Deuladeu Elizabeth Florindo Soares

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Deuladeu Elizabeth Florindo Soares

POLITICAL SECURITY OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGESOF TIMOR-LESTE’S ASEAN MEMBERSHIP

Deuladeu Elizabeth Florindo Soares*

Abstract

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste has implemented its foreign policy by participatingin various international organizations. To enhance its relation with other countries, particularlyat the regional level, Timor-Leste is working hard to achieve its full membership in ASEANand has already shown its seriousness to do so, submitting a formal application in 2011. Thisresearch focuses on political-security, aiming to find and describe the obstacles and challengesto political security in Timor-Leste, in support of the country joining ASEAN in the near future.Obstacles that have already been resolved by Timor-Leste, include the political security crisisof 2006, a problem of displaced persons, reconciliation and issues regarding veterans. Theissues that still need serious attention from the government, in order to be overcome, includeunlawful martial arts groups, boundary issues, and comprehensive security. While, politicalsecurity challenges for the country are good governance, democracy, human rights, the electoralsystem, and national security.

Keywords: Political Security; Obstacles; Challenges; Timor-Leste; ASEAN; ACCWG.

*Deuladeu Elizabeth Florindo Soares obtains a Master of Arts in International Law and Diplomacy, from the Graduate School of Law, at the Assumption University of Thailand. She received the Scholarship from the Ministry of Education of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.

ABAC Journal Vol.38 No.2 (July-December, 2018 pp 172-196)

INTRODUCTION

The formation of ASEAN in 1967 cameabout for many reasons; for example, therewere a number of states either at war or atleast in sharp conflict with each other, notablythe two Vietnams and the two Koreas. Therewas also the confrontation between Malaysia,supported by the United Kingdom, and

Indonesia. Moreover, the activities ofCommunist dissidents were continuingproblems for countries such as Thailand andthe Philippines, and even to some extentMalaysia. These countries felt the need togroup together in what was seen as a middleground between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The first attempts at aregional grouping date from 1961, when the

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Political Security Obstacles and Challenges of Timor-Leste’s ASEAN Membership

Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) wasformed by Malaya, Thailand, and thePhilippines. Two years later, MAPHILINDOwas formed by Malaya, the Philippines, andIndonesia. Neither of these organizations waseffective, largely owing to disputes betweenthe members over the formation of Malaysiain 1963. Finally, with the end of theconfrontation, all of these states agreed to forma regional cooperation, which was establishedin Bangkok on 8th August 1967 at a meetingof political representatives from the fivefounding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, thePhilippines, Singapore and Thailand (Roberts,2009). Based on the ASEAN RegionalForum, the formation of ASEAN wasannounced in the ASEAN Declaration, alsoknown as the Bangkok Declaration. Anotherfive members later joined ASEAN, includingBrunei Darussalam on 8th January 1984,Vietnam on 28th July 1995, Laos andMyanmar on 23rd July 1997, and Cambodiaon 30th April 1999.

The objective of ASEAN was to promotepolitical cooperation as well as to fosterregional stability and peace (Chirathivat,2004), while the root motivation for theestablishment of ASEAN was various securityconcerns, occurring during the Cold War era,and with a heavy influence of communism inthe region. The basis for membership inASEAN is provided in the fourth part of theBangkok Declaration: “The Association isopen for participation to all States in theSouth-East Asian Region subscribing to theaforementioned aims, principles andpurposes.” As a result of this provision, theassociation has expanded its membership toten members, the notable exception being theDemocratic Republic of Timor-Leste(Abdulrahim, 2013).

One of Timor-Leste’s cardinal foreignpolicies is to maintain its relations withneighbouring countries, as is stipulated inTimor-Leste’s Constitution:

(1) In the conduct of foreign relations, theDemocratic Republic of Timor-Leste shall beguided by the principles of nationalindependence, the right of the people to self-determination and independence, thepermanent sovereignty of the people over theirwealth and natural resources, the protectionof human rights, the mutual respect forsovereignty, territorial integrity and equalityamong States and the non-interference indomestic affairs of other States;

(2) The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste shall establish relations of friendship andco-operation with all other peoples, aiming atthe peaceful settlement of conflicts, controlleddisarmament, the establishment of a system ofcollective security, and the establishment of anew international economic order, all of whichshould contribute to ensuring peace and justicein the relations among peoples;

(3) The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste shall maintain privileged ties with thecountries whose official language is Portuguese;

(4) The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste shall maintain special ties of friendshipand co-operation with its neighbouringcountries and the countries of the region.

Another section of the Constitution thatsupports this foreign policy is Section 115,paragraph 1(h) on the competence of thegovernment, which ensures the representationof the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste ininternational relations.

The country’s key foreign policy objectivesconsist of pursuing cooperation with otherstates, both in bilateral and multilateral bases,especially through membership in the United

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Nations and several other internationalorganizations; integration into ASEAN;restoring relations with Indonesia; andmembership in the Community of PortugueseLanguage Countries, known as CPLP. Inaddition, Timor-Leste also assigns significantimportance to respect for human rights andfundamental freedom, democracy, and the ruleof law (Soares, 2011). At the present time,the primary focus of Timor-Leste’s foreignpolicy is to join ASEAN. However, it is noteasy to become an ASEAN member. Thereare several requirements for membership, bothexplicit and implicit. The explicit requirementscan be seen in the ASEAN Charter, Article6:2, which reads: admission shall be based onthe following criteria:

a) Location in the recognized geographicalregion of Southeast Asia;

b) Recognition by all ASEAN MemberStates;

c) Agreement to be bound and to abideby the Charter, and

d) Ability and willingness to carry out theobligations of Membership.

The implicit requirements are, among otherthings, to act and be seen as an ASEANmember, with all necessary administrativestructures (Ortuoste, 2011). Timor-Leste isfacing several obstacles and challenges to fulfilthe above-mentioned requirements. Theseobstacles and challenges as a whole, inhibit itsprogress toward membership with respect tovarious aspects of political security, theeconomy, and socio-cultural affairs.

ASEAN has three pillars, namely thepolitical-security community, economiccommunity, and socio-cultural community.These pillars were initiated by the ASEANleaders through the Bali Concord II in 2003,

with the agreement to transform theorganization into an ASEAN Community withone vision, one identity and one community.The ASEAN Political Security Community(APSC), ASEAN Economic Community(AEC), and ASEAN Socio-CulturalCommunity (ASCC) are very important forASEAN member states. The purpose of theAPSC is to ensure that countries in the regionlive at peace with one another and with theworld in a just, democratic and harmoniousenvironment. The APSC blueprint wasadopted by ASEAN leaders at the 14th

ASEAN Summit on 1st March 2009 in Cha-am/Hua Hin, Thailand. The characteristics ofthe AEC include: 1) a single market andproduction base with free flow of goods,services, investment, capital and of skilledlabour; priority integration sectors, includingfood, agriculture and forestry; a highlycompetitive economic region with competitivepolicies, consumer protection, intellectualproperty rights (IPR), infrastructuredevelopment, taxation, and e-commerce; 2)a region of equitable economic developmentthat supports the development of small andmedium enterprises (SME), and an Initiativefor ASEAN Integration (IAI); and 3) a regionfully integrated into the global economy with acoherent approach towards external economicrelations and enhanced participation in globalsupply networks. This community has a goalfor regional economic integration by 2015. TheAEC blueprint was adopted in the CebuDeclaration on 13th January 2007.

The ASCC aims to contribute to realisingas ASEAN Community that is people-orientedand socially responsible with a view toachieving enduring solidarity and unity amongthe people and ASEAN Member States. Itseeks to forge a common identity and build a

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caring and sharing society which is inclusiveand where the well-being, livelihood, andwelfare of the people are enhanced. TheASCC blueprint was adopted in 2009. Thecharacteristics and elements of the ASCC are:1) human development through advancing andprioritising education, investing in humanresource development, promotion of decentwork, promoting information andcommunication technology (ICT), facilitatingaccess to applied science and technology(S&T), strengthening entrepreneurial skills forwomen, youth, elderly and persons withdisabilities, and building civil service capability;2) social welfare and protection throughpoverty alleviation, a social safety net andprotection from the negative impacts ofintegration and globalization, enhancing foodsecurity and safety, access to healthcare andpromotion of healthy lifestyles, developingimproved capabilities to control communicablediseases, ensuring a drug-free ASEAN andbuilding disaster-resilient nations and safercommunities; 3) social justice and rightsthrough the promotion and protection of therights and welfare of women, children, theelderly, and persons with disabilities; protectionand promotion of the rights of migrant workers,and promoting corporate social responsibility(CSR); 4) ensuring environmental sustainabilityby addressing global environmental issues,managing and preventing transboundaryenvironmental pollution, promoting sustainabledevelopment through environmental educationand public participation, promotingenvironmentally sound technology (EST),promoting the development of high quality ofliving in ASEAN cities or urban areas,harmonizing environmental policies anddatabases, promoting the sustainable use ofcoastal and marine environments, promoting

the sustainable management of naturalresources and biodiversity, promoting thesustainable use of water resources, agricultureand environment, responding to climate changeand addressing its impacts, and promotingsustainable forest management (SFM); 5)building an ASEAN identity with the promotionof ASEAN awareness and a sense ofcommunity, preservation and promotion ofASEAN cultural heritage, promotion ofcultural creativity and industry, and engagementwith the community; and 6) narrowing thedevelopment gap.

Based on the roadmap for building anASEAN Community 2009-2015, the threepillars are expected to work in tandem toestablish the ASEAN Community in 2020.Among the three pillars of ASEAN, politicalsecurity is the one that is of the utmost concernto ASEAN member states for grantingmembership to the organization.

US legal online defines political securityas the defence against any form of politicaloppression. It is concerned with whetherpeople live in a society that honours their basichuman rights. A secure community is definedas a group whose members can maintaindependable expectations of peaceful changefor a long time (Archarya, 2001). Theories onsecurity describe political security in terms oforganizational stability and social order,whereby non-military threats are contained bypolitical units other than states, and politicalsecurity in defence of system-level referents,such as international law and society.

Prior to or after joining the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations, ASEAN countriesface various political and security relatedobstacles and challenges, often related to theshift of leadership power, frequently dubbedleadership crises in several ASEAN countries,

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such as those that occurred in the Philippinesand Indonesia (Keling, M. F., Som,Hishamudin Md., Saludin, M. N., Shuib, Md.S., & Ajis, M. N., 2010). The securitydevelopment in this region has the aim ofstopping external intervention and internalrebellion. The expansion of membership andfunction of ASEAN members involves 10countries with Southeast Asian backgrounds,and the target is to keep the peace and maintainthe security of the region. Before Timor-Lesterestored its independence, the country’spolitical security obstacles and challengesmostly came from outside, such as the invasionof Indonesia, which became a barrier forTimor-Leste to achieve its freedom. Even afterthe country obtained international recognitionof its independence, it still faces obstacles andchallenges in the political security sector. Theseobstacles and challenges to political securityin Timor-Leste are further elaborated in thefindings.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Politics is a peaceful means of determiningwho holds the power and influence in society(SAGE, 2014). Harold Lasswell definespolitics as a way of determining, withoutrecourse to violence, who receives power andresources in society, and how they get them.Power is the ability to get other people to dowhat you want them to, while resources mightinclude government jobs, tax revenues, lawsthat help you get your way, or public policiesthat work to your advantage. The tools ofpolitics are compromise and cooperation,discussion and debate, and sometimes briberyand deceit (SAGE, 2014). Politics is afundamental and complex human activity,reflecting our capacity to be political – to

cooperate, bargain, and compromise (SAGE,2014). Political is an adjective that describesbelonging to or concerned with the form,organization, and administration of a state orpart of a state, and with the regulation of itsrelations with other states. Political also pertainsto public life and affairs involving authority andgovernment; relating to or concerned withpolitical theory and practice (Brown, 1993).

The term security is derived from the Latinsecurus meaning safe and secure. This termcan be used with three meanings: 1) thetraditional meaning of security as an attributeof state, the absence of military conflict; 2)security used in a broader sense, yet stillreferring directly to the phenomena takingplace in international relations, or directly andindirectly caused by inter-state relations; and3) security in a universal sense of a unit and ofa social entity, i.e., human security (Mesjasz,2006). The design of security might beexpanded in various directions through thecombination of the following features (Mesjasz,2006):

- Reference object – state, region, alliance,society, various social groups – nations,minorities, ethnic groups, individuals, and theglobal system

- Areas or sectors in which existentialthreats are emerging – political, military,economic, ecological, societal

- Methods of prediction and identificationof threats – beginning with the search for“objective” threats and ending with subjectivelyperceived threats, and resulting from socialdiscourse (“securitization”)

- Methods of planning and accomplishingextraordinary actions aimed at monitoring,preventing or eliminating existential threats

This shows that all directions ofdevelopment of the concept of security provide

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a method for the prediction and identificationof threats, and for the planning and preparationof actions that are the main goals of any policy-oriented investigations into security (Mesjasz,2006). Security must be interpreted in thebroadest possible sense; if national or regionalsecurity is viewed as the overall strength andcapacity of a nation or region in coming togrips with perceived threats, there are twodimensions of security. First, external security:there are political and military dimensions thatare involved in security, to cope with and deterpotential and perceived external threats.Second, internal security, with the sense ofreducing and even solving internal sources ofinsecurity, as well as building and strengtheningstability and resilience through development.This could be termed the developmentdimension of security (Xuto, 1983).

The concept of security from theDepartment for Disarmament Affairs of theUnited Nations describes security as acondition in which states consider that there isno danger of military attack, political pressureor economic coercion, so that they are able topursue their own development freely and makeprogress. Other examples of security includethe balance of power, deterrence, equalsecurity, collective security, neutrality, non-alignment, and peaceful coexistence. Variousconcepts of security have a common purpose;it is for the protection of national security inchanging political, military, economic and othercircumstances. The concept comprisesdifferent elements such as military capabilities,economic strength, social development,technological and scientific progress, as wellas political co-operation through the use ofbilateral and multilateral diplomacy, alsoinvolving international organizations. Securitymay be defined as a protective condition that

statesmen either try to acquire, or preserve, inorder to guard the various components of theirpolities from either external or internal threats.

This research concentrates on the politicalsecurity area and focuses on previous studies,which can be categorized into two groupsbased on the opinions of the scholars. The firstgroup consists of supportive opinions, and thesecond group is critical opinions.

Ortuoste wrote that Timor-Leste hasstruggled to achieve sovereign statehood andto gain regional acceptance from the membersof the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) since 1975, when Timor-Lestedeclared its independence from Portugal.There were obstacles and challenges for itsmembership, due to ASEAN’s positiontowards Timor-Leste at that time, namely:considering East Timor as an imminentcommunist threat and rejecting its claims ofindependence in the 1970s, until finallyreluctantly accepting its sovereign statehoodin 2002; not interfering in Indonesia’sincorporation of its ‘twenty-seventh province,’but later contributing peacekeepers to UnitedNations missions in the country; and rejectingTimor-Leste’s overtures for ASEANmembership, before granting it observer status.Ortuoste argues that after the 1999 referendumin Timor-Leste, ASEAN had to develop waysto re-engage with Timor-Leste, not onlybecause of widespread internationalrecognition of the new state, but also becauseof ASEAN’s success in maintaining theregion’s peace and security. As a result, eachASEAN country slowly began to recognizeTimor-Leste’s sovereign statehood and, threeyears after independence in 2002, ASEANformally welcomed Timor-Leste as a ‘newmember of the international community,’ butdid not offer immediate ASEAN membership.

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She quoted some statements from ASEANleaders in 2006 in the Shangri-La Dialogue,where Timor-Leste was one of the topicsdiscussed. The Australian Defence Minister,Brendan Nelson, stated that the “regioncannot afford Timor-Leste to become a failedstate which could ‘become a haven’ perhaps,for transnational crime, for terrorism, andindeed humanitarian disasters and injustice.”Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and DefenceMinister Najib Tun Razak argued that therewere concerns about the potential disintegrationof Timor-Leste’s political structure, and thatASEAN needed to be part of any peaceprocess in Timor-Leste in accordance with itsvision of an ASEAN Security Community. Shefurther added her strong positive opinion ofTimor-Leste’s existence in the region such that,by 2009, ASEAN had included Timor-Lestein the geographic scope of Southeast Asia. Theregion’s political identity is in flux toaccommodate a more diverse membership aswell as to lay the foundation for a ‘new’ASEAN community. It is within this contextthat Timor-Leste has sought to improve itscapabilities to participate in ASEAN activities,as well as to demonstrate the positivecontributions it could make in this ASEANintegration effort.

Sahin (2012) discusses how Timoreseleaders delivered a statement that the Timor-Leste government’s strategic plan for theASEAN membership was based on a promisethat its presence would not become a “burden”for ASEAN. Thus, Timorese politiciansconvinced ASEAN member states that theircountry would not be looking for any financialassistance but would depend on their ownresources in order to participate in all activitiesof ASEAN’s community building. Sahinenhances her argument by showing the UNDP

report in 2010 that the significance of Timor-Leste bid to ASEAN is not only for economicbenefits, but also for security-building as wellas identity formation. ASEAN membership forTimor-Leste would also help secure theidentity of that country by emphasizing itspolitical and cultural difference from its twopowerful neighbours: an independent,Portuguese-speaking country and SoutheastAsian nation. In addition, the political situationduring the 2012 election has shown that Timor-Leste is capable of guaranteeing its internalpolitics and security sectors to the internationalcommunity, and is seen as one of theachievements of its government in maintainingpeace, stability and sustainable developmentin the country and in the region as well.

Suáres (2011) posits that the stability andsecurity situation in Timor-Leste is one of theissues that must be resolved for the country tobecome the 11th member of ASEAN. Thereare concerns that the organization will beburdened with a fragile state, prone to unrestand internal conflict. He argues that thoseconcerns might be misplaced, giving a strongopinion that in this past decade, there werealso areas of unrest and political turbulence insome ASEAN member states as well.Moreover, the conflict in Timor-Leste seemsto be more amenable to a solution by meansof dialogue and mediation. The result of theseefforts has decreased the level of violence. Heargues that in terms of regional security, itmakes sense to incorporate Timor-Leste intoASEAN due to the international attention paidto its natural resources. He assumes that if thecountry is admitted into ASEAN, it will opena door for Papua New Guinea to join ASEANas well.

Horta (2013) opines that Timor-Leste isincapable of fulfilling some basic requirements

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for admission into ASEAN. He provides theconcrete example that the country has notdeveloped proper security procedures forprotecting its borders and airport. Forinstance, Timorese passports, includingdiplomatic passports, lack basic securitymeasures, and immigration services are unableto read them electronically.

In her research, Sahin also offers somecritical opinions on the readiness of Timor-Leste for ASEAN membership. She arguesthat the application raises questions aboutwhether the country is capable of preparingits human resources and fulfilling basicrequirements to integrate into the organization.She also argues that Timor-Leste does nothave diplomatic representation in all ASEANcountries, and thus it is doubtful whether thecountry has enough qualified officials who arefluent in English to attend the many annualmeetings of ASEAN.

FINDINGS

Obstacles

An obstacle is something which blocks,stands in the way of, or obstructs progress(Brown, 1993). The current research foundthat issues such as the political security crisisof 2006, persons displaced by that crisis,reconciliation between Timorese people whosupported and opposed independence fromIndonesia, internal disturbances caused bymartial arts groups and veterans, boundaryissues and comprehensive security may haveimplications for the political security of Timor-Leste. Some of these issues have beenresolved, while others may present challengesfor the future. The details of these issues arepresented here.

A crisis erupted in 2006, proximatelycaused by the dismissal of 591 members ofTimor-Leste’s military (FFDTL) in March2006. This group came to be known as “thepetitioners,” and its members were almostexclusively from western districts. They allegedthat members of FFDTL from the east of thecountry had discriminated against membersfrom the west. The conflict resulted inwidespread fighting both between and withinTimor-Leste’s two uniformed security forces.Members of the army and police forces,including their respective oversight ministries,the Ministries of the Interior and Defence, weredirectly involved in the violence of April andMay 2006 (Wilson, 2013). This crisis causedinstability within the country, which resulted inpersons being displaced and houses beingburned. Many people were worried that thecountry could become a failed state. However,Timor-Leste was able to resolve the crisis inthree months, due to the great commitment ofits people to the process of independence. Thisdemonstrates Timor-Leste’s capacity toachieve and maintain political security, one ofthe three pillars of ASEAN, and serves as anexample of why Timor-Leste should beadmitted as an ASEAN member, because itwas not easy to resolve such a crisis in such ashort period of time.1

According to the Handbook for theProtection of Internally Displaced Persons, themeaning of the term internally displacedpersons (IDPs) is the persons or groups whohave been forced or obliged to flee or leavetheir homes or places of habitual residence asa result of, or in order to, avoid the effects ofarmed conflict, situational violence, violationsof human rights or a natural or human-madedisaster, and who have not crossed aninternationally recognized state border. Timor-

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Leste experienced problems with IDPs, as aresult of the 2006 crisis, as this caused thedisplacement of approximately 150,000people. The government was able tosuccessfully overcome the crisis. However,some of the IDPs remain in Dili, the capitalcity of Timor-Leste, and appear to be unwillingto return to their homes in their native districts.This has given rise to a slight increase of thepopulation in the country’s capital.

Reconciliation is a key objective in buildingsustainable peace and preventing a relapseinto conflict. Reconciliation entails rebuildingrelationships among people and groups, andbetween the state and its citizens (UN, 2012).In this regard, Timor-Leste has established asuccessful policy of reconciliation and peaceat the national level by healing wounds acrossthe previous deep divide between Timoresewho decided to integrate with Indonesia, andthose who opted for independence (Horta,2013). The reconciliation process, led byMaun Bo’ot Xanana Gusmao, was a uniqueprocess involving courage, determination, andcompassion. It was conducted among peoplefrom all 13 of its districts. These reconciliationefforts demonstrated to the world that theTimorese people have great heart in resistingthe temptation to exercise revenge in the nameof justice (Horta, 2013). Timor-Lestecontinues to promote the spirit ofreconciliation. Although Timor-Leste has hada gloomy history with Indonesia, it hasundertaken reconciliation with Indonesia. In ashort period of time, the two countries haveovercome the problems between them andhave left their past behind. Both countriespromote friendship and have become goodneighbours. Timor-Leste places extraordinaryvalue on reconciliation in the process of stateconsolidation and construction, and also in its

integration into the region.A veteran is an old soldier of long service,

or a former member of the armed forces(Merriam Webster Dictionary). In otherwords, a veteran is someone who was in thearmed forces, especially during wartime. Sinceachieving its independence, Timor-Leste hashad three well-known veterans groups,centred around the old resistance army orformer guerrilla leaders. These veteran groupsare the Council for the Defence of theDemocratic Republic of Timor-Leste(Conselho Popular pela Defesa daRepública Democrática de Timor-Leste,known as the CPD-RDTL), the SagradaFamilia and the Comando LibertasaunMaubere (Colimau 2000). The CPD-RDTL’s main platform is the declaration ofindependence on 28th November 1975 andthe reinstatement of the original Constitution.The leaders of this group are Olo-Gari Asswainand Paulino Gama also known as MaukMoruk (Scambary, 2013: 199-200). Thisgroup claims, that it is the true RevolutionaryFront for an Independent Timor-Leste, knownas Frente Revolucionário de Timor-Leste(FRETILIN) and the umbrella body for theresistance; that Timor-Leste is not yet readyfor a multiparty electoral system; and thatTimor-Leste should form an interimgovernment of national unity composed ofeminent people including veterans, academics,and political leaders (Scambary, 2013: 201-202). Mauk Moruk has also formed anorganization called the Revolutionary Councilof Maubere (Consellu RevolusionarioMaubere, or CRM). Sagrada Familia is anindependent armed movement in thehinterlands of Baucau District formed byCornelio Gama (also known as L7, or ElleSete) as a result of a clash with the Falintil

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High Command. This group formed a politicalparty called UNDERTIM in June 2005(Scambary, 2013: 202-204). Colimau wasoriginally formed in the mid-1980s byMartinho Vidal in the Hatu Builico of AinaroDistrict. When the founding members of thisgroup became inactive, a new generation arosein 2000. The followers of Colimau 2000 havebeen characterized as poor, illiterate peasantsfrom rural areas. Some members of this groupare ex-guerrillas from the fight forindependence. Colimau 2000 also claims tohave members from other clandestine groupslike Seven-Seven, Five Five, Buamalus andORSNACO (Scambary, 2013: 205).

Of these three main groups of veterans,the CPD-RDTL in particular, led by the ex-guerrilla commander Mauk Moruk, recentlybecame an obstacle to the political security ofTimor-Leste. Data from the Local MediaMonitoring informed that the governmentconsiders the CPD-RDTL to be an illegalgroup, and the Baucau District Court issuedan arrest warrant for the capture of MaukMoruk and his followers, due to theirengagement in acts of violence in that district.The joint operations forces were initially unableto capture the fugitives because they weresupported by their families. Meanwhile, thePresident of the Republic, Taur Matan Ruak,called on Mauk Moruk to surrender for thegood of the country’s stability. After severalmonths of operations, the joint operationsforces finally stopped the movement of therebel group after Mauk Moruk and three ofhis followers were killed in a confrontation witharmed forces in the area of Fatulia, Baucauduring the first week of August 2015. JoseRamos Horta, the former president of Timor-Leste, described the death of Mauk Morukas sad and unfortunate, but assumed that it

would not threaten the stability of the country(Everingham, 2015). Timor-Leste has madeefforts to overcome the issues of veteransgroups. For example, the National Parliamentissued Law No. 3/2006 on the Status of theNational Liberation Combatants (NLC).Chapter IV of the Law defines the rights andobligations of NLC, particularly Article 22regarding the rights of NLC, and Articles 24to 26 regarding the special pension for NLC.NLC obligations are also described in Article31.

A martial art is any of the traditional formsof oriental self-defence or combat that utilizesphysical skill and coordination withoutweapons, such as karate, aikido, judo, or KungFu, often practiced as sport (WebsterEncyclopaedic, 1996: 1180). Generally, thepurposes of the martial arts are pragmatism(getting the job done), sportsmanship (fairfighting), personal honour or responsibility(fighting your own fight, defending yourself),pacifism (avoiding conflict), nationalism andsacrifice (defending the country), and civicresponsibility or keeping the peace (Buckler,Scott and Castle, Paul and Peters, D.M.,2009). There are various martial art groups(MAGs) in Timor-Leste, including groupspracticing Taekwondo, Karate, Aikido, KungFu, Kempo, Persaudaraan Setia Hati Terate(PSHT), Ikatan Kera Sakti (IKS), andKorka. The MAGs in Timor-Leste have grownsignificantly in size and influence in recent years,with an estimated total membership between20,000 and 90,000 spread across all 13districts. Dili has become the main battlegroundfor MAGs, and fighting is public and frequent.The main factors precipitating these conflictsare property disputes, self-defence,unemployment, predatory crimes, politicalgrievances, and payback killings (revenge)

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among the groups (Scambary, 2010). Theinternal disturbance caused by MAGs is oneof the security obstacles confronting Timor-Leste. The government of Timor-Leste isworking hard to overcome the issue of MAGs.It has been reported that some members ofthe army and police forces of Timor-Leste areinvolved in MAGs. Therefore, on 13th January2015 the government of Prime MinisterXanana Gusmao conducted a swearing-inceremony at the Government Palace for 288members of F-FDTL and PNTL who werepreviously members of martial artsorganizations. This event aimed to remindmembers of the security forces not to becomeinvolved in martial arts organizations. This eventwas organized in accordance with governmentresolution 16/2013, issued on 22nd July 2103to disassociate the elements belonging toMAGs from any oaths they have provided tothose organizations whose activities are illegal.The resolution prohibits martial arts activitiesacross the entire national territory.

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Lestehas two neighbouring countries, Indonesia andAustralia. Timor-Leste shares a land borderwith Indonesia, and the two nations have hadborder issues since Timor-Leste achieved itsindependence. Studies on the current bordersecurity issues found that most of the disputesinvolve demarcating the border lines, but otherproblems in border areas involve cultural andpolitical conditions, poverty, inadequateinfrastructure, and lack of natural and humanresources. Some of these land border issueshave been resolved, but those that remainrequire urgent solutions. Timor-Leste andIndonesia have undertaken efforts to finalizetheir land boundary through the implementationof joint border demarcation (Sutisna, S &Handoyo, S., 2006). This joint cooperation

was initiated by Indonesia and the UnitedNations Transitional Administration in EastTimor (UNTAET) in 2000, with reference tothe 1904 Treaty between the Dutch andPortuguese, and the Permanent CommissionAward of 1914 (PCA 1914). The jointorganization was started in 2001 with the JointMinisterial Commission (JMC), includingForeign Ministers of both Indonesia andTimor-Leste (Liebenberg, E., Collier, P., &Torok, Z. G., 2012).

At the beginning of the joint bordercooperation between the countries, there wereproblems with eight segments of the border.By October 2004, five of these problems hadbeen resolved, including the segments of MotaMalibaca, and Noel Ekat (Sutisna, S &Handoyo, S., 2006). The issues in theremaining three segments of Noel Besi/Citranaand Bijael Sunan-Oben/Manusasi in the WestSector and Dilumil/Memo in the East Sectorwere still unresolved (Sutisna, S & Handoyo,S., 2006: 178). Through cooperation betweenTimor-Leste and Indonesia, the dispute overone of these final three segments, Dilumil/Memo, was resolved in 2013. In 2015, thecountries adopted an agenda calling for theother two segments to be resolved (KBRI Dili,2015). Despite minor tensions over thesesmall, unresolved stretches of the land border,Indonesia continues to be the key supporterand sponsor of Timor-Leste’s primary foreignpolicy and ambition of accession to ASEAN(Leach, 2014).

Timor-Leste also has maritime boundaryissues with both Australia and Indonesia. Themaritime border of Timor-Leste is clearlydelimited in Law No. 7/2002 on the MaritimeBorders of the Territory of the DemocraticRepublic of Timor-Leste, which came intoforce on 20th May 2002 (National Parliament,

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2002). However, Timor-Leste, Indonesia andAustralia have yet to sign any maritimeboundary treaty (Abidin, et al, 2005). In thecase of Australia, Timor-Leste has signed threeagreements: the Timor Sea Treaty, which wassigned on 20th May 2002; the InternationalUnitization Agreement (IUA) in July 2002; andCertain Maritime Arrangements in the TimorSea (CMATS) on 12th January 2006. Theseagreements are concerned with managementof petroleum development and revenues, anddo not define the permanent maritimeboundary between the two countries (La’oHamutuk, 2008). The maritime boundary withAustralia is a complicated issue. The CMATStreaty, which has a term of 50 years, forbidsboth parties from raising maritime borderissues (Neves, 2014).

Since achieving independence, Timor-Leste has aspired to exercise full sovereignpowers over its national territory and themaritime area that is under its jurisdiction underinternational law. Accordingly, the governmentof Timor-Leste enacted Decree-Law No.2/2015 on 14th January 2015 to create a Councilfor Definitive Delimitation of MaritimeBoundaries (La’o Hamutuk, 2008). Thiscouncil has the powers and functionsdescribed in the Article 6 of the Decree Law.In essence, this article states that thegovernment may specifically delegateresponsibilities to other departments orgovernment agencies to negotiate internationaltreaties.

The slow pace of resolving land boundarydisputes, such as Noel Besi/Citrana and BijaelSunan-Oben/Manusasi, and maritimeboundary issues with Indonesia and Australia,stems in part from the absence of institutionsat a national level that specifically manage andhandle all aspects of border management.

However, Timor-Leste expects to takeadvantage of its participation in ARF meetings,particularly on security matters, to talk aboutinternational best practices in handling maritimedisputes and other matters among states in theregion, such as its permanent boundaries withAustralia and Indonesia (SEAA-MNEC,2013).

The problem of political security for Timor-Leste is no longer traditional security, butcomprehensive security. Comprehensivesecurity is mentioned in the ASEAN Charter(Chapter I, Article 1, Paragraph 8), focusingon drug trafficking and human trafficking.Timor-Leste must seek to resolve these issues;otherwise, the country could become a centrefor these kinds of activities.2 The countryshould also develop its police force and army(PNTL and F-FDTL) in terms of quantity andquality, particularly in the area of intelligence.Timor-Leste needs to guarantee internalsecurity so that investors will feel safe investingin the country.

The unresolved obstacles discussedabove, such as MAGs issues, veteranproblems, boundary disputes andcomprehensive security, may affect Timor-Leste’s application for ASEAN membershipin both negative and positive ways. Thenegative impact can be seen from the APSCblueprint, which states that by 2020, ASEANshall establish a peaceful and stable SoutheastAsia where each nation is at peace with itselfand where the causes for conflict have beeneliminated through abiding respect for justiceand the rule of law and through thestrengthening of national and regional resilience.Timor-Leste faced a difficult challenge insolving issues relating to veterans, since theveteran group was led by an ex-guerrillacommander who had no intention of accepting

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the government’s invitation for dialogue.However, the government was able to finallyresolve this matter through the hard work ofits joint operations forces. The MAGs issuecould also affect its ASEAN membership, asthe issue could appear to be resolved byTimor-Leste, only to explode again any timethere is a group that wants to create instabilityin the country to further their own interests.Investors will think twice about investing in thecountry if the political security of Timor-Lesteis unstable.

On the other hand, Timor-Leste’smembership in ASEAN could have a positiveimpact for the country in terms of findingsolutions for boundary issues andcomprehensive security issues. Timor-Lesteand Indonesia may refer to the ASEANCharter, Chapter I, Article 23 regardingdispute settlement for assistance in resolvingtheir land and maritime boundaries.Furthermore, in the same chapter, Article 1,paragraph 8 indicates that one of the objectivesof ASEAN is to respond effectively, inaccordance with the principle ofcomprehensive security to all forms of threats,transnational crimes and trans-boundarychallenges. Thus, Timor-Leste will be requiredto tackle all these issues effectively. Timor-Leste will make more important positiveimpacts, in resolving its problems withcomprehensive security, once it joins ASEAN.Moreover, ASEAN countries will also obtainbenefits from Timor-Leste’s presence in theorganization, due to wider cooperation incombating organized crime and transnationalcrimes that threaten stability at national andregional levels.

Based on the country’s experiences inovercoming other obstacles such as the politicalsecurity crisis in 2006, issues with IDPs,

reconciliation among its people, and issues withveterans, it is likely that Timor-Leste is capableof handling these obstacles.

Challenges

A challenge is a demanding task orsituation (Soanes, 2006: 620), one thatrequires a great deal of skill, energy, anddetermination to deal with or achieve; it canalso be an action or idea that questionswhether something is true, accurate, or legal.The challenges confronting the political securityof Timor-Leste are discussed below.

The United Nations Economic and SocialCommission for Asian and the Pacific,describes governance as the process ofdecision-making, and also the process bywhich decisions are either implemented or notimplemented. Governance can be used inseveral contexts, such as corporategovernance, international governance, nationalgovernance and local governance. Goodgovernance has eight major characteristics: (1)participation, (2) rule of law, (3) transparency,(4) responsiveness, (5) orientation towardconsensus, (6) equity and inclusiveness, (7)effectiveness and efficiency, and(8) accountability. Good governance assuresthat corruption is minimized, that the views ofminorities are taken into account, that thevoices of the most vulnerable in society areheard in the decision-making process, and thatthe government is responsive to the presentand the future needs of society.

Transparency is the basis of goodgovernance and the first step in fightingcorruption. It provides a universal rationale formaintaining good records managementsystems, archives, and financial regulatory andmonitoring systems (IFLA, 2014). According

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to a report from the Asian Development Bank(ADB) in 2015, Timor-Leste madeimprovements between 2005 and 2009 onaccountability, political stability, governmenteffectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule oflaw and control of corruption. In 2010, Timor-Leste became the third country to comply withthe Extractive Industries TransparencyInitiative, which measures governmentdisclosure practices in the extractive sector,with a score of 70.5/100. The country wasrated as one of the top three countries in Asiaagainst the index, and also as havingcomprehensive revenue transparency.

Corruption is an insidious plague that hasa wide range of corrosive effects on societies.It undermines democracy and the rule of law,leads to violations of human rights, distortsmarkets, erodes the quality of life and allowsorganized crime, terrorism and other threatsto human security to flourish (UNCAC, 2011).Corruption is a phenomenon with negativeconsequences for social and economic life thataffects the principle of the Democratic Stateof Rule of Law. Therefore, Timor-Leste’s IVConstitutional Government proposed to theNational Parliament the establishment of a legalframework for an Anti-CorruptionCommission. This commission was establishedon 29 June 2009, based on the United NationsConvention against Corruption. Thecommission is an independent body thatconducts its own investigations and makesdecisions independently and objectively tocombat corruption effectively. Following thisdevelopment, Transparency Internationalranked Timor-Leste 127 out of 178 countriesin 2010, an improvement from a rank of 145in 2009. In 2012, Timor-Leste was ranked113 out of 176 countries and territories in theCorruption Perceptions Index, which ranks

countries based on how corrupt their publicsector is perceived to be (ETLJB, 2012). Thegovernment of Timor-Leste is striving toachieve good governance through variousefforts to ensure transparency and fight againstcorruption (TLMFA, 2012).

Democracy is a form of government inwhich the supreme power is vested in thepeople and exercised directly by them or bytheir elected agents under a free electoralsystem (Webster Encyclopaedic, 1996: 530).Timor-Leste’s democracy is young andtherefore imperfect. However, the governmentand opposition have found common groundon key strategic priorities for the country andhave been able to work together toconsolidate peace and national reconciliation,creating an enabling environment forsustainable development (Horta, 2013).

The United Nations Human Rights, statesthat human rights are rights inherent to allhuman beings without regard to nationality,place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin,colour, religion, language, or any other status.All people are equally entitled to human rightswithout discrimination. These rights are allinterrelated, interdependent and indivisible.Timor-Leste has a National Human RightsInstitution (NHRI), a governmentalorganization named the Provedoria deDireitos Humanos e Justiça (Office of theOmbudsman for Human Rights and Justice),which is empowered to deal with complaints(La’o Hamutuk, 2012). There is also a HumanRights Adviser’s Unit (HRAU) that wasestablished in 2013. HRAU works inpartnership with the NHRI, civil societyorganizations and the United Nations CountryTeam (UNCT) to support efforts to furtherdevelop the capacity of partners to promote,protect and mainstream human rights. Abuses

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of human rights are mostly focused onmarginalized groups, such as women andchildren, and especially on their ability toaccess justice on an equal basis (OHCHR,2010).

Gross human rights violations committedfrom 1974 to 1999 remain a challenge for thegovernment. The national parliament,particularly members of Committee A,proposed a set of draft laws that would createa national reparation program. However, thislegislation is still pending (OHCHR, 2010).Timor-Leste is included in the Working Groupon the Universal Periodic Review, which wasestablished in accordance with the HumanRights Council resolution 5/1 of 18th June2007. The country’s review was held at the15th meeting on 12th October 2011. It wasobserved that, before its independence wasrecognized, Timor-Leste was invaded andannexed by Indonesia, leading to widespreadhuman rights violations. Moreover, the countryis one of the few examples in the world whereself-determination of a people wasaccomplished simultaneously with the buildingof the state, based on the rule of law,democratic principles and respect for humanrights. Both Timor-Leste and Indonesia havemade efforts to normalize their bilateralrelations, based on mutual respect andfriendship. Timor-Leste stressed that it cannotand should not antagonize its closest neighbour,and that it had created mechanisms fordiplomatic dialogue which would permit pastwounds to heal, leading to a more promisingfuture (UNGA, 2012).

The Human Rights Handbook forJournalists in Timor-Leste clearly informed thatTimor-Leste has ratified seven internationalhuman rights conventions: the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights

(CCPR), the International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICESCR), the Convention against Tortureand Other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment (CAT), theConvention on the Elimination of RacialDiscrimination (CERD), the Convention on theElimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women (CEDAW), the Conventionon the Rights of the Child (CRC), and theInternational Convention on the Protection ofAll Migrant Workers and Members of TheirFamilies (ICRMW).

According to the Minister of Justice,Dionísio Babo, Timor-Leste has ratified theInternational Convention on Human Rights.Furthermore, Timor-Leste’s Constitutionguarantees human rights, even though Timor-Leste does not have a guide for dealing withhuman rights issues. Therefore, on 25th

September 2014, the Timorese Ministry ofJustice launched the Annual National ActionPlan for Research on Human Rights. It is aguide for all citizens and institutions on humanrights. Respect for human rights and genderbalance, at all levels of the government andthe nation, is one of the big challenges for thegovernment of Timor-Leste. However, thisyoung democratic country has shown itsseriousness and commitment to promoting andprotecting human rights and ensuring thefundamental freedoms of all the people in thecountry.

The electoral system is the bedrock of astrong democratic state (Lao Hamutuk, 2006).To ensure that elections are conducted in afree and democratic manner, Timor-Leste hastwo election management bodies: the NationalElectoral Commission, known as ComissãoNacional de Eleições (CNE), and theTechnical Secretariat for the Administration of

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Elections, known as Secretariado Técnico deAdministração Eleitoral (STAE). Free, fairand regular elections constitute the foundationof accountable and transparent government.The requirement of free and fair elections isenshrined in the Constitution of the DemocraticRepublic of Timor-Leste. Elections areregulated by the Law on the Election of theNational Parliament (Law No. 6/2006) andthe amendments to this law, Law No. 6/2007and Law No. 7/2011. The country has heldsix national elections that were free and fair.The first election was on 30th August 2001,selecting the members of the new parliamentwho were charged with writing the Constitutionfor the new democracy (Horta, 2013). Thesecond election was conducted under theauspices of UNTAET’s Independent ElectoralCommission (Lao Hamutuk, 2006), and washeld on 14th April 2002. In this election, theTimorese people voted for the first time for aPresident. The third election was held on 9th

April and 9th May 2007, again to elect apresident. The fourth election, held on 30th

June 2007, was to elect members ofparliament. The fifth election was thepresidential election held on 16th and 17th

March 2012, followed by the sixth electionheld that same year for members of parliament.Another election that takes place in Timor-Leste, known as the suco election, is held invillages (sucos) to select local communityleaders. The country has conducted two sucoelections for local authorities. The first,conducted in October 2005, was held in 442villages and 2,228 hamlets (aldeias), and wasgenerally said to be free and fair. The secondsuco election was held in 2009.

As the country has conducted almost allof its elections in a free and fair manner inaccordance with democratic values, it has

gained international trust, and in September2013 it received a request from the TransitionalGovernment of Guinea-Bissau to support theelectoral process in that country. Timor-Lesteofficials contributed to the preparation of theelectoral process, namely the voter registrationphase, which is crucial for credible democraticoutcomes so that elections may proceed in afair and transparent way and receive nationaland international recognition. The Timoresesupport for the electoral process in Guinea-Bissau was a success.

National security can be most fruitfullydefined as the ability of a nation to protect itsinternal values from external threats (Herman,C.F). According to Tun Dr. Mahathir, securityis not just a matter of military capability.National security is inseparable from politicalstability, economic success and socialharmony. Without these, all the guns in theworld cannot prevent a country from beingovercome by enemies whose ambition can befulfilled sometimes without firing a single shot(Keling, M.F., Som, Hishamudin Md., Saludin,M. N., Shuib, Md. S., & Ajis, M. N., 2010).There have been positive signs that the politicalleaders of Timor-Leste are committed tomutual respect for the promotion of peace,respect for the rule of democracy, and stabilityduring the electoral process (UNSC, 2011).The positive outcomes in Timor-Leste include:(1) strengthening and improving nationalsecurity; (2) increasing national and politicalstability to meet ASEAN standards; (3)continued progress in the capacity of itsnational security forces, both military andpolice, to cope with national and regionalsecurity issues in accordance with the existingrules and regulations of ASEAN; (4) improvingand strengthening Timor-Leste’s nationalimmigration, customs and quarantine systems

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to meet ASEAN standards; (5) maintaining afirm commitment to the peaceful settlement ofdisputes; and (6) increasing the quality ofhuman resources in all government ministriesand in civil society to respond to the needsand requirements of ASEAN (TLMFA, 2012).

Analysis on Timor-Leste’s AdmissionBased on ASEAN Charter, Article 6:2

Timor-Leste is situated in the SoutheastAsian region, and occupies the eastern part ofTimor Island, which itself, is one of the easternislands of the Indonesian archipelago. Timor-Leste is bounded by Indonesia to the west,the Timor Sea to the south, and the BandaSea to the north (Molnar, 2010: 6). Thus, thecountry is geographically part of the region ofSoutheast Asia.

Since Timor-Leste officially submitted itsapplication to join ASEAN, there have beenreactions from ASEAN member states, as wellas other countries located outside ASEAN.These can be summarized as follows:

The full support of the Cambodiangovernment for Timor-Leste’s ASEANmembership was expressed by theCambodian Prime Minister, H.E. Akka MohaSena Padei Techo Hun Sen on two occasions.The first statement by the Prime Minister cameon 30th March 2011, when the President ofTimor-Leste, H.E. Jose Ramos Horta, madea three-day visit to Cambodia. The PrimeMinister stated that Cambodia’s support doesnot depend on whether Timor-Leste is pooror rich, small or big, but reflects the equal rightsof the countries in the region (Nimul, 2011).This expression of support was reaffirmed byMr. Hun Sen during the visit of the TimoresePrime Minister to Cambodia on 5th - 9th

September 2013 (Soares, 2013).

The formal application of Timor-Leste wassubmitted in 2011 during Indonesia’s term aschair of ASEAN (Saragih, 2013). From thebeginning, Indonesia has shown itsstatesmanship by fully supporting Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN, even thoughIndonesia and Timor-Leste have a bitterhistory (Ximenes, 2014). The IndonesianPresident, H.E. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,reaffirmed Indonesia’s strong support forTimor-Leste during the visit of Timor-Leste’sPrime Minister, H.E. Kay Rala XananaGusmao, to Indonesia on 20th March 2013(Soares, 2013).

The Government of Thailand establisheddiplomatic relations with Timor-Leste whenthe country restored its independence in 2002.Both countries have enjoyed close and cordialrelations through the technical cooperationunder the Thailand International DevelopmentAgency (TIDA), (National Multimedia, 2012).The government of Thailand has firmlysupported the admission of Timor-Leste toASEAN on at least two occasions: first, whenthe Foreign Minister of Timor-Leste, H.E. Mr.Zacarias Albano da Costa, visited Thailand inFebruary 2012 (National Multimedia, 2012);and second, during the visit of Timor-Leste’sPrime Minister, H.E. Kay Rala XananaGusmao, on 25th - 29th April 2013 (Soares,2013).

At first, Singapore was one of thecountries that rejected Timor-Leste’s bid tojoin ASEAN, citing Timor-Leste’s lack ofdevelopment (Padden, 2011). However,during the visit of the Timorese Prime Ministerto Singapore on 3rd - 6th June 2013, theSingaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loongnoted that Timor-Leste naturally wants tostrengthen its ties with the region and desiredto join ASEAN. He reaffirmed Singapore’s

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commitment to the ASEAN CoordinatingCouncil Working Group process andSingapore’s continued assistance in capacity-building for Timor-Leste (Pereira, 2013).

During the official visit of Timor-Leste’sPrime Minister, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao,to the Philippines on 5th - 9th June 2013,President Benigno Aquino III expressed thePhilippines’ support for Timor-Leste’s bid tojoin the ASEAN community, and stated thathe looked forward to working more closelywith Timor-Leste in the future, and advancingregional dialogue, which will redound not onlyto the growth of the people and their countries,but also contribute to the stability and continueddevelopment of the region (Pereira, 2013).

Vietnam expressed strong support forTimor-Leste’s admission to ASEAN inSeptember 2013 (Soares, 2013). ThePeople’s Democratic Republic of Lao initiallyexpressed concern regarding Timor-Leste’seconomic development, claiming that admittingTimor-Leste to ASEAN could potentiallyrepresent a backward step in ASEAN’smovement toward the ASEAN Community in2015 (Initiatives for International Dialogue,2013). Lao finally manifested its support, andstated that it was ready to share lessons learnedin relation to Timor-Leste’s application forASEAN membership, in September 2014(Initiatives for International Dialogue, 2013).

Prior to Timor-Leste submitting its officialapplication for ASEAN membership,Myanmar had rejected the idea of itsmembership in ASEAN, stating an issue withPresident Gusmao’s past relationship withMyanmar’s opposition movement leader,Aung San Suu Kyi (Rajoo, 2006). However,following the submission of the application,Myanmar gave its full support to Timor-

Leste’s accession to ASEAN in September2013.

Malaysia expressed its support for Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN in April 2014(Rajoo, 2006).

Brunei Darussalam continues to supportTimor-Leste’s efforts to join ASEAN. Thissupport was expressed by His Majesty, Sultanand Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei DarussalamHaji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddinWaddaulah, when the Prime Minister ofTimor-Leste made a three-day visit to thecountry on 16th - 18th March 2014 (Kassim,2014).

The United States of America expressedsupport for Timor-Leste’s membership inASEAN on 5th September 2012 (Soares,2013). Australia has recognized the potentialfor the development of Timor-Leste if it joinsASEAN, stating that this will foster greateropportunities for further political, economicand social integration into its immediate regionand would give it a stronger voice in regionaland world affairs (Armitage, 2011). TheCommunity of Portuguese LanguageCountries (CPLP) consists of nine memberstates: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, EquatorialGuinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique,Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe, and Timor-Leste. This community fully supports Timor-Leste’s membership in ASEAN. A statementof support was released when Timor-Lestehosted the CPLP Summit in Dili on 23rd July2014 (Soares, 2013).

ASEAN Member States shall be boundand abide by the Charter. This is called theregional universal principle: when Timor-Lesteor another nation signs the ASEAN Charter,it is automatically integrated into thecommunity, and gains the legal status given to

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all ASEAN member states, with equal rightsand obligations.

Some areas of work remain for Timor-Leste before joining ASEAN. For example,the requirement that members accede to allASEAN Declarations, Treaties andAgreements will require the introduction oflegislation or ratification by the TimoreseNational Parliament. This is no easy task, giventhe vast amount of Declarations, Treaties andAgreements and the fact that they are not inTimor-Leste’s national languages of Tetum andPortuguese (Abdulrahim, 2013: 55-56).

Timor-Leste has taken steps to integrateitself into the ASEAN region. The country hasbeen a full participant in ARF since 2005 anda member of the Southeast Asia Ministers ofEducation Organization (SEAMEO). Timor-Leste has signed the Treaty of Amity andCooperation and has also served as anobserver of the ASEAN Inter-ParliamentaryAssembly (AIPA). Also, in this region of theworld, Timor-Leste is a member of theASEAN Football Federation (AFF), theSoutheast Asian National Forum on HumanRights (SEANF), the ASEAN CooperativeOrganization (ACO) and a founding memberof Asian Peace and Reconciliation (APRC),(Soares, 2013).

Once Timor-Leste obtains permanentmember status, it will have rights andobligations under the Charter equal to thoseof the other ASEAN member states. Memberstates shall take all necessary measures,including the enactment of appropriatedomestic legislation, to effectively implementthe provisions of the Charter and to complywith all obligations of membership (ASEANCharter).

To prepare for and meet the obligationsof the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and

Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT),Timor-Leste will need a large number of trainedtechnical officers with knowledge in economics,finance and trade in order to understand,introduce and enforce compliance with all therules and regulations related to ASEAN’sEconomic Cooperation projects (Abdulrahim,2013: 56).

Timor-Leste’s obligation to keep otherASEAN countries informed of all trade-related laws, regulations and requirements, andany subsequent changes thereto, necessitatesthe establishment of diplomatic missions in allten ASEAN member states. This will alsoenable Timor-Leste to be informed by otherASEAN member states of any changes totheir respective rules and regulations(Abdulrahim, 2013). Based on the Overviewon Timor-Leste’s Preparation towardsASEAN Membership (Soares, 2013), Timor-Leste has already accomplished this step byestablishing diplomatic relations with all tenmembers of ASEAN. It had previouslyestablished embassies in Indonesia, Malaysia,Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam;and Timor-Leste has recently installed four newembassies in Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,Lao PDR and Myanmar to complete itsrepresentation in all ASEAN member states.

The expectation that Timorese officials willattend and participate in the more than onethousand ASEAN meetings held annuallymeans that Timor-Leste will require a largenumber of civil servants with an adequatecommand of English, the working language ofASEAN in order to provide sufficientrepresentatives (Abdulrahim, 2013: 57).Furthermore, the expectation that Timor-Lestewill one day take the ASEAN Chair and takeresponsibility for hosting the ASEAN summit,ARF, East Asian Summit and other meetings

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during that year will require significant upgradesin financial and human resources (Abdulrahim,2013: 57-58). Since its official application wassubmitted in 2011, Timor-Leste hasundertaken many of the preparations for itsadmission to ASEAN, particularly in buildingits human resource capacity, as well as theinstallation of embassies in ASEAN memberstates.

CONCLUSION

ASEAN member states and theDemocratic Republic of Timor-Leste haveexperienced a similar history of colonizationby western powers. The main aim of theestablishment of ASEAN was to enhance andmaintain political security. The ASEANcommunity was initiated by the ASEANConcord II, in which ASEAN leaders agreedto establish the community in accordance withthree pillars: the ASEAN Political SecurityCommunity, the ASEAN EconomicCommunity, and the ASEAN Socio-CulturalCommunity. These three communities areexpected to be formed in 2015.

Timor-Leste has shown its willingness toparticipate in and contribute to the globalcommunity, particularly within its region, as isstipulated in its Constitution regarding itsforeign policy. The country has officiallysubmitted a formal application to join ASEAN,and in response the ASEAN member stateshave formed the ASEAN CoordinatingCouncil Working Group, whose main task isto discuss all relevant aspects of the applicationby Timor-Leste, and its possible implicationsfor ASEAN. Political security is listed in Timor-Leste’s Strategic Development Plan as one ofthe government’s priorities, and theestablishment by Timor-Leste of an ASEAN

National Secretariat demonstrated to theASEAN member states the seriousness of itsintention to join the organisation.

Based on these findings and the foregoingdiscussion, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste has resolved the main obstacles in thepolitical security sector, which are mainlyinternal political security issues consisting ofthe political security crisis of 2006, the problemof IDPs, national reconciliation and issuesregarding veterans. The remaining obstaclesthat the country has not yet overcome are theMAGs issues, boundary issues, andcomprehensive security issues, such as drugsand human trafficking. Timor-Leste will needto undertake additional efforts to overcomethese problems. The challenges for Timor-Leste are good governance, democracy,human rights, the electoral system and nationalsecurity. Timor-Leste has applied democraticvalues and showed its capabilities in managinggood governance through transparency, andcombating corruption. Moreover, it hassucceeded in conducting free and fair elections.However, the issues of human rights andnational security are ongoing challenges for thecountry that will require more effort.

In sum, Timor-Leste has no majorremaining obstacles or challenges to its politicalsecurity and is ready to be admitted as amember of ASEAN. However, the countrymust undertake further preparations in thesectors of human resources, infrastructure andthe economy, as these issues might interferewith Timor-Leste’s membership in ASEAN.This, newest country in the region has gainedsupport from many countries around the worldfor its efforts to integrate into ASEAN.Furthermore, Timor-Leste can contribute moreas a full member of ASEAN in terms ofreconciliation, human rights, peace-building,

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conflict resolution, transparency, goodgovernance, democracy, and links with othercountries such as CPLP, than it can on its own.

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(Footnotes)1 An Interview with H.E. Mr. Roberto

Sarmento de Oliveira Soares. Timor-Leste’s Secretary of State for ASEANAffairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs andCooperation of Timor-Leste. It wasconducted on 19 September 2014.

2 An Interview with Mr. Alarico da CostaXimenes, Director of the Department ofInternational Relations at the NationalUniversity of Timor-Leste (UNTL). It wasconducted on Wednesday, 17 September2014.

Deuladeu Elizabeth Florindo Soares

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