Eagles over Husky: The Allied Air Forces and the Sicilian Campaign, 14 May to 17 August 1943

Military History Colloquium 2014 Wilfrid Laurier University

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Alexander Fitzgerald-Black Twitter: @AlexFitzBlack

Sicily – A Pyrrhic Victory?

•Failures in inter-service cooperation allowed German forces on the island to defy odds of up to 6 to 1 and escape, ready to fight on the mainland, tarnishing victory in Sicily. •Part of this narrative indicates that what the army and navy accomplished was done without adequate air force cooperation or in spite of the poor job the air force did. •My argument: •The Allied Air Forces played a crucial role in the Battle of Sicily. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder’s theatre air power doctrine – air superiority, air interdiction, and air support, in that order of importance – assisted in a strategic victory that forced Germany to stand alone in the defence of Southern Europe. 2

“The Greatest Air Battle of the Mediterranean War”: Air

Superiority and Operation Husky • ‘Air superiority’: a position in war where one force holds (a certain degree of) control of air warfare and air power over enemy forces.

• It is not something that is strictly ‘won’ but rather maintained over an enemy air force.

• I will never use the term ‘air supremacy’ as this essentially indicates the absence of an enemy air force.

• Key theme = relationship between theatre (local) and European-wide air superiority battle. 3

Some key personalitiesAir Chief Marshal Sir

Arthur Tedder, Air Officer C-in-C, Mediterranean Air

Command

Professor Solly Zuckerman, scientific advisor and head of the Bombing Survey

Unit

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Williamson Murray Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945All figures based on quartermaster general loss tables

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“The greatest air battle of the Mediterranean war.”

Axis Order of Battle

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Axis combat aircraft (Sardinia, Sicily, southern and central Italy)

• 23 May 1943 II Fliegerkorps ops order: • Sardinia-Sicily-Crete to be treated as an

advanced defence line of Southern Europe: “should the enemy succeed in gaining a foothold in one of these islands, he will have achieved a penetration into Fortress Europe which would signify a grave threat to the defence of the mainland. Every last man and weapon must be rallied to prevent this from happening.”

• Attempt to contest air superiority: 1 May to 15 July approximately 40% of German fighter production to the Mediterranean; plus 2 Fw 190 fighter-bomber wings.

• Luftwaffe losses in May and June were 333 and 235 respectively.

What was the Significance of Operation Corkscrew?

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20 May to 31 July 1943 aerodrome raids Allied Air Forces

• Grand totals:• 198 raids, 10,014 sorties (6,312 bomber, 3,481 fighter, 221 fighter-bomber)• Air claims (vs GAF): 244 destroyed, 38 probable, 77 damaged • Ground claims (vs GAF): 93 destroyed, 145 damaged• Air claims (vs IAF): 25 destroyed, 3 probable, 9 damaged• Ground claims (vs IAF): 34 destroyed, 11 damaged• Losses (AAF): 77 destroyed/missing (46 bombers), 259 damaged (7 fighters)

• Caveats:• For AAF losses, most of the destroyed figures are from air combats while most of the damaged figures are from anti-aircraft fire.

• AAF air claims undoubtedly exaggerated but this offset to some degree by ground claims which are generally conservative according to BSU ground surveys.

• Adolf Hitler correspondence with Mussolini confirms this: 13 July message indicates > 320 fighters destroyed on the ground in last 3 weeks; 19 July at Feltre, Italy Hitler notes 300-400 of 500-600 aircraft had been destroyed on the ground.

• IAF losses are probably underrepresented. Possible their aircraft were often identified as GAF especially as they were using Bf 109s at this point.

• Figures do not account for ground organization disruption and installation damage.

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“An air offensive of unprecedented dimensions.”

– General Adolf Galland on the early July blitz on Sicilian aerodromesGerman Bf 109 strength (in the theatre!) drops from 380 to 300

(278-165 serviceable); Italians lose 2/3 leading aces.

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Effects of these raids

• General Paul Deichmann, Luftflotte 2 chief of staff (to 25 June):• “The appearance of four engine bombers working in conjunction with long-range fighters [P-38s and Spitfires, the latter flying from nearby Malta] had completely changed the position in the air.”

• Deichmann notes that only 21 four engine bombers were specifically claimed destroyed in the May to July period. There were a few occasions where bombers were claimed without a specific number shot down.

• Reichsmarshall Herman Goering:• “Together with the fighter pilots in France, Norway and Russia, I can only regard you with contempt. I want an immediate improvement in fighting spirit. If this improvement is not forthcoming, flying personnel from the commander down must expect to be remanded to the ranks and transferred to the eastern front to serve on the ground.”

• Colonel Thorsten Christ, Luftflotte 2 chief of staff (replaced Deichmann):• “In the last few weeks before the landing all the aerodromes, operational airfields, and landing grounds on Sicily were so destroyed in continuous attacks by massed forces that it was only possible to get this or that airfield in running order again for a short time, mainly by mobilizing all available forces, including those of the German and Italian armies.”

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Effects of these raids (con’t)

• Lieutenant-Colonel Johannes Steinhoff (Jagdgeschwader 77): • “With what we could scrape together of the remnants of the group, we would fly along the north coast over Etna’s crater towards the Straits of Messina where we would fling ourselves at the Flying Fortresses in a series of uncoordinated attacks. Our numbers were so few that we could do little damage, and even that little depended upon our breaking through to the bombers.

• “Afterward we would land in Gerbini if the airfield was still usable, or at Catania. We would refuel our aircraft by hand pump, rearm and top up with oil. We would leap into slit trenches and shelters and wait for the bomb carpets to unroll over us. And then we would crawl out again, haul the wrecked aircraft to one side, repair any minor damage and, provided we still had enough machines to make up a modest formation take off on the next patrol.” 12

Implications for convoy defence and the Axis long-range bomber force

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Pre-invasion skepticism• ACM Sir Arthur Tedder, Air Officer-in-Chief, Mediterranean Air Command:

• “Up to the day of the invasion itself, I was so much concerned at the fact that enemy aircraft had offered so little fight in the air … I could not help feeling that he might be holding many aircraft in reserve.”

• It turns out that Tedder was absolutely correct: between 30 June and 10 July German long-range bomber strength increased from 219 to 407 (119 to 253 bombers serviceable). Preserved for the landings.

• 23 May II Fliegerkorps ops order:• “In the event of enemy landing attempts, the men fighting on the ground will have the task of engaging the enemy during disembarkation while the vessels in which he is approaching the coast are brought under attack by the Luftwaffe and coastal artillery. At this moment he will be at his weakest for he will be situated in wide-open terrain devoid of cover, in which his heavy weapons – in so far as they are not operating from ships at sea – cannot as yet be brought to bear.”

• Tedder to Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, 10 July 1943:• “apart from reduction in numerical strength of enemy it appears certain that we have succeeded in reducing his operational efficiency. The air battle is, however, far from over, and we may well have difficult times during the next 48 hours. We cannot maintain continuous fighter cover over all beaches and ships. I intend to maintain certain scale of effort to hunt him at whatever airfields he settles on.”

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Landings Fighter Cover Program

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The climax of the air battle occurs during the assault

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Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica sortie data

Air HQ Malta ‘destroyed’ claims

Air HQ Malta losses

Malta Strikes Back “It is obvious to every individual in the Allied Command that, except for the Malta air force and for the constructive accomplishments of the whole Malta Command during the past

year, the current attack could scarcely be classified as a

feasible one. In spite of the fact that these things cannot now be published, I should like the

officers and men of your command to know of my profound obligation to them and to be assured that as soon

as considerations of security permit, these will be accorded

public as well as official credit for their outstanding services.”

- General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Air Vice-Marshal Sir Keith Park, Air Officer Commanding AHQ Malta 17

Axis withdrawal – what’s left?

13 July Luftwaffe fighters ordered to withdraw. By 17 July

island largely abandoned by Axis

aircraft.

Left on Sicilian aerodromes:

898 Axis aircraft of all types, and in various states.

(Probably 1,100 if one includes Sardinia).

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ConsequencesMain striking power of enemy air forces

relegated to night bombing of Allied

communications/airfields

F/O John Turnbull, RCAF (above) & F/Sgt Cyril Fowler, RAF

claim7 Ju88s and 1 He111

destroyed during Husky19

Malta and Sicily-based night

fighters claim 86 e/a destroyed for the loss of 3

aircraft. 11 July to 11 August 1943

What did the Luftwaffe lose?

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Conclusions• Williamson Murray:

• “Severe fighting over the Reich in summer and fall 1943 coupled with the decimation of air units on the periphery placed a rising, and in the long run, intolerable burden on the Luftwaffe.”

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