Disruptive Innovation: A Comparison Between Government and Commercial Space

of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

64th International Astronautical Congress, Beijing, China. Copyright ©2013 by the International Astronautical Federation. All rights reserved.

IAC–13–D1.3.3 DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION: A COMPARISON BETWEEN

GOVERNMENT AND COMMERCIAL SPACE

Tibor S. BalintRoyal College of Art, Innovation Design Engineering

Kensington Gore, London, SW7 2EU, United Kingdome-mail: [email protected]

AbstrAct

The world is changing around us, and it is driven by innovation. For over five decades now, space exploration re-quired and benefited from novel technologies and processes to expand human presence into distant destinations, while also broadening our understanding of the universe. The scale of such innovations varied from incremental through radical to disruptive. These are commonly recognized innovation terms, yet many of the characteristics are different between space and consumer markets. Furthermore, government supported space agencies may innovate differently from established and emerging commercial space companies. The former is driven by human or robotic exploration goals—instead of profits—coupled with system and process complexities, high development costs, risk averseness, near term stakeholder needs, budgetary uncertainties, changing priorities, government driven earmarks, policies, so-lidified processes, often rigid management approaches, and many other factors. Today, these present a particular challenge for introducing disruptive innovations. In comparison, profit driven commercial space industries benefit from previous investments and breakthroughs by government agencies, or can be highly dependent on agencies as funding sources and subsequent technology infusion pathways. Due to the close coupling, many characteristics are common between the two. Yet the desire and need persists to accelerate progress by bringing disruptive innovations to space technologies. This may require new approaches drawn from a new way of thinking. While good leadership, management, science and technology expertise can successfully reconcile constraints between usability, feasibility and viability of programs, projects, and processes, a design thinker could go a step beyond and successfully harmonize these. Thus, the introduction of design thinking to space technology developments and processes could benefit port-folio management, future planning, and could result in closer ties with stakeholders. If successfully applied, this may yield superior break through technology and process innovations. This paper provides a snapshot of the current state of space technology innovation domain, including working through development pipelines, infusion pathways, using various tools and processes, stakeholder interests and constraints, and identifies potential barriers to innovation. The discussion is followed by an introduction to design thinking within the space technology framework, and highlight its potential benefits to at least a subset of future technology and process development needs.

IntroductIon

It has been stated that for organizations to progress, to develop and grow, become more profitable, efficient, and sustainable, they need to successfully implement new ideas, or in other words, innovate. But the word “innova-tion” can have many meanings. On one hand it provides flexibility to interpret it, but it can be also confusing.

If innovation is described as: “Ideas successfully applied for people / by people”, then what do the component words mean? What is “success”? Success can have a tem-poral dimension, where an innovation might be initially successful, and eventually fail or vice versa. What is “ap-plied”? Is it applied to a product, a process, a service, or multiple of these? Is it applied within a single part of an organization, such as a Directorate (e.g., NASA’s Mission Directorates), or a Branch, or a Team? Or is it broader and applicable to the whole Agency (e.g., NASA), or company, or nationwide (e.g., the US National Initiatives for Manufacturing Innovation), or even internationally /

globally (e.g., collaboration between NASA and ESA)? Does it involve a large group of users (e.g., the science or technology communities)? Finally, what and who are the sources of the “ideas”? Especially when combining new and old ways of thinking. For example, much success of emerging commercial space companies (e.g., Space X) can be contributed to significant investments and technol-ogy solutions by NASA several decades ago.

Innovation can encounter multiple obstacles. Conse-quently, implementing innovative ideas and changing the organizational culture—especially in a government framework—requires tailoring the innovation processes. In turn we may identify new unexplored pathways and create new opportunities, which could feed back to a broader understanding and implementation of new ideas.

At government run programs, organizational, program and project managed practices are well established and often rigid. This does not readily facilitate flexibility


of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

and change. The introduction of a new way of thinking, namely design thinking, can introduce some flexibility to the current approaches, while harmonizing the con-straints for usability, feasibility and viability.

The topic and role of innovation and design, and its place within the technology sector have been broadly explored and published, with examples provided in the reference section of this paper. Therefore, the objective here is not to provide a complete overview of innovation, but to highlight some of the key characteristics and their rela-tionships to the government and commercial framework of space technology. Throughout the paper examples will be given from NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD). This new Mission Directorate was formed in February 2013 with 9 programs spanning the full Technology Readiness Level (TRL) range typically from 1 to 7, but on occasion up to TRL 9.

WhAt Is InnovAtIon?Organizations need to successfully implement new ideas to progress, to develop and grow, to become more profit-able, efficient and sustainable. Innovation can be catego-rized in different ways, and the discussion presented here is just one of the possible approaches. In general, innova-tion can sustain or interrupt existing ways of doing things for the whole system or for its components.

The extend or levels of innovation can vary significantly, and can be categorizes as:

• Incremental & sustaining innovation: which provides improvements to existing products, processes, or ser-vices. For example, increasing the performance or a product by a small percent.

• Radical innovation: changes the nature of products, services, and/or processes. For example, using ad-ditive manufacturing to produce rocket nozzles, or breaking the battery recharge cycle limit can have a significant impact on the aerospace industry.

• Transformational and disruptive innovations: are rev-olutionary in their impact, and may affect the whole sector or even the economy. For example, deep space optical communications and inflatable aeroshells can enable future human exploration missions to Mars by providing high data rates to communicate with the crew, and by enabling an order of magnitude larger landed mass on the surface of Mars, which is needed for a human future habitat.

Innovation can occur at different times, on different time scales, and their infusion to stakeholders can also vary.

• Innovation can occur before or ahead of its time. For example, Apple’s Newton set the stage for the Palm Pilot and for other personal assistants until the iPhone

became highly successful. Google Glass is currently under development, but its success is far from guaran-teed. Such products may not gain momentum for wide diffusion and growth, which could mean no chance for infusion for even decades. This brings up the question: “why invest now?”

• Innovative products may take too long to develop: dur-ing that time other ideas may come forward and suc-ceed. For example, a new product might be superior or cheaper. This can be leveraged with parallel invest-ments in the same topic area, where other solutions may emerge faster with nearer term infusion poten-tials.

Markets and technologies can also shift:

• Some ideas may have looked good at the time, but opinions and options may have changed under a new outlook. For example, recently the Mars program se-lected a mission architecture for 2020, which will re-sult in the re-flight of technologies from the previous Mars rover mission. This removed the need to advance some of the new technologies that initially targeted this mission opportunity. Under such circumstances a programmatic response is needed to reassess the tech-nology portfolio and use these markers to justify redi-rection to a new and relevant technology development content.

• In other cases the idea may have looked good at the time of initial conception and could have had initial successes, but with changes to the infusion potential and stakeholder needs, the “why invest now” ques-tions can no longer be satisfied.

Short development time scales may point to incremental developments, while radical innovations may need long development and infusion time scales.

The diffusion of innovation can also range from short to long time scales. For example, Internet-based services can infuse services within months or shorter, while phar-maceutical products, such as new drugs, may need many years to introduce to the market.

The innovation framework includes first movers and fast followers. First movers are the initial innovators who take and assume the risk of being first on the market. This may provide an edge if managed well. Fast followers “jump on the bandwagon” and try to capitalize on the emerging market. This topic is further discussed in the section on venture capitalists.

Customers or stakeholders are key elements to innova-tion, since an innovation is not successful unless they use it. Infusion paths are established with stakeholders in mind, but this by itself may pose challenges. In some fields, such as space and medicine, the innovators are

of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3


also the users of the innovation. Furthermore, stakehold-ers can inhibit innovation, by being conservative in their approach to infuse them. They can be complacent, locked into ways of doing things, and risk avert [Christensen, 1997]. Consequently, a potential problem of listening to customers too closely may result in catering to their im-mediate and incremental needs, without supporting tru-ly innovative ideas. Thus, responding to customers too closely may result in being left behind when changes oc-cur in technologies and markets.

Risks and FailuRes

Technology development and innovation inherently car-ries risks. There are various types of risks that one needs to address:

• Technology risks: are often encountered by technol-ogy developers, but a good risk posture allows accept-ing informed risks. New innovative technologies may fail, but it is expected when the developers push the boundaries. The relationship between informed risks and failures during the technology development pro-cess is further discussed under the sections on guiding principles for space technology programs and imple-menting new projects.

• Organizational risks: are often overlooked. In his book, entitled “Understanding Media”, Marshall McLuhan stated: “We shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape us.” [McLuhan, 1964] Setting up an organization in a certain way allows operating in that mode. Consequently, the products it produces will align with the operational mode. Trying to get a dif-ferent outcome than allowed by the setup can be chal-lenging.

• Network risks: can impact operations when working with other stakeholders. For example when a project is cofounded and fiscal constraints cause a partner to withdraw, it can have a significant impact on the project and its elements. Recent example is the US Sequestration decision, impacting a large number of projects within NASA’s portfolio. Many of these were executed in collaboration between multiple Mission Directorate partners. The resolution required negotia-tions.

• Contextual risk: is related to ambiguity and can occur when communications between various stakeholders are present.

• Wicked problems: describe problems that are difficult of impossible to solve due to contradictory or partial information, or impacted by requirement creep. These can be also hard to recognize. [Rittel & Webber, 1973] The complexities can also be driven by cross depen-dencies between various fields, and solving one ele-

ment or an over-constrained problem may introduce new problems at other areas. This can be illustrated by looking at NASA’s management of technology pro-grams with multiple contributing factors. The first un-certainty is the overall budget for the Mission Director-ate with its dependence on the Agency’s budget, which in turn provided by the government. Not passing the national budget on time results in a so-called continu-ing resolution and imposes constraints to programs and projects. The second uncertainty is the funding allocation to each program and project within, which could be impacted by overruns. The third is the work force allocation at NASA Centers and center politics, which influences some of the project decisions. The fourth is the availability of procurement—namely the funds available for purchases of products and services. The fifth is the time dimension with potential fluctua-tions in the phasing and spending. There are a number of other constraints as well, making programmatic bal-ance and execution an often over constrained wicked problem, where program managers are challenged to find the best possible outcomes. The solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or bad. NASA’s wicked problems are bound by the annual budget cycle, and typically don’t perpetuate. Instead they repeat piecewise, year after year, while introduc-ing new and unique challenges.

• Business risk: is typically not applicable to the gov-ernment sector, although there are project risks related to funding instabilities, changing priorities, and other factors.

• Demand risk: is typically not applicable to NASA, but collaborated projects may require deliverables to stakeholders, where the risk is related to meeting schedule, budget, and milestones.

leaRning

Organizations learn by doing familiar things. However, radical and disruptive innovations—those that include significant breakthroughs and break with traditional ways of doing things—can introduce significant challenges to organizations and the way they learn. Organizational re-sponses are a function of the pressure to change.

• Status quo: is often considered by management as positive, since it does not require change.

• Novel: is perceived as uncertain, hard to control, dis-tant, often due to the unfamiliarity towards oversight, and it can be seen as negative.

• Radical innovation: goes another step further, and these technologies could destabilize existing capabili-ties or an organization if not handled appropriately.

• Disruptive innovation: often results in disconnects


of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

with current stakeholders. In industry it can impact business and cash flow, and within NASA’s technol-ogy program it may prevent infusion and may result in the cancellation of the whole program if it is no longer considered beneficial to the Agency.

Consequently, the leadership has a significant role to play by providing strategy, encouragement, resources, re-views, and performing post-project assessments. It is also important to strike the right balance between the various segments of the portfolio investments. It has been sug-gested that portfolios for innovative organizations should be balanced by including core, adjacent and transforma-tional content, using the golden ratio of 70%, 20% and 10%, respectively. [Nagji & Tuff, 2012]

WoRkplaces, cReative people and teams

Edison showed that organizational vision, understanding and accepting educated risk postures and potential fail-ures, and diversity at the workplace are all key contribu-tors to innovation. Furthermore, fun and enjoyable work environments are preferred to impersonal and bureaucra-tized workplaces. Open dialogs and opinions contribute to generating and implementing new ideas. Allowing constructive criticisms to surface is welcomed, instead of complaining against already made decisions. [Dodson & Gann, 2010] Edison also found that people work harder when involved with interesting and rewarding work, and given meaningful rewards to foster individual ambitions and needs.

Innovations typically occur through team efforts, com-bining various ideas and experiences. There are many contributing factors to success, including the core knowl-edge of the individuals and the organization, coherence of the team, and a suitable team structure that facilitates the project goals. Incremental innovation can be approached in a structured way, but radical and disruptive innovation ideas need more creative people on the team, and more flexibility and freedom to experiment. Of course, this does not remove the need for due diligence.

Consequently, everybody in an organization has a role to make innovation happen. Management needs to cham-pion innovation in an organization by creating an envi-ronment where innovation is encouraged, supported by organizational culture, and where people are allowed to push the boundaries without the fear of reprimand in case of a failure. An organizational structure needs to support team and technical coordination, portfolio management, implementation of the projects, while communicating the message of innovation to all stakeholders. In addi-tion to management and the workforce another group, called “boundary spanners”, could greatly benefit an or-ganization. Such people provide links between their own organizations and cross-pollinate with external entities.

For example, at NASA they interact with mission direc-torates, other government agencies, industry, academia, attend conferences and meet with stakeholders. Within STMD the Senior Technical Officer, the Senior Technical Advisor, and the Director for Strategic Integration fulfill these functions.

In general, everyone inside an organization has equally significant roles to promote innovation, but in turn the or-ganization must recognize and reward talents and utilize them to the highest degree. The rewards can manifest in training and incentives. As a result, these organizations will attract the best people, thus perpetuating the cycle of innovation.

univeRsities and teaching

The primary product of universities is knowledge, which is transmitted to the stakeholders. Over the years the roles and functions of universities have extended towards economic activities, while teaching took a second seat. Through economic activities universities generate growth both regionally and nationally, benefiting industries and government agencies. For example, NASA’s Space Tech-nology Research Grants Program under STMD works closely with both university graduates and faculty re-searchers, through fellowships and grants, leveraging the knowledge base of the universities and the dynamic en-thusiasm of their researchers. These researchers and early career faculty members are considered problem solvers who provide a bridge between the knowledge base of their institutions and the outside technologists they are working with. In turn these real world experiences help the university researchers as well. For example, many re-searchers who participated in NASA’s Planetary Science Summer School, or had internships at NASA (e.g., from the International Space University), completed their ad-vanced degrees and became NASA researchers or tech-nologists.

Regions and cities

Innovation is often regional and it can clusters for nu-merous reasons (e.g., social and cultural). For example, the government played a key role in establishing and en-couraging Silicon Valley by donating lands to universi-ties, while also stimulating industry development. The government created policies that encouraged interactions between academia and businesses. Currently NASA’s Manufacturing Innovation Project under STMD’s Game Changing Development Program (GCDP) is involved with the Strong Cities, Strong Communities (SC2) na-tional initiative, launched by the Obama Administration in 2011. Such initiatives can attracts excellent people and create a buzz that feeds further developments.

Many cities around the world are considered major in-

of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3


novation hubs, each with a different focal point. Some cities are renowned learning centers (e.g., Oxford, Cam-bridge); engineering centers (Birmingham); finance cen-ters (London, New York); or design centers (London, Milan). These innovation hubs developed over the years and through the various economies, which started with the industrial economy, through the experience economy, to today’s knowledge economy [Brand & Rocchi, 2011]. Regardless of the change of ways businesses connect or people interact, there will always be a need for these in-novation hubs leveraging a critical mass of core expertise.

goveRnment

Governments are best positioned to establish an overall national innovation system and influence it. For exam-ple, in the US there are a number of National Initiatives to encourage innovation, and through various projects NASA’s STMD is involved with several of them, in-cluding the National Robotic Initiative, Manufacturing Innovation, Nanotechnology and the National Materials Genome Initiative.

Another key role for governments is to create suitable policies that supports, impacts, and stimulates innova-tion. These policies may include:

• Effective monetary and financial policies to provide confidence in the future

• Good education policies to mature well educated peo-ple who then can innovate

• Competition policies to prevent monopolies• Trade policies to increase the size of the market• Intellectual Properties (IP) laws to provide innovation

incentives• Environmental protection laws that lead to innovation• Free and open access to information• Information access through high-speed digital connec-

tions• Immigration laws to allow hiring of talents• Industrial relation laws to provide a secure work en-

vironment• Governmental resources to purchase innovation

It should be noted that there is a difference between the government providing functions and regulations in sup-port of innovation (as discussed above), and a govern-ment agency like NASA, which receives funding from the government and operates as a research and develop-ment environment.

InnovAtIon bArrIers In its 2011 review the National Research Council (NRC) [NRC, 2012] stated that NASA’s technology base is

largely depleted, and future successes will depend on ad-vanced technology developments.

In response, an internal NASA team conducted a study to identify barriers to innovation within the Agency, and while the findings are not yet released, the top level con-clusions are expected to be in line with classical barriers described in numerous literature sources, including [Ben-nis & Biederman, 1997], [Brown, 2009], [Christensen, 1997], [Dyer, et al., 2011], [Dodgson & Gann, 2008], [Kelley, 2005], and [Moggridge, 2007].

In line with literature sources and observations a number of typical barriers are listed below with NASA specific examples:

1. Risk-averse culture: while this has been true for NASA throughout its existence, and largely driven by the trickle down effect of astronaut safety, today’s NASA is much more risk avert than it was during the Apollo era. Over time this culture found its way into other parts of the Agency as well, creating an overly structured and regulated environment.

2. Low priority on innovation combined with short-term focus: budgetary pressures and constraints often drive this. Mission Directorates are leaning to select low risk missions, which then drives the use of flight qualified heritage components, thus not creating the immediate need for next generation technologies. Furthermore, the limited resources—multiple times over the Agency’s history—resulted in the cancella-tion of technology programs, thus curbing innovation. To remedy this, The Office of the Chief Technologist (OCT) was established to take an Agency wide view of the technology portfolio, and STMD to develop the next generation of technologies currently not in the pipeline.

3. Instability: funding uncertainties can adversely im-pact projects and workforce. Project can be descoped, canceled, postponed, or slowed down significantly. All of these have an impact on creating an innovative workforce, work environment, and bringing forward new innovative ideas.

4. Lack of opportunities: flight projects can provide a cadence to drive new ideas and approaches. However, lower cost cap missions rely on existing technology solutions and do not promote innovation. Large-scale space missions, such as Flagship missions, may occur once or twice a decade, where a larger budget could support the development and infusion of new technologies. Unfortunately these missions are too few and far apart to provide the foundational drive to establish and maintain an innovative organization. (This connects back to the second point.)


of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

5. Process overload: innovation implies being agile and responsive. Current management practices dictate significant oversight for most activities, driven by process and reporting requirements. These activities can become significant burdens on projects, while providing limited return value, beside the desire to track execution to a large extent. While Agency processes would allow for customization, their imple-mentations may introduce real or perceived barriers. (This also connects back to the first point.)

6. Communication Challenges: since projects are performed across ten research centers, and at times through collaboration with industry, academia and other government agencies, dispersed teams often experience communication challenges. Recently introduced restrictions to travel and conference at-tendance further limit teams to interact and exchange ideas, which would be under normal circumstances key to drive innovation.

7. Organizational inertia: internal politics within research centers, non-project specific drives and con-siderations, bureaucratic processes can all contribute to limiting innovation within an organization.

Innovation theory and practice may also provide potential solutions and examples to solve these issues. [Bennis & Biederman, 1997] [Christensen, 1997] [Dyer, et al., 2011] [Dodgson et al., 2008] Innovation in industry and govern-ment agencies (including NASA) could be encouraged in a number of ways, including:

• Creative ideation: this is similar to the industry ap-proach called Bootlegging, where a certain percentage of the work hours (e.g., 20%) could be used for devel-oping innovative projects and ideas. In the past this approach was used at Google and 3M.

• Innovation laboratories and creative spaces: this ap-proach is used widely within industry, including the concurrent design facilities of large automotive and oil and gas companies. Even within NASA most of the research centers established similar innovation related facilities [NASA, 2012].

• Innovation funding: this approach is used in indus-try through independent research and development (IRAD) funding, prizes (e.g., X PRIZE), awards, and grants. Within NASA’s Space Technology Mission Di-rectorate the Center Innovation Funds (CIF) Program provides seed funding to NASA Centers, where the Center Chief Technologist allocates these funds to low technology readiness level development projects, typi-cally with a one-year development life cycle.

• Skunkworks: this approach was established under Lockheed Martin’s Advance Development Program (ADP), called Skunkworks. With only a dozen key

rules, a collocated small team with sufficient funding, and using a rapid prototyping approach, designed and developed iconic flight hardware, like the Blackbird, in record time. A similar approach could be adopted at NASA to stimulate innovation, while aligning innova-tion pathways with NASA challenges. One example could be the Swamp Works at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center [Fox & Mueller, 2013].

• Process streamlining: within NASA, technology and research projects, as well as flight projects, are governed by NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR 7120.8 and 7120.5, respectively). These guidelines allow for tailoring, which can reduce reporting re-quirements, the high number of key decision points, and other deliverables through the project’s lifetime. While this is an available approach, its implementa-tion might be not that straight forward.

• A combination of some of these approaches could be used by merging Bootlegging (i.e., using time the al-location of civil servants) with innovation funding (by providing a small amount of procurement) and by pro-viding creative spaces and Skunkworks type environ-ments (i.e., by providing a suitable work space to carry out the project).

These barriers could be further explored through the field of cybernetics [Ashby, 1956] [Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001], which involves research into interdisciplinary fields, including power relationships and structures, con-straints and possibilities. These multi-directional interac-tions could be modeled through closed signal feedback loops, which may provide invaluable insights into this problem space. It is particularly useful and important, be-cause these barriers at NASA span across numerous fields from financial, regulatory and governmental, through management, individual interactions and center politics to science, technology, education, and outreach.

Why Invest In spAce technology?Based on the discussions given so far, the question arises: “why invest in space technology?” The first response is statistical. Since 1980 over 40 studies by NASA, the NRC and other related organizations have identified the need for regular investments in new, transformational space technologies. During this time period NASA has initiated then canceled a number of space technology programs. Without a dedicated space technology program, but with increasing budgetary constraints, Mission Directorates were forced to focus on immediate technology needs, using heritage hardware when possible, and reallocate their internal technology funding or treat it as a reserve to support operational activities and near term incremen-tal developments. These boom and bust cycles resulted in a recommendation by the Agency to establish a new

of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3


technology program that would address the development of innovative, disruptive, and transformational technolo-gies beyond the near term horizon. For these reasons, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (Public Law P.L. 111-267) authorized NASA’s Office of the Chief Technolo-gist (OCT) to develop advanced technologies in support of future space exploration. In February 2013, the Space Technology Program became a NASA Mission Director-ate and was renamed as the Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD). The primary reason was to separate OCT’s Agency-wide advocacy and oversight, from ST-MD’s focused project development and execution. The nine programs within STMD and their coverage of the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) range are shown in Fig.1. A number of examples in this paper refer to the Game Changing Development Program (GCDP) [Balint & Gaddis, 2013], which covers the mid-TRL range from TRL 3 to 5. These GCDP examples are relevant because they are already beyond the feasibility studies of the early stage innovation programs, but before the higher TRL projects of the Technology Demonstration Missions (TDM) Program.

The main goals of STMD are [Reuther, 2013]:

• To develop technologies which can enable a new class of NASA missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO).

• To provide innovative solutions to dramatically im-

prove technological capabilities for NASA and the Nation.

• To develop affordable and reliable technologies and capabilities for future NASA missions.

• To create new markets, spurring innovation for tradi-tional and emerging aerospace businesses.

• And to engages the brightest minds from academia to solve NASA’s tough technological challenges.

STMD develops these innovative new technologies by a broad involvement of the NASA workforce, academia, industry—including both large and small businesses—other government agencies (OGA), international part-ners, and the broader aerospace enterprise.

guIdIng prIncIples for spAce technology progrAms

NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate adheres to a framework that supports the development of next generation technologies, driven by a set of guiding prin-ciples, which are discussed below [Reuther, 2013]:

• STMD maintains a broad and balanced portfolio, and invests across the full TRL range (Fig.1). The portfo-lio can be divided into three main program subgroups with different characteristics, as shown in Fig.2:1. The first set of programs (i.e., STRG, NIAC and

Figure 1: Programs within NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate and its innovation pipeline


of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

CIF) is aligned with pioneering new concepts and developing an innovation community. These are STMD’s low TRL programs covering the range from TRL 1 to 3.

2. The second set of programs (i.e., CC, SBIR and FO) is creating new markets and growing the in-novation economy; these programs are working with outside companies through grants, challeng-es and awards.

3. The third set of programs (i.e., GCD, TDM and SST) is developing transformational and crosscut-ting innovation breakthroughs. Project implemen-tation is not limited to NASA, as it can involve the broad aerospace community. By this point the feasibility of the technologies is proven and can be advanced towards infusion to stakeholder needs. As stated earlier, the innovation life cycle covers the full range of the developments from the initial idea to use. Therefore, these mid-to-high TRL programs and projects are key elements of the multi-year technology development cycles.

• The portfolio is aligned with stakeholder needs, and driven by guiding documents, including NASA’s Space Technology Roadmaps [NASA, 2010], Na-tional Research Council (NRC) reports [NRC, 2012] [NRC, 2011], NASA’s Strategic Space Technology In-

vestment Plan (SSTIP) [NASA, 2013], and the NASA Strategic Plan [NASA, 2011]. In 2010 the Office of the Chief Technologist completed the development of the Space Technology Roadmaps, which included an extensive list of feasible technologies over the next 30 years time horizon. These Roadmaps served as a point of departure for the NRC assessment [NRC, 2012], which recommended priorities based on perceived needs. The SSTIP team advanced this prioritization, although didn’t fully address budgetary impacts. (This will be further discussed under the selection of new projects section.)

• STMD projects focus on crosscutting and transfor-mational technology developments. Crosscutting technologies refer to multiple users and mission ap-plications, instead of targeting a single point design solution. Transformational technologies target the next generation of missions, although some of the cur-rent developments address near terms infusion needs, in line with incremental developments. With time the ratio between near and long-term infusion targets is expected to move towards transformational long-term mission infusions.

• STMD strives to select the best performers for its de-velopment projects. If there are multiple lead perform-ers for a technology topic then the project is competed

Figure 2: Example of the balanced portfolio approach at NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate

of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3


and open to proposers from the broad aerospace en-terprise, both inside and outside of NASA. If the tech-nology core competence lies with a single performer, the project might be directed, that is, assigned to that performer.

• In general, STMD projects are well defined, address-ing life cycle cost, schedule, project milestones and decision points, oversight, appropriate entry and exit criteria identified through TRLs, and include clear project deliverables. This also ensures a smooth tran-sition between the development pipelines, and project infusion to stakeholder needs.

• The projects align with STMD’s innovation and infu-sion pipelines, which also positions NASA at the cut-ting edge of technology development. STMD’s inter-nal pipelines are shown in Fig.1, indicating how Early Stage Innovation (ESI) projects (i.e., STRG, NIAC, CIF, and SBIR) may mature through the mid-TRL pro-gram (i.e., GCD) to high TRL programs (i.e., TDM, FO, and CC), and from there to subsequent infusion to stakeholder needs.

• STMD also developed an informed risk posture, which includes rapid technology development that could encounter early failures. Discussion on potential failures, setbacks and their impacts on the projects are discussed in the section related to implementing new projects.

chAllenges And trends

Space exploration pushes the boundaries of technologies, driven by the encountered extreme environmental con-ditions throughout the various mission phases, including the launch environment and operating in-space and in planetary environments. In this section a brief discussion is given about the challenges and the partially overlap-ping current trends, which require the development of innovative and transformational new technologies. [Re-uther, 2013] [Balint & Gaddis, 2013]

• Propulsion addresses both launch propulsion and in-space propulsion. The trend of launching larger mass-es to orbit can enable future manned missions to plan-etary destinations, while low cost access to space with smaller launch vehicles may revolutionize the small satellite segment.

• Communication systems trend move towards higher data rates enabled by optical communication and in the future by X-ray communication. High data rates may enable high definition video links on crewed mis-sions and terabyte volume data transmissions from ro-botic missions, for example from high resolution map-ping of planetary surfaces.

• Robotics supports both unmanned science missions

and human missions. For example, Robonaut 2 is a hu-manoid robot on the International Space Station (ISS) working with astronauts in a cooperative environment. This trend will continue towards even closer integra-tion of robotic systems into future missions, coupled with increasing autonomy.

• Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) technologies al-lowed us to enter planetary atmospheres and safely land on surfaces. Future crewed missions to Mars re-quire an order of magnitude higher landed mass than allowed by the current state of the art (SoA) systems, consequently the trend is to develop new capabilities, which may include deployable and inflatable aero-shells, supersonic retro-propulsion (SRP), high Mach-number parachutes, hazard avoidance, and precision landing.

• Manufacturing innovation is building on the trend of advances in manufacturing, both for-space and in- space. On earth, spacecraft parts (e.g., rocket nozzles) could be efficiently and cost effectively “printed” us-ing additive manufacturing techniques. 3D printing can also mature towards creating spacecraft parts dur-ing long duration crewed space missions. The first step towards this is the launch of a 3D printer to the ISS during the summer of 2014. While this demonstration will use plastics, future 3D printers are envisioned us-ing metals.

• Small spacecraft trends benefit from miniaturization of components and affordable launches. In the near future micro satellites and cube satellites can be 3D printed. Formation flying spacecraft can enhance ob-servational capabilities, and planetary CubeSats can push the range and capabilities of these observational and scientific platforms.

• Power generation and storage are key technology ele-ments of space exploration. Scaled up external power sources (e.g., solar panels) and internal power genera-tors (e.g., nuclear systems) are needed to enable fu-ture crewed exploration missions. Improved battery technologies (e.g., with higher specific energies and increased recharge cycles) could not only extend op-erational capabilities, but could be designed to toler-ate extreme environmental conditions at both high and low temperatures.

• Navigation for space exploration missions can be es-sential at any phase of a mission, including accurate location identification during cruise, atmospheric en-try, and traverse on planetary surfaces. In the not so distant future advanced X-ray navigation will be able to pinpoint the location of a spacecraft anywhere in the solar system with high accuracy, using pulsars as navigation beacons.


of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

• Radiation protection and mitigation presents a par-ticular challenge for long duration crewed missions to Mars. Shielding from the accumulative effects of ga-lactic and solar radiation requires the development of new and innovative technologies, currently not avail-able.

• Environmental control and life support systems (ECLSS) need to be highly reliable and efficient on long duration crewed interplanetary flights. Closing the air and water loops and increasing the efficiency can significantly reduce the resource requirements on these future missions. The resulting mass impact would trickle through the whole mission architecture, making is more affordable.

• Logistics and autonomy are becoming increasingly important as long duration interplanetary missions introduce large communication delays, and the com-plexity of systems on crewed missions increase. This makes monitoring and maintenance challenging and will require new innovative technologies to support the crew.

selectIng neW projects

New and innovative technology project ideas can be generated in numerous ways. In general, innovation is considered successful when people use them. Therefore,

projects need to align with stakeholder needs, and can be identified from bottom up by the programs, they can come from the outside, or directed / guided from the top down. (Top down stakeholder priorities is discussed in the guiding principles section.) Candidate technologies are typically mapped into the Space Technology Roadmaps (Fig.3), NRC recommendations, and SSTIP priorities. Outside ideas and recommendations can come from the community, and from focused technology studies identi-fying needs for future missions in line with NRC recom-mendations [Balint & Cutts, 2009] [Balint et al., 2008, 2008a] [Kolawa et al., 2007]. These proposed technology concepts may range from incremental to transformational technologies. STMD typically focuses on crosscutting and transformational technologies, while other mission directorates may address incremental technologies for their near term use.

New projects can leverage internal NASA resources, for example its expert workforce in combination with pro-curement allocation for purchasing parts and services, but when possible and practical projects can be also com-peted.

A useful approach to generate new innovative project ideas is through single or multiple convergence and di-vergence cycles (Fig.4). During the divergence phase various project ideas are gathered, identifying a list of op-

Figure 3: NASA Space Technology Roadmaps, with the 14 Technology Areas [NASA, 2010]

of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3


tions and choices. These options can be analyzed, sorted by topic areas, and prioritized (i.e., at the red dotted line). In the second phase, called the convergence phase, the most suitable ideas can be identified and down selected for potential infusion and implementation for technol-ogy project developments. This down select can be done through synthesis, where the various elements and ideas are put together to form a new implementation option framework, and then assessed against a number of tech-nical and programmatic criteria until the best solution is found. This approach is already being used at STMD. The first example involves solicited, also called competed projects, which go through the typical divergence phase during the solicitation process, where the proposers with their offered technologies provide options for the review-ers. During the review process the review panels (i.e., the Subject Matter Expert (SME) and subsequent Recom-mendation Panels) assess the proposals. These reviews represent the convergence phase, where the options are narrowed down. Finally, the Source Selection Official (SSO) selects the best proposals for awards, thus making choices at the end of this process. The second example relates to the GCDP Manufacturing Innovation Project, where in the fist step white papers were requested from the community related to potential future technology ar-eas and projects (i.e., divergence phase). This was fol-lowed by a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM), where these options were assessed and grouped, thus reducing the over 100 white papers to 6 topic areas. Then the TIM sub-teams defined notional roadmaps from these technol-ogies within their topic areas. This allowed the manage-ment team to make choices and pick the best projects for new starts (i.e., convergence phase). The methodology and process provided and educated insight into the cur-rent SoA, and identified priorities for future investments.

Another approach to select the most innovative projects

is borrowed the world of Design, and it is called design thinking [Brown, 2009] [Kelley, 2005]. This methodol-ogy—shown in Fig.5—can be effectively used as a sanity check when assessing new content and evaluating prog-ress. Design thinking helps to optimize the constraints of usability, feasibility and viability. Usability addresses the “why invest now” question, user needs, infusion points, technology pull, and mission needs. Feasibility is related to the technical, engineering and science soundness of the innovative concept. It also evaluates the team and its relevant core knowledge, and the availability of suitable facilities to carry out the development. Viability relates to cost, other founding sources, schedule, and management. All of these elements come with constraints and while a good project manager can optimize these constraints, a design thinker may go one step beyond and harmonize them, which may translate to an innovative and ground-breaking outcome.

Reflecting on these three key areas can help to identify incomplete project concepts, or explain why past technol-ogy programs or projects did not succeed. For example, the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) mission [NASA-JPL, 2005] responded to the NRC recommendation for a scientific exploration of the Jovian system (usability) and the mission design with an in-space nuclear reactor was found to be technologically feasible. The engineering team from NASA and its industry partners was outstand-ing (feasibility). However, the project was not optimized for cost (viability), and there were further questions about subsequent mission concepts using the same architecture (usability). Due to the very high cost (feasibility) and a shift in NASA priorities (usability) the project was can-celed in 2005. Similarly, past technology programs failed because they addressed technology feasibility, and pro-vided funding to develop projects (viability), but those projects were not aligned with stakeholder needs (usabil-ity) and consequently the programs were canceled. Being

Figure 4: New idea generating process

Figure 5: Design Thinking


of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

a technology-focused organization the third possibility about not satisfying feasibility does not occur often. An example could be a solar powered mission to Neptune. While exploration of the outer planets is a scientific goal (usability) and solar power generation is an affordable technology choice (viability), it is technically not feasi-ble, because of physics. Solar flux decreases with the in-verse square of distance; therefore, at Neptune (at 30AU from the Sun) it is about 0.1% of that at Earth. This would necessitate 3 orders of magnitude larger solar panels to generate the same level of power as near earth, and would require the use of special low intensity, low temperature (LILT) solar panels. Thus this concept would fail on fea-sibility. (This the reason why solar powered missions are typically not proposed for outer planets exploration, al-though the JUNO mission to Jupiter is an exception.)

A better understanding of innovation theory helps identi-fying new technology infusion pathways and developing government agency specific models and frameworks that can help to select and transition STMD developed inno-vative technologies to other Mission Directorate needs, and improve interactions with stakeholders.

The design thinking approach can provide a more flex-ible framework to interrogate the proposed projects than it is currently established. It can serve as a guide to both proposers and evaluators. At present, technology devel-opment teams may bring forward less than optimized ideas, predominantly focusing on technical feasibility, presenting a brief summary on the resource requirements and often ignoring the usability element. In turn, using design thinking, decision makers can ask the right ques-tions from the proposers, quickly identify areas not fully addressed, and guide the decision making process. The foundation for this design thinking approach already ex-ists. Solicited proposals submitted to NASA STMD are evaluated against three criteria, namely intrinsic merit (feasibility), relevance to NASA (usability), and cost, schedule and management (viability). Building on this, design thinking could provide a way to customize and refine evaluation categories, thus guiding the proposers to submit further optimized concepts and project ideas.

In field of Design, usability refers to the human element and interaction with a product, process or service. In space technology the human element is involved to vari-ous extents. For science missions, technologies provide functionality, while the form is rendered secondary. Even for human exploration missions the crew interface with technologies may vary. The closest interaction with tech-nologies is related to human robotic systems and opera-tions with elements of communications and autonomous systems. It has been shown that design can benefit space related technologies in a number of ways [Wüsthoff, 2013].

It can:

• Foster product innovation• Connect a new technology with human factors• Improve efficiency of development processes• Enhance teamwork and accelerate decision-making• Promote internal and external communications• Strengthens brand visibility

In summary, the human element is represented in all of the space technologies, but the extend of interface and in-teraction with them dictate the appropriate level of influ-ence and coupling between function and form. At times optimization between form and function may serve non-traditional purposes. For example, a well designed tech-nology can help advocate agency goals to funding orga-nizations and inspire people through outreach activities.

ImplementIng neW projects

NASA’s STMD implements and matures space tech-nologies across the full TRL range. Early stage innova-tion (ESI) projects from TRL 1 to 3 are typically shorter, about a year long, and focus on demonstrating feasibil-ity. Mid-TRL projects build and test engineering mod-els. These projects are usually 2 to 3 years long, and can advance technologies within the internal development pipeline from lower TRL programs, and infuse them into higher TRL programs or directly to stakeholder needs. For example, GCDP’s Exploration Technology Develop-ment (ETD) projects are component technology devel-opments, which are infused to the Advance Exploration Systems (AES) program’s system level developments under the Human Exploration and Operations Mis-sion Directorate (HEOMD). GCDP projects are fewer in numbers but higher in life cycle costs than those for ESI projects. GCDP may advance multiple solutions to a problem, without down selecting to a single solution pre-maturely. This approach was also used at Edison’s Menlo Park Laboratory [Dodgson & Gann, 2010]. Technology demonstration missions have the highest life cycle cost caps, longest development time, and the strongest identi-fied infusion point to stakeholder needs. TDM projects conclude with a flight demonstration in a relevant envi-ronment.

The innovation development cycle completes once a technology is infused into mission use. A full develop-ment cycle from conception to infusion could take up to a decade or more for the most complex technologies, by which time terrestrial technologies can advance signifi-cantly faster. However, space technologies are driven by a set of significantly more stringent requirements, includ-ing high reliability while operations in extreme environ-ments. These designs often use dedicated and expensive

of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3


components, and the requirements extend beyond terres-trial needs. Therefore, direct transfer of these technolo-gies for terrestrial use is often not practical, although the gained experiences and knowledge, coupled with rede-signed and affordable components can form the basis for successful spin-offs.

Development of these transformational technologies in-volves risks and can introduce challenges. Fig.6 shows the generic flow of the technology development process. In general, the innovation cycle spans from ideation to use. In between, the steps involve the designing, build-ing, and testing of these technologies. For simpler and smaller project the full cycle may take a few months, but as discussed above, for complex space technologies the cycle may take years and include multiple phases. For STMD projects the development phases are aligned with their low, medium and high technology readiness levels.

During the ideation phase the developers identify the project goals, including an expected baseline perfor-mance. In this early stage the primary goal is to address feasibility of a concept, and it could be canceled if the idea does not seem to work or the expected performance falls below a threshold. In the next stage engineering models can be built and tested. Pushing performance

boundaries may result in partial failures, which can be more accurately referred to as roadblocks or challenges, because once feasibility is proven these problems can be typically solved by iterating through the design and test steps. The usual impact to the project is schedule slip and additional funding requirement. Following these itera-tions the performance of the technology needs to be reas-sessed, but as long as it falls between the baseline and threshold performance range the project may advance to the next development stage. For these reasons, call-ing these events project failures is not accurate. However, there can be cases when the performance repeatedly falls below the threshold in which case the project may be canceled. On the other hand there are examples when a technology outperformed its original baseline. The Mars Exploration Rovers were designed for a mission lifetime of 90 Martian days (sols) and a traverse distance of 600 meters. By May 2013, after over 9 years of operation, the Opportunity rover has traversed over 35 kilometers.

InfusIng dIsruptIve technologIes

Infusion of disruptive technologies to near term needs can be challenging. For example, NASA’s Science Mis-sion Directorate uses the National Research Council de-veloped Decadal Survey (DS) [NRC, 2011] as guidance

Figure 6: Informed risk and failure through the technology development cycle


of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

for upcoming missions over the next decade. When the NRC develops these DS reports, it identifies the high-est level of science questions it wishes to be answered, and asks mission architecture experts—such as NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory—to identify potential mis-sion architectures with appropriate technologies that can achieve these goals within the specified decade. Conse-quently, these mission architectures already assume well defined and reasonably advanced technologies, which in turn leave limited room to introduce new and disruptive technologies to these missions. However, if the targeted Mission Directorates can not accommodate such new disruptive technologies on their near term missions, then the urgency to develop these technologies is not pres-ent. This poses a challenge to technology developers at STMD. After identifying this paradigm, a set of options could be proposed, which could help with the infusion of disruptive technologies to near term missions. A key consideration is to make the infusion as simple as pos-sible, without significantly impacting the stakeholder’s processes, products, and mission architectures. To date four pathways have been identified to infuse disruptive technologies to mission directorate need. These are:

• New market disruption: targets a new class of custom-ers, presently not served by existing products. For ex-ample, GCDP’s Common Avionics Project may target the emerging market of affordable launch providers.

• Swap out replacement of sustaining technology disrup-tion: which brings a better product to an established market. For example, GCDP’s Woven TPS (thermal protection system) project may provide a swap out re-placement for PICA and Carbon-Phenolic TPS solu-tions, and compression pads for Orion.

• Low end disruption: which provides cheaper alterna-tive technologies to existing customers. For example, low cost propulsion technologies for small spacecraft and CubeSats can lower the cost for these space assets, allowing the stakeholders to build more satellites, or at a lower cost. This is similar to new market disruption.

• Add on augmentation disruption: which does not re-place the current technology element, but provides a higher performance augmentation. For example, GCDP’s multi-core processor for space applications would only require an addition slot to implement on a future mission. During the mission the process could be routed through the new hardware, providing more than an order of magnitude performance increase. In case of any problem, the mission would revert to the original processor.

Once these technologies are space qualified, then they can be easily baselined for future missions, and the dis-ruptive innovation becomes an accepted technology.

Infusion of new technologies to mission directorate needs and into new missions requires an accommodating pro-cess, which is coordinated between multiple parties, as illustrated in Fig.7. These coordination activities would need to take place prior to the release of the solicitation for a new mission, and include the following:

• Mission Directorate 1 (MD1) at NASA HQ is the top level governing body within that MD, responsible for funding the development of the new disruptive tech-nology project and for making related programmatic decisions. It is also the primary interface with Mission Directorate 2 (MD2) at HQ.

• MD2 at NASA HQ is the top level governing body at MD2, responsible for releasing the solicitation for a new mission, organizing the reviews, selecting the mission for funding, and monitoring the progress of the mission development and execution. MD2 also in-terfaces with the proposers, and responsible to include the new disruptive technology in the solicitation’s lan-guage. During the proposal development cycle it en-sures the proposers that the new technology will be accepted by NASA, if proposed.

• MD1 Technology Developers are responsible for the new technology development in a timely manner for infusion. (When a proposal is selected, new technolo-gies are expected to be at least at TRL 6.) MD1 TDs also works closely with the MD2 Proposers, provid-ing status on the development. They ensure that the Proposers have access to all the necessary information and performance data to include the new technology in their architecture. The developers also need to so-cialize the technology with TMCO. This can ensure a higher acceptance during the technology evaluation phase of the proposal.

• MD2 Proposers are responsible to develop their mis-sion architecture, write the proposal, and submit it to NASA HQ for evaluation and potential selection. They also interface with the MD1 Technology Devel-opers and communicate the need for information re-lated to the new technology, and required to generate the proposal.

• TMCO (Technical, Management, Cost, and Other) is the review team that provides assessments on the pro-posals to NASA HQ during the review process. Their reviews focus on cost, risk, feasibility, and manage-ment.

The developers, proposers and their related NASA HQ counterparts are required to work in close coordination throughout the proposal development process, prior to proposal submission, to guaranteed the success of infu-sion into the proposed mission architecture. If the pro-posal is selected for a flight project, the developers may

of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3


continue working with the proposing team or transfer de-velopment to them when the appropriate TRL is reached for mission infusion. To strengthen and demonstrate stakeholder commitment to the new technology, the de-velopers and their HQ counterpart may request a certain level of commitment from the proposers, which may in-clude a written mission use agreement (MUA), or even a certain level of cofounding for the technology develop-ment project.

commercIAl spAce

In general, commercial space companies can be divided into two groups. Traditional companies operated through a cost-plus contract business model, where the contractor is funded for all the expenses plus a limited amount of payment for profit. These cost-reimbursement contracts are different from the fixed-price contracts, characteris-tic of the new commercial space companies. The former are highly dependent on government contracts, may they be large, like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grum-man; medium size like Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corporation, Aerojet Corporation, Aerospace Corpora-tion, Orbital Sciences Corporation; or smaller contract firms. Funding may be provided through various contract vehicles, for example, in the form of grants, awards, co-operative agreements, inter-agency agreements. Under

contract, the companies can develop technologies from components to systems level or beyond, across the full range of the TRL spectrum. Small companies can also get funding through the Small Business Innovation Re-search (SBIR) program (which is under STMD). The companies can mature the technologies through multiple development phases, and potentially bring them back to the agency for further development. These for profit de-velopments provide synergy between government and commercial operations. Newer commercial space com-panies follow a different funding model, and deliver their products to the stakeholder at a fixed price, which includes profit. For example, driven by the X PRIZE competition, new companies emerged to develop sub-orbital launch capabilities for manned flights. The win-ner, Scaled Composites, spent about twice the amount of the X PRIZE award, before winning it in 2004. In 2007 the company was fully acquired by one of the previous minority owners, Northrop Grumman. As a follow on to the X PRIZE winning SpaceShip One vehicle, TSC (The Spaceship Company) has contracted Scaled Composites to build SpaceShip Two and WhiteKnight Two for Virgin Galactic. The profitability of the suborbital flight business is yet to be seen. However, it is clear that the technology developments are highly leveraging previous investments into suborbital vehicles, starting with the one used for the

Figure 7: Proposed example of technology infusion coordination between different organizations


of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

first manned suborbital Mercury-Redstone 3 flight by Alan Shepard in 1961.

Another successful commercial space company is Space-X, developing and supplying launch vehicles (Falcon), and human rated cargo vehicles (Dragon). Its LOX/Liq-uid Hydrogen and methane/LOX rocket engine develop-ments are derivatives of previous government funded de-velopment efforts, and the majority of its cash flow to date is linked to contracting with the government for launches and cargo delivery to the ISS. Space-X is a highly capable company, with a dynamic and young workforce, develop-ing innovative new approaches to an emerging commer-cial space market. But, it is also highly benefiting from spin-offs of previous government agency investments over the past half a century, on a scale of hundreds or millions of dollars. Without these prior investments and achievements commercial space companies would have a significantly more difficult path towards establishing a profitable business model.

Some of the commercial space companies were less suc-cessful than the above two. Armadillo Aerospace spent over $8M since it was established in 2000, and after en-countering failures, and not securing sufficient funding, it went into “hibernation mode” in August 2013. Over the past decade many of the initial contenders for the X PRIZE folded or never really materialized beyond paper studies, demonstrating the difficulties to find profitability in the commercial space arena.

The story of commercial space is still ahead of us. At present many of the companies are still dependant on government contracts and leveraging previous govern-ment investments before potentially becoming profitable.

ventuRe capitalists Venture capitalists (VC) belong to the group of fast fol-lowers instead of first movers. VCs invest in better es-tablished, rather than new and speculative ventures. They clearly identify and understand the maturity of techno-logical and market opportunities. They invest in high re-turn and high-risk developments, and expect that a num-ber of the investments may fail, while some succeed with high impacts. Interestingly, when it comes to identifying and selecting new innovative technology projects there are much in common between the processes employed by VCs and by government-based technology program executives. For example, NASA STMD’s Game Chang-ing Development Program is investing in medium TRL projects and trying to bridge the “valley of death” for technology developments. Selecting the best contents and performers could be done through competitive pro-cesses. The primary difference between the two is the motivation. NASA’s return on investment is infusion to

NASA needs and addressing national needs, while VCs are driven by profit and return on investment. This also differentiates the evaluation of success, but the similari-ties in their approaches are undeniable.

conclusIons

Space explorations related innovation and technology de-velopment in the government sector, but also in the pri-vate enterprise face many challenges. The technologies are often experimental and one-offs and the rewards are harder to measure than those for profit driven commer-cial terrestrial organizations. Space related project life cycles could be significantly longer than those for terres-trial technologies. At times the development cycle from idea to use can measure up to a decade or more, there-fore, by the time of infusion these technologies may look somewhat obsolete compared to similar terrestrial tech-nologies. However, space technologies often encounter extreme environmental conditions and mitigating these could be significantly more challenging than operating in terrestrial environments.

Innovation in the space field is a necessity. Pushing the boundaries for both human and robotic exploration re-quires technologies beyond terrestrial needs. While the space sector can build on commercially developed terres-trial experiences, pushing the requirements beyond those needs require significant investments, which often can be only afforded by the government sector.

In order to look beyond near term space exploration needs and enable future missions, it is essential to dedicate a portion of the space technology funding to radical, dis-ruptive and transformational technologies. Consequently, setting up an organization, such as NASA’s Space Tech-nology Mission Directorate, is a highly important ele-ment to advance our future space exploration goals.

Spin-offs from these developments often benefit other government agencies, the private sector, and the nation in general. Therefore, investing in space technology de-velopments and exploration is key to also advance our national capabilities and address our needs.

Commercial space in the near term plays a role through providing valuable services and product development under contract to the government sector. In the future, it is expected that commercial space will find a market to make their operations not only self-sustaining, but also profitable.

In the meantime, the high cost of space exploration and the related development of innovative, disruptive, radi-cal, transformational and crosscutting technologies re-quire dedicated organizations and funding to advance exploration goals and support national needs, without the pressure for profitability.

of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3


references

Ashby, W.R., 1956. “An Introduction to Cybernetics”, Chapman & Hall, London, Viewed: August 10, 2013, Internet (1999): http://pcp.vub.ac.be/books/Intro-Cyb.pdf

Balint, T., Gaddis, S., 2013. “Innovation within NASA Space Technology and its Game Changing Devel-opment Program”, Outer Planets Advisory Group (OPAG) Meeting, Atlanta, GA, January 10 Website: http://www.lpi.usra.edu/opag/jan2013/presenta-tions/10_Gaddis.pdf

Balint, T.S., Cutts, J.A., 2009. “White Paper to the NRC Decadal Survey Inner Planets Sub-Panel on Technol-ogies for future Venus exploration”, Sept. 9 , Web-site: http://www.lpi.usra.edu/decadal/vexag/;

Balint T.S., Kolawa, E.A., Cutts, J.A., Peterson, C.E., 2008. “Extreme environment technologies for NASA’s robotic planetary missions”, Acta Astronau-tica, 63 (2008) 285-298, Elsevier Publishing, Per-gamon, ScienceDirect

Balint, T.S., Cutts, J.A., Kwok, J.H., 2008a. “Overview of Flagship Class Venus Mission Architectures” 6th International Planetary Probe Workshop (IPPW-6), Atlanta, GA, June 23-27

Balint, T.S., Kolawa, E.A., Cutts, J.A., 2007. “Mitigating Extreme Environments for In-Situ Venus and Jupiter Missions”, Journal of British Interplanetary Society, JBIS, Vol.60, No.7., pp.238-248, July

Brand, R., Rocchi S., 2011. “Rethinking value in a chang-ing landscape: A model for strategic reflection and business transformation”, A Philips Design Paper, Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.

Brown, T., 2009. “Change by Design; how design think-ing transforms organizations and inspires innova-tion”, Harper Collins, ISBN 978-0-06-176608-4

Bennis, W, Biederman, P.W., 1997. “Organizing Genius; the secrets of creative collaboration”, Basic Books, New York, ISBN 10:0-201-33989-7

Christensen, C.M., 1997. “The Innovator’s Dilemma, When new technologies cause great firms to fail”, Harvard Business School Press, ISBN 0-87584-585

Cutts, J.A., Balint, T.S., Chassefiere, E., Kolawa, E.A., 2007. “Chapter 13: Technology Perspectives in the Future Exploration of Venus”, Chapman Monograph – Exploring Venus as a Terrestrial Planet, Publisher: AGU, Editors: L.W. Esposito, E.R. Stofan, R.E. Cra-vens, ISBN 978-0-87590-441-2, 2007

Dyer, J., Gregersen, H., Christensen, C.M., 2011. “The innovator’s DNA - Mastering the five skills of dis-ruptive innovation”, Harward Business Review Press

Dodgson, M., Gann, D., 2010. “Innovation, A very short introduction”, Oxford University Press, New York, ISBN 978-0-19-956890-1

Dodgson, M., Gann, D., Salter, A., 2008. “The man-agement of technological innovation (strategy and practice)”, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-920853-1

Fox, J., Mueller, R., 2013. “Swamp Works, New Tech-nology Development”, NASA KSC, Personal com-munications, July

Heylighen, F., Joslyn, C., 2001. “Cybernetics and Sec-ond-Order Cybernetics “ in: R.A. Meyers (ed.), En-cyclopedia of Physical Science & Technology, 3rd ed., Academic Press, New York, 2001

NASA-JPL, 2005. “Prometheus Project Final Report”, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Technical Report: 982-R120461, October 1, Viewed: on August 10, 2013, Website: http://trs-new.jpl.nasa.gov/dspace/bitstream/2014/38185/1/05-3441.pdf

von Karman, Theodore. Edson, Lee. 1967. The Wind and Beyond: Theodore von Karman, Pioneer in Avia-tion and Pathfinder in Space. by Little Brown & Co. ISBN 0316907537. (ISBN13: 9780316907538)

Kelley, T., 2005. “The ten faces of Innovation”, Double-day/Random House Inc., New York, ISBN0-385-51207-4

Kolawa, E., Balint, T.S., Birur, G. Brandon, E., Del Cas-tillo, L., Hall, J., Johnson, M., Kirschman, R., Manvi, R., Mojarradi, M., Moussessian, A., Patel, J., Pauken, M., Peterson, C., Whitacre, J., Martinez, E., Ven-kapathy, E., Newdeck, P., Okajie R., 2007. “Extreme Environment Technologies for Future Space Science Missions”, Technical Report JPL D-32832, National Aeronautical and Space Administration, Washington, D.C., September 19

McLuhan, M., 1964. “Understanding Media: The Exten-sions of Men”, New American Library, ISBN-10: 8114675357

Moggridge, B., 2007. “Design Interactions”, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, ISBN-10: 0-262-13474-8

Nagji, B., Tuff, G., 2012. “Managing your innovation portfolio”, Harvard Business Review, May, Viewed: August 10, 2013, Website: http://hbr.org/2012/05/managing-your-innovation-portfolio/ar/1

NASA, 2013. “NASA Strategic Space Technology In-vestment Plan”, NASA Office of the Chief Technolo-gist, Viewed: August 8, Website: http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oct/home/sstip.html#.UhFPfRbYP5Z

NASA, 2013a. “Barriers to Innovation (B2I)”, White Pa-per, Barriers to Innovation Working Group, NASA Office of the Chef Technologist (in print)

NASA, 2012. “Integrated List: Innovation Programs at NASA“, Viewed: August, 8, 2013, Website: http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/698688main_In-tegrated_List_Innovation_Programs_Sept18_%202012.pdf


of 18IAC–13–D1.3.3

NASA, 2011. “2011 NASA Strategic Plan”, NASA, Washington DC., February 14

NASA, 2010. “Space Technology Roadmaps”, NASA Office of the Chief Technologist, Viewed: August 8, 2013, Website: http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oct/home/roadmaps/index.html

NASA, 2009. Venus Flagship Mission Study, Website: http://vfm.jpl.nasa.gov, Viewed: May 11, 2013

NRC, 2012. “NASA Space Technology Roadmaps and Priorities: Restoring NASA’s Technological Edge and Paving the Way for a New Era in Space”. Wash-ington, DC: The National Academies Press. ISBN 978-0-309-25362-8

NRC, 2011. “Visions and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013-2022“, Space Studies Board, Na-tional Research Council, The National Academies Press, Washington D.C.

Reuther, J, 2013. “Space Technology Mission Director-ate Overview Briefing“, NASA, July 17, Viewed: August 8, Website: http://science.nasa.gov/media/medialibrary/2013/07/24/Reuther-STMD.pdf

Rittel, H.W.J, Webber, M.M., 1973. “Dilemmas in a Gen-eral Theory of Planning”. Policy Sciences 4: 155–169

Wüsthoff, T., 2013. “How to benefit from design in re-search projects: A brief introduction to design at the RMC”, DLR, Personal communications, July, Web-site: http://www.robotic.dlr.de/tilo.wuesthoff

Disruptive Innovation: A Comparison Between Government and Commercial Space

Documents

Transcript of Disruptive Innovation: A Comparison Between Government and Commercial Space