Druz and Jews in 1948

Druze and Jews in the War of 1948Author(s): Yoav GelberSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 229-252Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283714 .

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Druze and Jews in the War of 1948

YOAV GELBER

The relations between the Palestinian Druze and the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) commenced after the riots of 1929. They con- solidated during the Palestinian rebellion in 1936-39 and the early years of the Second World War. Embracing Jabal Druze, they were part of the Jewish Agency's attempts at cultivating contacts with Middle Eastern minority groups. This policy ventured to balance Arab hostility through a friendly 'minorities block', but these groups were rivals and too weak to meet the Agency's expectations.'

The Arab-Jewish tension in Palestine calmed down after 1942. Simul- taneously, frictions between the Yishuv and the Palestine Government increased. Under the new circumstances the ties loosened, losing much of their previous significance for both partners. The Druze's position in an Arab-Jewish confrontation in Palestine again bothered the Yishuv when this contingency reappeared after the Second World War. The Druze, too, exerted themselves on this issue because of their equivocal experience with both Jews and Arabs during the disturbances and ever since.

The SHAI's (the Haganah's intelligence service) officers in Haifa and in Galilee, Gyora Zeid, Amnon Yanai and Tuvia Lishansky, were in charge of local contacts with the Druze. Confident of their eventual fruits if another Arab-Jewish trial of force were to take place, they persisted with cultivating the bond. Elias Sasson and Yaacov Shimoni of the Arab Section of the Jewish Agency's political department, occasionally met with two Druze senior contacts, sheikh Labib Abu Ruqun of Isfiya and sheikh Saleh Hneifes of Shafa'amr. In these meetings they received a comprehensive sketch of developments within the community in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. Gradually, Hneifes attracted sheikh Jaber Mu'adi of Yarka, a prominent Druze dignitary in the western Galilee, to the Jewish side.

The Druze disposition varied according to their proximity to Jewish centres. Mixed Arab-Druze villages, where old intercommunal conflicts erupted now and then, were more favourably disposed to the Jews. Hamlets neighbouring on the Jewish areas followed them, while those in the heart of Arab territories were more careful and reserved.

Early in 1946 the anxiety in Palestine grew. The country expected the Anglo-American Committee's arrival and subsequently a determination of its fate, the Druze being no exception. Upon Jaber Mu'adi's initiative,

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.2, April 1995, pp.229-252 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON



MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

a group of notables assembled in Haifa and decided that the community should cease to depend on the Muslims. Instead, it should tighten its bond with the Jewish national institutions. The assembly appointed Mu'adi as a liaison with the Jews.

A week later sheikh Nimr al-Khatib, chief of the Muslim Brethren in Haifa, summoned Druze elders of the Carmel villages and Shafa'amr. He condemned their relations with the Jews and admonished them to stop selling their land. Al-Khatib particularly denounced Abu Ruqun and Hneifes, showing their pictures in the company of Jewish land traders.2

The Jewish Agency's Arab Section, too, increased its pressure on Abu Ruqun and Hneifes. Sasson and Shimoni felt that 'they do not render services commensurate with the payment they get from us'. Shimoni prevailed on the two sheikhs to diffuse the idea of 'sympathetic [to the Jews] Druze neutrality' and to establish a covert association for its promotion.3

Both sheikhs toured the Druze villages to find out what the community's leaders thought of such an agreement. They reported that the dignitaries welcomed the idea and proposed to summon the elders for a conference. This might be an appropriate opportunity for Sasson to raise the issue of Jewish-Druze alliance. This reply was non-committal, conveying what the messengers supposed to be expected from them. There is no evidence that the meeting ever took place, and even if it did, it yielded no results. Sasson did not cherish hopes in his agents' capacity to bring their brethren over to the Jewish side. He was aware of the opposite Arab pressures aimed at the same purpose: to secure Druze loyalty in a future encounter. The Arab Section was yet incapbale of neutralizing these exigencies.4

Contrary to the situation in 1936-39, the Jewish Agency could not attain in 1946-47 the support of the Jabal's leadership. Sultan al-Atrash was conspiring with King Abdullah of Transjordan for the Jabal's annexa- ftion to his kingdom. For Abdullah this might have been a first step towards accomplishing his 'Greater Syria' plan. The Arab Section knew it and abstained from any interference. In those years it embarked on a separate understanding with the King concerning another component of his scheme, the merger of Palestine's Arab part with Transjordan.5 Because of its close relations with the Maronites and the traditional Christian- Druze rivalry, the Jewish Agency also lacked connections with the leading Druze families in Lebanon. An attempt to establish contacts with the Lebanese Druze had been made in 1944, but was unsuccessful.6

Pressures on the Druze intensified after the publication of the Anglo- American Committee's report. The Arabs demanded a declaration of loyalty to their cause, prevailing on Hneifes to pay tribute to Jamil Husayni, the new chairman of the Arab Higher Committee. Hneifes was non-committal, excusing himself that he had to consult with his colleagues 7

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DRUZE AND JEWS IN THE WAR OF 1948

Simultaneously, the competing paramilitary organizations, the Najada and the Futuwwa, respectively urged Druze youth to join their ranks. The dignitaries, however, were indifferent to the rivalries between the Palestinian Arab militia organizations.8 Several notables even suggested the formation of an independent Druze militia, but their affiliation to the Jews provoked antagonism and the idea did not materialize.9

The Muslim Brethren in Haifa led the harassment of the Druze. Early in 1947 they intimidated Abu Ruqun and Hneifes, demanding to investi- gate their involvement in land transactions with the Jews. The Palestinian Druze recounted the threats to Sultan al-Atrash, who dispatched a mission to Haifa. His delegates sided with their co-religionists and admonished the Muslim leaders to stop bullying them. "' Nimr al-Khatib then substituted threats with persuasion. He visited Druze villages, preached to their inhabitants and made them swear to abstain from selling their land. His efforts were in vain, and the Druze business connections with the Jewish National Fund continued as before. "

Frictions between Druze and Arabs multiplied during 1947. The SHAI watched these quarrels, counting on utilizing them eventually for driving a wedge between the rival villages and expanding it to the entire community. The Palestinian Druze position was likely to affect their Syrian and Lebanese brethren's stance in a future Jewish-Arab war. Attempts at mobilizing Druze support in 1936-39 were well known. Hundreds of Druze were serving in the Syrian army and might retire to join the fighting in Palestine. Druze officers of the Syrian army who visited Palestine declared that in case of an Arab-Jewish war they would act upon the Druze leadership's instructions. Sultan's attitude was still vague. The SHAI learned of his alleged intention to summon an assembly to urge the elders to collect funds and to propagate the cause of the Palestine Arabs. Although this might have been only a cover up of his friendly disposition towards the Jews in the past, it sounded alarming.12

The Arab Section therefore displayed a growing interest in the Syrian and Lebanese Druze's relations among themselves and with their respec- tive governments. It dispatched its agent Ahmad al-Khalil, a judge in Haifa, to report on their development. He met with Druze leaders in both countries and conveyed his impressions to his operator: 'The situation in Jabal Druze is very serious, the relations with the Syrian government have deteriorated and there is no hope for a quick settlement."3 Soon afterwards, in November 1947, riots broke out in the Jabal between the Tarashan - the partisans of the al-Atrash family - and their opponents of Al-Lajnah Sha'biya. The death toll rose to 14 people, the adversaries captured many hostages and Sultan blamed the Syrian government for stirring the disturbances.'4

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After the Arab League's conference at Aley in October 1947, Druze dignitaries joined with Palestinian notables of all creeds who set on pilgrimage to the Mufti in Lebanon. Naguib Manzur, the Mukhtar of Isfiya, paid a visit to Hajj Amin, listened patiently to his exigencies and went to the Jabal to consult with its leaders. They advised him that the Palestinian Druze should negotiate with the Jews and find out their position. They should also ask for their help in counteracting Arab propaganda and demands, such as the recruitment of Druze youngsters to their ranks. 5

Upon the outbreak of hostilities in December 1947 the divisions among the Druze in Palestine and in the adjacent countries continued. The best solution seemed to be to stay aloof and await developments. Notables from Syria and Lebanon who visited the Druze villages cautioned an absolute neutrality towards the Arab-Jewish conflict.16

Among the visitors was Kemal Qanj, a Druze delegate to the Syrian parliament and son of sheikh As'ad of Majdal Shams, at the bottom of Mount Hermon. Through Naguib Manzur he contacted Tuvia Arazi, the Arab Section's representative in Haifa. Qanj offered to provide information on the Palestinian irregulars in the manner of the Druze-Jewish co-operation in the past. Arazi summoned Ezra Danin, the political department's expert on Arab affairs, to Haifa. Danin had some previous experience with sheikh As'ad, and therefore recommended turning down tactfully his son's proposal pending its thorough study. By contrast, Qanj junior favourably impressed Arazi who advised his superiors to hire his services and undertake the expenses. 7

The political department satisfied itself at this stage with prevention. Its main concern was to frustrate any Druze alignment with the Arab gangs, and this had preference to mobilizing their active support. On the eve of the war the Arab Section assigned the liaison with the Druze to Yehoshua (Josh) Palmon, the SHAI's chief operator of spies.

In January 1948 Hneifes proposed to undertake the conclusion of a 'neutrality accord'. Its price was '50-100 pounds monthly for the sheikh to enable him to supervise and to explain, also a modest support'. ' Hneifes summoned an assembly of Druze notables at Daliat al-Carmel where he solicited a decision to abstain from the disturbances. The leaders in the Jabal approved of this position.'9

On 19 February Ben-Gurion asked the advisers on Arab affairs to the Haganah's regional commanders about the Druze stance. Their opinions differed. Lishansky maintained that they would have to co-operate with the gangs despite their reluctance to fight. His colleague from Haifa, Gyora Zeid, insisted that the Druze in the Carmel and in Shafa'amr were not helping and probably would not extend aid to the Arabs.2"

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Late in March 1948 Joseph Fein, a veteran SHAI activist in Galilee, met with Sultan Qanj, Kemal's brother. Qanj told him that he had mobilized a band of 300 Druze, and requested his advice on what he should do next: disperse them or come to Palestine and get in touch with the Jews? Fein consulted with Abba Hushi, the general secretary of Haifa Workers' council and formerly the principal contact with the Druze. Hushi recommended sustaining Qanj and his followers, since if they disbanded another group would arrive. The main problem was financial, as Ben-Gurion commented in his diary: 'They are waiting for a reply (namely a payment). The leader charges 50 pounds and an ordinary member 10-14 pounds.'21

Hushi's approach, however, was anachronistic. Since the 1930s the game rules had changed. The investment seemed unnecessary and was discarded. Qanj and 150 of his men subsequently joined the Druze battalion of the Arab Liberation Army (hereafter ALA) and ultimately scattered in June 1948.22

Since the beginning of the disturbances in December 1947 small groups of Syrian and Lebanese Druze appeared at the villages of Galilee, ostensibly to help in their defence. Simultaneously, a Druze unit organized within the ALA. Broadmead, the British ambassador to Damascus, reported in early March that Shakib Wahab was raising a Druze battalion in the Jabal. Sultan al-Atrash's reservations apart, he remarked, the economic conditions in the Jabal would drive many to join the League's army.23

Wahab was born in 1888. He served in the Ottoman army during the First World War; took part in the Druze revolt against the French in 1926; led a Druze gang in the Arab rebellion of 1936-39; and served in the Druze Regiment of the British army during the Second World War and in the Free French army. In the years 1944-47 he held a commission in the Syrian army; he retired early in 1948 to join the ALA.

Sultan's consent was a prerequisite for Wahab's undertaking. At first, Sultan resisted the Arab League's pressure to involve the Druze in the war. Yet, wishing to preserve the precarious peace in the Jabal after the riots, he permitted Wahab to recruit, emphasizing that 'it should not be a Druze mobilization'. As Broadmead had anticipated, economic hard- ships encouraged rallying around Wahab's banner. Owing to a shortage of weapons he preferred those who came armed and paid them higher salaries. Ultimately, his battalion numbered 500 men, organized in four companies.24

All this was unknown then to the Arab Section and to the SHAI and emerged only during their later deliberations with the Druze. Late in March 1948, rumours spread in Carmel and in Galilee about Syrian and

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Lebanese Druze enlisting in gangs that were about to enter Palestine. On 29 March one of Fine's informants reported the arrival of 250 foreigners at Shafa'amr and identified them as Kemal Qanj's men from Majdal Shams.25 Further gossip about the infiltration of Druze warriors stemmed from all over the country. The numbers fluctuated between 250 and 550, and Wahab was increasingly mentioned as their leader.26

Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the ALA's commander in the field, originally inten- ded to employ the Druze detachment in northern Samaria. The League's military committee overruled him and established a separate command of the Haifa district under Wahab.27 It instructed Wahab to: fortify the villages; harass Jewish traffic; engage the Haganah in battles in moun- tainous terrain where its armoured vehicles would be useless; extend aid to Haifa's garrison; alleviate Jewish pressure on the city's Arab quarters by attacking Jewish settlements around the town; and avoid encounters with British troops except for self-defence.28

Early in April the SHAI reported the Druze's appearance in the country. Informers relayed that they were heading for Isfiya and Daliat al-Carmel.29 They drew this conclusion from patrols which Wahab had dispatched to the Carmel upon its arrival at Shafa'amr. Their mission was to contact the local Druze and to prepare the deployment in these villages. Wahab's intention was not yet clear and his Palestinian brethren urged him to avoid any encounter with the Jews.0

None the less, the SHAI was afraid that local Druze might join their Syrian and Lebanese comrades, and therefore attempted to negotiate with the invaders through its confidants. SHAI's representatives dis- cussed the implications of Wahab's arrival with Naguib Manzur. Manzur turned down a request that the Druze forcibly resist the gangs and deny them access to their villages, and instead proposed that the Jews bribe Wahab to abstain from any action.3'

Hushi, too, used his long acquaintance with the Palestinian and Syrian Druze to make contact with the invaders. In his opinion, it was possible to reach an understanding with them and loyal Palestinian Druze might be installed in their midst. At most, he said, Wahab would feign an attack on a Jewish settlement just to do his duty.32 Hushi, like the Druze, still thought in terms of 1936-39, when he had infiltrated the Arab gangs with Druze agents and As'ad Qanj had satisfied himself with a sham raid on the border fence and returned to Majdal Shams. The battle with Wahab's troops was fierce and far from being 'simulated'.

In the second week of April 1948, Qawuqji's attempt to make a break from Samaria towards Haifa failed. The Haganah defeated his troops at Mishmar Ha'emeq and he appealed to Wahab for assistance. The preliminary talks with Wahab's emissaries had not produced an agreement. In

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mid-April the Jewish forces repelled nine Druze attempts to storm the occupied Arab villages of Hushah and Kasayir, near kibbutz Ramat Yochanan north-east of Haifa. Wahab's Druze and accompanying local irregulars suffered about 100 casualties and had to retreat to Shafa'amr when their ammuniton was exhausted. This rout cooled their enthusiasm to challenge the Jews and several officers immediately dispatched messengers to the nearby settlement and asked to meet with the Haganah's representatives.

On 20 April a Jewish delegation met with Druze emissaries. Its chief was Moshe Dayan, who then supervised neighbourly relations with Arabs in the Haganah's general staff. This meeting apparently took place without Wahab's knowledge. The Druze proposed to defect and even to join the Haganah. Dayan reported the proposition to his superiors in Tel Aviv, but the Haganah was not ready yet to admit Druze volunteers and turned down the suggestion. At the next meeting the Druze spokesman, Isma'il Qabalan, substituted the defection proposition with a proposal to act for the Haganah behind Arab lines. The Jews approved and the Druze officer undertook to carry out sabotage operations in Galilee and to encourage his soldiers to desert. Soon the SHAI's Druze agents reported a mass desertion among Wahab's men. This was subsequently confirmed when the IDF captured Wahab's documents at Malkiye late in May 1948. At the beginning of that month, 212 defectors went back to Jabal Druze. No trace of the promised sabotage, however, was visible when the IDF occupied the lower Galilee in July 1948.33

Wahab felt that he was losing his men's allegiance. Concurrently he complained about not being adequately supported by the League's military committee and through Jaber Mu'adi's mediation on 9 May met a SHAI delegation at Shafa'amr. Both sides committed themselves to a cease-fire, and Wahab undertook to occupy the western Galilee. The idea was to create an independent Druze enclave in this area, which according to the UNO's partition plan belonged to the Arab state. A week later Wahab refused to extend aid to Acre. He was also careful to be absent when the British evacuated the Shafa'amr police station and the Haganah took it over.34

Following the Arab armies' invasion of Palestine on 15 May 1948, the ALA pulled back to reorganize. The Druze battalion left Shafa'amr and moved to Malkiye, on the Palestine-Lebanon border. Unaware of the general process of the ALA's reorganization, the SHAI wondered whether this movement testified to Wahab's treachery or an urgent need to defend Malkiye.

The transfer notwithstanding, the contacts with Wahab persisted. Before the assault on Malkiye on 28 May 1948 the Druze had withdrawn

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from their positions and the IDF occupied the empty village. During the first truce in June-July 1948 the Druze battalion dispersed. Most men returned to Jabal Druze and a few found shelters in Druze villages in Palestine. Only 50 continued to serve in the ALA.35

The Druze detachment's arrival in Shafa'amr and its participation in the fighting unmasked the community's hesitations regarding its stance. The Druze wished to safeguard themselves towards all parties: the Jews, the ALA and the governments of Syria and Lebanon. Their own heavy sacrifices, the ALA's defeats in April-May 1948 and especially the checking of the Arab armies' invasion, strengthened those who favoured the Jewish connection. But only in late July 1948, when the IDF's triumph was apparent, could they openly work for a full alliance with the Jews.

When the fighting resumed in July 1948, Shafa'amr was among the IDF's first objectives. Its conquest was closely co-ordinated with the SHAI's local agents to protect the Druze population and to secure its co-operation.36 SHAI officers accompanied the troops into the town to associate promptly with their confidants and to make sure that no Druze lives were lost or property damaged. Salah Quntar, the Druze local militia leader, received early warning of the imminent attack and dis- appeared from the scene. In his absence, the mostly Muslim militia offered little resistance.37

Operation 'Dekel' and the conquest of Shafa'amr in July 1948 brought the IDF closer to the Druze villages of the western Galilee. Its success, culminating in the conquest of Nazareth, encouraged the Druze to align themselves with the the Jews. Simultaneously, their relations with the neighbouring Muslim villages deteriorated. The Arabs blamed them for treachery, and the number of local incidents grew considerably. In one or two instances Druze hamlets appealed to the IDF for occupation and protection. The tension increased when Druze villages refused to admit Arab fugitives, while ALA's local commanders alloted to Muslim refugees land tracts previously cultivated by Druze.38

The local SHAI officer, Chaim Averbuch, introduced Mu'adi to Colonel Ben Dunkelman, a Canadian volunteer who commanded the IDF's 7th brigade in the western Galilee. They met at Nahariya on 28 July 1948 for a friendly discussion of future co-operation between the IDF and the Druze. Dunkelman promised to provide the Druze with arms and explosives and to come to their aid in the event of an ALA attack. The sheikh pledged that at the truce's end the Druze would let the IDF into their villages. If the ALA did not attack them, Israeli troops would enter the villages following a faked battle. Mu'adi also asked to meet with Hushi and the two promptly conferred in Haifa, where the sheikh undertook to obtain the other Druze villages' approval of the arrangement.

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This should have been a step towards signing a formal accord between Israel and the Druze.39

Dunkelman promptly planned to take over five Druze villages: Abu Snan, Julis, Yarka, Jat and Yanuh.4" The operation, none the less, was eventually postponed and ultimately cancelled. The pro-Israeli notables did not deliver the necessary commitments on their part. Their failure to do so reflected the continuing conflict within the community about the open alignment with the IDF. The proximity of the ALA force in Tarshiha seemed to several elders too dangerous. Its commander, Mahdi Bek, meanwhile demanded from Mu'adi to admit his troops into Yarka. Sheikh Jaber consulted with his colleagues of Julis and Abu Snan, and replied:

First, they have no water. Secondly, they are ready to welcome an ALA detachment. It should consist, however, of not less than 5,000 heavily armed men, otherwise they will only bring ruin upon the village.4'

The entire ALA did not exceed 3,000 men and the reasoning behind the answer was clear enough. Mahdi Bek did not press his demand and satisfied himself with stationing a small garrison in Yanuh, the village closest to his headquarters at Tarshiha. The IDF, too, gave up military occupation of the Druze villages. Instead, it turned to the UNO observers who supervised the truce, claiming the evacuation of the ALA troops from Yanuh. Israel also demanded from the UNO an official resolution that the Druze enclave in the Jat-Bet Jan area was out of the ALA's bounds.42

The Druze villages thus remained a no-man's-land between the IDF and the ALA lines. Both, however, continued to exert on them opposing exigencies throughout the truce. The IDF, the Foreign Ministry and Daat (or the 'Political Department'), the predecessor of the Mossad (Secret Service), were all active, sometimes competing with each other, in cultivating the Druze connection. The purpose, Shimoni wrote to Sasson, was:

To maintain their neutrality friendly to us and hostile to Qawuqji, and to encourage armed resistance to any attempt by Qawuqji to take over their hamlets . . . We promised them full assistance . .. They swear that this is their true stance. Their friendship and alliance with us are sincere and stable, although outwardly they appear neutral or even pro-Arab.43

Late in August 1948, after the ALA entered Yanuh and Jat unopposed, the Israelis summoned their Druze confidants to a conference at Abu

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Snan. They demanded to know why the Druze had not resisted this move and asked how they meant to react if Qawuqji attempted to occupy other villages. Shimoni analysed the differences of opinion among the Druze: while the religious leader sheikh Amin Tarif of Julis regarded their neutrality as a mask to conceal their real position from the Arabs, his colleague sheikh Salman Kheir of Abu Snan emphasized their impartial stance. Both minimized the significance of the ALA's occupation of the villages, assuring the Israelis that if Qawuqji tried to expand his domination the Druze would offer armed resistance.44

The IDF meanwhile extended its contacts also to the Druzse villages surrounding Mount Jirmaq - Bet Jan, Hurfish and Buqi'ah. Anticipating the truce's end, Dunkelman asked Emmanuel Friedman, the Ministry of Minorities' Affairs' representative in Safad, to obtain information on the three hamlets and to find out whether they were prepared to co-operate with the IDF. Consequently, Dunkelman met with the Jirmaq's notables and suggested that they prove their sincerity by operating behind the ALA's lines. The elders insisted, however, that such a course would be too risky unless the IDF occupied the villages immediately after the action. Dunkelman accepted this argument, agreeing to a permanent liaison and transmission of intelligence about the ALA's movements in the area.45

Late in September 1948 Daat concluded similar arrangements in the western Galilee through Jaber Mu'adi. He promised the neutrality of Julis, Yarka and Abu Snan if hostilities resumed. Simultaneously, the IDF should occupy Yanuh and Jat, previously coordinating the act with their inhabitants in the manner of Shafa'amr. Mu'adi undertook the necessary negotiations with the villages and Daat was confident of success.'

On the opposite side, the Lebanese Minister of Defence, Amir Majid Arsalan, summoned the Galilee Druze notables to Lebanon. In Qawuqji's presence he prevailed on them to refrain from any separate peace with the Jews and to collaborate with the ALA. The delegates refused to commit themselves and Qawuqji threatened to multiply their villages' burden. The IDF's intelligence service estimated that the ALA's recent combative- ness in Galilee had meant to impress the Druze by demonstrating to them the IDF's weakness. It was a last minute attempt to prevent their defection to the Israeli side.

The weak point of the preliminary deals was the village of Yanuh. Its proximity to Tarshiha, the site of the ALA Yarmuk brigade's Head- quarters, increased Qawuqji's concerns about the hamlet and his determination to prevent its desertion. In late September, Palestinian irregulars attached to the ALA occupied the village, replacing the small ALA garrison. Their task was to defend the southern approaches to Tarshiha

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and simultaneously to supervise the local inhabitants' behaviour and to frustrate their possible betrayal.

A month later, the IDF launched operation Hiram, conquering within 60 hours the central Galilee and 11 villages in southern Lebanon. Although Yanuh was not a principal objective of this campaign, a fierce battle took place in and around the hamlet. For political and prestige reasons, the assault was assigned to the new IDF's 'Minorities Unit' as its first test of active combat.

Military Intelligence, Daat, the Ministry of Minorities' Affairs and the 7th brigade headquarters each connived with Druze agents to secure the village's peaceful surrender, but the gambit failed, however, owing to the poor coordination among Jewish and Druze agents. The outcome was a tragic misunderstanding. The village's defenders opened fire on the approaching Druze force. It was caught by surprise, expecting the hamlet to capitulate peacefully to the feint, and fourteen of the IDF's Druze and Jewish officers and other ranks died.47 The Druze of Carmel, who had suffered the most casualties, angrily claimed that the fiasco could have been avoided and demanded an investigation into the chain of events which had led to it.48

The Yanuh affair assumed political significance in the Druze internal power struggles and damaged relations between villages and leading families as well as between the Druze and the Israeli authorities. Although the villages of Carmel and Galilee held a Sulha ceremony a few weeks after the battle, the excitement continued. The Abu Ruqun clan, which had lost several members at Yanuh, demanded an inquiry, asserting that the ordeal had been tantamount to a conspiracy to kill the Druze soldiers. Besides, they claimed, the matter involved notables whom the Israeli authorities unjustifiably treated with all due honours.49 It was more than an insinuation of Mu'adi's role in the affair as the mediator who had suggested the idea of a 'simulated battle', but the allegation should be considered in the context of the dignitaries' struggle for domination within the community.

The clearest manifestation of the Jewish-Druze alliance was the formation of the IDF's Minorities Unit in the summer of 1948. On the Druze's part this was a solemn expression of loyalty to the state in accordance with their long tradition.5" The IDF and Daat's motives were more practical. They schemed to use this unique unit for intelligence and subversion purposes and to employ it in special tasks behind enemy lines. Another idea was to use it to make contacts with Druze serving in Arab armies, particularly the ALA and the Syrian armed forces, and incite them to defect.

Members of the Minorities' Unit were of varied origin, not necessarily

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Druze. Since the invasion on 15 May 1948 the Palmach recruited friendly bedouin irregulars in raids on Arab hamlets along and beyond the Syrian and Lebanese frontiers.5' Soon other tribes asked to enlist in the IDF, mainly for economic reasons.52 A few dozen Druze volunteers under Gyora Zeid operated alongside the 'Oded' brigade, first in Galilee and later in southern Carmel. All but two were natives of Isfiya and Daliat al-Carmel, who belonged to the Abu Ruqun, Halabi and Manzur families; one came from Shafa'amr and one from Majdal Shams.53 The 'Golani' brigade, operating in the lower Galilee, had a small Circassian detachment composed of villagers from Qafar Qama.54

The creation of irregular and half-regular detachments of Druze, bedouins and Circassians provoked complaints about the preferential treatment given to minority communities. Their opponents claimed that there had been and still were hostile Druze, and friendly Muslims too. Danin, who had advocated the idea of a Minorities Unit, replied that it was not a question of distinguishing between the good and the bad, but a matter of interests:

We have not ignored for a moment our previous experience and knowledge of the Druze and the Christians. They are not different from the Muslims and perhaps they are worse. What mattered was their freedom of choice or the lack of it. The Muslims identify with their hinterland while these [the Druze] are weak and have no alternative . . . If one knows in advance the habits of his ally in distress, his character and his record, he can somehow manage.55

The authorities dismissed the criticism. The IDF's general staff decided to establish a regular organized Minorities Unit in co-operation with Daat. All Druze, Circassians and bedouins who had been attached to various brigades were transferred to the new unit's barracks at Nesher, near Haifa. The sub-units were organized on an ethnic basis, most of the new recruits being Druze. Lishansky became the unit's commanding officer and Yanai was his deputy for communal affairs.56

The new unit also admitted Druze deserters from the ALA's ranks, often relatives of Israeli soldiers who mediated their defection and admit- tance. Lishansky has testified that there was a deliberate policy to recruit as many deserters as possible, to undermine the Arab authorities' confidence in the Druze and the Circassians: 'We bought off as many as we could. We used them for various intelligence purposes and dispatched them across the borders, not as soldiers but as civilians.57

By the end of the war the Minorities Unit numbered about 850 officers and other ranks. It consisted of 400 Druze (of whom 80 were Syrian and

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Lebanese), 200 bedouins, 100 Circassians and 150 Jews. All officers and most technicians and other professionals were still Jews. From the beginning of 1949 the unit performed security duties along the frontlines and trained its new recruits.58 On the demobilization of the war army a corresponding reserve unit was also created, and the Druze were inte- grated in the Military Service Law of December 1949. Nevertheless, they continued to serve voluntarily until 1954, when the Knesset amended the conscription law to include all eligible members of the community.

The Minorities Unit overshadowed an irregular detachment of Lebanese Druze and Maronites, led by Israel Ben-Yehuda ('Abdu) and Iser Halamish. Its story began early in October 1948, when a few Druze and Maronite youngsters from villages in southern Lebanon crossed the border, asking to enlist in the IDF. The foreign ministry objected to creating a regular Maronite formation within the IDF, but acquiesced by using Lebanese volunteers as saboteurs behind the lines. Daat wanted to use them also for espionage and 'Abdu hastily trained them in sabotage methods. A fortnight later he dispatched the first saboteurs to blow up a bridge and a field park of Lebanese armoured vehicles in preparation for Operation 'Hiram'.59

The irregulars' next assignment was to frustrate the infiltration into recently occupied Galilee from Lebanon. Palmon suggested the idea to Ben-Gurion, who at first doubted their reliability in performing such duties. Palmon assured him of their devotion and stressed their other advantages in this task: 'These have always been loyal. They could not move over to Lebanon since they are traitors. Also they would be allowed to rob the infiltrators . . . They are expert smugglers who know all the routes and lanes.' Ben-Gurion approved, overruling the objection of Galilee's military governor, Emmanuel Mor, who claimed that entrusting this delicate mission to the Minorities Unit was inconceivable."

The detachment was reinforced for its new role by enlisting older Druze recruits, Israeli and Lebanese. The irregulars received a military rifle and a pair of shoes, while their salary came from the Minorities' Unit's special fund, collected by sales of captured smuggled property.6'

The Israeli propaganda agencies made an extensive use of the unit for psychological warfare. Radio broadcasts in Arabic glorified its activities as a symbol of intercommunal fraternity, in sharp contrast to the friction between Muslims and minorities in the Arab states. Agents returning from Syria and Lebanon reported on the broadcasts' 'tremendous impact' on the authorities, which consequently endeavoured to improve their relations with the Druze population.62 Besides broadcasting, the IDF distributed leaflets of psychological warfare describing the unit's routine and duties (although pictures of barefooted bedouins were sometimes

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mistakenly captioned 'our Druze and Circassian allies', and calling on enemy soldiers to defect.63

Despite the leaflets' rosy sketches, the Israeli Druze were partially under a military government. Since the beginning of the war the Carmel Druze enjoyed special treatment as a result of ties with the Yishuv dating from 1929. None the less, because of their proximity to the yet unoccupied Arab enclave in southern Carmel, Haifa's military governor restricted their freedom of movement and tightly supervised their trade. The reason was the contrabanding of supplies to the Arab hamlets. The Druze received their provisions from Haifa, were better off than their besieged neighbours and attempted to make profits by trading the surplus with them.6

Following the enclave's occupation late in July 1948, the government abolished most restrictions on the Carmel Druze. The status of their brethren in Shafa'amr's, however, was different: they were too close to ALA-held territory and the military governor of the western Galilee closely watched their movements.

Upon the liberation of the central Galilee in Operation 'Hiram', Israel had under its rule 18 Druze villages, a population exceeding 13,000. A new issue emerged following the IDF's penetration of southern Lebanon: Israel's relations with the Lebanese Druze. In view of the recently created vicinity the elders of Hazbaya asked Abu Ruqun to mediate between the community in Lebanon and the Israeli authorities concerning their future bond.

Initially, the new military governors, who lacked previous experience with Druze or awareness of their uniqueness, treated them on an equal basis with the Arabs.65 The army wished to confiscate all private weapons in the Druze sector, but the foreign ministry and Daat opposed the idea because such a measure might shake their loyalty. News about Druze smugglers who were allegedly bringing Arab refugees back from Lebanon across the border intensified the dispute over the policy to be taken regarding the community.

In view of the complex problems in the north, the foreign ministry suggested attaching a political officer to the northern front's headquarters. It maintained that the attitude towards the Druze was not a matter of military government but an issue of high policy, requiring expert counsel.66 Although Ben-Gurion disapproved of this idea, he insisted on differen- tiating between the various communities and advocated preferential treatment of the Druze. He overruled the expropriation of their arms since 'they would be reluctant to hand them over and the use of force would be undesirable'. Instead he ordered the registration of weapons, providing their owners with official licenses to carry them.67

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Ben-Gurion also instructed the chief military governor, Aluf (General) Elimelech Avner, to consult with Hushi on all civil matters pertaining to the Druze. According to his guidelines Hushi advised the military governors in the Galilee on questions such as the reopening of village schools and the appointment of mukhtars. His main contribution was to the swift organization of the Druze into an autonomous community. The government abolished Druze subordination to the Muslim courts, longstanding since the Ottoman period, and established an independent Druze judiciary.69

The Jewish-Druze connection spread beyond the bounds of Palestine. In Israeli eyes, the Palestinian Druze should have been a bridge to their brethren across the borders as they had been in the past.

Political contact with Jabal Druze ceased on the outbreak of war. However, Israel had proved its viability by checking the Arab invasion, and the Syrian Druze, just as their Palestinian brethren had done, had to reconsider their position. The villages of the Golan Heights anticipated the region's possible occupation and wished to safeguard themselves against such a contingency.

Late in June 1948 messengers from Majdal Shams crossed the front- line, asking to meet Israeli representatives. Local SHAI officers conferred with the emissaries, whose principal request was to guarantee the Druze rights if the IDF occupied their villages. The generous treatment accorded to the Israeli Druze had impressed them and they suggested publicizing this in Syria to contradict stories about Israeli atrocities. They volunteered to recruit Druze officers in the Syrian armed forces for intelligence purposes and perhaps for 'broader ambitions'. According to the SHAI's report, 'only after this has been accomplished should they claim compensation for their expenses . . . They think that much could be done to harass the Syrians and they are ready to do it'.69

A week later the truce ended and hostilities broke out, impeding this communication. Furthermore, since the envoys were opponents of the Qanj clan their errand induced their local rivals to bolster their ties with the Syrian authoritries. However, the outcome of the ten days of fighting between the truces opened new channels to Jabal Druze. Sultan al-Atrash, who had practically severed relations with the Syrian government, encouraged the Golan Heights' notables to cultivate the Jews.7' His close ally king Abdullah had probably influenced in this. He, too, concluded that the Arab coalition had failed to save Palestine and sought a separate understanding with Israel to consolidate his domination of the West Bank.

During the second truce Daat made various attempts to communicate directly with Sultan. Palmon, in charge of operations in the Arab sector, dispatched Labib Abu Ruqun to the Jabal. The courier failed to reach

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Sueida, the Jabal's capital, and had to flee to Lebanon after the Syrian authorities had become suspicious of his movements. In Beirut he met with Zaid al-Atrash, Sultan's younger brother. Abu Ruqun advised Zaid to contact the Israelis and propose 'feasible common plans' to oust the Syrian government. They agreed that Zaid would return to Jabal Druze to find out Sultan's dispostion before returning to Lebabon for further discussions. From Beirut he would summon Abu Ruqun, who would then bring with him Israel's proposals.7'

While Abu Ruqun was travelling between the Jabal and Beirut, a new avenue opened up with the advent of a delegation from Jabal Druze. Its chief was Anis Hatum, a native of the Jabal who was well-known to the SHAI and to its successor, Daat. Hatum had appeared in a Jewish settlement in the Galilee in February 1948, claiming to speak for Sultan and offering his services to the Jews.72 He had run several errands for the IDF beyond enemy lines, including damaging bridges in the Golan Heights. Now he came again, ostensibly on a 'political' mission.

Hatum and his colleagues met an Israeli team consisting of Danin, Shimoni (deputizing for Sasson as chief of the foreign ministry's Middle East department), Zvi Mekler of Daat and Yanai of the Minorities Unit. They pretended to be Sultan's deputies for 'discussing an agreement with Israel concerning a revolution in Syria'. Another assignment was finding out whether Israel would extend to the rebel Druze military and financial aid.

Certain points in their presentation made the Israelis suspicious. The Druze revealed that they had contacted French diplomats in Amman who had imparted their proposals to Paris, assuring them of French assistance in the forthcoming insurrection. They could not explain, still, France's interest in such a coup. Furthermore, the envoys seemed embarrassed when Shimoni said he would verify this story through Israel's connections in the French capital. Hatum also professed to having been associated with many opponents of the Syrian regime. He mentioned several names, but Shimoni was sure that it was impossible for all of them to co-operate. Moreover, it was inconceivable that an experienced rebel such as Sultan would have confided in so many people. Shimoni therefore wondered whether the Druze were truly their leader's emissaries or just imposters.

Ultimately, Hatum confessed that he had not been empowered to sign an accord. He urged the dispatch of an Israeli agent to the Jabal to con- clude the negotiations. The Israelis refused and instead sent a message to Sultan offering to negotiate with him or with his authorized deputies at a location of his choice. Israel preferred to hold the talks in France, where Sasson was staying at the time, trying to establish direct connections with Arab contacts.

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Shimoni summarized his impressions of the peculiar deputation: 'We have no complete assurance that the people with whom we have spoken were Sultan's emissaries. Yet, even if they were adventurers and charlatans we have told them nothing that might be harmful.' Sasson verified the Druze story in Paris and informed his colleagues in Tel Aviv that 'as far as it concerns the French, it has no basis'.73

The uncertainty in respect to Sultan's true stance continued. Early in September 1948 a Syrian newspaper published an interview with the Druze leader, who declared his loyalty to the Arab cause. Sultan denied the allegations, reproaching the Druze for their indifference to the war. If there had been such manifestations, he insisted, they should have been attributed to the riots in the Jabal. The newspaper did not indicate the interview's date, but if it was not a fake, Sultan had probably granted it earlier, probably at the beginning of 1948.74

A serious obstacle to any Jewish-Druze co-operation emanated from the continuing internal divisions among the Druze villages and clans in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. In the Golan Heights the partisans of Israel and Syria quarrelled with each other. Sultan al-Atrash continued to flirt with Abdullah. The sheikhs of Hazbaya, the community's spiritual leaders, urged the evading of conscription into the Syrian army.75 Sultan differed with the Lebanese Druze leaders over their contacts with the Syrian government. They, for their part, were furious at his attitude toward the internal strife between the Junbalat and the Arsalan clans. The atmos- phere in the Jabal was strained since the riots in November 1947, and Sultan's own prestige in the region was dubious.76

Despite the scepticism about Sultan's position the approaches towards him continued through Labib Abu Ruqun. Zaid al-Atrash returned to Beirut and summoned Labib as they had previously agreed. Palmon instructed the courier to speak only for the Israeli Druze and not for the government. If he were convinced of Zaid's sincere co-operation he should introduce him to an official Israeli delegate.

The Syrians were apparently aware of the Druze decreasing loyalty, either because they had learned about the secret contacts with Israel or due to the establishment of the Minorities Unit. In reaction, they tightened the supervision of the Druze officers' whereabouts. These were solely Sha'bis, since the Tarashan had already pulled their people back from the army. Their adversaries, anticipating the next round in the struggle for dominating the Jabal, also began to desert, anxious to keep their strength for the forthcoming trial.77

After Operation 'Hiram', the IDF turned its main effort to the Egyptian front. Its operations in the Negev late in 1948 probably convinced Sultan al-Atrash that he had little to expect from the Israelis. There is no record

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of further Israeli-Druze negotiations in the early months of 1949. None the less, there is evidence of Sultan's continuous plotting with Abdullah. While the Israelis were far away and showed no sign of moving towards the Jabal, Transjordan was adjacent and Abdullah was interested. Depu- tations from the Jabal visited Amman, and the king granted them some money for 'political subversion'.:

During the second truce and afterwards, the foreign ministry's 'Arabists' had little confidence in the IDF's capacity to crush the Arab armies suffi- ciently to enforce a political solution. Seeking a way to break the dead- lock, they looked for other options. An apparently attractive proposition was to attempt a coup d'etat in an Arab state. A successful revolution might disintegrate the Arab coalition, turn the Arab states' attention away from Palestine and eventually lead to a peaceful settlement.79

Natural candidates for such a putsch were the Maronites in Lebanon and the Druze in Syria, the two minorities with whom the Jews had established close ties during the period of the mandate. The Maronites, however, had shown their impotence several times during their alliance with the Jewish Agency. The Druze, whose relations with the Syrian government had deteriorated since the country had become independent in 1946, were therefore regarded as the most qualified to spearhead such an insurrection.

Danin and Shimoni cherished high expectations in the Druze connection, but were aware of its cost, financially and otherwise:

We consider an alignment with potential rebels in Syria . . . for creating a serious diversion and stabbing a poisoned knife at the back of the Arab coalition . . a way to precipitate a desirable solution. Obviously, if we align with the Druze . . . for a serious rebellion we shall have to devote to it many efforts and funds. Our army, too, should be ready to help.

The estimated expenditure was 10,000 pounds for the preliminary work for the operation; 100,000 pounds for a thorough examination of its feasibility; and half a million for its execution, besides arms supplies. Foreign minister Moshe Shertok, however, cooled down his subordinates' eagerness to act swiftly. He told them that in view of the state's financial breakdown there was no chance of carrying out such an ambitious scheme. Although he authorized the preparatory deliberations for exploring t'ie plan's practicability, he vetoed excessive financial commitments.""

Sasson concurred with Danin and Shimoni's opinion that a revolution in an Arab country could preface the war's end, but doubted Israel's capacity to realize it: 'We lack the good connections essential for such an audacious venture.'8' Danin refused to accept this grim conclusion. He

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maintained that the new circumstances did enable Israel to organize a coup d'etat:

Hitherto we have never had a common border with Ishmael [the Arabs]. We could not provide our partners with shelter and protection. We also could not supply them the necessary minimum of arms and ammunition, as well as train and prepare on our territory the future accomplices.

Meanwhile, he added, conditions had changed. Danin insisted on a serious survey of the possibilities. He wanted to use the small budget of 10,000 pounds approved by Shertok to feel out the position of potential con- spirators and summed up:

I am startled neither by the little chances of success nor by our poor actual connections, the financial cost and not even by a possible failure. The temptation is so attractive, the assets to be gained by its realization are so promising. . . that we should not consider this proposition an illusion.82

Danin, Arazi and other foreign ministry's 'Arabists' persisted with their efforts to cause a revolution in Syria as a means to dissociate it from the war. The deteriorating economic conditions, the continuing excitement in Jabal Druze, Syria's isolation within the Arab League and the growing political tension seemed a convenient background for a coup d'etat.83 Yet, the crucial question who might replace the existing rulers remained unanswered.

Early in December 1948 riots broke out in Damascus and rapidly spread throughout Syria. The crowd accused premier Jamil Mardam of 'selling the Galilee to the Jews'. Assuming temporary control, the army entered the principal towns to restore order.'M Mardam resigned and the agitation led to the institution of a new civil government under Khalid al- Azm. This was also a first step towards Husni al-Za'im's seizure of power four months later.

The Druze took an active part in this outburst. The IDF's intelligence ascribed the instigation of the riots, and the Druze participation in parti- cular, to Abdullah. It had information that thousands of Druze were allegedly training in Transjordan under Arab Legion's officers and Trans- jordan clandestinely shipped arms to the Jabai. Rumours circulated about a secret agreement to establish a 'Greater Syria' under Abdullah's suzerainty with Druze assistance.85

Opinions in the foreign ministry concerning the riots were divided. Walter Eitan, the director general, concurred with military intelligence, emphasizing the role of the controversy over the 'Greater Syria' issue and

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Syria's relations with Britain in inspiring the disorders. Mardam and his associates did blame British oil companies for inciting the disturbances to bolster the pro-Transjordanian opposition.86 The foreign ministry's Middle East department, by contrast, underestimated the involvement of outside forces in inflaming the situation. It ascribed the outburst primarily to economic causes. Since there was no alternative to the ruling elite, it stayed in power though some personal changes had taken place.87

In the wake of the upheaval Mardam went to France. In Sasson's absence (he had returned to Israel to take part in negotiations with Abdullah), Mardam met in Paris with two lower-ranking Israeli officials. They described Israel's conception of a possible arrangement with Syria, stressing the need for a breakthrough, and asked him to deliver the message to his successors in Damascus.88

The riots in Syria probably inspired Danin and his colleagues to prepare a draft plan for a coup d'etat in that country. Its purpose was instituting a new government in Damascus that would recognize Israel and sign a treaty with it. A 10,000 strong Druze army under Zaid al- Atrash should storm Damascus, where a sympathetic press previously bought off would welcome its arrival. Other partisans within the Syrian armed forces, such as the Circassians and the 1st Gendarmerie brigade, whose commanding officer had already been bribed, would then join in. The government would probably escape and a 'revolutionary regime' would be formed. France would recognize the new rulers, who should start negotiations with Israel.89

This scenario was surprisingly close to realization three months later, though not through the Druze but members of another minority group, the Kurds. Husni al-Za'im's coup d'etat late in March 1949 and the subsequent negotiations with Israel were astonishingly reminiscent of Danin's dreams. There is no conclusive evidence yet of Israel's involvement in Za'im's putsch. However, the already accessible Israeli documents contain several clues insinuating the existence of previous contacts with his principal political adviser, Husni Barazi (also a Kurd). They also imply an intention to get in direct touch with the Syrian Chief of Staff for launching a revolution.

The Israeli foreign ministry was less familiar with the Kurds and their problems than with the rest of the Middle Eastern ethnic and religious minority groups. None the less, Za'im's being of Kurdish descent and Kurds' participation in the Iraqi army in Palestine encouraged the interest in this nation. Thoughts of developing relations with Muslim states such as Turkey and Iran, both having substantial Kurd minorities, augmented this support.

Sasson had a veteran Kurd agent, the Emir Dr Kamuran Ali Bedir

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Khan, an exile who lived in Beirut. In the summer of 1948 they met in Paris and subsequently the spy set out on a tour of the Arab countries to explore the feasibility of a revolution. Upon his return to Paris he suggested a Kurd insurrection supported by Israel. Arazi dispatched him again to Syria to examine the chances of putting this into effect. Back in Paris Bedir Khan presented a long narrative, enumerating the potential bearers of the ostensible revolution."' Arazi sent the report to Tel Aviv and the enthusiastic Danin immediately proposed to unite the Kurds with the Druze. He also recommended involving Palmon, who until now had cultivated the Druze connection, in the scheme."'

Bedir Khan's paper was inconclusive on several issues. Upon further debriefing by Arazi he confessed that its real author was Barazi. The Syrian politician came twice to meet the Kurdish agent in Beirut, and Bedir Khan paid him 400 pounds out of Sasson's special fund as his 'expenses'.92 Barazi's association with Za'im was well known. Danin and Shimoni therefore suggested to invite both of them to Paris to discuss the revolution.93 Daat, too, joined the enterprise. In November Palmon went to Switzerland where he met with a high-ranking Syrian who might have been Barazi himself.94

Here the accessible documents stop. There is three months' gap between Za'im and Barazi's last mention in the available Israeli source material and the revolution. This gap might have been filled by the CIA, as Itamar Rabinovich has recently shown.

Za'im's seizure of power in Damascus seemed to fulfil Danin's broadest dreams. Within a few days he started armistice negotiations with Israel (though these had already been fixed in principle with the previous government through the UN mediator). He displayed readiness to con- clude a peace treaty, subject to various territorial and other stipulations, and even to settle many Palestinian refugees in Syria.95 A few months later, Sami al-Hinawi's next putsch in Syria surprised the Israeli intelligence services and foreign ministry, proving that revolutions in the Middle East were a multisided affair. Other interested parties, too, could incite them and Israel would not always be the beneficiary.

NOTES

1. Y. Gelber, 'The Antecedents of the Jewish-Druze Alliance in Palestine', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No.2 (April 1992), pp.352-73.

2. SHAI reports, 19 and 26 February 1946, Haganah Archives (hereafter HA), 105/195. 3. Shimoni's report to Bernard Joseph (director of the Jewish Agency's political depart-

ment) on 'Our Contacts with the Druze', 20 March 1946, Central Zionist Archives (hereafter CZA), S25/6638.

4. Sasson's report to Joseph, 30 April 1946, CZA, S25/3301.

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5. 'The Cantor"s report, 29 May 1946, HA, 8/8/B: 'A. 'A. reports, 7 June 1946, CZA, S25/4557, and 13 June 1946, CZA, S25/9023; News from Lebanon, 23 Sept. 1946, CZA, S25/9024; and news from Transjordan, 26 May 1947, CZA, S25/9037. 'The cantor' was a Palestinian agent close to the Mufti and the Arab Higher Committee. 'A. 'A. was the Arab Section's longest-serving agent in Syria. On the Jewish Agency's contacts with Abdullah at that time cf. Y. Gelber, 'The Negotiations between the Jewish Agency and Transjordan, 1946-1948, in Studies in Zionism, Vol.11, No.1 (Spring 1985), pp.53-84.

6. Asher Lutzky's report on his tour of 35 Druze villages in the Shuf mountains of Lebanon, 15 Oct. 1944, CZA, S25/6638.

7. News from 'Abu Yusuf (Gyora Zeid) in the SHAI's Arab Section review, 3 May 1946, HA, 105/195.

8. Reports on the conference of Druze notables at Haifa, 15 Nov. 1946, ibid. 9. News from Naguib Manzur (Mukhtar of Isfiya) through 'the journalist' (Ahmad

Manimni), 5 Dec. 1946, ibid. 10. 'Hanoch"s (Haifa SHAI) report, 2 Feb. 1947. 11. 'Hanoch"s report on the Muslim Association's visit to the Druze villages in Carmel,

16 July 1947. 12. 'Zefa"s (Galilee SHAI) news, 4 and 6 November 1946. 13. 'Hanagid"s (Ahmad al-Khalil) reports, 10 and 19 Aug. 1947. 14. A review on the events in Jabal Druze and their background, 16 November 1947, Israel

State Archives (hereafter ISA), FO/2567/13. 15. 'Hiram"s (Haifa SHAI) report, 11 Nov. 1947, HA, 105/195. 16. Information from 'Hiram', 18 and 25 Dec. 1947, ibid. 17. Arazi to Sasson, 16 Dec. 1947, CZA, S25/4015/A. 18. 'Lavi"s (Yoseph Fein) report on his interview with Hneifes, 23 Jan. 1948, CZA. S25/

6638. 19. Palmon's report, 5 Aug. 1948, HA, 105/195. 20. Entry for 19 Feb. 1948 in Ben-Gurion's War Diary (Hebrew), Vol.1 (Tel Aviv 1982),

pp.253-5 and a protocol of the meeting, HA, Israel Galili files no. 21. 21. Entry for 30 March 1948 in Ben-Gurion's War Diary, Vol.1, p.327, and Tene/A (the

SHAI's Arab section) daily summary, 19 April 1948, Israel Defense Force Archives (hereafter IDFA), 1/57/810.

22. SHAI reports, 24 May 1948, HA, 105/31, and 26 June 1948, HA, 105/195. 23. Broadmead to the Foreign Office, 8 March 1948, PRO, FO 371/68368. 24. Daat's (the SHAI's successor and the early form of the Israeli Mossad) review on 'The

Druze in the Palestine War', 1 Aug. 1948, IDFA, 957/52/13. 25. 'Hiram/Amiqam"s (Amnon Yanai) report, 16 March 1948, HA, 105/195; News from

'Hiram' and from 'Zefa/Leshem' (the SHAI officer in the lower Galilee), 25-27 March 1948, and Fein's report, 30 March 1948, ibid.

26. News from 'Hiram' and from 'Tiroshi' (the SHAI officer at the central district), 1-5 April 1948, ibid.

27. Qawuqji's organizational order, 23 March 1948, IDFA, 1/57/49, and Taha al-Hashimi's order to establish a separate command of the Haifa district, 28 March 1948, IDFA, 1/57/64.

28. General Hashimi's operational order to the Haifa district commander, 28 March 1948, ibidem. Hashimi was the ALA's Inspector General. Formerly, he had served in the Iraqi army and was Iraq's premier for a short period in 1941.

29. Various informers' reports, 1-7 April 1948, HA, 105/195. 30. Daat's review (note 24 above). 31. 'Hiram"s report to Tene/A, 4 April 1948, HA, 105/195. 32. 'Hiram"s report to Tene/A on the Druze gang in Shafa'amr, 5 April 1948, HA, 105/216. 33. 'Hiram"s report to Tene/A, 2-5 May 1948, HA, 105/195, and Daat's review (note 24

above). 34. Ibid. and Amnon Yanai's and Mordechai Shakhewitz's oral testimonies, March 1990. 35. Tene/A daily summary, 28 Mary 1948, IDFA, 1/57/810; 'Hiram"s report to Tene/A on a

meeting with Druze soldiers, 2 July 1948, HA, 105/227; Daat's review (note 24) and

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Palmon's report, 5 Aug. 1948, HA, 105/195. 36. Cf. D. Koren, Kesher Neeman: Hahaganah Ve Hadruzim (A Faithful Bond: The

Haganah and the Druze) (Tel Aviv, 1991), pp.64-5, and B. Dunkelman, Neemanut Kefula (Double Loyalty) (Tel Aviv, 1977), pp. 164-7.1.

37. Amnon Yanai's testimony, March 1990. 38. 'Hiram"s report to Daat/A, 27 July 1948, HA, 105/195. 39. 'Hiram/Yesha'ayahu"s (Averbuch) report on the Meetings with Sheikh Marzuk

Mu'adi, 1 Aug. 1948, HA, 105/195. 40. Operational Order 'Chaim' of the 7th brigade HQ, 28 July 1948, IDFA, 721/72/310. 41. 'Zuri/Joseph"s reports to Daat/A, 10 Aug. 1948, HA, 105/104, and 17 Aug. 1948, HA,

105/131. 42. Eitan (Director General of the Israeli foreign office) to Ridman, 18 Aug. 1948, ISA,

FO/2426/1 1. 43. Shimoni to Sasson, 19 Aug. 1948, ISA, FO/3749/1. 44. Shimoni's memorandum to Shertok (Minister of Foreign Affairs) on the co-operation

with the Druze, 15 Sept. 1948, ISA, FO/2565/8. 45. Friedman to Gad Machnes (Director General, Ministry of Minorities' Affairs), 1 Oct.

1948, ISA, C/307/10. 46. Daat to Yadin (Director of Military Operations at the IDF General Staff), 27 Sept.

1948, IDFA, 2384/50/10. 47. For a detailed description of the battle cf. Koren, op. cit., pp. 70-9. 48. Moshe Itah (the representative of the Ministry of Minorities Affairs in Haifa) to Shitrit,

1 Nov. 1948, ISA, C/1318/20. 49. Itah to the Ministry for Minorities' Affairs, 11 Jan. 1949, and Machnes' reply, 24 Jan.

1949, ibid. 50. Cf. Shakib Saleh, History of the Druze (Tel Aviv, 1989), in Hebrew, pp.45-9. 51. Cf. Y. Cohen, Le'or Ha'yom U'ba'machshach (In Daylight and in Darkness) (Tel Aviv,

1969), pp. 134-7. 52. Protocol of the meeting of the Advisory Committee to the Chief Military Governor,

23 Sept. 1948, ISA, FM/2564/11. 53. A list of the first 70 Druze recruits, undated (probably summer of 1948), ISA, C/1318/

20. 54. Shimoni to Sasson, 19 Aug. 1948, ISA, FM/3749/1. 55. Itzhak Avira to Danin, 29 July 1948, ISA, FM/2570/11, and Danin's reply, 16 Aug.

1948. 56. Lishansky's testimony, pp. 115-19, and the Chief of the General Staff's circular letter on

the establishment of the Minorities' Unit, 24 Aug. 1948, IDFA, 7249/49/219. 57. Lishansky's testimony, pp. 157-8. 58. Lishansky's memorandum on the conditions of his unit, 3 April 1949, IDFA, 488/55/

394. 59. Shimoni to Sasson, 2 Nov. 1948, ISA, FM/2570/11. 60. Entries for 20 Dec. 1948 and 1 Jan 1949 in Ben-Gurion's War Diary, Vol. III, p.888. 61. Lishansky's testimony, p. 158. 62. Daat's report (note 24 above). 63. Asher Dotan's (Lutzky) comments on the leaflets, 30 Nov. 1948, ISA, FM/2564/1.

Dotan headed the Foreign Office's Arab propaganda section. 64. Yaeli's report on his meeting with Mahmud al-Madi of Ighzem,13 June 1948, HA,

105/89; Lublini to Yaeli, 15 June 1948. Tene/A's daily bulletin, 16 June 1948, HA, 105/147.

65. Shakhewitz to Shitrit, 17 Oct. 1948, ISA, C/308/10. 66. Shimoni to Sasson, 12 Nov. 1948, ISA, FM/3749/1. 67. Entries for 10 and 15 Nov. 1948 in Ben-Gurion's War Diary, Vol.1, pp.807 and 828. 68. Entry for 22 Nov. 1948 in ibid., p.839. 69. 'Tzuri/Dori"s (Shapira) report to Tene/A on the interview with the Druze emissaries,

2 July 1948, HA, 105/195. 70. 'Tzuri"s report, 29 July 1948, ibid.

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71. Shimoni's memorandum to Shertok on 'The Druze Action', 15 Sept. 1948, ISA, FM/ 2565/8.

72. 'Hiram/Amiqam"s report to Tene/A, 16 Feb. 1948. 73. Shimoni's memorandum to Shertok on 'The Druze Action', 15 Sept. 1948, ISA,

FM/2565/8. 74. Al-Nadhir,4 Sept. 1948. 75. Daat's daily summary, 4 Aug. 1948, HA, 105/147, and information divulged by an ALA

Druze officer in the IDF Minorities Unit's report to Military Intelligence and Daat, 3 Sept. 1948, HA, 105/131.

76. Daat's report on the Druze, 27 Sept. 1948, HA, 105/195. 77. The Middle East department's review of the situation in Syria and Lebanon, 17 Dec.

1948, ISA, FM/2565/13. 78. MI/1's daily summary, 17 Jan. 1949, IDFA, 7249/49/236. 79. Danin to Arazi, 21 Sept. 1948, ISA, FM/3749/1. 80. Shimoni to Sasson, 16 Sept. 1948, ISA, FM/3749/1. 81. Sasson to Shimoni, 27 Sept. and 6 Oct. 1948, ibid. 82. Danin to 'Hadad' (Arazi), 24 Oct. 1948, ibid. 83. The Middle East department's review of the situation in Syria, 19 Oct. 1948, ISA,

FM/2565/13. 84. MI/l's daily summary, 4 Dec. 1948, IDFA, 5254/49/74. 85. MI/1's daily summaries, 7, 10 and 11 Dec. 1948, ibid. 86. Eitan to Epstein (the Israeli ambassador to the United States), 16 Dec. 1948, ISA,

FM/364/14. 87. The Middle East department's review of the situation in Syria and Lebanon, 17 Dec.

1948, ISA, FM/2565/13. 88. Arazi and Zeligson to Sasson, 31 Dec. 1948, ISA, FM/3749/1. 89. A draft-plan for a revolution in Syria, 28 Dec. 1948, ibid. 90. Shimoni to Sasson, 23 Sept. 1948, ISA, FM/3749/1. 91. Danin to Arazi, 21 Sept. 1948, ibid. 92. Sasson to Shimoni, 27 Sept. and 6 Oct. 1948, ibid. 93. Shimoni to Sasson, 2 Nov. 1948, ISA, FM/2570/11. 94. 'Yerushalmi"s (palmon) report in 'Yanai' (Daat's Paris station) to Daat, 17 Nov. 1948,

ISA, FM/2569/12. 95. Cf. I. Rabinovich, Hashalom Shehamak (The Evasive Peace) (Jerusalem, 1991),

pp.59-97. Rabinovich was not aware of the earlier connections with Barazi and does not mention them.

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Druz and Jews in 1948

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