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Duality Principles and Modern Hylomorphism by Kevin Karn (2015)

1. What is hylomorphism?

Hylomorphism is the doctrine, first advanced by Aristotle, that all individuals in the

physical world are comprised of two principles: matter (Greek: hyle) and form (Greek:

morphe or eidos). This doctrine was refined by the scholastics of the Middle Ages, but

later rejected, together with much of Aristotelian philosophy, by Descartes, Hobbes and

other mechanists of the early modern period. Today there is a modest resurgence of

interest in Aristotle's philosophy due to its affinity with modern trends. One trend is the

acceptance of "information" and "data" as bona fide entities in their own right, and this

suggests the idea of a modern hylomorphism in which material substances (e.g., metals,

gases, chemical compounds, organic materials) play the role of matter, while

information and data play the role of form. In analogy to hylomorphism, we might call

this modern version of hylomorphism "hardware-software-ism" or "hardsoftism."

Another trend is the advent of functionalism in the philosophy of mind1, and proposals

for "mind-uploading" in which a person's mind is transferred/copied into a computer or

other substrate. These ideas have some affinity with Aristotle's doctrine (set forth in De

Anima) that the "soul"2 of a person is the form of their body.

In this paper, I will be using the term "hylomorphism" in a modern sense, not the

traditional sense of Aristotle and the scholastics. That is, when I speak of hylomorphism

and individuals comprised of form and matter, by matter I will mean the "bill of

materials" (so to speak) of the entity, and by form I will mean the geometrical shape or

configuration of these materials, as specified by a detailed drawing or coordinates etc.3

Note that, according to this definition, a person does not have a single determinate

matter or form. For example, in the context of a certain analysis, we might select atoms

1 Likened to Aristotle's philosophy by a number of commentators. See Hilary Putnam "Philosophy and our mental life," Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam "Changing Aristotle's mind," and Christopher Shields "The first functionalist." 2 Soul (Greek: psuche): This is not the religious notion familiar from Christianity, etc. In Aristotle, soul is the dynamic process which distinguishes a living organism from a corpse. There is no doubt about whether a living organism has a soul in the Aristotelian sense. 3 Form might be taken more broadly, e.g., as the functional flowchart of the entity at a higher level of abstraction, but I won't discuss that alternative in any detail here.

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as the materials of interest so that the "matter" constituent (bill of materials, or BOM)

would look something like Fig. 1 below:

Fig. 1: BOM of a human being, taking atoms as components (image: Wikimedia

Commons)

The form corresponding to this BOM might be a detailed set of coordinates indicating

the position of each atom. (Notice that this is one variant of the "scan" spoken of in

discussions of mind uploading and teleportation.) If we select a different group of

materials, say molecules, then the BOM changes, and so does the associated form. (This

is similar to the notion of Berkeley and Frege4 that individual physical entities do not

have a determinate number associated with them. For example, how many items are

there in a carton of eggs? Twelve if we're counting eggs. An astronomical number if

we're counting molecules. The number we assign to an entity is relative to the concept

we are working with (e.g., eggs, molecules). Similarly, the form of an entity is relative

to the objects we designate as constituents of the BOM.)

This modern hylomorphism (MH) is related to, but different from, the traditional

4 Berkeley, Principles of Human Reason, 12; Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, 22.

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hylomorphism (TH) of Aristotle and the scholastics. One difference is that TH makes

almost no reference to ordinary materials. In TH, individuals are not comprised of

ordinary shape and materials, but rather of two principles called prime matter (PM) and

substantial form (SF). PM is an elusive entity with no characteristics at all in its own

right. No mass, no shape, no volume, no color, no temperature etc. All it has is the

potential to become something. For a modern reader, perhaps the best analogy of PM is

the void (empty space)5. The void (like PM) has no qualities in itself, but has the ability

to become things, like the waves, fields, particles and other disturbances which exist

within it. A second difference is that, in TH, form is regarded as superior to, or prior to,

matter. Matter is regarded as the sort of "junior partner" of hylomorphism which can

only be "actualized" or brought into being by a form. In the MH described here, matter

and form stand on an equal footing. Finally, there is a major difference between the

notions of form in MH and TH. In the version of MH described here, form is identified

strictly with geometrical shape or configuration. This is an empirical, scientifically

accessible notion of form. In TH, form has an extremely broad meaning6, but for the

most part is closest to what a modern person might call "species" or "kind." That is, the

form of a thing in TH is the category a thing falls under, or the kind of thing it is, not its

geometrical (or functional) configuration. TH form is a non-empirical, qualitative

notion of form that is dependent on human practices of definition (i.e., norms relating to

the definition of words). I point out these differences for reasons of clarity, and won't

speak further about TH in this paper. In the following, "hylomorphism" will always

refer to MH (unless otherwise indicated).

2. What is a duality principle?

In a given domain of discourse, a duality principle holds when certain terms can be

swapped in true statements and the result remains true. There are two classic examples

of this phenomenon in mathematics.

5 This is reminiscent of the "mother" or "receptacle" in Plato's Timaeus (50a, ff.) which seems to be the prototype of Aristotle's prime matter. Aristotle himself notes that Plato regarded the void as prime matter: "That is also why in the Timaeus Plato identifies matter and space, because what is capable of receiving form is the same as space." (Phys. 209b11) 6 See "Aristotle's Theory of Form" in D. Bostock, Space, Time, Matter, and Form: Essays on Aristotle's Physics, P. 79-102.

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2.1 Projective geometry

In ordinary plane geometry, the statement "two points determine a line" is an axiom,

and, aside from the case of parallel lines, this statement closely resembles the fact that

"two lines determine a point" (i.e., any two non-parallel lines intersect at one point.)

This illustrates the basic idea of duality. We can swap the words "line" and "point" for

each other in a true statement ("two points determine a line"), and the result remains a

true statement ("two lines determine a point"). The statements before and after the swap

are referred to as "duals." (Note that, in some cases, a statement may be it's own dual.

Such statements are called "self-duals.") This duality of points and lines is imperfect in

ordinary plane geometry (due to the fact that parallel lines do not intersect), but in

projective geometry, where there are no parallel lines, it is exact. There are a number of

famous geometrical theorems which are duals of each other:

1) Desargues' theory and its converse

2) Pascal's theorem and Branchion's theorem

3) Menelaus' theorem and Ceva's theorem

2.2 Elementary set theory (Boolean algebra)

A duality principle also holds in elementary set theory7, with the constants A (the

universal set) and φ (the empty set); and the operations ∪ (union), ∩

(intersection) and ¬ (not). In this case, a true statement can be changed into another true

statement by swapping A for φ, and ∪ for ∩. ¬ is "self-dual" because it is swapped

for itself.

Some examples (R, S, and T indicate arbitrary sets):

Statement Dual A∪A=A φ∩φ=φ

S∪φ=S S∩A=S

S∩¬S=φ S∪¬S=A

¬(R∪S)= ¬R∩¬S ¬(R∩S)= ¬R∪¬S

R∩(S∪T)=(R∩S)∪(R∩T) R∪(S∩T)=(R∪S)∩(R∪T)

7 The theory illustrated by Venn diagrams.

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The duality principle for sets carries over unchanged to the Boolean logic used by

computers8. In this case, true statements involving 1, 0, OR, AND, and NOT can be

converted into their duals by swapping 1 for 0, and OR for AND. (Here too, NOT is

self-dual.) One consequence of this is that a computer operating with 1s, 0s and NAND

gates, has an equivalent dual computer operating with 1s swapped for 0s, and NOR

gates swapped for NAND gates.

3. A duality principle in hylomorphism?

On the face of it, matter and form (as we have defined them) seem to be utterly

different things. How could there be a duality principle enabling us to swap the words

matter and form in a true statement to produce a new true statement? It seems very

implausible. That intuition shouldn't deter us, however. Points and lines, in the

geometric examples described above, are also very different, and on the face of it, it

seems highly unlikely that they could be swapped while maintaining truth. But that's

exactly what happens in projective geometry, as noted in 2.1.

The following section presents a number of candidates for dual statements (i.e., "duals")

within the context of hylomorphism.

4. Examples of duals in hylomorphism

4.1 Matter is not supervenient on form, and form is not supervenient on matter (i.e.

matter is independent of form and vice versa).

Supervenience is defined as follows. A supervenes on B if and only if "there cannot be

an A-difference without a B-difference." So let's examine the supervenience

relationships between matter and form. First, is matter supervenient on form? If so, then

there cannot be a difference in matter while retaining the same form. That's obviously

false. The same form can be implemented in all sorts of materials, e.g., a wooden circle,

a bronze circle, the circular profile of the moon. Another important example is the body

of a human being (or other organism). The form of the body stays roughly the same—at

8 Indeed, the same duality principle holds for all lattices (a type of algebraic structure). Sets and Boolean algebra are special cases of this type.

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least over the short term—even though there is constant throughput of materials, and

replacement of molecular components. Second, is form supervenient on matter? If so

then there cannot be a difference in form without a difference in matter. This is also

false. The same matter (BOM) can be used to build an endless variety of forms, e.g., all

sorts of shapes can be sculpted from the same piece of clay. Chemical isomers are

another example; they are made up of the same atoms, but have different properties due

to how those atoms are arranged in space. This shows that neither matter nor form is

supervenient on the other. They are independent in that form can vary while matter

remains constant, and vice versa. This is our first example of hylomorphic duals. Notice

the dual structure; the terms "form" and "matter" are swapped and the statement remains

true: "Form is not supervenient on matter." ⇔ "Matter is not supervenient on form."

4.2 Form is supervenient on physics. Matter is supervenient on physics.

In hylomorphic systems (both traditional and modern), the mind is identified with

form. Now, it is often pointed out that the mind must be supervenient on physics, and

that remains true in modern hylomorphism. However, we would also expect, based on

the duality principle of hylomorphism, that matter too must be supervenient on physics.

And that turns out to be correct. It is impossible for matter to be different while the

underlying physical state remains the same. Thus, to the extent that mind/form is taken

to be an impotent epiphenomenon due to its supervenience on physics, matter suffers

from the same issue.

This line of thought raises the possibility that the supervenience of mind on physics is

a red herring. That is, according to hylomorphism, all physical objects are composites of

matter + form. It's a trivial fact that any aspect of a whole will be supervenient on the

whole. So no interesting interplay between mind and body can be captured by taking the

physical world (as a whole) to be body, and an aspect of the physical world to be mind.

Similarly, we can't get an interesting interplay by drawing the line dividing body and

mind between the physical and non-physical because the physical, by definition,

encompasses everything that can be detected or measured (i.e., everything that exists, at

least to us). The interesting interplay must occur as a dualism of independent aspects

within physics, as we find with form and matter. Note that the identification of mind as

an actual, detectable feature of the physical world (i.e., as the form of the body) does

not imply that the mind is matter. This is analogous to the fact that identification of

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information as a real entity in the physical world does not imply that information

reduces to (or is supervenient on) matter or forces, etc.

4.3 Form cannot exist without matter. Matter cannot exist without form. (The

Hylomorphic Principle)

a) This is a fundamental axiom which, for convenience, I will call the "Hylomorphic

Principle" (HP). It reflects the common sense idea that any real-world individual must

have a specific, determinate form9, and that a form (i.e., information) cannot exist

without some sort of material or media to express it in. One side of the HP, the denial of

forms without matter (i.e., Platonic forms or disembodied spirits) is strongly associated

with Aristotle and his opposition to Plato10. The dual of Platonic form (i.e., form

without matter), however, is prime matter (i.e., matter without form), and that violation

of the HP was embraced by the medieval hylomorphists. Modern hylomorphism steers

clear of both, strictly rejecting both form without matter, and matter without form.

b) Corollary: Form is not prior to matter, and matter is not prior to form.

In Aristotle and Plato, priority11 is defined as follows: A is prior to B if A can exist

without B, but B cannot exist without A. Clearly, the HP implies that neither form nor

matter is prior to the other. Aristotle has a useful term for this relationship. He calls A

and B simultaneous by nature if the existence of A implies the existence of B, and vice

versa12. This is the correct relationship of form and matter. Indeed, it may be the best

available account of genuine unity of a complex entity. That is, there doesn't seem to be

any tighter sense of unity between two distinguishable entities than their needing each

other in order to exist. Although I won't treat the issue in detail here, there are many

things related in this way. For example, in the absence of advanced medical technology

a person's heart and lungs are simultaneous by nature. Neither can exist without the

other. The philosophy of Berkeley invokes a similar principle: the seer cannot exist

without the seen, and vice versa. Likewise, the part cannot exist (as a part) without the

whole, and vice versa. Or: attributes cannot exist without the underlying thing they are

9 Berkeley and Hume's arguments against abstract ideas are based on a version of this principle. See: Berkeley Principles, Intro. 13, and Hume Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, XII.1. 10 Although even Aristotle occasionally backslides, and admits Platonic forms of certain limited types. 11 Here by "priority" I mean priority of substance. See Meta. Δ11, 1019a1-4. 12 Cat. 13.

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attributes of, and the underlying thing cannot exist if it has no attributes.

c) Form and matter (or mind and body) form an intrinsic unity, and yet can vary

independently of each other.

This follows from 4.1 and 4.3b.

d) All forms must have matter of some sort, no matter how abstract or mental they

seem.

The HP leads to a natural broadening of the notion of matter. Thus far, we have spoken

of form as the arrangement of ordinary materials, but forms can also be comprised of

higher-order "matter" such as colors, sounds, symbols, letters, beams of light etc. For

instance, words are forms constructed from the "matter" of letters. More explicitly:

tangible matter (e.g., atoms) is to material objects as abstract material (e.g., symbols) is

to symbolic objects13. In part, what this means is that the boundary between physical

and symbolic objects is fuzzier than it might at first seem. For example, individual

instances of the letter "a" printed in books, or displayed on computer screens, seem

abstract but in fact are mass-produced objects akin to toothbrushes or shoes. They must

always combine both form and matter, and energy is required to produce them and

move them around. Furthermore, since our mental experiences are particular individuals,

they too must be comprised of form and matter, although, of course, this doesn't imply

any crass form of materialism. The material of our experiences can also be symbolic,

instead of "stuff" per se. Perhaps in the broadest sense, "matter" can be understood

simply as difference. That is, form (or information) can exist if and only if there is some

sort of difference.14

4.4 Matter is potential being which can only achieve reality by being actualized by form.

Form is potential being which can only achieve complete reality by being actualized by

matter.

The first statement is a doctrine of traditional hylomorphism, asserting the superiority

of form over matter. However, the duality principle suggests that the same principle

13 Aristotle calls the former "sensible matter" and the latter "intelligible matter." 14 An interesting application of the HP (4.4d) is Berkeley's argument that primary qualities like visual extension cannot exist without secondary qualities like color. Berkeley, Principles, 10. See also, Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, XII.1 (paragraph 15).

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holds for both matter and form. For example, if a piece of marble is only potentially

something, and can only become something real by being endowed with a form; then, in

a parallel way, the idea for a sculpture is only potentially something, and can only

become something real by being imparted into matter. Note, however, that this way of

thinking is only approximate. By the HP, both the uncarved marble, and the idea or

design in the sculptor's mind must both already be fully actual individuals with their

own components of matter and form.

4.5 Aristotle's Account of Change

a) Parmenides is famed for arguing that change is unreal. Aristotle describes his

argument as follows:

"[Parmenides and his followers] claimed that nothing comes to be or ceases to be, on the ground that for

anything to come to be it would have to come either from what is, or from what is not, but that neither of

these is possible. What is cannot come to be because it already is, and nothing can come from what is not

because there must be some underlying thing. And then they extrapolated from this to conclude that there

cannot be a plurality of things, but only being itself."15

The crux of the problem, according to Parmenides' argument, is that any truly new

being must somehow pop into existence out of nothing. And it is mystifying how that

could happen. Aristotle resolved this problem by describing a tripartite account of

change in Book I of the Physics. According to this theory, all change consists of three

elements: privation, form and matter. Matter is the underlying element which remains

constant throughout a change, and ensures that every new thing comes into existence

from something that already exists. Aristotle's other two elements—the contraries of

privation and form—play the role of Parmenides' nothing and something. For example,

if an ingot of metal is to be molded into the shape of Hermes, it must first lack the

quality it acquires as a result of the change; that is, it must not yet have the form of

Hermes (or equivalently, it must have a non-Hermes form). This lack is what Aristotle

calls "privation." After the change, the ingot acquires a new quality (i.e., a form) which

it did not have before, namely the shape of Hermes. This process can work in both

15 Phys. I8

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directions, as indicated in the diagram below. In the first case, matter M without the

form F (metal in blob shape, the state of privation) acquires the form F of Hermes. In

the second case, matter M with a form F (the shape of Hermes) loses that form, and

takes on the form not-F (e.g., a blob shape).

Fig. 1: Aristotle's tripartite theory of change

Now, this theory involves both matter and form as terms, so it's reasonable to expect

that it has a dual. That is, it should be possible for form to play the role of the

underlying, unchanging entity (instead of matter) and for matter to play the role of the

changing entity which moves between form and privation. This possibility is illustrated

in Fig. 2, and, indeed, we see this situation all the time. For example, human beings and

other organisms retain the same form while different tranches of matter cycle through

their bodies. The form remains constant while the matter varies.16

16 An common argument against taking shape to be the form in a hylomorphic compound is that shape is an accident of body. The duality principle shows that this is not always the case. It is possible, as in the human body, for the shape to be the persisting element, while the matter filling in the shape is constantly changing and accidental.

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Fig. 2: The dual

b) Form can travel through matter. Matter can travel through form.

Form can be transmitted from one piece of matter to another. Aristotle describes this

using the example of a gold signet ring, transferring its impression to some warm wax17.

This same principle is at work in modern communication media. As a signal is

transmitted down a cable, the same form is reproduced in sections of the cable made of

entirely different pieces of matter. This process is illustrated at the top of Fig. 3. F is a

form (i.e., a waveform, or information such as a tweet), and as it travels through the

cable, each successive material section of the cable is "impressed" with or assumes that

form.

Now, by the duality principle, this sort of transmission should have a dual, and it does,

although it functions somewhat differently. The dual is illustrated at the bottom of Fig.

3. In this case we have the same matter, persisting through time, as it takes on a series of

varying forms. An example might be a certain piece of clay, continually reshaped by a

child. A more sophisticated example would be a computer or robot, transitioning

through a kaleidoscopic series of states, all while retaining the same material

composition.

17 De Anima, II.12

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Fig. 3: Matter moving through form, and form moving through matter

4.6 Unchanging matter is the ultimate stuff of the world. Unchanging forms are the

ultimate stuff of the world.

Wilfrid Sellars describes an interesting matter-form duality in the development of

ancient philosophy. Note the odd similarity in the properties of form and matter:

"Now it is clear that it does not make sense to speak of universals as changing or coming into existence or

ceasing to be. It is rather to the objects which exemplify universals that these concepts apply. In these

respects, universals are like the fundamental stuffs of the Pre-Socratics, for example the atoms of

Democritus. If it is pointed out that the latter were not immune from all change, since they formed the

world-process by a constant mixing and unmixing, can we not reply that the various universals are related

to (exemplified by) different particulars at different times? This point of resemblance between universals

and world-stuffs might have been sufficient by itself to lead Socrates and perhaps the younger Plato to

hold that universals are ingredients, and indeed, the most real ingredients of the world-process."18

4.7 A contemporary example: "Human mental events are by nature events that happen

in or to human brains; unless and until there are human brains in the world, there can

occur no human mental events."19

This recalls the Berkeleian rejoinder: The only contact we have with brains is as ideas

18 Wilfrid Sellars, "Aristotelian Philosophies of Mind," P. II. 19 Crawford Elder, Real Natures and Familiar Objects," P. 12

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in our minds. That is, objects existing in a world with no minds may "exist" in some

attenuated sense, like objects in another dimension (or objects in the world to someone

who has died). But it's hard to say that they exist in the full sense of the world. More

generally, we can regard "existence" not as an absolute property of an object, but rather

as a relational property which always takes two relata, i.e. "X exists to A." So, for

example, the world exists to A (who is still living) but doesn't exist to B (who is dead).

Or, the organic chemicals and structures inside my cells exist to the organelles in those

cells, but they don't exist to me. According to this approach, a statement of the form "X

exists" is ambiguous and improperly formed, like the statement "X sees" where there is

nothing to see, or "X is a father" where there are no sons.

On such a basis, we can produce the dual of Elder's proposition, namely: "Human

brain events are by nature events that happen in or to human minds; unless and until

there are human minds in the world, there can occur no human brain events."

We can note a couple of points about this. First, in a hylomorphic theory of mind, in

which mind is identified with form, it is impossible for a brain to exist without mental

events. That is, brains are not prior to mental events, and indeed brains and mental

events are simultaneous by nature. Elder tries to deny this by asserting that "the

existence in the world of human brains is logically prior to the occurrence in the world

of human mental events." But that simply begs the question in favor of materialism, and

revives the very problem we're trying to put to rest. For example, if the brain can exist

without the mind, then the brain and mind aren't a true unity, and indeed the mind can't

be the brain. On the other hand, if we identify the mind with the brain, then we collapse

back into materialism, and we're unable to explain how mind and body can engage in a

complex interaction, within the domain of the physical, while still forming a tight and

inherent unity. So it seems the best course is to deny Elder's assumption, and adopt an

assumption (i.e., the simultaneity by nature of mind and brain) which allows the dual of

his statement to be true.

4.7 "Through space the universe grasps me and swallows me up like a speck; through

thought I grasp it."20

This dual is related to but not exactly the same as the duality principle of

20 Blaise Pascal, Pensées [348], transl. by A. J. Krailsheimer, Penguin, 1995, P. 29.

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hylomorphism. Here we have something like: "My mind is in the universe; the universe

is in my mind." A similar idea was explored by Merleau-Ponty, who calls this the

"intertwining":

The first of these terms is the intertwining. It signifies the double relation of being in that which is in us.

Thus, we are in the world; but this is the world that we internalize when we perceive. What this signifies,

as Merleau-Ponty writes, is that each of us has to assert: “I am in the world and the world is in me.” This,

according to Merleau-Ponty, is our natural “perceptual faith.” In his words, “The ‘natural’ man holds on

to both ends of the chain.” He believes that, since he is in the world that he perceives, he grasps things as

they are in this world. He also takes their apprehension to be within him. Thus, when he sees an object, he

takes it as out there in the world, a world that includes himself as one of its visible objects. When he

closes his eyes, this world disappears. He, therefore, also assumes that this world is in himself. As

Merleau-Ponty expresses this, the very “experience of my flesh … has taught me that perception …

emerges in the recesses of a body”—my body. In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty takes this

double relation as something prior to both subjects and objects. This priority is that of visibility or

appearing as such. The intertwining, for Merleau-Ponty, is its inherent form. His claim is that all

appearing exhibits the double relation of our being in that that which is in us.21

5. Duality and being

In the philosophy of mind, it is often suggested that mental events correspond with—

or just are—specific physical processes in the brain. A classic example would be the

suggestion that a quale, like a pain or the experience of the color red, is (in some sense)

the "firing of a certain group or type of nerve fibers." This is a seductive, but mistaken

way of looking at things. It suggests that the quale is somehow a property of the firing

activity per se — as though it were generated like an aura or field, similar to how a

radio can emit signals. The quale becomes a sort of occult radiation that requires

physical activity or work to be brought into being.

To get over this hurdle, note that the brain, like any computer or physical object, can

(at least theoretically) be replaced by an identically functioning dual in which

non-activity plays the role of activity22. That is, we can imagine a brain which carries

21 James Mensch, Selfhood and Appearing: The Intertwining, p. i. 22 Or non-matter plays the role of matter. See below.

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out the same functions as a normal brain, except that neurons in the dual brain are all

normally firing at their maximal rate, and communicate signals by becoming inactive.

Essentially, this is the "photographic negative" of neural processes, in which

non-activity plays the role of activity (or non-being plays the role of being) and vice

versa. The negative retains all of the shape of the original, while replacing "stuff" with

"non-stuff."

Once we reconceive the brain in this way, it's clear that the quale is not being

"generated" like an aura or field by physico-chemical activity. After all the quale can be

associated with non-activity as well as activity—just like no signal can be a signal, or

silence can be a sound, or zero can be a number. When you close your eyes and observe

the "brain gray" quale which fills your visual field, you're experiencing a field generated

not by the activity of neurons but by the non-activity of neurons. The quale attaches not

to the activity, but to the difference or distinguishability between activity and

non-activity.

We can even imagine a "negative" of the physical universe, i.e., a universe where the

figure-ground relationship is reversed. In this universe, what we call empty space or the

void is the figure (i.e., the "stuff," or real existing thing) while particles are holes in this

plenum23.

The upshot seems to be that being per se doesn't belong to the 1 (stuff) side of the 1 vs.

0 (stuff vs. void, being vs. non-being) dichotomy. The bias towards the 1 (stuff) side is

— like the doctrine of the priority of form over matter in traditional hylomorphism — a

temptation that should be resisted. Either side can play the role of "foreground," and it is

the relationship between the two, their difference and distinguishability, that is the real

heart of being.

6. Conclusion

Modern hylomorphism, in the form outlined here, has a number of attractive features.

Most importantly, it provides a satisfying explanation of why mind and body form a

tight, intrinsic unity, and yet remain distinct aspects which can vary independently of

each other. MH points the way toward a non-trivial, complex interaction of immaterial

mind/form and material body within the monism of the physical. MH is also a good

23 A space filled with a perfectly continuous, homogenous material.

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framework for analyzing issues connected with mind uploading and related topics

(although that hasn't been touched on here). It is the author's hope that this paper can

help liberate hylomorphism from some of the traditional accretions that hold it back,

and legitimize modern hylomorphism as a viable theory of mind-body unity and

interaction.