Domestic Terrorism and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical

Analysis of Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping

ISRAEL ADOBA B.Sc.| M.A| SAC.Dip| SAC.Cert| M.Sc. (In View)

Coventry University

Introduction

A peaceful, stable and secure environment is considered to be one of the basic needs of every

society (Huggins et al 2012). Security in any society can be achieved in a tranquil situation devoid

of threats to lives and property. Some of these threats are terrorism, political instability,

environmental degradation, economic meltdown, religious intolerance, to mention a few. Amongst

these threats, domestic terrorism has currently drawn the attention of the world as developed and

developing countries faced with threats of domestic terrorism (Peterside 2014: 283).

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and not a sole preserve of any class, clan, religion or race.

Terrorism dates back to the era of the Roman Empire when Roman Emperors used terrorism to

control domestic dissents and eliminate suspected enemies (Oche 2007:11). In the First Century

AD, the “Scarii”, referred to as “Dagger Men” employed terrorism to oppose Roman domination

of the land of Judea (Oche 2007:11). In the eleventh and twelfth Centuries, “Hashasheen”, a

terrorist group in Northern Iraq, systematically assassinated Muslim and Christian leaders (Oche

2007:11). Terrorism gained prominence in the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror (1793-1794)

where the government ruled through violence and fear (McCauley 1991:8). State terrorism as

exhibited in France, “also formed part of domestic terrorism when state actors (police, military,

etc.) resorted to acts of terror against their own nationals (Oloo 2009).

In 1894, Auguste Valliant threw a bomb into the chambers of Deputies in Paris, an action which

led to his execution in the same 1984 (Wardlaw 1982: 22). The execution of Auguste was avenged

a week later with the explosion of a bomb in a café in Paris which led to twenty people being

injured, one of whom later died. The president of France, Sadi Carnot, was also assassinated the

same year, in reaction to the execution of Auguste (Wardlaw 1982: 22). In Russia, domestic

terrorism was both one aspect of the formation of a revolutionist party and a symptom of a general

crisis within the Russian society (Wardlaw 1982: 19). This new wave of terror in Russia opened in

1902 with the assassination of Sipyagin, the Minister of Interior (Oloo 2009).

The assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Rabin, in Tel Aviv on the fourth of November

1995, was an act of domestic terrorism. The assassination was aimed at stopping the Israeli peace

process with Palestine because the assassin said that he ‘did not approve of the conceding of Israeli

lands to the Arabs, especially settlements like Gaza Strip (Oche 2007:64). In India, the attack by

militants on the four Hindu families in Waridhama, killing 23 men, women and children on the 25th

of January, 1998 was a demonstrated case of domestic terrorism (Oche 2007:25). In August 2004,

2 New York City natives were arrested for planning to blow up the 34 Street Subway Station in the

heartland of Manhattan’s Herald Square. The two had no known ties with Al-Qaeda or any

organization, hence an official of the New York Police Department (NYPD) classified the incident

as a “home-grown, lone-wolf incident” (Okumu and Botha 2008:15).

In Africa, there have been several incidences of terrorism in various forms or another. For instance,

the August 1998 bombings of the Embassy of the United States in Kenya and Tanzania which

killed hundreds; the October 2002 Soweto bombings by the White Supremacist Boermag

Organization in South Africa and the October 2004 bomb blast at Egyptian tourist resorts that

killed 28 people, to mention but a few (Lumina 2008: 11). Nigeria today is under serious threats of

domestic terrorism emanating from the restive youths of the Niger-Delta and the recurrent attacks

on the state by the Boko Haram Insurgents (Oloo 2009). The youths resorted to the disruption of

oil production, pipeline vandalism, hostage-taking, kidnaping, assault and bombing of oil

installations to fight for the perceived injustice in the distribution of the oil wealth (Ogundiya

2009). Boko Haram on the other hand have created for themselves a multivaried image by the

incessant bombings with the impunity and horrific portrayal of people burnt to ashes, maimed and

properties wantonly destroyed with the recent kidnapping of 234 girls from a secondary school in

the country (Blanchard 2014:5; Ogege 2013:82).

The hostage-taking and kidnapping of foreigners in the Niger-Delta region made the Federal

Government lose about N570 billion ($4.4 billion) in revenue as at 2006 (Ogundiya 2009). Also in

2006, more than 60 foreigners, mostly oil workers, were kidnapped but later released (Ifidian

2009:34). This later spread to other parts of the country, for instance, the kidnapping of Pa Simeon

Soludo (the father of the former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), was kidnapped

on the 27th October, 2009, in the South-East, Anambra State (Anyanwu 2009:6). Foremost

Nollywood actors- Pete Edochie and Nkem Owoh were kidnapped in August 2009 (Ifidian 2009:3;

Amatus 2009:8). In the North West, the Secretary to the Government of Kaduna State, Mr. Waje

Yayok, was kidnapped in September 2009 as well (Omipidan 2009:8).

The incidents of domestic terrorism, especially hostage-taking and kidnapping impinge on the

national security of the country as the act instilled fear and uncertainty in the minds of the

citizenry, thereby inhibiting investment and development and constituting a threat to national

security. This spate of kidnapping which has adversely affected the psyche of Nigerians has

become a serious source of concern. It was therefore as a result of this concern that a resolution

was taken by the House of Representatives asking the Inspector General of Police (IGP) to

mobilize security votes available to checkmate hostage-taking and kidnapping as well as related

crimes (Oraetoka 2009). Apart from creating fear and insecurity in the country, the incidences of

hostage-taking and kidnapping virtually affected any positive development that was to take place.

If according to McNamara (2005:48) that national security is development and development is

national security, then, the menace of hostage taking and kidnapping should be tackled head-on

(2005:48). The concern of the Federal Government of Nigeria towards finding a solution to

domestic terrorism has therefore motivated the researcher into undertaking a critical analysis of

hostage-taking and kidnaping in this dissertation.

Statement of the Problem

Nigeria, as a country, is under internal security threats occasioned by acts of domestic terrorism

which greatly affects the nation’s stability and well-being (Ogundiya 2009:31). Prominent among

these acts of domestic terrorism are ethno-religious fighting, violent and un-abated attacks in the

oil-rich Niger-Delta, small arms proliferation, hostage-taking and kidnapping, bombing and

wanton destruction of property (Ogundiya 2009:31-32). Domestic terrorism, especially hostage

taking and kidnapping negate security and where there is no security, anarchy strives and there is

no development. There is an urgent need for the Federal Government of Nigeria to curb hostage-

taking and kidnapping due to the consequent threat to national security. Any threat to the national

security will definitely have far-reaching negative consequences on Nigeria’s foreign image, the

country as a whole and the world at large.

Research Objectives

The main objective of this study is to examine the extent to which domestic terrorism has impacted

on the national security of Nigeria. The specific objectives are to:

1. Establish the relationship between domestic terrorism and national security;

2. Examine the impact of hostage-taking and kidnapping on the national security of Nigeria;

3. Identify the issues encountered by the various security agencies in combating the incidence

of hostage taking and kidnapping in Nigeria and proffer strategies to address these issues

Research Questions

In order to achieve the objectives of this study, the following research questions will be relevant to

this work:

1. What is the relationship between domestic terrorism and national security?

2. What impact does hostage taking and kidnapping have on the national security of Nigeria?

3. What are the issues encountered by the various security agencies in combating the

incidence of hostage-taking and kidnapping in Nigeria and what strategies can be adopted

to address these security challenges issues?

Research Methodology

The documentary research method will be used in gathering and analysing data for this work.

Review of relevant textbooks, newspapers, internet and all relevant publications and journals on

domestic terrorism and national security are used in this work. Therefore, the method of data

analysis is explanatory in nature.

Sources of Data

Since the method of data is based on secondary source, the sources adopted for the collection of

data will include relevant books, conference papers, unpublished works, interviews, journals and

the internet.

Methods of Data Collection

This study has adopted a variety of methods. These include research, use of the library materials,

internet search.

Technique of Data Analysis

Data analysis is based on the qualitative method, which is explanatory in nature. The descriptive

parts will consist of explaining the relationship between domestic terrorism and national security.

The use of figures and tables in this study would help in arriving at logical deductions.

Significance of the Study

The significance of the study is that the findings of this research would contribute to policy input

for members of the Security Council at the Federal, State and Local Government levels. Secondly,

the findings would be useful to the various security agencies such as the Nigerian Police, State

Security Services and their operatives who are directly charged with the onerous task of

maintenance of law and order as well as members of the armed forces. This research will also be

useful to members of the media especially defence and security correspondents who report issues

related to national security. Finally it would contribute to the existing body of knowledge on

domestic terrorism and hostage-taking as well as provoke further research interest on the subject

matter.

Scope of the Study

This study covers the decade 1999-2009. This period is chosen because of the upsurge and

intensity of hostage-taking and kidnapping within the period in Nigeria and the urgent need for a

long lasting solution. This study covers domestic terrorism with particular reference to hostage-

taking and kidnapping in Nigeria in relation to national security. The relationship between

domestic terrorism and national security, the impact of hostage taking and kidnapping on national

security and the challenges will also be discussed.

Conceptual Discourse/ Review of Literature

Domestic Terrorism

A seminar in Ghana on combatting terrorism titled ‘Understand Terrorism in Africa’ from the 5th to

the 6th of November 2009 came up with a definition of domestic terrorism as:

‘A terrorist act usually conducted by local groups within the state for the purpose of overthrowing a government or achieving local political advantage’ (Okumu 2009).

This definition did not address the economic, social and cultural values that could also give rise to

domestic terrorism. It also failed to reflect violence, coercion and fear. It is therefore not apt for

this study. Domestic terrorism, as conceptualized by Akanji (2009) is:

‘The act of terror committed within the boundaries of a sovereign state against civilians, the government and public and private properties in a bid to coerce or intimidate the government of people of that state’ (Akanji 2009).

However, Akanji’s conceptualization did not identify what constitutes a terrorist act and the

terrorist. The definition focused only on acts targeted against individuals or state. It is therefore not

a suitable definition for this study. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines domestic

terrorism as:

‘Acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of any state; which appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by mass destruction assassination or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the state in question’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2009).

Synthesizing from the foregoing conceptualizations, domestic terrorism, for the purpose of this

study, can be defined as terrorist acts of groups and individuals who are based and operate entirely

within a country and its territories without foreign direction. It is the unlawful use of force or

violence to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or government to further political, social or

economic objectives through acts of kidnapping, hostage-taking and other crimes. Human lives and

property are always threatened in the process. It is therefore pertinent to define hostage-taking and

kidnapping which is the main focus of this research.

Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping

Hostage-taking is ‘the seizure or capture of a person depriving him or her of liberty as a guarantee

that certain actions or promises will not be carried out’ (Encyclopedia Free Dictionary 2009). It is

the act of holding somebody as a prisoner by a person or persons such as criminal or terrorist

organizations, until specific demands are met or money handed over. Hostage-taking today is an

act of terrorism and a very serious crime (Asokan 2009). It is a new trend of domestic terrorism in

Nigeria used by the perpetrators or criminals to force relatives of any one held hostage to pay a

ransom fee (Attoh 2012:214). It is also used to ‘compel multi-national companies and governments

to take certain actions or refrained from some. The criminal activity involved in hostage-taking is

kidnapping (Microsoft Encarta 2009). On the other hand, kidnapping is the act of taking a person

against his/her will from one place to another under circumstances in which the person so taken

does not have freedom of movement, will, or decision through violence, force, threat or

intimidation (Free Dicitonary 2009). Kidnapping is an act of domestic terrorism now in vogue in

Nigeria. Kidnappers’ use it for ransom or reward purposes and views it as economically viable

hence, the upsurge in Nigeria. Both definitions border on limiting the liberty and freedom or

persons kidnapped and kept hostage for the purposes of ransom or reward. For the purpose of this

study therefore, both terms; hostage-taking and kidnapping will be used interchangeably in the

process of writing this dissertation.

National Security

Samaddar (2005:48) defines national security as:

‘a physical situation and a psychological condition where citizens have full freedom and opportunity to develop their potentials in their designed fashion; and, in the most fruitful manner without resistance’(2005:48)

This definition excludes the economic development and the political role of the government

towards ensuring national security. Uneven or poor economic growth and development may

stimulate internal dissent which is a threat to national security hence, an invitation to political

instability and internal security. This definition is not apt and therefore not accepted for this study.

According to McNamara (2005:43), national security is:

‘Part of the government policy which aims at generating favourable national and international strategic environment for the protection, promotion and proliferation of national values against existing or potential threats’ (2005:43).

McNamara sees development as an important aspect of national security; hence, he states that in

modernizing society: “Security means development”. Security is not military hardware though it may include it. Security is not military force though it involves it. Security is not military activity though it may encompass it. Security is development and without development there can be no security” (McNamara 2005: 48).

This definition talks of security based on national values, development and the military. Other

elements of national security like human development, food security environment, to mention a

few, are excluded. This definition is therefore not suitable for this study. Lippman (2009) defines

national security to mean:

“When a nation is secure to the extent that it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war (Lippman 2009)

Lippman’s definition is limited to preparedness of the military to defend the nation’s values when

challenged internally or externally. This definition is also not suitable for this study. On a more

suitable note, Obasanjo (2009) defines national security as the:

“Aggregation of the security interests of the individuals, political entities, human associations and ethnic groups, which make up the nation. The security interest includes safety of life and property, economic, psychological and mental well-being and the freedom to pursue the attainment of legitimate objectives without hindrance” (Obasanjo 2009).

Obasanjo’s definition is comprehensive as it touches every aspect of human endeavour and the

society and hence will be adopted as the definition for this study.

Review of Existing Literature

Domestic terrorism aims at creating disaffection among institutions in the state while national

security stands as the only instrument in the possession of the government and state to thwart any

threat to its existence and threats to humanity within its entity. The main purpose of national

security is to counter both the internal (domestic) and external (international) behaviours that might

threaten the survival of the state and its citizenry.

Oyeniyi, (2009:12) in his work on the ‘Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”

opined that:

“Domestic terrorism has an uneven growth in Nigeria it manifests in civil government situation as well as in inter-relationships between the different ethnic nationalities making up present Nigeria in form of ethnic or ethno-religious crisis with negative consequences on the national security of Nigeria” (2009:12)

To Oyeniyi, domestic terrorism in the post-colonial Nigeria manifests itself as ethnic nationalism

and militancy such as the age graders and other community based bodies. These bodies later

metamorphosed into the political and social development tools of these areas as some of the groups

later turned to interest groups. Oyeniyi argued that because of the precarious security situation in

the country whereby the police were overwhelmed, many vigilante organizations were formed to

improve on the security situation in their countries (Oyeniyi 2009:14). He further argued that the

emergence of the bodies like the Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra

(MASSOB), O’dua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

(MASSOP), Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND) and the recent insurgence

by the Boko Haram terrorist group were as a result of the insecurity problem in the country. With

dozens of these armed groups in the name of vigilantes, the role of the state security agents have

been summarily usurped. A situation whereby vigilante organizations take over the role of the state

security agents shows the failure of the security system in the country and, hence, the adverse

effects on the national security (Oyeniyi 2009:15). Although Oyeniyi argued that the precarious

situation in Nigeria informed the formation of vigilante groups, his work, however, failed to cover

the impact of the activities of these vigilante groups on the country’s national security.

The state derives tremendous power from its claim to be the guardian of national security, power

over resources and imposition of extra-ordinary measures on citizens. Since the role of the state is

to provide security to its citizenry from any threat, whether violence within or without, it is seen as

the only institution capable of providing that security on the face of an anarchical domestic

environment of an armed state (Terif et al 2009:145). Akanji (2009:56) in his work on “The

Politics of Combating Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria” established the jurisdiction within which

domestic terrorism takes place. His argument was limited to the terror activities in the Niger Delta

by the various groups as mentioned above and the Northern Part of Nigeria with the Boko Haram

insurgency but he failed to highlight its effect on the national security of Nigeria (2009:56).

Obi (2009:14) on his work on “The Impact of Domestic Terrorism on Civilian-Government

Relations” centred his argument on state terrorism in Nigeria from 1993 to 2007 (2009:14). He

stated that the acts of terrorism lead to domestic terrorism through the reaction of disenchanted

civil populace or religious fundamentalists (2009:14-15). Obi’s work also failed to mention other

acts constituting domestic terrorism, the perpetrators and its effect on the national security of the

country. Imobighe (2009:36) in his work titled “The Challenges in Categorizing Domestic

Terrorism” sees domestic terrorism as being perpetrated by persons or local groups within the state

to redress some domestic problem (2009:36). He did not identify these local groups as indigenes

who violently or coercively act against the government, public or individuals to achieve economic,

political or religious goals. These acts that constitute domestic terrorism are not mentioned and its

impact on national security not reflected within the state (2009:37).

Lumina (2009) again in his work on “The Impact of Domestic Terrorism on Human Rights in

Africa” limited the act of violence by nationals of a state within the state to change the political and

or social order of that state as domestic terrorism (Lumina 2009). Other variables or acts that

constitute domestic terrorism are lacking. This study sees domestic terrorism as an act to change

only the government or any authority in power. Lumina did not identify terrorists and other persons

or property that could be affected by the act of terrorism. The implication of domestic terrorism is

not also reflected. However, such acts of domestic terrorism such as political assassinations,

bombings, hostage-taking and kidnapping undermine confidence in the state’s ability to protect its

citizens. National security is a situation devoid of fear, violence, uncertainty and anarchy. Any act

of domestic terrorism threatens the security of lives and properties as well as stalls economic

development and foreign investment. Going back to the 9/11 attack on the United States, the

government of the US beefed up its national security in order for such incident never to take place

(Oche 2009: 41). The hostage taking and kidnapping, bombing and wanton destruction of property

in Nigeria are acts of domestic terrorism which have threatened the security of lives and property

and hampered local and foreign investment in the area.

Discussions on domestic terrorism in Nigeria as postulated by the works of the various scholars

reviewed, proved the extent of existing literature on domestic terrorism in Nigeria as well as their

complex features and the challenges to national security. However, the scholars’ works on

domestic terrorism did not bring out clearly the impact of domestic terrorism as it affects national

security. This study therefore seeks to fill the gap.

Theoretical Assumptions of Domestic Terrorism and National Security

Acts of terrorism are manifestations of unresolved conflicts and inability of the government to

overcome the challenges are reflections that the root causes of the conflicts are not identifies and

therefore the correct mechanism could not be adopted to manage or resolve it. Scholars such as

Cunningham (2003), Adekanye (2007), and Obi (2009) have propounded several theoretical

models to explain the prevalence of domestic terrorism but for the purpose of this study, a

combination of frustration-aggression, cognitive dissonance and asset to liability theories are

adopted.

The frustration-aggression theory is associated with works of John Dollard et al (1939) the core

assumption of which is that “aggression is always a consequence of frustration” (1939:1). The

authors argued that individuals are motivated to achieve life ambitions and fulfil destiny, but when

these expectations are thwarted, frustration sets in. In their line of thought, the occurrence of

aggressive behaviour presupposes “the existence of frustration always leads to some form of

aggression” (Dollard et al 1939:1). It is pertinent to note here that the existence of frustration does

not always lead to aggression, given that frustration may have other consequences other than

aggression. However, this argument may have failed to differentiate between instigation to

aggression and the real incidence of aggression, but this study acknowledges that frustration

generates inquiries to various types of consequences, which may include instigation to certain

kinds of aggression (Berkowitz 1989). Aggression may develop as a consequence of having been

exposed to an extremely frustrating condition sufficient to provoke the experience of hopelessness

(Amaraegbu 2011: 212). On this theory, the New Partnership for Africa’s development (NEPAD)

pointed out eloquently that:

“Nigeria presents a remarkable paradox of an enormously wealthy country both in potential and real terms, serving as home to the third largest concentration of poor people in the world. The country, although with the substantial revenue it makes from its oil wells annually has failed to provide the basic services for its people” (NEPAD 2008:33).

Adekanye (2007) provided three set of factors that largely explain the processes that

metamorphoses into conflict situations that can as well lead to domestic terrorism and these are the

structural background conditions, precipitating and triggers factors. Festinger (1951) developed a

theory about communication’s social influences, referred to as cognitive dissonance which is one

of the most important psychological concepts that shed light on terrorist behaviour. Cunningham

(2003) observes that:

“Men prefer a situation of stability in respect of values, behaviour and their environmental conditions. When people experience a difference between what they perceive and what they desire (cognitive dissonance), they seek to reduce this dissonance by reducing this gap through actions filtering information or altering perceptions” (Cunningham 2003)

Cognitive dissonance is therefore experienced whenever there is a discrepancy between preferred

value and actual value states. Such a situation has the tendency to produce hatred, anxiety, fear and

the desire to hurt or eliminate the source. The discrepancies could manifest within economic,

social, cultural, political and religious spheres as these issues form the micro level of analysis that

could be regarded as the structural background conditions operating at the individual level (Alao,

Alao and Atere 2012:3). It needs to be acknowledged that not in all instances of cognitive

dissonance or everybody that experiences it as well as deprived individuals or groups may choose

to commit terrorist acts. Some people may suffer in silence and adopt constitutional means to

address their grievances. Galtung (1969) in addition to the theories hypothesize the presence of

significant socio-economic indicators that can serve as breeding grounds for terrorists, but they do

not answer the question of why some people or groups in the same structurally disadvantaged

situations choose terrorism and others do not. Hence, the Boko Haram insurgency and other groups

within the Niger-Delta could therefore be located largely in the real or perceived discrepancy

between the preferred way of life and the actual state of living that influences the dissonance.

On the asset to liability theory Cunningham (2003) sees this theory as one that serves as a root of

“terrorist strategy”. The theory assumes that governments view states and local government areas

within its jurisdiction as assets that much be defended against internal or external aggression. It

goes further to state that acts of domestic terrorism will cost the government valuable lives and

money in defending these assets against sustained terrorist campaigns, for instance, Boko Haram.

The theory assumes that after the government suffers significant losses, the asset will become

instead, a liability and the government will decide to forfeit the asset and cut their losses, hence,

the goal of the government of the terrorist in this instance is to destabilize the country and make it

‘ungovernable’ as this could lead to a situation of breakup of the country. This is built on the

assumption that the anti-terrorist campaigns set up by the government will become oppressive in

order to combat domestic terrorism which will expose the weakness of the government and will in

turn make the members of the public withdraw from supporting the decisions of the government

and develop sympathy for this domestic terrorist groups. Though this theory has been criticized

time and time again, it reflects significantly the philosophy behind domestic terrorist groups and to

a large extent serves as the reason governments have been unable to overcome the challenges of

domestic terrorism.

Summary of the Chapters

Chapter one introduces the study. It discovers the problem, objectives, as well as the significance

of the study. It also outlines the scope of the study, limitations and discusses the methodology.

Chapter two provides a historical overview on domestic terrorism in Nigeria from 1999 to 2009

which is the time frame for this study as well as conceptualizing terrorism and examining the

Niger-Delta Conflict and the Boko Haram insurgency.

Chapter three examines domestic terrorism and security threats in Nigeria, discussing the nature,

causes and manifestations of domestic terrorism in Nigeria while looking at impact of domestic

terrorism on the national security of Nigeria and its foreign image.

Chapter four examines the security issues and the strategies for addressing these issues, first by

identifying the management of domestic terrorism in Nigeria thereby followed by identifying the

strategies for curbing the hostage-taking and kidnapping in Nigeria

Chapter five summarizes the study and findings and concludes the study.

CHAPTER TWO: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN

NIGERIA Nigeria, since her return to civil rule in 1999 has faced some national security challenges across the

six geo-political zones in the country. The spate of bomb blasts, kidnapping and other forms of

criminalities in recent times in various parts of the country are emerging trends of domestic

terrorism. This view was also shared by the Minister of Police Affairs in 2011, Ret. Navy Captain

Olubolade, when he acknowledged that the nation now faced new security threats different from

what was at hand in the not so far back past:

“I will rather say that we are facing new threats different from what we used to face before. But as these threats confront us, we will find solutions to them; it is now a period to look forward and overcome the challenges that face us” (NAN 2011).

As a fact, the high rate of kidnappings, armed robberies and political assassinations, are added

dimensions to the security challenges, which are stretching the nation to its limits, sometimes

constitute a great threat to the very fabric of its existence (Abimbola and Adesote 2012:11). A

number of analysts have variously attributed the disturbing trend to political dissatisfaction, ethnic

and religious differences, perceived societal neglect and pervasive poverty among the people. For

instance, the youth restiveness in the Niger-Delta and the consistent attacks by the Boko Haram

Sect and the activities of the Odua’a People’s Congress (OPC) has been worrisome since 1999.

The trend of domestic terrorism in the country has become a major concern for both the Nigerian

government and the international community. Significant stakeholders have suggested that there

should be a check on the new security challenges and that a holistic approach should be adopted in

collaboration with international organizations in order to proffer strategies to get rid of incidences

of domestic terrorism. It is against this background that this study will investigate the challenges of

domestic terrorism in Nigeria since 1999. This chapter will examine the history of domestic

terrorism in Nigeria since 1999 as well as the concept of terrorism. Also discussed will be the

historical analysis of two of the current instances of domestic terrorism- the Niger-Delta Crises and

the rise of the Boko Haram Sect while examining the context for which this study was selected in

the first place- hostage-taking and kidnapping.

Historicizing Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria since 1999

It is pertinent to state here that there is no universally agreed definition of terrorism. However, the

activities of terrorists involve bombings, assassinations, hijackings, hostage taking, to mention a

few, in order to intimidate nations into changing their policies or their leaders or surrendering parts

of their territory. Terrorism has existed for at least 2,000 years and is likely to remain a fixture on

political agendas, both domestic and international for years to come. Historically, the first known

acts of what we now call terrorism were perpetuated by a radical offshoot of the Zealots, a Jewish

sect active in Judea during the 1st Century AD. The Zealots resisted the Roman Empire’s rule of

what is today Israel through a determined campaign primarily involving assassination (Rapport

1984:658). Zealot fighters used the Sica, a primitive dagger, to attack their enemies in broad

daylight, often in crowded market places or on feast days- essentially wherever there were people

to witness the violence. The Jewish Zealots used terrorism to resist the Romans by killing many

Roman soldiers and destroying Roman property. The assassins embraced the same notions of self-

sacrifice and suicidal martyrdom evident in some Islamic terrorist group today. They regarded

violence as a sacramental or divine act that ensured its perpetrators would ascend to a glorious

heaven should they perish during the task (Rapport 1984: 660). Until the French revolution (1789-

1799), religion provided the main justification for the use of terrorism. This situation changed,

however, as nationalism, anarchism, Marxism and other secular political movements emerged

during the 1800s to challenge the divine rule by monarchs.

Modern terrorism was initially antimonarchical, embraced by rebels and constitutionalists during

the late stages of the French Revolution and in Russia by the People’s will (Hoffman 1998: 12).

The word terrorism was first used in France to describe a system of government adopted during the

French Revolution of which Maximillian Robespierre introduced the government sponsored

terrorism in order to promote democracy and popular rule which then transformed into a feared

instrument of the state (Hoffman 1998: 12-13). From that time on, terrorism gained a negative

connotation which was not so popular until the early 20th century when it was adopted by a group

of Russian revolutionaries during the Soviet Revolution. Lenin and Stalin thereby evolved

government sponsored terrorism to intimidate and frighten the entire society and according to

them, both terror and fear were veritable instruments for governmental operations (Danjibo

2009:8).

The modern terrorism especially right from the late 1960’s to the 1990s has taken different trends

and dimensions. It is therefore important to briefly examine these trends and dimensions with a

view to discussing its situation in Nigeria. Basically there are three main trends in modern

terrorism. First, it is loosely organized, self–financed and internationalised network of terrorists.

Another trend in terrorism is that which is religiously and ideologically motivated. For instance,

radical and fundamentalist groups that uses religion as a platform to pose terrorist threats of

varying kinds to many nations’ interests (Ojukwu 2011). A third trend in modern terrorism is the

apparent growth of military training and funding, technology transfer and political advice. In fact,

looming over the entire issue of international terrorism is a trend toward proliferation of Weapons

of Mass Destruction (WMD). For instance, the unconfirmed indications that the Al-Qaeda terrorist

organization attempted to acquire chemical, biological and radiological and nuclear weapons

before the death of Osama Bin Laden (Bagaji 2011:33). Modern terrorism equally has some

dimensions. Prominent among the dimensions of terrorism, include, state-bound; non-state

terrorism and terrorism across national boundaries. The state- bound terrorism deals with the

orchestrated and aided by states. This dimension could be in the form of intimidation, abduction

and kidnapping etc. An example will be the ethnic cleansing and genocidal activities of the Nazi

regime carried out against the Jewish population between 1939 and 1945 (Slann 1998). A good

example of non-state dimension of terrorism is the on-going Boko Haram attack in Nigeria. A

number of factors were said to be responsible for the non-state terrorism. These include relative

deprivation- asymmetrical allocation or distribution of public resources, poverty, political

frustration and religious intolerance or fanaticism (Ojukwu 2011). The third dimension has

external and international connections.

Having seen a brief history of terrorism and its dimensions and trends over the years, it is essential

to give some definitions of terrorism from different perspectives. Terrorism is generally defined as

politically motivated violence by clandestine groups or individuals against civilians or non-

combatant personnel. The United States Department of State defines terrorism as:

“Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Encarta 2009 cited in Mahan and Griset 2012:3).

Terrorism is by nature political because it involves the acquisition and use of power for the purpose

of forcing others to submit, or agree, to terrorist demands. Legal statutes in most countries around

the world regard terrorism as a crime, yet there is considerable variation in how these laws define

terrorism, even in countries whose laws derive from a common origin. In the United Kingdom, for

instance, the legislation titled Terrorist Act 2000 states that terrorism is:

“The use of threat of action designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public for the purpose of advising a political, religious or ideological cause” (Encarta 2009)

Military historian Caleb Carr, noting that terrorism is as old as human conflict itself, makes a

strong argument that terrorism, whatever kind, is equivalent to war. Carr places terrorism in the

discipline of military history, as opposed to the disciplines of political science or sociology. He

states that terrorism:

“Is simply the contemporary name given to, and the modern permutation of warfare deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable” (Carr 2002:6).

Carr also argued that the world leaders have generally identified terrorism as a type of crime, rather

than as war, “in effort to rally global indignation against the agents of such mayhem and deny them

the more respected statue of actual soldiers” (2002:7). According to Carr, denying that terrorism is

the same as war has created a problem and hence has limited the government to reactive, rather

than proactive in their responses to terrorism.

Finally, Kydd and Walter (2006:49) in the paper on “The Strategies of Terrorism” define terrorism

as:

“Actions focusing on harming some people in order to create fear in others by targeting civilians and facilities or system on which civilians rely (Kydd and Walter 2006: 49).

There is no doubt that terrorism or terrorist acts have increasingly become widespread criminal

violence in different countries of the world and each of them has its own unique way of

perpetrating the act. While terrorists take to bombing and hijacking of airlines, in Nigeria, for

instance, the terrorist settle with hostage taking, kidnapping and bombings of multinational oil

pipelines and wanton destruction of property. Of all the above, kidnapping and bombings are the

most devastating (Abimbola and Adesote 2012:15).

Therefore, the kidnapping of government officials and other Nigerians, bombing of oil companies

and vandalizing of properties by militants in the Niger-Delta region and the recent bombings in the

Northern Part of Nigeria by Boko Haram are classified as domestic terrorism. With the return to

civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has been confronted with series of security challenges which cut across

virtually all the six geo-political zones. The act of terrorism in the country was mainly carried out

by the militant in the Niger Delta area and the Boko Haram in the Northern part. For example,

before 1998, the Niger Delta people have adopted series of strategies as a means of getting

themselves out of socio-political marginalization, lack of infrastructural facilities, environmental

degradation, and lack of corporate social responsibilities. Among these strategies are, petition,

litigation, protest, and violence and mass mobilization (Abimbola and Adesote 2012: 16). The last

phase of Niger Delta agitation which began in 1998 to the present was marked with the emergence

of terror strategies which included, outright confrontation, violent, pipeline vandalization, bombing

of oil installations, armed resistance against the security agents and the transnational oil companies

operating in the region, kidnapping and hostage taking (Ogbogbo 2004). The activities of the

Youth restiveness in the Niger Delta area against the Nigerian state on one hand and the

transnational oil companies operating in the region on the other have constituted a major threat to

national security. In fact, before the adoption of Amnesty Programme by the late President, Alhaji

Umaru Musa Yar,Adua in 2010, as a positive measure to put an end to domestic terrorism in the

region, the region has remained the most dangerous zone to live in the country (Adesote 2010).

The prolonged agitations in the Niger Delta region since 1960 up till 1998 were as a result of the

repressive approach being adopted by various successive governments against the people. This

same approach was equally adopted when the country return to civil rule in 1999. Thus, the

adoption of the act of terrorism in the region especially since 1999 up till 2010 forced the Nigerian

state to change her tactics by withdrawing the stick and offering the carrot in form of amnesty

(Abimbola & Adesote, 2011). Another major challenge of domestic terrorism that is currently

facing the country is the emergence of dreaded Islamic sect popularly called Boko Haram in the

Northern part. The activities of the Islamic group especially since 2009 in the area have not only

constituted a major security threat to the nation, but have also made the area the most dangerous

place to live in the country. The activities of this sect are capable of disintegrating the country.

Thus, the need to find lasting solution to the grievance of this Islamic group is very paramount.

Causes of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria

The causes of domestic terrorist acts in Nigeria, especially hostage-taking and kidnapping could be

discussed under psychology, economy and political discrepancies or grievances among certain

group of people in the Nigerian Society. Apart from the causes, the proliferation of small arms

facilitates hostage-taking and kidnapping in Nigeria

Psychology

Relative deprivations in the social, economic or political spheres experienced by a group of people

for a long time could lead to frustration-aggression syndrome. When this occurs, the aggrieved

persons vent their anger on the perceived enemy as evidenced in the Niger-Delta Conflict and the

Boko Haram Insurgence. For instance, the Niger-Delta region has been the economic life wire of

the Nigerian State since the 1960s (Muhammed 2010). In spite of the fact that Nigeria

economically depends on the oil produced from the region, the area is largely underdeveloped,

neglected and marginalized by both the Federal Government and the multinational oil companies

operating in the region. This gave rise to agitation in the region for fair treatment from both parties

(Akanji 2009). Furthermore, the shows of affluence by the wealthy ones have psychological effects

on the youths. In agreement with this assertion, Alkali (2010) in an interview alluded to the fact

that affluent show-off drives the down-trodden into kidnapping “in order to get their own share of

the national cake (Alkali 2010). For the Boko Haram sect, the implications of relative deprivation

can be gleaned from the works of its finest exponents.

In his oft-cited book “Why Men Rebel,” Gurr (1970) argued that people would become dissatisfied

if they felt they have less than they should and could have. Overtime, such dissatisfaction leads to

frustration and then rebellion against the (real or perceived) source of their deprivation. In his

article, titled “Towards a Theory of Revolution,” Davies (1962:5) argued that the “occasion of

political violence was due to the insurmountable gap between what people wanted and what they

could get; the difference between expectations and gratifications: this discrepancy is a frustrating

experience that is sufficiently intense and focused to result in either rebellion or revolution.” A key

point in all the arguments above is that violent actions flourish within a context of grievances

caused by relative deprivation. It is no coincidence that one of the worst forms of domestic

terrorism in Nigeria today originates in the most socio-economically deprived parts of the country.

In the North where unemployment and chronic poverty are rife, radical Islamists groups have

challenged the authority of the state. Angered by their poor conditions amidst plenty, a flurry of

ethnic militia groups often consisting of unemployed youths have engaged in kidnappings and

other forms of violent attacks against the Nigerian state (Agbiboa 2013:76).

Economy

Economic imbalances, deprivation and its attendant consequences like inflation and poverty

provide a breeding ground for domestic terrorism (Leha 2010). The high rate of unemployment

with affluent living by the wealth living by the wealthy, are also responsible for kidnapping in

Nigeria. The Commissioner of Police for Abia, in an interview, sees poverty, unemployment and

show of affluence by the wealthy as factor facilitating kidnapping in the state (Johnson 2010). In

the South-east, kidnaping for a ransom is ubiquitous and commercialized. Ejibunu (2010) in

support of the above maintained that the “unnecessary display of affluence and the get rich-quick

syndrome” are some of the causes of kidnapping in the State. He also attributed the cause of

kidnaping to the lack of infrastructure such as electricity, water, adequate transportation and

recreational facilities (Ejibunu 2010). Prior to this, Ita (2009) said that the attitude of people to

readily pay ransom encourages kidnapping. Okorie (2010) attributed the spate of kidnapping to the

readiness of the relatives of kidnapped victims to pay ransom. For him, hostage taking and

kidnapping are motivated by economic opportunism (Okorie 2010). Brooks (2014:2) argues that

Boko Haram will continue to thrive as long as the Nigerian government and security agencies

continue with corrupt policies that cripple economic growth and cause regional and ethnic tensions.

Since 1970, Nigeria has produced in excess of $400 billion in oil revenue, but elites have used this

money for personal and political gain rather than investing the revenue in national infrastructure

(Brooks 2014:1). A lack of education for northern Nigerians is of considerable concern, but is

unlikely to improve until the Nigerian government works with Muslims in the North to establish a

school system that is not perceived as in opposition to Islamic teachings. Northern Nigerians who

pursue a western education, meanwhile, repeatedly find themselves in harms’ way. The April

abduction for instance, is just one of several Boko Haram attacks against the Nigerian government.

In addition to these challenges, many Nigerians distrust, if not fear, their police force because the

police are seen as seldom acting in the interest of the community. While the north is frequently in

the news headlines today, the oil region of the Niger delta has seen its fair share of conflict and

protest against a state that has been criticized for allowing oil exploitation to take priority over the

environment, local economies, and community welfare (Brooks 2014:2).

Politics

The perceived feeling of domination, marginalization, oppression, deprivation, neglect and bad

governance provoked violence and crisis in the polity. The aggrieved resorted to acts of domestic

terrorism, such as hostage-taking and kidnapping as well as other violent crimes to redress their

grievances. This has given rise to militancy in the South-south and South-East geopolitical zones

of the country. For instance, in the South-south, the main cause of the Niger-Delta is championed

by militant groups such as NDVF, MEND and NDV through hostage-taking and kidnapping of

foreigners and the destruction of oil pipelines (Ogazimorah 2009:51). Nigeria is a country where

leaders are involved in the most horrendous form of corruption one can imagine. What is even

more obscene is that they do all these with utter impunity. The much celebrated democracy in the

country is slowly turning into a perfect aristocracy. A tiny fragment of the society is gnawing on

the huge oil fortune of the country amid decaying public and private sector infrastructure and

institutions. Politics is drifting away from the democratic concept whereby the minority opposition

parties call those in power to order in the parliaments. All indications show that the politicking at

the moment is geared toward creation of a one-party polity (Mele 2009).

Though largely in principle, there are attempts in recent years to curb this menace. New institutions

had been established to fight corruption but still, there are some hidden corrupt forces bent on

extinguishing this flicker of hope. The bottom-line is that corruption is inarguably institutionalized

in the system and it will take nothing short of a revolutionary overhauling to change this situation

and this gives a good food for thought to people with revolutionary instincts (Odunfa 2010). Here,

the intention is not to explain whether or not there is corruption in Nigeria but to say, candidly, that

it has the effect of disillusioning and frustrating the public, especially the youth who see their

erstwhile hopeful lives falling to pieces because of the negligence and selfishness of their leaders.

Militant Insurgency and Security Threat in Nigeria

The corruption of Nigerian political process that left the oil mineral-producing communities of the

region poor and underdeveloped has produced an unintended consequence: It has created a large

class of young men who have no hope of legitimate work that would fulfil their ambitions, and are

easily recruited into violence (Human Rights Watch 2003: 2). Bayart (1993: 17) talked about the

idea of accumulation, opening up of opportunities of social mobility and enabling the holder of

power to set him up. During the 2003 elections, state governments in the region recruited armed

militias to carry out widespread electoral fraud (Walker 2008). The former leader of Niger Delta

People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Asari Dokubo, linked the former Governor of Rivers State,

Peter Odili, Abiye Sekibo, past Minister of Transportation, Austin Opara and Past Deputy Speaker

of the House of Representatives as sponsors and financiers of terror gangs.

The armed groups were formed and empowered before the general April 2003 election, to ensure

the victory of the ruling party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in the state “by any means

necessary” (NDPEHRD 2004:5-6). The above points to the fact that rather than a consensus of the

electorates being responsible for electing state officials, it is the support and the instrument of force

that determines who win elections in Nigeria. Again, and of more relevance for this study is that it

has raised questions about the role of politicians as financiers of armed groups and reaffirmed the

militarized nature of Nigerian politics where the political process is subjected to the force of

corruption and violence. The militants and terrorists have a combination of factors working to their

advantage that continue to have profound relevance in the contemporary domestic terrorism

debate. First, the terrain of the region constitutes one of the most obvious explanations. As “the

world’s third largest wetland” (NDDC 2006: 49), it is characterized by dense mangrove swamps

and waterways, making it a fertile ground where shadowy elements carry out guerrilla type

operations without detection. The geography of the region, and its marginalization from state

transportation and communication infrastructure makes the region extremely difficult to police.

This isolation amplifies the significance of MEND’s threats to destroy oil facilities (Kemedi 2006:

3). MEND employs a variety of techniques that require good knowledge of the mangroves, and

tactics designed to cause significant damage such as swarm-based tricks where militants would use

light plastic speedboats to launch swift attacks on targets.

Secondly, security in the region is lax. A climate of socio-economic uncertainty helped by easy

access to firearms among vast stretches of the populace, has made the region a fertile ground for

multiple conflagrations. The firearms used by militants are readily available in the region since

small-arms filter into Nigeria using speed boats through Cameroon and Gabon from conflict zones

like Angola, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast etc. Thirdly, the success of oil bunkering in Nigeria is

an indication that influential state officials offer cover and protection to criminal elements to

enable them operate and also provide security to well-established cartels without the interference

of the state security forces (Coventry Cathedral 2009: 14). Added to these tactical difficulties, are

the problems of overwhelming and unwavering forces of corruption. Government’s role as the

dominant player in the management of the petroleum sector and the lack of operative

accountability structure renders the industry vulnerable to corruption (Coventry Cathedral 2009:

14). Corrupt state and security officials work in partnership with criminal elements to undermine

effective law enforcement in dealing with militancy in the oil producing areas (Coventry Cathedral

2009: 12).

The terrorist dimension that the crisis has taken may look new in conception and scale, but the

massive fear it unleashes are achingly familiar to an African society frequently and routinely

terrorized by murderous rebels. Useful examples from other jurisdictions are instructive. In Sierra

Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Ivory Coast and other war ravaged

countries in the continent where vicious conflicts and terror attacks had taken place, it is evident

that the illegal transaction in such raw materials as the ‘blood diamond’ given in exchange for

arms, has been fuelling the conflicts. Akin to the trade in blood diamonds, arms are available to the

militants through ‘blood oil’ either directly as part payment or indirectly by payment for security

services to protect oil theft operations (Coventry Cathedral 2009: 13). Though contextual issues

might be different, but proceeds of ‘blood oil’ have similar destructive consequences on Niger

Delta‘s conflict as ‘blood diamonds’ did in the civil wars in Angola, DRC, etc. Donations from

politicians, hostage taking and ransom kidnapping, are other means through which the groups fund

their activities.

The Niger-Delta Conflict

Violent political agitation by the people of the Niger Delta for improved and equitable resources

allocation and involvement in the petroleum industry has constituted the most serious threat to the

economy, human and national security in Nigeria. Not only that, because of the nature, dimension

and strategies employed by the militants the country has been named among the terrorist trouble

spots around the world (Guitta and Simcox 2013:11). Since 1998, the Niger Delta has seen a rise in

the incidence of hostage taking of oil and oil related multinational company staff (both foreign and

local) sabotage of company property; pipeline vandalization; bombing of oil installations;

kidnapping for ransom, sea piracy and robbery on the waterways. It was reported in the Financial

Standard of January, 2006 that the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation recorded 1,306 cases

of line-breaks (majority of which took place in the Niger Delta) of petroleum products pipeline

across the country in 2005 (Ibiyemi 2006: 3). This figure is considered too high when compared

with 88 cases recorded in 2003. It also represents an increase of 40.5 percent over the 929 cases

recorded by the corporation in 2004. The situation is worse now (Ilufoye 2009: 36). There is no

passing day without a reported case of kidnap, hostage taking or pipeline destruction in the Niger

Delta. Balogun (2006:1) observed that:

Kidnap and hostage taking particularly of foreign oil workers, by militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria is assuming an alarming rate. Before youths militants became daring in 2006, they had limited their exuberance to just disrupting operations of oil producing companies, blowing up oil pipelines and invading oil fields with the aim of collecting ransom (Balogun 2006:1)

Today, people in the Niger Delta live in perpetual fear. More worrisome is the fact that the

legitimacy and the survival of the Nigerian state is under considerable threat. Table 1 below gives a

graphic picture of the situation in the Niger Delta. It is important to note that this table only shows

a few incidents of acts of terror in the Niger Delta region.

Indeed, kidnappings in Nigeria’s oil producing Niger Delta had become an almost daily occurrence

(Akpan 2010:33). MEND, the most active and violent militant group have been responsible for

most of the destruction of oil facilities and the kidnapping of oil workers. In short, the Niger Delta

region could be said to be in a state of war- a war of low intensity between the militants and

multinational oil companies on the one hand and the militants and the Nigerian state on the other

hand (Akpan and Akpabio 2009:23). More worrisome is the fact that the terrorists are now

confidently inching closer into the metropolis with the threat to make the attacks national. With a

more sophisticated weapon, the terrorist not only intimidate foreign citizens but also the Nigerian

security agencies. Irrefutably in the Niger Delta Region today, the fear of the militants is the

beginning of wisdom (Ogundiya 2009:37).

MEND in its non-compromising stance vowed to cripple the nation’s economy. Truly, the damage

youth restiveness has done to the Nigerian economy is huge. Shell, for example produced only

700,000 barrels per day from August to December 1998 falling short of its production quota of

830,000 barrels per day in July 1998 (SPDC Report, May 1999:2). The confrontation has also had

its toll on human lives. In 1999 for instance, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees

(UNHCR) reported that the Ogoni rebellion resulted in deaths and destruction of the community,

producing refugees estimated to be 5,400 (Ejobowah 2010:28). In another instance, in a military

operation in December 30 and 31 1998, about 26 civilians were killed and about 200 injured

(Ejobowah 2010:29). On the other hand 80 soldiers were reported missing. The effects of the

confrontation on the economy have been enormous. The oil industry is estimated to have lost 117

working days in 1997. In the first eight months of 1998 Shell, the largest oil company lost about 11

billion barrels of crude oil estimated at $3.2 billion (Ejobowah 2010:30). Appreciating the

damaging effect on the economy, General Abdusalam Abubakar in 1999 budget speech to the

nation as cited in the Guardian newspapers of January 2, 1999, confessed that: “… the temporary closure of wells in the Niger Delta led to a sharp reduction in government foreign exchange earnings”, resulting in the non-realization of “the budgeted 1998 revenue of N216.336 billion from oil (Abubakar 1999).

The situation has gone worse since then. In a period of seven months in 2006 (between February

and September) the Business Day of September 4, 2006 reported that the country lost about 12

billion US dollars to the Niger Delta militants. By May 2007, it is estimated that militant activities

and protest have reduced oil production from a total capacity of 3million barrels per day to about

2million barrels. At an average of 65 dollars a barrel, this loss translates to $65 million per day.

Expectedly, this is damaging to the economy of the nation- an economy that is significantly driven

by oil (Ogundiya 2009:37).

Therefore, if security derives from the common-sensical fact that a person’s first interest is

survival, the Niger Delta region’s environment (socially, economically, politically and in strict

environmental sense) is far from been secured. More worrisome is the threats it constitute to

Nigeria’s global image, as most nations including United States, Britain, Australia among others,

instructs their citizens against doing business in Nigeria (British High Commission, 2009;

Australian High Commission 2009). For example Australian High Commission warned:

“Australians in Nigeria should exercise a high degree of caution. The risk of terrorist attacks against Western interests remains…Australians are advised to defer non-essential travel to the riverine area in Bayelsa, Delta and River States in south-eastern Nigeria…Unrest and violence can occur without warning throughout Nigeria. Cult or street youth gang violence occurs regularly and can result in fatalities” (Australian High Commission 2009).

The image of Nigeria abroad is that of a state that is engrossed in war. What is the reaction of the

Nigerian state to the spate of violence to the country? The next section will examine the issues,

trends and activities of the Boko Haram Insurgency.

Boko Haram Insurgency

Northern Nigeria has been a hotbed of religious uprising, most often between the dominant

Muslims and minority Christian in the region (Schwarts 2010:1). Islam has become heterogeneous

with the springing up of many Islamic sects. The notable examples are the Izala movement, the

Shiite movement and many local Islamic sects that have limited expansion. These sects are

opposed to the traditional Nigerian Islamic teachings of the Sufi brotherhood and are gradually

alienating themselves from the main Islamic body (Mele 2009). The religious crises including the

Maitasini uprising of the 1980s to the sharia riots of 2000-2001, as well as recurring Jos religious

crisis since the fourth republic dispensation has mostly been spontaneous and contained through

massive deployment of security operatives who are ordinarily taken unawares by these

developments (Danjibo 2009:18; Philips 2010:26). The emergence of Boko Haram sect and their

operation is a departure from the trend of religious uprising in northern Nigeria. For instance in

July 2009, the group which had been lying low before now, unleashed a dimension of violence that

has never been seen in Nigeria, this Taliban like attack is the most serious outbreak of another kind

of religious violence which led to a number of deaths and injuries (The Economist 2009:34).

State security forces succeeded in arresting some members of the sect, who were later detained in

prison facilities in the affected states. Many of those arrested were held at the Bauchi prison

pending trial. Surviving members of the sect had promised to avenge the killing of their members

and on 7 September 2010, over 300 members of the Boko Haram Islamic sect did launched an

attack on Bauchi central prison and freed their members detained since the July 2009 revolt

(JWMG 2010). After freeing other inmates of the prison, they later set the facility and vehicles

packed within the premises ablaze. The group leader, Malam Muhammed Yusuf was allegedly

killed in 2009. Footage obtained by Aljazerra and published in several Nigerian newspapers

showed Mohammed Yusuf mutilated body still wearing handcuffs (Aljezerra, 2010). Even though

authorities in Nigeria were hopeful that the execution of Muhammed Yusuf said to be a

charismatic leader would eventually lead to the disintegration of the group, evidence emerging

proves the contrary as exemplified with the September 7 attack on the Bauchi prisons by the group

to free its members. Since then, other attacks by the group had been staged against government

interests and security operatives not only in Borno and Bauchi states but in most northern states

including the Federal Capital Territory.

The exact date of the emergence of the Boko Haram sect is mired in controversy, especially if

one relies on media accounts. The group is known to the Nigerian authority to have existed since

1995, under the name of Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra (Taiwo 2008:4). The sect has

subsequently flourished under various names like the Nigerian Taliban, Yusufiyyah sect, and

Boko Haram (literally meaning ‘Western education is a sin’). The name ‘Nigerian Taliban’ is

used in a derogatory sense by the local people who despise the philosophy and teachings of the

sect. Although the sect is fashioned like the Taliban in Afghanistan, it is widely believed that it

has no formal links with its Afghan counterpart.

Boko Haram first took up arms against state security forces on 24 December 2003 when it

attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns of Geiam and Kanamma in Yobe State.

Members occupied the two buildings for several days, hoisting the flag of Afghanistan’s Taliban

movement over the camps. A joint operation of soldiers and police called ‘operation flush’

dislodged the group after killing 18 and arresting dozens of its members (Suleman, 2007: 25). On

31 December 2003 Boko Haram left the village and dispersed into other northern states after

inscribing the word ‘Taliban’ on a captured vehicle. In 2004 it established a base called

‘Afghanistan’ in Kanamma village in northern Yobe State, on the border with the Republic of

Niger (Afowadeji, 2009: 8). On 21 September 2004, members attacked Bama and Gwoza police

stations in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunition. Members

later set the Gwoza police station ablaze. Apart from a few isolated skirmishes with the police,

the sect received marginal attention until the middle of 2007 and again in 2008 when their

militant activities came under surveillance by security operatives in Abuja.

In July 2009, members of the sect staged the most spectacular attacks on all institutions that

represent the Nigerian state. The uprising affected five northern states, namely Bauchi, Borno,

Kano, Katsina, and Yobe. A military campaign led to the killing of over 700 members of the

group including the leader Muhammed Yusuf, while several other were arrested and detained for

formal trial.

In terms of organization, late Muhammad Yusuf was then the Commander in Chief (Amir ul-

Aam) or the leader of the entire group. He has two deputies (Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I & II). Each

State where they exist has its own Amir (Commander/Leader), and each Local Government Area

were they operate also has an Amir. Below the Local Government Amirs are the remaining

followers. They also organized themselves according to various roles, such as Soldiers and

Police, among others (DCCN 2009: 14).

Established terrorist organizations and states that sponsor terrorism were behind most

international terrorism in the 1970’s and 1980’s. But in recent years, ad hoc groups of terrorists,

sometimes loosely linked, and often claiming to act on behalf of Islam, have been the most

dynamic elements in international terrorist attacks. These are deviants and fanatics who are

betraying the tenets of Islam, just as other terrorists who have sometimes used Christianity,

Judaism, Hinduism, and other religions to justify violence and in the process distort and abuse

their faiths (Wilcox 2000). The Nigerian situation is a localized but with great potential

international ramification. Concluding this chapter, the international community has perceived

Nigeria has emerged as a terrorism haven due to all the activities and trends of Boko Haram

aforementioned above. The next chapter will examine kidnapping and hostage taking and the

threats posed to the country as a result of domestic terrorism.

CHAPTER THREE

KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE TAKING IN NIGERIA: A CRITICAL

ANALYSIS

This chapter examines kidnapping and hostage taking in Nigeria, providing an understanding into

the nature and background of kidnapping and hostage taking in Nigeria, identifying the reasons as

to why this phenomenon is persistent within the country and examining the developmental

implications of kidnapping and hostage taking which will provide the analytical basis required for

this dissertation.

Nature of Kidnapping and Hostage Taking in Nigeria

Understanding the nature of kidnapping poses a number of definitional problems in relations to a

country’s legal and moral viewpoints as well as the availability of other variances such as hostage-

taking. Mohamed (2008) attempted some clarifications of the definitional position of the term with

respect to the legal point of view of some countries. For instance, he used Malaysia as his focal

point of reference to illustrate that the kidnapping of adults within the borders of Malaysia comes

under the heading of abduction in sharp contrast to the meaning given by the United Kingdom. In

the study of kidnapping, Turner (2008:145) provided a broad working definition of kidnapping

which has been adopted and applies to all situations where: …persons are forcibly seized and transported to a destination where they are held against their will in unlawful confinement. It also describes incidents when persons are lured away and then held illegally. This may involve force (Turner 2008:145).

Kidnapping is a very serious crime but relatively unheard of in contemporary scholarship

compared to robbery, burglary and other forms of societal crime. Yang et al. (2007) attributes such

relative obscurity to three reasons namely, rarity of the event itself, access to known kidnappers

and data problem. As a rare event, scholars tend to see kidnapping as an insignificant criminal act

which accounts for low research interest directed to it. In the second instance, getting access to

known kidnappers is difficult in most instances. The third relates to the reliability and validity of

data (Yang et al. 2007:324).

Turner (2008, citing Schiller 1985 and Warren 1985:229) has attempted a documentation of how

kidnapping originated. According to him, the term “kidnapping” originated in 17th Century

England where children were “kidnapped” and often sold as slaves or agricultural workers to

colonial farmers. Centuries before, Emperor Constantine (AD 315) of Rome became so alarmed by

the incidence of kidnapping that he ordered the death penalty as punishment for the crime. Robber-

barons were kidnapping merchants and holding them for ransom in the Middle Ages in Europe.

King Richard I of England was held hostage for years by the Archduke of Austria in the 12th

Century. In 1800, in the Sulu archipelago, now part of the Philippines, there was already a standard

scale of ransom fees ranging from 2000 pesos for a European friar to 30-50 Pesos for a male

Filipino. An upsurge in kidnapping in the USA by organized criminal groups led, in 1931, to the

introduction of federal legislation on kidnapping in both the Senate and House of Representatives.

Turner (2008) concluded that much kidnapping throughout history has no overt political

motivation but, since the early 1970s, there have been many highly publicized kidnappings around

the world for political purposes.

The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2003: 7-8, cited in Mohamed 2008) has

categorized kidnapping as follows: kidnapping for extortion (for ransom, to influence business

decisions or to obtain commercial advantage); kidnapping between or within criminal groups (for

debt recovery or to secure advantage in a criminal market); kidnapping for sexual exploitation;

kidnapping linked to domestic or family disputes (spouse or child abduction); revenge kidnapping;

and kidnapping for political or ideological purposes. These typologies have been broadly

categorized into three by Pharaoh (2005: 23) as follows: criminal kidnapping (hostage taking for

ransom); political kidnapping (to settle political scores or further some political objectives) and

pathological kidnapping (parental kidnapping and kidnapping for sexual purposes). From the

classifications above, it is seen that kidnapping has criminal, political and economic reasons.

However, Yang et al. (2007) has added the cultural dimension of kidnapping, whereby some

communities use it as a cultural practice (e.g. bride capture).

Kidnapping has grown over the years as an industry involving every level of the society and

motivated by many reasons. However, studies on it have been relatively a recent phenomenon,

with much of the literature coming from Asian, American and European continents. Throughout

the review, no single literature comes from the African contexts, yet there are series of media

reports of daily incidence of kidnapping in most African countries. One country where kidnapping

has become a daily event of recent is Nigeria and particularly the Niger Delta. Nigeria’s Niger

Delta is rich in petroleum oil and has been explored by multinational corporations and the Federal

Government of Nigeria amid high incidence of poverty, absence of infrastructures and deprivations

of the locals and oil communities (Akpan 2010:34). Various forms of crime, including kidnapping

and hostage-taking have emerged as a consequence. Despite this, there is no systematic

investigation of this phenomenon. This chapter will explore the social problem of kidnapping and

hostage-taking in its various forms as a prelude to a more empirical study.

General Background to Hostage Taking and Kidnapping in Nigeria

As mentioned above, the root and rise in kidnapping in Nigeria dwells mainly within the Niger-

Delta region of the country and this can be traced to what Townsend (2008) referred to as “natural

resource nationalism”- the tendency to seek bigger shares of the returns from natural resources. It

is also compounded by what Omeje (n.d) termed “accumulation politics”-the tendency for the

ruling class to be involved in endless accumulation of natural resource rents accruing from the

region through deliberate act of marginalization and deprivation.

The Niger Delta “question” of today is a heritage of Nigeria’s structural flaws which is

fundamentally constitutional and political. Onduku (2007) classified these flaws into two

categories. The first has to do with the division of the country into three unequal regions, with the

population of the size of the northern region alone exceeding that of the two southern regions put

together. The second flaw involves the political and demographic domination of the northern,

western, and eastern regions, being the majority ethnic nationalities and the attendant

marginalization of the minority ethnic nationalities that comprise approximately one third of the

population of each region. The Niger Delta is one of such minority groups and its position becomes

so important given that Nigeria’s economy depends on petroleum resources, which is drilled in the

region (Akpan 2010: 36). Despite being a minority ethnic group, the Niger Delta has a long history

of organizational and social mobilization capability and this predated the emergence of oil

resources as economic revenue as well as Nigeria’s emergence as a British colony. For instance,

Britain’s Niger Delta protectorate and the Niger Delta coast protectorate were already well

established by the mid -1880s before further British interests led to the formation of southern

Nigeria in 1900. In the decades before Second World War, many Niger Delta communities had

their own local leaders who distinguished themselves in the service of their people while serving

the British. It was only as a result of the Authur Richards’ reforms of 1946 that regional

representation became important in British colonial arrangements. Akpan (2010) argued that the

peoples’ experiences with the British leadership system and policies helped to shape and

strengthen the mechanism that led to the emergence of leaders they could count as representatives.

The emerging leaders were very good representatives of the Niger Delta people especially in the

late 1940s (Akpan 2010:37).

The mounting campaign generated by the representative leaders of the Niger Delta cause paid well

in raising the consciousness of the people leading to the demand for resource control and

developmental attention. At Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the situation had gotten to a crisis

point when Isaac Adaka Boro, a radical nationalist and an Ijaw born revolutionary championed a

revolt against the government of Nigeria. On February 23 1966, he launched a guerrilla war against

the then Federal Military Government. Following his proclamation of the region as an independent

entity (the Niger Delta Peoples Republic) with himself as the Head of State, a battle ensued with

the security forces which he defeated them. This rebellion has come to be known in the political

history of Nigeria today as the “Twelve-day Revolution”. By all calculations, it has always been

argued that the marginalization of the peoples in the Niger Delta, the despoliation of their

environments and the resultant conflicts have their roots in the discovery of oil as well as its

exploration and production activities by the oil multinationals in the late 1950s (Akpan and

Akpabio 2008; Onduku 2007).

The government of Nigeria has been compounding these problems through deliberate acts of

oppressive policies and persistent instances of marginalization in development. Statutorily,

ownership of oil and all mineral resources in Nigeria is vested in the federal government. All land

is also, by law, state property, but this controversial law is only activated when the vested

economic or political interests of the country are at stake (Omeje 2007). Government attitudes

toward the region is also reflected in the general absence of developmental attention as the people

continue to live in pristine conditions and in most cases without electricity, pipe borne water,

hospitals, housing and schools in spite of the enormous wealth the government derives from the

region (Idemudia and Ite 2008: 197). Concerns for the development of the Niger Delta region are

age-old phenomenon. The communities in the region have been protesting the injustices peacefully

for decades, until recently when such protests took on a violent form. The parties in the conflict do

not involve only the Federal Government and the Niger Delta people but also the oil multinationals

(Idemudia and Ite 2008: 199-200). The grievances of the people have involved three closely

interrelated but analytically distinct issues. Firstly, that all laws relating to oil exploration and land

ownership are abrogated; secondly, the issue of natural resource control and self -determination;

and thirdly, that appropriate institutional and financial arrangements should be put in place by the

oil producing communities for the developmental and environmental problems associated with oil

exploration and exploitation (Onduku 2007). As a result of this, the locals have now opted for

kidnapping and hostage taking of expatriate oil company workers and the demand of ransom, and

the repeated invasion and blockading of oil installations.

The oil multinationals have also been linked to equipping the Federal military for persistent

militarization of the Niger Delta to protect its investments and interests. In all, the government

wants to continuously maintain the region for revenue purposes and the oil companies have refused

to leave the region in spite of the several ultimatums given to them by the civil groups. The Niger

Delta people have now become more organized in their demands for the development of the

region, which has been denied them for a long time. These conflicting positions of the Federal

government and the locals have set the stage for violent conflicts. Hence, kidnapping of foreign

workers and keeping them as hostages have become one of the key elements of such conflicts as a

deliberate attempt to challenge government’s hegemonic powers over their resources. This has

unfortunately degenerated into various forms and dimensions besides the liberation elements. The

next section explores these reasons.

Reasons for Kidnapping and Hostage Taking in Nigeria

Kidnapping and hostage taking has assumed an alarming dimension in Nigeria especially in the

Niger Delta region thereby opening up opportunities and avenues for dangerous degeneration. Its

occurrence and impacts started to be felt this early 21st century, a phenomenon induced by oil

resource exploration. There are many reasons that have contributed to the emergence of this

phenomenon in the region. Apart from the wider liberation consciousness of the people over the

years, social, economic and political reasons have come to play prominent roles for the rise in the

industry of recent. These reasons are explored under separate headings as follows:

Kidnapping as a General Liberation Struggle

Early versions of kidnapping were believed to be part of a wider liberation call by the Movement

for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) for the development of the State. It was then an

activity with no monetary attachment as the key motivation factor and in most cases part of the

outcome of a confrontation between MEND and oil interests or the Federal Government of Nigeria

(FGN). The key grievances oftentimes advanced by MEND for such confrontations involved three

closely interrelated but analytically distinct issues namely:

1. That all laws relating to oil exploration and land ownership be abrogated to give the locals

more empowerment to have control of their resources;

2. That the issue of natural resource control and self-determination be recognized and

operationalized as cardinal principles for the protection of their minority status;

3. That appropriate institutional and financial arrangements be put in place for the

development as well as addressing the numerous environmental problems associated with

oil exploration and exploitation in oil producing communities in the Niger Delta (Akpan

2010:38).

The refusal or inability of the FGN to respond to these demands has been at the core of MEND’s

liberation struggle. These struggles have historical roots in Isaac Adaka Boro and Ken Saro

Wiwa’s earlier concerns and struggles for resource control and environmental justice. Apart from

the “Twelve-day Revolution” that was led by Isaac Boro, against the FGN in 1966, it is popularly

believed that the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa by the FGN on the 10th November, 1995, has

played key and fundamental role in fostering MEND’s strength and determination for such

liberation fights (Akpan 2010:39). More so, the government’s policies that promote economic and

environmental injustices against the people of the Niger Delta have also been responsible for

MEND’s liberation fights. Such policies include the obnoxious and controversial land use decree

and revenue allocation policies of government, which have tended to place the oil rich regions in

serious developmental and environmental disadvantages (Akpan and Akpabio 2008).

Kidnapping has come to play important role in such fights over the years. Initially, it could go

without ransom, but these days, some financial demands are made before release. Such ransom

seems to be useful in funding the organized groups involved. From the instances cited above, target

kidnapped are foreign oil company workers, although key government officials have been targeted

these days as a direct confrontation with the FGN.

Kidnapping for Economic Reasons

Tzanelli (2006, citing Gerth and Mills 1948: 56-7) posited that kidnapping is regulated by the laws

of demand and supply and is a type of social action that involves the calculation of the most

efficient means to the desired ends. Kidnapping is a social enterprise and according to Tzanelli

(2006) and he went further to reiterate that:

Kidnappers are businessmen, they just happen to be on the illegal side of it......if you deprive them of the demand then there is not going to be any supply. Why would I kidnap somebody who will not pay? (Tzanelli 2006:929).

In this category, there are heavy financial motivations and the victims are always from the “well-

to-do” class-political class, foreign workers, men and women and people of very rich background.

Kidnapping of this dimension cuts across boundaries but the common denomination is the

immediate and lucrative pay-off. This explains why they opt for the rich. One common factor that

supports this phenomenon is the rising incidence of endemic poverty and unemployment mostly in

the midst of abundant resources, despite the fact that oil is responsible for 90% of Nigeria’s foreign

exchange earnings and about 80% of government revenue (CBN 1981).

Despite these, the inhabitants remain very poor while their source of livelihoods depend on the

natural environment oftentimes devastated and degraded by oil production. Kidnapping and

hostage-taking happens to be the only industry of last resort aimed at forcefully getting a share of

the region’s wealth.

Kidnapping as a Political Tool

This case qualifies for what Turner (2008) describes as “money and politics” where there are

political motivations for kidnapping but where ransoms are also demanded. Such ransoms are often

used to further the political objectives of the kidnapping organisation or simply to facilitate the

survival of the organisation. Recently, it is learnt that most top kidnapping operations are

masterminded by government officials, opposition groups, unrewarded or uncompensated

members of election rigging militant groups, among others. Kidnapping is then seen as instrument

for political vendetta and settling of political scores. The operation is organized and targeted

mainly at key serving politicians or foreign workers or contractors working directly for

government. Once the victim is kidnapped, a high level negotiation is expected which will

ultimately lead to a very heavy ransom. Such a ransom is used to further political goals, self -

settling of aggrieved groups or a way of financially crippling a serving politician. The most notable

kidnapping gangs in the Niger Delta today are “used and dumped” political thugs. Most of them

were used during election and dumped at swearing-in still armed and without any compensation.

On the strength of the sophisticated weapons at their disposal the members regroup themselves and

target their political mentors or enemies. They specialize in high profile kidnapping that even

surpasses the capabilities of the State security agents.

To conclude this chapter, it was observed that while the Niger Delta region remained the engine of

Nigeria’s economy, it however suffered infrastructural and ecological neglects. Its “minority

status” had systematically marginalized and disabled its influence in the overall national politics

which is characterized by ethnic domination. Oil wealth in Nigeria has become synonymous with

poverty in the producing regions. These are fundamental issues that have engendered all forms of

social disorders.

CHAPTER FOUR:

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS THESE CHALLENGES

This chapter identifies the challenges encountered by the security agencies in combating hostage

taking and kidnapping in Nigeria. The challenges include the proliferation of small arms, lack of

synergy in crime control to mention a few. This chapter also proffered strategies to mitigate these

challenges.

National Security and the Management of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria

The maintenance of law and order in Nigeria in recent times has been very challenging such that

the ability and capacity to manage our National Security by the Security Agencies is being doubted

by the citizenry (Abimbola and Adesote 2012:22). Primarily, the Federal Government is charged

with the responsibility of using the military, police and other security agencies to protect every

citizen from all forms of security threats and incidents like armed robbery, kidnapping, civil

disorder, large scale violence, insurgency, killing, bombing and other forms of security breaches.

The negative impact of this ugly situation on the country generally cannot be estimated on the

economy as well as human lives and property. In fact, the state of affairs of the country over the

activities of these domestic terrorists is now a big source of concern to the country, especially, the

Security Agencies who are receiving all sorts of odium from the top Government brass and the

citizens (Boylan 2009, Adesoji 2010:95).

Some private security experts have identified militancy mismanagement as part of the causes of the

prevailing insecurity in Nigeria. According to Cesare Lambroso on causes of crimes, ‘it is evident

that certain crimes are committed as a means of protesting against the state or establishment rather

than being biological’ (Lambroso cited in Dearn 2011). Simply put, only below ten percent of the

society population will naturally have the passion and pride to commit any type of crime. The same

is applicable to Nigerians, which seem to be the happiest group of people in the world. The issue

here is that those who have taken to domestic terrorism, in the Niger Delta region through the

formation of various youth militias and that of Boko Haram in the northern part of the country are

of the view that since nobody wants to listen and engage them, perhaps, violence as a means of

expressing their grievances may the best option (Ojukwu 2011). An important institution that has

crucial role to play in resolving conflicts that usually result to domestic terrorist attacks is the

National Orientation Agency (NOA). Based on the demands of these terrorist groups, it is believed

that the first thing needed is re-orientation. Perhaps based on the earlier indoctrination they had

received, they need to be engaged by NOA and be re-oriented and re-integrated into the Nigerian

Agenda which is based on Unity in Diversity. They should be made to understand that they do not

have any other country than Nigeria and as such, they stand to gain more in a united, virile, and

strong Nigeria than disintegration. The Federal Government, on the other hand, should be more

determined and proactive in facing the current challenges through revisiting her domestic and

foreign policies. The need to fight domestic terrorism in Nigeria generally calls for re-evaluation of

her foreign policy most especially on national security (Ojukwu 2011).

Also, the government, especially, the political elites should have a total re-think in terms of

delivery of dividend of democracy to the electorate and comporting themselves while holding

public office. A situation where Nigerian politicians only associated with barbaric acquisition of

wealth and property through public corruption and to the chagrin of the impoverished Nigerians is

now part of the violent reaction by the people (Nwankwo 2012:21). Undoubtedly, this flagrant and

wanton display of this ill-gotten wealth relatively induces some weak-minded citizens to take to

terrorism and violence as means of survival in a society that does not have any plan for them

(Onyema 2011). As a result, at any slightest provocation, people resort to violent crimes as an

alternative means of complaint. Besides, one could equally be tempted to engage in act of terrorism

as alternative means to survive. There are two important points for managing domestic terrorism in

the country. First, for the purpose of promoting national security in the country, the adoption of

holistic approach which includes both preventive measures and long-term measures towards

addressing conditions conducive for the spread of domestic terrorism be pursued vigorously

(Gaibulloev and Sandler 2011: 355). In fact, it is expected that these two elements should form a

key compromise among the parliamentarians in the National Assembly by adopting the strategy

through consensus. It could reiterated that conditions conducive for the spread of domestic

terrorism include: “poverty, prolonged unresolved conflicts, lack of rule of law and violations of

human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic

marginalization and lack of good governance.

Secondly, there is the need for partnership between governments and civil society organization

(CSO) towards shorter-term preventive counterterrorism measures in the country (2011: 357). For

instance, interaction between governments and CSOs on the issue of small arms can help to check

its proliferation in the country (Rosand et al 2011). Similar efforts can also flourish between

government and non-governmental experts seeking to address the threat of illicit transfers of

biological, chemical, and nuclear materials to potential terrorists in the country if government re-

evaluates its domestic policies (Dearn 2011). In other developed countries where the CSOs have

been integrated into counter-terrorism, they are now making conscious and significant

contributions on measures to prevent terrorism in the implementation and monitoring of security

sector reform activities, which are linked to a state’s ability to carry out effective law enforcement

and other security-related counterterrorism measures (Miller 2011:331). Some CSOs, especially

research organizations, also foster closer, cooperative initiatives involving states and other

stakeholders to improve and raise awareness of threats and encourage collective action to address

vulnerabilities (Abimbola and Adesote 2012:26).

Government’s Dilemma to Combating Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria

The problems confronting the government in combating domestic terrorism are enormous. In spite

of the actions put in place to suppressing terrorism, the menace seems to be over stressing the

government. The fact is that most of the government efforts have been mere peripheral window

dressing as they have not actually addressed the issues that brought about terrorism in those areas.

For instance, while government actions in the Niger Delta were merely settling the militants and

their leaders, the general lack of infrastructural development in the Zones has remained unsolved.

This section will attempt to discuss the following as they hinder effective strategy towards

combating domestic terrorism.

Government Insincerity in Tackling the Root Causes of Terrorism

Scholars from various disciplines have all identified root causes as key to understanding why most

terrorism occurs. Bloom (2007) enumerated the following as root causes of domestic terrorism

among others: lack of rule of law, failed or weak states that provide havens for terrorists, corrupt

government, depression, discrimination, social injustice, unemployment, absolute poverty to

mention a few.

Aside from the huge amount of budget Government appropriates every fiscal year, Nigeria is yet to

reap the dividends of democracy. Basic social amenities like water, electricity, education, hospital,

roads etc. are none existent instead 25% of government budget is allocated to the National

Assembly overhead current expenditure. The public is only privileged to know how much budget

is approved for each fiscal year, but how much of the budget is implemented to transform the

socioeconomic status of the citizenry is another ball game entirely. Coleman (2011) is of the view

that the government is insincere in fulfilling her election campaign promises to the people instead

they flamboyantly with great impetus exhibit executive lawlessness in corruption and abuse of

office at the glaring face of hungry, poverty ridden, unemployed and absolutely deprived youths

(Coleman 2011:15).

Akanji (2007:63) argued that it is “corrupt and ineffectual political leadership that often engenders

poverty and, consequently, violent activities. The implication is that government inactions

precipitate violent acts”. Adesola (2007:12) followed up by saying:

As long as the government continues to distance the masses from their land and appropriate their rights without due process, government cannot be seen to be egalitarian as it does not take into consideration the principles of corporate governance, which involves freedom of choice, rule of law, transparency, justice and accountability (2007:12).

The fight against domestic terrorism cannot be fought when the generality of the citizens are living

below poverty level. In this era, where there are “free-lance terrorists” (soldiers of unemployed

youths, who do not belong to any fundamentalist or radical group but who are easy tools in the

hands of the rich or terrorist organizations) by just a mere financial inducement, they can carry out

any terrorist act (Boylan 2009). These youths are easily available for criminal acts because they

have nothing doing and nobody cares about their wellbeing. The Government only makes political

and economic promises in order to secure a win, but after they have won; promises are abandoned

only to recycle the promise in the next election because they must win their votes. This is the

Nigerian dilemma. This is the critical meeting point that has enhanced the emergence and growth

of militancy and terror groups in Nigeria (Danjibo 2009:21).

Lack of data base

Chinwokwu (2013:265) maintained that “the future of domestic terrorism in Nigeria will

eventually lead to the creation of more fear and insecurity if the basic necessities to combat this

menace”. The fight against domestic terrorism in the country demands a data base. The data base

must be constantly updated in line with operational exigencies that may be required. A data base

assembled by the United States agencies on terrorism, but data base on domestic terrorism is

lacking (Enders et al 2011:319). It is very important to reiterate the fact that while countries like

America, Britain etc. are battling with combating international terrorism Nigeria is grappling with

domestic terrorism that comprises among others hate group, Islamic fundamentalist and militants

(Peterside 2014:283). Peterside maintains that each of these groups mentioned have specific

justificatory approaches to their terrorist acts and it is important and of great value if the root

causes of Boko Haram outrage are known and their leaders identified, targets identified, groups

identified, modus of operandi identified, motives and motivations known, ideologies noted,

organizational structures located and identified, sponsors and beneficiaries identified etc. Armed

with these basic tools, policies, strategies, tactics and other related modules can be formulated. You

cannot win a war fighting a ghost or an unknown enemy. Boko Haram as at today is unknown at

least in our public domain (Peterside 2014:287).

Proliferation of weapons

The rate at which arms and ammunition, especially the prohibited ones - weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) makes nonsense of the fire arms law in Nigeria would cause one to infer that

there exist in the society a state of normlessness (Okumu 2009). It would be recalled that AK. 47

Rifle was introduced into the Nigeria Police force between 1998 and 2000. At that time, it was the

most sophisticated weapon in the hands of the police. It replaced the Mark IV Riffle-“Cock and

shoot” because of its automatic and rapid shooting capability, coupled with the capacity and calibre

of the ammunition and the magazine. It has the capacity of doing what we call “kill and show”

with shooting range above 300 meters (Enders et al 2011: 320).Unfortunately, this particular rifle

seems to be the commonest riffle now that can be found in the hands of criminals. The question is-

How did these criminals get these rifles? What is happening with our borders – sea port, land port

and airport? What is happening to the Custom Operatives, Navy, Police, SSS, Air force and Army?

What of those patrolling the sea and border post? What happens to the laws guiding the issue of

fire arms? (Laden 2012).These questions are pertinent, the answer will obviously help in

combating terrorism and until then it is a great threat to its fight. The cache of arms and

ammunition that was returned by the militants in the Niger Delta is very frightening. The Rambo

style operations going on in the Northern Zone of Nigeria is equally disturbing. Thus, Onuha

(2011) is of the view that the proliferation of arms and ammunition is a serious dilemma

confronting the Nigerian State in their resolve to combating terrorism and other related offences. It

is not only our domestic dilemma it is also an international dilemma. The inability of Nigerian

government to control the proliferation of arms and ammunition into the country is great danger to

her internal security (Onuha 2011).

Enforcement and implementation of Anti-terrorism Laws

Nigeria is one of the first countries in Africa to comply with all established and existing

Conventions, Resolutions. Protocols and other laws regarding to the regulation and combating of

international terrorism, combating of the financing of terrorism and anti-money laundering

(CFT/AMT) and other related criminal acts specified under those laws (Schwarts 2010).

Notwithstanding, the measures taken to be a compliant state among the comity of nations, Nigeria

lacks the will to enforce and implement the laws so far approved or passed relating to acts of

terrorism or financing of terrorism. There have been constant accusations that the federal

government is not actually prosecuting members of the Islamic fundamentalist Sect arrested across

the country for their ruthless and persistent mayhem they have been inflicting on the nation. This

lacks of will and show of weakness which government has blatantly demonstrated severally has

giving greater impetus to Boko Haram that they ludicrously in a “Rambo style” inflict grave harm

to the people. For instance, this was exhibited when they sacked the security agencies attached to

Bauchi prisons on September 7, 2010 and released all the 721 inmates in the process including

their own 123 members who had been in detention since July 2009 (Soriwei 2010:11). This

flagrant display of having government at their mercy is aptly illustrated by the various conditions

which they have been dishing to government as conditions for truce in the country.

Religion and culture

Another dilemma confronting the country is the emerging trend towards terrorism that is

religiously or ideologically motivated. Radical Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Boko Haram

or other groups using religion as a pretext to cause violent acts, pose a great danger to the internal

security and peace of the country. The challenge associated with this kind of terrorism is how to

condemn and combat such terrorist activity, or extremism and violent ideology of specific radical

groups, without appearing to be anti-Islamic or anti-religious in general. In the international level, a

desire to punish a state for supporting international terrorism may also conflict with other foreign

policy involving the nation. That notwithstanding, government must priorities its national internal

security interest with that of any group and understand that the unity and strength of the state is far

greater than the interest of any religion or culture. When the state is guided by this principle, that

the whole is greater than any of its component parts, then sentiment will be cast aside for the

interest of the whole.

Strategies to Mitigate the Security Issues of Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping in Nigeria

The strategies to mitigate the security issues of hostage taking and kidnapping in Nigeria range

from provision of adequate funding, a check on small arms proliferation, establishment of synergy

among the security agencies and the enlightenment and sensitization of the public.

Provision of Adequate Funding

Security is the pillar upon which other sectors land. To combat domestic terrorism, there is the

need for adequate funding for all security agencies in Nigeria by the Federal Government through

the increase in the defence and security budget. Collective responsibility is also necessary hence,

the need for the review of the status of the Security Equipment Fund (SEF). The Federal

Government should set up a committee to recognize the SEF with a view to making it function

better and provide adequate funding and equipment for all security agencies (Nwankwo 2012:33).

Check on Small Arms Proliferation

Proliferation of small arms cannot be divorced from the porous nature of the Nigerian land and

coastal borders. These small arms find their way into the Country through these borders. To check

this, the Federal Government needs to empower adequately the Customs, Immigration Police and

other relevant agencies in order to effectively man the borders so as to reduce the incidence of

small arms proliferation. Also, the law on illegal possession of firearms needs to be reviewed for

the imposition of a stiffer penalty (Boylan 2009).

Establishment of Synergy among Security Agencies

Information and intelligence gathering are effective tools of investigation (Amaraegbu 2010). The

fight against domestic terrorism is the responsibility of all security agencies in any nation and for

this to happen, security agencies should share information and intelligence to succeed. This is

necessary because these domestic terrorists have networks of cells all over the country and beyond

(Amaraegbu 2010). There is the need for regular security meeting of the stakeholders both at the

State and Federal levels where operational guidelines for sharing information and intelligence in

prevention of terrorist acts and detection and control are discussed and appraised.

Enlightenment and Sensitization of the Public

Lack of confidence and trust in security agencies especially the Nigerian Police could be attributed

to the non-cooperative attitude towards security operatives in cases of kidnap. The public needs to

be made to change their perception of the security agencies by these agencies themselves through a

change of attitude to duty. Coupled with this, the public should be enlightened and sensitized on

the danger of failure to adhere to the advice of security agents. They should be made to understand

that payment of ransom to kidnappers encourages the persistence of kidnapping and thereby

escalates the incidence (Nyatepe-Coo 2012:77). The Federal Ministry of Information and

Communications should carryout enlightenment and sensitization campaign on the subject matter

through the National Orientation Agency (NOA), electronic and print media, churches/mosques

and community leaders.

CHAPTER FIVE:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In order to summarize the findings of this research, I would need to review each of the questions

asked/identified in the first chapter of this dissertation to analyse if the research was able to answer

all of them/to summarize the findings. With the available literature, we have been able to examine

the extent to which domestic terrorism affects national security in Nigeria.

No meaningful change can be experienced without a complete overhaul of the corruption that

exists within the local, state and federal governments. The incessant increase in hostage taking and

kidnapping within the society points to the fact that the general living conditions of the people has

deteriorated, living them with no meaningful source of income, thereby encouraging get rich quick

schemes and criminal acts with its assumed immediate pay off. The government needs to instil the

need for unity and oneness amongst its people by: creating employment opportunities across all

geopolitical regions of the country; developing and introducing more technical based learning

opportunities to colleges and schools to equip the youth with more skill-based training that they

can use in creating employment opportunities for themselves and Looking into the situation of the

people in the Niger Delta and Northern parts of the country to meet their needs.

The issue in the Niger Delta revolves around being the major source of capital for the entire

economy yet being the worse off in the face of development. The Government can meet with

MEND and other groups there, list out the issues they are facing and make a move to better the

situation. Representatives from the multinational oil agencies drilling/with operations in the area

should attend the meeting and new laws should be drawn. The area must have the best hospitals,

schools, basic infrastructure and the like. The oil companies can give back to the society by

creating job opportunities to the youth and also creating training opportunities. The issue relating to

oil spillage must be addressed with heavy fines levied and deadlines issued for cleaning up the

spillage. This is a major issue as fishing is the primary occupation within the region.

With regards to the Insurgency in the Northern part of Nigeria, the government can meet with the

rural leaders of these communities/religious leaders. Farming is the mainstay of the people here –

agricultural and animal rearing. Create hospitals and provide free immunization (to an extent),

technical colleges, free basic primary education, look into the situation of farmers and provide

manure and basic resources to improve on their subsistence farming, good roads/infrastructural

facilities like pipe borne drinking water and electricity.

With all these in place, the people would not feel marginalized and depend on acts of terrorism as

the way out of poverty. They will be armed with the necessary knowledge and support from the

government to take care of their livelihoods and families. When these issues have been addressed

in these areas, the government can move on to overhaul the security agencies overseeing terrorism.

Training must be given to every one of them and punishment (imprisonment, court-martialling,

fines etc. levied on anyone lacking). State of the art security gadgets must be put in place and

training given to the people operating them – e.g. CCTV gadgets, anti-bomb disabling

devices/bomb tracking devices etc.

With regards to kidnapping and hostage taking, the populace must be educated on the proper action

to take (a unit in the police force/or armed forces must be created to handle only this cases). With

the creation of a national database, the government can keep track of people engaging in criminal

acts/caught with arms/causing protests or encouraging unrest within the country/deported from

other countries/imprisoned there for terrorist related crimes etc.

Conclusion

The strength of any research and its contribution to knowledge lie in its ability to explore new

grounds. This study was able to achieve most of that by conducting a critical analysis of hostage-

taking and kidnapping. The main aim of this study was to explain domestic terrorism in Nigeria

while looking at two major epicentres where the analysis of hostage taking and kidnapping had the

most impact. Using the frustration-aggression, cognitive dissonance and asset to liability theories,

this study clearly shows that poverty, Nigeria’s political process, with its system of compromises

conspire with other frustrating conditions like environmental security to render the youths

vulnerable to aggression.

This study attempted to examine the factors that led to hostage taking and kidnapping prior to the

crisis in the Niger-Delta, armed militancy after the amnesty deal. It also tried to advance the

discourse to a critical level of reflection by providing insight into the unhealthy interplay of a wider

amalgam of interests that conspired in various ways to shape as well as influence youth restiveness

in Nigeria. The incidence of hostage taking and kidnapping in the Nigeria has posed many

implications on the economy and the general developmental efforts of the nation. As most

kidnappings involve foreign workers and development partners, the effect on the economy is

enormous, as it scares away potential development partners, and robs the state of the benefit of

such developmental alliances and opportunities. At the moment foreign and national investors have

reduced significantly; oil company workers and other business men and women have fled the

Niger-Delta region; most oil Companies and allied operations have been shut down, while the

volume of investments and capital flows to the region has reduced drastically.

The depressing situation is emphasized by the inability of the State security agents to combat this

crime because they are ill equipped. The spread of kidnapping as a business itself has to do with

long periods of governmental neglects of the region, causing its people to aggressively adopt

militant confrontation in a bid to force governments’ attention to the plight of the region. At the

moment, various levels within the government have stepped up developmental attention in the

region in a bid to curb the rising incidence of the crime. However, the problem lies in how

politically committed the Federal Government of Nigeria is on these developmental interests.

The study therefore believes that the problem in the Niger Delta deserves serious governmental

attention. The current efforts of the government are welcome, but such efforts will not be

successful without genuine stakeholder participation and involvement. Elitist governance should

make room for the inclusion of all layers of stakeholders. In evolving developmental plans for the

region, efforts should be made to check the rising cases of benefit capture, whereby the real trickle

down development benefits are captured by vested interest and elites while the people are left out.

Available development agencies for the region should be strictly monitored to stem the rising case

of corruption that has always been the hallmark of such agencies. Doing these will help to build the

capacity of every stakeholder, as well as engaging them in meaningful developmental activities.

In conclusion, it is observed that while the Niger Delta region remains the engine of Nigeria’s

economy, it however suffers infrastructural and ecological neglects. Its “minority status” has

systematically marginalized and disabled its influence in the overall national politics which is

characterized by ethnic domination. Oil wealth in Nigeria has become synonymous with poverty in

the producing regions. These are fundamental issues that have engendered all forms of social

disorders

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INTERVIEWS

Alkali, Y.A. (2009) On Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking in Nigeria. Open access interview with the Commissioner of Police, 24th December 2009. Accessed on the 3rd of July, 2014.

Ita, E.E. (2009) Director of State Security Services interview on Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking in Nigeria. Open access interview with the Commissioner of Police, 7th April 2010. Accessed on the 3rd of July, 2014.

Leha, P.I. (2009) On Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking in Nigeria. Open access interview with the Commissioner of Police, 7th April 2010. Accessed on the 3rd of July, 2014.

Muhammed, T.Y. (2009) The Effects of Kidnapping in Nigeria. Open access interview with the DCP, Kaduna. Accessed in the 3rd of July, 2014.

Okorie, A. (2009) On Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking in Nigeria. Open access interview with the Commissioner of Police, 7th December 2009. Accessed on the 3rd of July, 2014.

UNPUBLISHED THESIS

Abimbola, J.O & Adesote S.A. (2011) Terrorism and National Security in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria: National Security and Resource Management in Nigeria. Unpublished Thesis, Ondo: Adeyemi College of Education.

Nwankwo, O.O. (2012) Conceptual Discourse and Theoretical Framework of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria. Unpublished FDC Thesis. Abuja: National Defence Collage

Ogbogbo, C.B. (2004) The Niger Delta and the Resource Control Conflict, 1960-1995. Unpublished PhD Thesis. University of Ibadan: Institute of African Studies

57

Appendix 1:

Table 1: Hostage Taking and Kidnapping incidents recorded between 1997- 2014

March, 1997: Youths captured a barge delivering goods to a Chevron installation. The crew of seventy Nigerians and twenty expatriates were held hostage for three

days

December 13-17, 1997: 13 employees of Western Geophysical were held hostage by youths in a barge off the coast of Ondo State

October 14, 1998: Militant seized control of two Chevron flow stations, at Abiteye and Olero Creek, near Escravos on the Atlantic coast, taking some thirty workers

hostage for two days

November, 1999: Odi-South-East, 12 Policemen were held hostages and murdered by the youth

October 10, 2001: 19 soldiers on a peace mission in the conflict area were abducted and killed by the Tiv

militia in Zaki-Biam

March 12, 2003: Government forces Vs Ijaw militia (Some soldiers and militants were killed)

June 5, 2004:The Nigerian military killed 17 bandits in the oil-rich Delta state as part of an effort to combat oil theft, piracy, and kidnappings of oil workers

January 11, 2006: Four hostages seized (a Briton, an American and two Hungarians). About 22 persons were reported to have died in the attack. February 1, 2006: Nine hostages seized April, 2006: Militant claimed responsibility of Bomb explosion 2 people died, six others injured. May 1, 2006 : Five military personnel killed in surprise raid by the militants May 20, 2006: Seven hostages: 4 Briton, 2 Canadian, 1 American

May 31, 2006: Five Koreans were held hostage by joint militant action July 13, 2006: 4 military personnel including a naval chief killed

July 18, 2006: 2 explosions rocked pipelines convening crude oil to Nigeria Agip oil, Twon Brass, Bayelsa State. October 1, 2006: Militants killed 13 soldiers while escorting two oil vessels along the Cowthorn Channel and sank their vessel October 3, 2006: Seven expatriate oil woekers held hostage from their residence at Essan Akpan estate in Eket

58

October 10, 2006: Sixty oil workers taken hostage by militant youth in Bayela State

January 8, 2007: 24 Filipino held hostage and was not released until after a month in February. Also 9 Chinese were kidnapped in Sagbama, Bayelsa state January 10, 2007: Ten oil workers comprising 9 Koreans and one Nigerian working for Daewoo were Kidnapped May 8,2007: Attack on oil facilities at Brass and Asaka May 16, 2007: Attack and destruction of the country house of Goodluck Jonathan, Governor of Bayelsa State and Vice President elect of the Federal Republic of Nigeria July 8, 2007: A Bulgarian and a Briton were abducted from a barge in Calabar, Cross River State July, 24 2007: Bayelsa State Speaker’s mother abducted September 9, 2008: Two British workers were kidnapped along with 27 other workers when their vessel was hijacked by MEND militants

January 21, 2009: Rebels from Niger Delta attacked diesel tanker and kidnapped a Romanian worker April 16, 2009: A Cnadian in Nigeria on a Rotary international exchange was a taken hostage January 12, 2010: Three Britons were kidnapped near Port-Harcourt April 11, 2010: A Nigerian employee was kidnapped by unknown men in Southern Nigeria November 17, 2011: Two Americans and a Mexican sailor were kidnapped by militants

December 17, 2012: Five Indian Sailors were kidnapped by MEND militants December 20, 2012: South Korean oil workers were kidnapped by MEND gunmen from an oil plant in the Niger-Delta July 10, 2014: The Commissioner for Agriculture, Dr. Ken Nwosu was kidnapped and shot by unknown gun men of whom he later died the following week.

Table 1: Terror incidents recorded between 1997- 2014 (Ogundiya 2009:36, Akpabio and Akpan 2012:39, The Punch Newspaper 2014).

59

Appendix 2:

Table 2: Some instances of cases and casualty figures resulting from domestic terrorism with reference to the Boko Haram insurgency

Date Casualties July 26, 2009 Boko Haram launches mass uprising with attack on a police station in Bauchi, starting a five-day uprising that

spread to Maiduguri and elsewhere. September 7, 2010 Boko Haram attacked a prison in Bauchi, killed about five guards and freed over 700 inmates, including former

sect members. October 11, 2010 Bombing/gun attack on a police station in Maiduguri with destroyed the station and

injured three by the group December 24, 2010 The group carried out a bomb attack in Jos, killing 8 people. December 28, 2010 Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the Christmas Eve bombing in Jos that killed 38 people December 31,2010 The group attacked a Mammy market at Army Mogadishu Barracks, Abuja, 11 people died April 1, 2011 The group attacked a police station in Bauchi April 9, 2011 The group attacked a polling center in Maiduguri and bombed it April 20, 2011 A bomb in Maiduguri killed a policeman. April 22, 2011 The group attacked a prison in Yola and freed 14 prisoners April 24, 2011 Four bombs exploded in Maiduguri, killing at least three. May 31, 2011 Gunmen assassinate Abba Anas Ibn Umar Garbai, brother of the Shehu of Borno, in

Maiduguri. June 1, 2011 The group killed Shehu of Borno’s brother, Abba El-kanemi June 7, 2011 A team of gunmen launched parallel attacks with guns and bombs on a church and police stations in Maiduguri,

killing 5 people. June 16, 2011 Bombing of police headquarters in Abuja, claimed by Boko Haram. Casualty reports vary. June 26, 2011 Gunmen shot and bombed a bar in Maiduguri, killing about 25 people August 16, 2011 The Bombing of United Nations Office in Abuja, killing over 34 people by the Group

60

December 25, 2011

Bombing of St. Theresa’s Catholic Church, Madalla, killing over 46 people

January 6, 2012 The Sect attacked some southerners in Mubi, killing about 13 Igbo January 21, 2012 Multiple bomb blasts rocked Kano city, claiming over 185 people January 29, 2012

Bombing of Kano Police Station at Naibawa Area of Yakatabo

February 8, 2012 Bomb blast rocked Army Headquarters in Kaduna February 15, 2012 Koton Karife Prison, Kogi State, was attacked by the sect and about 119 prisoners were released and a warder

was killed. February 19, 2012 Bomb blast rocked Suleja Niger State near Christ Embassy Church, leaving 5 people seriously injured February 26, 2012 Bombing of Church of Christ in Nigeria, Jos, leading to the death of about 2 worshippers & about 38 people

sustained serious injuries. March 8 2012 An Italian, Franco Lamolinara and a Briton, Christopher McManus, who were

Expatriate Staff of “Stabilim Visioni Construction Firm” were abdicated in 2011 by a splinter group of Boko Haram and were later killed.

March 11, 2012 Bombing of St. Finbarr’s Catholic Church, Rayfield, Jos, resulting in the killing of 11 people and several others wounded.

April 26 2012 Bombing of three media houses (This day Newspaper) in Abuja killing 3 &2 security Officers & injured 13 people; This day, the Sun & The Moments newspapers in Kaduna, killing 3 persons & injuring many Others

April,29,2012 Attack on Bayero University, Kano, killing 13 Christian Worshippers, a senior nonacademic staff & two Professors

April 30, 2012 Bomb explosion in Jalingo, claiming 11 persons and several others wounded. 8 March 2012 During a British hostage rescue attempt to free Italian engineer Franco Lamolinara and Briton Christopher

McManus, abducted in 2011 by a splinter group Boko Haram, both hostages were killed. 31 May 2012 During a Joint Task Force raid on a Boko Haram den, it was reported that 5 sect members and a German hostage

were killed. 3 June 2012 15 church-goers were killed and several injured in a church bombing in Bauchi state. Boko Haram claimed

responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa. 17 June 2012 Suicide bombers struck three churches in Kaduna State. At least 50 people were killed. 17 June 2012 130 bodies were found in Plateau State. It is presumed they were killed by Boko Haram members. 3 October 2012 Around 25–46 people were massacred in the town of Mubi in Nigeria during a nighttime raid.

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January 20, 2013 A group of gunmen attacked the convoy of Alhaji Ado Bayero, the Emir of Kano, killing 4 and injuring 14 others, including two of his sons. In addition, militants from the Boko Haram breakaway group Ansaru ambushed a Nigerian Army convoy in Kogi State, killing 2 officers and injuring 8 others. The troops were heading to Mali to assist in the ECOWAS mission as part of the conflict against Jihadist groups.

January 21, 2013 Suspected Boko Haram militants murdered 31 people over the course of 3 days, including 18 hunters selling bushmeat, who were shot at market in Damboa on January 21. Five people were shot in Kano on the next day as they were playing board games. At least 8 civilians were killed in Maiduguri on January 23, as gunfire was reported from parts of the city.

February 18, 2013 A suicide bomber attacked a bus station in a predominantly Christian area of Kano, killing scores of passengers and injuring more.

March 5, 2013 Unidentified gunmen attacked at least 13 locations in Ganye, a city in Nigeria's Northeastern Adamawa State, including the local police HQ, a bank and several local bars. At least 25 people were killed in the two-hour assault, including the deputy chief of the local prison, where 127 inmates were freed.

March 18, 2013 A suicide bomber attacked a bus station in a predominantly Christian area of Kano, killing 41 passengers and injuring dozens more.

May 7, 2013 At least 55 killed and 105 inmates freed in coordinated attacks on army barracks, a prison and police post in Bama town.

June 16, 2013 A team of suspected Islamist militants attacked a school in Damaturu, killing 13 people, including students and teachers. Three days later a similar attack in the city of Maiduguri left nine students dead

July 6, 2013 Gunmen storm a school in Yobe state, killing 20 students and a teacher, state media reports. August 11, 2013 Gunmen attack a mosque in Konduga, Borno state, with automatic weapons, killing at least 44 people, a local

police official says. September 29, 2013 Gunmen approach a dormitory at the College of Agriculture Gujba in Yobe state and open fire on sleeping

students. October 20, 2013 Gunmen suspected of being members of Boko Haram attack motorists in northeastern Nigeria, killing four. November 13, 2013 French priest, Georges Vandenbeusch, is snatched from his parish church in Nguetchewe, Cameroon, about 11

kilometers (7 miles) from the Nigerian border. December 2, 2013 Hundreds of Boko Haram militants attack an Air Force base and a military checkpoint in the northeastern

Nigerian city of Maiduguri, according to government officials. January 26, 2014 Militants open fire on a village market and burn homes in the village of Kawuri, killing at least 45 people. February 11, 2014 Suspected Boko Haram militants torch houses in the village of Konduga, killing at least 23 people, April 14, 2014 Boko Haram militants kidnap approximately 276 teenage girls from a boarding school in Chibok in Borno. Table 2: Some cases of Domestic Terrorism by the Boko Haram Insurgency (Chinwokwu 2013:267, CNN 2014)