Dealing with Change

January 2013

FOI-R--3589--SE

ISSN1650-1942

The wave of uprisings that swept North Africa and the Middle East at the end of 2010 changed the international and regional land-scape.

This report looks at the responses of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) to the popular revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The study highlights some of the key issues raised in the contemporary literature and in interviews. How, if at all, have relations between the two organisations and the three North African countries changed? Which instruments did the EU and the AU use, and were these tools appropriate? The analysis considers whether there are any lessons to be drawn for the two organisa-tions in their future relations with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and with regard to their ability to respond to political challenges simi-lar to those that arose in North Africa.

The study concludes with a list of recommendations for the EU and the AU on how to fine-tune their policies and programmes.

www.foi.se

Mikael Eriksson and Kristina Zetterlund

EU and AU Responses to the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya

Mikael Eriksson and Kristina Zetterlund

Dealing with Change

EU and AU Responses to the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya

Cover: (Scanpix/AP/Ben Curtis)

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Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk. All form av kopiering, översättning eller bearbetning utan medgivande är förbjuden.

This work is protected under the Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (SFS 1960:729). Any form of reproduction, translation or modification without permission is prohibited.

Titel Att hantera förändring: EU:s och AU:s reaktion på upproren i Tunisien, Egypten och Libyen

Title Dealing with Change: EU and AU Responses

to the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya

Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--3589--SE

Månad/Month Januari/January

Utgivningsår/Year 2013

Antal sidor/Pages 56 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet

Projektnr/Project no Afrikaprojektet (A12018)

Godkänd av/Approved by Maria Lignell Jakobsson

Ansvarig avdelning Försvarsanalys

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Sammanfattning Upproren som svepte över Nordafrika och Mellanöstern från slutet av 2010 innebar betydande förändringar både internationellt och regionalt. Denna rapport tittar på den Europeiska Unionens (EU:s) och den Afrikanska Unionens (AU:s) reaktion och svar på de folkliga upproren i Tunisien, Egypten och Libyen. Studien framhåller några av de huvudsakliga ämnen som tagits upp i nutida litteratur och i intervjuer. Hur, om alls, har relationerna mellan organisationerna och de nordafrikanska länderna förändrats? Vilka instrument valde EU och AU att använda, och var dessa verktyg lämpliga? Analysen överväger eventuella lärdomar för de två organisationernas framtida relationer med Tunisien, Egypten och Libyen, och med avseende på EU:s och AU:s förmåga att i framtiden möta liknande politiska utmaningar. Studien avslutas med en lista med rekommendationer för hur EU och AU skulle kunna anpassa sina strategier och program.

Nyckelord:

Afrika, afrikansk säkerhet, Tunisien, Egypten, Libyen, arabiska revolter, Arabiska Våren, Europeiska Unionen, EU, Afrikanska Unionen, AU, säkerhet, partnerskap

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Summary The wave of uprisings that swept North Africa and the Middle East at the end of 2010 changed the international and regional landscape. This report looks at the responses of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) to the popular revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The study highlights some of the key issues raised in the contemporary literature and in interviews. How, if at all, have relations between the two organisations and the three North African countries changed? Which instruments did the EU and the AU use, and were these tools appropriate? The analysis considers whether there are any lessons to be drawn for the two organisations in their future relations with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and with regard to their ability to respond to political challenges similar to those that arose in North Africa. The study concludes with a list of recommendations for the EU and the AU on how to fine-tune their policies and programmes.

Keywords:

Africa, African security, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Arab revolts, Arab Spring, European Union, EU, African Union, AU, Security, Partnership

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Acknowledgements This report is a product of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) research programme on African Security. It was commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence.1 The report has benefitted considerably from the input of many government and EU officials as well as analysts. We would like to extend our gratitude to the interviewees from the institutions and organisations listed on p. 50 – their insight and expertise were invaluable to the study. The interviewees were granted anonymity in order to give them the freedom to express their views and opinions. Eva Hagström Frisell of FOI kindly reviewed the report. Her helpful comments much improved the text. We are also grateful for the reviews conducted by Magdalena Tham Lindell and Markus Derblom, both at FOI. It should be underscored, however, that the views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors.

1 For additional studies on security in Africa see: http://www.foi.se/africa

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Table of Contents

Abbreviations 8

1 Introduction 9

1.1 Background ..................................................................................... 10

1.1.1 Purpose and Research Puzzle ................................................... 10 1.1.2 Method ........................................................................................ 10

1.1.3 Operationalisation and Delineations ........................................... 11

1.1.4 Material ....................................................................................... 12

2 Reform, Change and Security 13

2.1 Tunisia ............................................................................................. 14

2.2 Egypt ............................................................................................... 15

2.3 Libya ................................................................................................ 17

2.4 The Broader Security Environment ................................................. 18

3 The European Union 21

3.1 The EU’s Response ........................................................................ 21 3.1.1 More for More.............................................................................. 21

3.1.2 Regionalism and Differentiation .................................................. 23

3.2 An EU Strategy? ............................................................................. 25

3.2.1 What Can the EU Offer? ............................................................. 26

3.2.2 EU Objectives ............................................................................. 29

3.2.3 Engaging Political Islam .............................................................. 30 3.2.4 EU Instruments ........................................................................... 31

3.3 Reaching Out to Civil Society ......................................................... 32

3.3.1 Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility .......................................... 32

3.3.2 European Endowment for Democracy ........................................ 35

3.4 Conclusions ..................................................................................... 36

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4 The African Union 38

4.1 Impotent or Paralysed? ................................................................... 38 4.1.1 The AU’s Response to Tunisia .................................................... 40

4.1.2 The AU’s Response to Egypt ...................................................... 41

4.1.3 The AU’s Response to Libya ....................................................... 41

4.2 AU Reactions: an Analysis .............................................................. 42

4.3 Conclusions ..................................................................................... 47

5 Conclusions 48

Interviews 50

References 51

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Abbreviations AMU Arab Maghreb Union APSA African Peace and Security Architecture AQIM al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb AU African Union CSO Civil Society Organisations CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations EED European Endowment for Democracy EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights ENP European Neighborhood Policy EIB European Investment Bank ERBD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EU European Union EUSR European Union Special Representative GSPC Groupe Salafiste Pour la Prédication et le Combat LAS League of Arab States LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group MB Muslim Brotherhood MENA Middle East and North Africa MUJAO Movement for Openness and Jihad in West Africa NARC North African Regional Capability NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NED National Endowment for Democracy NTC National Transitional Council PSC AU Peace and Security Council REC Regional Economic Communities RELEX EU Directorate General for External Relations (RELEX) SPRING Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth SSR Security Sector Reform UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program UFM Union for the Mediterranean UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

1 Introduction The so-called Arab Spring entered its third year in 2013. The revolts have placed the states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at different stages along a democratic continuum, and most still face social and political upheaval.

In North Africa, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have freed themselves from previous authoritarian rule, while Algeria and Morocco are prolonging political reform – although some progress has been made.2 Of the countries in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, only Yemen has rid itself formally of its totalitarian ruler. In Syria, the regime led by the al-Assad family is fighting for survival in the midst of an armed opposition that is gaining the upper hand day by day. Most of the rest of the Arab states face different degrees of political opposition and demand for reform.3

This study revisits the three Arab states in North Africa that were first to embark on the journey of political transformation to democracy: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.4 While most of the current research on the Arab revolts focuses on domestic developments in these states, less has been written about the countries’ relations with multilateral partners in the region. Our scope is that of an exogenous partnership lens, that is, how regional actors have dealt with these three states’ transformations and the resulting challenges to their relations. We limit ourselves to an examination of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU).

Relations between the EU and the AU, on the one hand, and Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, on the other, are instrumental from a number of perspectives. The revolts that erupted in the region in late 2010 and early 2011 had significant implications for both the EU and the AU. For the EU, a key priority of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is to maintain a safe and stable southern neighbourhood. Uncertainty about the potential consequences of the revolts required close monitoring of events and swift policy responses. For the AU, the revolts struck at the heart of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which had been put in place to meet security challenges.5 They also had 2 Bellin (2012). 3 Israel, Iran and Turkey are not Arab states. Iraq also stands out because it had already embarked on

a democratic journey following the overthrow of former President Saddam Hussein. 4 The three countries are listed according to the timing of their uprisings. 5 APSA is a framework for crisis management and conflict prevention in Africa, established by the

AU and its Regional Economic Communities. The AU Peace and Security Council is the main body that deals with these matters.

9

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profound implications in the sense that the three states – and Libya and Egypt in particular – play an integral part in the AU.

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Purpose and Research Puzzle The need to pursue continual risk and policy assessments of developments in areas of importance to Swedish interests constitutes the overarching background to this report on how the EU and the AU dealt with the popularly driven political transformations. Sweden has a political and an economic interest in promoting a stable North Africa region. In addition, the study reflects Sweden’s active participation in the EU and its advocacy of stronger AU integration.

The revolts which took place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have had considerable political and security implications for North Africa, the EU and the AU. The political transformation is still ongoing and the outcome uncertain. This study analyses how the EU and the AU have been responding to the revolts. It also asks what kind of roles these actors can play in the region in the future. In doing so, the report explores whether events highlighted any strengths or weaknesses in the EU and the AU with regard to their ability to respond in the future to profound political challenges similar to those that took place in North Africa. Unconstitutional political transitions, be they driven by the ‘people’ (on an undemocratic basis), an acting head of state (e.g. by continuously extending mandate periods), or by coup makers, pose a challenge to external actors. Regardless of the character of change, political transitions are likely to occur again. Consequently, this study examines the contemporary challenges and lessons learned with regard to EU and AU relations with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Learning from how both the EU and the AU dealt with the Arab revolts, and are currently tackling political and security developments, will provide insights of value to scholars and policymakers engaging with the region through bilateral means but also through the EU format and in partnership with the AU.

1.1.2 Method In this study, we confine ourselves to policy analysis. In so doing, we examine the instruments, policies and partnerships that exist between the EU and Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, as well as those between the AU and these three countries. The study should be considered explorative and is intended to highlight some of the key issues raised in the contemporary literature and in interviews. We envisage that some of the findings will benefit from further in-depth investigation. One example of an issue that could profit from further examination, and which has been left out of this particular study, is relations between the EU and the AU.

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Another area which is only briefly addressed, mainly due to the limited amount of information available on on-going initiatives, is the role of EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

1.1.3 Operationalisation and Delineations This study is primarily concerned with the EU’s and the AU’s policy relations with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. By policy relations, we mean strategies that are primarily linked to security and development. These can take many forms, from short- and long-term policy cooperation to political and financial support for the promotion of political and social stability. The format of these policy relations can include programmes, policy instruments, aid, endowments and platforms for dialogue.

In terms of case selection, we chose Tunisia, Egypt and Libya because the transformations in these three states have progressed relatively far in terms of democratic governance. The three states responded well to the questions posed above. One problem with this case selection is that of selection bias, because the study could have benefited from a comparison with cases that have not experienced a popular uprising. However, this study is of an explorative nature and its scope is inherently restricted. Our assessment is that the value of additional case studies would be limited.

In terms of this study’s focus, it is worth noting that the EU is far more present and active in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya than the AU. There may therefore be a slight asymmetry regarding the focus of the analysis. The instruments available to the two organisations are very different. In addition, while these countries are members of the AU, the EU is an external actor. Consequently, the report’s sections on the EU and the AU are written in different ways.

The chapter on the EU is more focused on particular topics which have arisen in the literature review and interviews. This approach is also a reflection of the fact that the EU has chosen a relatively unified response to the whole region. The section on the AU, on the other hand, considers the organisation’s policy response more at the conceptual level and on a country-by-country basis. The discussion of the AU’s conceptual and strategic handling of the Arab revolts is linked to the AU’s Charter and its overall posture, because of the relevance it may have for future dealings with popularly driven revolts. While the report’s focus on the actions of the EU is more present-oriented, the analysis of the AU’s relations with the three states is more focused on the organisation’s initial reactions to events and the implications they may have for current and future cooperation. This is a reflection of the two organisations’ different ways of handling the revolts.

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1.1.4 Material The literature reviewed for this report includes policy documents as well as secondary studies, such as monographs, research reports and news articles. As far as possible, we have tried to collect and examine primary sources. The literature review has been complemented by interviews with experts on political developments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as well as AU and EU officials. Interviews were conducted in Brussels and Addis Ababa (see p. 50 for a list of interviewees).

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2 Reform, Change and Security In political science literature over the years, a disciplinary orthodoxy took root which perceived the orient as immune to political change.6 Such an attitude was also present in political practice prior to 2010, as political relations with most states in the region took a laissez-faire approach. EU and AU relations with the states in North Africa were conducted with undemocratic “republican monarchies” and their family members and cronies.

For the EU, the situation in its southern neighbourhood prior to 2010 represented stability without democracy. There was cooperation on matters such as trade, imports and exports, counterterrorism, energy supply and migration, and the democracy and human rights dialogue was to say the least relaxed. At no stage did the EU call for regime change.

Egypt and Libya were the main financial backers of the AU. Libya under Gaddafi was one of its staunchest supporters, calling for the integration of the continent as a balancing force to US, EU and MENA interference. Few African leaders called for Arab reform, despite the fact that the authoritarian rulers in these autocratic states presented a credibility problem for the AU’s democracy and peace creed.

In early 2011, the political landscape in North Africa and the Middle East changed profoundly. Mass protests and civil disobedience campaigns were sparked across the region. Presidents were deposed in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, while democratic reform fell short of regime change in Morocco and Algeria. In Libya, political change came through external military support.7 The EU and the AU responded to events in different ways.

Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have each held free and fair national elections. The old autocrats, Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi, are out of power, although informal power structures and remnants of the old regimes remain. In general, the Islamist organisations, which had previously been suppressed, triumphed in all three states in both local and national elections. All three governments have embarked on a political reform agenda. This section presents the current political state of play in the individual countries in order to provide some background for how the EU and the AU are responding.

6 See Eriksson (2011, 2012), Souaré and Mesfin (2011). 7 See Lindström and Zetterlund (2012) and Lindvall and Forssman (2012).

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2.1 Tunisia Events in Tunisia triggered the Arab revolts in late 2010 that subsequently spread across North Africa and the Middle East. Today, Tunisia may be considered the country that has undertaken the deepest reforms to do away with its history of authoritarian rule.

Soon after the revolt achieved its goal of overthrowing President Ben Ali, on 14 January 2011, the opposition began a process of rooting out representatives of the former political, economic, military and police elites. The central idea was to rid the state of former Ben Ali loyalists to ensure that democratic practices and governance were given a clean break in the new government. Much of this political ‘cleansing’ – mostly carried out by legitimate judicial means – was done during 2011, when political euphoria was still being felt across much of the country.

In retrospect, however, the political purge of former Ben Ali loyalists had a number of repercussions for the future of the political reform process. One important implication was that several Ben Ali party affiliates did not participate in the elections held for the Constituent Assembly on 23 October 2011. This paved the way for the Enahda, an Islamist political party, to become the largest party in the new Assembly.8 Another implication was the negative impact on the Tunisian government’s future reform processes and ability to govern. The purge of former regime loyalists of considerable political skill and experience has led to the incumbent government being criticised by the opposition for lacking the required skills to govern Tunisia. In late 2012, opposition to Tunisia’s first democratically elected government is growing.

Essentially, the opposition is questioning the viability of the government, because political and economic reform processes are slow to materialise while the general feeling of uncertainty remains high. In terms of security there is little trust in the police force, because it has a bad reputation linked to its previous loyalty to Ben Ali. In addition, it is not currently working effectively to prevent crime. Security issues have in some circumstances become a matter for religious communities, in that religious actors are being called on to maintain security.

The ruling government, on the other hand, accuses parts of the opposition of being remnants of the former regime, allegedly acting to undermine government

8 Enhada is by many viewed as liberal though in terms of their views on how economic policies

should be pursued. The party suffers from inexperience of participating in government.

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policy.9 This political polarisation is likely to have consequences for the next elections for the National Assembly and the presidency.10 The absence of a functioning police force has made life uncertain for many Tunisians, leading to rising crime and increased lawlessness. Informal power structures, often with a religious character, are growing. Moreover, religious groups are becoming increasingly prevalent and are expanding their influence at the expense of the absent state.

At the same time, reduced human security has increased frustration with higher food prices and the cost of living in general, and regular demonstrations are held against deteriorating public services. The main challenge for the government will be its capacity to address such criticisms. This, in turn, will require both democratic and economic reforms – challenges in their own right.

2.2 Egypt In early 2011, massive protests erupted in Egypt, inspired by the popular revolt in Tunisia.11 The protesters consisted of a broad group of people of different classes and interests, united by the demand for regime change and the urge for democracy. After 18 days of demonstrations, President Hosni Mubarak left office on 11 February 2011.12

An election for the National Assembly was held on 28 November 2011. The Islamist parties (i.e. the Freedom and the Justice Party and the more conservative Islamist party al-Nour) were the main winners. Political Islamists were also victorious in the presidential elections held on 16–17 June 2012, when the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) informal candidate, Mohammed Morsi, was elected President of Egypt.13

Since winning power, Morsi’s administration has implemented a variety of political and economic reforms. Early on, the president made several attempts to root out former Mubarak loyalists. Many steps were also taken to challenge the influential military. Although some reform of the armed forces was carried out, the military’s considerable influence over the whole of the economy endures. 9 It is worth noting that the former ruling family had ensured themselves a considerable amount of

wealth through corruption and repression. As the family fled, much of their money disappeared with them. Tunisia is a relatively poor country, and the disappearance of Tunisian taxpayers’ money is highly problematic given the reforms the country needs to make.

10 Election dates are not fixed. At the time of this study, they were to be held during late spring/summer 2013.

11 Keesing’s 2011: 50255. 12 Keesing’s 2011: 50426. 13 Both elections were held in an atmosphere that was considered free and fair.

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This factor alone represents one of the main challenges to the continuation of reform processes in the country.

Security remains an important issue. Domestically, the country is plagued by social tensions due to the polarisation between political Islamists, on the one hand, and liberals or secularists, on the other. One problem for the government and the Egyptian people is how to overcome political differences without increasing polarisation and social tensions. The military continues to act as a barrier between the government and the Egyptian people. In terms of regional security, Egypt remains a pivotal state in the Middle East and North Africa, enjoying good relations with Israel as well as a close collaboration with the United States.

In addition to the reform of the armed forces, the main policy challenge relates to the future of the country’s constitutional process. The process of drafting a new constitution for the country was initiated on 26 March 2012 (later reconfigured on 9 June 2012). However, the opposition realised early on that a democratically elected National Assembly dominated by Islamists would have implications for the make-up of the working group set up to draft the new constitution, which would thus be drawn up to reflect Islamic principles.14 The opposition therefore boycotted the constitution drafting process to signal its discontent.

At the end of November 2012, Morsi extended his powers by declaring all laws issued by decree since he took office on 30 June 2011 to be final and binding, until a new constitution had been adopted and a new parliament elected. By this measure, Morsi was able to overrule all the legal objections raised by the courts to his decrees. On 30 November 2012, the Islamist-dominated parliament passed a proposed draft of the new constitution, and Morsi set 15 December as the date for a national referendum on the constitution

The opposition argued that Morsi had granted himself unlimited power. However, the presidential administration’s position was that the decree was needed to prevent former Mubarak loyalists (including in the courts) undermining parliament and the reform initiatives taken to establish democracy in the country. The result was a polarised political landscape, leading to sizable street protests.

Hamdi Hassan, an Egypt expert at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, suggests in a commentary that many critics believe Morsi and the MB lack the required political vision to run, or a cadre capable of running, a country of Egypt’s size, and with its economic problems, political 14 In this context, however, it is worth noting that legal experts who have studied the draft conclude

that “it is hardly more religious than Egypt’s existing Constitution”. See Kirkpatrick and Fahim 11 December, 2012.

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complexities and strategic importance. Hassan argues that, so far, Morsi and the MB have done little to prove their critics wrong.15

Omar Ashour, a research associate at the Brookings Doha Center, makes the point that normally in a country in political transition, the kind of decree issued by Morsi to override judicial authority and gain comprehensive executive power would lead to dictatorship, but that with a judiciary filled with remnants of the former regime, this was the only logical step open to him. After all, the decree issued by Morsi was intended to protect a democratically elected institution, remove the national prosecutor appointed by Mubarak, ensure that security officials from the Mubarak era were brought to trial, and pay compensation to all the victims of the revolt and thereafter.16

On 8 December 2012, the opposition was invited to participate in a national dialogue to overcome the political impasse in Egypt, but the offer was rejected. Morsi continued to push the referendum forward. When the referendum was held it became clear that the political Islamists had beaten the liberal and secular opposition.

Some degree of political dispute is both logical and healthy for a state in political transition. However, a too far-reaching polarisation of Egypt may prevent essential reforms, including those needed for example to get the economy back on track, which is essential to meet both short- and long-term challenges. The short-term challenges for Egypt include relations with Israel and Palestinian groups, how to handle Syria, and how to respond to new Nile river initiatives. Long-term challenges include how to manage a growing population, increasing shortages of domestic energy, a growing shortage of fresh water and the adverse effects of climate change.

2.3 Libya On 26 February 2011, street protesters and rebels from the anti-Gaddafi opposition formed a National Transitional Council (NTC) in a bid to overthrow the incumbent regime in Libya. This radically transformed political and military dynamics on the ground.

A turning point for opposition forces was the decision on 17 March 2011 by the United Nations Security Council to adopt resolution 1973 (2011), which called

15 Interview with Hamdi Hassan on 12 October 2012. 16 Ashour (2012-12-03).

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on UN member states to take all necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians, including the establishment of a no-fly zone and an arms embargo.17

During the course of the spring, the rebels tried to establish themselves as a democratic alternative to the government in Tripoli. Both political and military campaigns by the NTC and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) backers grew in scale. By late June 2011, a number of states had recognised the NTC as the sole legitimate representative body in Libya. In late July, there was intense mediation in a bid to end the violence, but the military campaign would only end with the conquering of Tripoli on 23 August and the killing of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi on 20 October 2011.

Following the death of Gaddafi, an interim constitution was prepared by the NTC and a roadmap for political transition was presented. On 7 July 2012, Libya’s first democratic parliamentary election was held for the General National Congress. The Congress was later handed executive power by the NTC and tasked itself with designing a new constitution for Libya. Since 8 August, the General National Congress has acted as Libya’s legislative authority with the head of the Congress acting as Libya’s president.

As of December 2012, Libya is on the path to democracy. A number of political challenges remain as a number of militias and supporters of the previous regime still oppose the democratic shift.18 Another fundamental challenge is the absence of a strong civil society in the country, capable of monitoring democratic development. Moreover, enormous day-to-day challenges face the country and its citizens as most state and societal institutions need to be rebuilt.

The main security-related challenges include: the reconstruction of government institutions and restoration of their legitimacy, security sector reform, arms collection, and the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and militias. Libya also faces considerable challenges to its territorial sovereignty, that is, securing its borders and taking control of its territory.

2.4 The Broader Security Environment Egypt is a regional power in North Africa. It dominates the region politically, economically and militarily. Egypt has also become a pivotal state for regional stability. This partly dates to the prominence it gained through its role in the peace agreement with Israel and the signing of the Camp David Agreement in 1979. The Camp David Agreement set a regional security architecture for Egypt- 17 http://www.un.org/News (2011). 18 Several groups have not laid down their weapons yet so much uncertainty remains in those parts

of the country where the government does not have full control.

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Israel and the US, through which the latter provides both states with considerable amounts of military and financial support.

In the context of a regional security arrangement, attempts have been made to integrate North African governments into the framework of the APSA. More specifically, it has been a long-term goal of the AU to set up an African Standby Force based on Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs). In North Africa, the REC is the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the force the North African Regional Standby Brigade (compromising Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania and Western Sahara). However, Egypt is not in the AMU and Morocco is not part of the AU following a dispute over legal perceptions of Western Sahara. The North African Regional Capability (NARC) mechanism has therefore been created to overcome the lack of integration. The NARC structure is still far from complete. Democratic transformation in the region could open up new prospects for further NARC activities in readiness for the African Standby Force arrangement. The new democratic governments in the region may regard the arrangement differently as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have realised for example that cooperation and integration are key to dealing with regional challenges.

At the end of 2012, most parts of North Africa are free from armed conflicts. Skirmishes and tensions flare up occasionally on the border between Egypt and Israel, mostly as a result of tribal clashes or attacks by armed Islamic radicals linked either to Al-Qaida or armed Palestinian groups; or on the territory connecting Morocco and Western Sahara. However, the risk posed by Jihadist groups lingers. Potential threats are mainly in the form of terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and threats to human security and well-being.19

In terms of threats to peace and security in the whole of the region, there are currently two main radical, violent Jihadist groups operating in North Africa: al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), previously the Groupe Salafiste Pour La Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). A number of members of the LIFG were released from jail in Libya during the revolt after which, according to media accounts, they joined the opposition to Gaddafi. Most of the governments in North Africa have faced Jihadist challenges.20 How these militant movements will be affected by the popular revolts currently unfolding across the region remains open to question.21

19 See Abdalla (2011). 20 See the UCDP database at www.pcr.uu.se. 21 Jihadism exists in many different forms and organisations, most notably in Salafist, Tafrist,

Qutbist and Wahhabist networks.

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On the one hand, some scholars suggest that democracies are less likely to produce terrorist activity, as grievances can be taken care of fairly and transparently in the public domain and by public institutions. On the other hand, scholars also suggest that governments in political transition from authoritarianism to democracy are highly vulnerable to destabilisation.22 At the moment, Libya is the country in the region most overtly troubled by the presence of AQIM. AQIM members cross its territory and the arms and drugs trade is heavily related to its presence. AQIM is spread across the Sahel region, but it is constantly moving across the Sahel, not least through Libya and Mali.23

Following the political turmoil in Mali in 2011–2012 and the presence of a number of Jihadist groups on its northern territory (including AQIM and the Movement for Openness and Jihad in West Africa, MUJAO), the international community (i.e. the UN and the AU/the Economic Community of West African States) is planning an intervention to stabilise the country.24 This stabilisation mission could cause negative spillover effects in countries such as Libya and Tunisia, states that are already politically and socially fragile. Armed groups may take refuge in these states (or in other states in the region for that matter), creating social tensions and challenging existing authorities. The turmoil in Mali could also cause refugee flows into these states.

22 For a good case study on the implications of this argument for countries in North Africa see

Boukhars (2011). 23 See Jakobsson and Eriksson (2012). 24 See Tham Lindell (2012).

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3 The European Union The EU was relatively quick to respond to the wave of revolts in North Africa and the Middle East. Two years after the start of the Arab Spring, it remains to be seen whether the EU can deliver on its intentions, and continue to develop its multilateral policy approach to the region.

3.1 The EU’s Response The EU’s political response to the uprisings in the Arab world is primarily contained in two documents. The first is a joint communication of the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, and the European Commission, released on 8 March 2011– A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.25 This communication was followed in May 2011 by a comprehensive review of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), work on which had already started in early 2010 – A new response to a changing Neighbourhood.26

3.1.1 More for More Both documents set out an incentive approach based on the principle of “more for more”, whereby partner countries will be granted more support from the EU depending on the progress made with building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. More and faster reform will be rewarded with more EU support. The incentives on offer are contained in a framework known as the ‘Three Ms’ – Money, Mobility and Markets.

In terms of Money, the EU added EUR 1.2 billion to the EUR 5.7 billion already earmarked for support to the Neighbourhood for the period 2011–2013. And that money is set to increase in the forthcoming years. Notably, in its budget proposal for the period 2014–2020, the European Commission is recommending more than EUR 18.1 billion for the Neighbourhood Policy (including all 16 partner countries in both the East and the South). This would be an increase of some 40 per cent compared to 2007–2013.27 The European Investment Bank’s (EIB)

25 European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy, A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean (2011).

26 European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood – A review of European Neighbourhood Policy (2011).

27 European Commission, The EU’s response to the ‘Arab Spring’ (2011).

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budget for loans to the region was also increased by EUR 1 billion to EUR 5 billion. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) expanded its mandate to include the region and in May 2012 set up a special fund of EUR 1 billion to invest in emerging Arab democracies. The EBRD expects eventually to be able to invest up to EUR 2.5 billion annually in the region.28

Moreover, the support package also includes the European Commission’s launch in September 2011 of the so-called SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth).29 The programme injected an additional EUR 350 million in 2011–2012 to Southern Neighbourhood partner countries to support their transition to democracy.

In addition, the EU is party to the Deauville Partnership – an initiative launched in May 2011 by the Group of Eight (G8) countries to support the transition process in the MENA region.

Incentives with regard to Mobility entail facilitated mobility for citizens of partner countries, especially through more university scholarships and exchanges between the region and the EU, as well as easier access to visas to enter the EU.

Finally, the Markets component aims to facilitate the integration of partner countries into the EU single market. This process is mainly offered by way of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), which among other things entail the removal of tariffs and easing of other trade restrictions.

To improve the coordination of efforts and facilitate political dialogue with partner countries, the EU has appointed Bernardino León as Special Representative (EUSR) for the Southern Mediterranean region.30 The setting up of high-level task forces is a way to achieve such improved coordination. A task force was formed for Tunisia in September 2011, one on Jordan met for the first time in February 2012 and one for Egypt met in November 2012. The purpose of these task forces is also to ensure that the EU is accurately tailoring its support to each country’s specific needs. They bring together various relevant actors, such as EU institutions, EU member states, the authorities of the partner country, international financial institutions, civil society and the private sector.

Support for EU initiatives has been mostly uniform. However, one point of contention between member states has been the question of conditionality. While the incentive-based approach of the ENP stresses positive conditionality – “more for more”, the ENP also mentions the possibility of reconsidering, or even

28 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2012). 29 European Union, EU response to the Arab spring: the SPRING Programme (2011). 30 Official Journal of the European Union (2011).

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reducing, funding for those partner states that do not undertake reform.31 There are currently divergent opinions among member states over whether relations with southern partner countries should only involve incentives, or these should be accompanied by negative conditionality – “less for less”.32

3.1.2 Regionalism and Differentiation

A key component of the EU’s new(ish) policy prescription for dealing with its Southern Neighbourhood is its emphasis on differentiation, that is, tailoring relations with each country according to the particular situation as opposed to pursuing a regional approach. This differentiation recognises the different needs, opportunities and constraints of the various states in the region. It is also a way of avoiding the blockages that regional approaches often encountered in the past.33

The move towards greater differentiation is enshrined in the ENP. The revised communication on the ENP states that the “partnership will develop with each neighbour on the basis of its needs, capacities and reform objectives”.34

While the ENP has been the favoured tool of the EU in the wake of the Arab Spring, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) seems to have been less successful. Representing a more regional approach, the UfM was based on a proposal by Nicolas Sarkozy during his election campaign for the French presidency in 2007. However, his initiative quickly encountered resistance from other EU member states.35 Critics saw it as a French project – or rather a project for Sarkozy to boost his opinion poll ratings and international standing.36 Initially, Sarkozy’s proposal was for a Mediterranean Union limited to those countries that border that sea. Critics argued, however, that it would compete with existing EU instruments, and Germany in particular was outraged that the initiative excluded other EU member states.37 The initiative was eventually

31 European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood – A review of European Neighbourhood Policy (2011).

32 See Witney and Dworkin (2012). 33 Greenfield and Balfour (2012). 34 European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood – A review of European Neighbourhood Policy (2011).

35 Stefan Simmons “Union for the Mediterranean: Nicolas Sarkozy’s New ‘Club Med’”, Spiegel Online International, 14 July 2008.

36 Mikail (2011). 37 For more on the resistance against the initiative, see for example Steven Erlanger, “Sarkozy’s

Union of the Mediterranean falters”, The New York Times, 6 July 2008.

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amended to include all EU member states and to build on the existing Barcelona Process.38

The UfM has struggled since its inception. Almost from the start, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict severely hampered the organisation. The conflicts between Algeria and Morocco over the territory of Western Sahara and between Cyprus and Turkey have also plagued its work. In addition, the UfM has felt the pinch from the economic and financial crisis, given that its member states are experiencing severe economic stress. Thus, it was arguably no surprise that the EU chose the ENP as the vehicle for its response to the Arab Spring. As one EU official interviewed for this report put it: “Does anyone believe in the UfM?”39

The differentiation strategy has received considerable support from the EU member states, but there is a need for the EU to complement it with a multilateral approach. A regional framework would counteract fragmentation and accusations of double standards, and instead encourage a coordinated approach by the EU. Moreover, it could facilitate regional integration in neighbouring countries – an area in which it is recognised that there is a lot of potential for improvement. Separate partnerships with individual countries will not promote intra-regional trade, and differentiating the pace at which the EU provides support to different countries might even inhibit regional integration.40 It is also important to note that the policy of differentiation could make it difficult to identify the middle ground – which countries should be rewarded for progress, and which have not done enough to receive EU support.41 At the same time, it is essential that a multilateral enterprise recognises the region’s geopolitical tensions and conflicts.42

There is therefore a need for both sound bilateral policies and a solid regional approach, either in the shape of a revamped UfM or in another form. As is discussed above, the UfM is seen by many as ineffectual, and there is a feeling that a lot of regional initiatives have not been properly anchored in the Mediterranean countries. The UfM does provide an opportunity though to engage with Israel and Turkey, which are both parties to the multilateral partnership, although this has also been a source of conflict within the organisation.43

Recognising the need to reinvigorate the UfM, the EU recently assumed a larger role in its organisation, taking over as its co-chair in February 2012. The UfM is

38 The Barcelona Process was launched in 1995 by the then 15 EU members and 14 Mediterranean

partners, and formed the basis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which evolved into the UfM. 39 Interview, Brussels, November 2012. 40 Witney and Dworkin (2012). 41 Balfour, June (2012). 42 Perthes (2012). 43 For more on the Union for the Mediterranean, see: http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/.

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co-chaired by one party representing the European Union side and one representing the Mediterranean side, and until then the northern co-presidency had been held by France.44

The EU’s decision to co-chair the UfM could hopefully signal a renewed commitment to it. It is also a step in the right direction of trying to ensure that the co-chairs represent and are seen to represent the interests of the region as a whole as opposed to national interests. Arguably, it would be advisable to discuss ways to ensure that the southern co-chair also speaks for the region as a whole. It should be noted, however, that an underlying imbalance affects relations between the north and the south of the UfM. While the EU has had some 60 years to try to strengthen ties and build a shared identity, this is not the case for its southern neighbours. This lack of a community or union has reportedly meant that the southern co-presidency has had a tendency to act according to its national vision and interests.45

There appear to be few clear EU strategies for how to enhance regional and multilateral relations with its southern neighbours. There have been some initiatives at the sub-regional level though, such as supporting regional integration in the Maghreb.46 There are many reasons why the EU has not been as quick to sharpen its regional approach, as opposed to its focus on and review of bilateral instruments – mainly the ENP. One is internal divisions within the EU, while another may be that the interest of neighbouring countries in the EU is waning as other external actors gain influence in the region.47

3.2 An EU Strategy? A recurrent criticism in analyses of the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings is the organisation’s lack of an overall strategy. The EU was quick to respond, but did so by tweaking existing instruments rather than formulating a general strategy for the region. What are the long-term goals of the EU with regard to its relations with the MENA region? In the light of the EU’s incentive-based policies, the lack of overall strategic goals is arguably all the more curious. Moreover, the policy of “more for more” immediately begs the question: Are neighbouring countries interested in what the EU has to offer?

44 In June 2012, Jordan assumed the southern co-presidency which up till then had been held by

Egypt. 45 Senen Florensa (2010). 46 European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy, 17 December 2012. 47 Morillas (2012).

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3.2.1 What Can the EU Offer? The ENP is to a large extent based on the neighbourhood policy of enlargement.48 Accordingly, it is based on an incentive model developed for Central and Eastern Europe during its period of transformation after the Cold War. However, there are of course a number of differences between the countries of Central Europe and today’s MENA region. Whereas the prospect of EU membership was a strong carrot for most Central European states, states in the MENA region are less inclined to campaign for future EU membership. Indeed, many of these countries identify themselves more with the Arab World or the African continent.

In the case of the EU’s southern neighbours, the incentives currently on offer are less clear, and differ considerably between countries. This undermines the notion of conditionality and the ENP’s policy of “more for more”, whereby progress with reform is to be rewarded by increased support from the EU. If such conditionality is to work, the incentives must be seen as attractive to the partner country. Unclear incentives combined with conditions are likely to raise the question of the degree to which the new regimes are interested in carrying out externally prescribed reforms. After all, the EU’s conditions strike at the heart of these states’ sovereignty. Commentators have pointed out that the authoritarian Arab Mediterranean governments in place before the popular uprisings did not consider the incentives sufficiently attractive to undertake comprehensive reforms.49 The positions new more democratic regimes, such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, will take in their dialogue with the EU remain unclear, although some signs can be identified. Tunisia is keen on deep collaboration with the EU. In Egypt, the desire for a closer relation with the EU is not overwhelmingly strong. Egypt is aware of its role as a pivotal state both in terms of its market size and its political clout in the MENA region. Libya must stabilise its political and economic order before it can consider deepening its relationship with the EU.

The slogans of the Arab revolts were about freedom and dignity rather than any aspiration to join forces with the West. This touches on the conflicting perspectives from the different sides of the Mediterranean. In Europe there is sensitivity to the past, a realisation that it did little if anything to support the democratic forces prior to the popular uprisings. Now, there is an eagerness to build partnerships with the neighbours in the south, without patronising and without being overly self-interested. A majority of Arabs, by contrast, question European “preaching” about its experiences and models of transition, and are lukewarm about any idea of cultural partnership. Instead, their interests lie in

48 See for example Balfour (2012). 49 Schumacher (2011).

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European investment and the freedom to work in Europe.50 The post-revolutionary countries are interested in financing from the EU. Several interviewees noted that Egypt, for example, was not interested in loans, but primarily in ‘cash’.

As is discussed above, the ENP offers three carrots for neighbouring partner countries – the ‘Three Ms’ of Money, Mobility and Markets. A crucial weakness, and one which is inherent to the EU, is that the delivery of these incentives depends on the approval and performance of the EU member states.51 The three Ms will only become reality if the member states fulfil their commitments. This comes at a time when the EU is already under strain from the economic and financial crisis.

Moreover, the EU’s weight fades somewhat in comparison with bilateral relations with particular EU member states. The assistance provided under the ENP framework is reportedly less than half of that offered by the three largest bilateral EU donors, which admittedly account for almost 90 per cent of European bilateral aid.52 Looking at official development assistance provided in 2009-2010, France was a bigger donor than the EU in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Germany gave more aid to Libya and Egypt than Brussels did. In addition, Spain gave more assistance to Tunisia and the United Kingdom more to Libya than did EU institutions.53 This is not only a challenge when it comes to coordinating efforts in the field, but also seems to indicate member states’ preferences for bilateral approaches. Both factors are likely to undermine the EU’s influence in the region.

The benefits of facilitating mobility, for example, by way of easier access to visas, are likely to be limited to a small category of citizens, such as business people, students and for cultural exchanges.54 Protectionism still exists. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, some EU member states have called for the reform of Schengen rules to make it easier for countries to re-impose border controls.55

Increased market access is primarily offered by DCFTAs. In the light of the fact that half the exports of these countries go to Europe, the incentives provided by opening up markets could be considerable.56 The EU has offered to start

50 Youngs (2011). 51 Greenfield and Balfour (2012). 52 Witney and Dworkin (2012). 53 Based on statistics from the OECD and the World Bank,

http://www.oecd.org/countries/tunisia/aidstatisticsrecipientaidataglance.htm. 54 Greenfield and Balfour (2012). 55 Spiegel Online International, 12 May 2011. 56 Balfour (2012).

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negotiations on DCFTAs with Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia as soon as the relevant preparatory work has been completed.57 However, DCFTAs are comprehensive endeavours which take time.58 At the same time, there is no guarantee that the outcome will encompass full entry to the EU’s single market. Thus, the process is lengthy, requires comprehensive and potentially costly reforms which may disadvantage the country on the world market and, ultimately, promises uncertain rewards at the end. Considering the financial and economic state of the EU at the moment, it is also questionable whether North African and Middle Eastern neighbours will be that eager to carry out the prescribed reforms and adapt to European markets.

Recognising the problems with economic incentives, commentators suggest that the EU’s main strength is its values and principles on solidarity and human rights.59 This should not be underestimated, especially with regard to relations with new regimes which have come to power on the back of popular uprisings. European officials interviewed for this report highlighted the symbolic importance of Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi choosing to travel to Brussels in September, before visiting Washington. This was the first time that an Egyptian president had visited the European Union.60 One interviewee saw the visit as a reflection of how quickly the EU had chosen to engage with the Muslim Brotherhood.61

At the same time, the EU’s track record on supporting human rights and democracy is patchy to say the least. Prior to the revolts, the EU basically pursued a status quo policy, allowing autocratic rule as long as it meant that stability in the region was maintained.62 Such double standards may yet come to haunt the EU. For example, countries may turn elsewhere for support, especially where such support is not attached to any conditions. It is notable that before visiting Brussels in September 2012, President Morsi chose to visit Beijing, and then Tehran to attend a Non-Aligned Movement summit. This underlines the importance Egypt attaches to China as a critical partner. Interestingly, the visit

57 European Commission, The EU’s response to the ‘Arab Spring’ (2011). 58 For example, just negotiating a DCFTA with Ukraine took five years, see Witney and Dworkin

(2012). 59 E.g. interview, Brussels, 28 November 2012. 60 European Council, “Press statement by the President of the European Council Herman Van

Rompuy, following his meeting with the President of Egypt Mohamed Morsi” (2012). 61 Interview, Brussels, 27 November 2012. 62 In addition, as noted by Rosemary Hollis, the credibility of European (and US) support for

democracy and human rights was undermined by refusing to recognise Hamas as the winners of the 2006 Palestinian elections and withholding aid, see Hollis (2012).

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took place in spite of China’s response to the Arab Spring, including blocking UN action against Syria.63

3.2.2 EU Objectives A recurring criticism of the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings is that it has failed to take the opportunity to outline an overall strategy for its relations with the MENA region, instead only tweaking existing instruments. The explanations for this tools-based response can be found in the cumbersome bureaucracy of the EU structures, the divergent views of member states and, possibly, a lingering sense of unease about having been partly complicit in the survival of the authoritarian regimes.64 The failure of the EU to carry out a comprehensive strategy review ultimately means that it is unclear what its objectives are in the region – what does the EU want to achieve? As is noted above, this lack of overall strategic goals is arguably all the more curious when the response is one based on incentives.

At the same time, there is a sense in Brussels and the capitals of the EU member states that the EU must be sensitive to the needs of partner countries. Recent history and the EU’s complicity in the autocratic regimes in North Africa and the Middle East make for an uncomfortable setting. It is now essential that the EU listens to partner countries and that its policies and programmes are demand-driven rather than externally imposed. This creates something of a dichotomy. On the one hand, the EU needs to identify and convey its interests and objectives in a cohesive strategy while, on the other, the EU must be mindful of the demands of partner countries. An EU strategy on relations with its southern neighbours must strike a balance between both the needs of partners and the needs of the EU. Richard Youngs states that Europe should be unapologetically pro-reform but with strategic preferences that advance European interests.65 However, it is important to bear in mind that the new governments in these post-revolutionary countries are still trying to gain an understanding of and reach consensus on their need for outside support. In addition, many are unfamiliar with the EU’s often complicated structures and instruments, and are consequently still learning what they can ask for.

Beyond this policy intricacy, what then are the EU’s interests? A regional strategy of the EU is likely to need to address issues such as energy, immigration, and security – including areas such as counterterrorism and non-proliferation.

63 Spegele and Bradley, “Egypt’s Morsi Firms China Ties”, The Wall Street Journal, 29 August

2012. 64 Greenfield and R Balfour (2012). 65 Youngs (2011).

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Human rights and governance are also high priority questions for the EU. It might also be advisable to address the issues of external actors in the region and engagement with political Islam.

One way of pursuing this regional agenda has been through a dialogue with the League of Arab States (LAS). A ministerial meeting was held between the EU and the LAS on 13 November 2012, marking a “new intensified relationship”.66 This was the second ministerial meeting between the two organisations, but the first to take place since the start of the Arab Spring. Ministers emphasised the importance of continuing to develop political dialogue at all levels, and underlined the weight of bilateral cooperation through concrete projects. A new Crisis Room was inaugurated at LAS headquarters in Cairo.67 The situation room, which started operating in the spring of 2012, was co-financed by EUR 1.9 million of EU funds. In addition, the EU will help to train the 200 Arab officials who will operate the systems. The Crisis Room links the countries of the LAS and establishes connections with the EU’s early warning system.

Finally, there are those who argue that the EU needs to reach a shared understanding of its role and relations with other external actors in North Africa and the Middle East, such as Turkey and China. The EU’s strengthened links with the LAS could be seen as the start of a regional approach to third actors.

3.2.3 Engaging Political Islam

One key issue on the EU agenda is building ties with the new governments in North Africa. Closely connected to this is the question of how to interact with political Islam.

Debates on political engagement with Islamist parties are nothing new. They have been heard for many years, especially after the attacks on the US of 11 September 2001. The EU has attempted to develop an overarching framework for engagement with Islamist parties. In 2006, after the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections, the European Commission established a Task Force on Political Islamism within the Directorate General for External Relations (RELEX).68 The resulting document tried to establish a common European approach to Islamist groups, but failed to get the necessary support from member states. Consequently, the initiative was shelved.

66 “Cairo Declaration, Second European Union-League of Arab States Foreign Affairs Ministerial

Meeting, Arab Republic of Egypt” (2012). 67 European Union, High Representative Catherine Ashton inaugurates EU-funded Crisis Room at

League of Arab States (2012) and euobserver.com, 26 June 2012. 68 Kausch (2009).

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The lack of a shared EU strategy and the failure of EU instruments such as the ENP to involve Islamist actors and organisations meant that most engagement prior to the Arab Spring was on an ad hoc basis and at the bilateral level.69 Those member states with large Muslim immigrant populations, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, took the lead.70 In general, however, the EU has had a preference for engagement, arguing that it can be used to push its concerns in areas such as human rights.71 That said, concern over possible repercussions internationally and for public opinion at home has prevented the taking of a public stance on the issue. Member states also have different views about the need for a common strategy.

Debates among analysts prior to the Arab Spring did highlight the value of engaging with Islamists in preparation for the changes to come: “It is better to have leverage with Islamist groups before they come to power; afterwards may be too late”.72 Now, the question is whether it is already too late. EU officials interviewed said it was a challenge to build trust with the new Islamist regimes, especially given the EU’s history of supporting authoritarian regimes. Some EU officials saw the need for a debate on the issue of engagement with political Islam. In such discussions, it would be crucial that there is clear distinction made between Islamists and extremists. In addition, any EU guidelines on engagement with Islamists groups should make it clear that such engagement should be on the basis of equality. Islamists groups are a part of these countries’ societies and should, accordingly, be supported, monitored and criticised according to the same standards as other groups in that society.

3.2.4 EU Instruments By restricting itself to existing tools, and especially those of the ENP, the EU’s response to developments in North Africa has mainly focused on economic support. As is noted above, such incentives can provide considerable leverage. There is much to be done, however, to improve the trade balance between the EU and its neighbours to the south– only 5 per cent of EU trade is with the nine countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean.73

An analysis by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) concludes that the prominence given to economic relations has led the EU to neglect other

69 Hamid and Kadlec (2010). 70 Ibid. 71 Balfour (2012). 72 Hamid and Kadlec (2010). 73 Balfour (2012).

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approaches, which in many ways would be more appropriate to the situation.74 For example, the ECFR report notes that while political and diplomatic interaction is key, there are few EU diplomats on the ground in North Africa; and while security is a big concern for the region, the CSDP has hardly been used.

There is much that the EU can offer in terms of the CSDP. For example, the security sector in Libya is in need of much assistance, as are certain parts of the security sectors in Egypt and Tunisia. However, it is possible that it is too early for the EU to engage in too far-reaching collaborative programmes with these states, given that they are still in a delicate transition process. After all, security sector engagements are a particularly sensitive matter for a state. Libya and Egypt in particular are still in a period of transition, seeking to stabilise their countries and formalise policies. That said, there are areas in the field of security and defence where the EU could provide useful support further down the line. Support for security sector reform (SSR), especially in the area of rule of law, is an obvious one, and one which the EU is discussing with the partner countries. Border control is another matter with which the EU could plausibly assist. Moreover, instability in the Sahel, exacerbated by the conflict in Libya, could present a shared interest on which security cooperation could be built.

3.3 Reaching Out to Civil Society One of the most innovative aspects of the steps taken by the EU in the wake of the Arab Spring is its focus on support to civil society. A number of mechanisms have been put in place, of which two are discussed below: the Civil Society Facility and the European Endowment for Democracy.

3.3.1 Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility The EU envisaged the setting up of a Civil Society Facility in the two communiques described above, which set out the EU’s strategic response to the uprisings in the region.75

The Civil Society Facility aims to strengthen civil society actors in partner countries and promote their participation in policy dialogue. It also sets out to boost civil society actors’ involvement in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the EU’s own assistance and policies. The Facility will accomplish

74 Witney and Dworkin (2012). 75 For more information, see EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, “Neighbourhood Civil Society

Facility”, http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=393&id_type=10.

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this by, for example, providing financial support and training as well as involving civil society in national policy dialogues and bilateral programmes.

The initiative is commendable. Arab civil society organisations (CSOs) have played an important role over the years in advancing human rights, but they have also been weakened by both internal and external challenges. Obstacles have included the tight restrictions imposed by their governments and sometimes the lack of a clear mission and structure in the CSO. Moreover, the absence of any national development vision to which the CSOs could contribute has further hampered their work.76 Civil society is notably weak in Libya. There is now a window of opportunity for the EU to help strengthen civil society in these neighbouring countries.

Supporting civil society in other countries is, however, not without its problems. It can impinge on state sovereignty and does not always involve obvious partners or recipients.

Respecting sovereignty and non-interference in countries’ internal affairs have long been important principles in the post-colonial Arab world.77 Indeed, the new regimes in the region are more rather than less sceptical about outside interference, at least with regard to the EU. Arguably, this is justified. Prior to the uprisings, the EU and its member states did little to stand up for democratic forces in these countries but instead chose to turn a blind eye in pursuing a policy of maintaining the status quo. Supporting autocratic rulers was seen as a safer bet in terms of maintaining stability in the region and, thus, avoiding immigrant flows across EU borders.

The scepticism in the region about external interference was put in the spotlight when Egypt cracked down on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in the country at the beginning of 2012. In total, 43 people, including 19 US citizens, five Serbs, two Germans and three non-Egyptian Arab nationals, faced prosecution on charges of illegal foreign funding, carrying out political activities unrelated to their work and failing to obtain operating licences.78 Egypt also rejected applications from eight US-based civil society organisations for licences to work in the country, reportedly because it believed the groups’ operations violated state sovereignty.79 While the crackdown ignited widespread international outrage, some commentators questioned whether other countries, 76 Rama (2012). 77 As noted by Balfour (2012), a case in point is that Arab countries are hardly represented in the

International Criminal Court (ICC), as being a participant inherently means interference with one’s criminal judicial sovereignty Tunisia became an exception rather than a rule when it in in June 2011 was the first North African country to join the ICC.

78 Fahmy 6 February 2012. 79 Reuters, 24 April 2012.

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such as the US, would tolerate foreign organisations supporting political parties and electoral campaigns within their borders.80

Thus, supporting civil society in another country can be a sensitive activity. This is even more so in these countries today where trust is not in abundance. The EU is already having difficulties building confidence with the new regimes which, given its historical track record, arguably have little reason to trust the EU. Indeed, they may fear that support for civil society is only a way for external actors to undermine state structures. This may be of particular concern to Arab states, which are often viewed by their citizens with a level of suspicion and as enjoying little legitimacy.81

The EU, in its review of the ENP, seems to signal that support for civil society can also be an alternative to government aid:

The EU will uphold its policy of curtailing relations with governments engaged in violations of human rights and democracy standards, including by making use of targeted sanctions and other policy measures. Where it takes such measures, it will not only uphold but strengthen further its support to civil society. 82

The risk of governments feeling threatened by outside support to civil society could mean that people working for CSOs are at times hindered by the government or, at worst, that their personal safety is placed in danger. The Egyptian crackdown on (NGOs) at the beginning of 2012 is a case in point. Importantly, while the international staff of these organisations can leave in times of emergency, local staff do not always have that option. Consequently, the EU has to be sensitive to the local situation when supporting civil society.

The fine line between support and interference poses a challenge for the EU when supporting CSOs. The issue of selecting the recipients of EU support is complicated by the myriad of civil society actors. Moreover, the Arab revolts underscored the emergence of new CSOs, for example, within social media or trade unions.

The EU should also take care to fully coordinate the Facility with EU programmes and policies, such as the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the European Endowment for Democracy.

80 See for example Marlene Spoerri in Christian Science Monitor, 13 February 2012. 81 Agha and Malley (2012). 82 European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood – A review of European Neighbourhood Policy(2011).

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3.3.2 European Endowment for Democracy The European Endowment for Democracy (EED) was established in June 2012 to promote “deep and sustainable democracy” as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law.83 It will do this by supporting political parties, NGOs, trade unions and other actors. The geographical focus of the EED will initially be on the European Neighbourhood.

The initiative is a way to circumvent the EU’s bureaucratic hurdles and facilitate rapid and flexible funding to parties that may not otherwise be able to access EU resources. Modelled to a large extent on the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the EED will take the form of a private law foundation. While complementing EU cooperation instruments, the EED will be independent of EU institutions with its own statute and decision-making process. It will be financed by voluntary contributions from member states and others, such as private foundations. A small secretariat, headed by an Executive Director, will be responsible for day-to-day operations.

While the EED is a praiseworthy effort to encourage flexibility and quick responses, the initiative is also riddled with question marks. For one thing, it remains uncertain whether the EED enjoys the solid political support of the EU member states. This, in turn, casts doubt on whether it will be able to secure solid and long-term financing. Thus far, requests to fund it have received lukewarm responses and there have been no firm pledges. The European Commission has allocated EUR 6 million for the establishment and initial functioning of the EED.84 Sweden and Poland have pledged some EUR 5–10 million, but this is still to be confirmed, and Germany, for example, is said to be considering whether and how to support the endowment.85 In addition to uncertain funding inflows, there is also the danger of contributors wanting to tie allocations to specific countries or regions, for example, by earmarking contributions to the EU’s closest neighbours to the east rather than in the Mediterranean region.

The desire to tie financial commitments to specific countries would stand in stark contrast to the wish to ensure that the EED is autonomous. Tight purse strings may also make member states more concerned about the danger of the EED duplicating, or worse counteracting, other efforts in the area of democracy and human rights. For the EED’s continuation it is of the utmost importance that it finds a niche, ensuring that it complements existing instruments such as the EIDHR, the IfS and the Civil Society Facility. In addition, recognising the long-

83 European Commission, The European Endowment for Democracy: Support for the unsupported

(2012). 84 Ibid. 85 Richter and Leininger, November (2012) and August (2012).

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term nature of democratisation, it is vital that projects and programmes are handed over to EU instruments that are more suitable for providing long-term assistance.

The fact that all EU member states are represented on the Board of Governors of the EED has not translated into money, but has added to the danger of delays and that political interests and disagreements might come into play. The hope is that the Executive Committee – seven members drawn from the Board of Governors – will be granted a considerable level of independence to ensure that the EED can achieve its objective of being fast and flexible.86

That said, it is inevitable that the EED will deal with controversial and risky issues. No firm decision has been made, for example, with regard to support to political parties.87 Similarly, there are many models of democracy,88 which may lead to challenges for the EED in attempting to reach consensus. Undoubtedly, these unresolved issues will lead to debates and potential divisions between EU member states. As one interviewee put it: “I am glad that I am not the one signing off on the projects”.89

Along the same lines, it may be a challenge to agree criteria for the selection of partners. One guideline may be to pay particular attention to projects involving many participating organisations. Another may be to fund projects that have regional dimensions.

3.4 Conclusions The EU acted promptly in the wake of the uprisings in North Africa. It did so by using and amending the instruments it already had at hand, while adding some innovative initiatives such as the task forces and support for civil society. It is now time for the EU to reflect on the larger picture, and develop an overall strategy for its relations with the MENA region.

Resorting mainly to the ENP meant a response that was largely based on differentiation, with programmes and policies individually tailored to each country. Differentiation recognises the different needs, opportunities and constraints of the various states in the region. It is also a way of avoiding the blockages that regional approaches have often encountered in the past. However, there is a need for the EU to complement this with a multilateral framework,

86 See for example Kostanyan and Nasieniak (2012). 87 Richter and Leininger (2012). 88 Youngs and Brudzinska (2012). 89 Interview, Brussels, November 2012.

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which would counteract fragmentation and accusations of double standards. Importantly, this could also facilitate regional integration.

Developing clear, overall strategic goals becomes all the more urgent in the light of the EU’s incentive-based polices towards its southern neighbours. In forming its general regional strategy, it is essential that the EU carefully considers both what incentives could interest the countries in the region, and what the EU’s interests and objectives are.

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4 The African Union The Arab revolts took most policymakers by surprise. Governments and actors outside the MENA region were reluctant to immediately support citizens’ demands for democratic change. The African Union was one important actor that displayed such diffidence. This chapter discusses the AU’s legacy with regard to its response to the Arab revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The analysis takes a slightly different approach to that of the chapter on the EU. Unlike the EU, the AU has not adopted any policy instruments or financial tools to address the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In fact, the AU’s engagement with the new governments has been fairly passive. The principal reason for this is that the AU has neither the capacity nor the capability to engage itself in democratic reform. Rather than examining the AU’s policy initiatives, this chapter examines the principal policy approach the AU took at the time the revolts erupted, and the implications that might arise from such an approach.

4.1 Impotent or Paralysed? The AU responded quickly to events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. For example, in early 2011 the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) early on supported “the legitimate aspirations for democracy”, and also “condemned violence and violation of international humanitarian law against civilians in Libya”.90

However, the policy response did not involve a powerful political reaction beyond expressions of solidarity. This inability to respond more concretely to the Arab revolts has led to strong criticism of the organisation, not only from within the institution, but also from some of its member states and the NGO community.91

In particular, two negative judgements have been put forward. The first is linked to the AU having been ambiguous in its response to the uprisings in North Africa. After releasing the above statement, it was not entirely clear what the AU’s position was or meant. Did it still recognise the incumbent regimes or did it favour the democratic aspirations of the citizenry?

The second criticism was of the AU’s own institutional structure – that the inability to respond forcefully to democratic transformation displayed the weakness of the AU’s entire peace and security architecture.92 The lack of a clear 90 See Peace and Security Council Communiqué of the 260th meeting (2011-02-16) and the 261th

meeting (2011-02-23). 91 See Souaré and Mesfin (2011). 92 See Sturman (2012).

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compass suggested that no political instrument was at hand that could guide AU institutions in responding to events that should have been anticipated by, for example, the AU Commission.

In retrospect there were different reasons for the lack of clarity in the AU’s response to the revolts. One challenge for the AU was linked to power relations inside the organisation. The fact is that these Arab states had for a long time been the financial backbone of the entire AU project. At the time of the uprisings, Egypt, Libya and Algeria each contributed about 15 per cent each of the AU’s general budget.93 These states therefore held a relatively strong sway in the AU. For the AU or any of its member states to side with the opposition in these countries could have proved very costly.94

At the more conceptual level, the principle of sovereignty became a major issue and challenge when considering how the AU should tackle political developments. How could it react without interfering in the domestic affairs of a sovereign country facing major political breakdown? Most post-colonial states are highly sensitive to overstepping this sacred principle.

The other challenge, and a partial explanation for the AU’s weak reaction, related to the AU’s political and instrumental orientation only to handle so-called unconstitutional changes of power.95 The AU and its heads of state had been developing far-reaching principles on how to tackle unconstitutional changes of government. However, the AU has only recently been able to overcome differences among the African leaders and codify its position on such attempts, including punitive responses. The AU’s position on unconstitutional changes of government is set out in the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted in 2000.96 Coincidentally, the act left unattended the question of popular changes of government, which was the essence of the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The popular uprisings in North Africa to date have on the one hand been unconstitutional according to the definition in the Constitutive Act, but, on the other hand, have been led by the people.

93 Prior to the revolts, three of the five largest contributors to the AU were Arab states (in addition to

South Africa and Nigeria). 94 A related obstacle also had to do specifically with Libya’s Gaddafi. His influence on African

affairs and vision for the continent affected the AU member states’ attitudes to the position the organisation should take. States taking a position that engaged in criticising Libya risked being perceived as traitors by Gaddafi. A number of African states were also in close alignment with Gaddafi.

95 See Eriksson (2010). 96 The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted in 2000 at the Lome Summit (Togo). It

entered into force in 2001.

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There were simply no instruments to guide the AU on this matter. As Kathryn Sturman notes, the constitutionalism on which the AU’s democracy promotion is founded does not provide an adequate response to popular uprisings. The AU principle was only meant to apply to challenges to ‘democratically elected governments’.97

Another important factor is the AU’s general lack of sway in North Africa. David Zounmenou draws attention to the fact that North Africa does not have a functioning REC. Without an REC in North Africa, the AU was almost “inaudible”, as Zounmenou put it.98

Last but not least, some experts have argued that in the case of Libya, the AU was simply sidelined by NATO and the Arab League, due to its lack of so-called hard power. As Paul-Simon Handy notes: “The lack of military might and financial capacity to sustain a military effort is key to understanding the AU’s behaviour […]”.99

4.1.1 The AU’s Response to Tunisia

The AU’s reaction to the unconstitutional change of government driven by the Tunisian people was quick but cautious support for the popular protests. At the 257th meeting of the AU PSC in Addis Ababa on 15 January 2011 it stated:

The Council strongly condemned the excessive use of force against the demonstrators, resulting in loss of life, and stressed the need to spare no efforts to avoid any further loss of life. The Council expressed its solidarity with the people of Tunisia, and conveyed its condolences to the families of the victims and wished early recovery to the injured. The Council urgently appealed to the Tunisians for calm and an end to all acts of violence and destruction of property.100

The Council also appealed to “the political stakeholders and the Tunisian people to work together, in unity, consensus and respect for legality, towards a peaceful and democratic transition, which would allow the Tunisian people to freely choose their leaders through free, open, democratic and transparent elections.”101

Despite its call for an end to the violence, the AU did not confront the existing regime in any profound way. Nor did it challenge it with threats of exclusion or

97 Sturman (2012). 98 Zounmenou 2012: 20. 99 Handy 2012: 9. 100 Statement by the Peace and Security Council’s 257th meeting (2011). 101 Statement by the Peace and Security Council’s 257th meeting (2011).

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isolation, or concrete support for the opposition. During its 268th meeting on 23 March 2011, the PSC welcomed the revolution in Tunisia.102

4.1.2 The AU’s Response to Egypt The revolt in Tunisia had erupted without notice. The revolt in Egypt suggested that the Arab Spring was more than a local event. The AU’s reaction to Egypt’s unconstitutional change of power mirrors much its response to developments in Tunisia. At its 260th meeting, the PSC stated that it:

Notes the deeper aspirations of the Egyptian people… [And] Expresses AU solidarity with the Egyptian people whose desire for democracy is consistent with the relevant instruments of the AU and the continent’s commitment to promote democratisation, good governance and respect for human rights; Strongly condemns the acts of violence against the demonstrators, which led to loss of human life. Council requests the Egyptian authorities to shed light on these acts of violence and to bring their authors and perpetrators to justice… [And] Reserves the right, in the light of developments in the transition process and on the basis of the relevant AU instruments, to take any measure that the situation may warrant, with due respect for the legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people for democracy.103

The statement on Egypt was, like the Tunisian one, of a declaratory tone, as opposed to the launch of any concrete political action in support of the people.

4.1.3 The AU’s Response to Libya Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, in the case of Libya the Peace and Security Council of the AU did not want to side with the rebels. It may well have been that it wanted to be absolutely certain which side would come out victorious in the conflict.104

One element behind this reluctance may have been Gaddafi’s legendary standing in African political affairs. Gaddafi had over the years played an important role in developing the African integration agenda. He provided the AU with strong financial backing and, perhaps equally importantly, provided the continent with a vision for further integration.105 However, Gaddafi’s engagement with the 102 Statement by the Peace and Security Council’s 268th meeting (2011). 103 Statement by the Peace and Security Council’s 260th meeting (2011). 104 One counterargument is whether it is fair to expect a young organisation such as the AU to

respond to the Libyan crisis, when a more mature actor such as the EU was also very slow in responding.

105 This vision has every now and then been confronted by other visions of leading African countries (read South Africa) of a more slow-moving integration process. Others have also been sceptical about his undemocratic ambitions in relation to the AU.

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African continent was coupled with a policy of divide and rule. He had managed to acquire both strong supporters and powerful enemies on the continent.

President Zuma of South Africa played a crucial role in developing the AU’s policy response to the Libyan revolt. The response was formulated by the AU High-level Committee on Libya, of which South Africa was a member. On 10 March 2011, the Committee formally rejected the idea of foreign military intervention in Libya and instead called for mediation between President Gaddafi and the opposition.106 This contradicted South Africa’s own position, as it had previously voted in favour of UNSCR 1973 mandating military intervention within a UN framework.107 The AU’s rejection of military intervention was repeated on 25 May, when it restated its objection to NATO intervention.108

The position of the AU throughout the Libyan revolt was to look for a negotiated outcome instead of clearly backing the opposition forces. This position became increasingly awkward for it as the civil war ensued. The AU also called for an end to NATO airstrikes.109 The position of the AU stood in stark contrast to the broader international consensus on Libya.110

4.2 AU Reactions: an Analysis The above section provides a brief overview of how the AU responded to the revolts in early 2011. It is still too early to assess the AU’s post-revolt engagement with the three states, but an examination is made below of how it reacted and on what basis.

The AU’s responses to the revolutions will have significance for its future political development. The main problem for the AU in its early management of the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya was that the organisation treated the revolts inconsistently. The AU provided only general support for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, but in the case of Libya backed the principle of non-violence, which had the de facto effect of keeping Gaddafi in power. The chief reason seems to have been the failure to treat the revolts in the region differently from that of military coups or any other unconstitutional change of government, a lens through which the AU has traditionally operated.

106 Dersso 2011: 39. 107 However, South Africa did note its differing position at the time of voting. 108 As noted by Souaré the “…proposal for a political solution before military options is a consistent

approach of the AU in all conflict situations”: Souaré 2011: 25. 109 Souaré 2011: 25. 110 Aboagye (2011).

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As is noted above, the AU has over the years developed a number of policy instruments to tackle unconstitutional changes of government. Some of the most important ones are: the AU Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol),111 the Common African Defence and Security Policy,112 and the Constitutive Act. The latter is the most important for these purposes.113 It sets out a number of guiding principles on how the AU should respond to member states in violation of their obligations on human rights, democratic principles and governance, the sanctity of human life and unconstitutional changes of government.114

The AU also has a well-defined procedure on how to behave if such a situation occurs within a member state, that is, what form of political sanctions is to be implemented. Both the definitions and the political responses are found in the African Union Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration (2000), the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union (2002), and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance (2007).

The AU’s impotent reaction to the revolts in North Africa can in some respects be explained by the fact that it had not developed a rigorous policy on how to deal with popularly driven changes of government. Instead, it only had a general idea of what constituted an unconstitutional change of government and what responses such a situation required. The latter was at the time defined as follows:

The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly define an unconstitutional change of government as: (a) a military or other coup d’état against a democratically elected government; (b) an intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; (c) the replacement of a democratically elected government by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; (d) refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after a free and fair election; and (e) the overthrow and replacement of a democratically elected government by elements assisted by mercenaries.115

Moreover, article 23 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance defines an unconstitutional change of government as:

Any putsch or coup d’état against a democratically elected government, or any intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; or any replacement of a democratically elected government by

111 The AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council 2002. 112 African Union, the Solemn Declaration on the African Common Defence and Security Policy,

(2004). 113 See Constitutive Act of the African Union, see also Powell and Tieku (2005). 114 See the Constitutive Act of the African Union. See also discussion in Dersso 2011: 35. 115 Rules and Procedures of the Assembly of the Union.

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armed dissidents or rebels; or any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections; or any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.116

The instruments and recommendations on how and when to act are mainly located in the Constitutive Act, which states that the AU has the right: “ to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.”117 In addition to responding to an unconstitutional change of government by military means, the AU and its PSC have other means to their disposal, for example targeted sanctions and good offices, including mediation and the sending of high-level representatives such as the Panel of the Wise. These instruments are detailed in the Modalities for the Panel of the Wise, the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly (2002) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007).118

In this context, it is worth noting that there is no internationally established definition of an unconstitutional change of government. This is because each sovereign state has its own constitution that states how legal changes of government should be carried out and what are considered crimes against the constitution. An unconstitutional change of government has therefore traditionally been regarded as the internal affair of a state.

To gain an understanding of the AU’s policy on and behaviour towards the erupting revolts, it is important to recognise that it did not view the Arab Spring revolts in Tunisia and Egypt as unconstitutional changes of government in the strict sense, and so did not react to them as such. As is noted above, there are formal AU guidelines on how to conclude that an unconstitutional change of government has taken place, including what formal responses to take, but the AU will have to develop its policies with regard to popularly driven changes of government.

The motives for the AU to intervene should arguably be the same in cases of unconstitutional changes of government as in popularly driven changes of government: to improve the security climate for the people, states and regions. A good security climate is normatively associated with democracy and respect for human rights. 116 African Charter, Chapter 8, Article 23. 117 2000: Article 4. 118 Eriksson 2010: 10.

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Solomon Dersso puts forward a number of considerations that could be valuable for determining the nature of an unconstitutional change of government. One is whether a situation exists in a country that is undermining the promotion of democratic institutions and structures, such as the rule of law, social order, popular participation and electoral processes. Another could be the way in which protesters are mobilised and the type of protest. A third may be to consider the level of popularity of the uprising, and whether it is non-violent, or involves the military or external actors.119 All these considerations could form part of determining the legitimacy of an uprising.

Such considerations are important for the AU’s continued policy development, not least because popularly driven changes of government could spread beyond the MENA region to sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Sudan experienced demonstrations during 2012). Attempting to separate popularly driven from other unconstitutional changes of government presents a number of challenges though.

If the AU is to go beyond expressing declaratory support or condemnation to providing concrete support or imposing sanctions, who or what should it target? A “bad” unconstitutional change of government is easier to handle in this regard as the actor is often easy to identify and therefore easy to target. However, a popularly driven unconstitutional change of government is more difficult to deal with. This is especially the case as it is difficult to know not only who to target in an intervention, but arguably also when to do it. The AU reacted to developments in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia once the protests had reached a high level of intensity and the incumbent regimes had resorted to violence. The AU, however, did not react to the massive protests witnessed in the same period in Algeria and Malawi (and Morocco, although it is not an AU member state). The question is, then, whether the AU should intervene in the process of a popularly driven unconstitutional change of government or instead wait until it has actually taken place? What if, for example, a general strike in a country is mistaken for a popular revolt?

The question of how the AU could and should react or intervene in the event of a popularly driven unconstitutional change of government must also be posed. In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, the AU responded to the political crises after the event instead of taking a proactive approach. What is more, the AU did not actively or substantially intervene in the developments, but chose to stop at official support or condemnation. What could have been done differently?

First, if the regulations and mandates needed had been in place, together with a definition of an unconstitutional change of government, the AU could have applied non-violent measures such as targeted sanctions against the incumbent 119 Dersso: 2011: 37.

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regime in order to support popular demands for regime reform. Second, in addition to placing sanctions on the incumbent government, the AU could have offered support for the democracy advocates. This might, however, have posed huge problems as there are financial barriers to the AU engaging in such activities. The majority of AU member states have their own legitimacy problems and it would almost certainly infringe the sovereignty of the state in question.120

In sum, the AU is in need of an enlarged definition of popularly driven protest aimed at democratic reform. As is argued above, this is needed to ensure that the rights of citizens in Africa are not sacrificed to protect its governments. The current definition of unconstitutional change of government is understandable since the cases that the AU has had to deal with hitherto have been limited to coups d’état and the illegal elongation of tenures. However, as the events of the Arab Spring have amply demonstrated, there comes a time when the constitutionally provided mechanisms for change of government through elections become inaccessible to citizens (as was the case in Gaddafi’s Libya) or when they become so flawed that they are unable to produce political change (as in Ben Ali’s Tunisia). For such situations, the AU must develop definitions of and instruments for responding to popular but unconstitutional changes of government.

The AU is also in need of regulations on which tools to apply when such circumstances arise; and, of course, although this is beyond the scope of this paper, the capacity to implement them.121 Without a definition of a popularly driven unconstitutional change of government in situations of illegitimate incumbency, however, there is a risk that the behaviour of the AU will continue to lack consistency – in addition to the severe security risks at the human, state and regional levels.

Finally, the need to develop a definition of a popularly driven unconstitutional change of government, as well as efficient response mechanisms, would be in line with the AU’s envisioned Peace and Security Architecture. An important aspect of APSA is the setting up of credible capabilities to act promptly on various security threats on the continent, including political crises such as those in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

120 During the revolt in Egypt, the US provided democracy support. This led to a major political

crisis between Egypt and the US as the SCAF considered the US to overstep its mandate in the context of democracy support.

121 Eriksson (2010).

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4.3 Conclusions The AU lacked the proper instruments to deal with the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Although it reacted early to the events by issuing policy statements, and in the case of Libya offered mediation initiatives, the AU did not react as forcefully as it could have done if it had been equipped with the necessary policy tools. Hence, developing tools and mechanisms that could better respond to the governance issues arising on the continent would be a valuable exercise. The AU has the instruments to penalise with sanctions and isolation those who take power by force, or those democratically elected leaders that cling to power, but similarly tools are needed for those who are beating down calls for democratic change.122 This, in turn, demands that the AU further develops its guidelines on what constitutes a popularly driven constitutional change of government. Finally, it is worth noting that the AU also lacks more far-reaching instruments for dealing with security and stabilisation programmes in the above-mentioned states. The AU must develop a better capacity to manage local security and stability operations that could ease the transformation from authoritarianism to democracy.

The AU has so far been a relatively passive actor with regard to either country-by-country support or regional democracy support. It remains to be seen whether the AU’s future responses to the democratic transformations that have occurred will prove more effective. Some initiatives have been launched, for example, towards Libya in the form of border controls, but there have been no major new initiatives.

122 See also Handy 2012: 9.

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5 Conclusions As the Arab revolts enter their third year, the road to political stability remains rocky. In several North African states, incumbent regimes are facing strong criticism from the opposition, and some may even be on the brink of further regime change. International actors have learned by doing (or not doing) since the outset of the revolts and their responses have been increasingly well-considered. When comparing the EU and the AU, however, there were clear differences in their responses to developments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. While they were both quick to respond, the EU delivered concrete measures to support democratic forces while the AU largely limited itself to issuing statements and did not want to side with either the government or the rebels. It should be underlined though that the instruments available to the two organisations are very different. Moreover, the three countries are members of the AU, while the EU is an external actor.

We set out below a number of issues that both the EU and the AU should address in order to be able to respond better to future developments in the region and beyond.

An open debate on political Islam is to be welcomed. That is not to say that a common EU or AU policy on political Islam is necessarily required. However, it should be recognised that engagement with Islamists groups must be on the basis of mutual understanding. Islamist groups are part of these countries’ societies and should, accordingly, be supported, monitored and criticised as much and according to the same standards as other groups in society. Moreover, there should be a clear distinction made between Islamists and extremists.

Supporting civil society is commendable, but also requires skill and thought. Backing CSOs in other countries inherently infringes state sovereignty and does not always involve obvious partners/recipients. There is a fine line between support and interference and it is important that the provider’s objectives are clear and transparent. The supporter must also be aware of the fact that its support can endanger the personal safety of people who work for CSOs.

The EU should develop its regional approach to its southern neighbourhood. Until now, the EU’s response to the Arab revolts has mainly been within the framework of the ENP, entailing individual responses to each country. There is, however, a need for both sound bilateral policies and a solid regional approach. Such a multilateral strategy would encourage a coordinated approach by the EU. Moreover, it would facilitate integration in the MENA region.

It is crucial that EU member states deliver on their pronounced intentions. If the EU is to have a role to play in the MENA region, its member states must be sincere in delivering on what has been promised. Otherwise, the new regimes in North Africa are likely to look elsewhere for support. Many of these countries

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identify themselves more with the Arab World or the African continent, and other actors are also increasing their presence in the region.

Responding to popular uprisings requires good timing. The AU needs to adopt clear and formal guidelines within its existing instruments on when to react to popularly driven changes of government. Otherwise, there is a risk that the AU will be perceived as interfering in the internal affairs of member states or as responding too late.

The AU needs to develop a framework for responding to popularly driven changes of government. The AU needs to develop clear and coherent policy guidance on how (including the choice of instruments), when and to what standards it responds to situations like those of the Arab Spring. The AU’s different response to the revolt in Libya, in comparison to those in Tunisia and Egypt, attracted much criticism. This study identifies a number of considerations that could be useful to consider in developing such criteria. Considerations would advisably focus on the nature and local context of the popular revolt.

It is essential that the AU develops a policy toolbox for responding to popularly driven changes of government. In contrast to what some critics have claimed, the AU was quick to respond to events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. However, it fell short and only issued statements without taking any concrete measures. This study finds that beyond existing instruments such as mediation and good offices, the AU lacks the institutional mechanisms to respond more concretely to violations of human rights and undemocratic governance in times of popular revolt. Some instruments that could be used include sanctions, regime isolation, recognition of opposition actors and support to civil society.

International coordination is key for success. Although the AU is an independent and autonomous international actor, it could benefit a great deal from coordinating with other multilateral organisations, such as the EU, the LAS and the UN over popularly driven changes of government. In the early phase of the Arab revolt in North Africa, the AU was at odds with the international community. This caused unwarranted criticism of the AU. With better coordination such a situation could have been avoided.

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Interviews

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – October 2012

EU Delegation to the AU (military affairs)

Institute for Security Studies

Commission of the African Union

Brussels, Belgium – November 2012

Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations

European Commission, Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid

European External Action Service

Permanent Mission of the African Union

Sweden’s Permanent Representation to the European Union

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