EAPS 697 Final ProductBrian Rhode

Effective education seems to be in everyone’s best

interest. According to Cuban and Tyack (1995), “School

reform is…a prime arena for debating the shape of the future

of the society.” Societies include all members of

communities. Schooling goes well beyond the classroom

relationship between students and teachers. Again, Cuban

and Tyack (1995) add perspective to the expanse of the

education issue when they point out that conversations about

effective schooling are, “a broad civic and moral enterprise

in which all citizens are stake-holders.” With such

widespread reach it may seem sensible, at first, for

education reform to develop in political or administrative

spheres and then pushed down to schools. A “top-down”

approach to reforming education, in other words. Currently

this is the typical method employed by education reformers.

However, a history of the lack of promised success is

growing the contingent of those who question this particular

approach. It is the central argument of this paper that

traditional top-down large-scale reforms encounter multiple

problems that prevent them from improving the “core”

instructional interactions between teachers and students,

and creating reforms that are not vulnerable in the same way

must develop from teachers in classrooms in a bottom-up

fashion. The issue with large-scale reforms, according to

some, is they is do not influence the most significant

relationship in education, which is the exchange between a

teacher and a student. Teacher and student dynamics in

classrooms are part of what Elmore (1996) refers to as the

“core” of teaching. So, while education may be in the

interests of entire societies, changing it for the better

may be more of a function of analyzing and influencing the

simplest “core” relationship between teachers and students

in order to make significant gains.

This paper makes its argument both with a review of the

missteps of traditional “top-down” reform approaches and the

evidence of the effectiveness of “bottom-up” reform methods

that concentrate on changing the most important aspects of

schooling. First, the paper begins with a brief review of

the importance of what is known as the “core of educational

practice” when working to reform education. Next, a review

of “top-down” large-scale reform is analyzed for its various

pitfalls and shortcomings, which magnify inconsistencies

between planned and intended goals and ultimately hinder

their effectiveness.

The next part of the paper builds support for a more

effective “bottom-up” method of reform by highlighting the

ways it can get around the same issues plaguing top-down

reform. This section reviews how importance of teacher

developed reform. It also describes the stake-holding

groups effected by school reforms and methods to interact

with them in ways that nurtures educational change to the

“core” of instruction without creating inconsistency and

policy vulnerability.

The final portion of each section includes reflections

on the information covered.

Education’s Core

Many reforms of the recent past have begun in political

or high administrative levels in education and have sought

to enact comprehensive systemic educational change with

standards based alignment and compliance through testing.

The problem that keeps this type of reform from working is

that it ignores the level of education that ultimately

dictates the health of the whole system. This what Richard

Elmore (1996) refers to as the “the core of educational

practice.” At the heart of the “core” is, “how teachers

understand the nature of knowledge and the student’s role in

learning, and how these ideas about knowledge and learning

are manifested in teaching and classwork,” (Elmore 1996).

It also includes such specifics in schools as: the way

classrooms are physically laid out, how students are placed

into groups, the responsibilities teachers have for groups

of students and the relationships they have with students,

and also the way in which teachers assess student learning

and communicate it all the stake holding parties involved in

education (Elmore 1996). Just as many other complex systems

are made up of small important pieces, so, too, education is

built from smaller parts that must all be considered when

initiating change.

Attention to the way the core of education works is

essential for reforming schooling. According to Elmore

(2007), “ ‘the problems of the system are the problems of

the smallest unit.’” This might make one think of the

phrase, “a chain is only as strong as is weakest link,” and

in a school system the “links” are the core elements of

educational practice. It appears that the most significant

element one should analyze is understanding the ways in

which teachers seek knowledge and learn how to teach that

knowledge to students (Elmore 1996, Elmore and

McLaughlin1988). Not understanding this relationship or not

concentrating on changing it creates vulnerability in

reforms before they even reach classrooms. “Much of what

passes for “change” in U.S. schooling is not really about

changing the core…Innovations often embody vague intentions

of changing the core through modifications that are weakly

related, or not related at all...” (Elmore 1996). While

most large scale reforms do not even pay attention to the

core of teaching, those that do have additional challenges

that they may not have considered.

Simply aiming reforms at the core elements of education

is not enough, reformers must also understand how to nurture

change within the core and successfully scale it up. Elmore

(1996) explains that when an innovation gets closer to the

core of schooling it is less likely to influence teaching

and learning on a large scale, and he further argues that

when changes to education are further from the core they are

more likely to be adopted on a bigger scale. Considering

this, it is fairly clear why most reforms do not actually

change the way children are taught in classrooms, especially

when reformers seek to create consistency across an American

education landscape that is highly varied.

“Core” centric reform is possible and it is essential.

If schools seek to genuinely change the way teachers teach

and students learn then their efforts must hinge on

analyzing and observing how changes effect their core of

educational practices. Large-scale reforms have

traditionally failed to do this, but the reasons why are as

varied as the landscape of unique classrooms that make up

the American education system.

Missteps and Roadblocks of the Top-Down Reform Method

Educational change has many issues to overcome in order

to effectively work. According to Rincon-Gallardo and

Elmore (2012), “innovations that have attempted to directly

affect the instructional core rarely penetrate more than a

small fraction of schools and classrooms and seldom last

long when they do.” While this assessment of school change

sounds bleak there are several problems and assumptions of

current school reform that can be learned from in order to

create more effective policy.

One error made by current reformers is assuming that

newer ones replace older reform efforts. Those creating

reforms hope that the slate is wiped clean, so to speak,

each time a new reform comes out. In reality, each new

reform becomes part of a whole conglomerate of older reforms

that have entrenched themselves in the school systems (Cuban

and Tyack 1995). When a new reform adds its layer to the

pre-existing layers of old reforms it changes and no longer

produces the types of outcomes it was designed to do.

Consider the following example for this problem. Imagine a

classroom in which there already exists a curriculum based

on a reform that requires students to read independently for

sixty minutes a day. Then, another reform developed to

independently act on reading instruction in classrooms

appears the next year that requires students to engage in

reading “guided” by teachers for sixty minutes a day. The

reforms together require one hundred twenty minutes of

classroom time. Now, imagine that the teacher who is

responsible for implementing these reforms has only ninety

minutes daily for reading and writing instruction. Adaption

will occur to the new reform of guided reading in order to

make it co-exist with the previous reform requiring

independent reading time. As a result, neither reform is

being implemented in its original planned way, as a result,

potential goals get compromised. When reformers do not take

this into account they do not plan for how their reform will

mingle with pre-existing efforts, and this can lead to

reform failure.

The lack of consistency between the planned goals and

purposes of reform and the events that actually unfold in

districts and classrooms is another way that school change

efforts miss their mark. “Consistency as an attribute

refers to the degree of coherence among policies and the

extent to which they reinforce or contradict each other,”

(Desimone 2008). This lack of consistency between layers of

education policies and reforms changes the way a policy

looks “on the ground” and this also can lead to a change in

the purpose of a policy. When the purpose shifts too much

a reform’s validity is compromised. According to Elmore

(2000), “organizational coherence on purpose and practice is

an important precondition for the success of school

improvement.” A lack of consistency due to layered reforms’

competing purposes is only one way that policy may have its

organizational consistency disrupted.

Another factor disrupting the consistency of policy

purpose in classrooms comes from the misassumption by large-

scale reforms about how schools adapt to change. Just as

policy actions assume that no other layers of reform exist,

so too they push change with the intent to cause uniform

adaptation in all schools. Baard et. al. (2013) calls this

the “domain-general” approach to change. This approach, “…

views adaptive capabilities as generic…characterized by the

key underlying assumption that adaption can be captured as a

relatively stable (set of) trait(s) and related performance

constructs that can be generalized across domains,” (Baard

et. al. 2013, italics and parenthesis in original text).

The reality, of course, is that school environments are not

stable in their make-up. As a result, teachers are forced

to adapt reforms in order to make them usable in their own

unique classroom environments. And as was mentioned above,

this altering can effect the consistency of purpose that a

reform was designed with. Unfortunately, many large-scale

reforms do not take teacher judgment into consideration when

designing how reforms will be implemented.

When considering how a reform will blend into the

various layers of policy already present in a classroom

teachers must inevitably adapt the reform, unfortunately,

they are not designed to allow for this type of intervention

in order to remain consistent and successful. Even if the

adaption is only meant to incorporate it into the layers of

other policies that dictate how a teacher will practice, the

original reform will still function differently. However,

most large-scale reforms are not designed with the teacher

at the center of decision-making regarding implementation.

According to Elmore and McLaughlin (1988), “Policies that

aim to reduce variability by reducing teacher discretion not

only preclude learning from situational adaptation to policy

goals, they also can impede effective teaching.” Or,

consider these words by Elmore and McLaughlin (1988), “A

second theme cutting across federal reform policies is a

tendency to substitute external authority social science

methods, university experts, regulatory requirements, and

legal principles for authority and expertise of educational

practitioners.” In other words, it seems reforms are

designed to run without needing teacher professional input.

Yet, they are also not designed to combine with other policy

initiatives and they lose their power when their goals do

not match their planned outcomes. Certainly one can see why

failure has been the status quo for much large scale reform

when it comes to changing the core of educational practice.

It also exemplifies why many teachers must change and adapt

policy when it enters their classrooms, even though these

same reform initiatives do not grant them authority to do

so. However, there remains one significant force in

education that has extremely significant impact on any

initiative intended to alter schooling, which many reforms

ignore it seems.

The Grammar of “Real School”

The notion of “real school” explains why school

climates are amiable to some reforms, but an insurmountable

block to others. The idea of “real school” is fairly

simple. Cuban and Tyack (1995) use the term “real school”

to refer to the phenomena in which most people use their

past personal experiences in education to judge the validity

of any new school reforms. If a new idea diverges too far

from a constituencies’ notion of what a “real school” looks

like and how it operates then they will resist the reform.

This is true for teachers. Many professionals instruct their

students in the ways that they themselves were taught

because those methods fit their internal notion of what

school should look like. Further, Cuban and Tyack (1995)

also describe the “grammar of schooling,” which are the

ways that people talk about school and how it should

operate. For example, when people talk about classrooms do

they describe students sitting at desks that are in rows, or

do they describe students sitting in groups at tables? The

grammar of schooling is the language people use to describe

what a real school is to them. The power of “real school”

is expansive, as many people have gone through school

themselves and have a set of “grammar” that they use to

describe the characteristics of effective schooling to

themselves. “Almost any blueprint for basic reform will be

altered during implementation, so powerful is the hold of

the public's cultural construction of what constitutes a

"real school…" (Cuban and Tyack 1995). To the issue of

reform consistency, the grammar of schooling and the notion

of real school make up another avenue by which policies get

changed in ways that designers did not intend.

As mentioned above, teachers often adapt a new policy

so that it fits into the layers of policy that already make

up their professional world, but teachers also adapt reform

based upon their notions of what “real school” is to them.

Certainly one would think that this type of adaptation could

be even more subconscious. Teachers are not trying to

subvert a reform when they change it, rather they are taking

it and making it fit into the template they have for the

characteristics and practices that they believe make up

valid schooling. For example, a teacher who believes “real

school” involves students working primarily independently

may take an initiative that primarily utilizes students

working in collaborative groups to learn and adapt the

content so that students can do it at seats independently.

This, in turn, may alter the intended goals for the group

work initiative. Cuban and Tyack (1995) state that, “…so

common is the teachers' habit of hybridizing reforms to fit

local circumstances and public expectations.” And when

reforms are changed, they lose their power to genuinely

change the core of education.

Roadblocks to Reforms in Classrooms, Schools, and Districts

Top-down reform does not ask for volunteers to try new

techniques in the hopes of changing education. Rather,

these large-scale efforts tend to use rewards and sanctions

to try and change the grammar of school among districts,

schools, and teachers. This is another sticking point for

large reform in remaining consistent and effective. “At

best, laws and rules might create some necessary but not

sufficient conditions under which competent and caring

teachers and intellectually curious might flourish,” (Cuban

and Tyack 1995). The best way to initiate change, according

to Elmore (2000), is volunteerism, especially when those

asking for the changes do not influence the core of

education. Unfortunately, most reforms impose new methods

rather than ask for volunteers, which can lead to further

adaptation and inconsistency such as described by Cuban and

Tyack (1995), “When educators view reform demands as

inappropriate, they are skilled in finding ways to temper or

evade their effects.” Again, this is not always the result

of teachers overtly seeking to sabotage reform. Rather, it

is seen as a means of coping with the landscape that reform

creates. For example, “teachers are busy and engaged

actors, who must make their classrooms work: To do so, they

must balance all sorts of contrary tendencies." Policymakers

may "ignore the pedagogical past," but teachers and students

cannot,” Cuban & Tyack 1995. This compression of multiple

layers of reform and adaptation made against the grammar of

real school creates such an inconsistent environment for

school administrators, that they must be focused on the core

of education in order to be effective.

Administrators often have an uphill battle against the

residual effects of multiple reforms, the most impactful way

a school building leader can influence positive change is by

influencing the core of teaching. Working with the core of

teaching is a process that takes time, planning, and the

capacity to do something new. Many schools do not have the

right combination or surplus of these things in order to

realistically make changes, which tends to render

administrative action ineffective. According to Elmore

(1996), “…schools routinely undertake reforms for which they

have neither the instructional nor the individual

competence.” The result of this type of undertaking, says

Elmore (1996) culminates in changing the reform to fit into

the structure already in place, rather then changing the

practice itself. Administrators often do not have the

capacity within their own position to help mitigate this

issue. Elmore (2000) claims, “…direct involvement in

instruction is among the least frequent activities performed

by administrators of any kind at any level.” However,

without help from administrators teachers will not have the

ability to develop the capacity to genuinely reform their

practices, and the same can be said for district support, as

well.

With the issue of reforms meeting resistance from

multiple layers of policy shifts, the strength of “real

school” expectations, and the lack of capacity focused work

at any level, districts have resolved to maintained a guise

of professional development that really does not penetrate

the core of education. “Few school districts treat

professional development as part of an overall strategy for

school improvement. In fact, many districts tend to see

staff development as a specialized activity within a

bureaucratic structure,” (Elmore 2007). Not having a

central focus to work toward as a district also damages the

ability for teachers to develop new capacities.

Professional development can then actually lead to a

reduction in professional investment in new policy, “To the

degree that people are being asked to do things they don’t

know how to do, and at the same time are not being asked to

engage their own ideas…professional development shifts from

building capacity to demanding compliance,” (Elmore 2007).

The cumulative effect of unfocused professional development

pushing compliance is that it degrades the success of

reform. Rather than acquiesce to policy shifts, Elmore

(2007) points out that many districts either incorporate

reforms in “superficial ways” or reject them completely

arguing that the changes are unrealistic.

Reflections on Top-Down Reform

Large-scale top-down reforms often do not impact the

most important level of education, the way teachers instruct

students, for several important reasons. The factors that

create the roadblocks to reform are dynamic in the way they

interact and it is difficult to name one single element that

begins the deterioration of reform. However, there are some

areas that one can focus on in order to understand how to

change the way reforms impact education. Some elements that

stop reforms are the characteristics and language, or

“grammar of school,” districts and communities use define

“real school.” Policies that deviate too much from the

norms of schooling held by stakeholders in an education

system are rejected or adapted to fit better. This impacts

the consistency between planned reform goals and actual

impact, which diminishes their effectiveness. Other

problems with reforms are that they are designed without

consideration for how they will interact with previous

reforms or multiple policies acting at once. This leads to

adaptation and inconsistency because school districts cannot

treat the initiatives implemented by a reform with singular

priority. They are often changed to fit into classrooms

where many reforms can operate at the same time. Again,

this forces teachers to make changes in order to accommodate

all the policies they are required to utilize, and this

inconsistency limits reform impact. Finally, reforms are

resisted or changed because they demand levels of capacity

that do not exist in districts and with teachers. Without

building the skills needed to implement a new reform

teachers adapt them in order to fit the skill set they

already poses. Just as with the other issues mentioned

above, this forces inconsistency in the planned outcomes of

a reform and diminishes its impact. It is difficult to

determine which element creates the most resistance to new

education policy. However, what is clear is that in order

to truly impact the core of education a different approach

to designing and implementing reform is necessary.

Building Better Reform

The problems of top-down large-scale reform mentioned

above require a new strategy for changing the core of

education. The educational core consists primarily of the

relationship between teachers and students. So, it would

seem that an approach focusing on that relationship would be

the most fruitful for policy development. This is a more

specific approach to education reform. Baard et. al. (2013)

calls it a “domain-specific” approach which, “focuses on key

skills and/or processes relevant to adaption for domain-

specific knowledge and skills.” These domain-specific

skills are most appropriately viewed within classrooms.

Therefore, reform best come from this arena. As Elmore

(2007) succinctly states, “To succeed, school reform has to

happen ‘from the inside out.’” An apparent vulnerability to

large scale reform is the in-ability to plan for the

divergent environments present in various classrooms.

Taking this into consideration from the beginning and

utilizing the small scale, classroom, as the starting point

for reform work one may circumvent the issue of divergence

by embracing it. Or, as Elmore and McLaughlin (1988) state,

“results showed that the success of teaching was mainly

influenced by (undefined) attributes of the setting in which

it was done, rather than the expensive expertise and social

science methods brought to bear on teachers,” (parenthesis

in original text). Further, Elmore and McLaughlin (1988)

point out that federal policies have limited leverage on

educational core because they do not critically influence

the factors or people most responsible for implementing

reform. Cuban and Tyack (1995) add their support as well,

stating, “But if teachers work collaboratively with each

other and with policy advocates, sharing goals and tactics…

such an approach to school improvement could work better

than mandates from above.” It would seem that in order to

build reform that works one should start in the place where

it matters most and with the people closest to instructional

delivery.

Building Reform One Classroom at a Time

Considering the multiple ways in which the goals of

large-scale reform can be derailed on the way to classrooms

it seems to make more sense for reform to come out of the

classroom environments where external factors of influence

can be considered at the source. This certainly will not

look the same as a top-down reform seeking to minimize

divergence through common method. In fact, as Cuban and

Tyack (1995) put it, “…actual changes in schools will be

more gradual and piecemeal than the usual either-or rhetoric

of innovation might indicate.” However, this system of

generating small reforms and, “weaving them together into a

model that can be implemented,” as Desimone (2008) puts it,

can have better sticking power in schools.

Teacher developed policy can take into account the

multiple layers of reform already present in a classroom and

not add more “bulk” to instructional practice, thus

increasing support for them. “Reforms proposed and

implemented by school administrators and teachers themselves

to make their work easier or more efficient…were likely to

stick better than innovations pushed by outsiders,” (Cuban

and Tyack 1995). As primary gate keepers of reforms in

classrooms teacher buy-in cannot be understated. Also, by

scaling up slowly and collaboratively, designers of reform

can trouble-shoot another significant pitfall to their

efforts.

Bringing reform up from classrooms and schools instead

of from large administrative and political bodies also helps

to avoid the issue of unplanned adaption to policy. Simply

put, unplanned adaption can be minimized by building into

the reforms a capacity for potential changes without making

goals inconsistent. Cuban and Tyack (1995) state,

“Reforms should be designed to be hybridized, adapted by

educators working together to take advantage of their

knowledge of their own divers students and communities…”

Consider again the example used above, if a teacher is told

to use an initiative that uses group learning, but they know

that their students cannot handle group work and are more

productive working independently, they should be able to

adapt the delivery strategy while still meeting the learning

goals of the reform. With a flexible design built into

reforms they can be applied to more classrooms while

maintaining consistency between intended goals and the

outcomes that actually occur in schools. Teachers are an

indelible resource for monitoring this adaptability while

maintaining the health of a reform.

Finally, utilizing teachers to design reform makes

sense from a standpoint of efficiency in changing schools

and also in maintaining influence on the core of education.

“The closer policy gets to the instructional core,” say

Cuban and Tyack (1995), “…the more policy makers lose their

comparative advantage of knowledge and skill…they become

dependent on…practitioners to mold and shape the

instructional core.” Further, the issue of layering policy

mentioned above can also be avoided by looking to teachers

for reform design. Teachers know what is working in

classrooms and what needs to be fixed. Many reforms operate

by changing everything within a classroom, starting from

scratch, this leads to old reforms and new reforms existing

side-by-side and interfering with each other’s design.

Building through teachers would allow reform to be more

efficient, only seeking to change the elements of a practice

that are not working and allowing for things that do work to

remain (Cuban and Tyack 1995). If a reform is meant to

target a smaller element of a classroom, its connection

between intended goal and true outcome are also more

insulated. “Less is more,” in other words, in the world of

reform, and teachers can lead the way for designing

effective and simple methods to change the core of

instruction.

Generating Stake-Holder Buy-in From Classroom Teacher to

Community

Arguably the most important stakeholder group to

nurture buy-in of new characteristics of core instruction

methods is teachers. As the gatekeepers of reform it is

vital that they participate meaningfully in new policy. A

significant problem with developing reform, even when

considering building it from classrooms, is that teachers

who willingly take on new approaches to the core of

instruction are a minority. “Adults seldom learn new skills

or attitudes on demand…particularly when they involve

modification…threaten an adult’s already well-organized

self-concept and established level of accomplishment,”

(Elmore and McLaughlin1988). Therefor, if reforms are going

to be grown out of classrooms but applied broadly, the

environment in schools must nurture trial and error for

teacher practice. One must remember that teachers also have

ideas of what “real school” looks like and will be resistant

to new methods that create conflict with their beliefs.

Change will require more than setting levels of

accomplishment, as mentioned above.

One of the simplest ways to bolster a teacher’s

ability to change what “real school” looks like to them is

to allow for making mistakes to be encouraged as part of the

learning process. In many top-down reforms the barometer

for successful implementation relies on students performing

at certain academic benchmarks. This does not allow for

experimentation since teachers are generally considered to

be successful or unsuccessful at implementing the reform by

that method. Teachers put in this situation are very good at

adapting reforms to both produce “successful” information

while retaining as much of the core of instruction they had

prior to the policy shift. To aid teacher change in their

core of instruction schools would do better to embrace what

Baard et. al. (2013) calls, “…error-encouragement framing,”

which, “has a more positive impact on performance adaptation

than error-avoidant framing.” Essentially, teachers need

practice when changing their core behaviors and methods and

avoiding panelizing them for making mistakes creates the

best environment in which to make shifts. Certainly, a

school environment would be critical in fostering this for

teachers.

Simply put, encouraging teachers to adopt successful

reform requires tangible personal attention from school

leaders and district actions that convey support for them.

According to Elmore (1996), “It is unlikely that teachers

who are not intrinsically motivated to engage in hard,

uncertain work will learn to do so in large, anonymous

organizations that do not intensify personal commitments and

responsibilities.” One such commitment, it seems, that a

school must make to teachers is the concept described by

Elmore (2007) known as the “principal of reciprocity of

accountability for capacity,” which states, “For every

increment of performance I demand from you, I have an equal

responsibility to provide you with the capacity to meet that

expectation.” It goes further to state that when one is

invested in with a new skill and knowledge they have the

responsibility to demonstrate new performance. Too often,

the demand for new performance is made without investment in

new knowledge and skill. Providing teachers with the tools

they need to demonstrate new levels of performance while

also giving them the time and “safe rehearsal opportunities”

seems to be the best way to nurture new practices within

individuals’ core instructional practices (Elmore and

McLaughlin1988). A final element to consider for teachers

within schools and districts is the amounts of reform

organization take on at once.

It seems that districts should move conservatively in

the number of elements in the core of instruction they hope

to change at once. A significant problem for large-scale

top-down reform mentioned above comes from the inconsistency

that develops between intended outcomes and true outcomes

when policies enter schools and classrooms. To avoid this

same issue when developing and implementing reform from the

bottom-up districts must check in with results along the way

to be sure they match desired outcomes. This requires what

Elmore (2000) calls the “principle of tight focus,” which is

a stable message about the goal of a reform that applies to

everyone within a district from teachers to superintendents,

and community members. Desimone (2008) refers to this same

principle as the “Specificity” of a policy’s details. “The

more specific a policy is in terms of professional

development, guidance and instructions, the more likely

teachers will be to implement it…” (Desimone 2008). And,

the more likely real outcomes will match planned outcomes in

the reform. Thus, a tight focus on specific goals,

monitoring their progress, and gathering feedback from all

levels of implementation make reform the most successful.

Adherence to distant benchmarks, which is the typical large-

scale reform design, is much more vulnerable to goal

adaption and inconsistency then bottom-up reform. However,

communities outside of schools can still derail successful

bottom-up reform.

The notion of “real school” also exists in members of

communities that schools are within and must be considered

when designing reform.

Like with teachers and administrators, reforms that deviate

too far from people’s expectations and their own “grammar of

school” language will still be resisted even if they prove

successful in schools. This is most significant when the

community members in question are on the school board.

While they may not be educators by training, they still have

the ability to scuttle reform and their notions of “real

school” may be the cause for dissent. Therefor, creating

successful reform requires nurturing new notions of “real

school” with parents and school board members.

Successful methods for engaging communities in dialogue

around reform and school characteristics are present in

districts throughout America. One example from Modine

(2011) describes the use of “parental liaisons” in schools

in a Texas district. This link not only helps bring in

parent feedback but it also allows them to understand what

actions schools are taking and for what reasons. Mitra et.

al. (2008) warns that not building civic capacity around

school change can limit sustainability of reform efforts

over time. When many community members outside of schools

create new definitions of what “real school” entails the

less “leader centric” change becomes and the more

sustainable it will be. Gold (2014) describes three types

of community members that schools need to engage in order to

build collective impact in schools:

designees, individuals who represent the organization or community, but

do not have decision-making or implementation powers within their

organization or community; doers, individuals who are responsible for

implementing changes to behaviors and strategies in their organization or

community, but lack the formal authority to mandate them; and decision-

makers, individuals who have the authority or influencein their organization

or community to require that it change its behaviors and strategies

The essential message is that entire communities, not just

school employees influence the success of education reform

and must be brought into the process of change when shifting

the core of instruction. Doing so will ensure that

successful reforms cannot only be built but sustained over

time.

Reflections on Bottom-up Reform

Reforming education into the 21st century needs a

reversal in the direction that new policy is designed and

nurtured. Building reform from the bottom-up can address

and solve many of the problems that plague traditional top-

down reform, ultimately rendering it incapable of

realistically impacting the core of instruction, which is

the relationship between how and what teachers actually

teach students. The place to begin reform design is within

classrooms. Teachers are the first layer of oversight to

determine if reforms are working or not. Therefor, it makes

sense to access their expertise in order to define what

works in classrooms.

Ideas scaled up from classrooms still have potential

vulnerabilities. They risk being defeated if careful

attention is not paid to addressing the concerns and ideas

of what a “real school” is of the stakeholders affected by

schooling. Laying out specific goals in reforms that can be

checked for fidelity later are vital for changing policy.

If reformers do not take the step to compare actual practice

to intended practice they miss the opportunity to find

weaknesses. This close tie to classrooms means that

communication with teachers is vital. They must be viewed

as instructional authorities and valued in the process of

reform design.

Changing the core of instruction also means changing

the way teachers, administrators, school board members, and

community members view and speak about “real school.”

Bottom-up reform is positioned better to meet this need

since developers of the reform would be closer to schools

and communities than is typically the case with top-down

reformers. Taking feedback from community members would

help policy makers to understand which elements could easily

be shifted in a school and which ones may deviate too much

from the characteristics that create the “real school.”

This step then allows designers to see if they need to also

work on changing how stake-holders view school to “pave the

way” for new initiatives.

Once reform is scaled up and then re-applied to schools

the job of checking outcome fidelity, nurturing new

characteristics or “real school,” and relying on teacher

authority to determine what works locally does not end.

Perhaps it is even more vital at this point. Having

specific goals that are tightly focused and checked for

fidelity means also that reformers must rely on teachers to

thoughtfully adapt reforms in ways that fit their practice.

Schools can do this by nurturing the acceptance and use of

mistakes to tweak reforms while still maintaining consistent

goals. Trusting teacher authority will also help those who

are nervous about reform to accept and begin to change their

core instructional practices. All these elements must be

approached together and continuously. There is no such

thing as a “hands off” reform, which many top-down efforts

tend to be. By building reform from the bottom-up policy

workers have the best chance to realistically impact the

core of instruction and actually change what goes on inside

classrooms all over America for the better.

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