SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM AND DALYIAN STEADY-STATE ECONOMY

INVESTIGATING THE POTENTIAL FOR A MARXIAN CONTRIBUTION TO HERMAN DALY'S CONCEPTION OF

ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

A dissertation submitted to The University of Manchester for the degreeof Master or Arts in Political Economy in the Faculty of Humanities

2013

DAVOR MUJEZINOVIC

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Table of ContentsAbstract .............................................................................................................................3Intellectual Property Statement..........................................................................................4Acknowledgements............................................................................................................5Vita.....................................................................................................................................6Introduction........................................................................................................................7

Background and issues........................................................................................7Aims and goals....................................................................................................9Delimitation, literature, method and ethics.......................................................10

Chapter 1: Daly, steady-state economics and socialism..................................................131.1. Daly's relationship with socialism and capitalism......................................131.2. Evidence and examples of socialistic tendencies in Daly..........................151.3. Daly the socialist... but not Marxist............................................................18

Chapter 2: Marxism and ecology.....................................................................................212.1. Prometheus? Dispensing with a myth........................................................212.2. Marx, Daly and what drives growth...........................................................242.3. Materialist vs. idealist conceptions of the growth-oriented economy........29

Chapter 3: DSSE and class..............................................................................................313.1.1. Class and value – contradictions in Nature........................................313.1.2. Class and value – contradictions in production..................................33

3.2. Class conflict and profit under DSSE-S.....................................................353.2.1. Technological development................................................................37

3.3. DSSE-S and the state .................................................................................40Chapter 4: Concluding discussions..................................................................................43

4.1. Implications ...............................................................................................434.2. Towards a Marxian Ecological Economics................................................45

Bibliography....................................................................................................................48

Word Count: 16422

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ABSTRACT SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM AND DALYIAN STEADY-STATE ECONOMY

- INVESTIGATING THE POTENTIAL FOR A MARXIAN CONTRIBUTION TO

HERMAN DALY'S CONCEPTION OF ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

Thesis under the supervision of John F. O'Neill, Ph.D., Hallsworth Professor of Political Economy and Dr. Greig Charnock, Lecturer in International Politics.

Herman Daly is a major figure in the field of ecological economics, known for his advocacy of a 'steady-state economy'. This study accepts his positions on thermodynamics and biophysical limits to growth of matter-energy through-put, directing instead its critique to the social dimensions of Daly's theory. The investigation shows that limitations in Daly's conceptual framework lead to a failure to adequately explain the tendency towards continuous growth of matter-energy through-put under the capitalist mode of production. Additionally it fails to give satisfactory attention to issues of social conflict, specifically the contradictive economic and environmental interests of different classes, that would remain in a hypothetical steady-state society. I argue that these neglects and oversights are rooted in Daly's choice of pre-analytic vision rather than an analytical failure on his part. The addition of Marxian tools and categories to Daly's pre-analytic vision makes possible an explanation of the growth-orientated nature of capitalism, and allows the inherent class conflicts in Daly's suggested steady-state society to emerge in the analysis. Such an addition does not contradicting any crucial conclusions brought in by Daly's unmodified approach, and can in fact be shown to be compatible with both his normative and positive goals.

No portion of the work referred to in the dissertation has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STATEMENTi. The author of this dissertation (including any appendices and/or schedules to this dissertation) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

ii. Copies of this dissertation, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has entered into. This page must form part of any such copies made.

iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the dissertation, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this dissertation, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this dissertation, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/display.aspx?DocID=487), in any relevant Dissertation restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations

(see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s Guidance for the Presentation of Dissertations.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSFirst and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors professor John O’Neill and Dr. Greig Charnock for their continuous support and for helping me shape an actual dissertation out of the vague and somewhat incoherent idea it began as.

My earnest thanks also goes to professor Erik Swyngedouw, who took the time to assist me with formulating my initial concept and suggested possible approaches I could take.

I thank my fellow classmates on the MA in Political Economy for all the good times during the last year, and especially for the stimulating pub discussions on the finer points of Marxian theory.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family. My parents Mirsad and Jelena and my sister Nina for their encouragement and emotional support, and my partner Amy for all her love and for being an excellent sounding board for my ideas.

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VITADavor Mujezinovic was born June 22, 1986, in Bijeljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Former Republic of Yugoslavia). He did his undergraduate work at the School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He received a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration in June of 2012, and wrote his thesis on managerial decision-making and competitive strategy. He began work on his Master of Arts in Political Economy in September of 2012 with the purpose of combining his interest in Marxian political economy and ecological economics.

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Introduction

Background and issuesBroadly speaking, the issue that inspires this work is that of environmental destruction

and the careless treatment of Nature in favour of economic interests, supported by

expert economists who tend to underestimate the negative consequences of doing so1.

Ecological economics presents a much needed opportunity for both an economic science

in theory and, more importantly, economic decision-making in practice that is grounded

in a deeper understanding of natural science and attempts to takes the needs of the

planet into account. In this broader sense, I can but agree with Herman Daly's criticism

of the current paradigm and his effort to provide a more ecologically sound alternative.

As such, despite often going into criticism of his conception of ecological economics,

this work does not fundamentally oppose either that conception or the broader discipline

as such. Rather, any criticism offered is intended to root out weaknesses and, hopefully,

contribute to the strengthening of ecological economics.

My criticism is grounded in my conviction that elements crucial to understanding the

drive for growth in our current economic system, as well as other mechanisms and

forces that make it what it is, are missed by Dalyian ecological economics. This is not

due to any error in his analysis, but simply because such elements are not included in

the analysis to begin with due to particular choices concerning what Schumpeter called

the 'pre-analytic vision' (Schumpeter, 1954:41)2. I am confident that the inclusion of

certain concepts, tools and categories drawn from the Marxian tradition, to the pre-

analytic vision of Dalyian ecological economics can improve it by allowing it to analyse

and criticise elements hitherto invisible to it.

Daly himself strongly criticises the pre-analytic vision of neoclassical economics

because it excludes the natural environment3. However, the same points that Daly makes

in regards to neoclassical economics can be turned against him. While the conclusions

1 See The Ecological Rift by Foster et. al. (2010), p. 90-94, for specific examples. 2 In his History of Economic Analysis: “analytic effort is of necessity preceded by a preanalytic

cognitive act that supplies the raw material for the analytic effort”. 3 See Daly et. al., 2011:24 or Daly, 1992:xii for examples of Daly's use and endorsement of

Schumpeter's concept. Here can also be found discussions on the role of the pre-analytic vision to a discipline, and the manner in which ecological economics conceptualises the relationship between the economy and the environment.

7

of Dalyian ecological economics are “logical within its own pre-analytic vision”, they

are also “absurd from the viewpoint” of Marxian economics (Daly et. al., 2011:23). The

inability of Daly's theory to address matters such as the source of profit or the cause of

the drive towards growth, weakens both the explanatory and predictive power of his

theory. It also, I believe, reduces the ability of its normative elements to stand as a

feasible alternative to the prevailing paradigm.

On the other hand, Marxists have traditionally tended to neglect environmental issues4.

Even when those issues have been explored, the pivotal natural-scientific insights that

ecological economics makes use of have not been employed. An example of such an

insight is the limit imposed on growth by the laws of thermodynamics; a matter recently

shown to have been both taken seriously by Marx and compatible with his theories5. Nor

have the many varied attempts of achieving Marx's vision of socialism or communism

been very successful in practice. Instead, that vision is widely considered, at best, an

outdated idea that had its chance and failed and, at worst, as dangerous and wicked6.

This, I believe, is likely one of the causes of Daly's scepticism towards socialism.

I intend to explore the possible grounds for a synthesis that can aid and strengthen both

fields, as well as allow both to better live up to their avowed social goals. After all, both

Marxism and Dalyian ecological economics have given us the broad promise of a better

tomorrow, where people live freer and more equitable lives and enjoy a healthy

relationship with the Natural world of which they are a part. In this exploration of the

possibility of a synthesis, I also look towards the future of a Marxian Ecological

Economics; one that goes back to the roots of Marxian theory and re-evaluates it in its

entirety while giving the natural world the attention that is due. One that, in a manner of

speaking, is to traditional Marxian political economy what Dalyian ecological

economics is to the neoclassical school. In this I take inspiration from authors such as

John Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett. This work is written in that tradition and hopes

to develop their arguments further.

4 With notable exceptions. For example, Kautsky was early in analysing the 'metabolic rift', to borrow Foster's term, between town and country in The Agrarian Question (1988), and Lenin built on this work in The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx' (1961). See Foster et. al., 2010 for an example of Foster's use of the term 'metabolic rift'. Neo-Marxist approaches in the field of political ecology are also common; see for instance the work of Eric Wolf.

5 See Burkett, 2006a:142-208 or Altvater, 2011 for a discussion.6 For an extensive treatment on the subject, see Courtois et. al. The Black Book of Communism (1999).

8

Aims and goalsSpeaking more specifically, there are two central aims with this dissertation. Firstly, I

intend to show that it is possible to read Daly in a manner that is fully compatible with

the intentions and values of socialism. In other words, to show that an ideological

synthesis, a convergence of goals, is possible. Chapter 1 is devoted to this task. I will

avoid criticising Daly for some aspects of his suggestions with which I disagree or that

may contradict socialist values or aims, such as his Malthusian views on population or

market-based solutions to the population problem, and focus instead on the similarities.

This is because there is already plenty of literature that criticises Daly's suggestions on

Marxist or socialist grounds7, yet very little that emphasises what is held in common. In

my view, this recognition of at least some shared normative goals and visions in crucial

to the future development of both Dalyian ecological economics and Marxist political

economy as academic subjects, not to mention the possibility of a functioning synthesis

between the two. There are also possible real-world political consequences of such a

recognition, though I do not intend to speculate on those here.

Secondly, I wish to delve deeper on the matter of the pre-analytic vision of Dalyian

ecological economics. First of all, to clarify, I fully agree with Daly's critique of

neoclassical economics and believe his decision to include the natural environment, as

well as biophysical limits, in his pre-analytic vision to be sound. Yet I believe that there

are benefits to adding Marxian concepts to the vision as well. As Burkett puts it:

“Marxism reveals and helps resolve important contradictions, analytical silences, and

unanswered questions present in ecological economics” (2006a:3). I intend to

demonstrate this benefit in two ways; the first dealing with growth (Chapter 2) and the

other with class-tensions (Chapter 3).

In Chapter 2, I will begin by establishing that Marx's vision of socialism can be

compatible with the steady-state economy that Daly espouses, henceforth DSSE8. I will

then move on to argue that the same does not hold for capitalism or any system that

retains certain distinguishing characteristics of capitalism. In order to do so I am also

required to demonstrate what characteristics of capitalism make it pre-disposed towards

7 Examples include Burkett, 2005 ; Foster, 2011 ; Smith, 20108 I.e. “Dalyian Steady-State Economy”. When the need arises I shall distinguish between the system in

practice or as intended to be in practice, DSSE-S (“DSSE-Society”), and the pure theory of Daly's SSE, DSSE-T (“DSSE-Theory”).

9

growth, as well as establish whether or not said tendencies remain under DSSE-S.

In Chapter 3, I will continue the theme from Chapter 2 by showcasing the class tensions

and conflicts that could potentially arise in a DSSE-S, and that a purely DSSE-T

analysis misses. I will also discuss the role of the state in a DSSE-S. What will separate

this chapter from the ones preceding it is that it will rely to a far larger extent on Marx's

value theory. The preceding chapters could be accepted by someone who rejects the

Labour Theory of Value (LTV); perhaps and hopefully even by a non-Marxist, as they

merely suggest another way of looking at things. In contrast, Chapter 3 will use

analytical tools that clash far more with those used by Daly, and that are explicitly

rejected by him. Thus, the extent to which one accepts the conclusions drawn by this

chapter will depend on the extent to which one accepts Marx's LTV.

Both my aims ought to be taken as support of, though not in themselves necessarily

conclusive evidence of, the proposal that some form of socialist socio-politico-economic

system would be necessary in order to achieve anything like the steady-state economy

that Daly espouses. This view is notably shared by Richard England and Barry

Bluestone, who in the 1973 anthology Toward a Steady-state Economy, which Daly was

the editor of, promote socialism as a way of reaching a SSE9.

Lastly, a more indirect overall goal with this dissertation is to contribute to the further

development Marxian Ecological Economics. Thus in Chapter 4 I intend to look at the

implications of what the previous chapters have shown; academically, politically and

purely philosophically, and how it impacts the development of a Marxian Ecological

Economics.

Delimitation, literature, method and ethicsAs I have stated, this dissertation will focus on the work of Herman Daly rather than

exploring all of ecological economics. My reason is constraints of space. Daly

specifically was chosen due to his importance and status in the field, both in having

developed it theoretically from its roots in the work of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, and

in his continued advocacy of it. Note that ecological economics is not an unified field,

9 The article in question is Ecology and Social Conflict, p.190-209.

10

but a broad school of thought that contains within it many different views and

approaches. Any overview of ecological economics as a whole would have to be as

broad and diverse as the field itself in order to do it justice. What I argue in this

dissertation is directed at Dalyian ecological economics specifically, and may not

necessarily apply to other branches.

Apart from Daly I have relied chiefly on the works of Marx himself, but also on

literature treating Marxian approaches to ecology. This includes the works of Paul

Burkett, John Bellamy Foster and Jonathan Hughes. I have avoided two other major

contributors to the topic of Marx and ecology: James O'Connor and Ted Benton. The

first one because his work tends to focus more on the effects environmental problems

have on the economy than the other way around – and the other way around is the topic

of this dissertation10. The second because his works contains criticism of Marx and his

method, the chief point of which is that Marx neglected, or at least did not give

sufficient attention to, the Natural world (Benton, 1996:157-183)11. I wish to avoid a

possible misunderstanding here – to purposefully avoid literature because it disagrees

with or challenges what one tries to prove could, after all, be considered cherry-picking

data, making the conclusions of my work entirely unscientific. However, I do not deny

that a reading of Marx is possible that differs from mine and those authors I have relied

on. A debate between different interpretations of Marx is crucial if we wish to dig out

both what is useful in his theory and what may need to be changed or developed. Yet

once more constraints of space and purpose mean that this particular piece is not

suitable to be a platform for such a debate.

Concerning methodology, I have relied on a Marxian dialectical approach and class-

based analysis in order to reveal what DSSE-T misses, and the problems, both

theoretical and political, that can arise due to this blind-spot. This approach does not, at

any point, contradict in any way the basic tenets of DSSE-T concerning biophysical

limits to growth, nor bring in or imply any ethical or moral conclusions that go against

the concerns for human and natural welfare that it espouses. This is a crucial point to

make since, as already stated, various interpretations of Marx have historically been

used to justify crimes against both humanity and Nature. Yet it is not acceptable to 10 See any work on 'the Second Contradiction of Capitalism', especially O'Connor's anthology Natural

Causes (1998).11 For a critical appraisal of Benton's conclusions, see: Burkett, 1998a ; Burkett, 1998b ; Foster, 2002.

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simply brush concerns aside with a caveat. A proper investigation must both

acknowledge the problem and endeavor to overcome it. Hence moral concerns regarding

human and Natural well-being are a pivotal part of this work, forming its moral

foundation and serving as its inspiration. Marx's vision was one of liberating mankind,

but what is mankind without a healthy and stable relationship with the natural world of

which it is a part? The disasters of both capitalism and authoritarian Communist regimes

have shown the importance of re-claiming the humanist aspect of Marx, and such ideas

have fortunately gained more attention since the fall of the USSR. It is time that the

significance of Nature is fully recognised, both as the giver and nurturer of life and the

thing on which all human development depends, and that the environmental aspects of

Marx are lifted up and developed along the humanist ones. Humanity is in dire need of a

new liberatory project that can ensure the survival and flourishing of its members, both

as social beings and as organisms dependent on the biosphere.

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Chapter 1: Daly, steady-state economics and socialism

1.1. Daly's relationship with socialism and capitalismIn this chapter I intend to treat the relationship between DSSE in theory and practice and

different strains of the broad and diverse school of thought known as 'socialism'. It is my

belief that one can identify tendencies in Daly's writings that could be described as

socialist or socialist-leaning. Additionally, there are further such tendencies that, while

not explicitly socialist-related, do imply a strong compatibility between DSSE and at

least some forms of socialism.

The generalness and even vagueness of what is to follow is necessary because of two

reasons. Firstly, I have purposefully chosen not to stick to any one specific school of

socialism but instead identify broad tendencies. This is because my intent is precisely to

show the compatibility of DSSE with socialism as a broad school of thought, leaving the

question of 'which type of socialism is the most compatible with DSSE?' for future

considerations. It is, in my view, a crucial but complex question, deserving of a

treatment on its own. Secondly, and more importantly, Daly is himself quite vague,

making it impossible, even had I wanted to do so, to compare his theory with any

specific form of socialism. He states very briefly that his DSSE is neither capitalism nor

socialism12, but not only fails to define what it then is, but also neglects to specify what

he means with the words “capitalism” and “socialism” (Daly,1973:169)(Daly et. al.,

1994:13-15).

It is possible to gather from various remarks and brief statements scattered throughout

his writings that by 'socialism', Daly has USSR-like central planning models in mind

first and foremost (Daly et. al., 1994:13)(Daly et. al., 2011:52). When he does discuss

socialism more extensively, he defines it as “government ownership of the means of

production with allocation and distribution by central planning”, specifically

hierarchical i.e. top-down planning, though allowing for some reliance on the market.

Important to note is that he also conceives of socialism as having the same commitment

to growth as does capitalism (Daly et. al., 1994:13)(Daly, 1992:8).

What is clear is that what Daly opposes about 'socialism-as-it-was', apart from its 12 At least, “as they have been understood in the past” (Daly et. al., 1994:15).

13

commitment to growth, is its authoritarianism and the way it treats the individual's

relationship and place in the community. He sides with Catholic critics of socialism in

calling it a system where the individual is subsumed in society, drowned in it rather than

becoming a part of a community of sovereign persons (Daly et. al., 1994:16-18). Indeed,

certain socialist works, such as Stalin's Anarchism or Socialism (1954) and Lenin's

Anarchism and Socialism (1961) and Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder

(1964), all indeed give the idea that the collective is to be given primacy over the

individual, both analytically and politically. Not to mention the theoretical, and above

all practical, support these men gave to authoritarian top-down rule. I can only agree

with Daly in his rejection of this manner of thinking and acting. Given these definitions

of what 'socialism' is, Daly's claim that DSSE is not socialist is consistent with the rest

of his writings. In order to claim socialistic tendencies in Daly, we must look to other

schools of socialism; schools that Daly never discusses in greater detail13.

Regarding capitalism, Daly gives apparently inconsistent definitions, making it difficult

to determine whether or not his claim that DSSE is not capitalistic is internally

consistent. He briefly defines capitalism as “private ownership of the means of

production along with allocation and distribution by the market”, though allowing for

limited intervention by the state, where different firms compete with one-another and

the motivation is profit-maximisation (Daly et. al., 1994:13). By this definition, his

DSSE is indeed capitalism, as it would retain all of the above. Yet, as has been covered,

he explicitly denies that it is, even refusing to go engage in a proper debate with those

who claim otherwise14.

Daly never provides us with a clear answer to the conundrum above. Instead his

discussions seem to purposefully avert the question, stating rather that he wishes to

avoid the 'capitalism-socialism' or 'Left-Right' dichotomies, and create something new;

13 There are those who deny that the USSR and systems like it where socialist at all. For example, see Resnick and Wolff, 2002 or Bookchin, 1986:193-242. On the use of the term “state-capitalism” to refer to USSR-like systems by anarchists, see Avrich, 1967 or Goldman, 1996: 405-420.

14 I refer here to Daly's brief comment in Real-world Economics Review vol. 54 (entitled The operative word here is “somehow”), addressed to Richard Smith's criticism (in vol. 53 of the same journal, entitled Beyond growth or beyond capitalism?). Daly simply dismisses Smith's article out of hand because Smith discusses the incompatibility of capitalism and zero growth – and Daly is satisfied with plainly stating that his system is not capitalism. As Smith correctly states in his reply (vol. 55 of the same journal, If Herman Daly has a better plan, let’s hear it), Daly neither offers a definition of what his system is exactly, nor argues for why that which applies for capitalist accumulation does not apply for DSSE.

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something that focuses on communal well-being (Daly et. al., 1994:8-15)(Daly,

1992:12). However, the question of whether a system is socialist or capitalist is not

simply a question of labels, but a question of what forces and motivations drive the

economy; of how ownership, planning and production is arranged and what relations

and roles people have in them. What Daly chooses to call his system is not a problem I

am concerned with; I have no desire to debate semantics and he is free to deny the

labels “socialism” or “capitalism” if he wishes to. But the question of what underlying

forces prevail under his system still remains.

1.2. Evidence and examples of socialistic tendencies in DalyWhile Daly rejects both Marxism and socialism, a closer scrutiny of his writings reveals

his rejection of socialism to actually be a rejection of USSR-style top-down bureaucracy

and of central planning (Daly et. al., 1994:13)(Daly et. al., 2011:52) – a legitimate

rejection, in my view. Nowhere does Daly reject more decentralised, democratic and/or

market-reliant forms of socialism; in fact he seems to approve of them and think them a

“partner” in his quest for a more humane economy (1994:15). He goes so far as to admit

that if one by socialism means bottom-up, democratic control of the economy where

citizens and workers are empowered and given control of decision-making in industry,

he is “on the Left” (Ibid.)15 Daly's support of socialism can also be gathered from him

approvingly quoting Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and his advocacy of “ethical socialism”

(Daly, 1973:172). He even makes it clear that Marx's concept of man's alienation from

nature, as well as Marx's materialist outlook overall, are fully consistent with DSSE, and

can even be “enlisted as a moral foundation” of it (Daly, 1973:172). In addition, as Daly

himself states, he does not oppose all socialist-leaning ideas because he opposes a

certain conception of socialism (1994:14-15)(1992:168).

Due to his concern for human welfare and commitment to egalitarian values, Daly

argues for both an upper limit to the standard of living, and a lower limit “below which

no one is allowed to fall” in DSSE (Daly, 1973:168). The limits are enacted by means of

confiscation and redistribution of all wealth above the upper limit. Here, Daly comes of

sounding quite similar to a radical socialist. But unlike such a socialist, Daly claims that

the seizing of private property in this manner does not constitute an attack on the 15 It is not clear whether or not Daly is familiar with the concept of decentralised planning as an

alternative to the dichotomy between markets and central planning.

15

institution of private property itself. This seemingly strange proposal is understood

when one understands Daly's motivation for wanting to defend private property in the

first place. Daly follows J.S. Mill in seeing private property as a “bastion against

exploitation”, that only makes sense “if everyone owns some minimum amount”;

otherwise it becomes an “instrument of exploitation” and thus loses its purpose (Ibid.).

Private property is, in other words, neither an intrinsic good for Daly, nor something that

is axiomatically assumed to lead to good outcomes. It is a tool with an intended purpose,

and only good insofar as it serves that purpose. For Daly, that purpose is clearly to

ensure some minimum level of equality and defend people from exploitation. In fact, he

goes so far as to call the current institution of private property illegitimate, seeing as the

current system lacks a system of redistribution that wards of inequality (Daly,

1973:169). This, in part, serves to resolve the apparent inconsistency between him

defining capitalism as a system of private property in the means of production, and

denying that DSSE is capitalist despite it having private ownership of the means of

production. Daly ostensibly has two distinct views of what constitutes 'private property';

one that enables exploitation and prevails under capitalism-as-it-is and one that wards

against it and prevails under DSSE. Thus his goals, if not necessarily his suggested

methods nor manner of expression, clearly resonate well with the ideals of socialism.

Lastly, the relationship Daly has with labour and the working-class is both more

complex and socialist-leaning than some Marxist critics give him credit for. Richard

Smith, for example, plainly tells us that there is no workers' self-management in DSSE

and that Daly offers no answer to what happens to excess workers when production is

decreased; i.e. that they have no job security. He also adds a general critique of the lack

of economic democracy in Daly's proposition (2010a, 2010b). A simple reading of the

chapter on labour in Daly's book For the Common Good (1994), however, is sufficient

to reveal all these statements to be incorrect. Daly fully supports work-place democracy

in the form of both active participation and co-determination by workers in the decision-

making of firms, even going so far as to support full worker ownership of enterprises. In

the latter case, he sees problems with individual ownership of stocks of the company,

preferring instead that the worker's collectively own the enterprise and distribute part of

the profit among themselves (1994:301-305)(1973:168-170). He criticizes the

commodification of labour, quoting Polanyi approvingly, as well as the dehumanizing

effects of work under the current system, which alienates individuals both from their

16

own inner needs and community life. For him, worker ownership and work-place

democracy are crucial in bringing the needs of communities back into decision-making,

as well as ending the alienated form of labour and making work both more enjoyable

and creative (1994:294-309)(1995). Increased leisure time is also important to him

(Daly, 1994:297,455-457)(Daly, 2013)(Daly, 1973:166). Lastly, Daly not only wishes

for full employment under his system (1994:309-314)(2013), but also supports a

guaranteed basic income in case the goal of full employment is not achievable

(1994:315-318)1993:270-271). In the long-term, Daly even harbours a vision of, more

or less, abolishing the working-class by making sure that there is no-one with only their

labour to sell, as income from ownership would be universal (1994:315-318).

Consider also that Daly believes that it is “[h]e who own the means of production [who]

by and large controls the process of production and directs it to his own purposes”, and

interprets the Marxian division between classes as the division between owners and non-

owners of the means of production (Daly, 1992:158). Depending on how far worker

ownership and co-determination is taken, Daly could indeed be talking about the end of

the working class. After all, to extend private property of the means of production to

include everyone is, in a sense, more or less the same as abolishing private property

altogether. Daly's defense of private property can then, ironically, be read as a plea for a

collective ownership of sorts. This would be understandable given Daly's already

established conceptualization of 'socialism' as state ownership of the means of

production, and his opposition to it. Daly can thus be read as expressing a radically

socialist idea in a different language. In fact, he can be read as supporting all the

'traditional' aspects of the struggle of workers for, as Burkett puts it, “higher wages,

safer and less burdensome work procedures, reduced working time, and even for more

co-operative and democratic forms of ownership and management” (2006a:139)16.

This finally allows us to fully resolve the apparent inconsistency in Daly's view on

private property, and understand precisely what he means by property being a guard

against exploitation: if everyone takes part in the ownership of the means of production,

no-one relies on wage-labour alone for survival and their share in the means of

production thus protects them from being exploited.

16 Burkett in this passage refers to the struggle in the “sphere of wage-labour proper” that is the result of the contradictions of capitalism.

17

1.3. Daly the socialist... but not MarxistAs has been shown, there is a clear and overarching theme in Daly; he obviously shares

the goals of socialism and the ethical positions of egalitarianism and solidarity. Yet he

seemingly argues the aforementioned to be achievable through a modified form of free

market capitalism, even though Daly rejects the label “capitalism”. Despite the rejection

of capitalism-as-it-is, he emphasises the free market aspect of his DSSE and appears to

attempt to frame it as more capitalist-like than socialist-like; or rather that it preserves

and promotes the institution of capitalism, and the liberal values it was supposed to

embody but failed to (Daly,1973:169-170)(Daly, 1999:34-44)(1992:82-89). Consider,

for example, Daly's insurance that his policy of distribution is based on the “impeccably

respectable premises” of “private property, the free market, opposition to welfare

bureaucracies and centralized control” (Daly,1973:169). It is notable that he takes the

time to make explicit his support of traditional liberal values a paragraph after

expressing the radical notion that the current system of private property is illegitimate

because it acts as an instrument of exploitation, and demanding the seizing and

redistribution of such illegitimate property by the state apparatus.

All apparent consistences disappear when the true nature of his support of private

ownership of the means of production is taken into consideration, as well as the nature

of his opposition to 'socialism'. I have argued that once we get behind the veil of

appearances and begin to understand what Daly truly means with the language he uses,

a socialist reading of him is entirely possible. In that reading both his ends and the

means by which he seeks to attain them can find their counterpart in some school of

socialism; the only difference being one of expressive style. Thus I would argue that

rather than attempting to achieve socialist ends though modified capitalist means, Daly

is simply expressing very socialist ends and means through a liberal language. If Daly

himself is aware this I cannot say, nor does it matter since my intent has not been to

discern what hides inside the mind of professor Herman Daly the man. Rather, I sought

to demonstrate how similar, or at the very least compatible, many aspects of his DSSE

are to various branches of socialism given the right reading. Certainly, Daly remains

open to the same criticisms as other market-oriented socialists, but a socialist he is,

nonetheless.

18

But, alas, to have a socialist vision is not the same as making use of Marxian tools, nor

is it the same as providing a feasible path to a better world17. I do not see many

problems, ethically speaking, with the vast majority of Daly's suggestions, nor do I

doubt their ecological soundness. It is rather his analysis, both of society as it is and the

possible paths we can take to change it, that I find wanting. In a way, Daly describes for

us what lies beyond a great wall, but does not sufficiently treat the structure and

construction of that wall, and hence his suggestions of how to overcome or destroy it are

questionable.

In this he bears great similarity to the Utopian Socialists before Marx's time. Like them,

Daly does not fully recognise how deeply the antagonism between classes goes, imaging

instead that reconciliation and class-cooperation are possible (Daly, 1994:299-301)

(Marx. et. al., 1969:32)(Engels, 1901:36). Like Saint-Simon, Christianity and Christian

values are paramount to Daly, and are realised in the Utopia he envisions (Daly et. al.,

1994:382-406)(Daly, 1992:19,44-45)18(Engels, 1901:44)(Saint-Simon, 1825). In his

criticism of both the moral, in the form of “growthmania”, and the material, in the form

of the damage done to the planet, misery of the prevailing system, Daly is reminiscent

of Fourier – especially since he contrasts this critique with promises of a happy

tomorrow (Engels, 1901:46).

As I will discuss further in chapter 2.3, both Daly's vision and his analysis of society,

like that of the Utopian's, lacks a materialist basis. And like them, as Marx and Engels

pointed out, he can certainly provide both a critique of the current system and

inspiration for a different world, but no more. It is fitting to quote Engels here, because

Daly too believes that his system needs “only to be discovered to conquer all the world

by virtue of its own power” (Engels, 1901:52). This is evidenced in his continual attacks

on the way economics is taught19 as well as in his more general moral criticism of

capitalist society. Here, Daly is criticising what he perceives to be the institutions and

17 Daly demonstrates a seeming ignorance of this distinction by occasionally conflating the terms “socialist” and “Marxist”, or rather using them interchangeably. See for instance Daly et. al., 1994:10. In the text he speaks of “capitalism and socialism”, yet in the footnote to that paragraph instead speaks of “Marxism and capitalism”. Yet, in his defence, that mistake might as well be blamed on the avowedly 'socialist' and 'Marxist' states, who in my judgement made the same conflation.

18 More examples are not difficult to find as this is hardly something Daly hides, but is very open about. Consider for instance the inclusion of essays by theologian John Cobb and Christian apologetic C.S. Lewis in the 1973 anthology Toward a Steady-State Economy, of which Daly was the editor.

19 See Daly et. al., 1994:25-117, 361-366 ; Daly et. al., 2011:xxi, xviii, 479 ; Daly, 1999:77-104

19

practices that prevent his truth from being spread and recognised. He fails to recognise

the real-world forces that are preventing his admittedly sound ecological reasoning to

gain more acceptance, or to become implemented.

In order to understand these forces, a socialistic vision does not suffice. To again borrow

from Engels; to make a science of ecological economics, it has first to be placed upon a

real basis (1901:53). But it is not enough for that basis to be the realities of

thermodynamics or of ecology, something Daly already takes to heart; the social-

scientific aspect must too be materialist. In other words, Daly's problem is

methodological, and in my view pertains to the lack of certain categories and tools in his

pre-analytic vision – tools that we can find in Marx and Engels. Not only is such an

addition to the pre-analytic vision compatible with Daly's objectives, but in my view it

is more compatible with those objectives than his own pre-analytic vision.

20

Chapter 2: Marxism and ecology

2.1. Prometheus? Dispensing with a mythBefore one can begin the attempt of establishing the compatibility of either Marxism or

socialism to DSSE, one must first deal with a particularly stubborn myth in academia;

one that I will establish that Daly endorses. The myth is that of 'Marx the Promethean',

i.e. that Marx supposedly embraced, as Burkett puts it, an “industrialist outlook in which

human progress corresponds to ever-greater human domination and control over nature”

(1999a:5) and that his vision of Communism was “projected as extending and

rationalizing capitalism’s drive toward complete human domination over nature”

(1999a:vii)20.

Daly reads Marx as a proponent of economic growth, who completely neglects Nature.

Among the evidence Daly cites are Marx's models of simple and expanded

reproduction, which do not include Nature (1992:196). Yet Daly mistakes Marx's

descriptive statement for a prescriptive one. We should not expect anything else from

Marx's description of capitalism, which indeed treats Nature as a 'free gift' (Marx,

1990:131-163)(Marx, 1991:881-882).

Another aspect of Marx's theory that has been used as 'evidence' of his supposed

endorsement of growth is Marx's insistence that the 'productive forces' must be

developed under socialism21. Daly does not mention such a development specifically,

but claims that socialism requires a material abundance that only more growth could

deliver (1973:23). Because this developmental objective clearly applies as much for the

future socialist society Marx expected (Marx, 1998:54-62)(Marx, 1999:11), it cannot be

dismissed as a mere description of the current state of matters, and thus deserves further

attention. An unexpected, and certainly unintended, defence of Marx can be found in

Daly, who often makes a clear distinction between growing the economy quantitatively

and developing it qualitatively (Daly et. al., 2011:6-7, 64)(Daly, 1996:1-5). I would 20 Burkett is here summarising the prevailing view. He himself actually defends Marx on this point: see

Chapter 11 of Burkett's Marx and Nature - A Red and Green Perspective (1999a), entitled 'Nature and the Historical Progressivity of Capitalism' (p. 147-173). Among the academics whom Burkett cites as examples of those perpetuating the myth are Benton (1989:76–77), McLaughlin (1990:95), Mingione (1993:86), Feuer (1989:xii) and Löwy (1997:33–34).

21 Burkett's list under footnote 20 applies here as well. See also Hughes's Ecology and Historical Materialism (2000) for a lengthy discussion of this subject, especially Chapter 4, 'Development of the productive forces' (p. 121-160).

21

argue that the concept of a 'development of productive forces' can be interpreted as

entailing not only technological improvement, but a transformation in the motivation for

production taking place at all, i.e. use-value production replacing the that of exchange-

value production (Marx, 1861-3:Ch.9.2:§1)22. Additionally, changes can take place

concerning what is produced and how, as well as how much. Since the natural

environment is itself a source of use-value, as Marx makes clear in his Critique of the

Gotha Programme (1999:7), use-value can in a sense be 'produced' though a reduction

in industrial output. Sparing the natural environment in this manner would allow it to

provide a greater amount of what ecological economists dub 'amenity services', not to

mention life support services23.

In a similar way, the conception of Marx's vision of the 'mastery of Nature' (Hughes,

2000:177) does not necessarily have to be viewed as something negative or destructive.

As Levins and Lewontin demonstrate (2007:Ch.24:§11-16,22-27), every living being in

some manner changes and is in turn changed by its environment; this in fact constitutes

one of the chief characteristics of what 'life' is (Levins and Lewontin, 2007:Ch.5:§2-4).

My argument is thus that to 'master Nature' is to master the manner in which mankind

alters its environment, or what John Bellamy Foster calls the 'conscious control of the

human-Nature metabolism' (Foster, 2000:141-177)(Foster et. al., 2010:46, 75-87). The

conceptualization of 'mastery' as something negative is rooted in a idealized view of

Nature that supposes the impossible: life without altering Nature.

While Marx never precisely defines what he means with either 'mastery of Nature' or

'development of productive forces', there is no ground for assuming that he meant that

this would, under socialism, entail the same as under capitalism. i.e., in the first case, the

exploitation of Nature and treatment of her bounty as 'free gifts'; and in the second case,

the continued increase of the productivity of labour driven by the profit motive. The

transcendence of capitalism and all it entails is paramount to Marx's work, and one

22 For a distinctive argument that supports the same conclusion, see Hughes, 2000:121-149.23 Reduction in production can also be said to increase leisure time, which was crucial to Marx and is

also mentioned by Daly (Marx, 1991:953-970)(Daly, 1973: 706-708)(Daly et. al., 2011:275)(Daly,1994:68-82,455-457). However, because of the continued increase in productivity of labour (the most extreme case being that of full automation, seen in recent strides taken by Canon), arguments regarding working time are logically independent from those regarding total matter-energy through-put. Or put in other words, the fact the people work less hours in total might, for Marx at least, have meant that they produce less value, but it says nothing about the total matter-energy used up during the time that they do work. I will therefore disregard the discussion on leisure vs. labour time here.

22

cannot simply import fragments of his description of capitalism into his vision of

socialism. To suggest that either 'development' or 'mastery' have the same meaning to

him under capitalism as under socialism would contradict one of the most basic tenets of

Marx's view of socialism; that production occurs directly for the sake of use-values

(Marx, 1999). After all, what Marx is after is ultimately the satisfaction of human needs

and the 'all-round development' of humanity (Marx et. al. 1998:309). One could argue

that productive forces in the sense of industrial output are already more than well

developed for providing humanity adequately. I.e. that there is enough material stuff in

the aggregate, the problem being one of disproportionate access to that wealth. Nor does

it contradict the tenets of DSSE to allow short-term growth in total output, since it seeks

non-growth in the long term. Finally, DSSE does not seek to establish non-growth as an

unbreakable law that must never be violated, but as a norm. Some growth is accepted

within its framework, as long as it is an exception that occurs because of new

developments or needs, because we wish to reach new goals, and not because the

economic system as such depends on it (Daly, 1973:152-157)24.

This way of looking at things fits better with the views on Nature and human

development under socialism Marx expresses elsewhere25, and also meshes well with

DSSE. A cornerstone in Daly's argument is that further increases in total industrial

output not only do not increase human well-being any further, but actually reduce it by

destroying our environment; this informs his concept of 'uneconomic growth' (Daly et.

al., 2011:16-23)(Daly, 1973:149-152)(Daly, 1999b). If one accepts this, any further

'development' of productive forces would, in order to be beneficial to mankind, have to

preclude continued increases in matter-energy though-put in the long term. We can thus

imagine a 'development' that can include other aspects that find their equivalents in both

Marx and Daly: growth of leisure time (Daly, 1994:297,455-457)(Daly, 2013)(Daly,

1973:166)(Marx, 1991:953-970)(Marx, 1973:712) improved relations between humans

and between humanity and Nature (Marx,1959:XXIV-XXVII)(Daly, 1999:181-186),

and a greater development of humanity's creative and spiritual facets (Daly, 1996:219)

(Marx, 1959:XXXIX-4)26. It is that which Marx calls “co-operative wealth” (1999:11),

and not total industrial output, that is abundant in both visions.

24 Note also that some aspects of the economy can grow without the totality growing, as long as other aspects decrease by at least as much.

25 For examples see Marx,1959:XXIV or Marx, 1991:911,958-959.26 See also Engels, 1979:26–27

23

The green criticism of Marx's 'Prometheanism' can find no definitive support in Marx's

own writings. It succeeds only in establishing that a reading of Marx is possible which

has anti-ecological tendencies. The mere presence of uncertainty and the possibility of

different, eco-friendly interpretations are sufficient to establish that Marx's vision is not

inherently and necessarily anti-ecological. In fact, even if it could be proven beyond

doubt that Marx's green critics are right, and that the man himself wished for ever-

increasing matter-energy throughput even under socialism, it would be of little concern

for the purpose of this essay. Just like it would matter little if Herman Daly came out

and said that he is opposed to all forms of socialism, period, including those I wrote are

compatible with his ideas. This is because my intent is neither to vindicate Marx or

prove Daly as a socialist in the literal sense, but to show that a reading of both is

possible by which their works are compatible, and that such a reading of Marx can

contribute to Dalyian ecological economics. Even if Marx had meant something else, a

reading that is compatible with and supportive of the basic tenets of ecological

economics is clearly possible, and in my view ought to be preferred regardless of any

'true intent' Marx himself may have had.

2.2. Marx, Daly and what drives growthA key to answering whether or not DSSE-S is practically feasible lies in answering what

drives growth under capitalism. Only if the forces that make capitalism predisposed to

growth are known and understood is it possible to state whether or not such forces exist

under DSSE-S. Daly certainly focuses a great deal of his efforts on the question of

growth and trying to solve the riddle of what causes it. Yet I believe, and intend to show,

that his idealist approach to social science leads to responses that ultimately fail in

locating the actual, material, causes of economics growth; portraying it instead as a

moral failure rooted in shallow materialism and greed.

The critique that Clark and York level against adherents of deep ecology and the Gaia

hypothesis, I level at Daly. His criticism is “divorced from its social-material

influences”. To quote York and Clark, “[c]hange becomes a matter of adjusting values

and developing the proper eco-ethics, and from there, it is assumed, changes in the

social structure will follow” (2005:10). Indeed, because he locates the problem in an

improper working of moral facilities, changes in values form a central part of Daly's

24

arguments27. Here Daly commits the ethicist’s fallacy and confuses appraisal and

explanation, neglecting the underlying forces that drive the economy. It does not

logically follow from a behaviour being unethical that changing or preventing said

behaviour is a matter of changing ethical values (O'Neill, 2008:10-11).

Additionally, when Daly turns his critique to values and attitudes in economic theory

itself, and the way it is taught28, he conflates real economic processes with the theories

describing them. Certainly, there is a clear normative element to modern economics, and

many policies are made on the basis of advice from economists. There is an overlap

between the real processes and the theories that describe them; I do not deny this. But

Daly's mistake is to seemingly ascribe a great deal of the blame for 'growthmania' on

misguided advice based on faulty theories29, not looking at growth tendencies within

capitalism itself. In other words, I do not believe that for-profit firms in competition

need to be told by economic advisor that they need to make a profit and that growth in

matter-energy throughput is a good way of doing just that – the laws of capitalism will

make sure that happens. When such advice influences policy, that certainly helps, but it

is not what drives the process.

When Daly does look at the laws of capitalism, as he occasionally does, he often relies

on Marx's model of accumulation, i.e. the shift in capitalism from C-M-C' to M-C-M+.

Daly neither adds to, comments or critiques this model; never explicitly confirms

whether or not this is something he himself believes in, or if he is just recounting to us

what Marx believed (Daly et. al., 2011:286)(Daly, 1996:38-39)(Daly et. al., 1994:409-

410)(Daly, 1992:186)(Daly, 1999:136-137)30.

A similar phenomenon can be seen in how Daly treats value. In speaking of limits and

the concept of 'enough', he occasionally conflates exchange-value production with use-

value production; as if exchange-value production is acceptable, if only it had limits,

27 See Daly, 1973:170-171, 281-282 ; Daly, 1999:181-186 ; Daly, 1992:45 ; Daly 1994:382-406 and Daly, 1999:169-186.

28 Again, see Daly et. al., 1994:25-117, 361-366 ; Daly et. al., 2011:xxi, xviii, 479 ; Daly, 1999:77-104.29 Or, rather, theories with a pre-analytic vision that misses the role of the environment that thus cannot

ever produce an analysis that takes natural limits into account. But simply “faulty” will do in this instance.

30 Daly's use of this equation does not indicate or necessitate a endorsement of Marx's value theory, but is simply an observation that the purpose of production has shifted from use-values to exchange-values.

25

knew when to stop, before there was “too much of a good thing” (1992:99). This misses

the point of exchange-value production, one which Aristotle identified; that it has no

limit. In other places, Daly clearly acknowledges this, even referencing Marx

(1994:410)31. In fact, this distinction forms a vital basis of Daly's concept of a

macroeconomic equi-marginal principle: that the current way of operating produces

wealth in the monetary sense, but is actually a cost in terms of well-being (Daly,

1996:45-60).

This somewhat unclear relationship with Marxian models and categories leads me to

believe that Daly continually hits a methodological wall; his own pre-analytic vision is

insufficient to explain certain things, but his negative inclination towards Marxism

prevents him from incorporating Marxian categories and models into that pre-analytic

vision. The fact that even Daly himself, who openly rejects Marxism, cannot entirely do

without Marx, could be taken as a strong indication to the fact that certain Marxian

categories are necessary components of (Dalyian) ecological economics. Certainly,

Daly's method is partly materialist, underlining as it does the real world and pushing for

its incorporation into economic theory and decision-making. Yet part of his analysis

remains idealist, specifically the social-scientific part that tries to analyse capitalism

itself. Here, Daly's idealist model is insufficient to explain the material basis for growth.

Instead the man is caught between criticising the hegemonic economic theory's support

of growth (Daly, 1999:3-23, 60-68)(Daly, 1992:98-127,224-239)32 clouded uses of Marx

(see above) and invocations of moral and spiritual bankruptcy on behalf of both

economics as a science and society at large (Daly, 1992:168-177)(Daly, 1973:170-173)

(Daly, 1999:169-171).

Regarding the distinction between use- and exchange values, I am inclined to believe

that Daly neither fully appreciates the importance of the distinction in Marx nor uses it

in the way Marx does. In one specific instance, Daly re-defines the terms entirely; “use-

value” as total utility and “exchange value” as marginal utility (Daly et. al., 2011:287).

The same misuse of Marx I believe applies to the case of growth and accumulation,

evidenced by Daly's failure to explain why accumulation occurs. His focus is more on

the shift between C-M-C' to M-C-M+, i.e. the shift in “driving motive” (Daly et. al., 31 See Marx, 1990:Ch.4, footnote 6 for a brief overview on the Aristotelian distinction.32 He also criticises their ignorance of thermodynamics more specifically; see for instance Daly,

1999:77-104 or Daly, 1996:191-198.

26

2011:286)(Daly et. al., 1994:138-158); an idea adopted from Aristotle's distinction

between economics and chrematistics. In fact, I would argue that Daly conceives of and

interprets Marx's model in strictly Aristotelian terms, divorced from the specific

mechanics of capitalism. While Daly does not explicitly state this, there is no attempt on

his part to discuss either the historical process through which the shift occurred or the

internal forces that drive it at present. It is an idealist, rather than a materialist, reading

and use of Marx's model. Daly thus assumes that the accumulation drive of capitalism-

as-it-is would simply halt under DSSE-S. This, I believe is in part due to him missing

the class character of value. He fails to distinguish between a thing being useful,

whether in total or at the margin, for the capitalist class as a means of continuing the

cycle of accumulation and being useful for the working-class – or for that matter, for

humanity as a whole – as a means of living, reproducing and flourishing (Burkett,

1999a:104). DSSE-S retains the separate classes of capitalists and workers, and thus

also their different and contradictory interests, and hence this contradiction applies to it

as well. This concept will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.1.

A further consequence of Daly's methodological choice is that both his purpose for

overcoming 'growthmania' and his proposed solutions become caught between the

inadequacy of still far too neoclassically inspired models, and religious sermons33. The

former assume perfectly efficient markets and aim for Pareto optimality under state-

induced limitations to extraction; the latter aim to change people's values. For all his

criticism of the disease of 'growthmania' and accurate descriptions of what a healthy

state must be like, Daly fails to provide us with either a complete diagnosis or the means

of manufacturing a cure.

In contrast, a Marxian approach investigates the historical cause of the shift from C-M-

C' to M-C-M+. A contradiction between the qualitative limitlessness of monetary

accumulation and the limited character of Nature and natural resources is acknowledged

but never explained by Daly. Applying Marx's theory, the roots of this contradiction are

found in capitalist exploitation of labour, itself made possible by the creation of 'free

labour' (Marx, 1990:131-139, 873-914). It is through the historical process by which

labour is thus 'freed' that social ties are cut between the producers and Nature, and 33 Note that the anthologies Valuing the Earth (1993) and Ecological Economics and the Ecology of

Economics (1999) both contain sections on ethics, often with a firmly religious ring to them. Daly also co-wrote the book For the Common Good (1994) with theologian John Cobb, Jr.

27

between producers and appropriators of (the surplus of) what is produced. The

contradictions of values and goals between different classes, mentioned above, are

birthed. Nature becomes a means to an end (Marx,1959:XXIV-XXV)(Burkett, 1996:8-

9).

The above divorce process is a precondition for capitalism's inclination towards growth

of matter-energy through-put. Under capitalism, production is performed by separate

firms that are exclusively motivated by profit, and that are in competition with each-

other, where those that make insufficient profits ultimately perish. It is the singularity of

the profit motive as a drive combined with the lack of valuation of Nature, given the

premise of the aforesaid divorce, that causes capitalism to continually increase matter-

energy through-put. On the one hand the single-dimensional nature of the pursuit of

profit makes capitalism as a system blind to the destruction of natural wealth and human

well-being that such an increase causes – that is unless that destruction itself impacts

profit in some way34. On the other hand, the more that is produced and brought to

market, the greater the profit that the individual firm can make (Foster, 1994:123)

(Altvater, 1993:1998-203). Since Nature is treated as a “free gift” by the capitalist class,

there is no reason not to increase matter-energy through-put as far as it is possible;

again, as long as doing so does not in some way reduce profits. This is not to say that

environmentally sound outcomes are not possible at all. It is quite possible for

ecological and economic goals to coincide on occasion, as evidenced by the fact that

various forms of 'green products', such as organically grown produce and electric cars,

have become major sources of revenue for capitalist firms. The point is instead that the

conflict between profit and environment is inherent and prevents any long-term,

systematic alignment; environmentally sound outcomes are possible if and only if they

can be justified from a profit-maximising perspective. I do not doubt that many

capitalists, in their roles as human-beings and citizens, sincerely wish for more

ecologically sound outcomes, and are not just engaged in 'greenwashing'. But their

personal wishes and hopes are moot as long as the system that drives the whole

economy is arranged such that more matter-energy through-put and less care about the

environment tend to increase profits. Any capitalist that is unwilling or unable to go

along with such an arrangement will not remain a capitalist for long.

34 See O'Connor's work on the “second contradiction” of capitalism for more on this particular phenomenon.

28

I intend to deal more closely with the limits to individual actions and moral sentiments

in handling ecological problems caused by the economic system itself in the following

sub-chapter. But first I would take the time to point out that the Marxian approach I

have just used also brings in a question that has not been dealt with in other

engagements between Marxist and ecological economic, but which has been asked by

Daly and forms the foundation of his SSE: could the state intervene and forcefully stop

growth from happening35? Could we have a world of private producers in competition

with one-another, where the state apparatus steps in and forcibly prevents extraction

beyond a certain quantity to occur? After all, it does not logically follow from

identifying an inherent tendency towards material growth that growth is by necessity

unavoidable or unstoppable. Other destructive tendencies of capitalism that Marx

identified are halted, to some degree at least, in more welfare oriented and social-

democratic varieties of capitalism, such as the Nordic countries36. Could capitalism's

inherent and internal tendency towards growth, that I argue exist under DSSE as well,

be halted in a similar manner? Chapter 3 will be devoted to exploring this more closely.

2.3. Materialist vs. idealist conceptions of the growth-oriented economyWhen I claim that Daly's discussions on morality and values are not sufficient to explain

the drive for growth or to overcome it, I am neither denying that greed or other moral

failures exists or claiming them to be wholly a product of capitalism. Nor am I denying

ethics any role in surpassing the growth-oriented economy. As Daly acknowledges

(Daly et. al., 1994:87)(Daly, 2007:23) and as can be gathered from Marx as well (Marx,

1959:XXV-XXVII)(LaFave, 2009), certain tendencies in the human mind can be

exploited through commercials to induce more consumption and enable greater growth.

But greed itself is clearly a far older tendency. Long before capitalism, philosophers and

prophets alike discussed it. I also acknowledge that without a reason to overcome the

current system, one stemming from moral and ethical concerns, overcome it we never

will.

Yet, there is a difference between greed existing as a moral condition afflicting

individuals and greed being transformed into a mechanism that is built into the very core

35 See for instance Daly et. al., 2011:54, 261 ; Daly, 1999:50-51 ; or Daly, 1993:8-10.36 In fact, many Western capitalist democracies have some form of minimum wage laws, redistribution

of wealth through taxation, welfare payments, free healthcare and education, etc.

29

of the system, so that even the most selfless individual must either act in accordance to

the law of accumulation or vanish from the competitive market. In fact, I would suggest

that we cannot truly speak of the “greed” of capitalists, as the process is automatic,

mechanic even. It is both wholly impersonal and wholly independent of the moral

inclinations of the individuals involved. It is divorced from conscious and deliberative

actions and the forethought that informs them, and takes on a life of its own (Marx,

1990:247-257). “Greed” is a property of thinking and feeling beings and cannot be a

property of capitalist accumulation as a system any more than it can be the property of a

rock or a tree. Discussion of morality and ethics, while I do not deny their importance,

can thus not help us explain the drive for accumulation under capitalism. Capitalism is

not just an idea, it does not just exist in our minds, but entails real, concrete phenomena

that both restrict and shape our ways of thinking and acting. “People”, after all, “make

their own history, but they do not make it of their own free will, not under circumstances

of their own choosing” (Marx, 1885:9), but must instead deal with “already existing

conditions, passed on from the past”24 (Ibid)37.

Instead, what enables the above described mechanism are the specific social

arrangements and relations of production in the capitalist system, precisely because they

lead to the separation of production decisions and ethical considerations. All the ethical

criticism of Daly, not to mention countless others, is ultimately meaningless unless that

separation comes to an end, and production is placed under conscious human control.

Only when ethics and morality have a place in economic decision-making can the

outcome of said decision-making be truly open to ethical criticism.

Nevertheless, the criticism of Daly and others is useful, as it is directed against the veil

that obscures the nature of capitalist production. Such criticism is needed in order to, as

Marxist theoretician Gareth Dale puts it, “uncover contradictions in the dominant

ideology, to lay bare their connections within society’s mode of production and to

comprehend their obfuscatory workings” (2012). It allows us to expose what the actual

goal of capitalist production is, and do away with the rose-tinted illusion that growth is

somehow good for all of us.

37 Freely translated from the original German by the author.

30

Chapter 3: DSSE and classI must begin by making it clear that many Marxists conflate the fact that there is a

tendency, or even an outright requirement under normal circumstances, towards growth

under capitalism with growth being completely unavoidable. Their arguments fail to

take seriously enough the major role of the state in DSSE, implicitly assuming a free

market and demonstrating that constraint of matter-energy through-put could never

happen on its own accord38. But Daly is aware of that, and one of his main claims is that

the state must step in and bring about an 'optimal scale' because the market cannot reach

one on its own (Daly et. al., 2011:54, 261)(Daly, 1999:50-51)(Daly, 1993:8-10). I will

argue that this assumption on Daly's part is problematic due principally to Daly's lack of

class analysis and appreciation of conflicts of interest. Daly's underestimation of the role

of conflicting interests can be seen already in Daly's assumption of the magnitude of

state control. As I intend to show, a hypothetical state that exerts the amount of control

over capital required to enact DSSE-S would inevitably generate conflict between itself

and the capitalist class. Forcefully preventing growth acts against the interest of

capitalists since it is equal to forcefully reducing their profits39. The consequences of this

conflict and its relation to other contradiction within DSSE-S will be clarified in greater

detail as this chapter progresses.

3.1.1. Class and value – contradictions in NatureAs was alluded to in Chapter 2.2., Nature and natural resources have different

significances for humanity as a whole and for the capitalist class; just like labour has a

different significance for capitalists and workers. In both cases the qualitative difference

is reflected in a quantitative difference between their use- and exchange-values. The

exchange-values of both labour-power of and Nature do not reflect their usefulness to

the capitalist class, neither at the margin or in total in the manner that Daly suggests

(Daly et. al., 2011:287). That usefulness is absolute, since production would be entirely

impossible without either. Rather, the exchange-values of both labour-power and of

Nature reflect their respective 'costs of production'. In the case of labour, this means the

reproduction cost of labour-power. In the case of Nature it means nothing; it is treated as

38 For examples see Foster, 2011 ; Smith, 2010a, 2010b.39 And, to a certain extent, a barrier to firms expanding their market shares; an objective that is often

given primacy in the practical world of business. See for instance Lanzillotti, 1958 ; Buzzell, Gale, and Sultan, 1975 ; or Porter, 1979, 1980.

31

a gift to be freely appropriated40 (Marx, 1990:131-163)(Marx, 1991:881-882).

For humanity, labour and Nature are preconditions of both life itself and all forms of

material development (Marx,1959:XXIV). For the capitalist class, labour and Nature are

only useful to the extent that they “serve as [the] material conditions for the

accumulation of value” (Burkett, 2006b:6), i.e. that they can produce exchange-values

that translate into profit for the capitalists (Marx, 1990: 125-177). This contradiction

between the different interests of capital on the one hand, and humanity and the Natural

world on the other, is what enables the drive towards accumulation itself, as well as the

possibility to profit through increased matter-energy through-put. It lies at the heart of

capitalist relations of production. It is a difference that, to quote Daly, “could not be

more basic, more elementary, or more irreconcilable (Daly et. al., 2011:23).”41 To

highlight it is to highlight the incompatibility of the capitalist mode of production with

human and Natural well-being.

Certainly, there is some merit to the green focus on how environmental degradation and

climate change affects all of humanity regardless of class42; capitalists are not a different

species and need things like clean air and water just as much as workers do. But this

would be to confuse the issue, and conflate the process of capital reproduction with

biological reproduction of the living persons who happen to own the capital. The

Marxian analysis targets capitalists as a class, and the position of capitalist as a role, not

the actual human beings that happen to inhabit those roles – Marx after all called his

magnum opus “Capital”, and not “The Capitalists”. Alienation is a phenomenon that

faces capitalists as well, and what better example of 'alienation from human nature43'

(Marx, 1959:XXIV-XXVI) affecting capitalists than the fact that the laws of market

competition prevent them from acting in their interests as human-beings, forcing them

instead to despoil the Nature on which they too depend biologically. There is no

disputing the fact that the actual persons who inhabit the roles of workers and capitalists

40 See Burkett, 1999a:69-78 for a discussion on the use of the concept of 'free appropriation' as evidence of anti-ecology in Marx.

41 Note that Daly originally refers to the irreconcilable difference between the pre-analytic visions of neoclassical theory and ecological economics.

42 For examples of this attitude, see: UEPA's basic information about climate change, epa.gov/climatechange/basics/ ; WCED's s.c. 'Brundtland Report', appropriately titled “Our Common Future” (1987) ; UNEP's Introduction to climate change, unep.org/climatechange/Introduction.aspx ; or the National Geographic article '6 Ways Climate Change Will Affect You' (2013).

43 Translation note: the German Gattungswesen means 'species-essence', but can also be translated as 'human nature', or 'the essence of humanness'. 'Human nature' is most fitting in his instance, I believe.

32

do indeed have a common interest, as living beings and parts of the biosphere, to

preserve Nature. But to simply state that capitalists and workers both need Nature to live

is to disregard class and miss entirely that there are economics forces at play that

prevent that common interest from being acted on.

3.1.2. Class and value – contradictions in productionDaly's socialist tendencies have, I believe, been well established, yet Marxist critics

such as Smith and Foster are not entirely wrong in doubting Daly on this point, even

though they arguably underestimate the socialistic nature of his vision. The problem

does not lie in the values that inform Daly's vision but in the way in which he conceives

of us getting there and the precise manner in which society would function once we do.

Daly does not tell us how far either worker ownership and co-determination or bottom-

up economic democracy are supposed to go. As I have shown, we can infer from his

writings that, since competition between firms and the profit-motive remain, we are

dealing at most with some form of guild socialism. The impression I get is that he

imagines a pluralism of differing models; an economy populated by everything ranging

from corporations more or less as they are today, to corporations with worker and

community representation on their boards of directors, to fully worker-owned

cooperatives and everything in between (Daly et. al., 1994:302-304). I believe the

reason that he is not being more clear is that he does not fully appreciate how far and

deep the antagonism between classes goes and hence sees no reason to do so. Daly in

fact openly rejects the idea of a inherent contradiction between the interests of the

capitalist and working classes (Daly et. al., 1994:299,303). While he does not deny that

conflict does exist, to him this conflict is incidental rather than essential, and depends on

the mistreatment of the labour force by capital. He sees no reason why the two could not

be in harmony, as both benefit from “the healthy functioning of industry” (Daly et. al.,

1994:299). To a certain extent this is true, as Marx recognised early on (1993:21-23).

Under capitalism workers are indeed dependent on being exploited since they have, per

definition, nothing but their labour-power to sell, and a 'healthy functioning of industry'

industry can keep employment rates high.

Even so, if all the very socialist-sounding description recounted in Chapter 1 became a

reality, would there even be a source of conflict? After all, as I noted, at the most radical

33

point Daly's description could even be interpreted as undoing a foundation of

capitalism; the 'freeing' of workers from their means of production. Surely there can be

no inherent conflict between the working class and the capitalist class if there is no

working class and means of production are universally and collectively owned? It is

hard to penetrate what Daly truly images here. Even though he gives us a very

socialistic vision, he is very clear on the fact that there are separate classes of workers

and capitalists in DSSE-S. There is private ownership of the means of production,

commodity-production, wage-labour and profit-maximising behaviour (Daly, 1992:31-

75)(Daly et. al., 1994:283-314). Additionally, capital itself would remain and with it

both accumulation of capital and class division. This means that there exist, by

necessity, conflicts of interest between different classes. This aspect of capitalism is

retained under DSSE-S, and no matter how much Daly rejects the label 'capitalism',

Marxian class analysis can thus be applied to DSSE-S. It is the retaining of capital

accumulation and class conflict under DSSE, identified precisely because of the use of

Marxian categories in the pre-analytic vision, that allows the inherent problems and

contradictions of the system to surface.

Daly's own description may seem to contradict my claim of retained class interests. If

workers own and democratically control enterprises, and bring their own interests and

that of their communities into the decision-making and planning of firms, what role do

capitalists play and where does their profit-maximising come in? If there is a guaranteed

income as well as a guaranteed income-bringing ownership through the sharing of

profits between workers, why is there still wage-labour? This apparent contradiction is

understood if one takes into account the fact that Daly's analysis lacks the tools to

examine and understand class conflicts, leading him to make claims that on closer

inspection turn out to be impossible to implement. Simply stating that one desires a state

without class-conflict in no way means that such a state is possible even though classes

themselves and their differences remain. But Daly does not deal with, and assumes the

conflict away by saying that we must find a way of organising production that benefits

both classes (Daly et. al., 1994:299-305). He cannot convince of the possibility that the

conflict would remain when certain incidental properties of capitalism-as-it-is are

removed, yet essential ones remain. I believe that the introduction of class conflict to

Daly's socialist-sounding proposals reveals their practical limitations. They do not

replace, but co-exist with capitalist forms of production, ownership and decision-

34

making. Daly's belief in the non-existence of an inherent class conflict is so strong that

he sees no contradiction here; for him, profit-maximising capitalists and community-

caring workers sitting on the same boards and directing firms together bears no

problems. But he offers no clear way of going from a state of conflict to one of

cooperation; his suggestions only makes sense if one ignores the fact that a conflict

exists at all.

The above failure to distinguish between the interests of workers and capitalists in

production also weakens the basis of Daly's otherwise sound ecological arguments. This

is because, as noted in the preceding sub-chapter, the Natural world is a major stage in

which the conflict between the interests of the two classes plays out because Nature has

different meanings for them. In fact, the wider social conflict between classes takes in

the commodity the specific form of a contradiction between use- and exchange-values

(Marx, 1990:131-138). That is turn reflected in the manner in which Nature is conceived

of and involved in human affairs; on the one hand, as condition of commodity

production and on the other as the condition and source of life itself. We are actually

dealing with the same conflict at different levels of abstraction – Daly's failure to see the

irreconcilable conflict between workers and capitalists is the same as his failure to

properly distinguish between use- and exchange-values, previously discussed in Chapter

2.2.

3.2. Class conflict and profit under DSSE-SBurkett and Altvater both deny that profit is possible under a steady-state economy

(Altvater, 1993:202–203)(Burkett, 2006a:170-171). But is that truly the case? If we

accept Marx's position that the source of profit is the surplus extracted from workers,

then profit is not dependent on growth as such. There may be a clear incentive for

growth for the individual capitalist, as more products brought to market means a greater

chance of realising profit - but here we are speaking of the individual firm's share of the

total surplus that the capitalists as a class extract from the workers as a class. Class

exploitation itself does not disappear with growth. The total amount of surplus in society

may decrease as a consequence of stiffened growth, but there may still be a total surplus

that will be extracted by capitalists. Marx's own model of simple reproduction shows

35

that even in a static state44, there is profit (Marx, 1992: 468-556)(Marx, 1990:711-724).

In fact it could be argued that the most crucial point that Marx makes is that the profit of

capitalists derives from exploitation of the workers, from appropriation of their surplus.

Bear also in mind that in Daly's model, we cannot abstract from rent like Burkett does

(2006b:5) since that would be assuming away a major part of the problem. The prices

that capitalists “pay for natural resources” are then not “ultimately regulated by their

values (i.e., by the labor times required for their extraction)” as Burkett argues (Ibid).

Natural resources are owned by the state in DSSE-S, and firms gain access to them

through periodic auctions where a specific, by the state pre-determined, quota is sold to

the highest bidder (Daly et. al, 2011:423,434,452)(Daly, 1992:61-68). This behaviour

can be described as the state being a rentier that parasites on the profit of industrial

capitalists by taking a substantial share of the total surplus without creating any new

surplus-value (Marx, 1959:I,3-XXI)(Daly, 1992:64, 68). If total profit equals total

surplus-value (Marx, 1991:141-162, 273-301), only the distribution of profit changes

through the state appropriation of capitalist profit. The point is that the workings of the

market are disrupted by this process, at least as far as the extractive industry is

concerned. The state has an absolute monopoly and extracts everything according to

rules that are entirely unconnected to the market. There is no reason to assume that

Marx's labour theory of value, which assumed a free market, applies to what amounts to

a planned economy with a heavily regulated 'market' (if the auction system can even

accurately be described as such). There is neither any competition nor private

ownership. The entire concept of a “socially necessary” labour time in the extractive

industry becomes meaningless. Nor does the law of supply and demand apply, since the

state supplies what it has determined to be best for the environment, not what is

demanded, with Daly assuming that the inherent efficiency of markets will ensure

Pareto optimal distribution given that restriction (Daly, 1992:80, 189-190, 201-202). No

adjustment of labour expenditure to the demand for the output of that expenditure can

thus take place. I am far from claiming that the law of value does not exist in a DSSE-S,

but merely stating that as far as the extractive industry is concerned, there is no reason

to simply assume that labour-time required for extraction determines the price of natural

44 Note the distinction between “static”, which assumes no development or change over time at all, and “steady-state”, which merely assumes a steady through-put of matter-energy as the norm in the long run. I am using Marx's model merely as the starting point of my discussion, and will drop the assumption of a static economy in the following sub-chapter.

36

resources.

The implication of the above is that another major tension emerges between the state

and the capitalist class under DSSE-S. The state does not only, in its role as legislator

and monopolist on force, prevent capitalists from growing the matter-energy through-

put of their production. It also, in its role as owner of all natural resources, parasites on

the total surplus and leeches on their profit even more. This now two-fold limit on profit

placed on firms by the state further increases its antagonism with the capitalist class.

3.2.1. Technological developmentEarlier I argued that the possibility of profit under DSSE-S is implied by Marx's model

simple reproduction. Yet it must must be acknowledged that DSSE-S is not like that

model, because that model assumed an entirely static state. DSSE-S, however, retains

the competitive aspect of capitalism, and hence also an aspect of competition that is

crucial to profit under DSSE-S, i.e. technological development and rising productivity

of labour.

Under capitalism-as-it-is, whether the total mass of profit rises or not as organic

composition of capital decreases, and the extent do which it does either, depends on the

extent to which displaced workers can find new employment (Marx, 1991:339-342). As

shown in Chapter 1.2., Daly wishes to guarantee employment for workers under DSSE-

S, and provide a guaranteed income if that is not possible. But as Smith (2010a; 2010b)

asks, where are displaced workers to find employment when the economy is not

expanding? Specifically, though Smith fails to specify that, jobs in production; i.e. ones

that create value.

People might find jobs at the beginning of any hypothetical transition to a DSSE-S. As

the economy shifts to the greener model Daly suggests, the re-building and re-purposing

of factories towards that end becomes a possible source of employment. But such a re-

furbishing is only temporary and only justifiable under a DSSE-S in so far as total

environmental gains would improve and total through-put could decrease in the long run

(Daly, 1973:152-157, 166). It cannot be counted on to continually increase and provide

a need for labourers; that would in any case increase matter-energy through-put no

37

different than increased production would. Hence in the long run, displaced workers

cannot find new work, and thus under DSSE-S the total mass of profit will decrease as

the organic composition of capital decreases.

Additionally, if Daly's policy of guaranteed income was to be enacted, it would mean

that as less and less workers are employed and the total mass of profit decreases further

and further, that mass is cut into even more as the state appropriates constantly greater

portions of it in order to distribute it to the growing number of unemployed citizens as

guaranteed income. The state-imposed limit on capitalist profit would hence become

three-fold45.

If one agrees with Marx that the source of all profit is the surplus appropriated from

workers, i.e. that there is an aggregate equality of total profit and total surplus-value

produced, the only way for capitalists as a class to raise the total mass of profit is to

extract more total surplus from their workers. The same 'countervailing factors' that

Marx cites as countering the tendency of the profit rate to fall are applicable to this

situation under DSSE-S, except of course those that involve or imply a contradiction to

basic DSSE tenets46(Marx, 1991:339-348). Thus, for instance, relative over-population

is out of the question, since Daly wants a stable population. The same goes for foreign

trade, which if DSSE-S is assumed to be global ought to have no bearing on the matter;

an assumption necessary for DSSE-S to be ecologically sound. Intensifying exploitation

by making workers work harder, i.e. produce more in a shorter period of time, is also

clearly not possible: what are they to work harder on when the maximal output is

already pre-determined by how much raw-material has been secured from the state

before production even begins? The options left are lowering wages and prolonging the

working day. The former of the two might be problematic if guaranteed income exists.

The latter completely contradicts Daly's promises of more leisure, more enjoyable work,

better living standards and class cooperation, presented in Chapters 1.1. and 1.2, and

45 Note that the income the state generates through 'rent' can be used to pay out guaranteed income. Yet we would still be dealing with a three-fold limit, since the level of 'rent' extracted would be decided both by ecological factors and the need to pay citizens. It need not be said that this would further disrupt the workings of the 'market' and the connection between the price of raw materials and the socially necessary labour time of extraction them.

46 This is true regardless of what one believes about the theory of the TotPRtF and its empirical status under free market capitalism. The actions taken by the state under DSSE-S make it clear that the state would restrict and limit capitalist profit – making it likely that the same countervailing factors could be employed by capitalists as Marx suggests for the TotPRtF.

38

aggravates the struggle over the working day that Marx described as the essence of class

struggle (Marx, 1990: 340-411). Yet it also brings in the same issue as above; what are

workers to spend their longer working-days doing? The upper limit to how long, fast or

hard they work is set by the initial allotment of raw-material for that period. Once it has

been used up and as much as possible has been produced with it, no further socially

necessary labour can occur until more resources are acquired. The intensity at which

workers labour determines only how quickly the allotted resources are depleted, and

increasing that intensity only has an effect to the point at which the last resources of a

period are consumed just before the start of a new one47.

This is, in my reading, what Burkett and Altvater mean by “an economy without profit”.

Securing a profit would mean that a truly static state would have to be implemented,

where there is no technological development. In other words, what constitutes socially

necessary labour would have to be artificiality increased. Interestingly enough Daly

himself, despite encouraging technological development, suggests that automation ought

to be restricted as a way of securing full employment (Daly, 2013). He also suggests that

a DSSE-S would be more labour-intensive, as it would rely on repair and maintenance

rather than new production (Daly, 2005:p.6). The situation is the inverse of what

happens with free and unrestricted competition under capitalism-as-it-is. Increased

automation on the scale of the whole economy reduces the total mass of profit available

to the capitalist class as a whole. Yet due to the super-profit gained through

appropriation of existing surplus by the individual capitalist who first automates, it does

not appear so to that capitalist (Marx, 1990:430-438, 526-532, 578-580). Under DSSE-

S, state restrictions on automation actually serves to increase the total mass of profit, yet

such restrictions appear to the individual capitalist as a limit to their profit.

Finally, technological development and the idea of restricting it ought to be discussed in

connotation with the 'Jevon's Paradox' of resource efficiency48. We might assume that

the state manages to prevent a rising use of resources by periodically lowering the

amount of resources auctioned as the efficiency of resource use increases. Increased

efficiency of resource-use might then perhaps act as a counter-veining factor by

47 One might speculate that bringing one's products to market as quickly as possible could become a strategy, but that of course would have to be weighted against the consequences of letting production halt entirely until the next period begins.

48 See Foster et. al., 2010: 169-192 for a summary of the Paradox.

39

cheapening the cost of constant capital (Marx, 1991:342-343), not to mention provide an

incentive to continually use less resources, which is one of Daly's intentions with the

idea (1992:63-64). Daly also evidently believes that his system would eradicate the

Paradox (Daly, 2012; 2010). But in practice, the state would essentially preform what

Marx describes happens due to reduction in socially necessary labour time through

market competition, i.e. ensure that no profit can be made in the long term through

efficiency improvements (Marx, 1990:125-163). Such a forced prevention of the

Paradox would amount to an equivalent to the restriction on labour-saving automation,

making the state-imposed limitations now five-fold49.

Conclusively, note that is has not been the intention of this chapter to predict what

exactly would happen to profit in a DSSE-S. Profit is a complex process mediated by

competition between different capitals and between capitals and the state, not to

mention the struggle between classes. Precisely what would occur in practice under

DSSE-S is ultimately the result of the outcome of such competitions and struggles, the

precise details of which I cannot speculate on, especially not on this level of abstraction.

My intention was merely to lift up the struggles that would arise or intensify as a result

of the restrictions imposed by the state on capital. Having demonstrated the potential

severity of such conflicts, it becomes critical to look more closely at the nature and role

of the state under DSSE-S.

3.3. DSSE-S and the state Here we return to the question that began this chapter, and that was alluded to already in

Chapter 2.2, i.e. the possibility of the state apparatus forcing a DSSE-S into existence.

My intention is not to give a definitive answer, which I doubt is possible, but to lift up

the contradictions and conflicts involved in the attempt. Will the multitude ways in 49 To summarise, the restrictions are: 1) Absolute restriction on access to raw material for the capitalists

as a class, and therefore reduction of total possible through-put. 2) Appropriation of a portion of profits through requirement to pay an inflated price for raw-materials; the state essentially acts as a monopolistic rentier on all resources. 3) Increased taxation, resource-rents, or other forms of state appropriation of profits in order to pay out guaranteed incomes to unemployed citizens. 4) Restriction on the use of labour-saving technology. Note that Daly also argues for restricting off-shoring practices and immigration of cheap labour, yet this will be disregarded due to my assumption of a global DSSE-S (Daly, 2005:6). 5) Restriction of the ability to increase profits by “cheapening the elements of constant capital” (Marx, 1991:343) since the state constantly raises costs of raw materials as soon as efficiency improvements makes smaller amounts required. 1 is an absolute restriction, 2 and 3 limit profit through appropriation of it, and 4 and 5 appear to the capitalist as limiting, though 4 is not and 5 merely is in the same manner that competition is though perhaps more severely.

40

which the state encroaches, limits and parasites on capitalist profit be accepted by the

capitalist class? Is it likely that capitalists, given the enormous power and influence they

evidently have over both states and supra-state organisations in our current society, will

simply stand idly by and let it happen? Or, seen from another angle, will workers, who if

we are to believe Daly's own description have greater levels of influence and co-

determination, allow a state of affairs under which their exploitation continually

increases and their working days may become longer and longer? The question of the

motivation of states, and of who controls them, cannot be abstracted away. We cannot

simply assume that the state apparatus has somehow and for some reason simply

decided to suddenly do the bidding of the common man, and go against the interest of

capital in order to secure the well-being of people, communities and Nature.

If we read Daly a certain way, we can extract a decidedly socialist picture of a a truly

democratic state controlled directly by the people. One where control over natural

resources lies in the hands of the “many people” (Daly, 1973:169), who thus by

extension must have a major influence over the rest of the economy. In the case of such

a socialist state, we might understand its motivations for contradicting the interests of

capitalist so explicitly – but then I have to ask why the capitalists are around at all? If

we allow the assumption of sufficient power, democratic control and incentive on the

part of the state, we must ask why this ideal state still keeps the capitalist class, and its

own tensions and conflicts with it, around? This is especially strange when one

considers that this is, supposedly, an economy where worker ownership and co-

determination is already common and state control extensive. Stranger still it becomes

when one takes the above analysis into account, which implied that worker exploitation

may very well increase under DSSE-S. The two ideas are simply not compatible.

One cannot both have more worker co-determination and increased worker exploitation

at the same time. Nor can one at the same time have capital accumulation and zero

growth; nor an economic democracy and a free market; nor decentralisation50 and

absolute state ownership and planning of all extraction. This is because one cannot have

both capitalism and socialism at the same time; and that is precisely what Daly, in the

final analysis, is suggesting. His vision is revealed to be politico-economically unstable

and contradictory as soon as one acknowledges an irreconcilable conflict between

50 See for example Daly et. al., 2011: 212, 408.

41

classes. The specific outcome of such class struggles is not something one can predict,

and I do not intend to speculate on whether or not a DSSE-S is practically feasible. Yet

it is clear that conflicts do exist and that a DSSE-S would be much harder to practically

implement than Daly imagines.

42

Chapter 4: Concluding discussions

4.1. Implications Regarding the relationship between Daly and socialism, it would be silly to get into a

debate on semantics and linguistics. Regardless of whether or not one accepts the

specific label 'socialist', Daly's commitment to a form of 'eco-humanism' is undeniable.

An eco-humanism that is certainly compatible with a more humanistic and

environmental reading of Marx and eco-socialist politics and ideology; even the ethical

aspects of more radical positions such as the eco-communism advocated by Burkett and

Foster.

In comparison, a somewhat greater gulf appears to separate Daly from Marx: the issue

of moral foundation and general approach. Due to Daly's strong religious convictions

and his criticism of scientific materialism (Daly, 1999:181-186), it becomes necessary to

briefly examine this potential hurdle to cooperation. It is clear that Daly is a devout

Christian, to whom the pursuit of liberation from the shackles of the prevailing system is

a religious one51. Marx, on the other hand, is an atheist and a materialist for whom

“[r]eligion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the

soul of soulless conditions”, the abolition of which is required for people to regain their

senses and demand real happiness (Marx, 1844:§4). Yet in my view, such differing

sources of inspiration and views on religion need not be a problem. After all, Kropotkin

approved of Tolstoy despite the former being an atheist and latter a Christian, because

they held similar views of political ends and shared ethical and moral positions

(Kropotkin, 1911:918)52. That they derived them in different manners did not matter. In

a similar way, the work of Marxist Richard D. Wolff with religious activists such as

Cornel West53 on social issues demonstrates that a convergence of goals is more

important than a shared faith or lack thereof. The very existence of liberation theology

demonstrates the same54. There is therefore no particular reason to assume that the

normative goals of certain branches of Marxism and socialism and those of Daly's

51 See for instance Daly, 1992:18-19 or 1994:381.52 His entry into Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th Edition, under “Anarchism”.53 For example, “Occupy the Mind: Progressive Moral Agenda for the 21st Century” hosted on January

22nd in the Riverside Church, New York. See also Wolff's brief comment “Can socialism and religion get along?”, published on his website rdwolff.com (no date given).

54 For a detailed treatment of the relationship between liberation theology and Marxism, see Dussel, 2003.

43

conception of ecological economics are incompatible, or that ecological economists in

Daly's tradition and Marxists and socialists cannot cooperate in some way.

Method and approach are left as the dividers. But considering the explicit commitment

of ecological economics as a field to methodological pluralism, this ought to be a non-

issue as well (see Burkett, 2006a:viii,255). Daly, in his own conception of ecological

economics, never opposes this commitment. As shown, he even acknowledges that he is

not opposed to all socialist ideas (1992:168) and endorses Marx's materialism as a

possible moral foundation of a SSE (Daly, 1973:172). Daly himself may or may not

personally disprove of the use of a fully materialist approach to ecological economics,

or a morality that discards his particular god. But but as an ecological economist and a

scientists he clearly does not, and it is the latter that is of interest for the purpose of this

dissertation.

We are consequently left with no real obstructions to a more cooperative atmosphere

between Marxist political economy and Dalyian ecological economics in academia. The

main hurdles to a synthesis between the normative goals of socialism and Dalyian

ecological economics have also been dismantled. In fact other conceptions of ecological

economics, such as that on Joan Martinez-Alier, are already avowedly eco-socialist and

make use of Marx despite not being Marxist56. Such cooperation ought to be

encouraged. In my view, to do otherwise would be to compromise the avowed

commitment to methodological plurality for ecological economics and radical criticism

of capitalism for Marxism. What is more, it would compromise the commitment to

human and Natural well-being for both socialism and ecological economics in the

normative case. Indeed, it would be to compromise a commitment to proper scientific

investigation.

Yet neither a compatibility of inspiration and goals nor an acceptance of different

methods solves the riddle of what socio-political system is most suitable to make Daly's

steady-state vision a reality. Again, what one chooses to call such system is not of my

concern. My goal has been to establish the incompatibility of SSE with certain

55 Burkett lists as his sources: Boulding, 1966 and 1978 ; Daly, 1968 ; Costanza, 1989 and 2003; Norgaard, 1989 ; Proops, 1989 ; Underwood & King, 1989 ; Folke et al., 1994 ; Gowdy & Erickson, 2005

56 See for example Martinez-Alier, 2003, 2007 and 2013

44

characteristic found under capitalism, and with any other system of any other name that

retains those characteristics. As I have established, those characteristic are mainly: 1)

profit as the main motive for production, rather than production for use and 2) the

existence of different classes that have differing interests in Nature, particularly the

existence of a class that cannot acknowledge Nature as the source of and requirement

for life itself. This of course includes any underlying forces that enable 1 and 2. I have

argued these forces to be rooted chiefly in capital accumulation as the driving force of

the economy, which is itself made possible by the separation of the vast majority of

people from the means of production. Yet one need not agree with my particular

explanation for why 1 and 2 exist in order to acknowledge that they do exist and that

they do hinder a SSE.

Any system that is to achieve a SSE must do away with these two characteristic as a

minimum requirement; though doing so does of course not make a SSE economy

automatically possible. It is my belief that a model of the sort of system that possesses

the necessary properties required to achieve a SSE can be found within the socialist

tradition. However, clearly not any given model that happens to bear the label

'socialism' will do; as is proven by the historically existence of socialist societies that

had both the above characteristics despite the socialist label. Nor would making a SSE

possible be in and of itself sufficient as a normative goal, since such a state is

technically possible at different levels, some of which may not satisfy human needs well

enough (Georgescu-Roegen, 1976:22-23). Rather, a SSE is a requirement for a

ecologically sound society; which itself is a requirement for a fulfilling society that

properly sees to the needs and well-being of all its members. The question of how such

a society would look like and how we could achieve it remains open.

4.2. Towards a Marxian Ecological EconomicsMarxian Ecological Economics is a field that is already under development, and has

been so since the 1990s, mainly through the work of Paul Burkett and John Bellamy

Foster (Fine & Saad Filho, 2012:122-123). My work has served to build upon theirs and

I wish to end this dissertation with a brief discussion on what the future holds for the

field of Marxian Ecological Economics, and the work that I believe is still left to do.

45

I will begin with the need for adequate quantitative measurements of the stocks and

flows of matter-energy, that do not attempt to reduce their value to the single-

dimensional unit of money. Such measurements are required for any environmentally

sound decision-making, and have been suggested as being the foundation of ecological

economics (Martinez-Alier, Munda & O'Neill, 1998). The development of them was

first attempted by Marxist economist Otto Neurath. Interestingly enough, Neurath's

work on the incommensurability of values and the need for in natura measurement has

already greatly inspired ecological economics as field57. Furthermore, Daly himself

supports alternatives to presently used measurements such as GDP58.

As Fine and Saad Filho point out (2012:122-123), work has already been done on

physical accounts. Yet such work does not, in my view, sufficiently take into account

Neurath’s points on incommensurability, which hold as much for energy or mass units

as they do for money. What is lacking are social and qualitative dimensions, that are

able to take different contexts and circumstances into account, and which are open to

political and ethical criticism59. Daly already acknowledges the limits of quantitative

measures when it comes to welfare, and makes us of Max-Neef's matrix of needs

(2011:279-280). It would benefit ecological economics to develop an extended form of

such a matrix, one that takes into consideration humanity’s dependence on and

interconnection with the Natural world, but is also compatible with quantitative in

natura measurements of stocks and flows. Such measurements would need to be tools

and bearers of approximate information that can serve to inform and aid decision-

making; not the main basis of decisions, like profit maximisation is to the firm today.

Additionally, in my view it does not suffice to expand the means of investigation, but

that which is subject to study must be expanded as well. The challenges of modern

ecological devastation make it necessary to break down the barriers between different

disciplines, and even the dichotomy between social and natural sciences. The problems

we face affect us in many different ways and on many different levels, yet we divide the

knowledge needed to find solutions into separate, and sometimes even isolated, fields. A

more holistic approach is needed, one that is implied in Marx’s own dialectic method60.

57 See Martinez-Alier, 2012 and Burkett, 2006a:5.58 See for instance Daly et. al., 2011:272-284 and Daly, 1996:103-120.59 See O’Neill, 1998:112-142.60 See Foster, et. al., 2010:215-344 or Levins and Lewontin, 2007 for a discussion on the topic.

46

Daly himself supports such an approach, and sees it evolving into a non-disciplinary,

and not merely multi-disciplinary, undertaking (1994:365).

The work must begin to construct not only a Marxian Ecological Economics, but to

recognise the need for even such an endeavour to be only a part of what Neurath called

an ‘orchestration of the sciences’: “a project that would integrate the different sciences,

such that, on any specific problem, all relevant sciences could be called upon” (O’Neill,

1998:195-196). The end-goal ought to be an elaboration of Kropotkin’s old dream

(Kropotkin, 2007:169); a Physiology of Nature-Society. The study of the social,

economic, political, cultural, ecological, biological, etc. processes involved in the entire,

intricate networks of human-Nature metabolism and intra-human intercourse; from

extraction to production to waste-sinks, including all the corresponding social relations.

47

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