(DIS)LABELED:

A Critique of the ‘Disability’ Discourse

by

Lauren Jeanneau

April, 2015

© Copyright by Lauren Jeanneau, 2015

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Introduction

Social reality is not an objective experience; rather, it is highly subjective and

open to a variety of interpretations. Thus, it can be argued that social inequalities derive

from a disconnect between these various subjectivities, which has consequently fostered a

cultural inability to value the strengths in human diversity. As a result, rather than uniting

to accept each other’s differences in the face of an otherwise onerous and ambiguous

future, individuals often turn to the familiarity of their own preconceived perceptions of

social organization in order to gain a misplaced sense of control over an arduous and

uncertain social reality. This situation becomes problematic to those disadvantaged by

such predetermined biases and is particularly detrimental to individuals perceived to have

intellectual ‘disabilities.’ Timothy Shriver, Chairman and CEO of the Special Olympics,

contends that “people with intellectual disabilities remain the most marginalized and

discriminated against populations in the world” (Special Olympics 2015). This thesis

seeks to explore how their status of perpetual undesirability has been acquired and

maintained.

How do social preconceptions develop, particularly when concerned with

understandings of ‘disability?’ Large industrial societies, particularly those embodying

tenets of Western capitalism and democracy, are largely influential in this process.

Globally powerful nations are able to access far more resources that can be employed to

control the flow of knowledge, which additionally extends to them the ability to regulate

its dissemination. Thus, although the current stigma ascribed to the concept of ‘disability’

may not have been consciously created by these influential powers, they are certainly

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maintaining many existing prejudices by eschewing their social responsibility to provoke

substantive change. This thesis explores the social discriminations against ‘disability’

communities, deliberating particularly the ways in which an imbalance between power

and knowledge has had discursive influences over public opinion. It challenges normative

assumptions by asking: why has stigma towards ‘disability’ communities emerged in

dominant social and political thought, and how are these preconceptions reproduced?

This question will be answered in three stages: firstly, through a sociohistorical

investigation of how cognitive deviations from the established norm have been managed

by societies in the past; secondly, through a theoretical exploration of the systems of

organization aggravating social inequalities; and lastly, through the evaluation of a

sociolinguistic framework that both overtly and covertly reproduces an assumption of

absolute difference between ability and disability. Currently defined by a theme of

infliction, it is necessary to challenge the current discourse1 of ‘disability.’ This

intersectional analysis will scrutinize the historical, theoretical, and linguistic systems

bolstering the current narrative in order to understand the ways in which cultural attitudes

and scholarships can be informed in the future. In order to change the future, it is

important to understand past and present practices of prejudice.

1 Discourse is similar to what sociologists call an ideology: it is “a set of statements of beliefs which produce knowledge that serves the interests of a particular group or class” (Hall 2007: 202). Linguistic theory posits that words can be superior to the sentence; thus discourse is concerned with how these extensions influence social thought. Consequently, the term ‘dominant discourse’ refers to the learned knowledge disseminated by the elite, who consequently have the most influence and perceived credibility within the narrative. An important note on discourse: it reflects the principle values held by the majority, but it is something to which people generally pay little attention. It is like the food we consume: it is absorbed, and becomes part of how we interpret what we should consume. As Roland Barthe’s suggests, “it is language which teaches the definition of man, not the contrary” (1989: 6). Notably, although there are distinctions to be made between the terms discourse and narrative, they are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. The primary reason for doing so is that narratives “are influenced by culturally and demographically based discursive practices,” much like the influence over discourse (Bazeley 2013: 202). This thesis thus asserts that discourses and narratives are exposed to and shaped by the same cultural forces.

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Although there exists some academic literature challenging the dominant

discourse, the field of ‘disability’ studies is itself relatively new. The field of critical

‘disability’ studies is even newer and, therefore, gaps do exist. This work hopes to fill a

void and aims to demonstrate how social, cultural, and political barriers are far more

disabling to individuals with intellectual exceptions than their biological limitations. The

overarching goal of this research is to situate ‘disability’ in a broader social theory of

subjugation, because ‘disability’ oppression closely parallels the oppression of other

groups. The construction of stigma stems from “political-economic needs and belief

systems of domination,” which produce a logic bound by ideological stereotypes

(Charlton 2006:218). Erving Goffman suggests that, as a result of this rationale, “society

establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be

ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories” (Goffman 2006:131). In

other words, intangible stereotypes result in very tangible consequences. People begin to

subconsciously lean on their anticipations of social behaviour, developing normative

expectations that eventually transform into cultural demands. This process results in

stigma, and one who appears to fall short of satisfying such demands is branded as

‘abnormal.’ She or he is socially reduced from a whole and typical person to a tainted,

atypical one. Thus, cognitive deviations from the established norm can be understood as

the failure to adhere to social standards of ‘normalcy,’ and the stigma accounts for the

inadequacy this deviation represents within society (Goffman 2006:132).

Although individuals with intellectual exceptions are particularly vulnerable to

stigmatization, no individual is impervious. Social reality is highly subjective, and this

thesis demonstrates that the stigma associated with ‘disability’ is merely the

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representation of a dynamic history reflecting what people within power in a particular

point in time believed to be the nature and meaning of ‘normalcy.’ There is no objective

truth; the status of ‘normal’ is always susceptible to change.

DOMINANT CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF ‘DISABILITY’

Within industrial cultures shaded by democratic capitalism, individuals perceived

to be ‘disabled’ have struggled to live full and productive lives in a society laden with

discrimination and rampant inequality. Even in legislation and policy, many have been

regarded as functionally limited, dependent on others, and not expected to make any kind

of significant contributions to society. However, this is an incomplete assessment.

Analyzing in particular the social and political conceptions of cognitive ‘disability,’ this

thesis will examine the ways in which adverse social prejudices held against ‘disability’

communities are symptomatic of a larger issue. Although it is certainly important to re-

evaluate how individuals with intellectual and physical variations are perceived in the

social world, there is a disconnect between interpretations of each manifestation. As a

researcher, I am particularly interested in the stigma about ‘mental disability,’ because it

is a highly misunderstood conception that homogenizes what is arguably the most diverse

intellectual and sensory experience in the world. For instance, even the singular diagnosis

of autism is measured on an ineffably diverse spectrum; there is truth in the new adage,

“if you know one person with autism, you know one person with autism” (Plantenburg

2015). In other words, a trait prevalent in one individual with autism could be completely

non-existent in another. To define ‘standard’ characteristics of this diagnosis would thus

reveal ignorance of the disorder. However, to define ‘standard’ characteristics of all

intellectual deviations from the norm would be explicitly more injurious.

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Moreover, I am particularly bemused by the way in which one’s personal

unfamiliarity with intellectual ‘impairment’ regularly results in fear: people are often

frightened by those perceived to be ‘mentally challenged’ because they are stigmatized as

unpredictable and violent. Although it is logical – though not necessarily moral – to fear

what is not wholly understood, this response has had detrimental effects on the life-

quality of many individuals who are the object of this fear. The misguided nature of these

preconceptions can be exemplified in The Reason I Jump (2013), a book written by Naoki

Higashida, a thirteen-year-old boy with autism. The author is nonverbal and is therefore

highly misunderstood by his social peers, and this alienation inspired his attempt to

debunk many of the myths associated with his diagnosis. Befittingly, Higashida formatted

his book through a question/answer design that is both accessible and transparent to the

reader. Although the text can accurately reflect only the individual experience of the

author, his responses provide unique insight to the inner voice of someone with autism.

The problematic nature of presumptions that inform understandings of ‘disability’

can be exposed particularly through the answer Higashida provides to the question

outlined in the title: What is the reason you jump?:

What do you think I’m feeling when I’m jumping up and down clapping my hands? I bet you think I’m not really feeling anything much beyond the manic glee all over my face. But when I’m jumping, it’s as if my feelings are going upward to the sky. Really, my urge to be swallowed up by the sky is enough to make my heart quiver. When I’m jumping, I can feel my body parts really well, too – my bounding legs and my clapping hands – and that makes me feel so, so good. So that’s one reason why I jump, and recently I’ve noticed another reason. People with autism react physically to feelings of happiness and sadness. So when something happens that affects me emotionally, my body seizes up as if struck by lightening…. When I jump, I feel lighter, and I think the reason my body is drawn skyward is that the motion makes me want to change into a bird and fly off to some faraway place. (2013:48-9)

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What is important to emphasize from this excerpt is the mistaken nature of the

apprehension that might be felt by those who are unfamiliar with cognitive ‘disabilities.’

If Naoki Higashida were seen jumping around and making loud clapping noises, his

actions would likely prompt fear. The irony, of course, is that in reality he would be

experiencing joy that his body could not contain. This thesis aims to challenge many of

the normative assumptions credited to intellectual ‘disabilities.’ Most individuals

identified as ‘disabled’ are just like any other; they experience happiness, sadness,

confusion, and loneliness, and should not be dismissed simply because they communicate

these sensations differently from what is socially expected. They are whole, complete

persons, inseparable from but not defined by their ‘disorder.’

The Medical Model of ‘Disability’

Iniquitous things have been done to individuals perceived as cognitively abnormal

in the name of science: surgical mutilation, forced sterilization, euthanasia, confinement

to nursing homes and asylums, restriction from education and employment, and

ultimately the denial of a full and meaningful life (Mertens, Sullivan and Stace 2011:

227). These human-rights violations have been largely bolstered by the values embedded

in what is known as the medical model of disability. This model frames the concept of

‘disability’ as an objective problem requiring medical intervention, which assigns

medical meaning to certain types of human variations. Historically, this process supposed

that a physiological deviation in the body accordingly diminished the value of the

individual and resulted in harmful consequences that will be discussed in the following

chapter.

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Medical perceptions of the body are consistently underpinned by personal tragedy

theory, which posits individuals who are perceived to have a ‘disability’ as the tragic

victims of some terrible circumstance or event “who, rightfully, need to be pitied”

(Mertens et al. 2011:228). This infers that said individuals are plagued by defects and that

they desire medical ‘fixing’ to better integrate into society. As a result of the cultural

credibility ascribed to reason and scientific thought in industrial, democratic societies, the

medicalization of the body has come to dominate prevailing understandings of ‘disability.’

This ‘disability’ narrative encompasses a pathological deviance from normalcy, which

has consequently had a detrimental impact on public policy (Hiranandani 2005). This

discourse does not emphasize the social and political forces that shape the lives of people

with ‘disabilities,’ because the concept of ‘disability’ itself has been reduced to a singular,

‘objective’ measurement of human value. This limitation effectively obscures both

individual ability and agency. Such socially-constructed limitations have produced

tangible effects that prevent people who are perceived to have a ‘disability’ from

participating as full citizens and, moreover, they reaffirm the falsified narrative that

something is wrong with their bodies (Stubblefield 2007:167).

The medicalization of the body has largely contributed to the way differently-

abled people are recognized in the social world today. However, this model lacks

recognition of the multiple dimensions of diversity and, consequently, it places all those

construed to have a ‘disability’ into a metaphorical corner. It narrows the capacity not

only for such individuals to live meaningful lives, but to offer unique contributions to

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society2. This thesis, therefore, challenges this incomplete perception of ‘disability,’ and

turns to the social model of ‘disability’ in an attempt to fill the gaps.

The Social Model of ‘Disability’

The social model of ‘disability’ is positioned in juxtaposition to the medical

model. It is not restricted by narrow parameters and recognizes the intersectionality of

different social variables that influence subjective realities. It is a socio-political approach

that regards ‘disability’ as a product of interactions between the individual and her or his

environment (Mertens et al. 2011:227). In other words, the concept of ‘disability’ extends

beyond physical attributes by looking more closely at the ways in which the social and

structural environment can hinder one’s ability to function. The social model thus

employs a critical lens by assuming that a transformation in these structural barriers could

eliminate ‘disability’ altogether. Of course, cognitive ‘impairments’ cannot be erased in

the biological sense; however, cultural constructions of ‘disability’ are seldom informed

by biological reality.

The social model of ‘disability’ did not surface until 1976 in a statement by the

Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation in the United Kingdom

2 Individuals living with intellectual ‘disabilities’ have made impressive contributions to societies all around the world. In 2010, Tim Harris opened the “World’s Friendliest Restaurant” in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This entrepreneur lives with Downs Syndrome, and the success of his business additionally inspired him to start Tim’s Big Heart Foundation, a non-profit organization that aims to inspire people from all over the world “to lead meaningful and fulfilling lives via entrepreneurship and inclusion in their communities” (Tim’s Place 2014). In 2014, Cape Breton local Frankie MacDonald began to generate a lot of interest in his amateur weather reports throughout the Canadian Maritimes. This thirty-year old man lives with Autism, and his many videos have been viewed millions of times (CBC 2015). In Colorado, disability activist Temple Grandin has become very well-known, gaining public attention through various book publications and TED Talk performances. This Ph.D. professor of animal science lives with Autism, and advocates that the world needs “all kind of minds” (Grandin 2010). On the other side of the world, a band in Finland by the name of "Pertti Kurikan Nimipäivät" has become very successful. The band consists of four, middle-aged men, all of whom have intellectual ‘disabilities,’ and have released four punk rock albums (Pertti Kurikan Nimipäivät 2015). They will be representing Finland in the 2015 Eurovision Song Contest (Young 2015). These examples are not rare outliers of success, but are representative of the ways in which individuals with intellectual exceptions are equally qualified to contribute insight, intellect, and creativity to the broader society.

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(Hiranandani 2005). Rather than focusing on functional limitations, this new model

sought to address “society’s failure to provide appropriate services, and adequately ensure

the needs of disabled people are fully taken into account in its social organization” (ibid.).

As a result, conceptualizations of ‘disability’ through this lens acknowledge the important

social factors that impose restrictions on marginalized groups, particularly, negative

social attitudes, institutional discrimination, and inaccessible infrastructure. Furthermore,

the social model recognizes that normalizing forces within society are not stagnant, but

change over time to reflect the agenda of those in power (Stubblefield 2007:167). In

contrast to the seemingly ‘objective’ nature of medical science in the former model, the

social model of ‘disability’ contends that all knowledge is socially constructed and “a

product of a particular time and place” (Mertens et al. 2011:228).

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL MODELS

The discussions developed in this thesis will be largely influenced by the tenets of

the latter, social model. The various arguments presented will challenge the widespread

adoption of the medical model as an explanatory framework of ‘disability’ and its failure

to recognize that nothing, even the most objective medical diagnosis, can exist

independent of society. Moreover, they will deconstruct the stated and unstated

assumptions about people with perceived ‘disabilities.’ However, relying solely on

principles of a single conceptual model would be counterintuitive to the aims of this

project. Therefore, proposed analyses will be further buttressed by the alternative social

theories outlined in the following sections.

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Disciplinary Power and Control

In order to analyze the implications of a culturally constructed understanding of

‘disability,’ it is first necessary to recognize the imbalance of power relations in societies

that actively privilege some knowledge over others. Although authority over knowledge

is often indirect, it nonetheless informs the dominant discourse. To address the

power/knowledge matrix, this thesis will be drawing predominantly from Michel

Foucault’s analysis of dominance and coercion over the body in his work, Discipline and

Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1995). Foucault was a prominent French philosopher

who became well known for examining the relationship between power and knowledge

and its subsequent influence over social reality, thus providing a strong foundation on

which to build a broader critical analysis.

Foucault writes primarily about discipline over the body in the context of penal

discipline. While he does not directly implicate the ‘disabled’ body, a number of

similarities can be drawn between a body incarcerated and a body oppressed. Foucault

guides the reader through a progressive history of discipline, demonstrating how society

has moved away from corporal punishment as a means of control; the threat of violence

has become more powerful than the physical coercion itself. The author highlights two

crucial ideas concerning bodily control. First, inequitable power relations within society

create the conditions to control dominant social and political thought, particularly through

the manipulation of discourse. Although Foucault does not believe in a prevailing

dominant group, he does recognize that hierarchical social dynamics exist as a result of

distorting dominant public opinion. He argues that there is no centralized oppressive

power to be destabilized, and the inequalities and antagonisms of society are the

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consequence of repeated practices of discrimination, coercion, and self-censorship. Thus,

every individual is affected by this discourse, some more than others. This argument

complements the author’s second idea of a “docile body:” one that may be subjected,

used, transformed and improved upon by the power of discursive persuasion (Foucault

1995:136). Collectively, these ideas will help to inform the ways in which ‘disability’

communities are cast as the antithesis to the narrative of ‘normalcy.’ This thesis will

demonstrate how the powerful effects of this narrative are so deeply embedded in the

social sphere that it not only works to justify subjugation, but defines the status of

‘disability’ communities altogether. In some ways it will challenge Foucault’s rejection of

class conflict, suggesting that the significance of discourse in certain disciplines,

particularly medicine, legitimizes the ability of professional elites to maintain their

relationship with power and, as a result, their authority over marginalized groups.

Cultural Construction of Antipathy

The stigma towards ‘disability’ communities emerged from a “historically

specific way of viewing the body,” which was based on the increasingly normalized

practice of scaling and measuring mental capacities against standardized norms

(Hiranandani 2005). However, the concept of a norm is itself socially imagined, and this

imagination necessarily produces an antithesis against which ‘normal’ can be understood.

This process reflects the cultural construction of an ‘Other,’ which develops from a

singular idea rather than any accurate lived experience. Its conception only exists to

strengthen the identity of the dominant group.

This idea can be seen particularly through Edward Saïd’s research in the field of

Orientalism, in which he examines the implications of an Oriental identity that was

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constructed by and for the dominant Occident. Images of the Middle East have been

presented incompletely in modern Western scholarship, depicting an undesirable ‘Other’

to be feared. This image vilifies Oriental culture while simultaneously solidifying cultural

unity in Western societies; it creates a dichotomy of difference between ‘us’ and ‘them.’

Saïd sees reality as constructed by people, and focuses his research on the meanings that

they attach, or want to attach, to their social world. Looking primarily at his concepts of

latent and manifest orientalism (2005), this thesis will demonstrate that the dichotomy

outlined in Saïd’s discussion lends itself to the field of ‘disability’ studies.

There are distinct parallels between an ‘Other’ constructed from nationality and

one constructed from ability. This discussion will equate the role of the dominant

Occident in Saïd’s argument to the medical model that currently dominates public

perceptions of ‘disability.’ The associated stigma can be largely attributed to the

implications of the aforementioned model. It conveys that individuals with mental

deviations from the norm need to be fixed or cured: ‘they’ need to become more like ‘us.’

As a result, the broader population has accepted this singular, incomplete conception of

‘disability’ without recognizing the individual nature of human experience. Academics

such as Edward Saïd have looked to the past to explain the present, and the employment

of this research model will help to examine how systemic barriers have worked to

subjugate ‘disability’ communities and suppress their voices in society. An analysis of the

past will better inform an analysis of the present.

Marxist Analysis

The social model of ‘disability’ can be rooted in Marxist thought wherein people

with disabilities are viewed as ‘oppressed’ rather than marginalized (Hiranandani 2005).

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Karl Marx was a widely renowned German philosopher, and has arguably provided some

of the greatest contributions to social thought of all time. He has published extensive

critiques concerning the social phenomenon of class struggle, and his critical theory has

become the model for what is now referred to as the “conflict perspective” in sociological

research (Crawford 2009). The author asserts that social order is determined by the elite

class, and he fiercely challenges the status quo.

The social construction of an ‘Other’ can be facilitated in a number of ways, but it

is perhaps most influenced by the capitalist model structuring Western society. Marx

believed that “any understanding of human societies must begin with the material

conditions of human existence,” and he argued that the economic mode of production

plays a deeply significant role in influencing other aspects of life, particularly political

organization, ideology, religion, and culture (Hiranandani 2005). Referencing Wage-

Labour and Capital & Value, Price and Profit (Marx 1995), this thesis aims to

demonstrate that the development of competitive capitalism has drastically altered social

relations through its incapacity to accommodate the whole population. The meaning of

‘disability’ must therefore be understood “as a construct related to prevailing economic

organizations, institutions, bureaucratic structures and political contexts in a particular

historical period” (Hiranandani 2005). Marxist theory strengthens an analysis of

inequitable power relationships by demonstrating the way in which distinct labour values

reaffirm a socio-economic hierarchy of status. Therefore, people with perceived

‘disabilities’ are disfavored within a market-based economy. In a society that values

economic growth above all else, this research will challenge the problematic nature of a

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narrative that undervalues people who are deemed incapable of contributing to this

development at a satisfactory rate.

Feminist Critiques

A critical feminist analysis will play a central role in understanding cultural

perceptions of ‘disability’ because tenets of the feminist critique parallel those outlined

by the social model of ‘disability.’ This conceptual framework recognizes how systemic

barriers within society work to disable people, thus bolstering the argument that although

intellectual deviations do exist, they are only disabling because society fails to be more

inclusive of individual differences. In more recent years, studies in ‘disability’ have

migrated towards this socially cognizant framework, and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson

has become a pioneer in this particular field. In her paper Feminist Disability Studies

(2005), the author is concerned with the authority generated by people’s knowledge, and

she frames her argument through the assumption that femininity and ‘disability’ are

inextricably linked. Both are forms of identity socially constructed from their biological

reality.

Thus, the role of a critical feminist analysis is to challenge the normative values

that underwrite political, cultural, and economic arrangements in social organization. This

thesis will demonstrate how dominant social and political thought values the notion of an

‘ideal’ body. As a result, those who do not appear to adhere to such reductive

expectations are socially subverted. This theoretical model focuses primarily on the

intersectional experience of oppression through gender, race, sexuality, ability, and class,

which can be liberating for both ‘disabled’ and able-bodied people. It reflects more

broadly the theory of oppression over the body by political economy and culture

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(Hiranandani 2005). Feminist ‘disability’ studies demand a more holistic research lens in

order to augment a profound and socially relevant analysis of ‘disability’ as a social

construct.

Linguistic Framework

In order to evaluate current social attitudes influenced by the dominant discourse,

it is important to consider the sociolinguistic framework that makes the development of

social preconceptions possible. Linguistic theory provides a unique perspective for this

analysis, as language is more than the sum of its parts. Discourse is never neutral, and its

application of a particular vernacular can have subtle but powerful influences that compel

people to think a certain way. Research in this discussion will stem primarily from the

anthropological linguistics of Roland Barthes, a French literary philosopher who attempts

to define the linguistic relationship with its overarching social structure. The Rustle of

Language (1986) will offer an explanation for the ways in which language can be

harnessed to manipulate the dominant discourse. There is an inherent power in language

that shapes how people construct meaning toward and interpret reality, and this thesis will

reveal how linguistic systems have the capacity to command an effective influence over

social thought. In The Power of Language to Efface and Desensitize (1990), Diane

Mowery and Eve Duffy further address this query. Their work attempts to explain the

meanings people attach to symbols and words, and how they act according to their

subjective interpretations. The authors assert that ideology can operate as a discourse, and

suggest there are multiple stages of linguistic manipulation that differently influence

social thought.

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Although neither publication directly addresses ‘disability’, the authors’ findings

yield striking similarities to the ways in which social conceptions of ‘disability’ have

been shaped by the language itself. Discourse can design and impose value-laden

ideologies that support dominant interests, which can be an extremely effective tactic for

mobilizing groups of people. These ideas will be further developed through a critical

feminist analysis of the ‘disability’ vernacular.

METHODOLOGY

Data presented throughout this thesis has been generated through an analytical

review of the existing body of literature, particularly examining social theories of power

and knowledge through feminist and linguistic lenses. Although the resources presented

are primarily theoretical, research will not be limited to these works. In addition to

relevant journal articles and books, the analyses consider policy papers, statistical reports,

international news publications, and examples from pop culture and social media that

help to contextualize the analyses presented. This work seeks to understand why stigma

towards ‘disability’ communities has emerged in dominant social and political thought,

and what social systems help to reproduce these perceptions, presenting a proposal that is

theoretical in nature. Thus, conducting an analytical review of existing literature is the

best method to effectively frame this study. Furthermore, it would be difficult to conduct

any primary research to answer questions addressing collective social attitudes across a

variety of democratic societies.

Research will be presented in three chapters, subdivided by the dominant

theoretical themes framing this thesis: sociobiological thought, the dominion of discourse,

and sociolinguistic theory. This broad thematic selection will collectively illustrate how

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social structures are in place to remind people that they are different from one another,

consequently hindering the possibility of recognizing how they can be united in these

differences. There is a need for society to re-conceptualize ‘disability’ by focusing on

collective abilities rather than assumed individual debilities. Discourse is nothing more

than the imagination of itself, and creative manifestations are boundless.

LIMITATIONS

The scope of research will be necessarily limited by the broad nature of social

interactions throughout different cultures. There are undoubtedly intersections between

broad social categories such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, ability, and

class, but the purpose of this thesis is not to examine the individual challenges that arise

within such an array of groups. Although different communities and, more importantly,

distinct individuals, face obstacles unique to their own circumstances, this research seeks

to draw parallels between these barriers in order to formulate a critique of the broader

social structure. Furthermore, although the analyses presented will demonstrate how

history and language inform social behaviour, examining behaviour itself is beyond the

scope of this study. Lastly, as a researcher, I am an able-bodied academic. This presents a

power imbalance because my experiences cannot directly relate to those being explored.

Although it is challenging as a more privileged member of society to research a

marginalized group, I believe as a sociologist that it is important to consider a wide range

of perspectives pertaining to a particular social issue and hope that my position will offer

unique insights into the field of ‘disability’ research. Despite these limitations, I intend to

explain through the following chapters how industrial, democratic societies typically

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embodying tenets of Western culture develop preconceptions of what it means to have a

‘disability.’

DEFINING ‘DISABILITY’

How do people construct meaning towards the concept of ‘disability’? As

discussed in the former section, the medical model is currently the most widely accepted

framework through which to conceptualize the term. This model medicalizes the body,

and as a result, modern day definitions of ‘disability’ follow a theme of incapacity,

disadvantage, and deficiency, considering mental deviations as restrictive to ‘normal’

achievement (Linton 2006:162). ‘Disability’ has become socially synonymous with

inferiority.

The cultural interpretation of ‘disability’ brings together traits that may have little

in common in order to create a social class of people designated as ‘defective.’ A wide

range of individuals become politically, economically, and socially discriminated against.

Thus, people with chronic or acute illnesses, appearance impairments such as birthmarks,

latent conditions such as HIV or hereditary conditions, learning disabilities, and mental,

developmental, or emotional illnesses are grouped together “under the medical-scientific

rubric of abnormality and its accompanying cultural sentence of inferiority” (Garland-

Thomson 2005:1558). In light of this incomplete cultural conception, this thesis is

concerned with the diversity depicted under this umbrella term. Rather than narrowing

the research to explore the experience, for example, of individuals with Downs Syndrome,

it seeks to explain more broadly where the preconceived ideas of social construction

come from that actively homogenize the experiences of intellectual ‘disabilities’

altogether. Therefore, the term ‘disability community’ throughout this work refers to the

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cultural categorization of cognitive ‘disability’ rather than the specific members making

up this group.

Interestingly, the question of who ‘qualifies’ as an individual with a ‘disability’ is

a confounding issue in itself because the label is so fluid. It is only in the past century that

this term has been used to describe a distinct group of people, and as a result, it is difficult

to determine the interplay between older homogenous conceptions and newer, specialized

ones (Corker 2001:39). Thus, specific elements of ‘disability’ are less important to this

analysis than the reasons why this specificity has been effaced in favour of a more

reductive conception. To illustrate this cultural tendency to homogenize notions of

‘disability,’ this section first presents a formal classification of the term before

establishing interpretations more specific to this thesis.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states, according to most official

definitions of ‘disability,’ that two common factors generally stand out: first, a physical

or mental characteristic is perceived to be an impairment or dysfunction; and second,

there is a personal or social limitation associated with this impairment (Wasserman et al.

2013). The branding of a physical or mental variation as a dysfunction may be statistical3

or biological4; however, either explanation would be rooted in normative assumptions of

the body that criticize deviations from a socially-constructed ideal. Despite the wide

variation of individual attributes, there seems to be a cultural pertinacity that any

deviation from the norm be perceived in negative light. Notably, although this work

employs the term ‘deviation’ when referencing individuals who are cognitively

exceptional, it challenges the normative assumption that a deviation is inherently negative.

3 Based on the average of a given reference group. 4 Based on a theory of human functioning.  

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Consequently, although it would be easier to use the term ‘disabled people,’ rather than

‘individuals with intellectual/cognitive deviations from the norm,’ taking the extra time

through the latter expression reinforces the fact that ‘disability’ is a social construction

entirely relative to its context. It may become tiring to read such repetitive, convoluted

terminology, but imagine how frustrating it would be on the receiving end: to be ascribed

a homogenous and incomplete identity.

It can be argued that the negative nature of the term ‘disability’ can be attributed

to the use of the prefix ‘dis-.’ Simi Linton, a strong presence in the ‘disability’ rights

movement, offers interesting insights into the subtle but powerful effect of affix

placement. She uses the example of the suffix ‘-et’ to illustrate that, when appended to

nouns, it forms words that denote diminution, such as in “kitchenette;” femininity, as in

“usherette;” or inferior imitation, as in “leatherette” (Linton 2006:170). These various

meanings slip around in people’s minds and, often subconsciously, influence how other

words with the same suffix are interpreted. For instance, although the word “leatherette”

is used to describe an inferior version of leather, by association, the word “usherette”

becomes not only a female version of “usher,” but furthermore a signifier of inferiority.

Linton argues the prefix ‘dis-’ has similar “unchecked impulses” (Linton 2006:171). It

connotes separation in the broad sense of the word, and can take on a variety of branched

meanings. For instance, it connotes the meaning absence of, as in “disinterest;” opposite

of, as in “disfavor;” or deprived of, as in “disfranchise” (Linton 2006:171). Since the

Latin root ‘dis’ translates to mean “apart,” using the verb disable consequently means to

deprive of capability or effectiveness (DeForest 2000). Ultimately, the prefix creates a

linguistic barrier that produces tangible consequences, presenting ‘disability’ as the

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negation of ability. It is therefore important to examine the nondisabled position and its

relationship to power. This position is not the ‘standard’ from which ‘disabled’

individuals deviate but is rather “a category of people whose power and cultural capital

keep them at the center” (Linton 2006:171). Understanding how these subtle implications

help to shape social interpretations of reality will thus play a large role in challenging the

stigma about ‘disability.’

Social reality can be onerous, but people often find refuge in the familiarity of

their habits. Therefore, as a result of repeated cultural practices, Linton suggests, “many

people have a vested interest in keeping a tenacious hold on the current meaning [of

‘disability’] because it is consistent with the practices and policies that are central to their

livelihood or their ideologies” (2006:162). In other words, people cling to what they

know in order to feel a sense of control over their lives. Therefore, challenging the

dominant discourse would aggravate social anxieties. However, public perceptions of

‘disability’ have been molded by biased representations of history, which have been

perpetuated through the dominant discourse as objective ‘truths.’ It is thus necessary to

revisit that which people hold to be true in order to shift social attitudes and

preconceptions towards ‘disability’ communities.

Differently held understandings of ‘disability’ mean that an individual can be

considered ‘disabled’ by one definition but not by another. This thesis recognizes the

fluidity of this identity category. However, for the sake of continuity, two categories of

limitation will be defined, one by personal activity and the other by social or political

participation, labeled handicap and disability respectively. The former term, “handicap,”

refers to “a disadvantage in filling a role relative to a peer group” (Bauer et al. 2014:ix).

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What this means is that an individual may, for example, have a physical limitation but is

not “handicapped” until faced with a set of stairs. In other words, a handicap cannot be

inherent in an individual but is rather the result of environmental and infrastructural

barriers. The latter term, “disability,” refers to “the interaction between impairments and

the environment; a disadvantage imposed by the law, culture, or physical surrounding”

(Bauer et al. 2014:ix). In other words, ‘disability’ as a cultural construction is not based

on biological fact; rather, it is the result of political, cultural, and physical expectations

that disadvantage some individuals from living a full life. Therefore, the term ‘disability’

throughout this thesis is necessarily written between singular quotation marks as a

reflection of the subjective and constructive nature of its meaning.

It would also be prudent to define the term ‘impairment,’ because it is similarly

used to describe the ‘disability’ experience. The connotations of “impairment” are rooted

in the medical model, rebuking the individual as having “a problem in body function or

structure.” (Bauer et al. 2014:ix). This definition is problematic, however, because it

undermines the humanity of individuals who experience impairment. People with atypical

features or facilities may not reflect the ‘average’ person in a given society, but they are

nevertheless human beings.

The histories and experiences of individuals recognized to be cognitively

exceptional are not homogenous. However, once a physiological variation is labeled as a

‘disability,’ many assumptions emerge that compromise the life-quality of people

associated under this umbrella term. Incomplete perceptions of ‘disability’ are

particularly troublesome, “because of the failure to recognize the degree to which it

carries meanings far more revealing of us than of those whom we categorize”

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(Stubblefield 2007:179). The problem is not the ‘Other’ but in ideology, in ideas, and

cultural consciousness. ‘Disability’ is a social construction relative to a certain time and

place, and those deemed ‘disabled’ should not be confined to the limitations imposed by

the label.

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CHAPTER ONE:

The Evolution of Sociobiological Thought

Conceptualizing why stigma towards ‘disability’ communities exists in dominant

social and political thought requires an understanding of how inadequate perceptions of

cognitive deviations have been shaped by a succession of imbalanced social relationships.

‘History,’ as taught in academia, greatly contributes to this discourse, since

documentations of the past have often employed biased perspectives that protect

dominant groups. Structural discrimination is never taught in a way that would impugn

the system; rather, history recites an incomplete narrative that has had detrimental effects

not only on social thought, but more importantly, on social reality.

The theory of Social Darwinism became particularly prominent in Western

intellectual thought at the turn of the twentieth century (Davis 2006:7). This chapter first

discusses the various interpretations of this theory in academia through which scientific

concepts became increasingly applied to the social sphere and became a way of putting

prejudice into practice. This doctrine has had a particularly negative impact on those

perceived to have cognitive ‘disabilities.’ Second, this chapter highlights the flawed

notion of biological superiority. This theory branded many individuals with intellectual

exceptions as ‘naturally’ disadvantaged, which generated the conditions necessary to

sustain the practice of eugenics – forced sexual sterilization – on perceivably inferior

members of society. Third, this chapter will argue that a cultural construction of

‘whiteness’ informed a pathological rejection of any individuals or groups perceived to

deviate from this norm. ‘Whiteness’ as a theory, rather than a biological fact, lends itself

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to ‘disability’ research by providing a unique perspective through which to unpack the

politics of difference. This chapter also critiques the application of Social Darwinism in

education and advocates for its abolition. The impact of Social Darwinism on public

thought was an injustice on a massive scale whose impact has continued long after its

eradication in scientific application.

BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND THE “NORMAL” BELL CURVE

Industrial, capitalist societies have arguably created an environment of endless

competition between people for wealth, power, and success. Some might say that

antagonisms are simply an inherent part of social reality. However, at the turn of the

twentieth century, these abstract antagonisms produced real, material inequalities. The

new age was defined by the virtue of rational thought, and theories of biological

evolution began to dominate the social discourse. This ideology triggered a culturally

specific, hierarchical ranking of individuals based on biological characteristics, where

those perceived to be inferior were debilitated by their culturally constructed status. The

way individuals understood the world had shifted, and people could now be measured

against varying degrees of perfectibility.

Contrary to popular belief, as informed by the term ‘Social Darwinism,’ notions

of an exceptional human archetype emerged not from Charles Darwin, but rather, Herbert

Spencer. He had developed and published the basic tenets of his theory of evolution ten

years prior to Darwin’s principle work on natural selection (Versen 2009:406). For

Spencer, “evolution was a natural process of differentiation and integration of the

material universe in an inexorably…progressive movement toward a perfect state of

nature” (Versen 2009:406). In other words, he believed evolution to be a universal law,

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which he extended beyond biological principles and applied to social thought and ethics.

The ultimate aim of Spencer’s theorizing was to demonstrate that his theory of evolution

could produce a perfectly integrated society, in which systemic, governmental control

would be rendered obsolete. All people would act in their best interests, and as a result of

their ‘superior’ evolution, those interests would complement the best interests of

humanity overall.

Evolutionary adjustments are made over a long period of time. However, in light

of their newfound belief in human perfectibility, many scientists were anxious to

accelerate this progress. These ideas were the product of the nineteenth-century optimism

of the Anglo-American world, and became popular in the early twentieth century because

they confirmed the pre-existing prejudices held by people in society (Versen 2009:408-9).

This was an era of unrestricted bias. Widespread discrimination prevented many people

from earning a wage, regulated immigration, and resulted in the institutionalization of

tens of thousands of people (Baynton 2011:43). The concept of biological determinism

posits that some individuals are born with ‘naturally’ superior characteristics, thus

offering ‘proof’ that legitimized many social preconceptions. Furthermore, it endorsed the

enhancement and solidification of inequitable policies. Supporting ‘evidence’ was neatly

arranged into a philosophy made accessible to members of the dominant discourse in a

way that helped not only to explain the conditions of everyday life, but also implied a

way to improve their future. This narrative produced a scapegoat and offered a way for

the dominant group to defer social responsibility by ascribing the problems within society

to the failures of a socially distinct and abnormal ‘Other.’ These were the racialized, poor,

27

‘disabled,’ criminal, and promiscuous individuals, who were believed to be holding

society back by threatening its future stability and prosperity.

Ultimately, those who hold power in the social world have far more resources that

can be employed to control the dissemination of knowledge and can thereby standardize

the status quo in a way that will enhance their own agenda. This connection raises the

question: who decides what is normal? This authority can stem from a number of arenas,

but the branch of knowledge known as statistics may have offered the most prominent

influence. As outlined in the former chapter, the medical model largely informs stigma

because it perpetuates the idea that ‘disability’ is a problem to be fixed. However, this

viewpoint did not initially emerge as a tool of oppression but rather out of the nineteenth-

century employment of statistics as “the application of numbers to illustrate the natural

history of health and disease” (Porter 1986:24). What this means is that in order to

calculate – and consequently aid – the public health sector, it was necessary to first define

the parameters of a healthy body and then diagnose any deviations occurring outside of

this ‘normal’ state. Although it would be wrong to disregard the number of benefits

resulting from medical attention, this normative construction of health shaped a highly

influential mentality that encouraged the categorization of individuals who fell within or

outside of the standard state. This act of classification was very logical and served a

social purpose: distinguishing different groups of people based on their characteristics of

health helped to ease widespread fears of illness, disease, and death. Human beings often

feel compelled to fear what is not understood. Thus, labeling and segregating different

groups of people in this way arguably provided some level transparency.

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French statistician Adolphe Quetelet further elaborated the concept of a mean

standard of health in the nineteenth century by employing statistical principles onto the

public sphere. He created an archetype of the ‘ordinary’ individual and determined

statistical deviations of the body by applying the law of error5 to human features such as

height and weight (Davis 2006:4). What he called “l’homme moyen”6 was an abstract

being reflecting the average of all human attributes within a given country, and these

principles transcended beyond the body and onto ethical qualities (Davis 2006:4). This

archetype became both a physically and morally average construct against which real

people could be measured. The social implications of this idea are central. Quetelet

provided the justification for middle-class ideology, thus privileging what he knew to be

subjectively ‘true.’ Paradoxically, this kind of thinking qualified “l’homme moyen” to

become the pinnacle of human aspiration. As the statistician suggested, “an individual

who epitomized in himself, at a given time, all the qualities of the Average Man, would

represent at once all the greatness, beauty and goodness of that being” (Porter 1986:102).

Here, the political nature of the status quo is revealed: the hegemony of the middle was

shaped by the ethnocentric nature of Quetelet’s analysis, producing the kind of science

that would then validate the notion of a ‘norm.’

This statistical construction of a social norm implies that the majority of the

population must be or should desire to be under the normal bell curve. Since any bell

curve will likely carry outliers,7 it can be argued, “with the concept of the norm comes the

concept of deviations or extremes” (Davis 2006:6). The two directly inform each other.

5  The law of error is used by astronomers to locate a star by plotting all the sightings and then averaging the errors (Davis 2006:4). 6 “L’homme moyen” is French for “the average man.” 7 Outliers are extreme characteristics that exist outside of the bell curve.  

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Removing statistical theory from numbers on a page and applying it to human bodies and

social interactions demonstrates that deviance cannot exist without the standard of

normalcy. The point here is not to draw a distinct, linear timeline of changing ideas

regarding what is to be considered ‘normal.’ Nor is it to suggest that seemingly objective

concepts, such as the “l’homme moyen,” were deliberately created for the purpose of

oppression. Rather, it is to demonstrate how social narratives are never erased, they are

only added to. The statistical creation of an ‘average’ being is not in itself problematic;

however, it infers that human value can be measured. Consequently, new ideas regarding

social organization built on these existing connotations warped how the social realm

would be interpreted in the future.

EUGENIC PRACTICES

A relevant fact is that almost all of the early statisticians had one thing in common:

they were eugenicists (Davis 2006:6). This link could be coincidental, although that is

unlikely. There is a fundamental connection between statistically measuring humans and

asserting they can be improved if deviations from the norm are eliminated. Eugenics is

plausibly linked to statistics because its central insight is the idea that a population can be

normed. It divides citizens into standard and nonstandard subpopulations (Davis 2006:6.).

These two fields of research cannot, therefore, be mutually exclusive because they both

“bring into society the concept of a norm, particularly a normal body, and thus in effect

create the concept of the disabled body” (Davis 2006:6.).

Herbert Spencer’s theory of social evolution, later combined with Charles

Darwin’s notion of ‘Survival of the Fittest’ became convoluted among academics. As a

result, tenets of evolutionary philosophy were applied in a variety of areas that, today,

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would require much more substantiation. Social Darwinism contended that the biological

principles of natural selection in evolution could be similarly applied to the social sphere,

lobbying that cultural, domestic, and political life would improve with the triumph of a

superior race of people (Wilkins 1997). However, Social Darwinism did little more than

provide justifications for increasing imperialism, racism, competitive capitalism, and

altogether unequal circumstances. It legitimized the prominent positions of those who

gained the most from oppression, and this phenomenon of privilege was simultaneously

denied and protected. Those who benefited from the system conceived oppression as

putting others at a disadvantage, but they failed to consider the corollary aspects that put

themselves at an advantage (McIntosh 1989).

There were many negative consequences that resulted from the overgeneralization

or misinterpretation of theories regarding biological determinism, but the scientific

applications by Francis Galton were arguably the most detrimental in world history.

Coined as “the founder of eugenics,” Galton asserted that it was necessary to

scientifically manage the population in order to protect the ‘superior’ race from

degeneracy. His goal was to build a perfect society free of inequality (Baynton 2011:56).

Galton endorsed the utopic notion that if social deviants could be eliminated, so, too,

could the need for governance. Citizens would live in harmony because they would share

a mutual interest in the greater good of their community. Out of this logic emerged the

practice of eugenics: the science of controlling and breeding those perceived as superior

in society. Galton conceived the body as perfectible, but only when subject to necessary

measures of control.

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As Galton defined in his essay “Eugenics: Its Definitions, Scope, and Aims”

(1904), the practice implicated “the science which deals with all influences that improve

the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage”

(1904:1). Although the author appears to adhere to objectively scientific principles, he

fails to acknowledge the inherent privilege in his opulence. Only a limited few are able to

authorize what is or is not deemed valuable or acceptable in society. He suggests that

goodness or badness of character is not absolute but is relative to the existing form of

civilization; however, he did not contemplate cultural relativism in his proposition

(1904:1). He briefly acknowledges the fact that there is likely to be a disconnect between

different species and their definitions of morality, but he assumes that they would all

agree it is “better to be good rather than bad specimens of their kind, whatever that kind

might be” (1904:2).

Galton extends these suppositions into his evaluation of the qualities of

humankind, asserting, “there are a vast number of conflicting ideals, of alternative

characters, of incompatible civilizations, but they are wanted to give fullness and interest

to life” (1904:2). Although this statement recognizes that varying societies practice

incompatible values, it paradoxically suggests they unequivocally share a mutual goal of

developing to their highest potential. In making this assumption, Galton discounts the

possibility of tribal societies that do not believe in growth for the sake of growth or

agrarian societies that value kinship over capital, thus eclipsing any reason for

acknowledging human diversity in the first place.

Anxious to begin paving the road to human and cultural perfectibility, Galton

broadcast through the developing discourse that what nature achieves blindly and

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ruthlessly, man may do quickly and kindly (1904:5). This infers that he perceived eugenic

practices to be ‘kind,’ a reflection of the biased opinion of a man who would never be

forced to undergo sexual sterilization himself. Interestingly, Galton asserts paradoxically,

“we are ignorant of the ultimate destinies of humanity, but feel perfectly sure that it is as

noble a work to raise its level… as it would be disgraceful to abase it” (1904:6).

Summarizing the logic of Francis Galton, although there is no universal notion of

goodness or morality, Western intellect can be used as a model of excellence. Although it

is true that different societies have incompatible values, it is likely that they all subscribe

to the Western goal of developing intellectually to their highest potential. Thus, although

the destiny of humanity is uncertain, Galton asserts it would be best to apply his scientific

assumptions anyway.

Despite the gaping logical discrepancies in his proposal, Francis Galton

successfully advocated issuing certificates of fitness to people with “goodness of

constitution, of physique, and of mental capacity” in 1905, and this classification received

overwhelming intellectual support (Baynton 2011:56). Those who were not granted a

certificate were subject to forced sterilization: the process of permanently ending

someone’s ability to reproduce without her or his consent (Wilson 2015). The basic

assumed objective of this project was to perfect the gene pool in order to create the

necessary conditions for a society without crime, mental illness, and degeneracy. Ideally,

it was believed that if the social miscreants of society were kept from reproducing,

eventually all of these social problems would disappear, therefore endorsing the

principles of biological determinism. One discernible problem with this practice, beyond

the apparent ethical violations, was that elite intellectual members who could more easily

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manipulate the dominant discourse were those who defined the concept of degeneracy.

The practice of eugenics was motivated by fear of the deterioration of the human race, but

this fear was bound by highly subjective notions of normalcy. Thus, if the goal were truly

to shape a superior race “less foolish, less frivolous, less excitable, and politically more

provident than now,” imposing reproductive limitations based on unfounded pseudo-

scientific claims would not produce the desired results (Galton 1904:3). Such notions of

‘superiority’ were specific to a certain time and place and were not representative of an

objective, universal ‘truth.’ Although it could be argued that Galton and his constituents

operated through a misplaced sense of honour by truly believing in the betterment of

humankind, they were blinded by pre-existing prejudices that destroyed the well-being of

thousands of innocent people. Moreover, applying this theory to scientifically manage a

population fostered the ideological conditions necessary for the Holocaust to occur

(Kaelber 2011).

Case Study: The Sterilization of Leilani Muir

To contextualize eugenics in the field of ‘disability’ research, in the United States

alone compulsory sterilization laws adopted by over thirty states led to more than 60,000

sterilizations of individuals perceived to be ‘disabled’ (Kaelber 2011). Eugenics was

similarly practiced in Canada, legally implemented in Alberta by 1928 and British

Columbia five years later in 1933 (Inclusion BC 2012). The most successful Canadian

sterilization program was afforded via the passing of the Alberta Sexual Sterilization Act

of 1928, which was further amended in 1937 to eliminate the need for consent in the case

of those deemed “mentally defective” (webmaster 2009). Problematically, the parameters

for who qualified as such were highly subjective.

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Reprehensible periods of the past tend to be presented via the dominant discourse

as a long-since-passed history from which the given society has learned and grown as a

community. The narrative attempts to gloss over times of state-sanctioned brutalities by

highlighting instead the positive changes that have since occurred. However, eugenics is

not a dated practice with minimal remnants affecting modern society; rather, it reflects a

recent and disconcerting past that has strongly informed the current stigma towards

marginalized ‘disability’ communities. It is a direct reflection of the privileged nature of

knowledge and its relationship with power. Excluding it from historical narratives

reinforces this power.

The harrowing story of Leilani Muir provides excellent insight into the powerful

nature of structurally supported stereotypes. In 1959, the province of Alberta “wrongfully

surgically sterilized Ms. Muir,” among thousands of other individuals perceived to be

cognitively ‘disabled’ (Veit 1996:695). In 1995, Leilani Muir sued the province of

Alberta for damages (Whiting 1996). As the court document states:

The circumstances of Ms. Muir’s sterilization were so high-handed and so contemptuous of the statutory authority to effect sterilization, and were undertaken in an atmosphere that so little respected Ms. Muir's human dignity that the community's, and the court's sense of decency is offended. (Veit 1996:695)

The court transcript explains that no psychometric testing of Leilani Muir was done

despite its requirement as part of the application to the Provincial Training School for

Mental Defectives in Red Deer, Alberta. According to the school, she “seemed intelligent”

but was categorized as a “moron” with listed ‘deformities’ that were primarily small

scarring on parts of her body (Veit 1996:695). The most notable part of Leilani Muir’s

case was her reason for sterilization: “danger of the transmission to the progeny of Mental

Deficiency or Disability, also incapable of Intelligent parenthood.” This was a major

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concern of the institution, despite the lack of any valid scientific evidence supporting the

likelihood of Ms. Muir birthing a ‘defective’ child (Veit 1996:695).

The Muir case merited a lot of press when she sued the Alberta Government for

wrongful sterilization and damages thirty-six years after her initial victimization by the

state (Whiting 1996). However, she was only one among thousands of individuals whose

voices have been suppressed. Notably, behavioural studies suggest that individuals with

cognitive ‘disabilities’ who were subject to sterilization because the fear of producing

‘mentally defective’ offspring are less likely than individuals without a mental ‘disability’

to have children because they recognize the demands of parenthood (Whiting 1996). Thus,

these misinformed interpretations of human value demonstrate the powerful effect of

discourse in structurally oppressing large groups of people. The legal practice of eugenics

in many Western countries was sustained for over forty years. The Sexual Sterilization

Act was not revoked until 1972 in Alberta, and persisted another seven years in British

Columbia (Inclusion BC 2012). The remnants of such an intolerant philosophy – and its

supporting structure – continue to influence cultural interpretations of ‘disability’ today.

CHANGING TIMES, CHANGING WORDS

In light of pseudo-scientific ideas regarding biological determinism that emerged

in the twentieth century, social attitudes towards individuals perceived to deviate

intellectually from the norm became dramatically more negative (Baynton 2011:44).

Ultimately, playing into peoples’ prejudices was more effective than providing factual,

scientific evidence. However, it is still difficult to comprehend how such immoral, state-

sanctioned practices could be sustained for so long. Social theorist Douglas Baynton

(2011:44) suggests this longevity may be attributed to the changing public perceptions of

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time in a new, scientific age. Technological advancements provided the means necessary

to build innovative scientific tools, which prompted a shift in social thought that began to

equate time with urgency and efficiency. The popular discoveries in geology and

evolutionary biology radically altered impressions of historical time, while widespread

industrialization accelerated changing perceptions of everyday time (Baynton 2011:44).

These emerging ideas implied that society could strive for ‘perfection,’ and the broader

conception of time was accordingly reshaped into a new discourse of progress. In this era,

nearly any future became possible, but the hope placed in progress “had as its constant

companion the fear of decline” (Baynton 2011:48). As a result, quotidian time became

destabilized, and the most salient characteristic of life became its speed and the necessity

to use time economically. The author describes this phenomenon as a “gospel of

efficiency” (Baynton 2011:49). Consequently, the newly adopted belief that time was

moving quickly produced widespread fear that some people were holding back society

from achieving the highest possible level of development.

New changes in thought, based on this sense of urgency and limited time, brought

into being new ideas and new vocabulary. Although this thesis will elaborate on the

power of language in the final chapter, for now it is important to emphasize that a new

descriptive vernacular of ‘disability’ paralleled the shift in social thought. Words that

grew to dominate the ‘disability’ discourse signified the antithesis to progress: “handicap,”

and “retardation,” for instance, stem from ideas of affliction and backwardness (Baynton

2011:52). In practice, the label “retard” was often determined by competitive tests “that

ranked students according to their ability to respond to questions quickly” (Baynton

2011:52). The ‘slower’ responses of certain individuals ‘justified’ the fallacy that

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cognitive ability could be ordered hierarchically as a means to determine personal value.

Figure 1 exemplifies the imprecise nature of this approach, depicting a satirical cartoon

titled Now Climb That Tree (Russell 2012). In this illustration, animals of different sizes,

weights, and capabilities are lined up in a row and expected to complete the same task,

despite the obvious advantages it permits to some animals over others. This amusing, but

on-point depiction offers a critique of the public education system, which often employs

standardized testing rather than considering alternative assessments of intelligence that

would better reflect individual strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, the deprecating

language ascribed to individuals perceived to have cognitive ‘impairments’ eclipses their

personal validity by placing emphasis on the achievement – or failure – to satisfy a

socially determined standard of normalcy. Rather than highlighting individual ability,

‘disability’ is accentuated by an inability to live up to the rigid conventions of society. It

is institutionalized discrimination at its finest.

Figure 1: Now Climb That Tree (Russell 2012)

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PATHOLOGICAL ‘WHITENESS’

The cultural expectation to adhere to social norms was prefaced by Quetelet’s

conception of “l’Homme Moyen” discussed earlier in this chapter (Davis 2006:4). By the

end of the twentieth century, modern social concerns addressed what was considered

‘normal’ for people to do. If the majority of people acted a certain way, this standard

became the general consensus of a ‘normal’ behaviour. Consequently, those who were

considered ‘abnormal’ were not simply different but, moreover, became the apex of

aversion. This reflected the existence of a mutually exclusive dichotomy: the ‘normal’ is

inherently good, thus rendering the ‘abnormal’ as necessarily evil. There was an

assumption of absolute difference, which has had a detrimental impact on intellectually

exceptional individuals who are perceived to deviate from the model of normality; as

once suggested by Léon Bloy, “true poverty is involuntary, and its essence is to be

eternally incapable of being desired” (Barthes 1986:192). Social outliers isolated by the

‘normal’ bell curve of a given culture possess the very same essence. Members of the

‘disability’ community are plagued by a stigma that labels them as the least desirable

members of society. As a result, intellectuals advocating for eugenics could use these

ideas to “describe people who fell to one end of a distribution as ‘unfit’ and on that basis

to advocate their sterilization” (Baynton 2011:53). There was a figurative box labeled

‘normal,’ and all those that did not fit within these narrow parameters were subjected to

highly oppressive consequences. This process provides an interesting insight into social

power relations and helps to assess how such morally ambiguous goals were able to be

perpetuated throughout democratic societies so seamlessly. Public apathy became the

silent partner of authority.

39

A major problem for individuals who deviate cognitively from the established

norm is that the dominant discourse tends to categorize all allegedly undesirable traits

together: criminals, paupers, and cognitively exceptional individuals might thus be

mentioned in the same breath (Davis 2006:8-9). This conflation depicts the

overwhelmingly privileged nature of knowledge: some, but not others, can determine the

standards to which everyone must submit. Examining Peggy McIntosh’s book, White

Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Backpack (1989) reveals many similarities to the field

of ‘disability’ research. McIntosh describes privilege, particularly white privilege in this

case, as:

…an invisible package of unearned assets which [one] can count on cashing in each day, but about which [one] was ‘meant’ to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible backpack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and blank checks. (1989)

This concept of unmerited advantage cannot go overlooked, particularly when analyzing

the practice of eugenics. Some had the privilege to determine who required sterilization

while others were subjected to it. As McIntosh asserts, this privilege was not earned;

rather, some individuals were born into more fortune than others. This fortune could

materialize in a number of ways: through gender, race, ethnicity, ability, sexual

orientation, socio-economic status, and any number of other factors deemed culturally

favourable. The basis of the author’s analysis of white privilege is not accusatory,

however. She suggests, “whites are taught to think of their lives as a morally neutral,

normative, and average, also ideal, so that when we work to benefit others, this is seen as

work which will allow ‘them’ to be more like ‘us’” (McIntosh 1989). Although the

author’s homogenous characterization of ‘white’ identity is troubling, the logic

encompassing her assertion lends itself to the concept of an able body. Like whiteness in

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many industrialized, democratic nations, the able body is perpetuated as part of the

normative human archetype. Thus, the subjugation of thousands of perceived social

pariahs – by the way of the medical model of ‘disability’ – was not necessarily an attack

on the ‘Other’ but rather a misplaced altruistic attempt to ‘help’ them. However, although

power from unearned privilege can often look like strength, McIntosh argues that is in

fact permission to escape blame or to continue domination (1989). Perhaps this is why the

oppression of minority groups is so difficult to address and seemingly impossible to

overcome: those who benefit from the system rarely seek to change it. McIntosh states, “I

have met very few men who are truly distressed about systemic, unearned male advantage

and conferred dominance,” because it is often difficult to recognize oppression that one

will never experience herself or himself (1989).

McIntosh’s analysis of white privilege looks at whiteness as an identity category,

but her theory extends into ‘disability’ research as a way of understanding the ideological

dichotomy between ability and ‘disability.’ Although it would be counterintuitive to

suggest there is a singular standard of the able-bodied identity (equated to McIntosh’s

whiteness) that actively subverts its ‘disabled’ counterpart (equated with nonwhiteness),

the juxtaposition between the two arguably generates social tensions. The

conceptualization of an able body, similar to ideological whiteness, is not grounded in

biology but rather embodies the social construction of a ‘right’ way of being. This reflects

the precarious set of expectations expressed by dominant social and political thought.

While this thesis does not endorse the notion that there is one ‘type’ of able body any

more than it recognizes one ‘type’ of ‘disabled’ body, it argues that creating an absolute

ideological distinction between the two has a way of locking intellectually exceptional

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individuals into a determination that is immutable and intangible in origin. Those who

embody the ‘moral’ human being often projected by Western societies – white, male,

heterosexual, financially secure, and able-bodied – are provided certain social privileges,

while those who do not embody these traits lose in a very material, physical way, the full

protection that ‘normality’ affords in a deterministic society. The construction of

cognitive ‘disability’ in the early twentieth-century cannot be understood outside of other

social constructions; they are inherently intertwined. The unearned privileges afforded to

people in positions of authority allowed for the defining and re-defining of ‘disability’

over time, offering an interesting perspective on what it truly means to hold power within

society.

WHAT’S WRONG WITH A LITTLE SOCIAL DARWINISM?

The application of the term ‘Social Darwinism’ in academia reveals the broad

social effects of a historiographical debate. This one, esoteric idea was misinterpreted by

a variety of different theorists, and notions of biological determinism falsely qualified

prominent intellectuals and other elites to determine what would be best for society in the

long run. Considerations of social and structural influences were left largely unquestioned,

and many philosophers reinforced social inequalities through pseudo-scientific rationality.

This development points to the politically convoluted nature of historical interpretations.

There are also many modern problems that stem from oversimplifying the term

Social Darwinism, which have led to “inaccurate generalizations [that] weaken historical

interpretation” (Versen 2009:403). What this means is that the mistakes of yesterday are

causing problems today. Natural selection as a theory was adapted to better fit the social

realm, which distorted the dominant discourse and resulted in widely accepted

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generalizations that skew understandings of history today. Referencing ‘Social

Darwinism’ as an umbrella term to explain forced sexual sterilization in the twentieth

century effectively helps to distance the social actors from their practices and

consequently “gloss[es] over what is important: the widely held notions of ethnocentrism,

deep-seated racism, militarism, and imperialism that framed evolutionary ideas rather

than derived from them” (Versen 2009:404). This version of the past removes any blame

from the immediate context and teaches eugenics as a shameful period in Western history

that would never happen again. However, without addressing the imbalance of power

relations that resulted in widespread social inequalities, there is no lesson to be learned.

Ultimately, this thesis contends that the term Social Darwinism should be

eliminated from public education altogether because its meanings vary too widely across

academia. When considering the concept of ‘natural’ inferiority, it is more important to

look not at what is being said about the people to whom it is applied, but rather, at the

people who apply it:

The historiography of the term [Social Darwinism] demonstrates that it is of little practical value in describing actual people, groups, or events, but it persists. It persists because the intellectual tension between optimistic liberalism, pragmatic liberalism, and conservatism continues to exist, and the label remains a convenient shorthand condemnation of the losers and their ideas. (Versen 2009:419-20)

Social discriminations have been developed and maintained through false assumptions

that are rooted in a dark past, and it is therefore necessary to supply a different narrative

for the future. George Orwell once suggested that if everyone believes a lie, the lie

becomes truth (Thomson 2015). Sociologically, our opinions are shaped by what others

tell us; consequently, “in the absence of any other person to support our beliefs, we come

to doubt our own memories: whatever happens in all minds, truly happens” (Thomson

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2015). Therefore, if people continue to revisit incomplete historical narratives, like that

ascribed to the term Social Darwinism, it will remain in the dominant discourse as an

‘objective,’ historical truth. It is thus important to consider an alternative history, one that

disrupts what is understood to be a singular period in history and considers how it might

be symptomatic of a larger issue.

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CHAPTER TWO:

The Dominion Of Discourse

Throughout the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century, propagating notions

of biological superiority became a powerful tool to oppress intellectually-exceptional

individuals. It legitimized subjugation while effacing from the dominant discourse any

admission of exploitation, and this opacity has largely contributed to the stigma

associated with ‘disability.’ Chapter One offered a sense of the imbalanced power

dynamics in past social relationships, thus laying the foundation for a deeper evaluation

of the cultural and structural systems that help to reproduce misinformed perceptions of

‘disability’ in contemporary analyses.

This chapter explores the relationship between power and knowledge, divided by

the dominant praxes into four sections. First, it explores the different forms of

disciplinary power used to exercise subjugation by examining some of the theoretical

works of Michel Foucault. Second, it discusses how these interpretations have led to the

cultural construction of a distinct ‘Other,’ informed by Edward Saïd’s analysis of

Orientalism. Third, it draws from Karl Marx’s analysis of use value and capital to

demonstrate how capitalism as a dominant economic system renders cognitively-

exceptional individuals disposable within society. Lastly, this chapter presents feminist

‘disability’ research as an alternative theory of social organization that bolsters the

‘disability’ identity as different but equal.

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THE POWER/KNOWLEDGE MATRIX

In order to challenge the stigma associated with ‘disability’ in dominant social and

political thought, it is necessary to understand how the relationship between power and

knowledge directly informs social reality. Oppression requires a great deal of disciplinary

power, which over time has shifted away from corporeal violence towards less physical

means of coercion. French Philosopher Michel Foucault explores this progression

through a critical lens and provides a strong foundation on which to develop an elaborate

analysis of the mechanics of social control. Foucault is well established in evaluating this

power/knowledge matrix, particularly in relation to the body. The discussion developed

in this section refers primarily to Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1995),

which is written in the context of analyzing penal discipline over the body. Although this

text does not directly refer to the concept of ‘disability,’ a number of similarities can be

drawn between a body incarcerated and a body oppressed. Foucault leads his analysis

through a progressive history of discipline, demonstrating how corrective institutions

have moved away from physical punishment to more psychological means of control.

The impact of his theory illustrates the awesome power of discourse over social and

political thought.

The enlightenment era brought humankind into the “great calm of rationalism,” a

time in which logic and reason were ascribed higher value than emotion or philosophical

pursuit (Roberts 2015). However, despite the seemingly objective nature of rationality,

social theorist Antonio Gramsci posits that “every ‘essential’ social group which emerges

into history out of the preceding economic structure [is] an expression of a development

of this structure” (2005:50). In other words, the privileging of rational thought was

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simply a reflection of the values of the dominant group in this new period. Their

particular values were able to take cultural precedence through a historical continuity of

imbalanced power relations. Thus, the ‘truth’ in scientific reason was a greater reflection

of authority than objectivity, as rationality was associated with the elite. As a result,

philosophical thought was considered to be the antithesis of reason, a characteristic of

‘inferior’ thinking that was denied validity.

While Foucault does not support the Marxist notion of class-based inequality, this

thesis challenges his skepticism. It is difficult to conceptualize the exertion of power over

an individual or a group without making a distinction between those who are afforded

authority and those who are not, even within a democratic system. Although often

obscured by the guise of constitutional ideals, there is arguably a dominant group that is

relatively autonomous in deciding who counts as a political actor, and this offers a clear

distinction of class and status within a given society.

The societal value placed on scientific reason shaped the cultural construction of

the madman, a maligned figure conceptualized in contrast to rationality. In Madness and

Civilization (1988), Foucault describes how those deemed to lack reason were labeled

‘mad,’ and public paranoia of their ubiquity became increasingly problematic to the

dominant discourse. Their potential existence disturbed the status quo, which prompted

the subjugation of anyone deemed ‘mad:’ “the poor, the infirm, libertines, prostitutes,

magicians, alchemists, beggars, debauchers, precieuses, sodomites, nymphomaniacs, [and]

homosexuals” (Huffer 2010:58). Akin to the criteria that determined who would be

subject to forced sterilization in the twentieth century, the conceptualization of madness

was broadly obscure. It was grounded in the dichotomies between logic and emotion,

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science and philosophy, morality and immorality. One who was perceived to lack reason

was necessarily immoral, thus shaping the identity of the ‘madman:’

Madness and non-madness, reason and non reason are inextricably involved: inseparable at the moment when they do not yet exist, and existing for each other, in relation to each other, in the exchange which separates them. (Foucault 1988:x)

Foucault argues that the primary similarity linking one madman to another was their

designation as a social ‘Other,’ an orientation that was highly subjective. Consequently,

madness became the manifestation of non-being and the new focus of fear in the social

sphere (Foucault 1988:115).

The development of disparaging ideas regarding madness became widespread

throughout society. As it became increasingly viewed as an undesirable state, the

discourse adjusted to distinguish madness through an “imaginary stigma of disease”

(Foucault 1988:201). Since madness and normality were assumed to be mutually

exclusive characteristics, madness came to be recognized as a condition to be improved.

This line of thought parallels the principles outlined by the medical model, which

presents ‘disability’ as a problem to be fixed. Foucault alludes to a similar concept by

introducing the term “medical gaze” in The Birth of the Clinic (2003). This gaze reflects

the “objectifying gestures of modernism” that viewed the body as reducible to the sum of

its parts (Roberts 2015). Similar to the limitations imposed over the body by the medical

model of ‘disability,’ Foucault’s “medical gaze” reduces the subjectivity of one’s body to

the supposed ‘objective’ view of the medical practitioner. This effectively erases the

significance of real, lived experience in favour of a more homologous conceptualization

of the body, which disadvantages exceptional individuals from demonstrating their own

unique abilities. Foucault suggests that this narrow interpretation is dedicated to “the

endless task of absorbing experience in its entirety, and of mastering it” (2003:xvi). The

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author disregards the possibility of a dominant group attempting to control and refine

diversity, suggesting rather that discursive projects connect what ‘disability’ means in a

particular social practice – medicine, in this case – and the ways in which both social

structures and everyday experiences are subjectively organized based upon this meaning.

The inclination to value an ‘objective’ medical opinion reflects the privileged

nature of knowledge. It creates a standard through which bodily anomalies are rebuked,

and it validates a discourse of disease that frames a dichotomy between those who require

help and those who offer it. However, this standpoint does not disdain the developments

in medicine that can often help to drastically improve one’s quality of life. It only

becomes problematic when medical advocacy converges with a misplaced sense of

superiority, manifested through the essentialist belief that one kind of body is better than

another. In other words, concerns such as ‘What’s wrong with you,’ or ‘How can I help?’

subconsciously assert, ‘How can I help you become more like me?’ This implies the

existence of a hierarchy of bodily function that distinguishes between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’

kinds of bodies in dominant social and political thought.

Reflecting his rejection of class conflict within society, Foucault introduces an

important viewpoint in Discipline and Punish (1995) that postulates that the power to

judge derives from the exorbitant hegemony of the dominant discourse. In other words,

his theory does not submit to the possibility that political power is being consciously

harnessed as an instrument of domination. This power is exercised, the author argues, but

not technically owned. Rather, the control over knowledge is exerted through discourse,

which he believes to be the manifestation of the imbalanced power/knowledge matrix.

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Since domination is not managed or imposed through one particular institution, Foucault

reasons that it cannot be targeted or overrun:

In short this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions – an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. (Foucault 1995:26-7)

In a sense, Foucault implies that structural weakness here is actually strength. Forces of

oppression are not localized or organized in any way, and confronting structural

inequalities is therefore significantly difficult to achieve. The dominant discourse is a

self-sustaining force of subjugation that requires no governance; it reaffirms itself

through the repeated practices of prejudice. Discrimination is a vicious circle that

simultaneously creates and conditions social thought, permeating into every crevasse of

society by reinforcing distinctions between people. Power produces knowledge: they

“directly imply one another” (Foucault 1995:27).

Consistent with Foucault’s standpoint is the belief that control over the body no

longer requires physical coercion; it can rely on the dominion of discourse. The action or

attitude of an individual can thus be understood as a response to the power exercised over

her or him. This theory of ideological coercion lends itself to the interpretation of

‘disability’ stigma as a way of explaining how preconceptions have developed.

Prejudiced attitudes are not ‘natural’; rather, they are shaped by normalizing forces in

society. As Foucault reiterates, oppression is maintained not by physical coercion but by

habit. Power is reproduced through biased socialization practices. Therefore, stigma is

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simply the result of a multiplicity of minor practices that overlap and repeat themselves,

and are mutually supportive through their subtle employment onto the social realm.

The ways in which the space or place of the ‘disabled’ body have been

structurally controlled largely distorts how ‘disability’ is conceptualized within the

dominant discourse. Within corrective institutes, Foucault illustrates how control over the

body is achieved by confining them to cells. This process can similarly be exercised over

the ‘disabled’ body in various social arenas. The allotment of Special Education in most

public school systems or the designation of people to asylums in past psychiatric

practices, are both examples of how modern tactics of bodily control require structural

forms of exclusion. These segregating strategies connote to the perceivably ‘normal’

population, “Do not worry, the ‘abnormals’ will be kept far away from you.” They

perpetuate a discourse of difference. Although intellectually exceptional individuals are

not governed in the same way as prisoners, the author offers a theory that lends itself to a

deeper analysis of ‘disability’ as a social construct of perennial undesirability.

For Foucault, this form of ideological discipline can render marginalized

individuals as docile, which confers the body to be an object and target of power

(Foucault 1995:136). Individuals branded as ‘cognitively disabled’ are often perceived to

embody this docility, as dominant opinions frequently postulate that they do not

recognize their own subversion. This inaccurate assumption implies that intellectually

exceptional people as a whole have minimal brain function and little awareness of their

environment, which greatly distorts the dominant public perception of ‘disability.’ It

reduces the ‘disabled’ identity to a subhuman experience void of intellect, emotion, or

consciousness. However, although cognitive deviations often limit the intellectual

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capacity of an individual, such variations do not undermine their basic humanity.

Nevertheless, ableism persists in part because marginalized people often cannot stand up

for themselves. This stigma is further strengthened by the tacit compliance of the broader

public. As Foucault demonstrates, the dominant discourse can perpetually reproduce

oppression quite effectively without necessarily requiring a direct exertion of power.

Is the ‘Norm’ Normal?

It is a sensible human reaction to fear what cannot be explained. Social reality

creates normative expectations, and adhering to these standards of ‘normalcy’ offers

some misplaced sense of security. Consequently, in very broad terms, those with

privilege apparently conform to the life trajectory most often imagined by industrial,

Western societies: completing a comprehensive education, beginning a career qualified

by their scholarship, marriage, investing in property, having children, and passing along

these ideals to their offspring. Cultural expectations compel men to assert dominance

when necessary and women to adhere to impossible standards of beauty. However, the

very same standards require members of the ‘disability’ community to remain isolated

from the dominant social sphere. This marginalization is legitimized through the logical

fallacy argumentum ad antiquatatem, or the appeal to antiquity: this is how it is, because

this is how it has always been (Bennet 2013). As Lennard J. Davis suggests, “there is

probably no area of contemporary life in which some idea of a norm, mean, or average

has not been calculated” (2006:3). Thus, in order to understand the perceptions toward

intellectual deviations, it is necessary to first consider the implications accompanying the

notion of ‘normalcy.’

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Modern, democratic societies often produce ideological dichotomies by

prompting their citizens to rank the perceivably good against the perceivably bad. The

notion of ‘normalcy’ is juxtaposed by the notion of deviance, the latter of which defines

individuals who are perceived to have cognitive deviations from the norm. As a result,

‘disability’ has come to be seen as ‘objectively’ undesirable, as a problem to be fixed.

Thus, understanding the stigma associated with ‘disability’ in dominant social and

political thought must begin by challenging social conditions of normalcy that are

structured in contrast. Interestingly, different societies around the world have regarded

‘disability’ in vastly different ways. While an in-depth cross-cultural analysis of the

various conceptualizations of ‘disability’ is beyond the scope of this thesis, it would be

pertinent to mention that recent studies on preindustrial Europe and others on tribal

peoples in developing nations have yielded drastically different – and often positive –

interpretations of what is means to live with a ‘disability’ (Davis 2006:3). This raises the

question: what are the cultural distinctions that render ‘disability’ to be unattractive in

many modern, democratic societies?

‘Disability’ communities are cast as the antithesis to the narrative of ‘normalcy.’

However, the historical specificity of what it means to be ‘normal’ should call attention to

the social structures that are dependent on its meaning:

The very term that permeates our contemporary life – the normal – is a configuration that arises in a particular historical moment. It is part of a notion of progress, of industrialization, and of ideological consolidation of the power of the bourgeoisie. The implications of the hegemony of normalcy are profound and extend into the very heart of cultural production. (Linton 2006:167)

In other words, the underlying concept of a norm is unique to the historical, cultural, and

environmental circumstances of a given society. Notably, the opposing concepts of

‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ did not enter the European languages until rather late in human

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history. The word “normal” as “constituting, conforming to, not deviating or different

from” only entered the English language around 1840,8 demonstrating the need to rethink

assumptions about the universality of the concept of ‘normality’ (Davis 2006:3).

Dominant social and political thought conceptualizes ‘disability’ under these conditions

of binary thought, which marginalizes individuals for not adhering to the rigid

expectations defined by the socially-constructed norm. Thus, although the dimensions of

‘disability’ are culturally fluid, the coercive effects of a discourse of difference are deeply

embedded in public opinion. This distortion of reality not only works to legitimize

exploitation, but reduces the status of ‘disability’ communities altogether.

THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ‘OTHER’

The privileges and disparities that define social reality are products of society, not

of nature. Observable inequalities must thus be understood not as individual instances of

discrimination, but rather as a system of favoritism designed to benefit those in positions

of authority. Political, economic, and social powers determine cultural customs in order

to bolster their own dominance and manipulate those sharing in privilege into believing

that their supremacy is ‘natural’ and must be protected. Through this mentality, the

dominant group validates a biased model of morality; anyone who does not adhere to this

standard is culturally ‘Otherized.’ This strategy unites the group through a common

enemy, producing a dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ through which the ‘Other’ comes to

be defined by contempt.

The construction of an elusive ‘Other’ normalizes many of the values, beliefs, and

customs of what is already familiar within the dominant discourse. This enables those in

8 Before 1840, the word ‘normal’ had meant: “perpendicular; the carpenter’s square” (Davis 2006:3).

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power to continue regulating social thought among the majority. Thus, although the

average citizen may not actively exercise any discriminatory behaviour, she or he has

been socialized into a world that provokes in them a misinformed sense of superiority

over perceivably ‘inferior’ beings. The normalization of social imbalances is evident in

everyday experiences. Society seems to have developed an unspoken consensus for what

is normal and acceptable. This common view consequently hinders the potential for

change because certain forms of inequality have become so customary that they are

simply identified as inevitable consequences of social interaction. Society is jaded by

injustice.

Stigma stems from social constructions of an ‘Other’ that are built from singular

ideas rather than real, lived experience. The underlying message within any prejudice is

to convey: “You and I are not alike,” but this assertion is rarely supported by any

informed rationale. This message can be seen particularly through Edward Saïd’s

research in the field of Orientalism, in which he discusses how the Western construction

of an undesirable ‘Other’ is built from the demonization of Oriental culture. He sees

reality as culturally constructed and focuses on the meanings people attach to their social

world. Through his concepts of latent and manifest Orientalism (2005), Saïd explores that

ways in which the dominant Occident has formulated a homogenous, offensive, and

incomplete image of the Orient, using popular culture to perpetuate an ill-informed

identity of a distinctive, foreign ‘Other’ to be feared. Although the author dos not directly

implicate conceptualizations of ‘disability,’ his theory complements tenets of this

research. Particularly, Saïd demonstrates how a dominant group not only maintains the

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authority to define a minority group, but moreover can project onto them a false,

homogenous identity where they may not have the resources to defend themselves.

There is an assumption within academia that “learning and scholarship move

forward”; that theory adapts with the accumulation of new information, and as a result,

later generations of scholars are able to build upon the research of their predecessors

(Saïd 2005:423). In this sense, knowledge is an inherently malleable force, which renders

the study of Orientalism all the more fascinating to examine. Traditional conceptions of

Oriental culture have become stagnant over time rather than transformative thus

presenting a limited scope of ethnocentric representations as ‘truth’ in this field. For

instance, constructed meanings about ‘Islam’ in Western culture do little more than

function as a signifier to the word ‘terrorism,’ devoid of any political or social accuracy.

Nietszchian nihilism would suggest, “truths are illusions about which one has forgotten

that this is what they are,” a belief which Saïd similarly adopts. He frames his discussion

under the assumption that the meanings, associations, and connotations attached to the

concept of the Orient are a product of certain political powers that reflect a Western

agenda (Saïd 2005:424).

In Nietzsche’s sense of the word, Orientalism is simply a system of truths that

illustrates the inequitable balance of knowledge and power. One of the primary reasons

for the persistence of such a static perception of the Orient can be ascribed to the

relatively unchallenged nature of the research. There has been a distillation of essential

ideas about the Orient, which has distanced Western civilizations from acknowledging

any real sense of humanity in this region. Scholarship describes this ‘Other’ as

embodying “habits of inaccuracy [and] backwardness,” which are interestingly two

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dominant characteristics credited to the interpretation of ‘disability’ (Saïd 2005:424).

Many further parallels can be drawn. The very presence of an Oriental field of study, with

no corresponding equivalent about the Occident, similarly reflects the imbalance of

power that dominates the ‘disability’ discourse (Saïd 2005:424). Furthermore, the biased

work of very few scholars came to represent an entire field of thought in Western

academia. Although presented as morally neutral, these social theories collectively

besmirched a distinct ‘Other’ that was unable to defend its honour (Saïd 2005:424).

Difference became equated with weakness. Orientalism and ‘disability’ research thus face

similar obstacles: intellectuals who are “streaked and furrowed with inherited ignorance,

confusion, and traditionalism” (Smedley 2007:31).

The dominant Occident outlined in Saïd’s work can be ideologically equated with

the medical model of ‘disability.’ The ‘disability’ stigma persists partly as a result of the

widespread internalization of this model, which conveys that individuals with intellectual

deviations from the norm need to be fixed or cured. In other words, ‘they’ need to

become more like ‘us.’ People have generally accepted this singular, incomplete idea

without recognizing the individual nature of human experience, mirroring the ignorance

that shapes Western perceptions of Oriental culture.

Saïd distinguishes between two important components of this theory: manifest and

latent Orientalism. Manifest Orientalism reflects “differences in form and personal style”

that are ascribed to Oriental culture in some Western scholarly research, but has little

effect in transforming the prevailing connotations ascribed to the field (Saïd 2005:426).

Conversely, latent Orientalism, which exists precisely in these connotations, is virtually

untouchable and the basic content of this body of knowledge remains unwaveringly

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ethnocentric. It is “profoundly conservative,” dedicated to its self-preservation (Saïd

2005:438). By drawing distinctions between these two categories, Saïd challenges

whether Western research on the Orient has endorsed anything beyond political

hegemony. In true imperial form, the West adopted their historically well-versed role of

White Savior, through which Oriental backwardness became a problem to be solved by

the West rather than an opportunity from which to learn. This can be similarly observed

through the medicalization of the ‘disabled’ body, in which the very ability to ascribe

value onto another reflects a privileged position. ‘Disability’ stigma operates through a

discursive power through which different cultural representations operate for specific

purposes. Manifest and latent categories of ‘disability’ similarly reflect those of Oriental

research. Some manifest conditions have improved; for example, degrading vernaculars

and overt oppression have been challenged over the years. However, this change has had

little impact in transforming the broader, negative connotations of ‘disability.’ Latent

conceptualizations, on the other hand, remain an ostracizing force and are virtually

untouchable by way of the incomplete medical narrative. Similar to the adoption of the

White Savior ‘responsibility’ in European imperialism, the medical model informs the

perceivably ‘normal’ population that the ‘disabled’ rely on their assistance to live better

lives.

Saïd establishes at the onset of his argument that “the Orient existed for the West,

or so it seemed to countless Orientalists” (2005:425). Western superiority can only be

maintained in relation to an apparent inferior group, which perhaps explains why this

established ‘Other’ is still so inaccessible, even in contemporary scholarship. This logic

similarly reaffirms the necessity of a dichotomy that distinguishes ‘disability’

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communities from the ‘standard’ population. The dichotomy functions to solidify the

superiority of latter group over the former. Ultimately, the importance placed on one

discourse over another is a reflection of its power, and “the relationships and differences

between them must be regular and systematic, not random” (Hall 2007:56). In other

words, the ‘disability’ community is not lacking a narrative that more appropriately

reflects their individual experiences. It exists, but it is eclipsed by the larger narrative that

asserts the opinion of the ‘disabled’ is not culturally valid. If the dominant discourse

asserts a ‘truth’ that a minor discourse refutes, the former conception is endorsed by

public opinion. It is a vicious cycle in the struggle for significance.

Academics such as Edward Saïd look at the past to explain the present in order to

demonstrate how systemic barriers can be useful tools of oppression. This section has

applied Saïd’s cultural construction of an ‘Other’ onto ‘disability’ studies in order to

demonstrate the legitimizing forces that suppress marginalized voices in society.

However, looking only to the past would provide an incomplete analysis; thus, the

following section theorizes how the current capitalist structure in industrial, democratic

societies also relies on ‘Otherizing.’

COMPETING FOR CAPITAL

Examining the political economy of a given society is critical in constructing a

theory of ‘disability’ oppression, because poverty and powerlessness are “cornerstones of

the dependency people with disabilities experience” (Charlton 2006:218). This approach

is primarily concerned with class distinctions because, in a capitalist structure, status is

constructed relative to one’s relationship to the means of production. Everyday life is

informed by where and how individuals and communities are incorporated into this

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system. The structure is inherently faulted, however, because it cannot accommodate the

entire population into its production, exchange, and reproduction. This inability

consequently implicates people with perceived ‘disabilities’ to be part of what is referred

to as a “surplus population” (Charlton 2006:218). In other words, the system is

necessarily exclusive. Chapter One argued that social prejudices held against ‘disability’

communities were based in part on fears that economic efficiency and evolutionary

development were threatened by degeneracy and immorality. This argument depicts the

moral paradox of the capitalist structure: the strive for economic success is often pursued

with little ethical consideration (Baynton 2009:57). Thus, ironically, the structure requires

the oppression of individuals with cognitive aberrations from the norm out of fear that

their supposed immorality will hinder social progress.

The cultural construction of an ‘Other’ can be facilitated in a number of ways, but

it has been achieved predominantly through the capitalist structure of industrial,

democratic societies often typified by Western culture. Referring particularly to Karl

Marx’s Wage-Labour and Capital and Value, Price and Profit (1995), it becomes clear

that economic structures in society emphasize a competitive labour environment that

necessarily excludes ‘disability’ communities from full participation. Marx asserts social

order is determined by the elite class and fiercely challenges this status quo. Although

notions of class inequality seemingly conflict with Foucault’s power/knowledge matrix

discussed earlier in this chapter, a critique of the capitalist structure complements his

ideas regarding the disciplinary power of discourse.

Marx believed that any understanding of human societies “must begin with the

material conditions of human existence, or the economics of producing the necessities of

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life” (Hiranandani 2005). In other words, when looking at the systemic implications of a

given society, it cannot be denied that the economic mode of production is inherently

important to the function of other social arenas. This has a significant influence over

other aspects of life that make up industrial culture, including politics, ideology, and

religion. Marx asserts, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas:

[that is], the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its

ruling intellectual force” (Marx and Engels 2006:68). Therefore, social inequalities that

arise out of capitalist societies can be directly linked to the changing modes of production.

Budding tenets of capitalism radically altered former means of production and social

organization, leading to “profound implications for social relations, family life, and

attitudes” (Hiranandani 2005). Thus, although the conception of ‘disability’ undoubtedly

existed before the emergence and subsequent domination of capitalism in many societies,

it took a drastically different form when the economic system transformed into a

competitive labour structure (Hiranandani 2005).

Marx’s work is founded in class struggle, analyzing the antagonisms between

those who own the means of employing labour (the bourgeois) and those who do the

work (the proletariat). Interestingly, the author offers an atypical perspective towards

class distinctions by implying that even those perceived to be more elite within society,

such as doctors, lawyers, or actors, are just as ‘proletarian’ as the cashier, construction

worker, or ‘disabled’ employee. None of these individuals can access and thereby alter

the means of production that make their lives possible. This situation must be understood

as a relationship in which one group grows while the other diminishes.

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Marx’s critique of industrial capitalism reveals that the values of commodities are

based on the relative quantities of labour necessary for their production (Marx 1995:31).

Since the current economic model emphasizes a competitive labour market, it is

necessarily exclusive to the people who do not satisfy the narrowly defined expectations

of the industry. Logically, those who own the means of production seek to maximize the

greatest possible margin of profit. Consequently, people identified as ‘disabled’ are

usually perceived negatively in a market-based economy. In a work environment defined

by efficiency, they would be ascribed a lower use value than their perceivably productive

counterparts. For instance, if the owner of a company that produces rain boots could

employ an able-bodied, mentally capable person who will take, on average, two minutes

to craft each pair, it would be economically inefficient to hire somebody on an hourly

wage who would take twice as long to craft the same product. Problematically, this logic

is distorted by the competitive ambition of industrial capitalism. Rather than examining

the individual capacity of each worker, the owner of a means of production often

overlooks on principle any person who would presumably fail to meet the standards of

necessary labour required. The system is defined by demands that inevitably disregard

morality. As a result, individuals perceived to have mental ‘disabilities’ are grouped

together as one homogenous faction that cannot offer valuable contributions to the

capitalist sphere, and they are thus disvalued entirely.

The concept of average work necessary for commodity production can be drawn

further from Adolphe Quetelet’s “l’Homme Moyen” outlined in Chapter One (Davis

2006:4). One of Marx’s most powerful ideas – the notion of labour value – is in many

ways based on the construction of an ‘average’ worker. The differences between each

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individual labourer are measured in contrast to a common standard in order to determine

varying levels of productivity. Informed again by the ‘normal’ bell curve, the outliers on

the lower end of the spectrum would logically be eliminated in order to speed up overall

production (Davis 2006:5). However, an inherent problem with this mathematical

approach to labour value is that it is not always based on direct observation but is rather

informed by the dominant discourse. Consequently, individuals perceived to have

‘disabilities’ are often presumed to fall outside of the ‘normal’ bell curve without ever

getting the chance to demonstrate their abilities. As mentioned above, stigma does not

always develop from intentional subversion of a certain group, but rather from the

repeated practice of misinformed stereotyping and homogenous labeling that cumulate

over time as a powerfully oppressive force. The primary goal of this critique is not to

advocate for equal economic participation of individuals perceived to deviate cognitively

from the norm, because this alternative approach would be similarly flawed by

essentialism. The aim is rather to draw attention to the ways in which economic neglect

informs the discourse of difference in a very powerful way.

Leo Buscaglia critiques this practice of uninformed labeling as a distancing

phenomenon and asserts, “the laziness of stereotypes stifles its spirit, and labels limit its

transcendent power” (Popova 2015). In other words, ascribing these assumptions onto

people whose experiences are not understood inherently reduces their value rather than

exposes their potential. This exemplifies the banality of bias. Although the capitalist

structure is exploitative in nature, this exploitation is magnified among individuals with

perceived ‘disabilities’ who are not even given the chance to be brought into the

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economic sphere. Such exclusions9 reassert within the broader discourse that they hold no

use value whatsoever within a capitalist society. Although Marx’s work does not directly

address the concerns of ‘disability’ communities, his theory supports a critique of

inequitable power relations by demonstrating the ways in which distinct labour values

help to establish a social hierarchy that brands individuals with cognitive deviations from

the ‘norm’ as deviant overall. Consequently, they are relegated to the lower steps of the

metaphorical ladder.

The tangible impacts of such institutional discriminations have not gone unnoticed.

The International Disability Rights Monitor concluded that two-thirds of unemployed

individuals with some form of ‘disability’ stated they would like to work but could not

find jobs (United Nations 2014a). In other words, it was not for lack of ability or ambition

that these individuals were not employed. What many face are systemic barriers. A study

by Rutgers University found that the second most common reason given for not hiring

persons with documented ‘disabilities’ was the fear of costly special facilities (United

Nations 2014b). This statistic is a definitive depiction of the misunderstood conception of

‘disability:’ the onus is placed on the individual to adhere to structural expectations rather

than on structural requirements to be more inclusive. Notably, employers in a 2010 study

reported that 57% of these operational accommodations cost absolutely nothing, while the

rest typically cost fewer than five hundred dollars (Loy 2014:3). This finding illustrates

the ways in which cultural and economic barriers can, and often are, more disabling than

cognitive ‘impairments.’ Individuals perceived to be ‘disabled’ by economic standards

are thus further disadvantaged as they attempt to dispute an inherently inflexible system.

9 This exclusion from the work place refers to those based on preconceptions or prejudice, not on proven incapability to complete the task required.

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At this point, it could be argued that there are some individuals with cognitive

deviations from the norm who do work in various economic spheres, and they need to be

accounted for. However, social thought has a tendency to highlight the exception to the

rule as if it discounts the phenomena. This is simply not the case. When individuals with

cognitive exceptions are brought into the capitalist model, they are primarily brought into

it for the manipulative purpose of optics, which plays two principal roles in the economic

sphere. First, the policy can reflect an affirmative action hire, particularly in the case of

larger, corporate organizations such as Wal-Mart or McDonalds. Hiring individuals with

documented ‘disabilities’ is good public relations for the company. By doing so, these

conglomerates are asserting that they have fulfilled their social responsibility, and the

effect of this deceitful image renders capitalism to appear less exploitative than

conditions of reality suggest. Various arguments can be made that exalt these companies

for being inclusive where others have not, but this eclipses the larger picture.

Quantitatively, a significantly small percentage of people with ‘disabilities’ make up the

work force, and those who do find employment are statistically more likely to experience

harassment that violates national and international labour laws and Disability Acts

(Turcotte 2014). The problem here is twofold: the companies are actively oppressing

individuals with documented ‘disabilities’ while simultaneously being praised for their

inclusive nature.

Problematically, legal loopholes exist that allow for drastically unjust wages for

workers with ‘disabilities,’ as exemplified particularly by the organization, Goodwill.

One of the most well-known charities in North America is able to pay employees with

‘disabilities’ as little as twenty-two cents an hour, thanks to a seventy-five-year-old legal

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loophole that has not yet been revisited (Schecter 2013). Ironically, this organization

offers Disability Awareness Training, which advocates for more inclusive work

environments “by separating good practice from poor when communicating, working

with or assisting a person with a disability” (Goodwill 2015). The manipulation of optics

in this particular organization is iniquitous: Goodwill publicly advocates for the improved

work experience of individuals perceived to be ‘disabled,’ while simultaneously leading

economic oppression of this group. This is not an exaggerated claim: typing ‘wage

exploitation + disability’ into Google yields Goodwill exploitation as the very first search

result. Unfortunately, similar examples could be listed for pages; however, that is not the

aim of this analysis. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate how these instances of corruption are

symptomatic of a larger issue. They are shaped by a broader discourse, which subtly

reinforces the notion that individuals perceived to have cognitive exceptions from the

norm are less entitled to their rights than others.

As a result of this discourse, arguments have been made that denounce the labour

value of some individuals, thus justifying their unequal pay. Undeniably, there are many

ethical – if not legal – issues in suggesting that some people should not qualify for a

livable wage, particularly considering the extra costs that are often allocated to

individuals living with ‘disabilities.’ However, dominant social and political thought has

not yet acknowledged this reality. As recently as October 2014, British welfare reform

minister Lord Freud publicly declared the following about people with ‘disabilities:’

“There is a group where actually… they’re not worth the full wage” (Watt 2014). In what

was perhaps an attempt to challenge Freud’s statement, Justice Minister Andrew Selous

announced to a fringe meeting, “Disabled people work harder because they’re grateful to

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have the job” (Leftly 2014). Interestingly, the fact that a statement meant to defend the

rights of workers with ‘disabilities’ was issued in such an essentialist manner

demonstrates how rampant misconceptions of ‘disability’ remain in modern times,

extending even to public policy. This example is particularly troubling because these

instances of institutional subjugation reaffirm through the dominant discourse the

‘inferior’ position of ‘disabled’ workers within the capitalist structure.

A second role of optics offers a much more grim perspective. Building on Marx’s

discussion outlining the competitive nature of the labour market, it could be argued that,

particularly concerning menial labour,10 owners of the means of production would benefit

from extending negative incentives to their workers. As noted in the theory of the reserve

army of labour, Marx (1967) suggests that labourers tend to work harder when they feel

they can be replaced. Consequently, the effect of placing one person with a mental

‘impairment’ side-by-side with another person without a defined impairment, both doing

the same work, effectively communicates the message that “Any idiot can do this job.”

This implication is not stated outright but is rather the product of a discourse connoting

‘disability’ negatively. A consequence of this narrative is the desire for disassociation;

there is an expectation that a ‘normal’ person would not want their abilities to be equated

with those of someone defined as ‘abnormal.’ These optics are inherently beneficial to the

capitalist; not only can they present themselves as managing a socially-conscious

organization, but more importantly, they can coerce their employees into feeling

inadequate and induce them to work harder.

10 Individuals perceived to have intellectual deviations from the norm are more likely to be working in low-paying, menial jobs (Stuart 2006).

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Influenced by Marx’s work on use value, it is also important to consider how

seemingly inclusive industries of production, such as Canadian-based l’Arche Homefires

or Key Industries, actually reinforce the inequitable status quo. L’Arche Homefires is an

extension of the services provided by their group homes and employ members of its

community to sell candles and weaving in their local store (Veinot 2012). Similarly, Key

Industries provides workshops for individuals with intellectual deviations from the norm

to acquire workplace essential skills and employs members of its community to craft

screen-printing, embroidery, engraving, packaging, and “SWAG” to make profits that go

right back into the industry (Key Industries 2012). Other organizations valuing mutual

goals can be found in countries around the world. They are a progressive step forward

that reflect the growing awareness towards inequitable power relations that marginalize

‘disability’ communities (DPI 2012). Moreover, they provide a concrete way of both

addressing these issues and improving the lives of thousands of individuals. Therefore,

the following critique is not meant to be an attack on the organizations, but rather an

acknowledgement of how incomplete presumptions of what it means to be ‘disabled’

saturate the very fabric of modern society. These organizations are demonstrative of the

limited opportunity for individuals perceived to have intellectual ‘disabilities’ to

participate in the competitive capitalist sphere. Although they attempt to confront the

problematic nature of this discourse, such organizations simultaneously reproduce it by

portraying the success of perceivably ‘disabled’ individuals as possible only when

separate from the competitive capitalist model.

As discussed earlier, competitive capitalism is particularly exploitative of

individuals perceived to be intellectually disadvantaged because they are almost entirely

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isolated from the dominant economic sphere. Therefore, inclusive organizations such as

l’Arche or Key Industries reduce this exploitation but still foster sequestering conditions

that place workers with ‘disabilities’ into a corner that does not allow them to realize their

full potential. Although many individuals are provided with an opportunity that the

greater economic structure has not offered, there are consequences to this inclusion that

cannot be overlooked. Not only is the stigma of difference reinforced by this separation

from the dominant capitalist model, but moreover, such institutions are perceived to be

‘enough’ of a step forward. In other words, inequitable conditions for the ‘disability’

community become much harder to stress in political and economic spheres because these

concerns appear to be adequately addressed. This argument parallels the flawed logic of

asserting: ‘America has a black president now, so racism must be over.’ It is certainly a

remarkable step forward that has no historical equivalent, but Obama’s presidency hardly

eclipses the larger structural barriers still at play. From this economic analysis, it is

particularly interesting to challenge why non-state actors are so much more prevalent than

government intervention in addressing the concerns of the ‘disability’ community.

Although it is discouraging to criticize the efforts put forth by non-profit, non-

governmental organizations, there is only so much that can be done without greater

systemic support and integration.

The capitalist structure has further bolstered this stigma through the perception

that people with ‘disabilities’ fail to be effective consumers. Alexandra Elle once

expressed the idea, “when you are truly stunning, gorgeous and beautiful, you won’t have

to prove that to anyone visually” (Wiest 2015). These same principles can often be

applied to individuals with cognitive exceptions. Although a behavioural analysis is

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beyond the scope of this thesis, it could be argued that individuals identified as ‘disabled’

are further marginalized from the capitalist sphere because they are not valued on the

basis of the normative ideals of beauty that drive consumerism. For instance, consider for

a moment the grossly oversimplified aesthetic stereotype of an individual with

developmental delay: messy hair, wearing sweatpants pulled halfway up the torso, and

stuffed into mismatched socks. To really indulge in this typecast, imagine a little drool on

her or his face. This of course is a drastic over-generalization that in no way applies

homogenously to members of the ‘disability’ community. Void of any critical analysis,

however, these individuals are criticized by the dominant discourse for not caring about

their physical presentation in public. As a result, they would not be considered valuable

whatsoever to consumer culture.

FEMINIST ‘DISABILITY’ RESEARCH

The social model of ‘disability’ emerged to challenge the narrowly-defined

parameters of the medical model, recognizing that systemic barriers within society are

more disabling than biological limitations. It could be argued that the dominant

conceptualization of ‘disability’ is a reflection of the failures in society, which the newer

and developing field of ‘disability’ studies seeks to unpack. In recent years, academic

scholarship has migrated away from the medical model and towards a more socially

cognizant framework to understand ‘disability.’ With this intention, a distinctive branch

of social thought emerged out of feminist objectives. Increasingly, feminist researchers

have drawn similarities between the social construction of ‘disability’ and the social

construction of gender, since each functions to oppress a marginalized group of people in

society. Just as being biologically female is disadvantaged by the socio-cultural

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associations with femininity, being cognitively ‘disabled’ is disadvantaged by social,

political, and environmental barriers that reinforce a discourse of difference. Femininity

and ‘disability’ are thus inextricably linked: “both disability and gender are not

biologically given; they are socially constructed from biological reality” (Hiranandani

2005).

Although this research aims to redeem all members of those confined to the label

of ‘disabled,’ it is essential to examine for a moment the ways in which females perceived

to be cognitively deviant are exempt by two different but conjoined levels of subjectivity.

They are marginalized not only by their perceived ‘disability’ but moreover by their

gender. Evidently, cultural experiences of privilege and oppression must not be viewed as

mutually exclusive categories, but rather as indicating an intersection of variables that

influence daily life (Knoll 2009:124). There is an inherent imbalance of values ascribed

to these different variables, which are particularly problematic for women with perceived

‘disabilities.’

As this thesis has sought to illustrate, the ‘disabled’ body has been culturally cast

as deviant and inferior, and is consequently limited in opportunity to fully participate in

social and economic spheres. Therefore, a feminist critique lends itself to ‘disability’

research. The ‘disabled’ body, just as the feminine body, is expressed as the antithesis to

normalcy, and it represents to the perceivably ‘normal’ population a constant reminder

“of what the able-bodied are trying to avoid, forget and ignore” (Hiranandani 2005).

Social standards ascribe natural corporeal superiority to the archetype of a white, upper

class and able-bodied male, and this hierarchical ranking of bodily value shapes political,

social, and economic arrangements. Feminist ‘disability’ studies offers “a sharp political

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edge and a vigorous critical punch,” seeking to settle tired stereotypes and to reimagine

social implications of ‘disability’ (Garland-Thomson 2005:1557). This critical analysis

contrasts historical dealings of ‘disability’ by avoiding impairment-specific or medical

diagnostic categories. Alternatively, it seeks to scrutinize how people with a wide range

of cognitive and emotional differences are collectively imagined as defective and,

consequently, excluded from an equal place in the social order. Problematically, cultural

labels “accurately capture the single, reductive, exclusionary social category that

conflates and stigmatizes a range of differences according to a subordinating discourse”

(Garland-Thomson 2005:1558). Therefore, a feminist critique interrogates the concept of

‘disability’ in ways that parallel feminist challenges to patriarchal assumptions about

gender.

Feminist researchers recognize the pervasive presence of a misguided

understanding of ‘disability’ in cultural discourse, once one knows how to look for it

(Garland-Thomson 2005:1560). The term ‘disability’ has been misapplied in both

scholarly and colloquial literature, reflecting the ways in which it has been gendered,

racialized, and dehumanized to justify the mistreatment of intellectually exceptional

individuals. Around the turn of the twentieth century, social attitudes toward people with

mental deviations from the norm became more negative (Baynton 2011:43). For instance,

popular books, articles, and films advocated the euthanasia of perceivably ‘disabled’

infants, while a campaign to end the use of sign language among deaf people led to its

prohibition in most classrooms, even among schools for the deaf (Baynton 2011:43).

Historical representations of ‘disability’ have been heavily biased; however, the

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eradication of state-sanctioned oppression did not eliminate all remnants of bias.

Instances of stigma continue to pervade modern social thought today.

Feminist ‘disability’ research seeks not only to highlight the origins of associated

stigmas, but also endeavors to rewrite repressive cultural scripts. The dominant discourse

informs human relations and molds a sense of cultural identity; thus, prevailing narratives

that constrict the complexities of ‘disability’ respectively restrict the lives and

sensibilities of people who are thought of as ‘disabled.’ As feminist researcher Rosemarie

Garland-Thomson asserts, women with ‘disabilities,’ even more intensely than women in

general, “have been cast in the collective cultural imagination as inferior, lacking,

excessive, incapable, unfit, and useless” (2005:1567). More than half of individuals

perceived to deviate intellectually from the norm are women (Hiranandani 2005). Thus,

in light of the virulent biases and negative cultural associations that efface the personhood

of these individuals, the feminist movement has questioned the most deep-seated issues

about cultural representations of the body. Garland-Thomson highlights this concern,

arguing that is rare to see ‘disability’ presented “as an integral part of one’s embodiment,

character, life, and way of relating to the world” (Garland-Thomson 2005:1568). In other

words, society’s collective understanding of ‘disability’ seldom recognizes the autonomy

and value of a perceived ‘disability.’ Even less is it presented as part of a spectrum of

human variation. Rather, ‘disability’ is constructed through socialization as a

homogenous calamity of infliction. One’s relationship with her or his body is perhaps the

most universal of human experiences, but cultural presumptions have reduced what is

arguably the most diverse demonstration of this experience.

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A critical feminist theory of ‘disability’ is designed to be liberating not only for

people with perceived ‘disabilities,’ but also for the able-bodied, “since the theory of

disability is also the theory of the oppression of the body by society, political economy,

and culture” (Hiranandani 2005). Ideological domination over the body arguably stems

from a cultural fear of losing control. This fear manifests itself in capitalist societies

through the pervasiveness of the makeup industry, the staggeringly high number of

people who report having eating disorders11, and within ‘disability’ research, through the

mantra of the medical model: a body can, and should be controlled. The dominant

discourse informs the broader population that there is a ‘right’ kind of body, and any

variation from this established norm must be avoided at all costs. Within cultures that

place such a high value on this ‘ideal’ body and the ability to control it, those who cannot

are consequently viewed as the ‘Other.’

The impact of this narrative is paramount, and lends itself directly to the

marginalization of ‘disability’ communities. Discussions about the cognitively ‘disabled’

body echo feminisms’ long battle with the ideal of a socially constructed female body.

Individuals with cognitive deviations from the norm are categorized as one homogenous

group and marginalized based on broad cultural conceptions of ‘disability’ that eclipse

individual ability. Naomi Wolf once expressed, “a cultural fixation on female thinness is

not an obsession about female beauty but an obsession about female obedience” (Wiest

2015). The same rules apply to the social construction of ‘disability’: the modern stigma

associated with the intellectual ‘impairment’ is less concerned with the protection of

11 For instance, a college campus survey indicated that 86% of all student respondents reported an onset of eating disorder by age 20, while 43% report onset between ages of 16 and 20. Notably, Anorexia is the third more common chronic illness among adolescents (ANAD 2015).

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society – as it was claimed in the twentieth century – as it is with the inability to look and

act like the rest of ‘us.’ This perhaps helps to explain why, despite the geographically,

culturally, and socially different experiences, ‘disability’ continues to be imagined under

the umbrella of a homogenous and incomplete image.

Any way that it can be expressed, cultural singularity fragments collective

expression. It is thus important to look beyond the generally understood concept of

‘disability’ as a natural biological form of inferiority, and instead look to it as a culturally

fabricated, politicized label. A theory of social constructivism is required in order to

understand world negotiated from the vantage of the atypical. Kristina Knoll’s analysis of

oppression and privilege in her work Feminist Disability Studies Pedagogy (2009) builds

on this demand. Her writing is highly feminist and even more critical, with the goal of

creating real social change. Knoll indirectly draws on Edward Saïd’s theory of the ‘Other’

by exploring the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and highlighting the imbalance of

power and access to information in contemporary society. She attempts to address actual

solutions to the problems that are revealed by feminist ‘disability’ researchers. Principally,

even simple changes towards access to information in the classroom can create awareness

of the divide between those who are privileged and those who are not. Awareness, she

asserts, would work to address inequitable barriers and generate real social change.

There is an authority generated by people’s knowledge, and feminist ‘disability’

research demands a shift in this authority. There are intersections between gender, race,

sexuality, class, and dis/ability, which need to be considered collectively in order to

conceptualize ‘disability’ through a more holistic lens. Reconceptualization will provide a

more profound and socially relevant analysis of cultural attitudes towards ‘disability’

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communities. A feminist ‘disability’ perspective advocates that society is better off

learning to accommodate ‘disabilities,’ appreciate the lives of those perceived to be

intellectually exceptional, and create a more equitable and inclusive environment rather

than trying to eliminate ‘disability’ altogether (Garland-Thomson 2005:1568).

ASSESMENT OF PRAXES

Thoroughly examining how these social theories interact might help to explain

how industrial, capital societies have learned to construct meaning towards minority

groups. This chapter has been particularly interested in examining various theoretical

perspectives to explain the social stigma ascribed to the concept of ‘disability,’ and

argues that a social disconnect between power and knowledge has informed many of

these preconceptions. It has highlighted the persuasive power of discourse as a

materialization of the power/knowledge matrix, which is further advanced by the cultural

construction of ‘disabled’ individuals as a distinct, inferior ‘Other.’ Moreover, this

chapter has explored the flaws of a capitalist system that has created disposable

populations and concluded by appealing to the principles of feminist disability research in

order to consider an alternative way of theorizing ‘disability.’ A common denominator

between all four praxes has been the role of discourse as a powerful instrument of social

and political thought. This then raises the question: what is the best way to harness and

control this narrative? The following chapter will address this question by looking at the

language of discourse itself and assessing the ways in which linguistic control can

influence political and social thought within the broader narrative.

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CHAPTER THREE:

Censoring Semantics

The way people communicate largely influences everyday social reality. How

different people communicate is not always through spoken word, however, and

messages are often interpreted through body language and inferred connotations that

extend beyond the denoted meaning of a word. Much of what is conveyed or construed is

made possible through subtle nuances allowed by language, which will be the focus of

this final chapter. Following a broad study of social theory, this analysis now seeks to

establish a sociolinguistic framework through which to contextualize and evaluate

contemporary social attitudes regarding the concept of ‘disability.’

This chapter aims to demonstrate the various ways in which different elements of

a language are applied to strengthen the stigma towards ‘disability’ communities. It

begins by briefly defining the parameters of the term ‘language,’ which for the purpose of

this thesis have been defined by distinctions in sociolect rather than dialect. Second, this

chapter presents a discussion pertaining to the linguistic construction of normalcy.

Language often has an extremely subtle but equally powerful influence over what people

believe to be an objective ‘truth,’ and this section aims to explore the ways in which it

can effectively define both the expectations and limitations of social reality. Third, this

chapter illustrates the exclusive nature of dominant social and political language,

particularly challenging the misguided morality of a politically correct vocabulary. Lastly,

it outlines various ways in which linguistic tools are consciously harnessed as an

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instrument of oppression, thus demonstrating the endless creative ways in which language

can be used to subtly – or overtly – influence the dominant discourse.

WHAT IS LANGUAGE?

Sociohistorical transformations have played a large role in how ‘disability’

communities have come to be perceived in contemporary, capitalist societies. These

perceptions are informed by a discourse of difference, and affecting this narrative relies

on the elusive manipulation of language to direct social thought. The use of the term

language from herein refers not to differences in dialect (e.g. English, French, Mandarin,

etc.), but rather in sociolect: a register of language associated with a particular social

group (Barthes 1986:118). Thus, the following section will illustrate the ways in which

some sociolects stand in opposition to others, based on their position relative to the

dominant discourse. As a result, it could be argued that the linguistic oppression

experienced by ‘disability’ communities is not deliberately staged but is rather a

vernacular of hierarchical differences that, perhaps inadvertently, reproduces oppression.

The distinction between sociolects of inclusion and exclusion are examined in this

chapter, which furthermore explores the ways in which they can be harnessed as

linguistic tools of manipulation and marginalization.

This chapter considers ‘disability’ research through a sociolinguistic lens. The

field of sociolinguistics refers to “the separation of social groups insofar as they are

struggling for power [sic]” (Barthes 1986:117). Moreover, it denotes the political nature

of language: not the attempt to politicize language from the outside, but rather, a language

elaborated in the very movement of a political praxis. In other words, the language of

discourse is produced almost subconsciously and consequently absorbed into dominant

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social thought. It becomes part of how people interpret what they believe to be the most

important information to absorb. However, people do not share one common reality and

thus one common language can create vastly different experiences among different

groups.

THE LINGUISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF NORMALCY

As argued above, it is difficult to conceptualize the experience of the ‘Other’

without first recognizing the cultural construction of normalcy; each relies on the other to

exist. The same logic applies to the field of linguistics. In order to understand sociolects

of exclusion, it is important to first determine what constitutes an inclusive discourse:

language that helps not only to determine, but moreover to maintain a position of power

within the social hierarchy. Linguist Roland Barthes elaborates on this idea at the onset of

his book The Rustle of Language (1986:3):

The institution directly determines the nature of human knowledge, imposing its modes of division and of classification, just as a language, by its ‘obligatory rubrics’ (and not only by its exclusions), compels us to think in a certain way. In other words, what defines science….[is] its status, i.e., its social determination: the object of science is any material society deems worthy of being transmitted. In a word, science is what is taught.

The author introduces here an interesting concept that relates to the theory of the ‘Other’

presented by Edward Saïd. Even within academia, the science of linguistics is a guided

social progression that privileges some interests over others. Like science, art, music, or

any other representation of culture, language is highly determined by the dominant social

group. It compels a certain way of thought. This determination occurs not only on the

individual level but moreover in communities, or even whole nations, through subtle

nuances in words, connoted meanings, and broader social narratives. This argument

illustrates the political nature of knowledge, which social anthropologists recognize “as a

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variant of the [Sapir-] Whorf hypothesis that language conditions thought” (Goodin

1977:491). This linguistic principle contends that differences in the way languages

encode cultural and cognitive categories affect the way that people think about these

categories (Swoyer 2014). Although this line of thought refers to distinctions in dialect,

the logic similarly lends itself to explain distinctions in sociolect.

Language conditions thought, but there is a division of languages that bears on

their relation to power. That which most closely relates to this power has the strongest

influence. These are the languages which are “articulated, which develop, and which are

marked in the light of power, of its many state, institutional, ideological machineries,”

referred to as encratic languages or discourses (Barthes 1986:107). Facing them in

contrast, there are languages which are “elaborated, which feel their way, and which are

themselves outside or against power,” referred to as acratic languages or discourses

(Barthes 1986:107). The principle advantage of an encratic sociolect is thus the security it

affords. It reassures all the subjects inside while rejecting those outside. It is a sanctuary

rooted in the dominant vernacular. The ‘disability’ discourse embodies the principles of

the acratic language, therefore existing outside of the social insurance offered by its

antithesis.

Following the assertion that language conditions thought, it would be prudent to

consider not only the direct denoted meaning of a given word, but more importantly, the

connoted syntagmatic associations. Essentially, “words associate among themselves

according to a certain scale of probability,” and these associations are largely determined

by the values embedded in the dominant discourse (Barthes 1986:86). This could perhaps

be best illustrated in a game of word associations. For instance, if the word education was

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presented, logical associations might include student, university, college, and so on.

Similarly, one could associate with relationship words such as partner, intimacy, sex, and

so on. This is because there is a scale of probability that links education to school, and a

relationship to love. However, when presented with the word ‘disability,’ the associations

are often more negative: handicapped, pitiful, or dependent, to name a few. This reflects a

connoted meaning of ‘disability’ that extends beyond the denoted meaning of the word,

informed by the surrounding discourse. The general conceptualization of ‘disability’

stems from associations of disparity, thus reducing the real lived experience of

individuals who are cognitively exceptional. In making these distinctions, it becomes

clear that language provides symbolic interpretations, by which most people are

subconsciously influenced. These symbolic interpretations are linked to the language of a

culture by memory (Barthes 1986:24). Memory in this sense of the word does not

necessarily refer to a personal experience remembered over time, but rather as the

collective unfolding of sociohistorical events within a given culture that shape modern-

day discourse. This narrative does not reflect a static idea; rather, it is representative of

the interplay between the past and present. How discourses are shaped relies on how

collective memories are interpreted. In the ‘disability’ discourse, there is a memory of

dismissal.

Sociolects reflect the dominant interests of the culture they represent; language is

a reflection of the reality in which it exists. To provide a grossly oversimplified example,

consider the fact that cultures accustomed to a winter climate, such as communities in

Northern Canada, have multiple words in their vernacular to distinguish different

variations of snow. Similarly, those more accustomed to living in a desert have many

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words for differentiating between various kinds of sand. In contrast, English offers

significantly fewer linguistic options to describe the same conditions (Goodin 1977:593).

This is because language is built upon the subjective reality of lived experiences: those

who are more familiar with snow or sand develop deeper distinctions that would likely go

unnoticed by those who only experience these conditions sporadically. This moreover

reflects the politicized nature of language.

Class distinctions, shaped by historical relations of power and submission, have

helped to filter and revise the dominant language of society. Just as Saïd demonstrates in

his theory of the ‘Other,’ the employment of some language is more effective than others,

depending on whom it may privilege or marginalize in a particular circumstance. Barthes

applies this logic to explain the prominence of French stereotypes, of which he is most

familiar due to his French citizenship. He asserts that a form of national identification –

French nationality in this case – is based on “manuals of history [that] perpetually

advance what are called typically French values or typically French temperaments”

(1989:26). In other words, the common characteristics ascribed to ‘Frenchness’ are

prominent as a result of their repeated manifestations in French literature and history.

This logic lends itself to the broader application of language within any given culture.

The author makes the argument that everything with any kind of meaning is constructed

in relation to its dense history. The mere authority to determine meaning reflects a level

of subjectivity. Thus, challenging for instance the function of the term Social Darwinism

demonstrates how language used to describe history must not be deciphered as factually

objective. Rather, it must be viewed as a subjective interpretation reflecting the values

and temperaments of those disseminating the knowledge at the time.

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Grounding these ideas back into the field of ‘disability’ studies, consider the

analyses presented thus far: there has been a history of inequitable power relations that

has rendered marginalized groups – ‘disability’ communities among them – powerless

within society. These fringe groups have been subject to oppression, eugenic

sterilizations, and discriminations that continue to pervade modern societies today. Out of

nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideas of biological determinism surfaced the notion of

human perfectibility, which medicalized the body and rendered mental variants as deviant

from the standard expectations. Since knowledge is never eliminated, only added to,

“what we hold to be the nature of knowledge is not culture-free,” thus returning to the

concept of collective memory (Corker 2001:38). There is a sociohistorical memory that

informs modern mentality through the dominant social narrative: ‘disability’ is a medical

condition, an impairment that biologically relegates some individuals as inferior to others.

The impact of this discourse on social reality is ineffable. Discourse and the language that

shapes it cannot be understood as individual, stagnant forces that are easily replaced.

Rather, it has a layered quality, like that of an onion: “a superimposed construction of

skins (of layers, of levels, of systems) whose volume contains, finally, no heart, no core,

no secret, no irreducible principle, nothing but the very infinity of its envelopes – which

envelop nothing other than the totality of its surface” (Barthes 1986:99).

Foucault argued in his analysis that the power/knowledge matrix cannot be

reduced to one powerhouse force, and thus there can be no attack on any explicit

oppressor. There is simply a progression of historical instances that work together but

reveal no center. The language of discourse parallels this concept; there is no single

oppressive narrative to overcome. Instead, encratic language is bound up with enabling

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hierarchical paradigms that indirectly function as a naturalizing force of oppression. This

historical inertia helps to sustain the dominant discourse, and the allusion to routines,

linguistic or governmental, “may persist long after the objective conditions to which they

were originally responses have passed away” (Goodin 1977:494).

The False Truth of History

In ‘objective’ history, the ‘real’ is never anything but an unformulated

interpretation of social reality that is sheltered behind the apparent omnipotence of the

referent. What this means is that learned history is not factually true but is in fact biased

by those who disseminate the knowledge. Thus, the discourse that was shaped by and

emerged from collective industrial history is necessarily subjective; it “does not follow

the real, it merely signifies it” (Barthes 1986:139). This is problematic for a number of

reasons. To address these concerns – how representations of history are shaped by certain

interest groups – it is important to consider how distinctions in language could become a

resource for figuring and legitimizing inequality (Errington 2001:20). Language should

not be considered a representation of any objective ‘truth,’ but rather, “a method for

producing meaning and generating knowledge” (Hiranandani 2005).

Social theorist Slavoj Žižek provides a unique depiction of this assertion in his

work Violence (2009), in which he highlights how ideological mechanisms regulate

human life. Writing in the context of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans

in 2005, the author refers to the various media reports suggesting an explosion of black

violence in the days following the initial flood. These proved to be unverified rumours

that simply did not occur. However, they were reported as facts in the news. Propagated

primarily through right-wing media outlets, these stories were likely based on personal

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and cultural biases that presupposed a lack of civility among black members of the

community, which were then ‘proven’ to be ‘true’ in the immediate events following the

hurricane. As Žižek emphasizes, “these reports were not merely words, they were words

which had precise material effects: they generated fears that led the authorities to change

troop deployment, they delayed medical evacuations, drove police officers to quit, [and]

grounded helicopters” (2009:84). This illustrates the ease with which individuals and

organizations can employ confirmation bias12 to justify prejudice. The author therefore

challenges the representation of ‘truth’ in discourse. In New Orleans, social antagonisms

were projected onto the marginalized black community resulting in an emphatically

untrue narrative that had real life consequences. Žižek concludes, even if all reports of

violent perpetration in the days after Hurricane Katrina proved to be factually true, the

stories circulating about them would still be “pathological and racist,” since the

motivating force behind these stories was not facts, but racial prejudices and the

satisfaction felt by those who would be able to say ‘I told you so’ (2009:84). The author

refers to this as “lying in the guise of truth: even if what I’m saying is factually true, the

motives that make me say it are false” (2009:84-5).

This example is particularly relevant when looking at ‘disability’ communities

and the associated stigma. Just as pre-existing discriminations in New Orleans had real

life consequences, so do prejudices held against people with intellectual deviations from

the norm. In the social sphere, these individuals are stigmatized and avoided, pushed into

a metaphorical corner for no reason other than their culturally constructed status. In the

12 Confirmation bias, a term typically used in the field of psychology, connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs. Therefore, one reviews ‘evidence’ of such bias in a way that reaffirms her or his previously held idea (Nickerson 1998).

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capitalist sphere, members of the ‘disability’ community are marginalized from work not

because of their inabilities, but because of their disabilities. These disadvantages are not

based on fact but rather on the inherited assumptions that homogenize and subvert a

widely diverse community of individuals. The encratic language thus perpetuates “an

unshakeable homogeneity… woven habits, of repetitions, of stereotypes, of obligatory

fragments and key words” (Barthes 1986:67). The tangible consequences that emerge

from unfounded assumptions can be linked directly to how this language helps to shape

these assumptions in the first place. This language is not a representation of an objective

truth; rather, it is a reflection of historical and social progressions that mold social

stereotypes. As Barthe’s asserts: “culture is not only what returns, it is also and especially

what remains in place, like an imperishable corpse: it is a bizarre toy that History never

breaks” (1986:110).

A final note on the linguistic construction of normalcy: in order to drive a certain

discourse forward, there needs to be a sense of cohesion in the language. Ultimately,

“utterances have meaning only because there is some common, conventional

understanding as to what they connote” (Goodin 1977:492). This connotation is often

why language that oppresses marginalized groups can have a significantly ‘louder’ voice

than the language used to combat this oppression. The former shares a broader cultural

acceptance that the latter does not. For instance, employing the word ‘retarded’ to

describe unfavourable circumstances is a normalized term within the encratic discourse

and therefore preserves the active subjugation of individuals who are cognitively

exceptional. In contrast, there is little room for a language of opposition because it would

not be cohesive to the dominant discourse. Interestingly, individuals who are paraplegic

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often refer to able-bodied individuals as TABs (Temporarily Able-Bodied). However,

because this – and other language of the same vernacular – is only adopted by the

singular minority group of the ‘disabled,’ its political impact will also be minor. Just as

Edward Saïd outlines in his theory of the ‘Other,’ the dominant group necessarily

subverts others to boost themselves up. The encratic language in both cases is entrenched

by imperialistic undertones, which assert: ‘My opinion matters more than yours.’ All

political thought and, in consequence, all political action “is similarly constrained by the

linguistic tools at hand” (Goodin 1977:491). In this case, ‘disability’ communities are

armed with less effective tools, placing them at an immediate disadvantage.

In the larger discourse, the necessity for commonality emerges because language

“is responsive to demands made on it” (Goodin 1977:493). Therefore, language could be

argued as originally neutral, but it became skewed by the demands of the increasingly

popularized medical model of ‘disability.’ As this model became the dominant frame of

reference in academia, new distinctions required by this framework inevitably found their

way into the language, which subsequently created a linguistic bias that endorses personal

tragedy theory. Thus, the linguistic critiques outlined in this section are not meant to be

an appointment of blame. The analysis simply suggests that a model alleging that

individuals with ‘disabilities’ can be ‘fixed’ will necessarily favour terminology

reflecting this sentiment. This encratic language suggests they need to adapt to society,

not the other way around. For instance, the implications of suggesting that it is a virtuous

quality to ‘overcome’ one’s ‘disability’ communicates the message that ‘they’ desire to

become more like ‘us,’ just as does the foreign ‘Other’ in Edward Saïd’s theoretical

analysis. It effectively squanders any recognition of an individual’s personal agency and

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moreover perpetuates a misguided understanding that neglects to recognize that people

with ‘disabilities’ are human beings with human needs and desires. It evokes pity where

pity is not warranted nor wanted. There is not necessarily any intention to oppress per se,

“but only the relentless workings of rigged routine” that have ossified a past power

imbalance (Goodin 1977:494). The language itself is not the ideology, but there is no

denying that the sociolect does embody, reflect, and bolster it.

SOCIOLECTS OF EXCLUSION

The vast majority of people culturally construed to have ‘disabilities’ have

consistently embodied the poor, powerless, and marginalized members of society, and

this oppression is a product of both past and present influences (Charlton 2006:217).

Some aspects of this oppression can be traced back to ancient political and traditional

beliefs, while others are the result of more recent occurrences in industrialized culture.

Modern developments within the ‘disability’ discourse have been improvements on the

past; however, even some of the largest organizations in the world still fall short from

even basic linguistic improvements. Consider the following statement, a recent contention

issued by the United Nations to address the rights of individuals with documented

‘disabilities:’

Handicapped people remain outcasts around the world, living in shame and squalor among populations lacking not only in resources to help them but also in understanding. And with their numbers growing rapidly, their plight is getting worse… The normal perception is that nothing can be done for disabled children. This has to do with prejudice and old-fashioned thinking that this punishment comes from God, some evil spirits or magic… We have a catastrophic human rights situation… They [persons with disabilities] are a group without power. (Helander 1993)

On the surface, this appears to be an informed statement designed to address the major

obstacles facing individuals conceived as to have ‘disabilities’ in contemporary society.

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Arguably, their intentions are pure and this acknowledgment of the dire nature of

‘disability’ rights by international governance is a huge step forward from how these

matters were dealt with in the past. However, the misuse of language in they very first

word13 of their statement contributes to the misunderstanding and consequently the

marginalization of people perceived to be intellectually deviant from the norm. The

former statement does assert a certain truth: this subcategory of people is indeed

powerless, and on average people do tend to believe that nothing can be done for children

with ‘disabilities.’ However, their plight does not stem from the fact that something can

be done for them but is not, but rather, that people believe that something must be done

for them, rather than society. This admission does not draw away from the progressive

steps forward being taken. However, the fact remains that even the global representatives

of governance and human rights cannot properly employ the appropriate language when

addressing the concerns of individuals deemed to be ‘disabled.’ Furthermore, the United

Nations did not take this opportunity to address the social, cultural, and political barriers

that disable the experience of many individuals. This statement effectively acknowledges

the issue but makes no suggestions on how to move forward. Should public opinion

perceive this acknowledgment as ‘enough’ action, it would further shroud the broader

systemic failures.

Culturally, “there is an inveterate war of languages: our languages exclude each

other; in a society divided (by social class, money, academic origin), language itself

divides” (Barthes 1986:101). Essentially, there is a dominant discursive system (encratic)

that eclipses the needs of the marginalized (acratic), revealed even through the very

13 The very first word used, “handicapped,” is defined as “disadvantage in filling a role relative to a peer group” (Bauer et al. 2014: ix). Thus, one cannot be inherently handicapped; ‘handicap’ only emerges in light of an environmental or infrastructural factor that disables an individual in a particular circumstance.

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organization designed to address these problems of inequality. To contextualize this into

‘disability’ studies, one needs only to consider the language emerging from the recent

cultural appeal to political correctness. As history has demonstrated, social relationships

have become far more socially progressive then even twenty-five years ago: eugenic

practices have been abolished, every ‘developed’ country in the world has signed the UN

Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities14, and there are more and more

social welfare organizations emerging from all around the world (United Nations 2015).

However, this recognition does not eclipse the progress that still needs to be made, and

presenting it as such only hinders the integrity of ‘disability’ activism. The encratic

language, the language articulated in the light of power, is entrenched in the vernacular of

political correctness: it was created for and supported by the dominant discourse. Words

like ‘retarded’ are slowly being replaced by alternative descriptions, such as ‘mentally

challenged’ or ‘intellectually disabled.’ However, while this undoubtedly reflects a

change for the better, the positive impact of being politically conscious is often

overvalued. This results in the cultural adoption of a false sense of morality. Consider, for

instance, three different signs on a property fence that are used to express warning:

“Vicious Dog,” “Dangerous Dog,” and “Watchdog” (Barthes 1986:106). Despite the

distinctions in word choice, the underlying implication of each sign remains the same. On

the level of the simplest message – Do Not Enter – there is a division of language that

connotes different meanings: the first is aggressive, the second is philanthropic, and the

third is arguably objective (Barthes 1986:106). There is meaning in this difference. Thus,

one could similarly argue that although the connotation of politically correct language in

14 Switzerland has not yet signed the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities; however, this nation has ratified the Convention, which is a more binding agreement (United Nations 2015).

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reference to ‘disability’ is certainly more respectful than language used in the past, the

underlying message remains the same: ‘You are distinctly different from me.’ Altering

the terminology that references an Othered group without changing any real-life

circumstances simply becomes another pejorative. There may be a new vocabulary, but it

sustains the same discourse of difference.

This new vocabulary similarly sparked a strategy of employing euphemisms,

which often mask unconscious feelings of subordination. For instance, in a Saturday

Night Live routine, a character known as ‘Church Lady’ declares ‘Isn’t that special!’

whenever she comes across something distasteful or morally repugnant (Linton

2006:164). Although this character is not directly addressing or even speaking about

‘disability,’ she is applying the same politically correct term – ‘special’ – that is used to

address a group of people perceived as intellectually disadvantaged and equating the

word with something undesirable. This creates an ideological shift in the meaning of the

encratic word: a euphemism for intellectual ‘disability’ has now become a measure of

misfortune in other areas of social reality. It inadvertently shapes a hateful diatribe.

Perhaps it is difficult to properly grasp the inherent problem in utilizing the word ‘special,’

since it so prominently saturates the encratic language. A more commonplace example

can explored from the use of the word ‘retarded.’ The usual defense for colloquially

applying this word argues, ‘I would never call someone retarded to their face; that would

be awful! I am simply saying that it is retarded that I have to read this book. I am not

trying to attack or offend anyone.’ However, would one make the same argument if the

term were symbiotic with a differently marginalized group? What if, instead of applying

the former word, it was commonplace to associate the N-word with undesirable

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circumstances? Perhaps this seems like an over-exaggeration; however, is it really all that

different? The word ‘special’ produces the same results. It is equating a generally

accepted – albeit candidly condescending– definition of a group of people perceived to be

intellectually exceptional to the likes of something negative. Similarly, the word ‘retarded’

is meant to be derogatory, and the way it is used even in a separate context outside of the

reference group shows just how offensive and pervasive discourse can be. So long as this

continues to happen, the stigma will continue to reproduce.

Politically correct language is a step; however, when this language undergoes

critical analysis, it is difficult to see any real transformation in the general social

preconceptions. Perhaps the most notable issue within the vernacular surrounding

‘disability’ is the way to which intellectually exceptional individuals are referred. More

often than not, the perceived ‘disability’ becomes the defining quality of a person; there

needs to be a flip in this perception. There is a notion of person-first language, which is

designed to place the value on personhood above any other characteristic, especially the

subjective interpretation of a ‘disability.’ In other words, a child living with Downs

Syndrome, for example, is just that; a child living with Downs Syndrome. Not ‘a Downs

kid’ or ‘a slow child,’ or any other label that places a diagnosis above an individual’s

personhood. ‘Disability’ does not define a person, and language that infers otherwise

should have no place in the dominant discourse.

On the other end of the spectrum, it is also important to focus on the language that

is being left out. What is known as the linguistic deprivation school argues that

sociopolitical consequences arise less out of what language structures, and more out of

what it leaves unstructured (Goodin 1977:496). To explore this idea, consider the

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juxtaposition between apparently biased language and no language at all: it is much easier

to target the bias in the former and thus correct it. The latter, however, is more

problematic: “it is far harder to turn the tables if the bias is achieved by leaving these

concepts out of the language altogether” (Goodin 1977:496). Politically, one of the

difficulties with this theory is that it implicates someone else as responsible for imposing

the limitations on the language. However, as this chapter has established, the linguistic

oppression of ‘disability,’ and the tangible oppression that results offers no singular

source of subjugation that actively works to manipulate language and marginalize

minority groups. Rather, it is the rigorous routine of stereotyping and making

homogenous cultural assumptions that reproduces inequality.

Although it could be argued that there is no observable, direct intent, “elites do

have a more elaborate code for use in discoursing among themselves” (Goodin 1977:497).

What this means is that while it would be challenging to prove that elites consciously

harness linguistic tools for the purpose of oppression, there are still clear variations in the

language used within an elite sociolect. In other words, each sociolect offers linguistic

distinctions that are more relevant to their own ‘kind.’ For instance, within the encratic

European discourse, there are obligatory linguistic distinctions made between two

geographical associations to Irish nationality: to confuse Southern Irish identity with their

Northern counterpart would create a great deal of animosity, as Southerners generally

tend to resent their relation with the Crown. Another instance of linguistic control can be

drawn from the distinctions made between different beard types among men. There are

not just two or three variations, but rather, closer to twenty different styles, all ascribed

official labels. Within the sociolect of beard-baring individuals, to suggest that a man

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with a chinstrap beard has the same caliber of facial hair as a man with a full, Old Dutch

style beard would be downright offensive to the latter individual. This specificity

demonstrates the relationship between power and language in even the most politically

insignificant linguistic distinctions. However, groups of privilege, and their correlating

sociolects, transcend more effectively than others into dominant social and political

thought. Thus, within the same discourse, there is no explicitly adopted distinction made

between a boy with Oppositional Defiance Disorder and an adult woman with autism:

they are both referred to as ‘disabled’ in this context. Thus, the deprivation model is a

powerful linguistic tool that effectively favours what the encratic sociolect considers to be

important. It functions as a social mirror that distorts perceptions of reality “by being

incompletely reflective” (Goodin 1977:497).

The former examples demonstrate how the encratic languages of a few Western

societies requires specific distinctions between a single nationality or between different

variations of facial hair, but disregards almost entirely the vastly different experiences of

individuals perceived to have cognitive ‘disabilities.’ When the encratic discourse is

lacking acratic representation, it is difficult to acknowledge any inequalities to begin with.

What this communicates, then, is that the language of the same suffices the encratic group,

and there is no room for the language of the ‘Other:’ to each her or his own vernacular

serves. As a result, “we lock ourselves into the language of our own social, professional

cell, and this sequestration has a neurotic value: it permits us to adapt ourselves as best

we can to the fragmentation of society” (Barthes 1986:116). Favouring a sociolect that

most closely reflects one’s own experience is natural; however, it would be ignorant to

assume it is the only one that matters.

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Feminist ‘disability’ research bolsters this argument, and asserts that language

reflects on some level the relationship between power and the speaker. For instance, Deaf

writer Mairian Corker argues that she may ‘speak’ the same language as English-

speaking and -hearing people on the surface, but communicating on this level has

generated a loss of self because, “at the deeper level of signification my language was

very different” (2001:39). To clarify her point, the author provides the example of the

term ‘discussion’: for her, it signifies “the social practice that is legitimated by the

dominant hearing-speaking culture” (2001:39). The term may appear to signify

commonality of meaning at the deeper level of signification, but in reality is a reflection

of power among the speaking-hearing group. Corker herself will never be able to engage

in the full meaning of the term.

Although Corker does not write in the context of cognitive ‘disability,’ the

linguistic principles apply to this research by revealing the privileged nature of language.

Rosemarie Garland-Thomson further expands on Corker’s discussion of ‘discussion,’

coining the term ‘sitpoint theory’ as a way of challenging normative assumptions “that

one perceives the world from a standing rather than sitting position” (2005:1570). The

irony in this emphasis cannot go unnoticed. The naming of standpoint theory, which is

designed to “articulate the importance of perspectival differences stemming from social

location” actually affronts the very perspective it is meant to defend when addressing

‘disability’ (Grasswick 2013). Standpoint theory was coined by sociologist Dorothy

Smith, who argued that there is no objective knowledge (grenas 2011). Therefore, nobody

should take her or his personal standpoint for granted. This theory was conceived as a

result of Smith’s own personal experiences in sociology: the discipline was created by

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white, middle-class males, “who only saw their own relevance in society” (grenas 2011).

She argued that their failure to realize they were creating a masculine discipline made the

field biased as it excluded women and their standpoints (grenas 2011). Arguably, there

exists a similar failure in contemporary sociology, perpetuated through a biased

vocabulary, which reduces the ‘disability’ experience to the vernacular of the able-bodied.

RHETORICAL TOOLS

The language that informs different sociolects can have strong effects on the

tangible, lived experience of intellectually exceptional people. This chapter has argued

thus far that language carries the capacity to oppress, but that this is not necessarily its

intended purpose. The following section will be presented in juxtaposition by discussing

the ways in which language can be consciously controlled to compel people to think in

certain ways.

Linguistic biases reflect, “for better or worse, what people are forced to talk about”

(Goodin 1977:493). Accordingly, encratic language reflects dominant social stereotypes.

Although a sociolect can support a pre-existing stereotype without necessarily creating it,

language ultimately teaches what it preaches. For instance, using the male pronoun as the

gendered default in Eurocentric English dialect reflects the patriarchal nature of this

culture, while simultaneously, teaches to emerging generations that they are entering a

male-dominated reality. Ultimately, “even if the language is not itself the paradigm, there

is no denying that it does embody it” (Goodin 1977:495). In linguistic theory, this line of

thought is referred to as the cage theory of language.

In order to comprehend how the dominant ideology is able to prevail, it is

important to first understand the distinctive roles of each sociolect. In a metaphorical cage,

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“one…naturally finds his attention narrowed to – and hence focused on – the territory

inside the bars” (Goodin 1977:495). The underlying idea presented in the cage theory of

language implies that individuals are more likely to absorb and internalize information

that is immediately accessible to them. This is particularly pertinent if they do not have

the capacity to conduct a more critical analysis. Thus, in the struggle for equal rights for

people perceived as ‘disabled,’ the cage represents the narrow version of reality that is

disseminated through biased language in the dominant discourse. This language conveys

an incomplete ‘truth’ that defines ‘disability’ as an inherently inferior characteristic. It

distorts what people interpret to be reality. The process of selectively disseminating

knowledge ultimately regulates the normative expectations to reflect the standards of

those in power. Discourse can thus design and impose value-laden ideologies that support

dominant interests, making this linguistic trap an extremely effective tactic for rendering

the broader public apathetic to the rights of people outside of their own metaphorical cage.

The more bars that are added to this cage, the less the chance that knowledge of the

‘Other’ will squeeze through the gaps.

Linguistic concepts, such as the cage theory of language, offer better ways to

understand the obstacles that hinder the possibility for equal rights. Those who exist

under the ‘normal’ bell curve fall into the cage, and often internalize the encratic

language fed to them by the dominant group. This actively insulates actors from taking

any greater social responsibility, as they often do not recognize discriminations in the first

place. The cage theory moreover provides a unique standpoint when challenging how

people can experience apathy in the face of inequitable human rights. There appears to be

an awesome power inherent to the encratic discourse, which begs the question: how can

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language hold this much influence? In The Power of Language to Efface and Desensitize

(1990), Diane Mowery and Eve Duffy explore this very question.

The encratic language of the dominant narrative is highly influential, although

subtle by nature. Mowery and Duffy thus argue that this language can be harnessed and

manipulated to enable and maintain a certain way of thinking within the broader

population. As Foucault noted, power-structured relationships “cannot themselves be

established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation,

circulation, and functioning of discourse” (Mowery and Duffy 1990:163). The authors

therefore seek to demonstrate how a particular language can be used to promote and

protect political relationships, which they argue can be achieved in two primary ways:

first, to efface the effects of domination, and second, to delimit compassion and

desensitize the ruling group to the suffering of the subordinate group (Mowery et.al

1990:163). In this context, the ruling group does not refer solely to elite members of

authority, but rather, anybody whose identity is supported by the dominant narrative.

However, this assertion is not designed to assign blame. Rather, it is to demonstrate the

ways in which the successful desensitization of the general public makes it possible for

members of the dominant group to remain unaffected by the atrocities of their domination

– to which they are directly or indirectly a party – “even when those atrocities are obvious

to subjects who are not members of the ruling group” (Mowery et.al 1990:163). As

Edward Saïd previously suggested in his research, those with the authority to control and

disseminate certain knowledge wield the power to produce narratives of false ‘truths’ that

justify those atrocities.

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The authors categorize this theory into what they refer to as “three fundamental

modes of ideological interpellation,” which explore the ways in which social paradigms

can be manipulated to inform the dominant discourse about what exists/does not exist,

what is good/is not good, and what is possible/impossible (Mowery et.al 1990:163).

Ultimately, the dominant group can regulate the ways in which information is conveyed

through the public narrative. The authors assert that language can skew the discourse in

three stages, functioning as layered lines of defense. The goal is to remain the first stage

for as long as possible, but there are two fail-safe steps if this cannot be maintained.

In the first step, the discourse states that exploitation does not exist, propagating

the false idea that nobody is being exploited, and everybody is treated equally (Mowery

et al. 1990:164). Historically speaking, this stage is mirrored by the introductory years of

eugenic practices in the early twentieth-century. This first line of defense managed to be

maintained for a while. Although there were observable discriminations, the dominant

discourse did not address this fact, thus rendering unaffected citizens to be apathetic at

best. According to the authors, this success can be attributed to a “rather obvious methods

of linguistic camouflage” (Mowery et al. 1990:164). This refers to the ways in which a

unique vocabulary can separate or mask the brutality of an action, and this ‘camouflage’

produces multiple consequences: firstly, it is a way of distancing unfavourable actions

from the actual narrative; secondly, it can be seen as a way of separating oneself

personally. The guise of ‘sterilizing’ an individual with Autism, for instance, is much

easier to sanction than a total disregard of their autonomy and personhood. ‘Sterilization’

was camouflaged as a necessary step in human and social evolution. This was perpetuated

through the encratic sociolect, which in turn evoked support from the masses who were

99

informed, through their metaphorical cage, that their future prosperity depended on the

sterilization of these ‘lesser’ people.

However, eventually exploitation had to be admitted, guiding the discourse into

its second line of defense: the exploitation exists, but only because it is rightly so

(Mowery et al. 1990:166). This stage can be reflected in the legalization of eugenics.

Although the discourse acknowledged some levels of inequality, it offered pseudo-

scientific ‘evidence’ of Social Darwinism to justify perceptions of subjugation. In other

words, exploitation was definitely occurring, but it was putatively for the greater good of

society. The subjugated victims were assigned a subhuman identity, defined through the

encratic language as a threat to the future prosperity of social order. This stage of

discourse was thus informed by fear, which contributed largely to the prolonged practices

of eugenics. An important crutch of this method was the employment of metaphors to

serve an identifying purpose, which helped to ‘prove’ the ways in which members of a

subordinate group were less than human. This discourse consequently made it possible

for the ruling group to continue their oppressive practices. After all, victims of forced

sterilization were depicted to be ‘feebleminded,’ and therefore inferior. This prompted the

vilification of marginalized groups, which became “an even more effective mode of

reasoning that allowed the ruling group to be insensitive to the sufferings [of others]”

(Mowery et al. 1990:167). Social Darwinism provided the groundwork necessary to

encourage eugenicists to ‘do something’ about the ‘problem’ lest it get worse. The

perception that ‘feebleminded’ individuals were a threat to society led to the creation of

additional metaphors that reinforced and promoted social inequalities. Moreover, it

permitted the broader population to desensitize themselves to the sufferings of those

100

being sterilized, because the metaphors informed public opinion that these victims

somehow deserved this fate by virtue of their biology. The discourse was guided by the

notion that perceivably inferior individuals could not be trusted to participate in the

broader moral community: without knowing what was going on their heads, it was

justified to try and control them.

However, this support became progressively minimized as more and more people

began to perceive the exploitation as unjust. This led the discourse into the third and final

line of defense: that exploitation exists, but only because it cannot be stopped (Mowery et

al. 1990:169). This is the current stage in which the ‘disability’ discourse exists in

contemporary capitalist societies. It conveys the recognition of past mistakes, but does

not take responsibility for current conditions. The underlying message of this final stage

asserts: ‘We are too far gone to change the stigma now.’ This is perhaps the most

damaging of all three stages, because it assumes defeat. It promotes a sentiment that there

is nothing else that can be done, and the marginalized groups – individuals conceived to

be ‘disabled’ prominently among them – will simply have to adapt to these new social

circumstances. It places the onus on the oppressed to climb out of their socially

constructed misery, perpetuated even through the colloquial language of the encratic

discourse.

Consider the example of the narrative of overcoming ‘disability:’ the ideas

imbedded in this narrative are of personal triumph over a personal condition, and nothing

else. It is “a wish fulfillment generated from the outside, [and] a demand that you be

plucky and resolute, and not let the obstacles get in your way” (Linton 2006:165). When

the ‘disability’ community then internalizes this demand to overcome rather then to

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demand social change, it displaces the responsibility away from the dominant group. The

last line of defense is particularly implicated in the imbalance of power relations, because

only those in power can make the decisions that determine “what power can be expected

to achieve” (Mowery et al. 1990:169). In other words, neither the recognition of social

atrocity nor the desire to change it is valid if the encratic ideology indicates that change is

simply not possible. This can perhaps help to explain the current conditions of social

apathy regarding ‘disability’ rights: those unaffected by the inequality are hard-pressed to

fight for a justice they do not believe can occur. Raymond Williams has suggested that

the ruling class is anxious “to represent its interests as the common interests of all the

members of society…as the only rational, universally valid one” (Mowery et al.

1990:169). The encratic discourse similarly projects an attitude that somehow equates the

cultural with the natural. It forces many individuals to adopt a homogenous and

incomplete identity that is fixed, frozen, and arguably just as essentialist as biological

determination in the twentieth century. On the one hand it creates difference, while on the

other hand, erases difference altogether.

Discourses become servants of certain ideological positions, and they have the

power to manipulate cultural conceptions of ‘disability.’ Manipulating discourse is thus a

formidable instrument of power to the dominant paradigm. The cage theory of knowledge

postulates that false ‘truths’ can be disseminated to efface the effects of authoritative

domination, which both promotes and protects the established status quo. The language

becomes a figure of intimidation, designed to keep the ‘Other’ from speaking. It

transforms and displaces the elusive ‘us,’ providing distorted explanations of social and

102

political relationships so the broader population do not themselves have to conduct

critical analyses. The encratic sociolect demands faith in a broken system.

However, hope is not lost in the depths of the current ‘disability’ discourse.

Language is powerful, but it is also very accessible. There is so much potential to take the

control away from small interest groups and change the conversation by critically

thinking about the ways in which language influences what each individual believes to be

‘objectively’ true. ‘Reality’ is sheltered by the apparent omnipotence of the dominant rule,

which has historically lacked any sincere acratic representation. Sociohistorical discourse

only signifies a subjective ‘truth,’ constantly repeating ‘This is the way things are,’

without this assertion ever requiring validation (Barthes 1989:139). It is time to begin re-

defining what is understood to be ‘normal,’ and to bring the power of language back to

those who need it most. Social reality currently exists in a moment where “so-called mass

culture is the direct expression of…state presence;” however, the path of social discourse

can be re-routed (Barthes 1986:104). The encratic language does not circulate truths.

Rather, is reflects a systemic representation that constitutes and reinforces an accepted

code of thinking. The meaning of ‘disability’ is open to interpretations that are relative to

geography, time, and social organization, and those ascribed this identity category should

not be reduced to any ideological limitations.

103

Conclusion

The stigma towards the concept of ‘disability’ is an undeniable fact within

dominant social and political thought, but its pervasiveness is not natural nor is it

impenetrable. This thesis has sought to challenge why stigma has emerged, examining the

social systems that help to reproduce such misinformed or incomplete perceptions. The

body of this work has argued that understanding the ways in which cognitive differences

have been dealt with in the past is the key to transforming how they are interpreted in the

future. Furthermore, it is necessary to contrast sociological theories of organization and

cultural relationships in order to understand how structural and social systems work to

either improve or hinder the rights of individuals perceived as ‘disabled.’ People with

diverse abilities share more similarities than differences, and the arguments put forth in

each analysis underline this potential for social cohesion.

In order to shift the system away from further exploitation of ‘disability’

communities, it is imperative to understand the sociohistorical context informing the

current marginalizing discourse. Individuals build their own interpretations of reality on

the basis of prior conditions. Thus, the first chapter asked: how were cognitive deviations

and inequalities dealt with in the past? It explored in particular the cultural, academic and

political impact of Social Darwinism on dominant public opinion, which enveloped an

incomplete social theory of evolution that largely influenced the mass subjugation and

exploitation of individuals perceived to deviate intellectually from the established norms

of society. This chapter presented a critique of the harmful nature of perverting and

misinterpreting this theory in academia, through which pseudo-scientific understandings

of biological superiority were endorsed. Furthermore, it examined how the overwhelming

104

influence of this theory in the dominant discourse created the conditions necessary for the

legalization of eugenic practices in many countries. This justified the forced sterilization

of perceivably ‘feebleminded’ individuals under the pretense of their ‘natural’ inferiority.

This chapter then challenged the current version of history taught in the public school

system, arguing that it leaves out details of the past that would potentially impugn the

state. It insisted that the term Social Darwinism to be abolished from academia, as the

misinterpretation of this theory has convoluted history in a way that distances the actors

from their social responsibility. In order to change dominant social and political thought

in the future, it is important to understand the ways in which sociohistorical relationships

have distorted different values of human life. Although history has arguably demonstrated

otherwise, the lives of all individuals within society, especially those perceived to have

‘disabilities,’ have value.

In order to prompt substantive social change, it is also important to recognize the

social systems in place that help or hinder the advancements of ‘disability’ rights. Do

different social systems antagonize each other? How can these be reformed to work more

cohesively? These are important questions that need to be answered in order to effect

long-lasting social change. Accordingly, the second chapter analyzed the principles of

various theoretical perspectives in order to understand the ways in which different

systems of thought help to reproduce distorted perceptions of ‘disability.’ Firstly, it

explored Foucault’s theory of power and knowledge, which posits that an imbalance of

this binary system both creates and is reproduced by a discourse of difference. This

concept is further solidified by a cultural tendency to construct the image of an inferior

‘Other,’ which was reinforced particularly through Saïd’s interpretation of Orientalism in

105

the second section. Thirdly, this chapter critiqued the exclusive tendency of a capitalist

system to produce disposable populations within society. It argued that individuals

perceived to deviate intellectually from the norm in this competitive economic structure

are subject to extreme exploitation, subjugation, or dismissal from the sphere entirely.

Lastly, this chapter explored relevant feminist principles as a way of theorizing the

concept of ‘disability’ differently. This alternative conceptual model presented a unique

perspective that invoked an intersectional way of thinking about the social world, and

strengthened the notion that the stigma associated with ‘disability’ is a culturally

constructed identity rather than a biological fact. Although these four praxes may

contradict each other in theory, they all shared one important element in common: the

dominant discourse is highly influential over social and political thought. The second

chapter was thus an important way of illustrating the ways in which the origins of the

‘disability’ stigma are intangible, rather than an exertion of power from a singular,

oppressive entity. It is the consequence of a complex web of sociohistorical relationships

that has taken a multiplicity of forms, and reshaped over time.

The second chapter concluded that there are many layers of complex prejudices to

overcome. It moreover revealed is how the oppressive force of stigma is inherently

malleable. Therefore, although it cannot be destabilized, it can certainly be manipulated.

The final chapter thus undertook this challenge by exploring the ways in which linguistic

control can influence political and social thought within the dominant narrative.

Discursive practices can be used to transform what people believe to be ‘true’ in a highly

subjective social reality, and language is a very important instrument to both exert and

confront oppression. In order to challenge the stigma associated with the concept of

106

‘disability,’ it is important to understand how languages subconsciously inform social

thought of what should be considered ‘normal’ versus ‘abnormal.’ This chapter examined

the strategic ways in which linguistic tools can be harnessed as instruments of

manipulation. Although research drew on examples demonstrating the exertion of

linguistic power through the dominant discourse, there is no reason these strategies

cannot similarly be used by marginalized groups. Language is so deeply imbedded into

colloquial life, and there are endless creative and manipulative ways to compel certain

attitudes, values, and beliefs. This chapter argued that language is an instrument of social

and political thought that, if used correctly, can shift global perceptions of what it truly

means to live fully with a cognitive ‘disability.’

With conscious awareness and cultural unity, this thesis concludes that it is

possible to shift public perceptions in order to recognize the basic humanity in ‘disability.’

Individuals with intellectual exceptions may deviate from the established norms of

society, but should not be reduced to a sub-human identity signifying they are dependent

or lacking any valid opinions and emotions. Every human life has value, and this

unequivocal fact must be better represented in dominant social and political thought. The

concept of ‘disability’ is merely the representation of a dynamic and biased sociohistory

that reflect what people in power in a particular point in time believed to be the nature of

‘normalcy.’ Inequality is built into the system: into the history, into how people

understand social reality, and into the language. It embodies the very fabric of society,

and challenging the current stigma towards ‘disability’ communities is thus difficult to

achieve. However, disrupting the current discourse to perpetuate a more empathetic

philosophy is far less of a burden than the injustices faced by members of the disability

107

community in their daily lives. Social reality can be daunting in its ambiguity, but people

with diverse abilities share far more similarities than differences.

108

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