Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication

John R. CarlsonBaylor University

Hankamer School of BusinessDepartment of Information Systems

Waco, Texas 76798-8005Voice: (254) 710-4604

E-mail: john_carlson@baylor.edu

Joey F. GeorgeIMS Department

College of BusinessFlorida State UniversityTallahassee, FL 32311Voice: (850) 644-7449

E-mail: jgeorge@garnet.acns.fsu.edu

Judee K. BurgoonCenter for the Management of Information

University of ArizonaTucson, AZ 85721

Voice: (520) 621-5818E-mail: judee@email.arizona.edu

Mark AdkinsCenter for the Management of Information

University of ArizonaTucson, AZ 85721

Voice: (520) 621-2603E-mail: madkins@cmi.arizona.edu

Cindy H. WhiteDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of Colorado, Boulder

Boulder, CO 80309-0270Voice : (303) 492-5022

E-mail : cindy.white@colorado.edu

_____________________Acknowledgements: Portions of this research were supported by funding from the U.S. Air Force Officeof Scientific Research. The views, opinions, and/or findings in this report are those of the authors andshould not be construed as an official Department of the Air Force position, policy, or decision.

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Organizational life presents many situations where organizational members must

determine how to manage information that they possess. A worker must decide whether or not

to tell her supervisor that a proposed initiative is likely to fail; an account manager must decide

what to tell a client about a delay on a much needed order. A team member wishing to influence

a decision being made by the team must decide whether or not to share information he has that

might not help his agenda. Deciding whether and how to deliver bad news is one thing (cf.

Sussman & Sproull, 1999) -- deciding to cover up bad news through deception is another.

Dilemmas related to truth and deception are not unusual events in the work world. Although

there has been considerable work on communication in organizations, and researchers have been

attentive to problems surrounding accurate or efficient communication, researchers have paid

relatively little attention to understanding the dynamics of deception in organizations.

Researchers have found that deceptive communication is part of many types of interaction, yet

few researchers have explicitly addressed the issue of lying in the context of organizational life

(Buller & Burgoon, 1994; DePaulo, Stone & Lassiter, 1985; Knapp & Comadena, 1979;

Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981).

Given that computer-mediated communication (CMC) has become pervasive in all types

of organizations, we would expect employees to utilize information technology, in addition to

their use of more traditional communication channels such as telephone and face-to-face

communication, to transmit deceptive information. In support of this, recent models of CMC

posit that many of the relational processes that occur in face-to-face communication also emerge

in contexts where IT is used (Saunders, Robey, & Vaverek, 1994; Walther, 1994, 1997). In fact,

there is evidence that the ability afforded by computer-mediated communication to manage self-

presentation can even exaggerate some of these relational processes -- such as a desire to be seen

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in a positive light, which may reasonably lead to the use of additional ingratiation and impression

management tactics that may include deception.

This convergence of IT and deception in the work place has largely been a neglected

topic. However, information technologies designed to help individuals communicate and work

together may provide especially fertile ground for deceptive interaction (Zmud, 1990), even

though veracity is generally assumed when people use these technologies (Kling, 1991; Kraut &

Higgins, 1989; Walther, 1997). Recently, George and Carlson (1999) proposed a model of

deceptive communication and detection moderated by the communication technology used.

However, the major focus of this model was to examine the impact of media choice and

participant experiences on deception and detection. As such, the model did not examine in detail

the potential motivators for both the deceiver and the receiver. Moreover, the model emphasized

deception in an asynchronous communication mode (such as e-mail), and was therefore not

readily applicable to other modalities.

In this paper, we attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of deceptive communication

as part of normal organizational work processes, focusing in particular on communication that is

mediated by computers. This comprehensive picture includes the motivations of deceivers to

deceive, their natural or learned ability to do so, the motivations of message receivers to detect

deception, deception detection success, and the impact of communication media on both the

decision of how to lie and the ability to detect deception. We also introduce deceivers’ and

receivers’ experiences with the medium, co-interactant, context, and message (Carlson & Zmud,

1999), a cluster of experiential features that we posit will affect both the ability to deceive and

the ability to detect deception. To flesh out our picture, we review various literatures, including

those in information systems, psychology, management, and communication. We then develop a

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model of deception, computer-mediated communication, and deception detection, and derive

several propositions from the model to guide future research in this area.

Deceptive Communication

As a starting point, it is useful to define deception. Deception is “a message knowingly

transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the receiver” (Buller & Burgoon,

1996, p. 205). In other words, deception is an intentional act that occurs when communicators

control information in a message to create a particular effect. Using this definition, deception

may take a variety of forms ranging from its most direct form, fabrication, to more subtle forms

like half-truths, vagueness, equivocations, and concealments (e.g., Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero,

Afifi, & Feldman, 1996).

There is ample evidence that deception, in a variety of forms, is a part of everyday life

(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; Turner, Edgley & Olmstead, 1975).

People deceive one another about all sorts of matters from the mundane, such as opinions about

appearance, to the essential, such as courtroom testimony. In addition, there are established

streams of literature investigating “impression management” (e.g., Krauss, 1981), power and

politics (e.g., Pfeffer, 1992), and negotiation behaviors (e.g., Lewicki, 1983; Pinkley, et al.,

1995) in organizations – all forms of communication that often contain a deceptive component.

Despite the prevalence of deception in everyday life (or perhaps because of it), people are

typically poor detectors of deception (Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1982; Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu,

& Rockwell, 1994). In fact, people are able to detect deception at a level only slightly better than

chance (Feeley & deTurck, 1995; Miller & Stiff, 1993). Although it is not completely clear why

people are poor lie detectors, one potential explanation is related to the fundamental nature of

communication. Communication is made possible by cooperation that requires senders and

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receivers to work together in trying to understand the meaning of what is being said -- they

attend to the intended meaning of a message. For instance, when a boss asks an employee who

failed to show up for work where she was yesterday, the employee will respond with information

about why she was absent; she will not provide the boss with a complete story of where she was

and what she was doing. This means that when we communicate, we are attempting to make

sense of what another has said, and a basic assumption that we make in this attempt is that the

message is comprehensible and truthful (McCornack, 1992). This assumption is called truth bias,

defined as a predisposition to assume truthfulness, or trust (Levine & McCornack, 1992).

Of course, there are circumstances in which individuals recognize that a message may not

be truthful. In the courtroom, in interview situations, negotiation contexts, supervisor-

subordinate relationships, and a number of other settings, communicators may be attuned to the

possibility that not all information provided to them is entirely truthful. In situations such as

these, where an individual’s suspicion is aroused, communicators tend to examine message cues

more intently to try to determine the veracity of a message. One reason that these cues are seen

as indicators of deception is that deception has typically been thought of as a communication

action that is demanding and anxiety-provoking for the deceiver. Thus, researchers have assumed

that some evidence of lying will be “leaked out” in communication behaviors (e.g., in how a

particular sentence is phrased or through certain body motions that accompany the message)

(Ekman & Friesen, 1969). There are several cues that are potentially available to any message

recipient that could provide evidence for deception and/or create heightened suspicion. These

include verbal cues, including language style and message content; nonverbal cues, including

auditory, visual, spatial and temporal behavior accompanying verbal messages; and contextual

cues, including environmental features and aspects of the communication channel that provide a

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frame of reference for the messages being exchanged. Interactions among two or more of these

cues are referred to as meta-cues.

Verbal cues: Language style

Linguistic cues available to the receiver are ones related to the manner in which the

message is either spoken or written (Buller, Burgoon, Buslig, & Roiger, 1994, 1996). In fact,

“language style” is an important characteristic of computer-mediated communication because it

is one of the few cues used to generate impressions and supply relational information (Adkins &

Brashers, 1995). Whether impressions are positive or negative, message receivers use them to

determine future communication strategy and to determine whether someone is lying. This

makes language style an important variable in the general study of deceptive communication.

With increased use of computer-mediated communication (CMC), where there is often little

more to the message than the words themselves, the style and formatting of language itself

becomes an even more important clue to deception.

One language variable that may influence perceptions is powerful and powerless

speaking styles (O’Barr, 1982). Powerless language style can reflect low social status or low

social power of the speaker. A powerless language style is defined by the overuse of polite forms

(“Yes, sir”), hedges (“I sort of did”), hesitations (“I...uh...like this”), deictic phrases (indirect

references, such as, “That man over there…”), intensifiers (“He really did”), and tag questions

(“It is, isn’t it?”). Powerful language style is defined as the opposite of powerless language,

where one uses fluent, terse, and direct speech (Bradac & Mulac, 1984). Clearly, while users of

powerless language styles are not necessarily low in social power or social status, they may be

perceived as such because of these linguistic cues. For instance, when eyewitnesses testifying in

a trial use a powerless language style, they are perceived as less credible, less attractive, and less

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persuasive by observers (O’Barr, 1982). However, message sources also may intentionally use

powerless or weaker linguistic forms as a means of distancing or disassociating themselves from

message contents and making statements more tentative. Powerless speech also makes deceivers

appear submissive and, by inference, less responsible for their communication. Thus, this

strategic use of language may reduce their apparent culpability and attributions of responsibility

or guilt, thereby attenuating receivers’ belief that the message is being deceptive. Exemplars

include past tense verbs, qualifiers, indefinite pronouns, absence of pronouns, and verbal hedges.

Bradac and Mulac (1984: 307) summarize the research on language style by saying that

“messages exhibiting the linguistic indicants of powerlessness have consistently produced

relatively low ratings of speaker power in experimental research.” The experiments that have

produced these results have typically asked participants to assess the characteristics of an

individual using a powerless or powerful style. This research has produced seemingly valid and

reliable results, but it has focused primarily on situations where a single message is attributed to

an individual.

Additional support for the premise that language style is a potentially valid indicator of

deceptive communication comes from several studies (e.g., Buller, Burgoon, Buslig, & Roiger,

1994, 1996; Cody et al., 1984; DePaulo et al., 1985; Stiff & Miller, 1986; Stiff et al., 1990;

Zuckerman, et al., 1986), indicating that deceivers are more reticent (less involved) than truth-

tellers, use fewer unique words, use more negative statements, use more indirect forms of

expression (i.e., use more third person and less personal reference), use more leveling (or

generalizing) terms, and have greater lexical diversity (larger type-token ratio, that is, adjectives

and adverbs versus nouns).

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Verbal cues: Message content

As opposed to linguistic cues, which pertain to the manner and style in which language is

used, content cues refer to specific informational attributes (or perceived attributes) of a

message. For example, while a deceiver may use either a powerful or powerless language style,

if statements in a message are in partial or direct contradiction to each other, this may be an

informational aspect of message content that signals the possibility of deception. Generally,

when compared to truth tellers, deceivers give less plausible responses, use obfuscation and

vagueness to avoid being caught in making outright false statements, provide more irrelevant

information, are not able to add much detail to responses, and offer briefer, less detailed

responses (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). At least some of this content

manipulation is strategic: Deceivers intentionally manage message information to make it less

veridical, less complete, less clear, less relevant and direct, and less personalized (i.e., accounts

of events may be devoid of references to the deceiver or other people) (Burgoon, Buller,

Guerrero, Afifi, & Feldman, 1996). They may also enlist the receiver in the construction of

plausible lies by accepting or building upon whatever interpretations and accounts the receiver

offers (Burgoon, Buller, Floyd & Grandpre, 1996).

Nonverbal cues

Beyond linguistic cues available in the spoken and written word, there are a variety of

nonverbal cues available to communicators (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Buller, Burgoon, White, &

Ebesu, 1994; Burgoon & Buller, 1994; Burgoon, Buller, White, Afifi, & Buslig, 1999). These

are cues that are not part of the verbal or textual content of the message but which accompany

the delivery of the message (e.g., where speakers are looking, what they are doing with their

hands, whether they are smiling, their tempo and pitch level, the fluency of their speech, etc.).

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They include body movements, eye contact, gestures, facial expressions, vocal features, and use

of distance or space, among others.

Research indicates that communicators depend more heavily on nonverbal than verbal

cues when attempting to detect deception (DePaulo et al., 1980; Hurd & Noller, 1990; Stiff et al.,

1990), and considerable research attention has been devoted to identifying the specific nonverbal

cues that reveal deception. However, the number of cues that have been identified as highly

reliable, diagnostic indicators is small. Zuckerman and Driver (1985) conducted a meta-analysis

of work completed to that time and identified the following cues as indicative of deceit: adaptors,

blinking, pupil dilation, speech errors, voice pitch, hand shrugs, and facial and bodily

segmentation. These were positively correlated with deception, indicating that deceivers use

more adaptors and blink more frequently than truth tellers. Adaptors include self-grooming

behaviors and the cues we often associate with nervousness, such as touching oneself or nervous

movement of objects like pens. Other cues that have emerged in research conducted since the

meta-analysis include pauses, response latencies, hand and leg gestures, eye contact, and

message duration (deTurck & Miller, 1985; Vrij, 2000). Importantly, the deTurck and Miller

experiment sought to parse out what behaviors are truly indicative of deceit as opposed to

arousal. They found six cues that distinguished deceivers from both unaroused and aroused (i.e.,

experiencing sympathetic activation) truthtellers: Deceivers used more adaptors and hand

gestures, had more speech errors, more pauses, and longer response latencies, and spent less time

answering questions than aroused truth tellers. The authors concluded that these behaviors can be

reliably associated with deception rather than arousal per se. Other behaviors they studied--

blinking and gaze avoidance—failed to differentiate deceivers from aroused truth tellers.

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Contextual cues

In addition, there may be factors associated with the context of the communication event

that cue a message recipient to deceptive content (e.g., Buller & Burgoon, 1997). For example,

information received from a used-car salesperson about a vehicle for sale may, independent of

any content or message delivery related cues, be examined much more closely due to the context.

In addition, the literature suggests that some media are capable of communicating degrees of

“social context” with a message, that is, information about the social status, social intimacy, and

normative history of the communicators (Walther, 1994, 1997).

Meta-cues

Finally, there may be a detectable interaction between two or more of these sets of cues

that will itself serve as an additional cue (i.e., a “meta-cue”). Bond, Omar, Pitre, Lashley,

Skaggs, and Kirk (1992) found that when people deceive, they often enact nonverbal cues that

are “out of sync” with the verbal message and with the other nonverbal cues they are sending.

Receivers were able to spot this asynchrony and indicated they thought something suspicious

was going on. These findings are consistent with Expectancy Violations Theory (Burgoon, 1978)

and Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), which hold that certain kinds of

expectancy violations can undermine believability. Likewise, the Zuckerman and Driver (1985)

meta-analysis found that channel discrepancies create perceptions of deceit. These lines of

research are important because they suggest that people attend to the message as a “package” of

cues. In assessing this package, receivers may rely both on the summative and interactive nature

of the cues. This raises the question of how communicators, both deceivers and message

recipients, respond to deception when it occurs in media for which this package of cues is

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attenuated (e.g., in computer-mediated contexts where nonverbal cues are limited and where

linguistic cues may be altered by the demands of written text).

In sum, the research on deception indicates that no single behavior or specific cue can be

used to determine whether an individual is conveying deceptive information. While there are

nonverbal and linguistic elements that are affected by deception, a clear profile of deceptive

behavior has not emerged. Although past research on leakage cues has provided some insight

into indicators of deception, a primary reason that no consistent profile of deception has emerged

is that such research has ignored the fact that deceptive communicators can strategically control

many behaviors during an interaction and that deceptive messages occur in an on-going

conversational context. Buller and Burgoon, in their development of Interpersonal Deception

Theory (1996), have proposed an interpersonal approach to deception that posits that, while

communicators may “leak” some information about their deception goals, they may also engage

in behavior specifically designed to mask deception cues and to convey an honest demeanor.

According to IDT, deceptive communication is not just a single isolated communication event

but rather takes place in the context of an on-going dialogue. The research generated by Buller

and Burgoon’s framework has demonstrated that when we think about deception as an

interactive process, the actions of both the deceiver and receiver are highly influential in

determining how a deceptive message is negotiated in the interaction. For instance, using Buller

and Burgoon’s theoretical framework, White and Burgoon (2001) found evidence of strong

mutual influence among deceivers and receivers and evidence of deceivers using receiver

feedback to improve their performances, findings which confirm that receivers can impact

whether or not deceivers have an easy or difficult time in “pulling off” deception. Other research

by Burgoon, Buller, White, Afifi, and Buslig (1999) similarly demonstrated that deceivers adapt

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their performances over time so that deceptive performances become indistinguishable from

truthful ones.

Computer-Mediated Communication

Computer-mediated communication (CMC) is a common communication medium for

business today. Electronic mail (e-mail) has become a standard communication tool for

employees and businesses all over the world. The CMC environment is unique because, although

it allows for relatively high-speed interaction between participants, it also “filters out” certain

informational cues (e.g., Adkins & Brashers, 1995; Daft, Lengel, & Trevino, 1987; Sproull &

Kiesler, 1991; Williams, 1978). E-mail generally transmits only text-based (including “rich” or

“styled” text) messages, thereby omitting some nonverbal cues or channels that are typically

used to transmit contextual and social information. When CMC is used with anonymous or

pseudonymous communicators, as is the case for group support systems and chat rooms

respectively, there are even fewer such cues available to affect interaction.

Determining the availability of cues in CMC and how this compares to other

communication media is part of the tradition of cross-media comparisons in the communication

literature. At least two theories have been developed to explain cross-media differences, social

presence theory (Short, Williams & Christie, 1976) and media richness theory (Daft & Lengel,

1986). In the first, social presence is defined as a subjective, cognitive synthesis of all of the

many factors that reflect the social immediacy or intimacy of a communication medium. Social

presence depends on the visual non-verbal cues transmitted, the apparent distance of the person

or people that are being communicated with, and the "realness" of those being communicated

with (Short et al., 1976). There are measurable factors that determine a medium's social

presence, including the ability of a medium to convey non-verbal cues, the social or

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organizational role of users, and the potential for interactivity (Rice & Williams, 1984). All

other things being equal, these measurable factors are thought to determine which media are

chosen for communication and the consequences of the communication.

Based on the experiments of Short and colleagues (Short et al., 1976), media could be

ordered in terms of their social presence as follows, from least to most: business letter,

telephone/ speakerphone, multispeaker audio, television, face-to-face. In general, the greatest

distinctions were drawn between visual and non-visual media. Short and colleagues hypothesize

that the suitability of any particular communication medium for a specified task, and the

consequences of performing that task, depends on the social presence of the medium. They also

hypothesize that the suitability of the communication medium depends on the social presence of

the task. If a medium with low social presence is chosen for a task requiring high social

presence, then the consequences of the communication interaction will be very different from

what would have occurred had a more suitable medium been chosen for that particular task.

Media richness theory was developed by Daft and colleagues (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Daft,

Lengel & Trevino, 1987) to explain why managers overwhelmingly prefer oral communication,

even when other channels are available. They suggest that communication media can be

characterized in terms of their "richness," where media richness is based on four criteria:

feedback, multiple cues, language variety, and personal focus. The more there are of all of these

attributes, the richer the medium. Daft, et al. (1987) found that media high in richness are

preferred for communication that is high in equivocality, and that media low in richness are

favored for communication that is unequivocal. They considered face-to-face communication to

be the richest medium, followed in descending order by the telephone, addressed written

communication, and unaddressed written communication. The overall ratings of communication

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media are similar for both social presence and media richness theories (although reached in

theoretically distinct approaches).

The clear implication from both theories of cross-media differences is that a particular

medium is more successful at conveying information than others, a capability often thought of as

greater or lesser bandwidth (Short, et al., 1976). One of the key reasons for comparing electronic

media to more traditional media is the belief that electronic media are not capable of transmitting

many of the cues that are available in other media (Rice & Williams, 1984; Sproull & Kiesler,

1991). At present, the primary component of electronic media is text, so that many but not all

cues about status, position, and situational norms are missing. In addition, nonverbal cues to

meaning in informational exchanges, such as vocal pitch, tempo, gestures, and facial expression

are not included. The lack of nonverbal cues is thought to be associated with "flaming," the

practice of responding out of all proportion to the intent or seriousness of the message received.

Given the lack of cues in most electronic media, such as those that convey information in textual

form, one could place them between the telephone and written messages in the spectra of social

presence and richness in communication media. Any electronic medium that also employs video

images, such as videoconferencing, should appear somewhere between face-to-face and

telephone (near where Short and colleagues place television).

The ability of a given communication medium to transmit the cues necessary to

understand a message, that is, its bandwidth, is not fixed, however. There is evidence in the

literature that participant experiences may play a key role in their ability to process information

in CMC environments. Carlson and Zmud (1994, 1999) identify four experiential bases that can

impact an individual’s perceptions of the richness of the CMC medium: experience with the

medium, with other participants, with the messaging topic, and with the organizational context.

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Carlson and Zmud (1999) found that as individuals gained experience in these four areas, their

perceptions of the richness of a CMC medium (e-mail, in their case) increased in a related

manner. That is, as communicators gained experience, they found the CMC medium to be better

able to handle rich, equivocality-reducing, socio-emotional messages.

Given the observation that transmission capacity of a medium is not inherent to the

medium, there is some debate concerning the important characteristics that should be included in

CMC research. Generally, studies of CMC have been based on either media richness or social

presence theory. It has been suggested that perhaps the basic constructs underlying media

richness are incomplete, especially with respect to newer media (e.g., Dennis & Valicich, 1999).

While Daft and colleagues (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Daft, et al., 1987) suggested four

characteristics important to understanding media differences, Dennis and Valicich (1999)

propose the existence of five. The approach we take here is to integrate and extend these

formulations to produce a set of constructs that are especially germane for deception research:

synchronicity, symbol variety, tailorability, reprocessability, and extensibility.

Synchronicity pertains to the speed of interaction and feedback supported by the medium

and is sometimes equated with interactivity.1 If a medium supports simultaneous transmission or

immediate response to another’s prior transmission, it is synchronous. Media that incur

significant delays between transmissions are asynchronous. In addition, media with lower

feedback speeds allow users additional time to compose, rehearse, and edit the information they

wish to communicate (Dennis & Valacich, 1999). Symbol variety is created through the number

of differing cues and language elements that a medium can simultaneously communicate. For

example, while basic e-mail systems can communicate textual language elements, video-

1 Although readers are referred to Burgoon, Bonito, Bengtsson, Ramierz, Dunbar, & Miczo (2000) for abroader definition of interactivity in which synchronicity is just one of its constituent properties.

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conferencing adds visual cues to enrich the information exchange. Tailorability refers to the

ability of the medium to allow the author of the message to customize the communication event

to match the (perceived) individual needs of each recipient. Reprocessability comes from the

ability of the medium to store message contents and allow participants’ subsequent access to and

analysis of these messages. Finally, extensibility refers to the degree to which the medium

supports tools and information to aid in message composition and/or interpretation. For example,

HTML-based messaging can contain links to additional information that the recipient could

choose to access to extend or deepen their interpretation of the message; this extended

information is not directly contained in the message, but the medium supports the high-speed

access of this information to aid the receiver.

A Model of Deception and Detection in Computer-Mediated Communication

While the depth of research in both deceptive communication and general

communication in computer-mediated environments is laudable, there is a scarcity of empirical

and theoretical work at their intersection. At the same time, society is increasingly using

computer-based technologies for all aspects of communication. There is no reason to expect that

the deception that pervades all other forms of human communication is not equally present in

communication that is computer-mediated. Understanding how deception might play out in

CMC is important to understanding CMC generally.

Having identified some of the variables important to deceptive communication, deception

detection, motivations for deception, and cross-media comparison characteristics, it is useful to

construct a model that incorporates deception and communication media. Such a model can

guide empirical research studies investigating the extent to which deception using computer-

mediated communication can be successfully detected. The model in Figures 1 and 2 is based on

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models by Miller & Stiff (1993), Grover (1993a), Buller & Burgoon, (1996), and George &

Carlson (1999).

Broadly, we posit that the successful detection of a deceptive communication message is

determined by the participants involved, their relationship, the design and delivery of the

deception, and the medium chosen to convey it. In an on-going deceptive communication event,

the success or failure of the receiver to detect the deception serves as input for both the receiver

and the receiver for the next message(s) in the dialogue between the deceiver and the receiver.

Figure 1: A Model of Deceptive Communication and Its Detection

The dependent variables in the model are those typically of interest in the deception

research, including: detection deception success, the confidence the receiver has in the

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information acquired, and the confidence the deceiver has in his/her deception. These outcomes

are seen to be products of the nature of the communication event that has just completed as well

as the communication medium through which it was conducted. Three sets of variables are

antecedent to the event and the medium chosen: the receiver, the deceiver, and their relationship.

We posit that the outcomes themselves feedback to the receiver and the deceiver, affecting the

actors, which in turn influences the communication event and the medium. Finally, all of these

processes occur within a given context.

The Deceiver

The deceiver – the individual or group that engages in the act of deception – has many

characteristics that may predict how well they are able to perpetrate deception across multiple

media.

Motivations to Deceive

The deceiver may experience a number of different motivations to deceive, including role

strain, outcome value and relevance, and the likelihood of success. Each of these are considered

next.

Role strain. Role strain is the psychological state that can result from the stressors that

occur when an individual is involved in multiple roles. Role strain is a multidimensional

construct that includes role conflict, role overload, and role ambiguity (Kahn et al., 1964). More

specifically, role strain occurs due to the occurrence of one or more sets of role demands in the

work place in which certain demands are impossible, unclear, or in conflict with demands

simultaneously imposed by another role. For example, role conflicts can be due to several

factors, including divergent demands made by two different superiors, discrepancies between an

employee’s values and those of the organization, inconsistencies between performance

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expectations and the time and resources the employee has to meet those expectations, and

clashes between what is expected from members of different groups an individual belongs to

simultaneously (e.g., Putnam & Stohl, 1996).

When faced with such conflict, an individual will either choose one of the roles to guide

their behavior, avoid the conflict, or compromise between the roles (Kahn, et al., 1964).

According to Grover (1993a, 1993b), deceit is one of the distress-relieving mechanisms available

to those caught in role conflict.2 Grover (1993b) also found that the likelihood of lying for one

role or the other was related to role commitment; subjects with high levels of professional

commitment reported less likelihood to lie in their professional role than did those with low

levels of professional commitment. Subjects with high levels of organizational commitment

were less likely to lie in their organizational roles than those with low levels of organizational

commitment. Further, those with more attachment to the organization were more aroused by role

conflict, while those with more attachment to the profession were less aroused.

Outcome value and relevance. The value and relevance of the outcomes associated with a

successful deception extends earlier work that identified the “consequences of a successful

deception” as an important motivator (Miller & Stiff, 1993; George & Carlson, 1999); however,

such consequences may have widely varying values and degrees of relevance to different

individuals that need to be uncovered. Nevertheless, Vasek (1986) notes that when people have

something to gain or lose, deception in their interactions with others must be suspected.

Likelihood of success. The perceived likelihood of successfully carrying out the

deception is another motivator; individuals feeling little risk of being caught may be additionally

2 The other four mechanisms are choice (choosing one role over others to guide behavior),avoidance (pretending the conflict does not exist), compromise, and voice (changing the roledemands).

20

motivated in carrying out the unethical behavior (e.g., Jones, 1991). Whether high levels of

motivation result in successful deception is in dispute. DePaulo and colleagues (e.g., DePaulo &

Kirkendol, 1989; DePaulo, Lanier, & Davis, 1983), contend that high levels of motivation impair

performance due to less control over cue leakage and less ability to adapt to receiver suspicion.

Burgoon and colleagues (e.g., Burgoon & Floyd, 2000; Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, & Feldman,

1994) contend that higher motivation produces more successful performances due to greater self-

monitoring and strategic behavior and have offered empirical evidence to support that position.

That said, extremely high levels of motivation, such as might the case when there are severe

repercussions if caught, may be cognitively and emotionally “overloaded” and have some

detrimental impact on performance. Therefore,

P1: Deceivers with low motivation to succeed will be less successful ingenerating successful deceptive messages than those with moderate tomoderately high levels of motivation; extremely high levels of motivationmay impair performance.

Intrinsic Ability

An individual’s intrinsic ability to perpetrate a successful deception – one that does in

fact change the receiver’s understanding in a manner consistent with the goal(s) of the deception

and does so without raising the receiver’s suspicion – is a function of the deceiver’s social skills

and speaking fluency, among other factors. The more skilled a person is in expressing

themselves verbally and nonverbally and in controlling those expressions as circumstances

demand, the more successful (e.g., Burgoon, Buller, & Guerrero, 1995; Burgoon, Buller, White,

& Rockwell, 1994; Riggio, 1983).

P2a: Deceivers with greater intrinsic ability will produce deceptive messages thatare less likely to be detected.

21

In addition, it is likely that intrinsic ability will manifest itself differently on different

communication media; for example, an individual who is skilled at encoding information in

visual channels may not be as skilled with audio channels. As such, the fit between the

deceiver’s intrinsic abilities and the medium selected becomes important:

P2b: Deceivers who select a communication medium that better fits their intrinsicabilities will produce deceptive messages that are less likely to be detected.

Task Characteristics

The characteristics of the communication and deception task that confront the deceiver

will also strongly influence his or her choice of medium and the nature in which the

communication event evolves. In addition to the overall task load, the deceiver may have a

variety of goals in regard to a specific communication event, including goals pertaining to the

information exchange needs, the overt task at hand, the deception, and the longer-term

relationship.

Task load. An individual’s task load is a multifaceted construct that includes the

cognitive complexity of the task, the cognitive effort required, the physical effort required, and

the time pressure involved (Hart & Staveland, 1988). We believe that these characteristics and

demands of the deception task will strongly influence the deceiver’s ability to carry out a

successful deception.

Task goals. The deceiver is seen to have both overt and covert task goals. Unless the

entire communication event is a fabrication (from the deceiver’s standpoint), the deceiver will

have some overt goals relating to the task at hand. These are goals that are unrelated to the

deception and are not intended to be hidden from the receiver. Overt goals include goals

concerning the nature and degree of task accomplishment, information exchange goals, and

22

relevant criteria such as efficiency and productivity. Covert task goals include goals relating to

the deception itself and other communication objectives that are to be hidden from the receiver.

The deception goals include communicating to the receiver a full understanding of and belief in

the deceptive message without engendering any suspicion.

Relational goals. The deceiver in this communication event may need to continue to work

with the receiver and may therefore have additional goals in regard to future (and potentially

truthful) communications with the receiver. This is true whether the relationship is personal or

work related and required the deceiver to focus not only on the current communication event but

future events as well.

Tasks that have many goals, especially if the goals are complicated and contradictory,

immediate and long-term, will themselves generate considerable cognitive load for the deceiver.

Keeping track of all the task goals while working toward fulfilling them will be complicated

enough; trying to deceive someone on top of that will be extremely difficult.

P3: The more complicated and varied the task characteristics, the less likely thedeceiver will be to generate successful deceptive messages.

Experiences

The experiences relevant here are those identified in Channel Expansion Theory (Carlson

& Zmud, 1994; 1999): experience with the co-participant(s), experience with the messaging

topic(s), experience with the available communication contexts, and experience with the

available media. The first three sets of experiences can help the deceiver improve his or her

abilities to deceive, especially with respect to a particular receiver. The last set of experiences,

with different media, will help the deceiver decide which media to choose. The extent to which

23

the deceiver is at an experiential advantage over the receiver will positively impact the likelihood

of a successful deception. Therefore,

P4: Increasing experience for deceivers relative to the receivers will improve theirability to successfully deceive.

In addition, the greater the degree of freedom deceivers have in selecting the specific

deception target, communication medium and communication context, the better able they will

be at creating a fit between his or her experiences and the deception requirements.

P5: The better the fit between the deceiver’s experiences and the deceptionrequirements, the more successful the deceiver will be.

Cognitions and Affect

Despite the pervasiveness of deception in all forms of human communication, deception

itself is hardily disapproved of and discouraged in most societies, perhaps going back to the

Biblical exhortation to not lie, or to not bear false witness. Societal sanctions against deception

cause feelings of unease in many people, even when the ethical calculus may point to deception

as the course of action that would injure the fewest people in a given situation. An individual

then may choose not to lie in face of the cognitive and/or affective dissonance such behavior

would cause. “Deceivers may experience varying degrees of physiological arousal and negative

affect stemming from detection apprehension (the fear of being caught deceiving) and guilt or

discomfort associated with violating conversational rules and social prescriptions against deceit

(Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p. 210).” On the other hand, some individuals may derive a thrill from

deceit, where the excitement of lying and the risk of getting caught may provide ample

motivation to deceive, even when the stakes are trivial.

P6: For most deceivers, the cognitive and/or affective dissonance associated with deceitwill most likely result in less successful deceptions.

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The Receiver

The relevant constructs affecting the receiver to a large extent parallel those for the

deceiver, with some important differences.

Motivation

The receiver’s motivation to detect is based on intrinsic and contextual factors. Intrinsic

factors include the receiver’s truth bias and naturally suspicious nature. The contextual

motivators, which are based on the topic and manner of the deception, include the receiver’s trust

in the sender, their suspicion concerning the message itself (e.g., Buller & Burgoon, 1994), and

the value and relevance to them of successfully detecting any deception in the message. Each of

these contextual motivators may evolve as the communication event unfolds.

P7a: Receivers with greater intrinsic motivation to detect will have higher ratesof deception detection performance.

P7b: Receivers with greater contextual motivation to detect will have higher ratesof deception detection performance.

Intrinsic Ability

The receiver’s sensitivity and communication skills will play an important role in

correctly uncovering deceptions. Receivers who are more sensitive to the available deception

cues should be better able to identify deceptive content; moreover, both social and emotional

sensitivity skills are important for accurate identification (Burgoon & Buller, 1996). Moreover,

different facets of the receiver’s communication skill must be examined, including both verbal

and nonverbal skills (Burgoon & Bacue, in press).

P8a: Receivers with greater social sensitivity will have higher rates of deceptiondetection performance.

P8b: Receivers with greater emotional sensitivity will have higher rates ofdeception detection performance.

25

P8c: Receivers with greater verbal communication skills will have higher rates ofdeception detection performance.

P8d: Receivers with greater non-verbal communication skills will have higherrates of deception detection performance.

Task Characteristics

The same task characteristics that may play a role in a deceiver’s ability to successfully

detect a deceptive message, namely task load, task goals, and relational goals, should also play a

role in a receiver’s ability to detect the deception.

Task load. As with the deceiver, if the receiver is under conditions of high task load, he

or she will have less ability to focus on deceptive cues and therefore more difficulty uncovering

deception.

Task goals. The receiver will also have overt and covert task goals – with the same basic

constructs involved. For the receiver, goals that may be more overt include: determining the

truthfulness of the information, determining their confidence level in the information, and

strategic information management (e.g., not revealing certain information via the questions that

are asked).

Relational goals. Likewise, the receiver will have certain longer-term goals pertaining to

the receiver and their working and social relationships. A strong desire to maintain a positive

relationship with the deceiver, for example, may inhibit the receiver in asking certain questions

or challenging certain assertions.

P9: The more complicated and varied the task characteristics, the less likely thereceiver will be to successfully detect deceptive messages.

Experiences

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Finally, the experience of the receiver plays an important role in the model. Increases in

the relevant experiences of the receiver (with respect to the deceiver), make it more likely that he

or she will be able to overcome the deceptive potential of the message due to his or her

increasing ability to receive and accurately interpret cues contained in the message. Therefore,

P10a: Increasing experience for the receiver relative to the deceiver will improve his orher ability to successfully uncover the deception.

Moreover, although the receiver is not able to determine the nature and characteristics of

the deception, his or her relevant experiences will nevertheless impact the ability to successfully

decode deception cues and associated levels of trust and suspicion.

P10b: The better the fit between the receiver’s experiences and the deceptioncharacteristics, the more successful the receiver will be.

P10c: Experience affects the receiver’s relationship with the deceiver.

Cognitions and Affect

Just as it may be unpleasant for some deceivers to have to lie, it may also be unpleasant

for some receivers to detect deception. In many cases, depending on the circumstances, people

would just as soon not know that they are being lied to. “Receivers may experience similar

cognitive and emotional responses [to those experienced by deceivers] when experiencing

suspicion due to their motivation to detect deception, heightened surveillance, cognitive

difficulty, and unpleasantness associated with uncovering duplicity (Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p.

210).” Such cognitive and affective reactions to discovering that one is being deceived may mask

the presence of cues that would otherwise indicate deceptive communication.

P11: For most receivers, the cognitive and/or affective dissonance associated withdiscovering deceit will most likely result in successful deception attempts.

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The Relationship Between the Deceiver and the Receiver

Although there are many different ways to think about the relationship between the

deceiver and the receiver, we have tried to summarize the extent of these experiences in two

broad categories: shared and overlapping experiences, and relational closeness.

Shared and Overlapping Experiences

The experiences discussed earlier must also be considered in terms of the levels of shared

or overlapped experiences between the participants (see, e.g., Burgoon & Buller, 1996; Carlson

& Zmud, 1999). Shared experiences are those that involved both participants – their “history” of

interactions – which provide both background information and a behavioral familiarity with each

other (Burgoon & Buller, 1996). Overlapped experiences are those that the participants all have,

although they are not gained with each other. Examples include participants having the same

types of education, training, certifications, family situations, employment background, and so on.

These experiences can be used to more richly decode messages received from the co-participant

(e.g., Carlson & Zmud, 1999).

P12: The more experiences the deceiver and the receiver have in common, the morelikely the receiver will be to successfully detect deception.

Relational Closeness

Relational closeness is the constellation of relational dimensions related to intimacy:

trust, involvement, familiarity (depth and breadth), receptivity, similarity, and mutuality.

Relational closeness engenders a sense of relationship that “may invoke norms of reciprocity and

expectations of trust and mutual aid, creating positivity biases in interpersonal conversations”

(Burgoon & Buller, 1996, p. 213).

28

Trust is obviously a key construct in deceptive communication. Although trust has been

defined in various ways, a particularly straightforward definition is “that one believes in, and is

willing to depend on, another party” (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998, p. 474). Some

people are more trusting of others naturally, while others have a predisposition to be suspicious,

as measured by Levine's and McCornack's "generalized communicative suspicion" construct

(Levine and McCornack, 1991). We posit, however, that trust in a close relationship can dampen

a natural disposition to be suspicious.

P13: A perception of relational closeness to the deceiver will make it more difficult forthe receiver to perceive deception cues.

The Communication Event

The communication event can be described as an ongoing dialogue in which the deceiver

presents some deception and attempts to control the concomitant leakage of cues (Figure 2).

These cues, whichever they may be, are displayed as part of the dialogue and may be perceived

by the receiver. If suspicion is triggered by such cues, by prior experiences, or by contextual

factors, then the receiver will actively search for and assess these cues. However, the perception

that a communication co-participant may be actively trying to deceive (as opposed to simply

stating an incorrect fact) may arouse the receiver to display cues in his/her communication that

signal this suspicion. This signaling, if not managed by the receiver, will be presented in the

interaction and may be detected by the deceiver. In turn, this may allow the deceiver to adapt

his/her deception strategy to better address the aspects that he/she perceives to be causing the

suspicion (Burgoon & Buller, 1996).

29

Figure 2: The Deceptive Communication Event

We posit that this package of information content cues, verbal and textual linguistic cues,

nonverbal cues, and contextual cues, acts as the interface between the deceiver and the receiver.

The potential of the deceptive message to successfully deceive the receiver is based on the

presence or absence of a sufficient number of deception cues and the availability of alternative

cues signaling trustworthiness. The more messages are devoid of any of the deception cues and

have sufficient strategic cues signaling credibility, the more successful they should be. Such a

configuration of cues is most likely to occur under low-stakes, low-pressure conditions and

conditions when deceivers can plan or rehearse their messages.

P14: Deceptive messages that minimize deception cues and maximizetrustworthiness cues will be least likely to be detected.

The Communication Medium

In addition, the communication event is heavily influenced not only by the participants

but also by the communication medium in use. Referring to our discussion above, since

communication media vary on their available bandwidth for carrying informational cues (and

30

this bandwidth varies based on the experience factors mentioned), the selection of medium will

affect both the deceiver’s capability to perpetrate a believable deception as well as the receiver’s

capability to perceive cues that may uncover it. For example, if the deceiver was largely able to

manage his/her display of deception cues, it is more likely that the deception will go undetected.

In addition, if a low-bandwidth medium was used (for instance), fewer cues will be available to

both participants, which may lessen their confidence as to whether their respective

communication goals were met.

The choice of communication medium has several effects in the model. As discussed, in

addition to social presence, the primary media characteristics posited to affect the deception

process are: speed of feedback, cue variety, tailorability, reprocessability, and extensibility. It is

proposed that the deceptive potential of a message (i.e., its believability) is aided by higher levels

of social presence, speed of feedback, and tailorability, a moderate level of symbol variety, and

lower levels of reprocessability and extensibility.

Messages that possess high social presence should engender more trust (and less

suspicion) on the part of the receiver by triggering truth biases; messages that appear socially

distant, on the other hand, won’t be evaluated with the same degree of trust. Communication

media supporting a high speed of feedback, in which there is a quick interchange of information

and ideas, provide the receiver less ability to think through the ideas being exchanged to uncover

cues to deception. Finally, media that support a high level of tailorability give the deceiver the

necessary tools to customize the message to convey the best “package” of cues to a particular

receiver. For example, asynchronous and leaner media may enable deceivers to better control

their self-presentations (Walther, 1996). Therefore,

P15a: Media with higher levels of social presence, speed of feedback, andtailorability will enable messages with higher deceptive potential.

31

Symbol variety, which is traditionally categorized with speed of feedback and

tailorability, is seen to have a more complex, nonlinear impact here. Lower levels of symbol

variety inhibit social presence, but also restrict the cues available to the receiver for use in

uncovering the deception. On the other hand, higher levels of symbol variety allow for additional

social presence, but also provide the receiver with an abundance of potential leakage cues.

Therefore, a moderate level of symbol variety is suggested to maximize the potential of the

deceptive message.

P15b: Media with moderate levels of symbol variety (as opposed to either high orlow levels) will enable messages with higher deceptive potential.

Related to symbol variety, different media allow different communication channels to be

used. Work comparing communication modalities (e.g., Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal,

1981) suggests that deceivers should be successful at self-presentation when controlling visual

cues, so media supporting a visual channel are typically better for them. Additionally, text is

considered more controllable than audio, so audio-only media may be less effective in some

circumstances. In general, media that are advantageous for the deceiver will have more channels

that his/her experiences and intrinsic abilities render manageable.

P15c: Media with the greatest proportion of manageable channels (for thedeceiver) will enable messages with higher deceptive potential.

Another channel-related consideration is channel congruence. Discrepancies among

channels carried on a given medium may lead to attributions of deceit by the receiver, while

consistency my promote attributions of truthfulness (Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). In this case,

media with fewer channels become preferable for the deceiver. However, the medium must also

contain sufficient channels to enable a degree of richness and social presence to engender trust.

32

P15d: Media that minimize the number of channels the deceiver must manage,while also providing a sufficient and appropriate selection of channels toengender a feeling of social presence with the receiver, will enable messageswith higher deceptive potential.

Media supporting lower levels of reprocessability allow the receiver less opportunity to

review messages for deceptive cues that were missed during the initial communication event.

Similarly, media supporting lower levels of extensibility provide the receiver with less ability to

extend the information content of the message or to create customized tools within the medium

to uncover deceptive cues. Therefore,

P15e: Media with lower levels of reprocessability and extensibility will enablemessages with higher deceptive potential.

Implications and Research Directions

This paper represents the first attempt that we are aware of to bring together and

synthesize the relevant literatures and theories that pertain to the intersection between deceptive

and computer-mediated communication. The paper pulls from the disciplines of communication,

organizational behavior, small group research, and management information systems. Within

each discipline, much has been accomplished with regard to cross-media comparisons, how

computer-mediated communication differs from and is similar to traditional media, the role of

media differences in managerial communication and among members of work teams, and with

regard to gaining an understanding of deception and its role in communication, both in and

outside of the work place. This paper, however, is the only attempt we are aware of to bring all

of these ideas together into a single model and set of propositions.

This model and its derivative propositions is not the end, however, but is instead the

beginning of a sizable research effort. The propositions identify several areas where research is

warranted, where the answers are far from clear. In fact, for some of these propositions, we

33

realized as we crafted them that their proposed directionality could just as easily have been

written in the alternate way. Further, we do not mean to suggest that the propositions we have

identified are the only ones possible to draw from our model. We have really only skimmed the

surface of what is possible here. We also do not mean to suggest that the model itself cannot be

further refined, and we welcome efforts to do so. Hopefully we have shown that the intersection

of research on deceptive and computer-mediated communication is full of potential, and we call

on our colleagues to join us in mining this rich vein. The body of work that will result is no less

relevant than the separate studies of media and of deception that have preceded and informed the

area of research to which we draw your attention.

34

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