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Description of dynamic shared knowledge: an exploratory study during acompetitive team sports interactionJ. Bourboussona; G. Poizatb; J. Saurya; C. Sevea

a University of Nantes, Nantes, France b University of Burgundy, Dijon, France

Online publication date: 02 February 2011

To cite this Article Bourbousson, J. , Poizat, G. , Saury, J. and Seve, C.(2011) 'Description of dynamic shared knowledge: anexploratory study during a competitive team sports interaction', Ergonomics, 54: 2, 120 — 138To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00140139.2010.544763URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2010.544763

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Description of dynamic shared knowledge: an exploratory study during a competitive team sports

interaction

J. Bourboussona*, G. Poizatb, J. Saurya and C. Sevea

aUniversity of Nantes, 25 bis de boulevard Guy Mollet, Nantes 44322, France; bUniversity of Burgundy, Dijon, France

(Received 25 March 2010; final version received 23 September 2010)

This exploratory case study describes the sharedness of knowledge within a basketball team (nine players) and how itchanges during an official match. To determine how knowledge is mobilised in an actual game situation, the datawere collected and processed following course-of-action theory (Theureau 2003). The results were used tocharacterise the contents of the shared knowledge (i.e. regarding teammate characteristics, team functioning,opponent characteristics, opposing team functioning and game conditions) and to identify the characteristic types ofchange: (a) the reinforcement of a previous element of shared knowledge; (b) the invalidation of an element of sharedknowledge; (c) fragmentation of an element of shared knowledge; (d) the creation of a new element of sharedknowledge. The discussion deals with the diverse types of change in shared knowledge and the heterogeneous anddynamic nature of common ground within the team.

Statement of Relevance: The present case study focused on how the cognitions of individual members of a teamcoordinate to produce a team performance (e.g. surgical teams in hospitals, military teams) and how the sharedknowledge changes during team activity. Traditional methods to increase knowledge sharedness can be enhanced bymaking use of ‘opportunities for coordination’ to optimise team adaptiveness.

Keywords: course of action; shared knowledge; team cognition; team sport; teamwork

1. Introduction

Team functioning has become an increasingly im-portant research focus in industrial and organisa-tional psychology (e.g. surgical teams, cockpit crews)and military psychology (e.g. military crews) (Salaset al. 2008b). These studies have particularly soughtto gain greater insight into the notion of teamefficiency as a means to enhance team performanceand/or prevent teamwork breakdowns, which insome cases would have fatal consequences. Manyhave been inspired by the investigations in teamcognition and this has given rise to various andheterogeneous theoretical frameworks and empiricalstudies (Gorman et al. 2006, Bourbousson et al.2010a,b, Fiore et al. 2010, Grote et al. 2010,Kennedy and McComb 2010, Klein et al. 2010).Although the variety of research topics is wide, asubstantial number of recent investigations hasfocused on the sharedness of understanding betweenmembers of a team (e.g. Cooke et al. 2009, Jenkinset al. 2010, Stanton et al. 2009). The notion ofsharedness can be explored by defining three areas offocus: the contents of sharedness (e.g. what doteammates need to share in order to achieve team

effectiveness?); (b) the forms of sharedness (e.g.should knowledge be shared by all members orshould it be selectively distributed?); (c) the processof sharing (e.g. how should sharedness beconstructed and regulated by the team members?).

1.1. Contents of sharedness

These studies have essentially sought to characterisetwo types of contents that facilitate sharedunderstanding among team members (Cooke et al.2009): (a) stable shared cognitive contents constructedprior to the team performance (i.e. knowledge bases,mental models) that enhance shared understandingwithin the team; (b) more dynamic shared cognitivecontents (i.e. situation awareness (SA)) that areconstructed for transitorily shared understandingpertaining to a given situation at a given point in time.In addition to the study of these two types of contents,some recent studies have noted the need forinvestigations that would be intermediary (Ward andEccles 2006, Kennedy and McComb 2010); that is, thecontents of knowledge sharedness could beinvestigated by focusing on those characteristics thatare refashioned during team performance.

*Corresponding author. Email: jerome.bourbousson@univ-nantes.fr

Ergonomics

Vol. 54, No. 2, February 2011, 120–138

ISSN 0014-0139 print/ISSN 1366-5847 online

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DOI: 10.1080/00140139.2010.544763

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1.1.1. Shared knowledge

Knowledge contents prior to team performance referto the shared knowledge constructed by team membersover the course of their past experiences and interac-tions. Generally, this type of knowledge is consideredto be relatively stable and to permit team members toconstruct shared understanding. Two types of sharedknowledge have been determined to play a role in teamperformance (Mathieu et al. 2000): (1) knowledgeabout the task to be accomplished (e.g. ‘task workmental models’); (2) knowledge about the organisationof the teamwork (e.g. ‘teamwork mental models’)(Cannon-Bowers et al. 1995, Lim and Klein 2006).These types of shared knowledge have been extensivelystudied, as they are considered as constitutive of theessential ‘common ground’ (Koschman and Lebaron2003, Nyssen 2007) of the team, which describes howjoint understanding is achieved (McCarthy et al. 1991).For example, several studies in diverse fields (civil andmilitary aviation, regulation centres) have demon-strated the essential role of knowledge shared priorto team performance during intensive work situations;that is to say, in situations that are complex, uncertainand dynamic and during which the team memberscollaborate for a specified time under strong temporaland affective pressures that inhibit them from system-atically interacting in an explicit coordination mode(Wittenbaum et al. 1996, Grote et al. 2010).

1.1.2. Shared situation awareness

Insight into the transitory and dynamic cognitivecontents needed to ensure smooth team functioninghas essentially been gained through the use of theconcept of SA (Sarter and Woods 1991, Endsley 1995),classically used in studies of individual cognition. Thisawareness is conceived of differently, depending on thetheoretical perspective and methodology of the re-searchers (Durso and Gronlund 1999, Salmon et al.2008b). SA comprises the perception and understand-ing that an individual has of his or her environment ata given instant, as well as any expectations about thefuture unfolding of the situation. SA is transitory inthat it is constantly changing in relation to ongoingactivity and the perception of new elements in thesituation that modify the individual’s expectations(Gorman et al. 2006). In order to take into account thetransitory cognitive contents shared by teammates,some authors have studied how SA is shared amongteam members (e.g. Stout et al. 1996, Artman 2000,Endsley and Pearce 2001, Salmon et al. 2008a). Byfocusing on highly dynamic cognitive contents (i.e.SA), these researchers investigated shared understand-ing as a transitory phenomenon, related to a given

situation at a given moment. The authors alternativelyreferred to the notion of shared SA (Endsley 1995,Endsley and Robertson 2000), team SA (Stout et al.1996, Gorman et al. 2006) and distributed SA (DSA)(Salmon et al. 2009, Griffin et al. 2010, Stanton et al.2009).

1.1.3. Toward a study of the dynamic nature of sharedknowledge

The study of shared knowledge (e.g. shared mentalmodels) has generally been based on the assumption ofthis knowledge as relatively stable. The study of moretransitory cognitive contents has been carried out froma quite different perspective, with the focus on theshared understanding of a given situation at a giveninstant. Yet very few studies have considered anintermediary investigation of the dynamic nature ofshared knowledge: as it is activated by teammates inreal-time settings (Kennedy and McComb 2010).

Individual cognition analyses in sports andergonomics, notably those using a sense-makingapproach, have demonstrated that individualknowledge can be conceived as dynamic cognitivecontents that may change over the course of activity.An actor can elaborate new knowledge, question it,compare it, preserve it or remodel it (e.g. Seve et al.2005, Sieck et al. 2007). Yet this dynamicdeconstruction/reconstruction of shared knowledgehas barely been addressed by analyses of teamcognition. There is thus a need for temporal study ofteam cognition (Kennedy and McComb 2010,McComb et al. 2010). The very few researchers whohave investigated the dynamic nature of sharedknowledge have done so by examining the convergenceof individual knowledge at specific instants afterperformance episodes (Mathieu et al. 2000, Mathieuet al. 2005, Edwards et al. 2006). None, however, hascaptured the dynamics of knowledge deconstruction/reconstruction as it occurs during real-time teamperformance (Kennedy and McComb 2010). Thepresent study was thus designed to do so.

1.2. Forms of sharedness

Several studies have focused on the form of sharednessthat is required for efficient performance. Salmon andco-workers (Stanton et al. 2006, Salmon et al. 2008a,2009, Stanton et al. 2009) distinguished two approachesto the notion of sharedness. In the first, sharedness isconceived as a zone containing the understandingcommon to all team members, with the underlyingassumption being that similarities in this understandingare essential to effective team functioning. Thisconceptualisation of sharedness conforms to the flower

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model, illustrated in Figure 1(a), and can serve as areference in the analysis of various cognitive contents(e.g. shared knowledge, Eccles and Tenenbaum 2004,shared SA, Endsley and Robertson 2000, shared goals,Reimer et al. 2006).

In the second conception of sharedness (illustratedin Figure 1(b)), sharedness does not refer to what isheld in common by several individuals, but insteadindicates the distribution of a collective’s resourcessuch that members may share roles. In this sense of theterm, shared understanding is distributed among thecollective members (Hutchins 1995, Cooke et al. 2007,2009, Salmon et al. 2008a, 2009), with the underlyingassumption being that compatibilities (rather thansimilarities) in this understanding will facilitate effec-tive team functioning.

The sharedness of cognitive contents can thus beseen in different ways. As an illustration, Salmon et al.(2009) studied how SA can be shared in socio-technicalcollaborative systems and demonstrated the heuristicvalue of a conception in terms of DSA to account forthe dynamic shared understanding that teams con-struct in naturalistic settings, rather than conceivingsharedness in terms of similarities. Given the currentlack of consensus in the literature about the appro-priate conceptualisation of sharedness for differenttypes of teams (Salmon et al. 2009), it was decided tofocus on sharedness among the members of a specificteam: a team of basketball players.

1.3. From sharedness to sharing

With reference to the lack of research on the dynamicnature of shared knowledge, several authors (e.g.Cooke et al. 2004, Cooke and Gorman 2006, McCombet al. 2010) recently pointed out that the studies on

team cognition have essentially produced a staticunderstanding of the knowledge needed to coordinate,for two reasons. First, the studies often employedmethodologies for collecting data on actors’ relativelygeneric knowledge about their activity and investigatedless the actual knowledge being dynamically mobilisedin real situations (Salas et al. 2008a). Second, almostall the studies analysed the sharedness of knowledge asa product at a given moment (e.g. Smith and Semin2007) (analysis of the contents and structure of sharedknowledge) and gave little attention to knowledgesharing as a process (Ward and Eccles 2006, Cookeet al. 2007, Kennedy and McComb 2010). From thisperspective, Endsley and Pearce (2001) and Cooke andGorman (2006) indicated that the processes leading toshared knowledge may be more important than theoutcome of shared knowledge. To describe theseprocesses, the notion of sharing may be sometimespreferable to the notion of sharedness. Sharing refersto when and how cognitive contents are shared,whereas sharedness has often been used to refer towhat is held in common. The present study concernsboth the contents of sharedness and the process ofsharing.

1.4. A dynamic description of shared knowledge inorder to resolve a persistent paradox

Increasingly, dynamic assessments of team cognitionhave been made to explore how and when SA is shared(Gorman et al. 2006, Salmon et al. 2008a, Cooke et al.2009). These studies have clearly demonstrated theirheuristic contribution to the investigation of sharedunderstanding. However, a temporal investigation ofsharedness has not yet been conducted concerningknowledge-based approaches to team cognition

Figure 1. Graphical representations of sharedness. (a) Representation (from Eccles and Tenenbaum 2004) of sharednessin a three-member team. Each circle represents the understanding of an individual; (b) representation (from Stanton et al. 2008a)of sharedness in a four-member team. The puzzle design represents the compatibility of individual understanding.

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(McComb 2008), which continue to face the followingparadox (Uitdewilligen et al. 2010). On the one hand,shared knowledge items are assumed to play amajor rolein coordination in situations that are indeterminate,uncertain, dynamic and complex. It is thus furtherassumed that great attention should be given to theiraccuracy regarding situation characteristics. On theother hand, situations, because they are dynamic, havechanging characteristics that may render the knowledgeitems shared before the actual activity occursprogressively more inaccurate. The paradox is thusthat, although the temporal changes and adaptiveproperties of shared knowledge are consideredindispensable, research up to now has neglected toexamine what happens to the knowledge shared duringthe course of a performance.

In light of the current gaps in the literature onsharedness, the present study investigated sharedknowledge with the aim of trying to bring it up todate. To do so, an original assessment of teamcognition was conducted during the activity of ateam operating in its naturalistic environment. Teamcognition was assessed with a particular focus on theforms of sharedness that appeared during real-timeactivity. The dynamic nature of the sharedness ofknowledge (i.e. sharing) was studied, particularly bydescribing how the knowledge contents changed in thecourse of activity. Thus, an exploratory naturalisticcase study of team cognition was conducted within abasketball team.

1.5. Situation of the study: sports settings inergonomics

Much of the data from studies in sports settings offerinsight into human interactions in several contexts(e.g. daily living, professional and artistic) and is asrelevant to ergonomics research as it is to sportsresearch (Salmon et al. 2010). Empirical results haveshown that cognitive processes that are difficult toobserve in work contexts are particularly salient inthe sports context (Seve et al. 2002, James andPatrick 2004, Helsen et al. 2007, Macquet andFleurance 2007, Janelle and Hatfield 2008, Tenen-baum et al. 2008). Team sports imply that teamprocesses are continuously being reinforced, notablybecause team functioning is highly complex, dynamic,uncertain and achieved under high temporal andaffective pressures (Bourbousson et al. 2010c). Theinvestigation of team cognition in team sports settingshas been neglected, although several recent articleshave called for empirical studies in this field (Ecclesand Tenenbaum 2004, 2007, Fiore and Salas 2006,2008, Pedersen and Cooke 2006, Goodwin 2008,Eccles and Johnson 2009).

The present study analysed the functioning of abasketball team during a competitive match. Abasketball team is composed of five members acting ina dynamic and highly uncertain situation againstopponents with an antagonist goal. Players actaccording to a strong team interdependence (i.e. manyreciprocal interactions among teammates that mayoccur at any instant) (Saavedra et al. 1993). The teamis considered as homogeneous (Cooke et al. 2007); thatis, the players all have the same rights and fairly similarskills and there is no formal team leader, althoughsome responsibilities are distributed (e.g. guard,forward, centre). Only in time-outs and the fewminutes between quarters is there enough time toredefine the collaboration framework. During thegame, players act continuously, with little opportunityto communicate verbally about upcoming actions(Cannon-Bowers and Bowers 2006). To ensure thattheir actions are coordinated, they depend onbasketball plays, which are prepared action series foreach team member, ordered in time and space andexplicitly taught and then practised in trainingsessions. Team coordination is synchronous andcarried out in a shared space, where mutual visibility isfacilitated. Interacting teammates form an action-team(Uitdewilligen et al. 2010), also called aplan-execution-team (Stagl et al. 2006).

1.6. Course-of-action framework

This study aimed to investigate dynamically someaspects of the common ground of a basketball team,particularly the shared knowledge mobilised in a realsituation, which helps players to achieve teamcoordination. Because few studies have specificallyfocused on this topic at the workplace or in intensivesports settings, the study was necessarily exploratoryand qualitative. A case study was conducted in orderto process the overall length of the game with allteammates. It focused on the types of knowledgecontent mobilised and held in common by all membersof a basketball team and explored the changes in thisknowledge over the course of a match. The study wasconducted within the course-of-action framework (forfurther details, see Theureau 2003). Originallydeveloped in the French language for research inergonomics (Daniellou 2005), this framework has beenused for numerous empirical studies in the field ofwork (e.g. Theureau and Filippi 2000, Theureau et al.2001, 2002, Theureau 2002) and sports expertise. Insport, the studies originally focused on the situatedcognitive processes of expert athletes (e.g. Hauw andDurand 2005, Seve et al. 2005, 2006, 2007) but haverecently begun to explore the coordination of theirindividual activities (e.g. Poizat et al. 2009,

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Bourbousson et al. 2010c). This framework is suitablefor taking into account the dynamic character ofactivity and is able to determine the temporality andchaining of cognitive processes. The course-of-actionframework includes a methodology that makes use ofaudio-video recordings in natural settings andinterview techniques of stimulated recall (Gilbertet al. 1999). It thus permits activity to be studied onthe basis of the reconstruction of the natural andspecific conditions of the activity, which then permitsthe analysis of the actors’ course of action (Theureau2003). A course of action is a chain of activity unitsthat are meaningful for the actor. When actors areasked to describe their activity, they spontaneouslybreak down the continuous stream of actions intodiscrete units that are meaningful to them. Thesediscrete units may be physical actions, communicativeexchanges, interpretations or feelings, all of whichmay constitute the meaningful units of activity of thecourse of action. By analysing each instant in thechaining of units of activity, a more preciseidentification and comparison of the knowledgeelements that are being mobilised during a matchbecomes possible. As an illustration, this frameworkallowed Seve et al. (2005) to highlight the fact thatthe way individuals deconstruct and reconstructpersonal knowledge is related to the way that theyexperience their own situation (personal aims,perceptions and previous knowledge). Themethodology was useful in that it was able to givea detailed account of how these individual experienceswere chained together and dynamically reconstructedprevious knowledge.

The present study is a qualitative analysis of theshared knowledge of the members of a basketball teamduring an official match. Thus, the course of action ofeach player during the match was reconstructed andthen synchronised. The knowledge contents that eachplayer was able to report were identified via aninterview technique of stimulated recall. The items ofthis reported knowledge were called knowledge ele-ments to emphasise that only part of their knowledgecould be accessed; that which is reportable by the actorduring ongoing activity. The analysis of knowledgeelements does not yield an exhaustive description ofplayers’ knowledge bases. It is, however, a fairlypowerful method to produce the first qualitative andknowledge-related description of team cognition dur-ing the real-time activity of a team of basketballplayers. The knowledge elements that were mobilisedwere then identified and how these knowledge elementswere shared by the players was characterised. Thechanges in these shared elements over the course of thematch (i.e. temporal view of sharedness) were thencharacterised.

Given the characteristics of the tasks in basketball(i.e. dynamic, complex and with few overtcommunications) and the team characteristics (i.e.homogeneous and highly interdependent): (a) it wasexpected that the players would show high similarity inthe knowledge they mobilised to coordinate theiractivities. Given the findings obtained in sense-makingapproaches to the knowledge mobilised by individualactors during real-time activities (e.g. Seve et al. 2005,Sieck et al. 2007): (b) it was expected that the playerswould use and reinforce certain past knowledgeelements, invalidate others and construct new ones.This would be done in such a way that the sharedknowledge of the teammates would change over thecourse of the game. Given the few opportunities tocoordinate that are available to the players during thegame: (c) it was expected that sharedness would declineand knowledge would progressively diverge.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

Nine French basketball players and their coachvolunteered for this study. The team competed at thehighest national level in the under-18 category.Although the players did not ask to remainanonymous, they were given pseudonyms to guaranteesome degree of confidentiality: Chris, Jules andBertrand were guards; Guy and Bastien were smallforwards; Vic and Vince were power forwards; Noeand Niels were centres. The participants were agedbetween 16 and 18 years old at the time of the study(mean 17.11, SD 0.60) and had been playingcompetitive basketball for 7–10 years (mean 8.22,SD 0.97).

2.2. Procedure

The players’ activity was studied during an entirematch. The team was playing in the first division of theFrench Cadets Championship (i.e. the 16 best teamsin the under-18 category) and the competition was heldin November 2007. The team was ranked first at thetime of the study. It had easily defeated its currentopponent 2 months earlier (with a 25-point lead) andhad again won the present match. The final score was74–58 and the scores in each quarter were 21–14, 17–9,27–12, 9–23.

2.3. Data collection

The data were collected according to a proceduredefined for course-of-action analysis (e.g. Seve et al.2003, Theureau 2003). Two types of data werecollected: (1) continuous audio-video recordings of

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the players’ behaviours during the match; (2)verbalisations during post-match interviews.

During the match, recordings were made withan audio-video camera (Sony DCR-SR 58; SonyCorporation, Tokyo, Japan) positioned behind andto the side of the court. A wide angle lens continuouslyfilmed all players and their opponents. The anglewas constantly adapted to follow the players’ move-ments on the court and to include as much as possiblethe four other players who were waiting on the side-lines. Another audio-video camera specifically filmedthe team briefings in the locker room (before the matchand at half-time). It also filmed the time-outs.

The verbalisation data were gathered from indivi-dual self-confrontation interviews with each of theplayers (for further details, see Theureau 2003) as soonas possible after the matches (from 24 to 48 h post-match). During the interview, the player viewed theaudio-videotape of the match together with theresearcher. The player was asked to describe andcomment on his activity during the match (what he wasdoing, feeling, thinking and perceiving during thematch). Prompts from the interviewer were designed toobtain complementary information about the actionsthat were meaningful to the player (e.g. ‘There, you’resaying that you’re waiting for Chris to call theplay. . .?’). Each of the players commented on theentire match. The interviews lasted an average of75 min and all were recorded in their entirety using acamera and a tape recorder.

2.4. Data processing

The audio-videotapes were viewed in order to draw upan inventory of the nine players’ moves. The verbalexchanges between player and researcher during theinterview were recorded and fully transcribed. Thedata were then processed in four steps: (1) generating alog of the match; (2) reconstructing individual players’courses of action; (3) synchronising the individualcourses of action; (4) identifying shared knowledge

elements and characterising their change over thecourse of the match.

2.4.1. Generating match logs

This step consisted of generating a summary table orlog containing the data collected for the match. Thedata were presented by mapping two levels of data toeach other. The first level pertained to the datarecorded during the match (i.e. descriptions of aplayer’s moves and communications). The second levelpertained to the data recorded during the post-matchinterview (i.e. verbatim transcription of the promptedverbalisations) (see Table 1).

2.4.2. Reconstructing players’ courses of action

The components of the discrete meaningful units ofactivity that constituted the course of action for eachplayer were first identified and then documented. Theseunits have personal meaning and are assumed to be theexpression of the articulation of six components(Theureau 2006). For each unit, the six componentswere documented step by step on the basis of: (a) theaudio-video recording; (b) the verbalisation transcript;(c) specific questioning. Each of the components wasdefined and illustrated with Jules’s verbalisation data(see Table 1) concerning a segment in the game whenhe was guarding his opponent and also observingNoe’s defensive play against his opponent, a centre.

The first component in each unit of activitycorresponds to the player’s concerns at a givenmoment. In accordance with the course-of-actionframework, it is called the ‘involvement in thesituation’ (Theureau 2006). The involvement in thesituation was identified by asking the followingquestion about the collected and transcribed data:‘What are the player’s significant concerns in relationto the element taken into account in the situation?’ Inthe example, Jules was seeking to mount an efficientdefence.

Table 1. Excerpt from the match log of Jules.

Observable behaviour Verbalisations of Jules

The opposing centre gets the ball andplays man-to-man with Noe

There, you have to have a good defence . . . the ball was passed to the opposingcentre, I’m monitoring my player while I keep an eye on the game . . . Noe’sopponent does a reverse.

Noe gets overwhelmed, then catchesupwith his opponent and blockshim

Noe is starting to lose it . . . but he manages to come back and block the shot.

I tell myself that Noe has done a pretty good job, the opposing centre handledthings badly, he tried to pull a fake even though it would have been quicker toshoot, that’s whyNoe was able to get back on top of things and, right when hisopponent was going to shoot, he was able to block it. But usually, there, Noewas supposed to take two points, because he fell for it, and it’s rare when hemake up for his mistakes . . .

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The second component in each unit of activitycorresponds to the elements expected by the actor inhis or her dynamic situation at a given moment, takinginto account the involvement. It is called the ‘potentialactuality’. The potential actuality was identified byasking the following questions about the collected andtranscribed data: ‘What are the player’s realisticexpectations arising from his concerns and from theelement taken into account in the situation?’, Whatresult is he waiting for?’. In the example, Jules’expectations concern the results of Noe’s man-to-man defence: he is expecting Noe to fail.

The third component in each unit of activitycorresponds to the actor’s past knowledge that canbe used at a given moment. It is called the ‘referential’.The referential was identified by asking the followingquestion about the collected and transcribed data:‘What prior element of knowledge is the player using?’.In the example, Jules was mobilising elements ofknowledge about the game in general, in that he knowsthat when a player manages to reverse the ball, hegenerally gains the upper hand and often makes abasket. He was also mobilising elements of knowledgeabout Noe, who is usually unable to make up for anymistakes in these situations.

The fourth component corresponds to the elementsof the situation that are significant to the actor at a givenmoment. It is called the ‘representamen’. It wasidentified by asking the following questions about thecollected and transcribed data: ‘What is the meaningfulelement in the situation for the player?’, ‘What elementof the situation is the player considering?’. In theexample, Jules is taking into account the fact that Noe’sopponent managed to reverse the ball.

The fifth component corresponds to the fraction ofactivity that can be shown, told and commented on bythe actor at a given moment. It is called the ‘unit ofcourse of action’. The unit may be an interpretation,physical action, communicative exchange or emotion.It was identified by asking the following questionsabout the collected and transcribed data: ‘What is theplayer doing?’, ‘What is he thinking?’, ‘What is hefeeling?’. In the example, the meaningful action forJules was to guard his direct opponent while stillkeeping an eye on the unfolding game.

The sixth component corresponds to the compo-nent of activity that is modifying elements of knowl-edge at a given moment (e.g. validation and extensionof past knowledge, construction of new knowledge). Itis called the ‘interpretant’. It was identified by askingthe following question about the collected andtranscribed data: ‘What knowledge is being con-structed, validated or invalidated by the player?’. Inthe example, the knowledge that Noe does not usuallymake up for mistakes is being destabilised.

During the game period under study, 249 discreteunits of activity were identified for Chris’ course ofaction, 429 units for Jules’, 259 for Bertrand’s, 224 forGuy’s, 185 for Bastien’s, 197 for Vic’s, 243 for Vince’s,269 for Noe’s and 321 for Niels’.

2.4.3. Synchronising the players’ courses of action

In this step, the nine courses of action weresynchronised by presenting them side by side inchronological order in the same table. To facilitate thesynchronisation, an objective description of theunfolding match was inserted, which gave the ballholder’s name, the timing of the players’ actions andthe players’ positions on the court. Table 2 shows thesynchronisation of the meaningful units of theindividual players’ activities at a given moment of thematch.

2.4.4. Identification of shared knowledge elements andcharacterisation of changes

This analysis comprised three steps: (1) theidentification of the shared knowledge; (2) thecharacterisation of the degree of sharedness of theknowledge elements; (3) the characterisation of thechange in each shared knowledge element.

The first analysis identified the shared knowledge,that is to say, the knowledge elements held in commonby the players and which appeared in the units ofactivity of the courses of actions of at least two players.Altogether, 47 shared knowledge elements wereidentified. A thematic analysis of the contents of theshared knowledge elements was performed. For thecategorisation, the knowledge elements found in thenine courses of action were grouped by content intospecific categories. For the 47 knowledge elements, thisresulted in five categories. According to groundedtheory, the contents of the knowledge elements weregrouped into larger units on the basis of two criteria:(1) the meaning of the statements; (2) the use ofcategory definitions that were discriminating enough toavoid overlapping (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Thecategories were defined step by step.

Second, the degree of sharedness of theseknowledge elements was characterised. This degree ofsharedness corresponded to the number of players whohad mobilised the knowledge element at least onceduring the course of the match and had a value rangingfrom 2 (only two players had mobilised the knowledgeelement during the match) to 9 (all the players hadmobilised the knowledge element during the match).

Third, the evolution of each shared knowledgeelement during the match was characterised on thebasis of the responses to the following questions: ‘Was

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the shared knowledge item constructed before thematch or during the match?’, ‘Was the knowledgeconstructed at the same moment for all players?’,‘Was this shared knowledge validated or invalidatedduring the match by some or all of the players?’.This analysis resulted in the characterisation of fourtypical forms of change in shared knowledgeelements during the course of the match (describedin section 3).

3. Results

From the description of the activity at the level thatwas meaningful for the players, the analysis of theknowledge elements mobilised by the players duringthis basketball match identified 47 shared knowledgeelements (Table 3): 10 elements were shared by twopartners; 16 by three partners; seven by four partners;six by five partners; five by six partners; one by eightpartners; two by nine partners. The analysis of thecontents of the shared knowledge elements revealedfive categories of knowledge about: (a) gameconditions (n¼ 3); (b) functioning of the opposingteam (n¼ 4); (c) characteristics of one’s opponents(n¼ 4); (d) functioning of one’s own team (n¼ 5); (e)characteristics of one’s teammates (n¼ 31).

The analysis of the evolution of the sharedknowledge elements revealed four characteristicforms of change: (a) the reinforcement of a previousshared knowledge element; (b) invalidation ofa shared knowledge element; (c) fragmentation of ashared knowledge element; (d) creation of a newshared knowledge element (Figure 2).

3.1. Reinforcement of a previous shared knowledgeelement

The ‘reinforcement of a previous shared knowledgeelement’ (Figure 2(a)) accounts for the followingchange. Shared knowledge elements constructed beforethe match were ‘reinforced’ during the match for eachof the players. In other words, the confidence that theplayers had in this knowledge element was greater afterthe game than before it. This form of changeconcerned 22 shared knowledge elements during thecourse of the match.

This form of change in shared knowledge isillustrated by the following knowledge element: ‘Vichas the physical qualities to perform efficiently’. Thisknowledge element showed a sharedness degree of 8. Ithad been constructed by the players during othergames and practices, when they had taken note of Vic’sphysical advantages. During the match under study,the players had mobilised this knowledge in three typesof situation: (1) when Vic chained together severalT

able

2.

Illustrationofthesynchronisationoftheninecourses

ofaction.

Extrinsic

description

Unitsofactivity

forJules

Unitsofactivity

forChris

Unitsofactivity

forGuy

Unitsofactivity

forBertrand

Unitsofactivity

forBastien

Unitsofactivity

forNoe

Unitsofactivity

forNiels

Unitsofactivity

forVince

Unitsofactivity

forVic

Theopposing

centregetsthe

ballandNoe

playsman

-to-

mandefence

Noegets

overwhelmed,

then

catches

up

withhis

opponentand

blockshim

(Ontheside-lines:

Guy,Bastien,

Niels,Vince)

E¼Todefend

effectively

A¼

Noe’sdirect

opponentis

goingto

get

awayfrom

him

S¼A

player

who

manages

areverse

generally

getstheupper

handandcan

shoot;Noe

rarelymakes

up

formistakes

R¼Noe’s

opponent

manages

areverse

butNoe

makes

upforit

U¼Guardshis

player

while

keepinganeye

onthegame

I¼NI

E¼Todefenda

zone

A¼Fastplayatthe

firstattack

S¼It’snoteasy

toblock

an

opponentwhen

youare

overwhelmed

R¼Noeisblocking

theopposing

centre

U¼Tellsselfthat

Noe’sdefence

isgood

I¼NI

E¼Towatchthe

gameunfold

A¼Slowdownthe

rhythmalittleon

thenextattack

S¼NI

R¼Noeguardsthe

opposingcentre

andblockshim

U¼Tellsselfthatit

waswelldone

I¼NI

E¼Tobein

agood

positionfora

slam

dunk

A¼Situationofa

counter-attack

S¼In

general,

when

you

suddenly

get

hold

oftheball,

youcancarry

outacounter-

attack

R¼Noegetshold

oftheball

U¼Beginsto

run

I¼NI

E¼Toobservethe

qualities

ofthe

game

A¼NI

S¼The

inform

ation

gathered

while

I’m

onthebench

helpsmeto

be

betterforthe

nextmatch

R¼Thecoach

isin

frontofmeandI

can’tseethe

game

U¼Watches

the

defence

I¼NI

E¼Todefend

effectively

A¼NI

S¼In

general,

when

there’sa

realsize

difference

betweentw

oplayers,it’s

harder

forthe

referee

R¼Imadeasm

all

foulthatwasn’t

called

U¼Guardshis

opponent

I¼Validationof

theknowledge:

‘Ingeneral,w

hen

there’sarealsize

difference

betweentw

oplayers,it’s

harder

forthe

referee’

E¼Torecover

physically

A¼Theopponent

won’tget

abasket

now

S¼Theopposing

centreisnotvery

goodnearthe

circle

R¼Noeblocksa

basket

U¼Watches

the

game

I¼Validationof

theknowledge:

‘Theopposing

centreisnotvery

goodnearthe

circle’

E¼NI

A¼NI

S¼NI

R¼Thetall

opponenttriesto

shootandNoe

blockshim

U¼Watches

the

game

I¼NI

E¼Todefendthe

zone

A¼Thecoach

isgoingto

remind

aboutforgetting

S¼Onzone

defence,Ihavea

veryspecific

place

tobeandI

sometim

esforget

that

R¼Noehasme

repositionmyself

ontheside

U¼Repositions

selfontheside

I¼Reinforcem

ent

ofthe

knowledge:

‘Onzonedefence

Ihaveavery

specificplace

tobeandI

sometim

esforget

that’

E¼involvem

entin

thesituation;A¼potentialactuality;S¼referential;R¼representamen;U¼unitofcourseofaction;I¼interpretant;NI¼notidentified.

Ergonomics 127

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Table3.

Listoftheidentified

sharedknowledgeelem

ents,theplayerswhomobilised

them

,theknowledgecategories

towhichthey

belonged,andthetypes

ofchangethey

underwent.

Players

Form

sofchange

Sharedknowledge

Jules

Chris

Guy

Bertrand

Bastien

Noe

Niels

Vince

Vic

Reinforcem

ent

Invalidation

Fragmentation

Creation

1-K

Crelatedto

thegam

econditions

1.1-When

theheatingisnotwellregulated,the

floorbecomes

slippery

xx

xx

1.2-Todaytherefereeingismediocre

xx

xx

xx

xx

xx

1.3-Todaythespectators

are

dynamic

xx

xx

xx

x

2-K

Crelatedto

thefunctioningofthe

opposingteam

2.1-Theaverage

heightofthisteam

makes

them

dan

gerousonrebound

xx

xx

2.2-Theteam

has

oneofthebesttraining

centres

inFrance

xx

xx

x

2.3-Thisteam’sgameisnottoostrongwhen

they’reattacking

xx

xx

2.4-Thisteam

isdangerousmakingoutside

shots

xx

xx

3-K

Crelatedto

thecharacteristics

ofone’s

opponents

3.1-Number

14oftheopposingteam

isdan

gerous

xx

xx

xx

x

3.2-Number

7oftheopposingteam

isreally

bad

xx

xx

3.3-Number

9oftheopposingteam

isagood

shooter

xx

xx

xx

3.4-Number

10oftheopposingteam

isnot

adroit

xx

x

4-K

Crelatedto

thefunctioningofone’steam

4.1-Ourzonepress

isaseriousthreatto

the

opposingteam

xx

xx

xx

xx

xx

4.2-Ourinsidegameisnotfocusedenough

xx

xx

x

4.3-Weoften

lose

theballin

thekeyhole

xx

xx

xx

x

4.4-O

urteamdoesn’tplayaswellinthesecond

half

xx

xx

xx

4.5-Werarely

carryoutset-playsto

theend

xx

xx

xx

x

5-K

Crelatedto

thecharacteristics

ofone’s

teammates

5.1-Vichasthephysicalqualities

toperform

efficiently

xx

xx

xx

xx

x

5.2-Vicoften

provokes

fouls

xx

xx

xx

5.3-Vicisrarelytotallycommittedto

theteam

xx

x

5.4-Vicplaysforhim

self

xx

xx

5.5-Vicdoesn’treallyknowhisroleisthezone

press

verywell

xx

xx

(continued)

128 J. Bourbousson et al.

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Table

3.(C

ontinued).

Players

Form

sofchange

Sharedknowledge

Jules

Chris

Guy

Bertrand

Bastien

Noe

Niels

Vince

Vic

Reinforcem

ent

Invalidation

Fragmentation

Creation

5.6-Vicusuallymakes

stupid

mistakes

xx

xx

x

5.7-Guyisagoodattacker

when

hehas

the

ball

xx

xx

x

5.8-Guyoften

shootsfor3points

xx

xx

x

5.9-Noeplaysforhim

self

xx

xx

5.10-Noeisaslowplayer

xx

xx

5.11-Noeisgoodatfoulshots

xx

xx

5.12-When

Noeisnotin

topform

,he’svery

clumsy

xx

xx

5.13-Noeisn’tverygoodwhen

heplayswith

hislefthan

dx

xx

x

5.14-Noeisveryadroitclose

tothecircle

xx

x

5.15-Nielsisaplayer

that

lacksattacker’s

qualities

xx

x

5.16-Nielsisadroitclose

tothecircle

xx

xx

5.17-Bertrandplaysforhim

self

xx

xx

5.18-Bertrandisadroitatlong-distantshot

xx

xx

x

5.19-Bertrandisn’tagoodpointguard

xx

x

5.20-Bertrandnever

getsinto

thekeyhole

xx

x

5.21-Chrisplaysdefence

wellbyputting

pressure

onhisopponent

xx

xx

xx

5.22-Chrisgenerallyscoreswhen

hecan

dribblebefore

shooting

xx

x

5.23-Chrisoften

simulatesfouls

xx

xx

5.24-Julesisagooddefender

xx

xx

5.25-ChrisandJulestogetherare

ableto

bring

theballto

theforecourtwithoutrisk

xx

x

5.26-ChrisandJulescan’tbebeatwhen

they

playdefence

together

xx

xx

xx

5.27-ChrisandJuleshaveabigrolein

diffi

cult

matches

xx

x

5.28-Vince

isfairly

adroitat3-pointshots

xx

xx

x

5.29-Bastienisunderestimatedbythecoach

xx

xx

xx

5.30-Bastiendoesn’thesitate

toshoot

xx

x

5.31-Bastienoften

putshim

selfin

thecorner

foranattack

xx

xx

Total

31

17

14

17

23

25

19

17

16

22

73

15

KC¼knowledgecontent.

Ergonomics 129

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highly efficient actions; (2) when Vic carried out anexploit on his own; (3) when Vic made aninappropriate decision, in terms of team routines,that turned out to be advantageous. To illustrate,excerpts of the self-confrontation interviews refer tovarious moments in the game where the analysispointed out that this knowledge element wasmobilised by various players: ‘Vic is often bigger andfaster-moving than the opposing centres, so he’s rightto go man-to-man the way he’s doing there’ (Noe,fourth minute of the game), ‘Vic is so dynamic that hecan shoot any time he wants’ (Bertrand, fifth minute)and ‘Vic is looking for an offensive rebound there andhe’ll make a basket right after; he’s got a really strongphysical presence’ (Chris, seventh minute).

Having perceived that Vic systematically domi-nated in man-to-man confrontations with an oppo-nent, the players validated the knowledge element ‘Vichas the physical qualities to perform efficiently’ severaltimes during the match. The confidence in this knowl-edge was thus greater at the end of the match than atthe beginning.

3.2. Invalidation of a shared knowledge element

The form of ‘invalidation of a shared knowledgeelement’ (Figure 2(b)) accounts for the followingchange. The elements of shared knowledgeconstructed before the match were progressivelyinvalidated during the match by each of theconcerned players. In other words, the confidencethat the players had in this knowledge elementdiminished gradually over the course of the match(more or less quickly, depending on the player), untilit was invalidated and the players stopped mobilisingit. This form of change concerned seven sharedknowledge elements during the match.

This type of change in shared knowledge isillustrated by ‘Number 14 of the opposing team isdangerous’. This knowledge presented sharedness ofdegree 6. It had been constructed during the priormatch against this team by certain of the players. Theplayers essentially mobilised this knowledge in twotypes of situations: when they tested its validity duringthe opening moves of the match; when they perceived ahigh number of ineffective moves from this opponent.

Figure 2. Diagram of the four forms of change in shared knowledge. Each box is an element of shared knowledge. (a)Reinforcement of a previous element of shared knowledge; (b) invalidation of an element of shared knowledge; (c) fragmentationof an element of shared knowledge; (d) creation of a new element of shared knowledge.

130 J. Bourbousson et al.

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Their perceptions, judgements and interpretationsduring the match were such that they gradually lostconfidence in this element of knowledge. To illustrate,Chris and Bastien questioned its validity from thebeginning of the match: ‘14 makes a lot of uselessmoves, he gets into trouble all by himself’ (Chris, thirdminute) and ‘This 14 doesn’t seem to be anythingspecial, he’s not as good as all that’ (Bastien, fourthminute). Several times, Bertrand and Noe observedthat their opponent’s level of play was not as good aswhat they had been expecting: ‘14 made a poor choiceabout shooting, and he’s played badly several timesnow’ (Noe, 12th minute) and ‘Number 14 has lost theball a couple of times now while trying to bring it upcourt’ (Bertrand, 14th minute). Vince definitivelyinvalidated the pre-constructed knowledge about theplaying level of 14 at the 15th minute of play when 14missed a pass: ‘In fact, this 14 is not all that great—andso much the better for us’.

The six players had mobilised the knowledge that‘Number 14 of the opposing team is dangerous’ butthen progressively lost confidence in this knowledgeand invalidated it.

3.3. Fragmentation of a shared knowledge element

The ‘fragmentation of a shared knowledge element’form (Figure 2) accounts for the following type ofchange. The elements of shared knowledge constructedbefore the match had different ‘evolutions’, dependingon the player. Some players had even greaterconfidence in the knowledge, others lost confidence init, still others invalidated it and the remaining playersdecided that it was valid in some situations but not inothers, thereby expressing a certain scepticism. Thistype concerned three shared knowledge elementsduring the match.

This form of change in shared knowledge isillustrated by ‘Our zone press is a serious threat tothe opposing team’. This element had a degree ofsharedness of 9. It concerned a particular defensivestrategy and had been constructed by the players andcoach during the prior match against this team. Thecoach reminded the players just before this match thatthe defensive strategy would be important. The playersmobilised this knowledge several times during thematch. Their judgements about the effectiveness of thestrategy varied widely, in such a way that by the end ofthe match this knowledge element showed severalforms of change, depending on the player. At the endof the match, two players (Bastien and Noe) hadreinforced their confidence in this knowledge, twoplayers (Bertrand and Vic) had lost confidence in it,two players (Jules and Vince) had invalidated it andthree (Chris, Guy and Niels) were undecided in that the

validity of this element had varied with the moment inthe game (it seems valid in some situations and invalidin others). The divergence in the items taken intoaccount by the players and in the judgements made incertain game situations explained in great part thediversity of evolutions of this shared pre-matchknowledge: ‘Our zone press is a serious threat to theopposing team’.

Bastien and Noe reinforced this knowledge elementin that they were particularly aware of the majorerrors made by the opposing team. To illustrate, theself-confrontation excerpts that follow refer tomoments in the game where the analysis pointed outthat this knowledge element was validated. Thisvalidation occurred after Bastien and Noe saw theiropponents repeatedly lose the ball: ‘It’s only thebeginning of the match and already we’ve stolen theball a couple of times, they’re making some really bigmistakes’ (Noe, fifth minute) and ‘They just lost theball again, they seem to be shaken up by our zonepress’ (Bastien, eighth minute).

This element became highly suspect for Bertrandand Vic, who several times perceived that an opponentspeeded up his play in response and got into positionto shoot. To illustrate, after some interpretation aboutthe effectiveness of his team’s defensive play, Bertrandlost confidence in this knowledge element: ‘Theircounter-attack succeeded, and that’s twice now that wedidn’t get back into defensive position’ (Bertrand, sixthminute).

Jules and Vince were particularly aware ofsituations of ineffective defensive play and invalidatedthis knowledge element. To illustrate, the self-confrontation excerpts that follow refer to moments inthe game where the analysis showed that Julesinvalidated this knowledge on the basis of very fewobservations of the ineffectiveness of their zone press:‘If they make quick passes like that to attack our press,we’re dead, we’ll never bounce back’ (Jules, fourthminute). The second excerpt reflects the moment whenJules definitively invalidated this knowledge: ‘Our zonepress isn’t working anymore’ (Jules, 35th minute).

Chris, Guy and Niels neither validated norinvalidated the knowledge during the match. Theirjudgements in various situations revealed that theysometimes found the zone press effective andsometimes not and they remained indecisive about thiselement of shared knowledge. The self-confrontationexcerpts that follow reflect the range of thesejudgements. At certain moments, these playersmobilised this knowledge element to interpret specificgame situations: ‘They’ll have to make some changes[in players] if they’re going to try to deal with our zonepress’ (Chris, second minute) and ‘We really sloweddown their attempt to bring the ball up court’ (Guy,

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third minute). At other moments, the validity of thisknowledge was under question: ‘This time, they reallyattacked our zone press well’ (Chris, third minute) and‘Our zone press was off, we took too much time gettingback into defensive position’ (Niels, 35th minute).

3.4. Creation of a new shared knowledge element

The ‘creation of a new shared knowledge element’(Figure 2(d)) accounts for the following change. Newelements of shared knowledge were constructed duringthe match by certain players (between three and nineplayers, depending on the new constructed knowl-edge). This type of change concerned 15 sharedknowledge elements during the match.

This type of change in shared knowledge isillustrated by the element ‘Today the refereeing ismediocre’. None of the players knew the referees beforethe match. At the end of the match, this knowledgeshowed a degree of 9 for sharedness. The reiteration ofthree types of situation contributed to the creation andthen the reinforcement of this knowledge. No foul (orany violation) called for a play that should have beenfouled, a foul (or a violation) called for a play thatshould not have been fouled and an inadequateexplanation for calling a foul (or a violation). Toillustrate, the self-confrontation excerpts that followrefer to various moments in the game where the analysispointed out that this knowledge element was con-structed by the players. ‘It wasn’t called, the refereesdidn’t see Vic’s foul, things worked out OK for Victhere’ (Jules, sixth minute), ‘Not a very good call there,the referee called an out-of-bounds violation when infact it was a travelling violation’ (Noe, 17th minute) and‘There the referee called a foul that didn’t happen, it’sincredible to do that and in fact this is the second time’(Niels, 23rd minute). The two self-confrontation ex-cerpts that follow reflect the reliability of the newlyconstructed knowledge. ‘The refereeing was no goodtoday’ (Guy, 12th minute) and ‘Towards the end of thematch, the referees were blowing their whistles like abunch of beginners’ (Noe, 36th minute).

This construction of new shared knowledge re-sulted in identical and repeated judgements about therefereeing events that occurred during this match.

4. Discussion

In industrial/organisational, military and sports psy-chology, teamwork analysis has mostly been con-ducted with the idea of highlighting that whichcontributes to the attainment of a hypothetical‘common ground’ within the team (Clark and Marshall1998, Hoc 2001, Grehaigne et al. 2004, Nyssen 2007).Shared knowledge is assumed to be one of the main

components of optimal team functioning, notably byfacilitating the coordination of a homogeneous andhighly interdependent team, whose individuals share acomplex and dynamic situation. In order to explore thedynamic nature of knowledge that is mobilised in areal situation and to investigate the changes in thesharedness of knowledge, the present study wasqualitative and based on the ability of expert athletesto give a precise account of their thoughts (Ericssonand Simon 1980). Thus, their ongoing cognitions asthey played were reconstructed. Although this studycould only account for a certain level of knowledgemobilised by the basketball players (i.e. the knowledgereportable by the athletes), it generated original resultsabout how shared knowledge changed during thecourse of a time of activity. The results are discussed infour parts in relation to: (a) the heterogeneous anddynamic nature of the common ground concerning thedegree of sharedness of the knowledge; (b) theheterogeneous and dynamic nature of the commonground concerning the knowledge contents; (c) thesimilarity of individual knowledge refashioning; (d) thepractical and theoretical implications.

4.1. Degree of the sharedness of knowledge: whatabout shared understanding in a highly interdependentteam?

The analysis of the degree of knowledge sharednessshowed that the knowledge mobilised was rarelyshared by all members of the team. More than half ofthe shared knowledge elements identified had asharedness degree of 2 or 3. These results indicate theimportance of local sharing of understanding (betweenonly certain players) and recall the conceptualisationsabout distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995) and DSA(Salmon et al. 2009) used to describe the transitoryshared understanding occurring in socio-technicalcollaborative systems. By pointing to the heterogeneitywithin the common ground regarding degrees ofsharedness, the current results again question theassumptions about sharedness in the literature,particularly in studies dealing with sharedunderstanding in homogeneous interdependent teams.

According to the literature, the forms of sharednessrequired for efficient team functioning are assumed todepend on the task requirements (McGrath 1984) andthe team structure (Wageman 1995, Cohen and Bailey1997). Tasks that offer few ‘opportunities tocoordinate’ (i.e. in which the requirements for taskperformance do not allow the partners to communicateexplicitly) (Cannon-Bowers and Bowers 2006) requireknowledge sharedness in the form of similarity,whereas tasks that offer a great many opportunities forcoordination during their performance allow for more

132 J. Bourbousson et al.

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diversified forms of sharedness (Stout et al. 1996). Thesimilarity mode is reported to be most efficient forteams with high interdependence among members(Saavedra et al. 1993) and a low degree of taskspecialisation (homogeneous teams). In contrast, whenthe degree of interdependence is low and the degree oftask specialisation is high, sharedness occurs in themodes of complementarity and distribution (Cookeand Gorman 2006 , Salmon et al. 2008a, Stanton et al.2009). As an illustration, this form of sharedness (e.g.the understanding needed for efficient teamfunctioning is not totally shared among the members)has been observed in shared SA investigation. Salmonand colleagues highlighted that:

Team members each experience a situation in differentways (as defined by their own personal experience,goals, roles, training, knowledge, and skills and so on)and therefore their awareness is compatible rather thanshared. (Salmon et al. 2009, p. 208)

In any case, this form of sharedness has essentiallybeen pointed out in transitory shared understandinginvestigation and often in teams that are quite large,distributed in time and space and characterised by lowinterdependence between members (Gorman et al.2006, Salmon et al. 2008a).

A recent study of a basketball team that could becharacterised as homogeneous, highly interdependentand with few opportunities to coordinate began toquestion the notion of sharedness conceived exclu-sively in terms of similarity. This investigation of thecognitive coordination modes between teammatesshowed that team cognition was constructed essentiallyfrom chains of local coordinations and it suggestedthat local sharing of understanding seemed to besufficient to ensure coordinated collective activity(Bourbousson et al. 2010 a,c). It was not possible inthe present study to identify with accuracy thesituations in which certain forms of knowledgesharedness were associated with maximal team effi-ciency. It can nevertheless be concluded that the teamwas overall efficient (they won the match), althoughefficiency (i.e. score difference) declined in the fourthquarter. Also, in light of Salmon et al.’s (2009)observations, the present results question the viabilityof shared understanding conceived exclusively in termsof the similarity of the knowledge elements possessedby the members of a small interdependent andhomogeneous team acting in a shared space. First,most of the mobilised knowledge was not shared by allmembers. Second, those elements that were shared by ahigh number of players sometimes had differentevolutions during the match, depending on the player,giving rise to new forms of knowledge sharedness. Theplayers of this team shared a certain understanding of

the competitive interaction but the form of sharednesshas to be described as more complex and plural thanclassically assumed for teammates with relatively lowtask specialisation and high interdependence. Thisleads the present authors to think that teamfunctioning, whatever its characteristics, is based onseveral forms of shared understanding. Furtherinvestigations could focus on how the various forms ofsharedness are manifested in dynamic and complexsettings and how they constantly change in relation tothe effects produced in the situation by the teamactivity.

4.2. Contents of the common ground: heterogeneousand dynamic aspects

The analysis of the contents of the shared elementsof knowledge identified five categories of knowledgecontent mobilised by the players during the match.This knowledge was mobilised by the players toconstruct an understanding of their presentinteraction and it oriented their decisions aboutactions to take. Most of the knowledge shared andmobilised by this basketball team concerned thecharacteristics of the team itself (characteristics of theteam members and team functioning). However,most studies on team cognition have focused on theunderstanding that teams construct about theirenvironment and they have paid little attention tothe understanding that teams construct aboutthemselves (Lim and Klein 2006, Uitdewilligen et al.2010). This neglect of ‘internal’ team aspects mayhave been due to the research tradition of centringon task-oriented analyses and a prescriptiveconception of activity—apprehended independentlyof the actors acting and the meanings that theyconstruct in situations (Uitdewilligen et al. 2010).Also, strong focus on a shared understanding aboutthe team environment may be due to theexperimental conditions in which many of the studieswere conducted (Lim and Klein 2006). In thesesituations, the ‘team members’ (the subjects) had tocoordinate but often did not know one another andwere engaged in relatively simple, discrete and clearlydefined tasks for which future events could bereasonably anticipated. Lim and Klein’s (2006)interpretations lead the present authors to think thatcomplex real-world studies would provide strongerevidence of the role of shared knowledge about theteam’s inner workings:

in the field, where tasks are relatively uncertain andunpredictable, team members’ shared expectations ofteam processes may facilitate coordination anddecision making. (Lim and Klein 2006, p. 407)

Ergonomics 133

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The present naturalistic study has much in commonwith these interpretations, in that these results pointedout the major role of knowledge about the character-istics of the team itself, mobilised by the teammates inorder to understand their situation of competitiveinteraction (and to update this understanding asneeded). This study suggested a certain heterogeneityin the team’s common ground of knowledge contentsin competitive interaction. The teammates sought tounderstand the here-and-now functioning of their teamin order to interpret the match. This investigation ofknowledge contents in basketball thus lends support tosome of the criticisms made about SA studies: thatthey often do not take into account the understandingthat the individual or the team has of its own activity(Uitdewilligen et al. 2010).

The present results also pointed out the changes inshared knowledge content during a match. Previousstudies using a knowledge-based approach to indivi-dual cognitive activity performed situated analyses toassess the individual mobilised knowledge of experttable tennis players during competition (Seve et al.2002, 2005). These studies showed how the knowledgeelaborated before and during a match was continu-ously revised in accordance with the subjective appro-priation of events by the players as they unfolded. Asthe table tennis match progressed, the players re-inforced some elements of their knowledge, invalidatedothers and constructed new ones. These findings on themodalities of dynamic knowledge construction duringcompetition suggested the hypothetical aspect ofknowledge. The degree of confidence that the tabletennis players had in their knowledge was constantlyand dynamically being modified as events unfolded. Insimilar fashion, each member of the basketball teamalso reconstructed knowledge in relation to teamactivity, reporting differences in the elements thatwere taken into account and the judgements made inthe unfolding game situation. These individual recon-structions led to changes in the shared knowledge andthis finding clearly underlines the fluctuating anddynamic character of the common ground at the scaleof a match. It confirms the promising nature ofdynamic investigation of shared knowledge that ismobilised in real-time performance by pointing outsome of the cognitive phenomena that have beenunder-addressed in the team cognition literature.

4.3. Similarity of individual knowledge refashioning

The present results also question the relationshipbetween communication and knowledge convergence.Many of the studies that have sought to model thedynamics of sharing phenomena (McComb 2008,Kennedy and McComb 2010, McComb et al. 2010)

assumed that knowledge would be increasingly sharedover time and that this knowledge convergence wouldbe facilitated by explicit communication betweenpartners about shared understanding. The currentresults are therefore interesting because, most of thetime, the basketball players did not overtlycommunicate about an identified shared knowledgeelement. This particularity supported one of theresearch hypotheses: fluctuations in sharedness couldlead to a divergence in the evolutions of sharedknowledge elements over the time of the game and toconflicting interpretations within the team.

As illustrated with the form of change‘fragmentation of shared knowledge’, such divergenceis a distinct possibility, even within an expert team, andmore explicit communication between players mighthelp them to avoid this danger. It should neverthelessbe noted that the fragmentation of shared knowledgewas infrequent (n¼ 3) and that, most of the time, thefluctuations in sharedness facilitated the constructionof similar understandings by several players. Thus,although the present study demonstrated thatmobilised knowledge was often shared by a smallnumber of players and was quite diverse in content, italso indicated that this knowledge was mainly modifiedby a ‘collective evolution’ of refashioning. Asillustrated by the collective invalidation of an elementof knowledge about the quality of play of number 14from the opposing team, the present results showedthat the teammates modified their knowledge in similarways during the match. Thus, the evolution of a sharedelement of knowledge was often similar for all players(29 shared knowledge elements had the same evolutionduring the match and 15 new shared elements wereconstructed). This phenomenon facilitated theadoption of a common perspective on the game.

The knowledge convergence observed in thisbasketball team did not seem to be directly caused byexplicit communication. The briefings during time-outsand at half-time did not concern the identified sharedknowledge elements, nor did the few verbalcommunications that the players reported during theinterviews. This suggests that the factors facilitatingknowledge convergence cannot be reduced to real-timeexplicit communication between teammates and thussuggests two lines of interpretation.

First, if this convergence did not arise from explicitcommunication, it may be explained by the players’common situation and their access to the sameinformation. In fact, Clark and Brennan (1991)proposed that co-presence, visibility and co-temporality are important properties of socialsituations that could contribute to the common groundbetween actors being updated without necessarily theneed for explicit communication. In this view, the

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shared knowledge revision process is mediated by theshared situation, which to a certain extent led theplayers to construct similar interpretations of the gameand to undergo converging changes in knowledge.However, recent studies in basketball have shown thatplayers do not necessarily take the same events intoaccount at the same instant in the shared space(Bourbousson et al. 2010c), which suggests the needto revise this initial interpretation. If a perception of asituation at a given instant is not shared by all players,yet the players all reconstruct their knowledge in asimilar fashion, it may be proposed that the events thatlead to a ‘collective evolution’ in knowledge aresufficiently recurrent (i.e. they appear at differentmoments in the match) to be perceived andinterpreted in the same manner by several players. Asan illustration, in the match studied here, events suchas refereeing errors, the failed moves of opponentnumber 14 and the exploits of Vic occurred oftenenough to be perceived and interpreted in the samemanner by several players. Thus, one may thinkthat the refashioning process was mediated by thesituation and that it was essentially the temporalredundancy of information that led the players toconstruct convergent interpretations. In some cases,the situation as the mediating factor was not sufficientto produce a convergence of interpretations. This wasthe case, for example, regarding the judgements aboutthe effectiveness of the zone press. The events weresuch that judgements were diverse, as different items ofinformation were available and thus offered severalpossible interpretations. Despite the numerous eventsconcerning it, the knowledge item ‘Our zone press is aserious threat to the opposing team’ showed differentdirections of change among the players.

Second, the preceding interpretation can be com-plemented by a second one about the sharedness ofembodied knowledge by the players. Although theknowledge contents reported in this study (concerningthe characteristics of one’s teammates and opponents,the functioning of one’s team and the opposing team)were to a certain extent distributed and divergentwithin this homogeneous team, it is neverthelessassumed that adaptive team functioning presupposesa certain degree of knowledge sharedness. Thissharedness would concern, among other things,practical knowledge or reasoning modes about howto validate/invalidate knowledge that are mobilised inthe background to interpret the unfolding situation.Sharedness would facilitate smooth changes in theteam’s common ground so that teammates wouldcontinue to function harmoniously. The present study,in taking account of only a certain level of knowledgeactivated by the basketball players (i.e. the knowledgereportable by the athletes), thus suggests that these

procedures were embodied and not directly reportableby the players. These elements of individual embodiedbackground may be assumed to be an importantcomponent of common ground contents that allow ahomogeneous team to be highly adaptive in settingswith few opportunities to coordinate. A betterunderstanding of this practical knowledge and the roleof shared space seems likely to provide vital insightinto how shared knowledge on a team is constantlyconstructed and reconstructed.

The current study was nevertheless limited in that itcould only account for the communications that weresignificant for the players. It would be of interest toconduct studies that give a precise account of theverbal/non-verbal and intentional/unintentionalcommunications, using specific methodologies, such asthose used in ethnomethodological analyses ofinteraction (Heath and Luff 1992, Goodwin 1994,2000, 2007) or the ethnographic methods from socialsciences (Walker et al. 2010).

4.4. Practical and theoretical implications

The present naturalistic study of the cognitions ofexperts involved in team play confirmed some of theresults obtained in the framework of individual activity;notably, the situated character of knowledge that isrevised over the course of the game. At a relational levelof analysis, the revision of individual knowledge maythreaten team effectiveness, by leading to a certaindeconstruction of the common ground (although thisappeared to be rare). The training methods that havebeen developed to help to improve the coordination ofvarious types of teams (such as project managementteams in business, surgical teams in hospitals, militaryteams or air crew interacting with air traffic controllers)usually emphasise the importance of knowledgemanagement, especially to reduce the number of explicitcommunications needed for coordination and thus tofacilitate team functioning in intensive work situations.Methods such as communication training and trainingfor adaptability, pre-performance attitudes and teamself-correction are all assumed to improve theadaptability of team functioning. Other trainingmethods have also been proposed to specifically increaseknowledge sharedness, essentially pre-briefing, post-briefing and cross-training (Cannon-Bowers andBowers 2006). Since shared understanding is rarelycompletely pre-regulated before team performance, thepresent exploratory study suggests that trainingmethods have to develop further in the direction of teamadaptiveness.

In this sense, this study has implications foroptimising training to help teammates to adaptknowledge similarly. Specifically, the current study

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suggests that existing training methods need to focusmore on the learning of practical knowledge (abouthow a team member should validate/invalidateknowledge). By doing so, the individual knowledgeelements that are being refashioned during activity mayconverge and the ‘collective evolution’ of knowledgemay be facilitated; notably, in highly complex anddynamic settings. Second, in the case of insufficientembodied knowledge and in shared situations withoutsufficient constraints (both assumed to facilitateadaptive shared understanding), innovative practicesthat are centred on online shared knowledgemanagement should be encouraged. Such methodsshould allow for the revision and updating of sharingduring the actual team activity. For example, a team canimprove its online mastery of knowledge sharingthrough intensive practice at making the most of thevery few opportunities for overt communication. Themoments in a match when task demands are reducedcan be used for common ground updating, with playerscommunicating to their teammates the respectivechanges in their understanding of the situation.Training methods should be developed to teach teammembers to use these opportunities for coordination asthey appear, in order to regularly check and updateknowledge sharedness by the team.

This exploratory study also suggests two principaldirections for research. The first is to continue studyingthe forms of sharedness in various types of teams, withthe goal of determining the conditions for efficacy ofeach form. The use of specific performance indicatorswould help to understand the relationships between theobserved sharedness forms and the constraints andeffects that they produce. The goal of the seconddirection would be to develop temporal analyses of teamcognition constructs. This exploratory study suggeststhat the characterisation of sharedness forms should beextended by a study of how they evolve in the course ofactivity. This calls for a broader investigation of activitythrough the simultaneous analyses of the cognitions andbehaviours produced by members of a team.

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