DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY AND HOPE, I

DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY A N D HOPE, I FRANCIS P. FIORENZA

Miinster-in- Westfalen, Germany

INTRODUCTION

Around 1844 David Friedrich Strauss composed the following epigram concerning the students of Hegel and of Schleiermacher. ‘1. Hegel: His system was more intelligent than he was; that is why his students have explained their master better than he understood himself. 2. Schleier- macher: He was more intelligent than his system; that is why his students, who lacked his spirit, made such a bad impression.’’ Although this witty statement may not be taken too seriously as an evaluative judgement or an historical explanation, its validity does merit some discussion. The epigram appears on the one hand to be confirmed by the enduring relevance and significance which Hegel’s philosophy has enjoyed on the German theological and philosophical scene through the influence of his students. On the other hand it appears to have been refuted not only by the radical criticism of Hegel’s students against the system itself, but also by their divergent explanations and conflicting interpretations of it. However, the relationships between Hegel and Schleiermacher, between Hegel and his students and between the students themselves merit serious consideration because they provide the background for the contemporary German theological discussion and shifts of position.

Although the present situation is more than a century removed from Hegel, the current theological debate can be seen no longer as a mere shift from a Bultmannian to a post-Bultmannian position: consisting only of a modification of some of Bultmann’s tenets and of a switch from the early to the later Heidegger,3 but must be seen in the light of the nineteenth- century debate between Hegel and Schleiermacher, and as a critical return

Quoted from M. Rbgnier, ‘Ambiguitb de la thbologie h6gblienne’, Archives de Philosophie (avril-juin, 1966), p. 188.

The expression ‘post-Bultmannian’ is an unfortunate slogan because the theologians so named do not really present an alternative to the Bultmannian position. Cf. the critique by E. Kgsemann, ‘Konsequente Traditionsgeschichte ?’, Zeitschrif f i r Tkeologie und Kirche, 62 (1965), p. 137; W. G. Kiimmel, ‘Jesusforschung s i t 1950’, Theologische Rundschau, 31 (1966), pp. 19-46; E. Dinkler ‘Einleitung in Rudolf Bultmann’, Exegetica (Tiibingen, 1967), p. xix.

Heidegger’s influence on Bultmann has been unfortunately exaggerated. Cf. W. Schmithals, Die Theologie RudolfBultmanns (Tiibingen, 1966), pp. 18-19; 0. Schnubbe, Der Existenzbegriff in der TheoIogie Rudorf Bultmam (Gottingen, 1959), pp. 9-69.

143

144 F R A N C I S P. F I O R E N Z A

to the problems of Hegel’s philosophy. The importance of the debate between Hegel and Schleiermacher lies in the formal similarity between Moltmann’s critique of Bultmann and Hegel’s critique of Schleiermacher despite the great differences between Schleiermacher and Bultmann. This return to the problems of Hegel’s philosophy, however, is no longer presented under the influence of his students to the right, but under that of those to the left, and especially Karl Marx. The present theological concern with Karl Marx is part of a general renewed interest in Marx, an interest well observed by Professor Sidney Hook when he wrote in The New York Times Book Review: ‘The intellectual historian of the future will be challenged by a strange phenomen of the latter half of the twentieth century-the second coming of Karl Marx. In the second coming he appears not in the dusty frock-coat of the economist, as the author of Capital, nor as a revolutionary sans-culotte, the inspired pamphleteer of the Communist Muni$esto. He comes robed as a philosopher and moral prophet with glad tidings about human freedom, valid beyond the narrow circles of class, party or faction. In his train flock not the industrial workers of the world but the literary intellectuals of the capital cities of the world, not the proletariat but elements of the professoriat, not the socially disinherited but the psychologically alienated, and a varied assortment of writers and artists, of idealistic young men and women in search of a cause.” Most surprising of all, however, is the emergence and influence of Karl Marx among contemporary Catholic and Protestant theologians. One is tempted to ask: How can Marx with his attack on Religion as being the result of social misery and as the opium of the p e ~ p l e , ~ be the source of a theological movement? How can his atheist dialectical materialism be of any positive use for theologians ? Why do these theologians substitute Marx for

Recent scholarship has proved that Hegel misunderstood the depth of Schleier- macher’s argumentation and identified it too easily with Romanticism. T. Rendtorff, Kirche und Theologie. Die systernatische Funktion des Kirchenbegriffs in der neueren Theologie (Giitersloh, 1966), pp. 63-167. This book presents a brilliant systematic attempt to rehabilitate Semler, Hegel and Schleiermacher in opposition to the over- critical presentations of dialectical theology. A review of Schleiermacher in English literature is presented by Richard R. Niebuhr in Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion (London, 1965).

May 22nd, 1966, p. 2. Cf. his historical treatment: From Hegel to Marx, Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx (Ann Arbor, 1962; earlier edition, 1950).

‘Das religiiise Elend ist in einem der Ausdruck des wirklichen Elends und in einem die Protestation gegen das wirkliche Elend. Die Religion ist der Seufzer der bedrhgten, das Gemiit einer herzlosen Welt, wie sie der Geist geistloser Zustiinde ist. Sie ist das Opium des Volkes’, ‘Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie’, MEGA, 1 Abt. Bd. I, 1 p. 607. Cf. G. Rohrmoser, ‘Die Religionskritik von Karl Marx im Blickpunkt der Hegelschen Religionsphilosophie’, Neue Zeitschrift fur systematische Theologie, 2 (1960), 44-66; Iring Fetscher, ‘Developments in the Marxist Critique of Religion’, Conciliurn, Vol. 6, no. 2 (June 1966), pp. 57-68.

DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY AND HOPE, I 145

Kierkegaard as their prophet, and exchange Sein undZeit of the early Martin Heidegger for the Paris Manuscripts of the early Marx?’ The answer to this seeming paradox can be found to no small measure in the person and philosophy of Ernst Bloch. His influence, at first limited to academic circles of philosophy and theology has now received its due popular and public recognition. The publishers at the International Book Fair in Frankfurt awarded Bloch the Peace Prize for 1967, which had previously been awarded to theologians such as Paul Tillich and Romano Guardini, and to philosophers, such as Karl Jaspers, Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel.2

This series of articles attempts to describe and to evaluate critically the influence of Bloch’s philosophy upon the present German theological scene.3 The central concern of the theologians influenced by Bloch is a new understanding of Christian eschatology. Jurgen Moltmann, noted for his studies on Cal~inism,~ ‘dialectical the~logy’,~ and on Dietrich Bonhoeffer: wrote his Theology of Hope’ as a counterpart to Bloch’s major work Dus Prinzip Hoffnung. Gerhard Sauter, whose interest in social and utopic problems is manifest in his dissertation, Die Theologie des Reiches Gottes beim alteren und jiingeren Blumhardt,’ has written for his ‘Habilitation’, Zgkunft und Verheissung: an extensive study of various philosophical and theological conceptions of eschatology. He develops his own position in open dialogue and in critical confrontation with Ernst Bloch’s philosophy. Wolf- Dieter Marsch has presented a popular exposition of Bloch’s philosophy in HofSen Worauf. Auseinandersetzung mit Ernst Blochl0 and, following the suggestion of Moltmann, has given historical support to the present interest in eschatology and society with his study on the early Hegel, Gegenwart Christi in der Gesellschaft. Eine Studie zu Hegels Dia1ektik.I Although this movement has its main representatives in Protestant circles, the influence of Bloch has extended to Catholic theologians as well,

Cf. N. Lobkowicz, ‘Karl Marx 1966. Ein grosser Denker und die Genesis einer Ideologie’, Wort und Wahrheit, XXXI, 67 (Juni-Juli, 1966), pp. 409-25.

Cf. A. Selzle, ‘Friedenspreis fiir einen streitbaren Marxisten’, Stimmen der Zeit, 180 (November, 1967), pp. 348-51.

The Festschrift for Ernst Bloch on the occasion of his 80th birthday is an indication of the strength of this influence. Seven of the twenty contributions were of a theological nature. Cf. Ernst BZoch zu ehren, edited by S . UnseId (Frankfurt, 1965).

His ‘Habilitation’ was ‘Christoph Pezel(1539-1604) und der Calvinismus in Bremen’ (Gottingen, 1957); Priidestination und Perseveranz (1959).

He edited two volumes of the early writings and documents of the ‘dialectical theology’: Anfinge der dialektischen Theologie TI. 1. 2. Theologische Biicherei, 17 (Miinchen, 1962, 1963).

Herrschajl Christi und soziale Wirklichkeit nach Dietrich Bonhoefer: Theologische Existenz Heute 71 (Miinchen, 1959).

Trans. by James W. Leitch (London, 1967). (Zurich, 1965). = Forschungen zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus xxxi (Miinchen, 1965).

8 (Ziirich, 1962). lo = Studienbucher 27 (Hamburg, 1963).

146 FRANCIS P. FIORENZA

Ladislaus Boros has called attention to the positive value of Bloch’s philosophy and to certain similarities with Blondel’s position.’ His own position, however, has remained closer to Teilhard de Chardin than to Bloch. A systematic attempt in Catholic theology to make use of Bloch’s categories has been initiated by Johannes Metz in his various articles. Metz’s encounter with Ernst Bloch has led him to criticize the transcendental theology of his teacher, Karl Rahner, and to formulate his own position as being a ‘political theology’.’

Our treatment of this contemporary theological movement will concentrate especially on Jiirgen Moltmann’s Theology of Hope. This book has not only given the major impulse to the recognition of Bloch’s philosophy, but has also been the central object of the discussions of this re~ognition.~ We will proceed as follows: First we shall seek a proper perspective for the presentation and evaluation of this movement by relat- ing it not only to the previous theological currents of the twentieth century, but also to the theological and philosophical controversies of the nineteenth century. The opposition between Hegel’s philosophy of religion and the ‘dialectical theology’ provides a contrasting background in which the acceptance of Bloch‘s philosophy can be located. The differences between Moltmann’s position on the one hand and Hegel’s philosophy and the ‘dialectical theology’ on the other provide the horizon for his critical acceptance of elements of Bloch’s philosophy. This horizon lies in Molt- mann’s equivocal reaction to Hegel’s philosophy. Although Moltmann employs Hegel’s critique of the prevailing philosophy and theology of his day to point out the inadequacies of the transcendental and existential theology which developed out of ‘dialectical theology’, he is critical of Hegel’s own position as a closed speculative synthesis. However, in his critique of Hegel, he does not follow Kierkegaard but rather Marx. Molt- mann borrows the Marxist dialectic as interpreted and understood by Ernst Bloch. This dialectic which he develops both in dependence on, and in criticism of, Hegel, is the underlying and driving force of the Theology of Hope. Secondly: against this background the main principles and basic categories of Bloch‘s philosophy will be discussed. Thirdly: since the major problem of any theological dialogue with Bloch’s philosophy is the relationship between his conception of Transcendence (the problem of his ‘atheism’) and his understanding of eschatology, our treatment will

‘Begriffene Hoffnung’, Orientierung, 25 (1961), 4C-4. Cf. Philosophy Today, X (winter, 1966). This issue contains a collection of Metz’s

articles, a selected bibliography of his writings and an introductory essay on his thought. Cf. Diskussion uber die ‘Theologie der Hoffnung’, edited by W. D. Marsch. This book

contains 13 major reviews or articles on Moltmann’s book as well as an introduction by Marsch and a reply by Moltmann.

DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY A N D HOPE, I 147

discuss this relationship and both the positive theological use of Bloch’s conception of eschatology and the important differences between Bloch and the theologians in regard to both Transcendence and eschatology. Fourthly: a critique of some of the basic and common presuppositions of this theological movement will be presented.

GENERAL B A C K G R O U N D

A survey of the philosophy and theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reveals sharp differences between Hegel’s philosophy of religion and ‘dialectical theology’ both in its early stages and in its development into the separate positions of Barth and Bultmann. These differences are not lessened by their apparent agreement in the analysis of the modern world. Both agree that man’s state in modern society is alienated or estranged. Both are aware of an ‘absence of God’ in the dynamics of society. But their understanding and interpretation of man’s alienated situation differ so greatly that their attempts to overcome this alienation and to perceive the presence of God stand in opposition to one another. ‘Dialectical theology’ has therefore criticized Hegelian philosophy radically. And Hegel’s critique of the transcendental philosophy and theology of his day does present in some aspects an anticipatory critique of dialectical theology. The opposition between the early ‘dialectical theology’ and Hegel’s philosophy of religion has been described by Ernst Bloch thus : ‘There is at present an authoritarian Protestant theoIogy, which has originated in Germany and has found wide acceptance ; it has been represented especially forcefully by Karl Barth. This theology is the furthest removed from Hegel’s position, since Barth posits the absolute theonomous, the Word of God, which absolutely negates the spirit of man, against all humanizing of the faith, against all movements of “speech and thinking” of the creature. (Whereas it is indeed not clear, as Maritain has bitingly remarked, if this negating word is actually the word of Barth or the Word of God.) Hegel stands in opposition to Barth’s position in the same manner that he rejected all pious irrationalism’.’ Although Bloch’s criticism is e~aggerated,~

G. Huntemann, Die dialektische Theologie und der spekulative Idealismus Hegels, theol. Diss. (Berne, 1957). Huntemann argues that ‘dialectical theology’ was so influenced by criticism of Hegel in the second half of the nineteenth century, that there was no chance of a confrontation with the genuine philosophy of Hegel.

Subjekt-Objekt. Erlauterungen zu Hegel. Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 8. (Frankfurt, 1962; second edition), p. 316.

Despite his severe criticism of Hegel Karl Barth writes: ‘Zweifellos: die Theologie konnte und kann auch bei Hegel etwas lernen. Es sieht so aus, als ob sie hier etwas versitumt habe, und sie hat jedenfalls keinen Anlass, einer vielleicht bevorstehenden Hegel-Renaissance angstlich und abwehrend gegenuberzustehen’, Die protestantische

148 FRANCIS P. FIORENZA

it does indicate the radical opposition between ‘dialectical theology’ and Hegel’s philosophy. This opposition is so great that any attempted middle position would seem to be either a simple compromise or an arbitrary eclecticism which really sacrifices the main principles of one position or the other, or those of both. Since any new theological programme is con- fronted with these alternatives, the question necessarily arises : Where does the present theological movement as exemplified in Moltmann’s Theology of Hope stand? How has he fulfilled his task? On the one hand G. Sauter, H. G. Geyer, K. Barth, W. Kreck, etc., criticize Moltmann for falling too often from the heights of ‘dialectical theology’ into the depths of an anthropological, historical and sociological phenomenology of hope. On the other hand W. D. Marsch, W. Pannenberg and D. Sblle complain that Moltmann has hypostatized God’s word of promise too much and has not given sufficient attention to the worldly future of man.’ These critical characterizations of Moltmann’s position stand, however, in contrast with the explicit intention of the proponents for a theological acceptance of Bloch’s philosophy. Metz argues : ‘the commonly made opposition between an orientation to Transcendence and one to the future, between promise and historical imperative, between expectation and struggle, and between a Christian hope in the final eschatology and an operative forma- tion of the world, is false’.’ Moltmann maintains that the progress of the history of theology should not be understood as a mere swinging between recognizedpositions in the attempt to avoid the one-sidedness and absolute- ness of any of them. Such a view would consider the ‘all-sided’ middle as the ideal position. But this procedure would absolutize the past of theology, by stressing the best of the past and offering in reality no new position or higher viewpoint to overcome the alternatives of the past.3 The TheoZogy of Hope is therefore Moltmann’s attempt to take seriously the double task of every theologian: to be faithful to the biblical revelation and to correlate meaningfully this revelation to man’s present situation in the world. Moltmann has therefore sought to correlate the results of recent biblical

Cf. Jiirgen Moltmann, ‘Antwort auf die Kritik der Theologie der Hoffnung’ in Diskussion iiber ‘Theologie der Hoffnung’, op. cit., pp. 205-6. The articles of most of the listed authors are in this collection of essays.

‘Die Verantwortung der christlichen Gemeinde fur die Planung der Zukunft’, in Die neue Gemeinde, edited by A. Exeler (Mainz, 1967) p. 255.

‘Antwort auf die Kritik der Theologie der Hoffnung’, op. cit., pp. 208-9.

Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert (Zurich, 1946, third edition, 1960), p. 374. However, he continues : ‘Sie konnte dann die Augen vielleicht fur das hiichst Positive, theologisch mindestens indirekt Bedeutsame dieser Philosophie etwas besser auftun als das erste Ma1 und dann vielleicht auch etwas gewappneter sein, ihren unleugbaren Gefahren und Versuchungen eben deshalb besser zu entgehen, als dies das erste Ma1 geschehen ist’, loc. cit.


scholarship on the nature of eschatology with man’s prevailing interest in the future, an interest indicated by the current philosophical approaches to eschatology and by the science of futurology with its planning, prognosis and projections of the future.’ To achieve this task Moltmann uses the ‘Hegel-Marx-Dialectic” as understood by Ernst Bloch, but he does so with some reservations. Moltmann hopes with these thought categories not only to achieve a new systematic position relevant for contemporary man, but also to overcome the antitheses of previous theological position^.^ Has Moltmann succeeded on both these counts ? Has he successfully integrated biblical eschatology and human experience ? Has his theological programme avoided the aporia of the opposition between the ‘dialectical theology’ and Hegel’s philosophy? We do not attempt here to answer the first question, but to discuss whether or not Moltmann has sufficiently overcome the inadequacies of the ‘dialectical theology’ which he himself has criticized. Our last article will try to make clear to what extent he shares the basic presuppositions and weakness of ‘dialectical theology’ despite his attempt to overcome the clear-cut opposition between ‘dialectical theology’ and Hegelian philosophy and despite his use of Hegel’s critique of the transcendental philosophy to criticize Barth and Bultmann. However, it is first necessary to see how Moltmann attempts to overcome this opposition and why he makes use of Bloch’s philosophy for such an attempt. As a general background the following points deserve discussion : (1) the context, position and consequences of ‘dialectical theology’; (2) the context and significance of Hegel’s critique of transcendental philosophy and theology which enables it to be used by Moltmann for his criticism of the transcendental theology of our day; (3) Marx’s critique of Hegel which provides the immediate background of Ernst Bloch’s philosophy and the indirect source of the Theology of Hope.

THE PROTEST OF ‘DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY’

The title ‘dialectical theology’, as well as that of ‘theology of crisis’ or ‘theology of paradox’, refers to a theological movement which began in Germany at the end of World War I4 and was to no small extent influenced

‘Hoffnung und Planung’ in Modelle der Gesellschaft von Morgen, edited by Paul Rieger = Evangelisches Forum 6 (Gottingen, 1966) pp. 67-87.

a ‘Gottesoffenbarung und Wahrheitsfrage’ in Parrhesia. Karl Barth zum 80 Geburt- stag (Ziirich, 1966), 149-72; Moltmann writes: ‘Die Riickfiihrung des an Kierkegaard orientierten Paradoxbegriffs auf die umfassendere Dialektik von Hegel und Marx.. . . Eben dieses ist die Absicht der “Theologie der Hoffnung” ’, p. 171, footnote 43.

‘Antwort auf die Kritik der Theologie der Hoffnung’, op. cit., pp. 201-9. Cf. Anfange der diulektischen Theologie, op. cit. ; W. Pannenberg ‘Dialektische

Theologie’, RGG3, Bd. 2, col. 168-74.

150 FRANCIS P. PIORENZA

by the catastrophes and effects of the war.’ This movement was basically a protest against the idealistic and neo-Protestant attempt to reconcile revelation and reason and to integrate Church and culture. It emphasized the ‘Jenseitigkeit’ and Transcendence of God and the absolute sovereignty of His revelation over and against the experience and thinking of man as expressed in man’s philosophy, culture and religion. Although this protest of ‘dialectical theology’ was carried on by the Protestant theologians who collaborated in the journal Zwischen den Zeiten from 1923 to 1933; its motives and interests were shared by Cath~l ic ,~ Orthodox4 and Jewish theologians’ as well. The parallelism is so striking that one author has labelled this criticism of Idealism ‘an ecumenical event of the highest order’.6 The extent and significance of this protest cannot be under- estimated; it would be false to consider it as no more than a theoretical and theological critique of nineteenth-century German idealism and liberal theology. K. Scholder remarks that this protest is not merely the rejection of a previous theological tradition: ‘It is certainly that. But it is very much more too. It is the rejection of the nineteenth century in general and of all its tradition: it is the proclamation of a judgement over a past that is now dead, empty and meaningless.” The spirit of ‘dialectical theology’ is therefore not just limited to theological areas, but extends to various fields of thought and to many aspects of man’s life. ‘Dialectical theology’ falls within the general context of a reaction against the ideas of the Enlighten- ment and the liberal spirit of the modern age. For example, Friedrich Gogarten’s protest against liberal theology finds its parallel in Carl

Moltmann maintains in his introduction: ‘Die “dialektische Theologie” stammt nicht aus der Krisenstimmung jener turbulenten Jahre’, p. x (cf. p. 145 n. 5). The church historian Klaus Scholder argues against Moltmann’s attempt to minimize or reduce the influence on this movement of the crisis situation after World War I. Cf. K. Scholder, ‘Neuere deutsche Geschichte und protestantische Theologie’, Evangelische Theologie, 23 (1963), 510-36: ‘Moltmanns Feststellung . . . diirfte in dieser Kiirze dem vielschich- tigen Problem kaum gerecht werden. Oder sollten die zahllosen Beziige auf die grosse Krisis, die sich in fast allen Beitragen mehr oder minder nachdriicklich und ausge- sprochen linden, wirklich nur interessante Arabeske sin?’ p. 511.

’ F. Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitaten, Pneumatologische Fragmente (1921). Ebner writes that idealism is ‘wahrhaftig die auszehrende Krankheit des Geistes’, p. 114.

Cf. Anfinge der dialektisrhen Theologie, op. cit.

L. Schestow, Potestas Clavium (dt. 1926). F. Rosennveig, Der Stern der Erlosung (1921, second edition, 1930). Cf. K. Lowith,

‘M. Heidegger und F. Rosenzweig. Ein Nachtrag zu ‘‘%in und &it” ’, Gesamrnelte Abhandlungen. Zur Kritik der geschichtlichen Existenz (Stuttgart, 1960)’ pp. 68-93. Cf. M. Buber, Zch und Du (1923).

0. Marquard, ‘Idealismus und Theodizee’, Philosophisches Juhrbuch, 73, 1 (1965), p. 33.

‘Op. cit., p. 517. Cf. C. Krockow, Die Entscheidung. Eine Untersuchung uber E. Junger, C. Srhmitt und M. Weidegger (Stuttgart, 1958).


Schmitt’s critique of the liberal political theories and government of the nineteenth century and of Martin Heidegger’s attempted destruction of traditional metaphysics. These three examples are judged by Karl Lbwith to be an expression of the decisionism in the philosophy and theology of the time.’ Characteristic of their pessimistic spirit is the title which 0. Spengler gave to his morphology of world history: The Decline of the West.= However, one does not do justice to ‘dialectical theology’, if one con- siders it only as a result of the negative and pessimistic spirit in Germany after World War I. As every negation presupposes a position, the negative in ‘dialectical theology’ presupposes a positive insight into Chri~tianity.~ ‘Dialectical theology’ should therefore be analysed in regard to (a) the immediate theological context and impulses stimulating its radical critique : (b) the positive systematic position which it offered and (c) the consequences of this position.

ESCHATOLOGY A N D TRANSCENDENCE

(a) Two of the events or discoveries of theological scholarship, which led to ‘dialectical theology’ and form the immediate background for its affirmation of the diastasis between God and men, are of interest here. The first event is the publication by Johannes Weiss in 1892 of Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche G ~ t t e s . ~ Weiss locates Jesus in the late Jewish apocalyptic with its expectation of the imminent end of the world. The preaching of Jesus is therefore centred not primarily on morality, but on the transcendence and future coming of the Kingdom of God. A new image of Jesus is presented: he is not a moral teacher like Socrates or Kant, but an apocalyptic preacher. This new viewpoint received further support from Albert Schweitzer in his book Von Reimarus zu Wrede. Die Geschichte der

K. Lowith, ‘Der Okkasionelle Dezisionismus von C. Schmitt’ in Gesammelte Abhandlungen, op. cit., pp. 93-126. Lowith does not only discuss C. Schmitt, he also treats of Gogarten, Heidegger and Bultmann. For Gogarten cf. Th. Strohm, Konservaiive politische Romantik in den Friihschrifren Gogartens. Diss. (Berlin, 1960).

Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte, 2 Bde. (Miinchen, 1923).

Cf. P. Tillich, Der Protestantismus als Kritik und Gestaltung. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. VII (Stuttgart, 1961). This collection of his early essays contains two critical articles on ‘dialectical theology’. ‘Kritisches und positives Paradox’: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Karl Barth und Friedrich Gogarten’, pp. 216-25; ‘Was ist falsch in der “dialektischen” Theologie?’, pp. 247-62. Tillich stresses the necessity of a position as well as a negation. He accuses ‘dialectical theology’ of being too ‘undialectical’. It says ‘no’, instead of saying ‘yes and no’.

Reprint of second edition (= Gottingen, 1964); edited by F. Hahn; introduced by R. Bultmann.

152 F R A N C I S P . F I O R E N Z A

Leben-Jesu-Forschung (1906)‘ and has led to the school of ‘consistent’ eschatology. The second event is the publication in 1917 of Rudolf Otto’s Das Heilige.’ Otto defines ‘das Heilige’ as a singular and a priori category which is not to be equated with absolute goodness, but with the ‘numinous’ as a ‘mysterium tremendum’ that transcends the ethical and rational spheres. ‘Dialectical theology’ drew the consequences of these two insights by emphasizing the absolute transcendence of God in relation to man and by stressing the opposition between a biblical eschatology and an immanent worldly eschatology. The attempts of liberal theology to correlate God and man and to associate the promised eschatological future with the future that could be achieved by man’s education and development were rejected. The liberal theologians were accused of emphasizing man too much and of neglecting God, the true object of theology. Bultmann writes: ‘The object of theology is God and the objection to the liberal theology is that it treated not of God, but of man. God means the radical negation and cancellation of man ; theology, whose object is God, can therefore have only the word of the cross for its content, but this content is a scandal for man.’3 This objection is interesting because Moltmann accuses Bultmann of the same; he speaks too much of man, rather than of God’s revealed promise. However, what is surprising above all is that he illustrates his critique by reference to Hegel’s criticism of transcendental philosophy, which knew so much about human things, but nothing of God. In other words, Moltmann’s critique of Bultmann has a formal similarity with the Hegelian critique of both the romantic and the transcendental phi lo sop hie^.^ This critique, however, is applied by Moltmann not to renew Hegel’s philosophy, but to underline all the more those very insights which led to ‘dialectical theology’ : the transcendence of God and the importance of eschatology. The apparent parallelism of these criticisms does not therefore lessen in any way the radically different approaches of ‘dialectical theology’ and Hegelian philosophy.

English Translation = The Quest of the Historical Jesus. A Critical Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede, trans. by W . Montgomery (New York, 1966, fourth printing). The translation was made in 191 1, i.e. of the fist German edition.

EnglishTranslation = TheIdeaof the Holy, trans. by John W. Harvey (Oxford, 1923). For the differences between ‘dialectical theology’ and Otto, cf. W. Pannenberg, ‘Dialek- tische Theologie’, op. cit. col. 170.

‘Die liberale Theologie und die jiingste theologische Bewegung’, Glauben und Verstehen (Tubingen, 1933), p. 2.

Theology of Hope, op. cit., pp. 45-59. Cf. Hegel, Glauben und Wissen (1802; edited by G. Lasson, reprint Hamburg, 1962): ‘Da der feste Standpunkt, den die allmachtige Zeit und ihre Kultur fur die Philosophie fixiert haben, eine mit Sinnlichkeit affizierte Vernunft ist, so ist das, worauf solche Philosophie ausgehen kann, nicht, Gott zuerkennen, sondern, was man heisst, den Menschen’, p. 11.


THE W O R D OF G O D

(b) ‘Dialectical theology’ seeks to overcome the alleged neglect of God’s transcendence in liberal theology by stressing the transcendence of God’s Word in the scriptures and by appealing for a return to the unique, biblical, Word of God. This appeal for a direct encounter with the Word of God in the scriptures is an authentically Christian imperative. But it can be somewhat of a ‘reactionary’ tendency, if the absolute transcendence of God’s Word in the scriptures is so strongly stressed that the significance of man’s historically developing understanding of God’s Word is not sufficiently taken into acc0unt.l Such an appeal can become fundamentalist, if one maintains that there is a proto-history ( Urgeschichte)2 of God’s Word revealed in the scriptures, but no other or later history of God’s word, so that Christianity would be reduced to biblical Christianity, whose written word would stand in absolute judgement over present Christianity.’ This authentically Christian appeal is therefore not only positive, but can be negative. Whereas the centralization of God’s revelation in ‘dialectical theology’ is scarcely open to criticism, its specific understanding of this revelation opposes much of the previous theological tradition. ‘Dialectical theology’ accentuates the transcendence of God’s Word so much that every authentic developing history of this Word is e~c luded .~ God’s Word and man’s history are so conceived in terms of the relationship between eternity and time that God’s Word does not really enter man’s history, but just ‘touches’ i t 5 The relation of God’s revelation to all human history is that of immediacy. God’s revelation is practically located in the past, but it is made present by its actualization or repetition in preaching. The theoretical implications of this understanding

Cf. M. Fischer, Christlicher Glaube und Geschichte. Voraussetzungen und Folgen der Theologie Friedrich Gogartens (Giitersloh, 1967), p. 73 : ‘Die Betonung der absoluten Tranzendenz Gottes hebt den Gedanken einer geschichtlichen Offenbarung auf.’

Cf. E. Jiingel, Gottes Sein ist im Werden (Tubingen, 1965), pp. 87-8 for a discussion of the central importance of proto-history for Barth‘s theology. Jiingel refers to the various texts and to the development of Barth’s varied use of this term especially in regard to his abandonment and then his renewal of it.

Cf. critique of G. Gloege, ‘Zur Versohnungslehre Karl Barths’ in Heilsgeschichte und Welt, Bd. I (Gottingen, 1965), pp. 133-73, esp. pp. 162-5.

J. Ratzinger, Das Problem der Dogmeweschichte in der Sicht der katholischen Theo- Zogie (Koln, 1966, pp. 10-15). discusses the extent to which the history of dogma is understood by the majority of Protestant theologians as a history of decay. On this point there is a certain continuity between ‘dialectical theology’ and nineteenth-century theologians such as Ritschl and Harnack. Our stress on the discontinuity between nineteenth- and twentiethcentury theological positions would have to be balanced by a treatment of the differences between the positive and speculative liberal theologies. ‘Dialectical theology’ stands in opposition to both, but more so to the latter.

Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 171.

B

154 F R A N C I S P . FIORENZA

of revelation would amount to a practical identification or assimilation of historical and systematic theology.’ The criterion of the truth of a theological statement would be neither human reason and history, nor extra-biblical experience of reality, but solely reflection on the past biblical word and present experience of this Word of God as judgement or as grace. Systematic theology, then, would be principally orientated towards the past and would be the re-actualization, repetition or re-presentation of the ‘totally other’ and singular biblical revelation.2

B A R T H A N D B U L T M A N N

(c) The consequences and development of this movement reveal its inner dialectic. ‘Dialectical theology’, unable to maintain the vigour of its original critical impulse, split up in 1933 and developed in various conflicting directions. This development, however, is open to two different interpretations. On the one hand the original affirmation of the absolute diastasis between God and world appears to have been aband~ned .~ But on the other hand the ensuing development indicates in many respects not an abandonment but a more consistent explication of the original po~ i t ion .~ This contrast exemplifies the problematic and the consequence of any affirmation of a radical diastasis between God and world. The first interpretation of this development as abandonment is seen in Barth’s early criticism of Bultmann, Brunner, Gogarten, etc. Bultmann’s ‘existential

Cf. P. Hefner, Faith and the Vitalities of History (New York, 1966), chap. 5, pp. 153-85. ‘The current retreat from the vitalities of history’ presents a critique of Ebeling on this point.

K. Barth, Romerbrief. Vorwort (2. Auflage, 1921). His contrast between Calvin and Julicher indicates his lack of understanding for the historical difference between the text of the bible and the present reader. Calvin’s method is praised because it removes this distance (‘bis die Mauer zwischen dem 1. und 16. Jahrhundert transparent wird, bis Paulus dort redet und der Mensch des 16. Jahrhunderts hier hort . . .’ p. xi). Julicher is criticized because he exaggerates and maintains this difference (‘wie schnell ist er bereit, dieses und jenes durch forschendes Uberlegen des Sinnes kaum beruhrte exegetische Rohmaterial als singullre Ansicht und Lehre des Paulus hinzustellen . . .’ p. xii). For a more favourable presentation of Barth cf. Friedrich Schmid, Verkiindigung und Dogmatik in der Theologie Karl Barths. Hermeneutik und Ontologie in einer Theologie des Wortes Gottes (Munchen, 1964). He indicates that Barth’s later position in his Dogmatics is a consistent development of his early position.

Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 173: ‘So ist der ursprungliche Ansatz der d. Th. bei keinem ihrer Reprasentanten erhalten geblieben.’

Rendtorff, op. cit., p, 173: ‘Denn die grosse Absage der Anfangszeit ist tiefer in die Entfaltung der Ansiitze der dialektischen Theologie eingedrungen und in ihr festgemacht, als dies an der anflnglichen expliziten Polemik, wie sie vor allem Barth geiibt hat, abgelesen werden konnte.’

Cf. K. Barth, ‘Abschied von “Zwischen den Zeiten” ’, in Zwischen den Zeiten, 11 (1933), pp. 536-44; ‘Rudolf Bultmann: Ein Versuch, ihn zu verstehen, Christus und Adam nach Rom 5’ (Zurich, 1952).


theology’ is rebuked for negating the otherness of God’s Word and for reducing revelation to a new self-understanding of man. However, Barth’s own construction of an ecclesial and christocentric dogmatic can also appear as an abandonment of the absolute diastasis between God and man.’ According to the second interpretation, however, the development of ‘dialectical theology’ exhibits a radicalization of the original insight not only by Barth but also by Bultmann. Barth executes this radicalization of his early affirmation of the otherness of God by means of the distinction between God’s Word and God’s Being,2 so that the return to the Holy Scriptures is now referred further back to the proto-history of God’s trinitarian self-revelation3 The otherness of God’s revelation is thereby further stressed. The ‘either-or’ of the original position demanding no bridge between God and man, except that ‘bridge’ which God himself is, finds its continuation in the hermeneutical relevance of the Church in Barth’s Dogmatics. The Church is conceived so strictly in terms of its orientation to God’s revelation, and to Christ as its centre, that the ‘otherness of God’ is, on a different level, expressed as the ‘otherness of the Church’ in relation to the world. The point of encounter with God’s revelation is consequently not the history of this revelation4 but the preaching of the Church. Theology is not conceived as the strict historical science of liberal theology, but as an ecclesial discipline. The construction of a Church Dogmatics may therefore appear as an abandonment of the original position, but it is in reality a continuation of the original position with its emphasis on the transcendence of God and the ‘otherness’ of his revelation in relation to human h i~ to ry .~ This continuation is, however, not achieved by Barth alone ; for the development of an existential theology by Bultmann does not involve a sacrifice of the original insight of ‘dialectical

’ Cf. V. A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (New York, 1966), pp. 153-9. Harvey explains briefly the inconsistency and ambiguity of Barth’s position. Barth is aware of changes in his thought, but maintains his basic consistency. Cf. Die Menschllch- keit Gottes = Theologische Studien 48 (Ziirich, 1956). H. Zahmt, Die Sache mit Gott. Die Protestantische Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert (Miinchen, 1966), p. 108: ‘Barths Eifer fiir die Gottheit Gottes ist geblieben, aber aus dem Eifer des Propheten ist der Eifer eines Evangelisten geworden.’

Cf. the distinction between the ‘primaen Gegensttindlichkeit’ und ‘sekundgren Gegensttindlichkeit Gottes’, Kirchliche Dogmatik, II/l, p. 15 passim.

K. Barth, Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf, Bd. I; Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes (1927), p. 43: ‘ruckwarts in den mehr als historischen Raum der Urgeschichte’. The Trinity has for Barth the same function as Bultmann’s de-mythologizing. Cf. Jiingel, op. cit., p. 33.

K. Barth, Die Theologie unddie Kirche (Ziirich, 1928) p, 310: ‘Wer Geschichte sagt, sagt eben damit Nicht-Offenbarung.’

Rendtorff, op. cit., pp. 169-217: ‘Das Offenbmgsproblem im Kirchenbegriff‘ in Offenbarung ah Geschichte (Gottingen, 1963, second edition), pp. 115-31.

156 F R A N C I S P . FIORENZA

theology’, despite the criticism of Barth and his followers to the contrary.’ Although Bultmann’s stress on the anthropological relation of God’s revelation is in opposition to Barth‘s position,’ it does not imply a com- plete dissolution of theological statements into anthropological statements. Bultmann has not forgotten the diastasis between God and man, but has affirmed it by means of the distinction between ‘Historie’ and ‘Geschichte’. The truth of revelation is not in ‘Historie’, but in ‘Ge~chichte’.~ Revelation is not grounded in the historical Jesus, but is expressed in the faith and kerygma of the primitive Christian community. This revelation is made actual for the present generation not through historical development or traditions, but through the preaching of the Word in the concrete situation.

R E A S O N AND/OR REVELATION?

Despite the opposition between Barth and Bultmann, a continuation and development of the original affirmation of the diastasis between God and man can be recognized in both. The transcendent sovereignty and ‘otherness’ of God’s revelation is radicalized by Barth’s emphasis on revelation as inne~trinitarian,~ and is maintained by Bultmann’s distinction between ‘Historie’ and ‘Geschichte’ and his understanding of the ‘kerygma’s

Cf. p. 154 n. 5. Note also K. Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, II1/2, 531-7. C. Hartlich and W. Sachs, ‘Kritische Priifung der Haupteinwgnde Barths gegen Bultmann’ in Kerygma und Mythos, 11, hrsg. H. W. Bartsch (Hamburg, 1952), pp. 113-25.

The main difference: whereas Barth emphasizes the ‘ontological’ possibility of revelation, namely, the freedom of God in his revelation and the inner-trinitarian possiblity of God’s revelation, Bultmann stresses the epistemological problem of man’s knowledge of God‘s revelation. Bultmann asks: What sense does it make to speak of God? Barth asks: In what sense must one speak of God, if the discourse is truly about God?

Bultmann’s affirmation of the paradoxical identity of historical and eschatological events enables him to ward off attacks from both the left and the right.

C. H. Ratschow, Gott existiert. Eine dogmatische Studie (Berlin, 1966, pp. 63 ff.) sees a radical change in Barth’s position in regard to natural theology and the evaluation of non-biblical truth. As others have done, he refers to Kirchliche Dogmatik, IV, 3, 122-88. Cf. the recent rebuttal by Jiingel, op. cit.. pp. 21-2. (Note: this explicit rebuttal is only in the second edition 119661). Cf. Jiingel’s earlier and more extensive treatment, ‘Die Moglichkeit theologischer Anthropologie auf dem Grunde der Analogie. Eine Untersuchung zum Analogieverstiindnis Karl Barths’, Evangelische Theologie, 22 (1962), 535-7; L. Steiger, Die Hermeneutik als dogmatisches Problem (Gutersloh, 1961), 53-79, who carefully analyses the continuation of Barth’s original position. His interpretation of Bultmann is unsatisfactory in so far as he sees an abandonment of the original position by Bultmann, who according to Steiger’s interpretation niakes human existence the criterion of the truth of revelation. Cf., however, Schmithals, op. cit., pp. 251-3.


relation to man’s self-understanding. Although Barth and Bultmann differ in their understanding of the objectivity of revelation, they agree that historical science cannot arrive at revelation because revelation transcends history. The communication and mediation of revelation to man does not occur through history as grasped by man’s historical sciences, but through the concrete preaching of God’s Word. The transcendence of revelation may be preserved by this actualistic understanding of revelation,2 but what are its consequences? Does it not tend to with- draw revelation from the objective historical world of man’s knowledge and confine it to the personal subjectivity of the believer or to the religious self- understanding of the Church? Does it not involve a dualism between scientific, historical knowledge and the Christian faith, which renews the problematic of the past century in regard to the relation of knowledge and faith, when they were placed in radical opposition to each other? Does not this dualism of reason and revelation lead to the increasing irrelevance of such a theology of revelation for man’s scientific knowledge of reality and for his planned social actions?

The problematic of this dualism was the central concern of Hegel and his critique of the philosophies and theologies of his day. He develops his concept of dialectic, which underlies his whole philosophical system, not from purely speculative or esoteric motives, but because of his critical confrontation with the religious and political situation of his times. His early writings concentrate on the split of man into a believing and a knowing person and at the same time into his departmentalization as both a private individual and a citizen of the state.3 His later lectures in Berlin attack the theoretical atheism not only of contemporary theologians and philosophers, but also of society and the state.4 Hegel’s critical description of his times remind us of Bultmann’s later critique of liberal theology. ‘There was a time when all science was a science of God; our age, however, has the distinction of knowing about each and every thing, and about an infinite number of objects, but knowing nothing about God alone.”

Cf. Rendtorff, Kirche und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 201-7. Rendtorff stresses how Buitmann’s conception of the Church is relevant for BuItmann’s understanding of her- meneutics. The Church has a double function: ‘die Grenze zur Welt der Vorfindlichkeit zu ziehen, weil der Offenbarungsbegriff solchen Schutzes bediirftig ist, und die Offen- barungserkenntnis selbst als je gegenwiirtige, aktuale begreifen zu lassen’, p. 207.

Cf. R. Bultmann, ‘Anknupfung und Widerspruch’, Gfuuben und Verstehen 11, (Tubingen, 1952), pp. 117-32.

L. Landgrebe, ‘Das Problem der Dialektik‘, Marxismus-Studien, 111, edited by I. Fetscher (Tiibingen, 1960), p. 15 ff. ‘ Hegel, Grundfinien der Philosophie des Rechts (edited by J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg, 1955). p. 7.

Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Religion (edited by G. Lasson = 1925; Hamburg, 1966, reprint), p. 5.

158 FRANCIS P . FIORENZA

Despite the similarity of the descriptions, the reactions of Hegel and of ‘dialectical theology’ to the challenge of the times are quite different. Whereas Hegel attempts through his philosophy to overcome the false (according to Hegel) opposition between knowledge and faith, and between science (in the broad sense) and the knowledge of God, ‘dialectical theology’ understands this opposition as an expression of the authentic character of the Christian faith in God.

‘GOD IS DEAD’: NIETZSCHE A N D HEGEL

A comparison of their understanding of and their reaction to the expression ‘God is Dead’, illustrates the radical difference between Hegel’s philosophy of religion and ‘dialectical theology’. The significance of this phrase for ‘dialectical theology’ is usually based on Nietzsche’s interpretation of it, but this is the very opposite of his intention.’ ‘Dialectical theology’ maintains that the modern age is radically atheistic, but this atheism is not a mere human possibility, but has become possible only as a result of Christianity and in regard to the presuppositions of the Christian faith, Only where God is so radically affirmed, only where he is so radically believed as the transcendent God, can he be so radically denied. In this perspective atheism receives somewhat of a positive significance inasmuch as the present age of nihilism provides the most fitting ground for the acceptance of the Christian message. The faith of the individual is seen in its total authentic otherness to the nihilism of the world.2 This understanding and reaction of ‘dialectical theology’ results in the subjectivization and privatization of the Christian faith. Giinther Rohrmoser has described this reaction of ‘dialectical theology’ quite well :

The acknowledgement of the dominion of atheism in the social reality corres- ponds to the present tendency-which is coming to a crisis-to subjectivize totally the contents of the Christian faith. Whether the faith is defined as dialectical with Barth, as existential with Bultmann or as interpersonal with Braun or otherwise, all these forms of a modern, implicitly atheistic theology have the tendency to reduce the faith to the confines of subjectivity. . . . The being of the world and of historical reality is accepted as godless, and God is so different as to be qualitatively infinitely removed from this reality, as with Barth in the Preface to his Commentary on Romans in 1920. The making actual of a

Cf. G. Ebeling, ‘Die Botschaft von Gott an das Zeitalter des Atheismus’, Monutschr#it fir Pastoralfheologie, 52 (1963), pp. 8-24; K. E. Lsgstrup, ‘The Doctrines of God and Man in the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann’ in The Theology of RudolfBultmann, edited by Charles W. Kegley (London, 1966), pp. 83-103. Cf. Bultmann’s answer in the same book pp. 268-71. V. A. Harvey ‘Die Gottesfrage in der amerikanischen Theologie der Gegenwart’, Zeitschrifr fur Theologie und Kirche, 64,3 (Oktober, 1967), pp. 343-9.

G. Ebeling, Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens (Ziirich, 1959), pp. 93-101.


God, who is placed in a relation of infinite distance, demands theEntweltlichungl of the Christian existence as the positive mode of its own realization.2 Hegel uses the phrase ‘God is Dead’ with a quite different purpose. The

phrase has a double function. On the one hand it is a polemical characteristi- zation of the results of the transcendental philosophers and the subjectivist theologians of his day. In this sense it attacks a theological and philosophical position which-despite many differences-came to basically the same results as ‘dialectical theology’ in its subjectivization of the Christian faith.3 On the other hand it is an expression of the dialectic of reality which Hegel seeks to grasp in order to see through the opposition between faith and knowledge and to overcome the resulting subjectivization of the Christian faith. Thejrstfunction of the phrase ‘God is Dead’ is clear from its content within an article, entitled, ‘Faith and Knowledge’. In this early article Hegel attacks the ‘idealistic’ and ‘subjectivistic’ philosophers of reflection, i.e. Kant, Jacobi and Fichte. Hegel’s philosophy has as its ‘guiding intention’ the overcoming of the subjectivism of modern religiosity or, positively expressed, ‘the knowledge of the objective reality of God’.4 Hegel criticizes

‘Entweltlichung’ is often translated as ‘de-secularization’. This translation is mis- leading because ‘secularization’ often refers to an evaluation or interpretation of the process of world history in which the world has become separated from religious values or ecclesial control. Bultmann does not want a return to the Middle Ages when he speaks of the ‘Entweltlichung’ of Christian existence. By ‘Entweltlichung’ Bultmann means the liberation from the hostile and evil powers of the world which is granted to the Christian in the forgiveness of sin. Are not the attacks against Bultmann on this point by Rohrmoser and Moltmann somewhat exaggerated ? Bultmann distinguishes clearly between a gnostic and a Christian ‘Entweltlichung’. Cf. ‘Ankniipfung und Widerspruch’, op. cit., p. 132. K. Barth also stresses how the Church’s freedom from the world is also a freedom for the world. Cf. KD, IV/3, op. cit., pp. 18-40.

‘Das Atheismusproblem bei Hegel und Nietzsche’, Der evungelische Erzieher, 18 (1966), p. 350.

Carl E. Braaten, New Directions in Theology Today. Volume 11, History and Her- meneutics (Philadelphia, 1966), p. 21: ‘Contrary to the opinion of many Bultmann scholars, contemporary existentialist theology is not a twentieth-century novelty. Its roots can be traced back to the second major alternative to orthodox and Enlightenment rationalism, namely, Schleiermacher’s mystical theology of religious experience. Existentialism is the present-day edition of mysticism. Both are guilty of a massive interiorization of the Biblical historical drama of salvation.’ Recent scholarship has shown that Schleiermacher is not at all so subjectivist as Braaten thinks. Cf. Rendtorff, Kirche und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 115-217.

M. Theunissen, ‘Die Dialektik der Offenbarung. Zur Auseinandersetzung Schellings und Kierkegaards mit der Religionsphilosophie Hegels’, Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 72 (1964/5), p. 135. Hegel’s critique of subjectivity is not one-sided. He realizes that subjectivity can be a source of progress or of corruption (Hegel, Werke, 11, p. 345.) He distinguishes between a bad and a good subjectivity, and criticizes the bad romantic subjectivity not in order to minimize the importance of man’s personal subjectivity, but to apprehend this subjectivity in its positivity and substantiality and to re-establish it within the modem world and its conditions. Cf. W. Oelmiiller, ‘Hegels Satz vom Ende der Kunst und das Problem der Philosophie der Kunst nach Hegel’, Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 73 (1965), p. 83 ff.

160 F R A N C I S P . F I O R E N Z A

Kant because his transcendental philosophy makes the principle of subjectivity or formal thinking the highest principle of truth. The goal of Hegel’s critique, however, should not be misunderstood.’ He opposes Kant’s transcendental philosophy because it is inconsequent and not radical enough. Its principles not only fail to attain Kant’s own intention, but turn round and end up in the very opposite of Kant’s intention.’ Kant seeks to overcome rationalism and empiricism. Against rationalism he limits human knowledge to knowledge of experienced objects, so that the infinite is not an object of theoretical reason, but a postulate of practical reason. Against empiricism he points out the a priori structure of human knowledge and the postulates of practical reason. The result is a denial of the possibility of any theoretical knowledge of the absolute. Hegel points out that this limitation of theoretical knowledge does not involve a knowledge of man’s limitation or finiteness, as Kant thinks, but rather sets up this finiteness and this limited knowledge as an absolute. For Hegel, only in so far as man knows the absolute can he know his own limitation and the reasonableness of things. This analysis is followed by a severe critique of the positivistic subjectivism of Jacobi’s philosophy of feeling and by a scrutiny of Fichte’s unsuccessful attempt to synthesize the positions of Kant and Jacobi. All three philosophies result in an atheism of theoretical philosophy or in a ‘nihilism of transcendental phil~sophy.’~ The infinite and finite, the supernatural and natural, the religious subject and the objective scientific and social world are placed in opposition to one another. Knowledge of God is reduced to the inner subjectivity of the believer who is alienated from the objective and social world. Hegel’s use of the phrase ‘God himself is dead’4 can be understood as a polemical description of the nihilistic results of transcendental philosophy and subjective theology, but its second and main function is to express the reconciliation of the division (Entzweiung) between subjectivity and objectivity, between faith and knowledge, and between finite and infinite. The key to the understanding of this text lies not in Hegel’s philosophy of

R. Wiehl, ‘Vernunft als Kanon, Organon und Kathartikon des allgemeinen Ver- standes’, in Subjektivitat UndMetuphysik. Festschrift fiir Wolfgang Cramer, edited by D. Henrich et ul. (Frankfurt, 1966), pp. 342-3. ‘It is not against the notion of subjectivity, nor against formal thinking in the sense of a thorough formalization of the faculty of reason. . . , but against the way and manner in which these principles are applied.’

Ibid., p. 348. Wiehl presents here an exact treatment of Hegel’s critique of transcendental philosophy (pp. 336-53). Cf. G. Rohrmoser, ‘Die theologische Bedeutung von Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der Philosophie Kants und dem Prinzip der Subjektivitat’, Neue Zeitschrgt fur systematische Theologie, 4 (1962), pp. 89-1 11.

Hegel, Glauben und Wissen, op. cit. Ibid., pp. 123-9. Cf. Moltmann, Theology of Hope op. cit., pp. 168-9 for English

translation of text.


religion alone, but also in the context of his philosophical conception of history and of law.’ The present division of man and of society is not reconciled by rejecting one side or by identifying the opposites, but by grasping the original unity of their opposition. Hegel parallels man’s pain- ful experience of his separation from and loss of God with Christ’s experience of the absence of God on the cross. He thereby draws a parallel between the possibility and exigence of reconciliation in man’s present separation and the historical and factual reconciliation of the finite and the infinite in Christ’s death and resurrection. In the death of Christ, i.e. by his own death on the cross in the ‘otherness’ of Christ, God takes on and unites himself to the otherness and finiteness of finite being so that he reconciles the otherness and limitation of the finite with the infinite. In other words, God’s giving up of himself in love (Entausserung) in the death of Christ is the deepest point of separation and at the same time a coming to himself. The dialectic is Hegel’s answer to the problem of man’s coming to himself, his rising to a new life, to a presence of God as Spirit in the community of Christians. The death and resurrection is for Hegel an expression of the dialectic of reality. Hegel’s understanding of this dialectic enables him to reconcile in his philosophy the relationship between finite and infinite, free subjectivity and objective union, faith and knowledge. In other words it is Hegel’s understanding of God’s revelation in history which is the key to his understanding of reality. To the extent that human reason knows of its unity with God-as the central Christian mysteries express it -to the same extent does it know of its own finiteness. As Hegel stresses against Kant : only when reason knows of the absolute does it affirm its own finiteness. When it does not know of the absolute, i.e. when it is not in some way united with the absolute, it does not know of its finiteness, i.e. its otherness to the absolute. The same can be said of the relationship between subjectivity and objective society. Subjectivity comes to itself only in so far as it expresses or gives itself up in union. In other words : God’s giving up of himself in love, which is the basis of religion, is also the basis of the de facto reality of the world and of the de facto history of the world. God’s giving up of himself in love in the objectivity of the world signifies that freedom achieves itself only in so far as it expresses and gives itself up in reality, not to lose itself, but to regain itself. Therefore faith, which for Hegel is thought of in terms of love and freedom, must give itself up and enter into the objectivity of society in order to regain itself. Likewise

Our presentation of Hegel has been guided by Landgrebe, op. cit. J. Ritter. Hegel und die frunzosische Revolution = edition Suhrkamp, p. 114 (Frankfurt, 1965), and Rohrmoser, op. cit. They indicate the connection between the political and the religious motives in Hegel.

B*

162 FRANCIS P . FIORENZA

subjective freedom must objectify itself in the laws of society, not to lose freedom, but to gain freedom. For Hegel Faith is not Faith in opposition to a nihilistic reality, but Faith in involvement with the positive social, political and intellectual reality of the day.

This Hegelian dialectic is not an answer to the problem in terms of Kant, but it is an attempt to overcome the limitations of understanding which only grasp a part of reality or one aspect of it. It is for these reasons that in his philosophy of religion Hegel attacks both the philosophies of understanding, e.g. Kant,’ and the theologies of faith, e.g. Schleiermacher.2 For Hegel they both result in a dualism of faith and reason and fail to see the unity of faith and reason and of subjectivity and objectivity, etc.’ And for these reasons Moltmann refers to Hegel more than to any other philosopher or theologian and applies his critique to the transcendental theology of our day with its worldless faith and faithless world. But Moltmann’s theological programme is not a restoration of the Hegelian theology of the nineteenth century, as is that, for example, represented by Biedermann, nor is it an attempt to reconcile Hegel and Schleiermacher as in the Mediation theology (Vermittlungstheologie), but it is an attempt to take Karl Marx’s critique of Hegel seriously.

HEGEL-MARX : BLOCH A N D MOLTMANN

A third important element of the background of the recent theological movement centring on Hope is Marx’s philosophy and his critique of Hegel. However, an adequate or even a short analysis of the relationship

Recent scholarship has pointed out that much of Hegel’s polemic against Kant was unjustified because Hegel misunderstood Kant on several important points. Kant’s argumentation is not so simple or a-political as Hegel thinks; cf. D. Henrich, Der ontologische Gottesbeweis (Tiibingen, 1960), pp. 194-208, W. Oelmiiller, ‘Kants Beitrag zur Grundlegung einer praktischen Philosophie in der Moderne’, Philosophisches Juhrbuch, 75, 1 (1967), pp. 22-55.

The value of Schleiermacher, as against common misunderstandings of him, will be discussed in the fourth article.

Our presentation of Hegel’s philosophy does not take into account two important problems: (1) The development of the early to the late Hegel. The early Hegel attacks institutional Christianity and emphasizes ‘life’ more than the ‘Geist’ of the later Hegel. No attempt can be made here to prove the continuity in Hegel’s position against those who claim a break. (2) Does Hegel’s ‘Aufhebung’ of religious ‘Vorstellungen’ into ‘Begriffe’ involve a denial of Christianity? For a balanced position cf. G. Van Riet ‘Le probkme de Dieu chez Hegel. Athhisme ou christianismel’, Revue philosophique de Louvain 63 (1965), pp. 353-418. As a good counterbalance to so much negative English literature on this question, cf. Q. Lauer, ‘Hegel on Proofs for God’s Existence’ Kunt- Studien, 55 (1964), pp. 443-65. I hope there is no real need to refute Altizer’s interpretation of Hegel and the death of God.


between Marx and Hegel’ would extend beyond the limits of this introductory background. The difficulty is fairly well expressed by Iring Fetscher’s adoption of Fichte’s aphorism; Fetscher writes: ‘Tell me how you determine the relationship between Marx and Hegel and I will tell you what kind of a marxist you are.’ Two Marxists, Georg Lukhcs and Ernst Bloch have become heterodox Marxists because of their ‘revisionist’ presentations of the relationship between Marx and Hegel. In so far as they bring closer together the thought of Marx and of Hegel they are in opposition to the prevailing ‘Stalinist’ interpretations. Lukhcs interprets the young Hegel as a very enlightened bourgeois philosopher interested mainly in economic and political problems. His previous interpretation of the young Marx made the latter very humanitarian, so that the relationship is that of the realization of Hegel’s philosophy in Marx. Ernst Bloch, however, goes in the opposite direction. Since Bloch sees the danger that dialectical materialism can easily degenerate into a mechanism, he is less interested in the materialistic elements in Hegel than in indicating the unex- hausted riches of Hegel whose legacy is possessed by Marx. Whereas the official interpretation of Marx stresses the scientific superiority of materialism as against Hegel’s idealism, Bloch emphasizes Marx’s critique of the closed system which serves primarily to open the system and to make the dialectic more practical. Bloch does not centre his attention on Marx’s transformation of Hegel’s idealism into materialism, but on his orientation to the future and to practical revolution in society. Moltmann’s critique of Hegel is the same. Hegel‘s system is closed and does not allow any room for eschatology or for the practical revolution in society that faith should have. Moltmann does not take over Hegel’s philosophy, but merely his critique of the transcendental philosophy. This granted, he claims that Hegel’s philosophy is too chained to the Greek logos to achieve its primary intention of overcoming the dualism between faith and reason, between the Christian and society, between God and man.2 Moltmann proposes a return to biblical categories and structures of thought and finds a central key for the theological value of these thoughts in Bloch‘s philosophy, whose basic principles and categories will be discussed in the next article.

An excellent survey of all the literature on this question is in the collection of essays of I. Fetscher, Karl Marx und der Marxismus (Miinchen, 1967). ’ A serious question in regard to Moltmann’s own attempt concerns his sharp formal distinction between Hebrew and Greek thought. James Barr’s writings indicate the many drawbacks of this distinction. Does not this distinction imply the very dualism that Moltmann claims he wishes to overcome? In many respects his position is open to Hegel’s critique against the transcendental philosophy.

DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY AND HOPE, I

Documents

Transcript of DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY AND HOPE, I