Do Greek voters want more grassroots politics? Inside the voter’s mind: Perceptions and...

2013/2014 Department of Government, LSE

London School of Economics and Political Science MSc Political Science & Political Economy GV4A2 Research Project

Do Greek voters want more grassroots politics?

Inside the voter’s mind: perception and understanding of Golden Dawn’s political activity.

A research project submitted by Angeliki Vourdaki to the Department of Government, the London School

of Economics and Political Science, in part completion of the requirements for the MSc in Political Science & Political Economy.

May 2014

Word Count: 6,587


1. Introduction

It is with utter disgust that the press has treated the Golden Dawn (GD), an extreme right party in Greece

which has now entered the mainstream with 6.92%.1 People focus on the resemblance of the party to a

Nazi-like organization and their symbol has been said to purposely look like a swastika; while they have

recently also been targeted as a criminal organization and questions have arisen regarding their legality.

However, there is one element of their story that is significantly understated: their activism. That GD

activism could have had anything to do with its success, is perhaps an unsettling thought. Greece has been

trying to resurrect from its economic downfall and political figures prefer to assume that voting for GD is

but an outburst of indignation at the unpopular austerity measures. This project is going to put this to the

test and truly examine whether people support GD just to protest against austerity, increasing

unemployment and rising taxes, or whether there is more to the story; more that comes with a new type of

grassroots politics that has not been dared before in a society where political talent is waning,

campaigning is virtually non-existent, and communication between politicians and voters is restrained to

pre-election hand-shaking and hug-giving.

What is interesting about the Golden Dawn case is the fact that it arose in a country where politics and

generally rhetoric have traditionally been leftist and populist, while also maintaining a remarkably

nationalist touch. It is without a doubt that “nationalism in Greece is a prominent feature of mainstream

social and political discourse” (Davis, 1998, p. 168). Nationalism and patriotism are two concepts that get

easily confused, mainly because of the country’s deeply dividing history. Greece has suffered until very

recently from ideological struggles of the left and right; however, the motto “fatherland, religion, family”

is something that leads many classes to a sense of identity (Pettifer, 2000). Greece, with its numerous war

heroes and all the people that have given their lives for their country’s freedom, has learnt to survive crises

by using the tool of nationalism as a building bloc of identity and enemy creation – Greek against

anything that is non Greek. Interestingly, this is not only by the traditional right wing. Once-upon-a-time

socialist PASOK once satisfied nationalist demands with pursuing independent foreign policies that

elevate the long lost Greek megali idea (Great Idea).

Seeing as nationalist ideals have always been part of political discourse it is interesting to study why GD

arose now. Arguably, the last few decades have seen the utter demolition of trust towards politicians, of

both the left and the right, due to a number of scandals and evidence of corruption. People do not know

who to trust and they do not have a leader to look up to. Recent foreign intervention masqueraded in the

form of a bailout has brought Greeks to believe that they cannot trust their leaders anymore – “they are all

the same”. This project is going to argue that this is the niche that GD has aimed (and in some cases,

1 All election results data are from hereon taken from the Ministry of Interior webpage.


succeeded) to fill. Its success is not random and it is not simply a protest against the economy. GD, with

its grassroots activity dared to differentiate itself and come close to the people.

The initial hypothesis, therefore, is that citizens have been affected more by their luck of trust towards

current mainstream politics than they have been affected by the crisis; they voted for GD because it

managed to gain their trust. This was achieved through the interaction of two dimensions of political

understanding: (1) disaffection with the status quo accompanied by (2) emotionally charged reaction.

First, the essay will start off with a review of the literature that is most frequently used to explain the rise

of the extreme-right. The theoretical framework that does seem to help the hypothesis and is most

reflective of the empirical data is a branch of supply-side theories that gives credit to grassroots politics.

Second, the hypothesis will be investigated empirically. The empirical section of this essay will take the

reader in the cafeterias of two areas in Greece that gave GD a high percentage of the vote. By talking to

the people, potential and actual GD voters, it will be demonstrated that it is GD’s grassroots politics that

has set it apart from a group of “politicians-not-to-be-trusted”. The issues of trust, nationalism, activism

and anger will be all examined in the final analytical section of this essay, providing a further impetus to

study the rise of GD as profoundly and honestly as we can. Mainstream comments that people voted for

GD “because they wanted to send a message” are superficial. The message was voiced loud and clear:

voters are in need of action.

2. Theoretical Backdrop

2.1 Why voters turn to the extreme right

It has been widely argued that the rise of the extreme right correlates with a bad economy (Betz, 1994).

The rise of unemployment and poverty can lead people to look for scapegoats – with immigrant groups

usually suffering the blame. This is a ‘bottom up’ approach, which allows for the commonly xenophobic

rhetoric of extreme right parties to gain votes. Norris (2005) identifies the following as key factors that

create demand for right-wing extremism: “new waves of immigration, the electorate has become widely

discontented with the mainstream parties, cuts in the welfare state, growing levels of job insecurity and

rising patterns of unemployment” (Norris, 2005, p. 11). This theory focuses on the demand-side of

electoral behaviour: voters are seen as influential actors in the wider political society in which they reside,

as they are able to influence the policy agenda and give rise to parties which raise the issues that are of

direct concern. This implies that the groups who vote for the extreme right are all part of a certain interest

group. In this case, extreme right voters would be mainly found among the poorest and/or most insecure

ranks of society. First, this does not seem to have much ground on an empirical level as extreme right

voters usually come from the middle classes, as was demonstrated by Kitschelt in his study of Italy

(Kitschelt, 1997, p. 161). Second, while the most insecure voters might vote for the extreme right because

they associate their insecurity with the influx of immigration, it only explains why xenophobic parties


might gain support but leaves out other extreme right parties who might voice their concerns about issues

that are generally populist but not xenophobic (Harrison & Bruter, 2011, p. 98).

Smith studies the correlation between crime rates and support for the extreme right, hypothesizing that

when the crime rates are higher voters feel more protected by the extreme right. As Smith writes, “populist

right parties increasingly appeal to a disaffected electorate concerned with their own physical, economic

and social security using populist rhetoric to campaign on strong law and order platforms, often linking

crime to rising immigrant populations” (Smith, 2010, p. 1477). Smith’s study seems to seek to prove that

the right gains political space where there is an actual increase in crime rates. Assuming that this could be

the case in every context where there is a rise of the extreme right, we would have to accept that fear is a

motivating factor when casting a vote. However, fear is an arbitrary term – it is neither objective nor

subjective. People might actually witness a crime and feel more insecure or they might simply hear of a

crime and end up feeling insecure. Thus, Smith’s argument could perhaps be enriched: it is not crime that

is associated with the rise of the extreme right, but, rather, it is the perceptions of crime that matter. While

Smith argues that “higher crime rates provide populist right parties with the political opportunity structure

to garner electoral support” (Smith, 2010, p. 1478), it is unclear whether this relationship only has one

direction, as something as arbitrary as ‘fear of crime’ could be manipulated.

Kitschelt (1997) puts forward a different theory: on the supply side, what triggers support for extreme

right-wing parties is the depolarization between the right and left across the existing political spectrum.

According to this argument, if the right and left converge towards the median voter, then voters seek for

an alternative and thus resort to the extreme right. (Kitschelt, 1997). If voters believe that their interests

are not being consistently or adequately represented by the established parties then they might find their

‘deliverers’ in the extreme right who use this political opportunity to maximize support. An important

element of this theory is the effect of post-materialism: voters are becoming increasingly interested in

issue-based politics (such as immigration) and the growing, educated middle class chooses to revolt in a

wider context of disaffection (Kitschelt, 1997, p. 161). This theory provides a framework through which it

is difficult to explain why voters turn to the extreme right and not to the extreme left. Both the extreme left

and the extreme right should gain support from the depolarization of party ideology so this theory could

be used to explain the extreme in general rather than the extreme right.

Perhaps the above theory can be enriched with Borschier’s model of party structures. Bornschier (2010)

brings forward the importance of the wider context of party systems when analyzing the rising support for

the extreme right. According to this model, voters turn to the extreme right because the extreme right itself

manages to manipulate the political agenda and shift it towards the issues that it deems important, i.e.

immigration (Bornschier, 2010). The extreme right has “seized the immigration problem” and has made it

its own. Parties achieve this by bringing these issues forward and thus replying to an unsatisfied demand.

This agenda-setting force, in combination with the internal party structure characterized by a “charismatic


leader”, convinces voters to put their trust into the party. Additionally, Bornschier hypothesizes the

changing cleavages in society that seem to drive party preference: moving away from the state-market

debate the cleavages are now largely cultural. However, this offers little intuition about the socio-

psychological characteristics that trigger extreme right support. It is unclear what happens when the

extreme right in a given context is not particularly xenophobic but more populist.2

It might be that the opposite of ideological convergence, party distinctiveness, leads to rising support of

the extreme right. Strong polarization in a national debate “might signal the lack of elite consensus”

(Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, p. 424). Zaller, in his work on mass opinion, proves that when there is a

distinct division between two ideological fronts on a debate, extremes are likely to be reinforced (Zaller,

1992). This could explain why voters choose the extremes when, in fact, there is no evident convergence

towards the middle (which was the case in the Greek 2012 elections). Arzheimer and Carter prove

empirically that the further right the mainstream right party places itself, the more the extreme right gets

legitimized (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). If the established right party brings into the debate policies that

are generally supported (or ‘owned’ via Bornschier) by the extreme right, people become more likely to

vote for the extreme right than they would otherwise.

Perhaps less intuitively, one could recycle theories of social movements and mobilization to provide some

theoretical understanding of voting behaviour. Tarrow (1998) discusses how states can unconsciously lead

to the success of social movements by allowing them access to media tools and gimmicks that can ‘make

or break them’. The role of the media in the rise of the extreme right appears to be multifaceted.

Nevertheless, raising awareness of a movement’s (or a party’s) activity even through negative advertising

is sometimes enough to instigate support (Tarrow, 1998, p. 20). Tarrow also writes of the mobilization

techniques that social movements employ. This brings in the importance of grassroots politics: it is the

face-to-face and social networks, “the connective structures” that lead to increased support (Tarrow, 1998,

p. 22). Moreover, Tarrow theorizes the importance of counter-movements. In a diverged society, where

ideological divisions lead to a polarization of political issues, challengers create opportunities for their

opponents. Where there is a strong left-wing, there is an opportunity for a strong right-wing and vice

versa. This, in combination with Zaller’s and Arzheimer’s conclusions could provide a robust theoretical

background to the analysis of this project on two fronts: (1) the polarity of debate in the 2012 issue-driven

elections and (2) the mobilization techniques that could have driven attitudes towards GD are both

important analytical tools that can be put to the test.

2.2. Golden Dawn gains space

GD carried out two exceptionally intelligent strategies: (1) it made itself present in the areas where there

was an opportunity to create demand and (2) it created demand by being consciously and continuously

2 Following Harriston & Bruter’s profiling of extreme right as either xenophobic or populist.


active (Dinas, Georgiadou, Iannis, & Rori, 2013). The immigrant-hit Aghios Panteleimon area was long

suffering from crime and burglaries. Since 2008, GD members have conquered the streets of Aghios

Panteleimon providing protection to its Greek inhabitants, ‘cleansing’ the squares and parks and helping

old ladies go to cashpoints without fearing that they will get mugged (Ellinas, 2013). At the same time,

GD has provided extensive help to groups who have been hit by the crisis by providing food and water for

free as seen on the party’s website. Their organized common meals have one requirement: Greek

nationality. For a populist party, they are also extremely ideologically consistent, as they have publically

given up a share of their own wage for the creation of a Golden Dawn Social Fund, which is aimed at

financing all of the aforementioned activities. Drawing away from the usual formalistic and elitist reality

of Greek mainstream politics, GD has played an excellent political game. It is this essay’s empirical quest

to prove that it is particularly this new type of grassroots politics which, in the existing circumstances of

complete mistrust towards the system, gave many Greeks hope that GD is, in fact, different.

Dinas, Georgiadou, Konstandinidis and Rori (2013) have shed light on the unconventional case of

Golden Dawn voters through their extensive survey in the area of Aghios Panteleimon, which gave GD a

total of 6.97% in May 2012. This survey has constituted the starting point for this project’s methodology,

providing all the necessary information that gave academic relevance to my initial hypothesis. Dinas et al

confirm that it is GD’s grassroots activity that gave it its current electoral status. I have chosen to focus on

areas that are not Aghios Panteleimon. The very real problem of immigration in Aghios Panteleimon is

clearly a variable that can be associated with increasing support of the extreme right. My hypothesis to be

tested, therefore is that, regardless of immigration, Greek voters want a more direct relationship with their

politicians and that the GD success story constitutes proof of that appeal. The choice of areas is not the

only thing that differs from Dinas et al’s great work. I have also chosen not to carry out a quantitative

survey but, rather, to focus on the thoughts, beliefs and explanations that the voters have to provide

themselves. I have been influenced by Eatwell’s approach that we need “more evidence about what

combination of political-psychological sentiments triggers extreme right voting” (Eatwell, 2003, p. 68).

Therefore, I chose to carry out interviews with six focus groups from two areas where GD scored a

relatively high percentage of the vote (> 9.5%). I firstly expect that GD activity will be higher in these

areas, thus proving its grassroots techniques. Secondly, I expect that the interviewees will in some way or

another quote GD activity and will shed light on their perspective; how do they feel that GD is closer to

them than other parties?

3. Methodology and Data

3.1 Choice of areas

It is necessary to explain the choice of areas, Keratsini and Argos. Keratsini is a neighborhood of largely

left-wing and proud Pireas, which is located further south from Athens and is the commercial port of the


city. Pireas has a tradition of hosting mainly working class and lower middle class families, white-collar

employees, blue-collar shipping workers and public servants. For that reason, Pireas has normally voted

for left-wing, and centre-left parties, such as PASOK (44.34% in 2009) and KKE (12.88% in 2009). The

workers believe that their interests will be better represented by left-wing parties whose populist rhetoric

brings forward a discussion over labor rights. However, something happened in June 2012 and the B’

Pireas district, in which Keratsini belongs, gave GD a 9.28%. Keratsini is of specific importance for two

particular reasons: first, left-wing hip hop artist Pavlos Fyssas was murdered there by alleged GD activist

Giorgos Roupakias. Second, Keratsini holds the infamous ‘fish market’ where Greek and foreign fish

vendors supposedly fight over the control of the market. I expect that for those reasons GD will show a

high rate of activity in Keratsini and voters will be able to offer some intuition.

Argos, on the other hand, is located in the Peloponnese, in the municipality of Argolis, and is a city of

almost 30,000 inhabitants that are traditionally very right wing. Argos – as well as the whole of the

Peloponnese – shows a very high support for the right-wing; quite shockingly to some, its inhabitants

sometimes openly identify as ‘junta-nostalgic’ and pro-monarchy (Pettifer, 2000: 24-5). This is largely due

to historical reasons, as dictator Papadopoulos erased the farmers’ debts to assist agriculture. Argos voters

are relatively homogeneous to Keratsini voters, in the sense that they are also mostly working class and

lower middle class voters, blue-collar workers and self-employed farmers and shepherds. What is also very

interesting about the Argos case is that it is quite close to Athens, yet it has a very strong regional identity;

a local joke has Argites believe that Athenians visit Argos because they want to “go to Greece”. Thus,

Argos bestows a very strong Greek identity. Moreover, Argos presents an interesting case because it holds

a very strong Greek Orthodox identity, with the Church meddling in all types of private and political life.

For all these reasons, one would expect that Argites would vote for more traditional right-wing parties

that resemble LAOS or ANEL, yet GD appears to be particularly successful there with 9.44%. Finally,

Argos hosts many immigrants because of its agricultural tradition. I therefore expect that GD will have

placed itself strategically there and that voters will approve of GD activity.

Admittedly, there is no reason why Keratsini and Argos present a better case than any other area that

gave GD a high percentage of the vote. In fact, cities in Laconia could have been even more

representative, as they demonstrated the highest GD support in the country with 10.9% (Ellinas, 2013).

Given the time, word and resource constraints of my research, I believe that Argos and Keratsini are good

enough to enrich the existing literature on the matter. Both areas constitute an alternative path of analysis

to the usual study of the 6th district of Athens, where the sudden influx of immigrants might have caused

an increased demand for GD.


3.2 Gathering the data

It is important for the empirical section of this essay that the voters’ thoughts are put across as accurately

as possible. In fact, it is not the GD strategic moves that matter for my analysis but, rather, the voters’

perceptions about GD. For that reason, I wanted a random sample of voters from these areas, which

could only be achieved by simply going to the territories of interest and talking to as many people as

possible. It is self-evident that talking to GD officials placed in those areas would give out a biased result,

thus talking to simple, common, everyday people was of utter importance.

Because of the nature of this research it was necessary to have a random sample and the only way to

achieve that was to walk into cafeterias in the areas of interest and simply ask people that resembled the

necessary profile whether they want to have a conversation about the Golden Dawn. I first went to

Keratsini to Platia (“square”) Kiprou and Platia Laou. I believed that I could find some cafeterias where

the locals like to socialize at these squares, the ones I visited being two of the most common ones. I chose

a Saturday morning all the way to night as it is almost a cultural given that citizens will go “for coffee”

and socialize on Saturdays. As was expected, the cafeterias were full of people. Keratsini being a relatively

non-central area has maintained some of the more traditional cafeterias where middle-aged men usually

constitute the habitual crowd. I walked in and asked people whether they would like to talk about the

Golden Dawn as I am doing my postgraduate research on voting behaviour. I specified that all

discussions will be recorded but that the participants will remain anonymous. The first few groups that I

approached were not very positive. This led me to change my attitude and not reveal that this is a student

research but let them speculate about the reasons for this study. It became clear later that most believed

that I was carrying out some government-funded gallop so they were willing to fully express their anger

and thoughts in the hope that I will pass on their sentiments to government officials. During the

conversation I made it clear that this is a postgraduate study; whether they believed me or not remains a

mystery (most of them seemed not to). I spent around eight hours talking to different groups, waiting for

groups to leave and new ones to come by.

When I went to Argos, given the fact that I had no relation with the area, I found a group of students who

were postering on behalf of the KKE, so I asked them what they knew about GD activity and whether I

can find any voters around. They told me to go to a traditional ‘kafenio’ (cafeteria aimed at middle-aged

men) and that I will find a good mix of people that resemble my profile there. When I went there I

realized that attitudes were opposite to Keratsini. People were more suspicious when I did not reveal the

purposes of my study and were a lot more helpful when I told them that it was for a postgraduate research

project. I spent another six hours in this kafenio, talking to six different groups.

Every focus group discussion lasted for about 1 hour and 15 minutes. It was my conviction from the start

that I should not ask my research question directly but ‘test the waters’ to truly hear what the voters had to


say without me influencing them. I therefore started every interview with the same question of generic

character: “What do you know about the Golden Dawn?” Other questions that I asked – not in a

particular order – were:

• What do you know about Golden Dawn’s activity in your area?

• Why did people and/or you not vote for the extreme left, anti-establishment parties, i.e.

ANTARSYA?

• Why did people and/or you not vote for traditionally right-wing, anti-immigrant parties, i.e.

LAOS?

• Why did people and/or you not vote for new right-wing, anti-immigrant parties, i.e. ANEL?

The 6 focus groups that I chose to include in this project are comprised of an equal amount of GD voters

(but not party affiliates) and non-GD voters. This was an important aspect of the analysis to see whether

supporters of GD and non-supporters’ attitudes and knowledge converge. Supporters would be expected

to know more about GD party activity so introducing the non-supporting groups can eliminate this bias.

There were more interviews than will actually be used to test my hypothesis but I have opted to use the

focus groups that more closely replicate the profile of the GD voter.3 For that reason, the focus groups are

relatively homogeneous. They are all comprised of white-collar and self-employed workers. Out of 34

participants, 8 were women and the rest were men. They are all between the ages of 25-45 years old and

most of GD supporters happened to be between the ages of 35-45 – GD’s main audience. None of the GD

supporters in the groups are officially affiliated with the party, which eliminates their bias. Most of them

do not identify with or are aware of the party ideology, which greatly improves the scope of my analysis,

as the units are not fanaticized supporters but voters that are likely to jump between parties. Finally, a

majority of the sample GD voters are self-employed.4

There are, of course, some limitations to my method. First, it is likely that those who agreed to have a

conversation about the GD are the ones that are more interested in politics anyway, which makes them

more likely to be aware of GD activity in their municipality. This, however, does not cause a problem for

my analysis as I am interested in what they know is going on in their areas so, in a sense, interest in

politics is somewhat of a prerequisite for the participants. Second, it is possible that the people who

engaged in conversation believed that they are doing so because what they say will be actually presented

in Parliament and thus they might have exaggerated their points. In fact, several of them across different

groups said even after I had specifically explained to them that this is a university research project: “Tell

them exactly what we tell you. Do not tell them what they want to hear.”

3 For a more extensive profiling of GD voters see Georgiadou (2013). 4 See Appendix Table 3.2 for a summary of the units’ characteristics.


4. Presentation of Trends

4.1 Common patterns in Keratsini and Argos

That Greek voters do not trust their politicians would be an understatement. The overall suspicion with

which they instinctively replied to questions and discussed among themselves was evident across the

sample. Voters gravitated between complete mistrust and conspiracy theory to anger and hopelessness.

They all quoted the absence of alternatives and appeared to believe that politicians are all the same. This

idea that “they are all the same” also seems to have influenced their perception of the left-wing. They all

mentioned that they see no difference between left and right anymore, as politicians from both ends of the

spectrum “shout at each other on television but are best buddies behind closed doors”. 5 This utter

suspicion towards the status quo and the established bigger parties has led to a divided perception of

politics: on the one side there are all the established politicians and on the other there is GD. Voting for

GD has been a medium of political expression on two fronts: either it is a vote of reaction against the

establishment, or it is a vote of allegiance, which expresses anger. In all cases, it is the voters’

understanding of GD’s violence that pushed them to cast their vote for the extreme right party. Table 4.1

shows some typical statements and the frequency of their use. The table shows the bi-dimensionality of

the statements, going from political – mistrust and suspicion towards politicians, the lack of alternatives,

absence of political activity – to emotional – anger and betrayal, reaction with frustration and expression

of these negative feelings via GD. It is evident that there is a general political disillusion with all of the

participants showing their distress with the supply of parties available. There is also a very clear tendency

to resort to emotions of anger and a willingness to react and punish the established parties.

4.2 Keratsini

The strong left-wing identity of Keratsini was shattered by the GD phenomenon. A participant said that

“to hear that in a left-wing neighbourhood people are voting for GD shows a clear sign of revenge”.

Politically, not only are people disappointed with alternatives (“I do not want any of them! I am voting for

GD.”), they are also disappointed with democracy: “All these parties have created a democracy between

them that is in their interest. The MPs help each other out. In 2010 the district attorney had appealed for

the lifting of immunity of some politicians from ND, PASOK and LAOS because of some scandals and

nobody in the Parliament voted for it. Not even KKE! [They] are always fighting on television, why didn’t

[they] vote?” This type of disillusion with politics and politicians is accompanied by a general feeling of

estrangement. “What does Samaras know about Keratsini? Has he ever come here? No, the furthest south

5 This was a recurring phrase used. In particular, people are referring to the anecdotal televised discussions on the night-‐time news where representatives from different parties are usually invited and correspondence takes place through so-‐called ‘windows’. The news ‘windows’ have almost made their way into pop culture with the recurring arguments that take place on usually unimportant matters and minor, irrelevant policies.


he goes is the Parliament”.6 The estranged voter does not find it hard to turn to GD. In fact, the party’s

activity in the area seems to have played a role in its rise. “The way they [GD] speak to them [other MPs]

is what expresses citizens’ feelings. We wish we could speak to them like this but we cannot.” Several

statements were made along the same lines.

From an emotional perspective, the feelings of anger and resentment that voters have towards their

politicians are expressed via GD’s violence. Numerous participants quoted with laughter the incident

when a GD MP slapped a KKE politician on live television. Others mentioned the incident when the

same MP said to a ND MP when she got up to voice her disapproval of his speech: “Are you drunk

again? Sit down re!”7 People think this attitude to be representative of their feelings of anger towards the

big parties. Even non-GD voters said that they were secretly happy when these incidents took place and

they wish they could have done it instead. In Keratsini, people are also aware of GD activity around the

area.

However, they seem to think that the media has played a more important role in raising awareness about

GD activity than GD has done for itself. They say: “It all started in 2010 with the polls. The news was

always about how ‘GD is rising!’, ‘GD in Aghios Panteleimon’, ‘GD helps the pensioners’… They turned

them into heroes”. GD has offices near Keratsini and some residents have joined the party as full-time

mobilized members. They always walk with bodyguards and have formed “unnanounced inspection

units” that kick immigrants out of street markets and the fish market.

4.3 Argos

Argos is a special case because it is found in the traditionally right-wing Peloponnese. Argos presented all

of the Keratsini patterns but in excess. Politically, people still consider that voting for GD is an action of

revenge against the big parties. Here, however, there are a number of conspiracy theories that go along.

“GD is their own child. Every time they wanted to pass a new piece of legislation they would tell them to

go out and destroy things. So everybody would care about the riots and not about the legislation”.8 A

different scenario was “It was predetermined that GD would do this well. They [other parties] saw that

they lost their reliability so they created GD to come closer to the people”. People do feel that GD is

closer to them as they claim that GD expresses and truly represents their interests: “In a few months there

are going to be the European elections. We will send 50 Chryssavgites (Golden Dawnists) and then we

will see if Merkel dares to bring her own here again.” There is clear mistrust towards the established

parties and people believe that there is a lack of alternatives. “They sold us out. There is no ideology

6 In wider Athens the northern suburbs are the richest with upper class families and politicians usually residing in those areas. Keratsini is found in the south and among other working class and lower middle class neighbourhoods. 7 “Re” is a derogatory interjection that adds emphasis and insult. 8 There seems to be some confusion as to who is actually rioting, possibly due to the remoteness of the area from the events.


anymore. In the old times you knew who was right- and who was left-wing. Now you see them fight on

television and they hug each other backstage. Who to believe?” There is a clear line that divides other

parties and GD.

The angered, estranged Argite voter, perceives GD as an active agent. Some people said that

“Chryssavgites are honest, they are humanists” (!) and others believe that they are a continuation of the

junta. As expected, people were adamant that the extreme right is the only way forward.9 Numerous junta

nostalgic participants said: “People talk about the junta but the junta went to every distant village and fixed

everything, even their toilets. And they didn’t take any money. This is what GD does”. People seem to

feel that they are far away from political reality. They say that “politics is played in higher structures” and

“we want a farmer to get involved so they know what to do with agriculture”. Essentially, they want

people like them to govern them. GD has offices in nearby Corinth and they organise football games

accompanied by speeches in Argos. According to some more involved participants, “they do what they

can to keep the nucleus warm and alive”.

Another issue that came up was that of religion in the province. There are some extreme orthodox

subgroups and some Olympian Gods worshippers who both believe that GD is actively representing them.

A Christian priest in Argos said during service “Do not vote for Tsipras! He is an atheist!” and this seems

to have affected people’s perception of SYRIZA and the left. Concurrently, the subgroups who consider

themselves to be the continuation of Ancient Greeks believe that GD is secretly pushing for an agenda to

destroy Christianity and bring back the worship of the Olympian Gods. They think that GD’s symbol is

an Ancient Greek symbol and that the GD hail (lifting up the right arm) is “a hail to the Sun”.

5. Analysis and discussion

When reading the data the absence of immigration and crime shines. This shows that in areas different to

Aghios Panteleimon GD has based its activity on presenting itself as solely a populist party with less

xenophobic discourse than in Athens. There is clearly, therefore, a different line of explanation as to why

people perceive the GD to be closer to them.

5.1 Political explanations and the supply of alternatives

As is evident from the data, voters are disillusioned with the supply of political parties that characterizes

Greek reality. The perceived absence of political alternatives played an important role in GD’s rise. While

there was not a depolarization of the left and right per se people perceive them as two sides of the same

9 A participant interrupted his friend and asked me: “Do you want to know what I am?”. He showed me his lighter with the logo of EPEN – the party that former dictator Papadopoulos created from prison. “Fatherland, religion, family. That is what I am.”


coin. Paradoxically, polarization was presumably at its highest in the 2012 elections. The recent

unpopularity of centre-left PASOK, caused the party’s support to drop by 31.64%, thus bringing about the

rise of radical left SYRIZA, whose representatives not only were left-wing and anti-Memorandum but

some also called for Greece’s exit from the Eurozone. However, a lot of people seem to be utterly

disappointed by the left. The left’s inability to find a common ground and form a coalition to govern has

estranged many indecisive voters. Especially in an environment where some voters appear to need strong

leadership, the perception of the left as a weak agent could have pushed some already anti-leftist voters to

the extreme. In general, it seems that this perception of convergence does not refer to policy or ideology

but, rather, to a general lack of activity: “Who would you have us vote for? ND and PASOK are out of

the question. SYRIZA? As if they would do anything different. They only want to oppose but secretly

they don’t even want to get elected”. Even though MPs from opposing parties are vocal about their

ideological differences it is believed that they would not do anything different were they to get elected. In

this sense, a somewhat twisted version of Kitschelt’s theory is confirmed.

A question can arise as to why these voters did not turn to already established parties of the far right. As

seen on Table 5.1, in 2012 there were two right-wing ideological alternatives to GD, namely LAOS and

ANEL. However, the new dichotomy of pro- and anti-Memorandum parties that characterized these

elections disrupted the ideological continuum. LAOS, the first extreme right party to enter the Parliament

after the demolition of the junta, committed political suicide by supporting the Memorandum and did not

pass the 3% threshold. For the first time, there were three right-wing alternatives that placed themselves

further right to ND. LAOS was unresponsive to the general anti-Memorandum sentiment of the 2012

elections and was thus eliminated from political reality – and from potential electoral competitors of GD.

ANEL, on the other hand, did a little bit better than GD in 2012 but, at the time of writing, support for

GD has actually risen to 10-13% whereas it has fallen for ANEL (Financial Times, 2013). The emergence

of ANEL, however, as Arzheimer and Carter would argue, could have legitimized extreme right discourse

and thus led to an ‘extremisation’ of the voters’ preferences.

5.2 Emotional explanations, injustice and violence

Klandermans (1997) speaks of “suddenly imposed grievances” when analyzing the social psychology of

protest. These grievances are experienced under a wider sentiment of injustice. He mentions that “the

events impose a collective identity upon those affected; everybody is victim of the same incident”

(Klandermans, 1997, p. 40). This seems to be the emotional basis of Greek voters’ reactionary attitude. As

was the case in France, when the policies of rigueur created an environment that gave political opportunity

to the National Front, the troika imposed austerity has consequently fuelled emotions of injustice among

citizens: “They have their off-shores and their NGOs when their grandparents were shepherds like me.

And what do I have? Sheep that I cannot even sell anymore because they import meat from the Balkans.”

This statement summarizes the interaction of corruption and inequality as these structures are perpetuated


throughout generations and further estrange voters. This injustice has had an estrangement effect on

voters who feel that they cannot make an impact as they are not part of a wider narrative; only reactors of

what is handed out to them.

These grievances and the feelings of injustice have admittedly led to an angry expression of rage and an

endorsement of GD’s violence. Injustice and violence have traditionally been associated in Hannah

Arendt’s work. Even though Arendt mainly speaks of state violence against citizens, the diachronic

theoretical usefulness of her argument could provide some analytical explanations in this context. Arendt

writes that “violence appears where power is in jeopardy” (Arendt, 1970, p. 56). It is more than evident

from the data that voters seem to feel like they have lost their power: the power to change the electoral

outcomes (“finally we broke the two-party system”), the power to influence policy (“at least now there is

strong opposition”), the power to affect their own fates (“maybe now we can lobby for better agricultural

policy”), the power to punish the politicians who, they believe, have wronged them (“now suddently they

are scared even though nothing has changed”). Reacting to this feeling of ‘powerlessness’ with rage and

violence is the only medium through which people believe they can make an impact. Essentially, it could

be argued that their vote to GD is but the right-wing equivalent to the violent riots by leftist, anti-

establishment groups. GD voters could be part of the “new poor” created by austerity who only recently

lost their power. Their insofar involvement with the right might have to do with an already strong and

active left (as per Tarrow).

5.3 Other explanations

An unpopular, but nevertheless worth mentioning, explanation that also treats the left and right as two

sides of the same coin is the underlying nationalism of people’s comments. Almost all of the participants

spoke of the need to find a true, Greek leader. The unpopularity of the troika, and anything foreign, is not a

new phenomenon. The belief that Greek politicians are “sell-outs” and that they only serve foreign

interests was widely established among the citizens. This new type of nationalism that stems from and

leads to mistrust is shared not only among right-wing voters but the left-wing as well. As Halikiopoulou et

al (2012) argue, both left- and right-wing parties in Greece are mobilized by the same type of nationalism

– which also constitutes the ideological ‘womb’ of Euroscepticism. Following this argument, it can be

theorized that the pro- and anti-Memorandum politics, which essentially approve or disapprove of the

European Union’s involvement in the country’s economy, provide the new ideological cleavage:

Europhilic versus Eurosceptic.

Media has clearly also played a role in the perception of GD as a party close to the people. Voters seem to

be aware of this dynamic as they quote the media as their main source of information over GD’s activity.

“We don’t have immigrants here but we hear what happens in Athens. People can finally sleep with their

doors unlocked!” This remoteness from Athens, even in Keratsini is evident throughout. The remoteness


from the city centre is also a symbol of the remoteness from the politicians. Lack of political activity also

set the GD apart as the media kept trying to alarm people of rising GD activity. However, this had the

opposite effect. As predicted by Tarrow, voters seemed to appreciate the fact that at least some political

agent was active in these areas. A participant in Argos told me that some drug addicts broke into his

house and stole some things from him, including a gun. He chased them and caught them and made them

admit to the crime. When he called the police nobody came. When he called the local GD members they

came and helped. This could tie in with the crime rates that Smith addressed. As seen on table 5.3, while

there seems to be no increase in crime in Greece until 2010 (the year when GD’s first success was

recorded with the Athens Mayoral elections), people believe that there is more crime. “It is not as if

something has changed, there are just as many immigrants as before, if not fewer. Only now, somebody

does something about it” – a participant characteristically said. The media seems to have assisted in these

perceptions of crime and in raising awareness of GD activity to tackle these issues.

What was the aim of this research project from the beginning has been implicitly proven all along: there is

a wider disaffection with formalistic politics. There is a ‘us and them’ discourse which was evident across

all six focus groups. Politicians are perceived to be as distant figures who do not have the people’s interests

at heart but, rather, their own secret agenda. Politicians are seen as corrupt individuals who support each

other in order to maintain their lobbying power and pull strings. A participant said: “I will tell you what

politics in Greece is like: we spit on the politicians and they tell us that it is raining”. This deeply

engrained suspicion towards politics and the way it is being carried out has turned the voters towards a

new player who is truly active; the Golden Dawn. Its violent politics is by many seen as the expression of

their own anger. The fact that GD is close to the people and there are a number of its officials running to

satisfy the citizens’ needs makes them appealing.

6. Conclusions

In this project it was discussed whether Greek voters have demonstrated a need for more grassroots

politics and whether this was associated with the high percentage of the vote which was achieved by the

Golden Dawn in the May and June 2012 elections. Through a discussion of the relevant theories

regarding the rise of the extreme right, it was maintained that the GD case largely resembles a

combination of supply-side and mobilization theories. The empirical core of this project took the reader to

dwo different areas in Greece, Keratsini and Argos, which gave GD high levels of support. By talking to

the people it was demonstrated that people are in need of a more active political figure: they are

completely disengaged with the current alternatives and they appreciate GD’s aggression. This bi-

dimensionality of estrangement and passivity on the one front and emotion and reaction on the other, has

shed light on what made people feel like GD is closer to them than other parties. Politically, the idea that

the left and right are all the same and emotionally, the feelings of injustice and loss of power could have


led voters to believe that GD is different. Underlying nationalism and the media also assisted in this force.

However, throughout all of the analysis one common factor outshines the others: GD is an active

grassroots agent and that is what voters are able to believe in.


APPENDIX Table 3.2 Summary of participants’ characteristics.

Unit Gender Age Profession GD Voter

KERATSINI 1 F 41 White-collar No

2 M 43 Self-employed No

3 M 45 White-collar No

4 F 43 White-collar No

5 M 48 Self-employed No

6 F 44 White-collar No

1 M 45 Self-employed Yes 2 M 43 White-collar Yes 3 F 43 White-collar Yes 4 F 37 Self-employed No 5 F 40 White-collar Yes 6 M 48 White-collar Yes

1 F 34 White-collar Yes 2 F 32 Unemployed No 3 M 35 Self-employed Yes 4 M 34 Unemployed No 5 M 33 White-collar Yes

ARGOS 1 M 30 Self-employed No

2 M 35 Self-employed Yes







4 M 32 Public servant No










Table 4.1. Typical statements and frequency used

Typical Statment Times mentioned Keratsini Argos GD voters Non-GD

voters

POLITICA

L (sup

ply)

"I don't believe politicians" 34 17 17 20 14

"They are all the same" 34 17 17 20 14

"Parties do not act" 34 17 17 20 14

EMOTIONAL

(movem

ent) "They sold us out" 33 16 17 20 13

"We want to react" 26 9 17 20 6

"GD is different" 19 7 12 19 0

Total 34 17 17 20 14

Table 5.1 Party participation in May/June 2012 Greek elections Party Left Right Pro-‐Memorandum Anti-‐Memorandum New Democracy

✔ ✔

PASOK ✔ ✔

SYRIZA ✔

✔

DEMAR (Democratic Left)

✔

✔

ANEL (Independent Greeks)

✔

✔

Golden Dawn ✔

✔

KKE (Communist Party)

✔

✔

LAOS ✔ ✔

Liberal Alliance

✔ ✔

ANTARSYA ✔

✔

OP (Green Party) ✔

✔


Table 5.3 Eurostat crime rates in European Member States


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