacity to be sufficiently trans-formed at the time of accession (Nugent 2005). They also testify the disconnection ofthe question of enlargement from the question of belonging to the EU. That is whyparties with non-trench positions use mainly the evolutive criterion of technical legit-imacy (Copenhagen criteria) to position themselves towards Turkey’s inclusion to theEU. Such stance aroused the interest among Turkish elites (mainly military elites) thatrepeatedly stated that the Copenhagen criteria should be implemented taking intoconsideration the interests and realities of the country (Bilgin 2005).

The viability and robustness of any candidate country from institutional conditionof ‘eligibility’ has been converted into an informal goal of the integration process withthe risk that such proceedings are pending until to fulfil the goal. This perhaps mayexplain why Turkey’s membership inclusiveness ensures now much less strongly thanbefore that the integration is given, thus reversing the conditionality principle by posi-tive to negative. In this sense, thanks to non-trench party positions any behaviourchanges can be rationalized with a lower cost, thus transforming the accession processin an ‘open-ended’ process.

Conclusion

In this paper, we argue that national moderate parties contribute mainly to the trans-formation of the accession process into an ‘open-ended’ process by developing volatileattitudes. We tried to ‘map’ EU national parties’ positions or their fractions’ preferencestowards Turkish accession by specifying party discourses, identifying ideological vola-tility of national parties and mobilizing different explanatory factors that underpin them.Beyond the ‘hostile’ or ‘favourable’ position of political parties, the challenge was to

400 F. Chatzistavrou

understand what types of arguments relate positions. Partisan polarization may becomea source of explanation of party preferences when it responds to stable ideological prin-ciples. The political orientation remains the dominant explanatory factor of the homo-geneity of protest parties’ positions of the EU. In other terms, the political affiliationinform us less on the party positioning and much more on the homogeneity or not ofit. In this context, the main question is whether there is a concordance between partypositions with the same political affiliation at the transnational level.

Regarding protest parties, the positions appear to be clearer: consistent positionswith transnational consensus ‘against’ between extreme right-wing parties, and homo-geneous positions, but less consensual, with a clear dominant transnational consensus‘for’ between extreme left-wing parties. This is not the case for moderate parties. Themoderate left and right parties became largely places of dissent, thus leading ondivided or uncertain positions. The moderate right-wing parties are more emblematicof this phenomenon.

The disparity in perceptions and/or the instability of attitudes to the issue betweenfractions of the same party or parties with similar political affiliation led us to examinethe different uses of discourses. The moderate left and right parties use similardiscourses. We observe therefore that the same discourses are used by political partiesof different orientation and different discourses are used by different fractions of thesame party or by parties with similar political affiliation.

Furthermore, we proposed that moderate party positioning should be understoodprimarily on the basis of three explanatory parameters (structural, strategic andnational), rather than on purely ideological terms. Intra-party divisions are morepresent in political parties of the old Europe. Inter-party differences between partieswith similar political affiliation are rarely located at the moderate left of the politicalspectrum. They are especially observed between right-wing conservatives in the coun-tries of the Central and Eastern Europe.

Finally, we argued that the phenomenon of ideological volatility of a large numberof national moderate parties regarding Turkish accession reveals the difficulties facingparties’ elite in addressing the question of EU membership. Probably, the emergenceof divided or unstable positions favours the nationalization of the issue and reinforcesthe strategic behaviour of parties (electoral gains in partisan competition, politicalgains in the short-term, systemic legitimacy towards the risk of marginalization, maxi-mize their visibility in public space or a strategy of rapprochement with other parties).In this perspective, an increased conflictualization of party relations within the moder-ate parties at the national level should not be excluded. Any prospect of further ‘Euro-peanization’ of the issue of Turkish accession would be weakened, thus quasi-institutionalizing the open character of the process.

Notes1. Unlike his fellow Social Democrats, the President of the EP, Spanish socialist Josep

Borrell, was hardly enthusiastic about Turkey’s accession. He called for a vote just beforethe European Council’s decision of December 2004, even if it was only advisory. InDecember 2004, in the EP voting session for the opening of negotiations, members of thecentre-right European People’s Party joined the extreme right; other members of the EPPclaimed their negative vote openly.

2. Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) and Egon Bahr, adviser to the former Chancellor Willy Brandt,had proposed that the accession negotiations of Turkey are ‘more open’.

3. Our taxonomy does not include Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus and the two countries recentlyjoined the EU, Bulgaria and Romania.

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 401

4. We privileged the spatial model of voting of Antony Downs theory (Downs 1957). A partypreference on the specific issue is represented as a point in the space.

5. The term of ‘divided or uncertain attitude’ was chosen in order to emphasize the non-trench position and avoid terms variably graduated as ‘turcosceptic’. This term containsthe same semantic difficulties as the term ‘Eurosceptic’. This second term cannot beaccommodated on a single political axis opposing Eurosceptic attitude to Eurotrustful atti-tude. The different types of attitude towards the EU are much more complex (Gaxie andHubé 2008, 17).

In cases of uncertain attitude, we include all confused, ambivalent or vague discoursesthat can sometimes express mixed views and therefore views not exclusively critical asscepticism suggests.

6. We call transnational consensus the consensus among parties of the same or similar polit-ical affiliation; we call transpartisan consensus the consensus at the national level amongparties of different political affiliation.

7. This left-wing coalition Izquierda Unidaa, organized in 1986 during the mobilizations inSpain against NATO, brings together leftists, ecologists, socialists of the left wing,Republicans. It was always dominated by the PCE.

8. CPBM is the only communist party in Central Europe to share many common features withthe former Czechoslovak Communist Party. In fact, the first one has also managed to keepthe control over the Czech part of the militant base of the latter one. CPBM is consideredto adopt a very ‘conservative’ and orthodox ideological position.

9. The EPP is a motley assembly of conservative, liberal, Christian democratic, centrist andsocial liberal (centre-right) parties. The moderate left (PES) is composed of moderatesocialists, social democrats and social liberals of the center-left.

10. UMP brings together different sensibilities of the right, namely conservative-Gaullists,liberals but also some centrists. The Union for French Democracy (UDF) has been partiallyabsorbed by the Modem, a new party formed by F. Bayrou in 2007. The members of theUDF who opposed the resolution, created the New Centre.

11. At the opening of negotiations, differences within the UMP erupted publicly. On the onehand, the former President of the Republic, Jacques Chirac, supported the launch of theaccession process, and on the other hand, the party leader at that time, Nicolas Sarkozy,positioned against. Jean-Pierre Raffarin joined too. The promotion of a ‘privileged partner-ship’ was the argument put forward by Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, Jacques Barrot, theCzech MEP Jozef Zieleniec (Civic Democratic Party [ODS]) and the German head of theEPP, Hans-Gert Pöttering (CDU). These controversies had induced President Chirac toadopt by Congress on 28 February 2005 the revision of the Constitution of the FifthRepublic. Any new accession to the EU decided after the 1 July 2004 (that is to say, afterBulgaria, Romania and Croatia), will be ratified through a referendum.

12. For example, Yves Leterme (CD&V) many times expressed his reticence about Turkey,considering, nevertheless, that negotiations should continue.

13. Guy Verhofstadt and Karel De Gucht (VLD) supported Turkey’s accession.14. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Belgium, Didier Reynders (Reform-

ist Movement) had assured Turkey of Belgian support, saying that ‘Belgium supported theopening of accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union’, press releaseof 10 August 2004, Turkish Anadolu Agency.

15. This post-communist and social democratic oriented party, received liberal influences,after Marek Belka (former member of the SLD), Prime Minister from May 2004 until theelections of 2005, and close to President Aleksander Kwasniewski, has left it in order toform the Democratic Party (demokraci.pl).

16. This centre-left coalition called Left and Democrats (Lewica i Demokraci, LiD) – wherethe Democratic Party (demokraci.pl) also participated – was established in 2006 at theinitiative of former President Aleksander Kwa niewski, succeeded later by LechKaczy ski.

It was opposed to the conservative coalition government, to power since 2005, led bythe populist Law and Justice (PiS) Kaczy ski brothers, and the conservative liberal partyCivic Platform (PO).

At European level, these social democratic parties are members of the Party ofEuropean Socialists, except the Democratic Party – democraci.pl who is a member of theAlliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).

sn

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402 F. Chatzistavrou

Since the early elections of 2007, this Left and Democrats coalition, in opposition, wasfacing a new coalition government, composed of the Polish People’s Party (PSL) and theCivic Platform (PO).

17. ‘If the Union wants to be treated seriously, it has to tell Turkey whether its participation inEuropean integration is possible or not. We treat Turkey seriously and have our answer tothe question. In our opinion Turkish membership in 10, 15 or 20 years will hasten furthermodernization of this country. It will be a good example for the whole Islamic world. Thatis the same logic which was adopted by the Allied Forces in the case of Germany or Japanafter World War II. Well, it worked then, so it will also work this time in Turkey’ (Rzecz-pospolita 2005).

18. Before Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Venstre) became Prime Minister, he was positionedagainst the accession of Turkey. But since he attained the highest office (November 2001–April 2009), he promoted the accession perspective as ‘the only way to keep Turkey asmuch as possible aligned with Europe’ (Statement by Prime Minister A.F. Rasmussenfollowing the meeting with Prime Minister J.-C. Junker, on December 2004 in Luxem-bourg). The Minister of Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller (Venstre) reiterated that theDanish Government has no intention of changing its policy of support for Turkey. Despitehis statements, the Minister of social affairs, Karen Jespersen, has often expressed herdissatisfaction at the prospect of Turkish accession and she called for a referendum todecide the issue. Other members stressed the importance of compliance requirements.

19. The first coalition brought together the Christian Democrats (CDA), the People’s Party forFreedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Social Liberal Democrats’ 66 (D66). In thesecond coalition, the cabinet Balkenende IV has been composed of the Christian Demo-crats (CDA), the Social Democrats (the Labor Party, PvdA) and the Christian-Social Party(Christian party, ChristenUnie). The Christian party is as small conservative party on ethi-cal issues and with a centre-left orientation on economic and social issues, and it is opposedto Turkish membership.

20. In October 2004, following the European Commission report on Turkey, the CDA partyheld an internal debate on the question where the arguments have met. The Ex-President ofthe party Marnix van Rij emphasized the populist risk that the party incurred.

21. In September 2004, Jozias van Aartsen, the leader of the party at that time, reiterated theparty line. They considered that there was no obstacle to membership, but they insistedupon the respect of a set of strict conditions. Despite opinion polls that recorded oppositionto the membership by more than two-thirds of sympathizers of the VVD, the party votedfor the opening of negotiations.

22. Through the publication of a report, the Commission expressed its favourable intention forthe opening of negotiations in 2005 (Commission Report COM(2004)656 final –SEC(2004) 1201). M. Barroso made a declaration to clarify that ‘if Turkey meets the crite-ria, I think we should not close the door to that nation. Turkey must respect the values ofthe EU which are not religious’ (Statement by President Barroso following the publicationof the report in October 2004).

23. In Portugal, CDU members had advocated for European Constitution’s referendum,whereas opposing positions on Turkey’s accession should have the opportunity to comeforward. In this regard, the anti-capitalist and libertarian party of Left Bloc (BE) had notexpressed itself at the time.

24. At that time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Artis Pabriks (People’s Party) has explicitlyargued that Turkey’s accession in the EU was in the interest of the country. ‘… We haveto have close relations with Turkey … we do not, the EU’s international role will decrease,there will be less security around EU’s borders which will result in a negative influence forrelations with countries like Ukraine and Moldova. Turkey will be like a litmus test for EUpolicy in these countries …’ A foreign policy according to common sense and constitution,Interview with Artis Pabriks, Public policy portal Politika.lv, July 19, 2005.

25. This heterogeneous coalition was composed of the People’s Party, the Union of Greens andFarmers (ZZS), an agrarian centrist and green coalition, the far-right party of the country,called Fatherland and Freedom, and the Christian populist and traditionalist party calledFirst Latvian Party.

26. The medieval occupation of Hungary by the Ottomans and the issue of Armenian genocideare matters that may affect partisan attitudes but also societal perceptions in this country.The integration of Croatia, the religious issue and the bilateral tourism between these two

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 403

countries and possibly the integration of Ukraine – where a Hungarian minority lives – areof far greater importance.

27. The former Slovak Prime Minister Mikulá Dzurinda (SDKU) had emphasized the securityaspect of the decision: ‘… Europe will be more secure if countries of the former Yugosla-via, the Western Balkans, Turkey could be integrated into the EU.’ The former ForeignMinister Eduard Kukan (SDKU) had highlighted the political dimension of the EU deci-sion on Turkey ‘… we are warned that sending a negative signal regarding the disagree-ment on the issue of Turkey’s future membership would be a bad decision …’ (Statementson the margins of the Brussels European Council of 16 and 17 December 2004).

28. According to the Report on the 4 states of Central Europe, Agnes Batory, in May 2005,during the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister in Hungary, despite the general rhetoric ofgovernment support on Turkey, the relations between the two countries registered a rela-tively low intensity.

See Nepszabadsag 3 October 2005, analysis of the policy debate on the Europeanperspective of Turkey and Ukraine in the Report on the 4 states of Central Europe, AgnesBatory, Center for Policy Studies, Central European University, 1, 2005.

29. According to a report by experts in Atlanta: ‘The ruling Hungarian Socialist Party will notsupport Turkey’s EU membership, until it guarantees rights for national minorities livinginside Turkey which the EU legally demands’, Atlanta single dating expert report, 2007.

30. Austria had also refused to approve the opening of negotiations with Turkey, if the sameprocess were not also simultaneously opened with Croatia.

31. This trend is reinforced by the fact that there is no Turkish minority in Poland (nationalcontext parameter).

32. This coalition was composed of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), the left-populist calledSamoobrona and the national Catholic party called League of Polish Families (LPR). InJuly 2007, League and Self-Defence (Liga i Samoobrona, LiS) was born from the mergerof the two parties in the ruling coalition, the League of Polish Families and Samoobrona.

33. During the discussions of the first chapter of the accession process (June 2006), AnnaFotyga, Foreign Affairs Minister (PiS) declared that she was against the introduction of theprecondition called ‘absorption capacity of the EU’ not only for Ukraine but also forTurkey. During a visit to Ankara on July 2006, Marek Jurek (PiS deputy at the LowerChamber of the Polish Parliament) had reiterated support for Turkey’s EU bid.

Notes on contributorFilippa Chatzistavrou is a lawyer and has a PhD in political science (University of Paris I –Sorbonne). Currently, she is ELIAMEP research fellow and web editor, as well as researchassociate at the Centre for European Political Sociology GSPE-CNRS (University of Stras-bourg – Sciences Po). She is a visiting lecturer at the University of Athens (Department ofInternational and European Studies).

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erat

e w

ing

Cen

tre

win

gS

ocia

l dem

ocra

tic

or s

ocia

list

win

gG

reen

sN

on-c

omm

unis

t le

ft w

ing

Com

mun

ist

win

g

Pol

and

��

��

�

Slo

vaki

a��

�

susp

ende

d fr

om

mem

bers

hip

in

the

PE

S, 2

006

�

MS

’s p

osit

ion

Favo

urab

le: �

Unf

avou

rabl

e: �

Frac

ture

int

ra-p

arti

san:

C

onfu

sed/

Am

biva

lent

:

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 407

Tabl

e A

2.D

escr

iptiv

e st

atis

tics

.

Pop. thousands

Extreme right

Conservatives

Liberals

Centrists

Social Democrats

Greens

Reformist left

Communists

Aus

tria

8282

−1−1

ndnd

00

ndnd

Fra

nce

63,1

95−1

0

nd−0

.50

1nd

1G

erm

any

82,3

76nd

−10

nd0

00

ndIt

aly

58,9

41−1

11

11

11

1S

pain

44,1

16nd

1nd

nd1

nd1

1P

ortu

gal

10,5

84nd

0nd

nd1

−11

−1G

reec

e11

,148

−11

ndnd

1nd

1−1

Den

mar

k54

37−1

10

nd0

11

ndF

inla

nd52

66−1

11

11

11

ndS

wed

en90

81nd

11

nd1

11

ndT

he N

ethe

rlan

ds16

,346

−1−0

.50.

5−1

01

1nd

Irel

and

4262

nd1

0nd

11

0−1

Bel

gium

10,5

48−1

−10.

50

10

ndnd

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

60,6

23nd

11

nd1

ndnd

ndE

ston

ia13

441

11

11

−1nd

ndL

ithu

ania

3394

−10

00

0nd

ndnd

Lat

via

2288

−10

1nd

11

nd−1

Slo

veni

a20

07nd

11

11

ndnd

ndH

unga

ry10

,071

nd−0

.51

nd0

ndnd

ndC

zech

Rep

ubli

c10

,269

nd

0.5

ndnd

01

nd1

Pol

and

38,1

41−0

.51

11

0nd

ndnd

Slo

vaki

a53

91−1

0nd

nd1

ndnd

−1

408 F. Chatzistavrou

Tabl

e A

2.(C

onti

nued

).

Pop. thousands

Extreme right

Conservatives

Liberals

Centrists

Social Democrats

Greens

Reformist left

Communists

Unw

eigh

ted

bala

nce

[1]

% o

f un

favo

urab

le88

.5%

18.2

%0.

0%16

.7%

0.0%

14.3

%0.

0%55

.6%

[2]

% o

f fa

vour

able

7.7%

52.3

%66

.7%

55.6

%59

.1%

64.3

%80

.0%

44.4

%B

alan

ce o

f op

inio

ns [

2] −

[1]

−80.

8%34

.1%

66.7

%38

.9%

59.1

%50

.0%

80.0

%−1

1.1%

Wei

ghte

d by

cou

ntry

pop

ulat

ion

size

(co

lum

n 1)

[1]

% o

f un

favo

urab

le91

.1%

24.7

%0.

0%24

.1%

0.0%

4.1%

0.0%

16.0

%[2

] %

of

favo

urab

le0.

6%53

.0%

64.9

%53

.1%

48.7

%60

.7%

65.0

%84

.0%

Bal

ance

of

opin

ions

[2]

− [

1]−9

0.5%

28.3

%64

.9%

29.0

%48

.7%

56.6

%65

.0%

68.0

%

Not

e: T

able

A2

is d

eriv

ed f

rom

Tab

le A

1A

dum

my

vari

able

(al

so k

now

n as

ind

icat

or v

aria

ble

or j

ust

dum

my)

is

one

that

tak

es t

he v

alue

s 0

or 1

to

indi

cate

the

abs

ence

or

pres

ence

of

som

e ca

tego

rica

l ef

fect

tha

tm

ay b

e ex

pect

ed t

o sh

ift

the

outc

ome.

Dum

my

= 1

whe

n th

e pa

rty

is f

avou

rabl

eD

umm

y =

−1

whe

n th

e pa

rty

is u

nfav

oura

ble

Dum

my

= 0

whe

n th

e pa

rty

is a

mbi

vale

nt.

Whe

n th

ere

are

two

part

ies,

we

take

the

ave

rage

of

the

two

part

isan

opi

nion

s: f

or i

nsta

nce

0.5

mea

ns t

hat

a pa

rty

is f

avou

rabl

e w

hile

the

oth

er i

s am

biva

lent

.

Form

ulas

:U

nwei

ghte

d:[1

] %

of

unfa

vour

able

= Σ

neg

ativ

e du

mm

ies/

num

ber

of a

nsw

ers

[2]

% o

f fa

vour

able

= Σ

pos

itiv

e du

mm

ies/

num

ber

of a

nsw

ers

Bal

ance

% =

[2]

− [

1].

Wei

ghte

d:W

i is

the

popu

lati

on o

f th

e co

untr

y i.

For

each

par

ty w

e ha

ve :

[1]

% o

f un

favo

urab

le =

neg

ativ

e du

mm

y of

cou

ntry

[2]

% o

f fa

vour

able

=

posi

tive

dum

my

of c

ount

ry

Bal

ance

% =

[2]

− [

1].

∑ == ii

122

iW

Wi

ii

i×

∑ ==/

122

∑ == ii

122

iW

Wi

ii

i×

∑ ==/

122

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 409

Tabl

e A

3.Pa

rty

fam

ilie

s an

d us

e of

pol

itic

al d

isco

urse

s.

Pol

itic

al w

ings

in

nati

onal

lev

el

Typ

es o

f ar

gum

ents

use

dE

xtre

me

righ

t w

ing

Lib

eral

ri

ght

win

gC

onse

rvat

ive

and/

or m

oder

ate

win

gC

entr

e w

ing

Soc

ial d

emoc

rati

c or

soc

iali

st w

ing

Gre

ens

Non

-com

mun

ist

left

win

gC

omm

unis

t w

ing

Typ

e 1

√√

√T

ype

2√

√T

ype

3√

√√

√√

Typ

e 4

√√

√√

(soc

ial

libe

ral)

Typ

e 5

√√

Typ

e 6

√T

ype

7√

Typ

e 8

√T

ype

9√

√