Croatian Studies Review 9 (2013)

CROATIAN STUDIES REVIEW ČASOPIS ZA HRVATSKE STUDIJE

Volume 9, 2013 ISSN 1440-0448

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Publisher: Croatian Studies Centre, Macquarie University, Australia

For the Publisher: Luka Budak, Director Croatian Studies Centre (Macquarie University) Editor-in-Chief Luka Budak (Macquarie University) [email protected] Editors Boris Škvorc (Macquarie University/University of Split) Literature, Cultural studies [email protected] Danijel Dzino (Macquarie University) History, Book reviews [email protected] Jim Hlavac (Monash University) Linguistics [email protected] Correspondence / Poštanska adresa: Croatian Studies Review Croatian Studies Centre Department of International Studies Faculty of Arts, Macquarie University Sydney NSW 2109, Australia Editing Nevenko Bartulin (Macquarie Unversity). Danijel Dzino (Macquarie University) Layout and Print Macquarie Press, Sydney Printed in June 2014

International Editorial Board: Mladen Ančić, University of Zadar, Croatia Nevenko Bartulin, Macquarie University, Australia. Stjepan Blažetin, Janus Pannonius University, Hungary Neven Budak, University of Zagreb, Croatia Vinko Grubišić, University of Waterloo, Canada Vesna Drapač, University of Adelaide, Australia Josip Matešić, Mannheim University, Germany Mislav Ježić, University of Zagreb, Croatia Krystyna Pieniazek-Marković, Universytet Im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poland International Advisory Board Krešimir Bagić, University of Zagreb, Croatia Lada Badurina, University of Rijeka, Croatia Stjepan Barić, Janus Pannonius University, Hungary Ralph Bogert, University of Toronto, Canada Inoslav Bešker, University of Bologna, Italy Vinko Brešić, University of Zagreb, Croatia Ivan Bošković, University of Split, Croatia Joško Božanić, University of Split, Croatia Damion Buterin, Macquarie University, Australia Gordana Galić-Kakkonen, University of Split, Croatia Zrinka Jelaska, University of Zagreb, Croatia Dunja Jutronić, University of Maribor, Slovenia Ljiljana Kaliterna-Lipovčan, Institute of Social Sciences “Ivo Pilar”, Croatia Walter Lalich, Macquarie University, Australia Josip Lisac, University of Zadar, Croatia Goran Rem, University of Osijek, Croatia Helena Sablić-Tomić, University of Osijek, Croatia Ljiljana Šarić, University of Oslo, Norway Diana Stolac, University of Rijeka, Croatia Brian Willems, University of Split, Croatia Boguslav Zielinski, University of Poznań, Poland Tanja Zimmerman, University of Konstanz, Germany Sanja Zubčić, University of Rijeka, Croatia To Prospective Contributors Articles submitted for publications should not exceed 10,000 words in length and review articles 4,000 words if not agreed otherwise. They should be submitted to email of the editors. Authors of articles published will receive one free copy of the Croatian Studies Review. All articles are anonimously peer-reviewed. Potencijalnim suradnicima Zaprimljeni izvorni znanstveni članci ne smiju prelaziti 10000 riječi, a pregledni članci i recenzije 4000 riječi ako s Uredništvom nije dogovoreno drugačije. Trebaju biti poslani na e-mail adresu nadležnog urednika. Autori čiji članci budu objavljeni dobit će besplatan primjerak Časopisa za hrvatske studije. Svi članci prolaze kroz međunarodni proces recenzije. This volume was published thanks to the financial contribution of the State Office for Croats outside Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Studies Foundation of Australia.

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© 2014, Croatian Studies Centre Macquarie University, Sydney NSW 2109 Australia All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form by print, photo-print, microfilm microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher.

© 2014, Croatian Studies Centre Macquarie University, Sydney NSW 2109 Australia Sva prava pridržana. Nijedan dio ove publikacije ne može se reproducirati ili prevesti u bilo kakvom obliku u tisku, fotokopiji, mikrofilmu ili bilo kojem drugom obliku bez pisanog odobrenja izdavača.

Croatian Studies Review 9 (2013)

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Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

THE WORD FROM THE EDITORS 7

RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVA 9

PROGRAM OF THE CONFERENCE CROATIANS: HISTORY,

LANGUAGE AND MIGRATION 11

ARTICLES 15

Igor Vranić: “The International Community’s Peace Plans in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995” 17

Walter V. Lalich: “From diaspora to transnational flows” 73

Dragan Komadina: “A Short history of Croatian theatre in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 98

BOOK REVIEWS 105

Igor Vranić: “What is and what should never be – Review of I. Lučić, Uzroci rata and J. Glaurdić, Vrijeme Europe” 107

Danijel Dzino: “Some thoughts on fashion culture and racial discourses. The review of Simončič, Kultura odijevanja and Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the

Independent State of Croatia” 111

SUBMISSION GUIDE 122


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The word from the editors

It is difficult to believe dear readers, but we have just published no less than the ninth volume of the Croatian Studies Review. The editors and editorial board are successfully continuing their commitment to the annual publication of the journal, which is striving toward scholarly quality and the publication of new faces and new research dealing with Croatians and Croatia. Besides continuing support from the Croatian Studies Foundation and Ministry of Science, Education and Sport of the Republic of Croatia, the publication of this volume is (as was the previous one) supported with the grant given by the State Office for Croats outside the Republic of Croatia as part of a competitive grant provided for financing publishing programs and projects for the Croatian diaspora.

The Croatian Studies Centre has had a busy and exciting start to the year. In February 2014, the Centre successfully hosted the international conference Croatians: History, Language and Migration, honouring 30 years of Croatian Studies at Macquarie University. The conference was convened by Luka Budak and Danijel Dzino. On that occasion, the Centre and Croatian Studies Foundation co-published a refereed Book of abstracts, edited by Luka Budak and entitled: Croatians: History, Language and Migration. Abstracts of the International Conference Honouring 30 Years of Croatian Studies at Macquarie University / Sydney, Australia 5-7 February 2014. The book of abstracts also have an introduction written by the convenors under the title: “The social relevance of Croatian Studies at an Australian university OR: Why bother maintaining small humanistic disciplines in the age of financial cuts and rationalisation of academic departments and curricula?” The conference hosted a number of interesting and diverse papers by scholars from Australian, Croatian and Hungarian institutions. A full program of the conference is included in this volume of CSR, and we are planning to publish selected papers from the conference.

In March 2014, Macquarie University was visited by Mr Zoran Milanović, Prime Minister of Croatia. During his visit, a tripartite agreement was signed between the Croatian government, Macquarie University and Croatian Studies Foundation. The agreement secures a 5-year funding commitment on behalf of the Croatian government. The financing comes from the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport of the Republic of Croatia and the State Office for Croats Abroad, Republic of Croatia. The total sum for five years, 2015-2019, is AU$750,000, which enables increased funding for the Centre and Croatian Studies at Macquarie University. Committed funding will enable the introduction of new teaching in the near future which will deal with Croatian history and archaeology as well as the history of Croatian migration.

The Croatian Studies Centre also began a new project in collaboration with the Department of Ancient History at Macquarie University. This is the Bribir excavation project, involving archaeological excavations of Bribirska


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glavica near Skradin, one of the most important archaeological localities in Croatia with a continuing habitation from the Bronze Age to the 19th century. The excavations were financed by the Faculty of Arts, Macquarie University, and with financial contribution from the Croatian Studies Foundation. They were conducted in collaboration with the following Croatian partners: the Museum of Croatian Archaeological Monuments from Split and Šibenik City Museum. The first excavation was successfully accomplished in April 2014 and led by Dr Victor Ghica (field director) and Dr Danijel Dzino (deputy field director). The excavation concentrated on the revision of earlier excavations of late antiquity and early medieval structures below the Church of St. Joachim and Anne, including a polyconch church, whose dating is still in progress but which might go back to late antiquity. A complete geomagnetic survey of the archaeological site (approx. 58,000 m2) has also been carried out, which resulted in a map of the buried structures.

The Centre is also participating in new projects in the near future, such as co-hosting the Croatian Migrant Congress, to be held 23rd-26th of June 2014 in Zagreb. The Congress will be attended by four members of the Centre: Luka Budak, Danijel Dzino, Natasha Levak and Walter F. Lalich, who are going to present papers at the conference.

For the editors: Luka Budak and Danijel Dzino

Signing of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia, Macquarie University and Croatian Studies Foundation, Standing (from left to right): Mr Zoran Milanović, Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia; the Hon Michael Egan AO, Chancellor of Macquarie University; Sitting: HE Dr Damir Kušen, The Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to Australia; Professor S. Bruce Dowtown, Vice-Chancellor, Macquarie University; and Mr John Gavljak, President, Croatian Studies Foundation.


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Riječ uredništva

Teško je vjerovati, dragi čitatelji, ali upravo smo evo objavili ni više ni manje već deveti svezak Časopisa za hrvatske studije. Urednici i uređivački odbor uspješno nastavljaju svoju namjeru redovite godišnje publikacije časopisa, koji nastoji prezentirati znanstvenu kvalitetu objavljenih radova te objavljivati nova imena i nova istraživanja koja se tiču Hrvata i Hrvatske. Uz kontinuiranu potporu Zaklade hrvatskih studija i Ministarstva znanosti obrazovanja i sporta Republike Hrvatske, izdavanje ovog broja (kao i prethodnog) potpomognuto je potporom zaprimljenom od Državnog ureda za Hrvate izvan Republike Hrvatske u sklopu natječaja za financiranje programa i projekata nakladničke djelatnosti za hrvatsko iseljeništvo.

Centar hrvatskih studija imao je naporan i uzbudljiv početak godine. U veljači 2014. Centar je uspješno organizirao međunarodnu konferenciju Hrvati: Povijest, jezik i migracije, u čast 30. obljetnice Hrvatskih studija na Sveučilištu Macquarie. Konferenciju su organizirali Luka Budak i Danijel Džino. Uz tu prigodu Centar i Zaklada hrvatskih studija su objavili recenziranu knjigu sažetaka pod naslovom Hrvati: Povijest, jezik i migracije. Sažetci međunarodne konferencije u čast 30. obljetnice Hrvatskih studija na Sveučilištu Macquarie / Sydney, Australija 5. - 7. veljače 2014. koju je uredio Luka Budak. Uz sažetke knjiga također sadrži uvod naslovljen “Društvena relevantnost Hrvatskih studija na australskom sveučilištu ILI: Zašto se mučiti održavanjem male humanističke discipline u doba financijskih rezova i racionalizacije akademskih odjela i nastavnih planova i programa?” koji potpisuju organizatori Budak i Džino. Konferencija je sadržavala brojne zanimljive i raznolike referate znanstvenika s australskih, hrvatskih i mađarskih institucija. Program konferencije donosimo u ovom svesku, a u sljedećem planiramo objaviti izabrane radove prezentirane na međunarodnom skupu.

U ožujku 2014. Sveučilište Macquarie je posjetio gosp. Zoran Milanović, predsjednik vlade Republike Hrvatske. Tijekom njegova posjeta potpisan je trostrani ugovor između vlade Republike Hrvatske, Sveučilišta Macquarie i Zaklade hrvatskih studija. Ugovorom se osigurava petogodišnje sufinanciranje Centra i studija hrvatskog jezika na ovom sveučilištu. Sufinanciranje dolazi iz Ministarstva znanosti obrazovanja i sporta te Državnog ureda za Hrvate izvan Republike Hrvatske. Radi se o ukupno 750.000AUD, što je dodatno povećanje dosadašnjeg sufinanciranja Centra hrvatskih studija na Sveučilištu Macquarie. S dodatnim financiranjem planiraju se u budućnosti uvesti novi kolegiji koji će se baviti hrvatskom poviješću i arheologijom te poviješću hrvatskog iseljeništva.

Centar hrvatskih studija je također krenuo u novi projekt u suradnji s Odjelom antičke povijesti Sveučilišta Macquarie, jednim od ponajboljih u južnoj hemisferi. Radi se o Bribirskom projektu, to jest arheološkim iskopavanjima na lokalitetu Bribirska glavica pokraj Skradina, jednom od najznačajnijih arheoloških lokaliteta u Hrvatskoj s kontinuiranim


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nastanjivanjem od brončanog doba do 19. stoljeća. Iskopavanja je financirao Fakultet humanističkih znanosti Sveučilišta Macquarie uz znakovitu potporu Zaklade hrvatskih studija, a u suradnji s hrvatskim partnerima: Muzejem hrvatskih arheoloških spomenika iz Splita i Šibenskim gradskim muzejem. Prva kampanja je uspješno završena u travnju 2014. Nju je predvodio dr. Victor Ghica kao voditelj iskopavanja i dr. Danijel Džino kao njegov zamjenik. Kampanja je bila usredotočena na revizijska iskopavanja kasnoantičkih i ranosrednjovjekovnih objekata ispod crkve Sv. Joakima i Ane, uključujući višeapsidnu crkvu čije je datiranje još uvijek u tijeku, a moglo bi se odnositi na period kasne antike. Također je obavljeno geomagnetsko ispitivanje kompletnog lokaliteta (ca. 58.000 m2) kojim su otkrivene podzemne strukture.

Centar također planira sudjelovati u novim projektima u budućnosti, poput suorganiziranja Hrvatskog iseljeničkog kongresa, koji će se održati od 23. do 26. lipnja 2014. u Zagrebu. Na kongresu će s referatima sudjelovati četiri člana Centra hrvatskih studija: Luka Budak, Danijel Džino, Natasha Levak i Walter F. Lalich.

Za uredništvo: Luka Budak i Danijel Dzino

Potpisivanje ugovora između vlade Republike Hrvatske, Sveučilišta Macquarie i Zaklade hrvatskih studija

Stoje (s lijeva na desno): Gosp. Zoran Milanović, premijer Vlade Republike Hrvatske; gosp. Michael Egan, rektor Sveučilišta Macquarie; Sjede: NjE dr. Damir Kušen, veleposlanik Republike Hrvatske u Australiji, profesor S. Bruce Dowtown, predsjednik Sveučilišta Macquarie i gosp. John Gavljak, predsjednik Zaklade hrvatskih studija.


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Program of the Conference Croatians: History, Language

and Migration

Wednesday 5th of February 2014

10.00-10.25 Opening ceremony

MARTINA MÖLLERING: Head, Department of International Studies / Macquarie University

NEVEN BUDAK: Special Advisor for Science and Education Envoy to the Prime Minister / Republic of Croatia

10.30-12.00 Session 1: Ancient and Medieval Croatia

CHARLES BARNETT (Macquarie University):

Alcoholic beverages and resistance to Roman imperialism in Dalmatia

VICTOR GHICA & DANIJEL DŽINO (Macquarie University):

Archaeological excavations at Bribirska glavica: An overview

TRPIMIR VEDRIŠ (University of Zagreb):

The destruction of medieval architecture and the role of medieval heritage in formation of Croatian national identity

13.30-15.00 Session 2: Early Modern Era

HAN BALTUSSEN (University of Adelaide):

Nicolas of Modrus’ De Consolatione (1465-66): A new ‘science’ of grief management?

KATARINA NINA SIMONČIČ (University of Zagreb):

Clothing identity of Croats in engravings by Cesare Vecellio from the end of the 16th century

DANIEL PREMERL (Institute of Art History in Zagreb) – read in absentia:

Iconology of frescoes in the Illyrian-Hungarian College in Bologna

15.30-17.30 Session 3: Literature & Identity in the 19th and 20th Century

DIANA STOLAC (University of Rijeka):

Croatian marine terminology as a sign of Croatian identity of the Eastern Adriatic Coast


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SLOBODANKA VLADIV-GLOVER (Monash University):

Krleža’s poetics of ‘qualitative psychological action’ and Strindberg’s intimate theatre

ZDENKO ZLATAR (Sydney University):

Ivan Mažuranić: Language, poetry and a quest for Croatian national identity. On the occasion of the 200th anniversary of his birth

ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIĆ (Macquarie University):

‘Lijepa naša …’: The song of love and of national borders

18.00-19.00 Keynote Address

MARY O’KANE (NSW Chief Scientist & Engineer):

Harnessing new technologies to tackle big research questions in history, language and migration

Thursday, 6th of February 2014

9.30-10.30 Session 4: Croatian as a Second Language

JIM HLAVAČ (Monash University):

Language maintenance of Croatian in Australia and language-use amongst second generation Croatian-Australians

NATASHA LEVAK (University of Southern Queensland):

Building cultural understanding and personal identity through tandem learning utilising virtual and online learning spaces

11.00-12.00 Session 5: Croatian Language

PETER M HILL (Universität Hamburg & Australian National University):

Sex and gender in European languages

JIM HLAVAČ (Monash University):

Attitudes and practices of Croatian-language interpreters and translators

13.00-15.00 Session 6: Recent Croatian History

MARIN SOPTA (Centre for Culture and Information in Zagreb):

Work and political activities of the Croatian Liberation Movement (Hrvatski oslobodilački pokret), Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka) and Croatian National Council (Hrvatsko narodno vijeće) in emigration after 1945


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IGOR VRANIĆ (Central European University):

International policy towards war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

IVICA TOLIĆ (Retired General of the Croatian Army):

Transition of the Republic of Croatia from totalitarian political system to parliamentary democracy

ANTE NAZOR (Croatian Homeland War Memorial Documentation Centre in Zagreb):

The chronology of the establishment of the modern Croatian State 1990-1991: The key dates

15.30-16.30 Session 7: World War II

VESNA DRAPAČ (University of Adelaide):

Croatian women’s resistance in the Second World War

NEVENKO BARTULIN (Independent Researcher):

The racial idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and theory

Friday, 7th of February 2014

9.30-11.00 Session 8: Croatians in Australia I

STEVEN KOSOVICH (Independent Researcher):

A statistical survey of Croatian settlers in colonial Australia

ILIJA D ŠUTALO (CSIRO & Curtin University):

Immigrant experiences through life stories of Croatians in Australia

WALTER F LALIĆ (Macquarie University):

Kalgoorlie racial riots 1934: Destruction and death at the Goldfields

11.30-12.30 Session 9: Croatians in Australia II

REBEKA MESARIĆ ŽABČIĆ (Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies in Zagreb):

The phenomenon of overseas chain migration to Australia

LUKA BUDAK (Macquarie University):

Croatian Australians struggle for recognition and identity


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12.30-13.00 Special lecture

RUŽA TOMAŠIĆ (Croatian Member of EU Parliament):

Croatia in the European Union


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Articles


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Igor Vranić: “The International Community’s Peace Plans in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995”

Igor Vranić Department of History Central European University, Budapest [email protected]

Abstract The article offers a review of the Yugoslav war of dissolution with special reference to the international communityʼs peace plans. The articleʼs main aim is to examine the purpose and efficiency of international diplomacy and the role of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in new geopolitical relations caused by the fall of Communism. Answers are provided as to what caused the war, whether the war could have been avoided and what were the war aims of the belligerent sides.

Key words: Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, international mediation, sovereignty, Serbian rebellion


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Abbreviations used in the text

ABiH Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina) BiH Bosna i Hercegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina) HDZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) HVO Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (Croatian Defence Council) HR HB Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna (Croatian Community of

Herceg-Bosna, 1993-1996) HZ HB Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna (Croatian Community of

Herceg-Bosna, 1991-1993) JNA Jugoslavenska narodna armija (Yugoslav peopleʼs army) RS Republika Srpska (The Serb Republic in BiH, 1992- ) RSK Republika Srpska Krajina (Republic of Serbian Krajina, 1990-

1995) SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action) SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian Democratic Party in BiH) SR BiH Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (Socialist

Republic of BiH, 1943-1992) UJDI Udruženje za jugoslavensku demokratsku inicijativu

(Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative) UNPA United Nations Protected Areas Introduction The latest war in Croatia and BiH has produced a multitude of scholarly, semi-scholarly, autobiographical and journalistic works. Only a very small number of these works meet the requirements of modern historical science, while the majority are attempts to achieve personal political aims under false academic pretense. Also, participants of the war have attempted, through their own literary works, to present themselves in a more positive light or explain how they were right but were not listened to which led to todayʼs results that are worse than expected. A separate group consists of non-Yugoslav authors, usually poorly familiar with the topics as well as with the languages of the studied area. These are mostly people who have spent some time in Belgrade or Sarajevo where they gained acquaintances, as for example, David Gibbs, Robert Donia, John Fine, etc. They usually produce some kind of colonial discourse regarding peoples of the former Yugoslavia, i.e. how they have ‘ancient hatreds’ or of their prewar unity,


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how they were not wise enough to choose the right choice at the first democratic elections etc. Exceptions to this can be discerned in the likes of James Gow and Michael Mann, whose works, however, also include a noticeable lack of ʻlocal knowledgeʼ.1 An interesting development was the growth of scientific papers on the Serbs starting immediately before and continuing after the NATO intervention on Kosovo in 1999, which evidently was meant to serve as part of a legitimation process.

This article will present a personal view of the key events of the war that was waged on Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory, with special attention paid to peace plans led under the aegis of the international community. In considering these plans I will present the changes they brought to the field, and what each plan offered to all sides, but also the reasons for their general failure. However, it is important to bear in mind that the outlined picture is primarily based on the current level of knowledge, which could experience a drastic change in the future when the official archives of all sides are opened.

Global change and the role of Yugoslavia The late 1980s of the twentieth century brought about notable global changes and subsequently the collapse of Communist systems. Significant changes also affected the European Community, todayʼs European Union. Leading countries started establishing tighter co-operation, and the possibility of expanding the Union was growing stronger as an idea. Although it was the main potential entrant, Yugoslavia did not join the EC, having, as it did, preconditions to complete such reforms as political and cultural democratization and introducing the market economy system.2 Besides, democratic elections were also a precondition for receiving the loans Yugoslavia had been given since the start of the 1980s.3

The first democratic elections held in Yugoslavia in 1990 resulted in winning campaigns by democratic national parties, except in Serbia where the Communists led by Slobodan Milošević maintained their lead. It appears that the leading countries of the European Community, namely Great Britain, laid too much hope in the reformed Communists led by Ante Marković and the Democratic Alternative (Demokratska alternativa) led by

1 An excellent essay of the same name on ʻlocal knowledgeʼ can be found in Geertz (1983). 2 Miškulin (2010): 299-301. 3 Bekić (2010): 340.


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Adil Zulfikarpašić, Desimir Tošić and Vane Ivanović, who were expected to reform Yugoslavia into a state acceptable to the European Community. This preceded the actions of Communist intellectuals and employees, who founded the UJDI in 1989. Distinguished members included the likes of Branko Horvat, Žarko Puhovski, Milorad Pupovac, Koča Popović, Ljubomir Tadić, Nenad Zakošek, Mirjana Kasapović and Milan Kangrga.4 In 1990 Žarko Puhovski published the book Socijalistička konstrukcija zbilje (Socialist Construction of Reality), which, in the last chapter, included a potential plan for a future state structure, whereby decisions would be made by citizens (not by the state) and important topics would be dealt with through referendums. Since no specific stress was placed on protecting minority rights, it could be presumed that such a system (and the rest of its sort) would pander to the most numerous ʻcitizensʼ. Furthermore, Puhovski was stunned by the citizens’ commitment to the ʻprimitiveʼ HDZ at the first democratic elections, contrary to voting in favor of the intellectuals (presumably UJDI members) and the program presented in his work.5

This period was significantly affected by the turnaround in American politics, since the USA wanted to reduce its military obligations in Europe after the Cold War, but also retain its influence. This meant that the USA would not interfere in European security issues unless it was part of some direct interest, which was visible during the obstruction of the Vance-Owen peace plan. By the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia had lost its significant strategic position of a ʻbuffer-zoneʼ between the East and the West, and was transformed into a guinea-pig, in other words, a training ground for American diplomatic experiments.6 Nation-forming, political experience and the creation of the Yugoslavias Michael Mann separates four sources of power: ideological, economic, military and political. The ideological source refers to the mobilization of social values, norms and rituals of peoples and societies. Military power is a socially organized, congested and lethal form of violence. Political power refers to a centralized and territorial regulation of social life, essentially 4 Orlić (2011): 101. This article does not tell the reader much about the stateʼs problems from the title and summary, but is instead full of the authorʼs regret because of the UJDIʼs failure. Furthermore, the author does not understand the main point of Michael Mannʼs book or she has not read it, Orlić (2011): 110. 5 Puhovski (1990); for the mental set of Milan Kangrga see the excellent article by Lučić (2005a). 6 Gow (1997): 29-30.


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being authoritarian and monopolistic.7 Before the first democratic elections in Yugoslavia, all four power sources were more or less in the hands of the Communist Party or under its control (monopoly). The elections initiated the redistribution and dispersal of this power. The war in ex-Yugoslavia was essentially a clash between the ʻAll Serbs in One Countryʼ Serbian project and its opponents, primarily consisting of Croats in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniaks8 and Kosovo Albanians.

When considering the downfall of Yugoslavia a question arises: what are states? What is their point? Pre-modern states were static, possible to sustain by force, while modern countries tend toward a voluntary consent of the people rather than coercion. Both Yugoslavias, the second less than the first, were primarily a tool of the Serbian political elite, but also of others to a lesser extent, and used to carry out their own economic and political interests. The first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was created out of almost completely formed nations, which had diverse political experiences and cultures. Of all the Yugoslav nations, the loudest political demands were made by either the Croats or Slovenians.

The Yugoslav political centre reckoned that the Yugoslav nations should and could be assimilated to a new Yugoslav nation. The creation of this nation was to be achieved through school-systems, but also repression if necessary. Examples of this kind are known from the 19th century, but in the 20th century this type of assimilation became unsustainable due to the final phase of nation forming. Contrary to this, the second Yugoslavia, according to Communist practice, was impregnated with the opinion that nations were slowly disappearing. A clear example of this opinion is the relatively recent work of Dejan Jović, who is still surprised by the fact that nations have not yet vanished.9 Both of the Yugoslav states neglected the importance of nations. Individuals use nationality to perceive their moral obligations, believing that as members of an (imagined) community they are entitled to group solidarity. Nations are not seeking secession from themselves. The impossibility of creating a unified Yugoslav nation caused and deepened

7 Mann (2005): 30-32. 8 The Bosniaks is current ethnic designation for Bosnian Muslims, which was officially used after 1993. The paper will refer to the (Bosnian) Muslims before 1993 and the Bosniaks after 1993, understanding the same people. 9 Jović (2003).


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international discords.10 Western studies of nations and nationalism lost their importance in the

1980s due to the opinion that the role of nations was growing weak. Re-interest in nations and nationalism reappeared in the early 1990s, only after significant international conflicts. Unlike Western intellectuals who were directed toward social studies, the then Croatian historian and dissident Franjo Tuđman warned in his book from 1981 that solving the question of nations was the crucial element for any modern state to function properly.11 So far, nationalism appears to be the most successful movement in achieving integration compared to all other ideologies.12

Were the Yugoslavias sustainable? Compared with the above, it is clear that the odds for conserving the Yugoslavias were extremely poor. Nations were not willing to compromise with other nations about the redistribution of already limited resources. This became visible during the Axis attack on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia when some of its citizens refused to defend it, joining the German forces instead. An important factor in the breakdown of socialist Yugoslavia were the changes in personnel Josip Broz made in the 1970s. From the Second World War up until the 1970s, Broz removed most of his closest political associates, and replaced them with new – thus carrying out a negative selection. The same group continued to rule Yugoslavia after Broz had died, without having the necessary skills and knowledge to sustain a complex multinational country. The only way of sustaining Yugoslavia, (though this did not necessarily guarantee success), was finding a charismatic heir for Broz who would govern like his predecessor.13

Since the 1960s, the Serbs have experienced a demographic drop, primarily in Kosovo which became a precondition for conflict. The economic crisis in the 1980s led to a hard struggle for already insufficient resources. The control of these resources was possible only under the condition of federal control, which led to control of the republics and that of local government. Federal control enabled arbitrary redistributions and the installation of politically suitable people in important positions. Due to

10 Schöpflin (2000): 324-43. 11 F. Tuđman (1981). 12 M. Tuđman (2012): 201. 13 Schöpflin (2000): 337.


23

insufficient resources, at least one group was expected to face losses. This is why the Serbs were against decentralization which was favored by the Slovenes and Croats. Nationalist parties won the elections in these republics because they asserted that the ʻnational wealthʼ belonged to the people, in other words, the redistribution which they advocated was more important than political power. An ideal denouement for the Serbs was a strong centralized federation, which they would control and also redistribute all of its resources. A back-up plan was the creation of a Greater Serbia, with a loyal leadership in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.14 An interesting article to single-out in this context is one by Nina Caspersen on the relations of Beograd with Knin and Pale (political centres of RSK and RS), in which the author makes sources out of her own interviews with instigators of the Serbian rebellion in Croatia and BiH which she conducted in 2003. The most interesting person in the interviews is definitely leader of the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia - Goran Hadžić.15

Practice has shown that is hard to sustain a country under international stress if it lacks domestic legitimation and if there is no voluntary consent on part of the demos.16 This is best shown in the political situation in todayʼs Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was created and remains sustainable almost only thanks to international pressure and support.

An overview of the nature of the war The start of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had similar features. Firstly, local Serbs would occupy an area, which would lead to the JNA separating the conflicting sides, which in practice meant a confirmation of Serbian conquests, and creating the so-called ʻbuffer zonesʼ. When local Serbs failed in seizing territory, generally larger cities, the JNA would surround the cities and attack them with the aim of intimidating and expelling the population. This demonstrative type of violence was meant to force the population to leave without a struggle, due to the fact that the JNA did not have enough men for street combat, a vital factor for seizing cities, but merely artillery. Another advantage of expelling the population was the inability to wage a potential guerilla war from within.17 The JNAʼs dread of

14 Mann (2005): 363-67. 15 Caspersen (2007). 16 Schöpflin (2000): 342. 17 Gow (1997): 41.


24

guerrila warfare was visible at the end of 1991, when it stopped advancing and engaged forces to cleanse the rest of the occupied areas in Croatia. Since cities under siege were easier to defend, and capturing these cities came at the price of a large number of dead and wounded, street warfare was left to the Serb militia.18

The purpose of leading such a limited war was to force the other side to retreat, rather than to expand the conflict.19 The unreadiness of the conflicting sides to sustain great mortality led to the creation of forced strategies. This meant avoiding direct combat whenever possible. The aim of coercion was to influence the other sidesʼ conduct through posing threats in order to change the previous conduct. In the case of disregarding the threats, the other side would be exposed to a punishment which would probably be better to avoid. However, the punishment would need to be appropriate, so that the enforcers were satisfied, and not discontented.20 The question remains as to whether the JNA could have managed to intersect Croatia as they planned without applying the given strategy, but instead leaving major cities under siege and then continuing to advance. The Vance Plan and the international recognition of Croatia: From agression to international recognition The first trace of the implementation of the Serbian project can be seen in the plan of proclaiming the federal unit of Srpska Krajina in Knin in 1989, during the celebration of the Battle of Kosovo, planned by the Initial Serb Committee from northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Slavonia and Baranja, which was stopped by extinguishing the sound system.21

The events which marked the beginning of tensions in May 1990 were the following: disarming the Croatian military reserve, enactment of new amendments in the Croatian Constitution, the staged assassination of Miroslav Mlinar, the withdrawal of the Knin municipality from the Municipality Communities of Dalmatia and the clash at a football match between Dinamo Zagreb and Belgradeʼs Red Star. The foremost issues with the newly made amendments was in particular the question of Serbian constitutionality, which changed the status of Serbs in Croatia from a

18 Gow (2003): 161. 19 Marijan (2008); Gow (2003): 300. 20 Gow (1997): 39. 21 Barić (2005): 50.


25

constitutional nation to a national minority, listed with other minorities. The problem of the aforementioned ʻlocal knowledgeʼ is visible in the

works of James Gow and Michael Mann in that they both stress the firing of policemen of Serbian nationality as one of the main causes of the Serbian rebellion in Croatia. On July 3 1990, members of the Public Safety Station Knin sent a letter to the Secretary of the federal police Petar Gračanin, in which they stressed that the Croatian government was relieving Serbian police officers and that they did not want new uniforms or changing the name of the police forces from communist milicija to Croatian redarstvo (police) due to its similarity to the NDH (Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945) nomenclature. The redarstvo was never officially announced, and new uniforms came into use only at the end of 1991. Two days later Croatian interior minister Boljkovac met with the signatories of the letter in Knin, who requested the establishment of a municipal station, which in practice would have meant an independent militia which the central government would have no control over.22 In early 1991 the police forces of RSK were founded. The government in Zagreb requested the signing of an oath of loyalty to the Republic of Croatia. Rejection would mean a suspension of employment, which was interpreted by the Serbian leadership as a provocation. These new circumstances required a new repressive system which would fulfill the governmentʼs wishes. The authorities placed trustworthy people in crucial positions, while the changes made primarily affected the Serbs due to the fact that they formed the majority in the repressive apparatus.23 Taking the above into consideration, it seems that relieving the Serbian policemen was not the start of the armed rebellion, but rather the unwillingness of all policemen, regardless of nationality, to serve the central authority. The key problem was that the Serbs, who were over-represented in the communist-era Croatian police forces, compared with their percentage of the population,24 felt that they were losing the privilege of control and handling of the repressive apparatus.

In addition, by the end of June Borisav Jović and Slobodan Milošević were planning to use the JNA to force Croats and Slovenes to separate, with the condition that the Serbs in Croatia carry out a referendum to determine 22 Barić (2005): 68. 23 Barić (2005): 126-27. 24 In 1984 the Serbs constituted 49% of police officers in Croatia, although in the 1981 census the Serbs constitued only 11.55% of the Croatian population, see Štulhofer (1993).


26

the borders. The Serbs held a Serbian assembly in Srb on July 25, which proclaimed the ʻDeclaration of independence and autonomy of the Serbian peopleʼ. The main argument stressed in the Declaration was that the privilege of independence should be given to nations, and not republics.25 According to the Constitution of socialist Croatia, Croatia was “… the national state of the Croatian people, the state of the Serbian people in Croatia, and the state of other peoples and nationalities who live in it.”26 The meaning of Communist constitutions was symbolic and intentionally written to be manipulated, and needs to be distinguished from democratic constitutions, it is also clear that Serbs were not granted constitutionality. They would have possessed constitutionality if it had been written that Croatia was the national state of the Serbian people in Croatia. Therefore, if the new Croatian Constitution abolished the constitutionality of the Serbs, it also abolished the constitutionality of other nations as well. This formulation of the Constitution was only meant to emphasise the special position of the Serbian people in Croatia who were larger in number compared to other minorities.

Shortly after this, on August 17, 1990, the police in Zadar took away 70 rifles from the police station in Benkovac, while on the same day in Obrovac and Knin arms of the reserve police were distributed to Serbian rebels. The Croatian police in Zagreb was instructed to deal with the situation with helicopters and transporters. The JNA stopped the helicopters, and the Serbian population in Titova Korenica stopped the transporters. That the rebellion and the JNAʼs interference was planned earlier is clearly visible in the fact that two months earlier the 221st Motorized Brigade of the Knin Army Corps had its classification brought to level B (15-60% capacity), and was reinforced with two batallions of A classification (60-100% capacity).27

The Serbian referendum of autonomy was carried out from August 19 to September 2, and on September 30 autonomy was proclaimed with 99.96% of the voters approving. Taking into consideration that the voting was not completely regular, as well as the media war that was waged against the Croatian government, it is still clear that the Serbian people did not want to live in any kind of Croatia. A significant statement on this 25 Barić (2005): 72. 26 Yugoslav constitution (1974): 242. 27 Barić (2005): 78-80.


27

question was made by Milan Babić in 1991: “I assure you that we in Krajina would rather die or depart from Krajina to Europe, than to agree to any kind of living in any kind of Croatian state.” It seems very likely the mass departure of the Serbs in 1995 during Croatian military operations was planned by the Serbian government with a yet unknown goal in mind. The probable answer is that the Serbian government wanted to damage the reputation of Croatia in the eyes of the international community and move the refugees to Kosovo in order to increase the Serbian demographic rate.

In early March 1991, an armed revolt broke out in Pakrac, which led to the intervention of the JNA, separating the local Serbs and the Croatian police, enabling the local Serbs to retreat. Pakrac was the first place to witness the JNAʼs role as a ʻbuffer-zoneʼ. Preventing the Croatian police from entering the territory under armed siege with closed roads, the JNA secured the better organization of the local Serbs and basically gave them protection.28 A week after this, demonstrations broke out in Belgrade against Milošević and the ruling structures. The opposition resented Miloševićʼs poor care for Serbs outside of Serbia.29 On March 21, local Serbs occupied the Bureau of the National Park Plitvička Jezera. Croatian police arrived to intervene, and again the JNA appeared as a ʻbuffer-zoneʼ. At the Plitvice Lakes the first Croatian victim fell – the police officer Josip Jović. In May, the Croatian village of Kijevo was attacked and 12 police officers were killed in Borovo Selo.

From declaring independence to the acceptance of the Vance Plan as a precondition for international recognition On June 25, the Croatian Parliament proclaimed the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Croatia. By mediation of the international community, specifically the European Triplet for Antiwar Actions,30 on July 8 on the Brijuni Islands, a three-month moratorium was proclaimed on the independence. In practice this enabled the JNA and Croatian Serbs to continue the plans for the last attempt at salvaging Yugoslavia. Croatian authorities desired the immediate dispatching of international observers

28 Marijan (2008): 57-58. 29 Lučić (2008): 120. 30 The Triplet consisted of ministers of foregin affairs from past, present and future chairs of the European Community. In the begining the Triplet was led by Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg. Italy was later succeeded by Portugal.


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which was opposed by the federal Yugoslav authorities. The observersʼ mission arrived in Croatia at the beginning of July, but they stressed that their authority merely applied to Slovenia. This standpoint changed only at the end of July, when Croatia became part of their mission. The Federal authorities created problems with regard to the observers, delaying their dispatch as much as possible. After a few failed initiatives, an ultimatum was handed to all sides to agree to given conditions by September 1. The mission started its operations on the field with a civil character although Croatian authorities also sought a military character.31 Besides their official work, the observers carried out intelligence work for their home countries as well.

The last attempt at stopping Croatian independence was the bombing of the official residence of the Croatian government, Banski Dvori, by the JNA, on October 7, 1991, after the expiry of the three-month moratorium. Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, President of the Federal Presidency Stjepan Mesić and Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković left the scene a few minutes earlier and thus avoided assassination. The next day independence was proclaimed by the Croatian Parliament. The Croatian government wanted to gain international recognition as soon as possible and secure the arrival of the UN Peace Corps. In Paris, on October 11, representatives of the European Community offered the Serbs autonomy in Croatia and stressed that Croatia would soon be internationally recognized, which they refused immediately.32 The Serbian government and the JNA wanted to conquer the planned areas and only after that secure the arrival of the UN Peace Corps. The Croatian government, however, started a series of successful military operations, which resulted in recovery of parts of Bilogora and west Slavonia. In Geneva, on November 23, a cease-fire and the raising of the blockade of barracks was signed by the Presidency of Yugoslavia, Croatia and the JNA, which was meant to enable the departure of the JNA as one of the preconditions for the arrival of the Peace Corps.

Since the beginning of the conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the main disagreement was the question of the right of separation – was it the right of a nation or a federal republic? The inability of conducting sovereignty over its entire territory was the main problem for

31 For more information on the observersʼ mission see Miškulin (2010). 32 Barić (2008): 68.


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Croatia. In normal circumstances, a government can justify almost any operation of conducting its sovereign rights. A sovereign authority is an ultimate one which can not be overruled or rejected.33 Sovereignty has to be achieved through armed force, but also sustained in the case of individual rebel activity.34 Accordingly, the Croatian government did not have full, but limited, sovereignty because it was not able to control its whole territory or to quash the rebellion by negotiation or by force.

Due to the disagreement of the main participants, The Ministersʼ Council of the European Community decided to form an Arbitration Commission which would investigate the problem, popularly named the Badinter Commission after its president Robert Badinter who was the president of the Constitutional Court of France. Even though the commission consisted of five High Court judges (Italy, Germany, France, Spain and Belgium), the main negotiations were held between Germany and France, that is between the chancellor Helmut Kohl and the minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on the one hand, and the French president Francois Mitterand and the Foreign Affair minister Roland Dumas on the other. Germany favored the recognition of the newly-founded republics of Croatia and Slovenia to prevent further warfare, while France and Great Britain claimed that premature recognition would only enhance the conflict.

At the same time, under the influence of Great Britain, the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was convoked under the presidency of Lord Peter Carrington, a highly esteemed diplomat who had enjoyed high positions such as the British Secretary of State for Defence (1970-1974) and Secretary of State for Foreign nad Commonwealth Affairs (1979-1982), Secretary General of NATO (1984-1988) and the Chair of of the Lancaster House Conference, which solved problems in Rhodesia and enabled its transformation into Zimbabwe. The Peace Conferenceʼs tactic was, as Lord Carrington himself stressed, to shape the conduct of the conflicting sides by blackmailing them with international recognition through the ʻstick and carrotʼ system. Besides, they founded several ineffective work-groups. Germany played a major role with its lobbying for Croatia and therefore ʻconfoundedʼ the Peace Conferenceʼs plans. After the recognition of

33 Gow (1997): 68-69. 34 Gow (1994): 476.


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Croatia, the Conference blamed Germany for the extension of the war due to premature recognition.

The German instance of the unilateral recognition of Croatia is an exception in international relations. In practice, only states which possess complete rule over their territory are recognised, and after being given approval by a majority of countries in the international community. One of the causes of Germanyʼs behaviour was surely its desire to show its international status, and the intrepidity in making unilateral decisions, without fearing potential sanctions or isolation.35 An important role was also played by the German fear of a wave of refugees which was a potential threat for the country.

It is important to point out that in peace mediations the main goal is to fulfill the interests of the ones who are mediating, and only after that, the interests of the conflicting sides.36 The international community had different interests, on one side the German and Austrian, and on the other French and British interests. However, good mutual relations were more important to them than their stance towards Yugoslavia. The truncated Presidency was therefore surprised after France changed its stance. In exchange for strengthening relations with the newly united German state, France decided to sacrifice its support for preserving Yugoslavia.

Germany advised Croatia to be completely cooperative towards the international community in case the Peace Conference collapsed because of internal problems, and the recognition of Croatia was soon to come.37 Besides, Croatia was told to accept the UN Peace Corps, that is the Vance Plan, as a condition for international recognition, but also for possible membership in the UN. The Vance Plan was presented to all sides on December 11, while the Security Council implemented it with Resolution 724 on December 14, 1991. The sending of peace corps was arranged, including the military component, but not before it was determined that all sides were to respect the cease-fire and the embargo on importing weapons. After Vanceʼs stay in Belgrade where he obtained the Serbian governmentʼs acceptance of the peace plan and ceasefire on December 31, 1991, on New Yearʼs Day 1992, he met with Tuđman who accepted the plan. The next day the Sarajevo Agreement was signed which stopped the war in Croatia. 35 Crawford (1996). 36 Filipović (2008): 92. 37 Nobilo (2000): 160.


31

In Croatia an idea emerged in parts of the military structure (Anton Tus, Petar Stipetić, Martin Špegelj, etc) that it was possible to free the entire territory of western Slavonia, and maybe more. Bearing in mind the situation at the time, such an operation was impossible. The Croatian Army had, with great casualties, performed operations in Bilogora and in western Slavonia, and a great number of soldiers were not available for further combat. Besides, it was revealed that the Croatian Army captured areas which were less defended, that is, they were defended by the local Serbs, while better defended lines held by the JNA were difficult to surpass.38

According to the Vance Plan, the mission was to consist of 10 combat battalions, a hundred military observers and 500 civil police officers and assistant military and civil personnel, counting in total 10,000 people.39 It was then the most expensive UN project ever undertaken, and its cost was visible by the fact that the UN could not completely finance it , so that part of the expense was covered by the conflicting sides. The UNʼs policy of separating conflicting sides was determined primarily by the failure it experienced in the Congo in the 1960s, after which it stopped carrying out offensive operations.40 The area under the UN mandate was split into three UNPA zones (Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina), or four sectors which were located in the zones: East (territory of Eastern Slavonia), West (territory of Western Slavonia), South and North (territory of Krajina). The International forces and observers were to be deployed in the areas that were to be demilitarized, with local armed forces disbanded or required to withdraw. The JNA retreated, and the local Serbs reformed into a type of local militia. The arming of the rebels was placed under strict, ʻdoubleʼ surveillance, one conducted by the international representatives and the other by the local authorities. This ʻdoubleʼ system proved ineffective by the end of the war, when the Serbs managed to acquire arms. According to the plan, the return of refugees was also to be enabled (which did not occur before the conflict ended), while the status quo was to be preserved until a political solution between the conflicting sides was found.41

A part of the Croatian public was opposed to the arrival of the Peace Corps because it felt that military actions should be continued, while others 38 Marijan (2008): 61. 39 Barić (2005): 149. 40 Ničota (1992b): 7-9. 41 Filipović (2008): 99.


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pointed to the potential ending of the war and that the UNPA zones would soon be returned to the legal framework of Croatia thanks to international forces.42 With time it was shown that the UN was not able to fulfill its task and that the Serbian side was not prepared to make compromises, which resulted in the liberation of occupied territories excluding eastern Slavonia, Baranja and part of Srijem (Syrmia) which were returned through peaceful reintegration.

On January 14, 1992, the military mission of the UN arrived in the crisis areas and confirmed that conditions for a mission did exist. The next day Croatia received international recognition from 12 members of the European Community, which encouraged other countries to recognise Croatia by the end of January. The president of the RSK (political entity formed in a meantime by Croatian Serbs) Milan Babić was opposed to the start of the UN mission because he considered it a prejudical decision in favour of Croatia, and demanded international recognition of the RSK.43 Babić also stressed that the Peace Corps should stand on the front-line and protect the Serbs. He opposed the JNAʼs retreat and wanted to personally negotiate with Cyrus Vance and the UNʼs General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali.44 International factors ignored Babić, letting him know that they did not consider him an international subject. To stop turning Croatia into Cyprus, which was desired by the Serbian rebels, Tuđman, during a meeting with the UNʼs Head Secretary assistant Marrack Goulding, refused to accept an undetermined mandate for the Peace Corps, which resulted in Gouldingʼs fiery departure from the meeting.45 On February 21, the Security Council declared Resolution 743 with which it confirmed that conditions had been created to send the Peace Corps, after the approval of the Serbian and Croatian authorities. UNPROFOR (United Nation Protection Forces) was founded on the basis of a mandate of 12 months, which was possible to extend.46

42 Barišić (1992); Ničota (1992a). 43 Filipović (2008): 103. 44 Barić (2005): 151. 45 Filipović (2008): 103. 46 Filipović (2008): 106.


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Disagreements among Serbian authorities over the acceptance of the Vance Plan From January 31 to February 2 a meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency was held with Serbian participants from Croatia and BiH. The main purpose of the meeting was to convince the RSK president Babić to accept the peace plan and the sending of the Peace Corps. Babić was the only one opposing the plan during the voting and soon left the meeting. According to the RSK Constitution, the president in absence could be replaced by the president of the Skupština (Assembly). As president of the Skupština, Mile Paspalj accepted the plan, but pointed out that it also had to be accepted by the Skupština.47 In Glina, on February 9, 1992, an extraordinary meeting of the RSK Assembly was held under the presidency of Paspalj, inviting Branko Kostić, Blagoje Adžić and other members of the military and civil authorities from Serbia as guests, and at which the only topic was the acceptance of the Vance Plan. Immediately after the session, Babić notified Boutros Boutros-Ghali that the meeting was illegal, but he was further ignored by the international community. The next day Babić held an extraordinary meeting in Knin, where it was stressed that the people had a legitimate right to decide for themselves, and he asked for a referendum. The Knin meeting was pronounced null and void on February 16 in Glina, while Babić was recalled from presidential duty and the referendum was revoked as well. Babićʼs resistance was not an important factor because Belgrade controlled the JNA and Martićʼs local police. Therefore, the entire leadership in Knin was forced to accept the plan if they wanted to continue receiving help from Belgrade.48 The matter of the ʻpink zonesʼ The ʻPink zonesʼ referred to areas which, according to the Vance Plan, were under Croatian sovereignty, but were temporarily occupied and had to be returned to Croatian rule. However, it was soon clear that the local Serbs were not prepared to hand over these areas, to which Croatia responded by drawing the attention of international representatives to this matter. The ʻpink zonesʼ represented a massive communication and economic problem for Croatia, and were also used to target nearby Croatian localities. After failed negotiations, it was decided to militarily occupy these areas. The first

47 Barić (2005): 154. 48 Barić (2005): 158-62.


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operation of this sort happened from June 21-22 in 1992, when the 40 km² area of Miljevci plateau was occupied.49 In January 1993, the operation Gusar (Pirate) was carried out, known to the public as Operation Maslenica, which secured the strategically important Maslenica Bridge, the Peruča hydropower and the Zemunik airport. This connected the Croatian North with the South, also thereby solving the energetic problem. The ʻKarađorđevo agreementʼ and other political myths The meeting of the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the Croatian President Franjo Tuđman in Karađorđevo, on March 25, 1991, is a common subject in daily-political discussions. For those favoring the idea that they planned the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina it serves as the main evidence for disclosing the intentions of the two presidents.50 However, it is important to point out that this meeting did not give rise to significant media attention at the time and appeared in public discussion for the first time only after disagreements emerged in the ruling Croatian party – HDZ, after which Stjepan Mesić, Josip Manolić and their supporters left the party. The first media launch of the ʻdivisionʼ story occurred in June 1991, when, in an interview for the Serbian weekly Vreme, Muhamed Filipović presented such a thesis with a clear aim in mind – to create suspicion amongst the Muslims towards the Croats, and to justify the Muslim-Serb negotiations being held between Filipović and Adil Zulfikarpašić and Karadžić and Milošević.51 The conversation between the two presidents was not heard by anybody, although some claim to possess audio-tapes of the talks. If the presidents did arrange the division of BiH, the military actions that occurred afterwards in Croatia and BiH clearly prove that the ʻdealʼ collapsed. In a recent book Glaurdić52 understands the situation, but cannot cope with the fact that no division took place arguing that the division was arranged, but never carried out. His main sources of cognition are HDZ breakaways Stjepan Mesić and Dušan Bilandžić. However, when Mesić removes pro-Muslim moderate Stjepan Kljuić as head of BiH branch of HDZ, Glaurdić, out of respect, does not specifically name him, but mentions him in general terms as part of the more

49 Barić (2005): 178-79. 50 For a detailed deconstruction of the Karađorđevo myth see Lučić (2003). 51 Lučić (2003): 18. 52 Glaurdić (2011): 141.


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radical Mate Bobanʼs faction.53 It is also important to point out that one third of Croatian territory was

occupied soon after the ʻagreementʼ, as well as 70% of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, bearing in mind that during the aggression on Croatia in 1991 BiH served as a logistics base and that the JNA Banja Luka corps in western Slavonia was receiving money from Bosnia-Herzegovina, one could speak of the aggression of BiH against Croatia.54 Also, a further question arises – what is Bosnia-Herzegovina in this time, if it did not have control of its own territory and its own institutions? The meeting in Karađorđevo should, above all, be observed as a political myth which has a practical use in present times for the purpose of disqualifying political, ideological or academic adversaries. The Karađorđevo myth became a means of pacifying Croatian and Serbian nationalism and for disabling legitimate political demands and rights.55

Political myths are also a part of the media war, the purpose of which is to influence the behaviour of people. Thus, the fall of Vukovar was presented by Serbian intelligence as a traitorous sell-out to discourage the Croatian population in Slavonia and force them to escape on the one hand, and to disqualify the political leadership on the other. The people of Vukovar experienced the cityʼs fall as a sell-out primarily because it was easier to deal with defeat as an internal betrayal, rather than admit the supremacy of the enemy.56 The same can be seen with the Krajina Serbs who blame Belgrade for the collapse of the RSK.57

In his recently published book, retired lieutenant-general of the Army of RS, Novica Simić, writes openly how the ʻbetrayalʼ of Posavina was intentionally launched through the media to weaken Croatian forces and for the purpose of conquering the Posavina corridor with less effort, which was of vital importance for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian forces achieved initial successes mostly due to the weakness of their opponents, who had to transform the JNA into the Army of the RS. After the successful transformation, Croatian forces could not resist the enemy who 53 Glaurdić (2011): 264. 54 Marijan (2004): 215. 55 Lučić (2013): 459. 56 For an excellent analysis of informational warfare from Hrvoje Zovkoʼs report regarding Vukovarʼs downfall see Domović (2009). 57 For more about the construction of political myths and their social use, see Ančić (2008): 71-105.


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outnumbered them and had more military power. Besides the ʻsaleʼ of Posavina, Simić also notes that the First Krajina Corps leaked intentional misinformation on the agreement between Mate Boban and Radovan Karadžić in Graz:

“The command of the 1st Krajina Corps, through means of intelligence, deliberately spread misinformation as to their intentions. All misunderstandings, disagreements and different interests between Herceg-Bosna and the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo were skilfully manipulated. Information about the agreement between Boban and Karadžić, which was signed in Graz, and according to which the Serbs were to be given a corridor through Posavina, was constantly repeated. Spreading the misinformation that the civil authorities in Osijek held a meeting with representatives of the Posavina and Semberija Serbs, with the presence of the JNA general Praščević, caused even more suspicion amongst Croats and Muslims that something was ʻgoing onʼ, and also confirmed doubts as to ʻfishy affairsʼ about Bosnian Posavina … It was a task worthy of every victim.”58

The example of the Posavina ʻsaleʼ is a classic instance of an information war, the aim of which is to discredit the opponent. The opponents' military weakness was used as evidence of an intentional retreat. This type of media warfare was not only intended for the opponentʼs public, with the purpose of discrediting the other side, but also for oneʼs own public, in order to garner support for aims which would not be accepted by the public if the truth was known. The purpose of disinformation is double-natured – to justify one's own behaviour, intentions and goals through erroneous (untruthful) interpretations of someone elseʼs behaviour, intentions and goals.59 Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović publicly accused Tuđman of retreating from Posavina, while at the same time secretly asking the international community to demand the retreat of Croatian forces.60 What is Bosnia and Herzegovina and the question of its sovereignty 58 Simić (2011): 59-60. 59 M. Tuđman (2012): 143, 154. 60 Lučić (2013): 420.


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In public and academic discourse ʻBosniaʼ is a common subject, without a clear indication of what exactly contemporary, or any other, Bosnia is, while Herzegovina is frequently omitted from the discourse. Considering that the name of the country is Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should be used in its full form, except when it is not used exclusively for the geographical terms of Bosnia or Herzegovina. In such discourse, mostly in current Bosniak intellectual circles and/or the “socialism of semi-educated pseudo-intellectuals”61 who comprehend the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in 1943, as a natural given, Bosnia is presented as a millenial country, praising its statehood and multiculturalism. One interesting example is surely Ivan Lovrenović, who sees ʻBosniaʼ as something ʻmetaphysicalʼ.62 This view neglects the fact that every kind of medieval Bosnian uniqueness was lost in 1463 when the Bosnian kingdom was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans introduced a particular state system in which Bosnia did not possess any state- or legal uniqueness, but was merely a province that was legally no different than any other province in the Empire. Similarly to statehood, any kind of multiculturalism stopped after the Ottoman conquest. The only exception were the Franciscans, who represented a social institution, which sustained its existence through the entire period of Ottoman rule, and who also represented the only custodians of the memory of the medieval Bosnian state which grew weaker with time.63 The modern idea of multiculturalism is used, primarily amongst the Bosniak intellectual circles, as a type of dogma which one is not allowed to oppose.64 It remains unclear as to why something multicultural automatically means that it is something (absolutely) good, especially bearing in mind todayʼs situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when a significant percentage of the population does not wish to live in the country.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was united only in the 19th century, through the occupation by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The purpose of its creation was the forming of a new and unique Bosnian nation which would prevent the union between Croatia and Serbia, serving as a wedge in the cleft.65 The

61 Expression taken from Ančić (1999): 113. 62 More about Lovrenovićʼs understandings in Raspudić (2011). 63 Ančić (1999): 116. 64 E.g. Mahmutćehajić (2000). 65 See Kraljačić (1987); Okey (2007): 55-143, 253-55.


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project collapsed because the central government was not able to convince the Catholic and the Orthodox population that they were Bosnians, and not Croats or Serbs. The nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina is substantially determined by the fact that all the way from its beginnings in the 19th century to this day it was created and sustained only through outside pressure. Bosnia and Herzegovina in todayʼs form was created at the first assembly of the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZAVNOBiH) on November 25, 1943, in Mrkonjić Grad. It was defined as “… neither Serbian nor Croatian nor Muslim, but Serbian, Muslim and Croatian together.”

Bearing in mind the conditions on the field during the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992, it is clear that it did not have sovereignty. Organized political power broke down by the end of 1991, through the separation of parts of the territory by the Serbs, and the founding of the HZ HB. It is important to point out that the HZ HB did not separate, but rather it acknowledged the stateʼs authority as long as there was national independence in relation to any kind of Yugoslavia.66 It did, however, set up a different social structure to protect itself from Serbian conquests due to the inability and the lack of will of the central government in Sarajevo to protect the population. Glaurdić recently shows a lack of understanding of the problem, equalising the separation of Serbian territories from Bosnia and Herzegovina with the founding of Croatian administrative areas within BiH. He also claims that: “… in the Yugoslav Constitution Bosnia and Herzegovina was defined as a state, like the other republics”,67 which is doubtful, because the particularity of SR BiH was the fact that sovereignity was not conferred to a single nation, but rather was shared by three equal nations.

Apart from all of the above, the central authorities were not capable of controlling the repressive organs of the state (police and army) on at least half of the territory they laid claim to in 1992.68 Furthermore, it is important to add that at least one third of the population clearly demonstrated that they did not acknowledge the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina with its own central institutions and refused to participate in the referendum on 66 M. Tuđman (2005): 99-100. 67 Glaurdić (2011): 263, 217. Through the entire work it is clear that the author does not know these facts or does not want to admit them, giving legitimacy only to the Bosniaks. 68 Ančić (2008): 167.


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independence conducted on February 29 and March 1, 1992. An important determinant of behaviour of all three sides was the attitude toward the Constitution. The Croatian side, as the smallest, accepted most of the solutions, and stressed as the only condition, separation from Yugoslavia. The Muslim side used institutions according to need, most often unconstitutionally because of the lack of consent from all three nations. The Serb side was least concerned about the Constitution, considering that they possessed a force able to control conditions on the field.

The central authorities themselves had, as a repressive organ, according to all definitions, a paramilitary Muslim formation called The Patriotic League (Patriotska liga) which will later evolve into the official army of the central Muslim government in Sarajevo – the ABiH. In early 1992, the Patriotic League stressed as its main task, even though no larger conflicts between Croats and Muslims had yet emerged, the ʻprotection of the Muslim peopleʼ, and also counted amongst their enemies the ʻextreme forces of the HDZ (strength ranging from one to two brigades)ʼ.69 The main political parties and their goals In the summer of 1990, three national parties were founded, gaining significant support at the first free elections, and which were to play crucial roles during the war, and still do to this day. Alija Izetbegović became the president of the SDA, which defined itself as the party for Yugoslav citizens who belong to the Muslim historical and cultural circle. Radovan Karadžić was chosen to lead the SDS, and this party was declared as an ʻall-Serbian national movementʼ. Davor Perinović was elected to be the president of the BiH branch of the HDZ, but was removed in September and his place was taken, as the officer in charge, by a sports journalist, Stjepan Kljuić. The HDZ declared itself as ʻpolitical movement of all Croatians in the worldʼ.70 Therefore, none of these parties were based exclusively on Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to point out that, out of these three national parties, HDZ had the least educated members, which led to incompetence in strategic thinking, both medium and long term.71 Unlike the other two sides, the Croatian Communist leadership, during the Communist government, had no legitimacy amongst the people, which caused it to be frequently 69 Ančić (1999): 35-36. 70 Lučić (2008): 109-10. 71 Lučić (2005): 161.


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condemned by the Central Committee.72 Thus it was only after the first democratic elections that most of the Croatian politicians started to participate in political life, without the previous knowledge possessed by the Muslim and the Serbian side.

The first democratic elections were held on November 18, 1990, and won by a coalition of national parties which secured 84% of the mandates in the Parliament of the SR BiH. The elections reflected the national structure which has remained the practice until the present day. It is important to note that many Western social scientists dispute the free choice and democratic right of the citizens in 1990, considering them to be too immature to make their own political decisions. Using the ʻsubsequent clevernessʼ syndrome, they have concluded that it would have been better if the citizens had voted for the reformed Communists of Ante Marković, which would have allowed the country to prosper, unlike with the ʻnationalistsʼ who brought it war.73

It was clear from the start that this type of coalition would have difficulties in reaching a common platform. The key question was that of BiH remaining in or leaving Yugoslavia, which happened after the acceptance of the Declaration of Sovereignty. It is important to point out that the feeling of fellowship in BiH was related to Yugoslavism, and not republican ʻBosnianʼ identity. Accordingly, the relationship with Yugoslavia determined mutual relations between the three nations.74 All three sides had a different vision of the internal arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would remain visible during the entire war, and also later on. The referendum on independence and international recognition The decision on holding the referendum to confirm status of BiH was brought on January 24 and 25 in 1992 in the Skupština in the absence of Serbian representatives. In October they founded the Skupština of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For this period it is important to point to the excellent detail noticed by Pehar.75 It concerns the 50th meeting of the Presidency of SR BiH held on January 10 under the presidentship of Alija Izetbegović with only one item on the agenda – the Decision of the Serbian Skupština on the proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian nation

72 Lučić (2013): 22. 73 E.g. Chandler (2000): 7-33. 74 Lučić (2013): 179. 75 Pehar (2011).


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in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The meeting was attended by the representatives of SR BiH from Serbian ranks, Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević.

The session was a potential arena at which negotiations could have taken place, but the result was the opposite. Izetbegović addressed the Serbian representatives with a preponderant tone, stating that they would be arrested in any normal country, which automatically implied that the Serbs were impossible to negotiate with and that he saw them as criminals and persons against whom state force should be used. Although he had been a political prisoner, Izetbegović clearly showed by his stand that he viewed the state from an exclusively Marxist point of view, that is, as an instrument of power by which one group ruled over another. Besides, Izetbegović considered that he himself knew what was best for the Serbs in BiH and that they had enough rights. Instead of attempting to negotiate, Izetbegović threatened war and compared the Serbs with the Nazis. Summarising this speech, one can clearly conlude that Izetbegović felt that only an integral BiH could be the ʻorder-issuing authorityʼ, a state in which the internal organisation had to be arranged exclusively according to his ideas, while everything else was considered Nazi expansionism. He had shown clearly that he was ready to start a war over this question.

The Serbian representatives tried to polemicise with Izetbegović, seeking a compromise solution, which was utterly ignored by Izetbegović. Nikola Koljević admitted that the ʻDecisionʼ was anti-constitutional and should be discussed because it represented the reality on the field. To all this Izetbegović reacted by negating the legitimacy of the Serbian representatives, requesting that the people manifest their wishes through a referendum on independence.76 It is not hard to conclude that such a ʻone man – one voteʼ principle led to the overruling of minorities. By the publicly uttered principle of a ʻcivil republic or civil warʼ,77 it was clear that the denial of the Muslim privilege to represent all citizens inevitably meant war. A part of the mentality of the Muslim political elite is reflected in the statement by Hadžo Efendić, who claimed that they (Muslims) ʻdo not have another homelandʼ,78 which had a clear meaning – Serbs and Croats, go to your home countries and achieve your goals there. As an argument against negotiations, Izetbegović pointed to the diversity of the negotiating sides and saw a 76 Pehar (2011): 30-37. 77 Lučić (2008): 111. 78 Lučić (2008): 116.


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referendum as the only possible solution. By refusing to negotiate with the Serbs, he was left with the Croats as the only partners for a referendum.

On the Croatian side, Stjepan Kljuić was losing more and more credibility due to the lack of public reaction to the Serbian aggression on Croatian areas, and at the beginning of February resigned at the meeting of HDZ in Široki Brijeg under the presidency of Stjepan Mesić. The central committee of the HDZ was not satisfied with the formulation of the referendum and wanted to put forward a demand for ʻnational cantonsʼ. As the meeting was held in Livno, the matter of national cantons is now known as the Livanjsko pitanje (The Livno Question). The Parliament of SR BiH rejected the Livanjsko pitanje, but invited Croats to vote for independence. The international community accepted the Croatian demands, which were included in the Cutileiro Plan79, according to which Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be a state composed of three units based on national, geographic, economic and other criteria. The first round of talks was held on February 13 and 14, on the first day with the three leading parties, and including the opposition on the second day. An agreement was not reached, while an extention for talks was announced for February 21 and 22 in Lisbon.80 After returning from the negotiations in Lisbon, Alija Izetbegović stated, at an expanded meeting of the SDA, that the referendum depended on Croatian votes and that he therefore promised them “… some sort of sovereignty, some kind of national recognition, some regions.”81 It is important to point out that immediately after arriving back from Lisbon, Karadžić replied that an agreement on the new referendum formulation should be reached if there was time.82

The referendum was held on February 29 and March 1, resulting in 62.68% of the population voting for independence, primarily Muslims and Croats. Simultaneously, the situation became worse when two Serbs near Travnik were killed while trying to break through Serbian road barricades. In Sarajevo, Serbian nuptials were attacked by a number of Muslims, resulting in one death, and one injured. The SDS blocked on March 2 all important crossroads in Sarajevo and stressed that this was an assault on the entire

79 Also known as Cutileiro-Carrington plan, after Lord Carrington and Portuguese ambassador José Cutileiro. 80 Begić (1997): 84-85. 81 Lučić (2008): 136-37. 82 M. Tuđman (2005): 137.


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Serbian nation.83 The negotiations continued and on March 9 in Bruxelles the ʻStatement on the principles for a new constitutional arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ84 was proclaimed, reflecting the negotiations held hitherto on the arrangement of BiH as a state divided into three units with a national appellation. Local governments would have broad authority, while the state would be decentralized with the central government being a guardian of sustainability and key strategic interests. After the negotiations were nearly finished, Izetbegović stated that he did not want national regions which were the basis of the new constitutional proposal. On March 11 the Serbian Skupština rejected the Bruxelles constitutional arrangement emphasising that the minimum that the Serbs could accept was to either remain in Yugoslavia or a confederal state consisting of three national states.85

On April 6, a group of citizens from a large anti-war rally held outside crashed into the building of the BiH Skupština in Sarajevo and proclaimed the ʻAll-National Parliament of the Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ. The Council of Ministers of the European Community recognised it on the same day, while the United States, Austria and Croatia followed suit on April 7.86 The Muslim rejection of the very basis of the new constitutional arrangement was probably suggested by American diplomacy. The Serbs, regardless of their rejection of the plan, were prepared for further negotiations. The question remains as to whether they were just trying to ʻbuy some timeʼ for further conquests or were they prepared, as they themselves stressed, to accept a federal BiH inside Yugoslavia or a confederal state consisting of three national units. After Izetbegović retreated, there was a lack of international pressure on the sides to accept the plan, which resulted in further negotiations throughout April and May in Sarajevo and Lisbon with poor chances of being accepted. The impossibility of a real threat from the international community in case of non-acceptance of the plan highlighted its weakness i.e. its inability to force an implementation through the deployment of land troops, which is one of the main tasks in international mediation. One of the causes of the reluctance of the international community to send combat forces was, as Boutros Boutros-Ghali pointed out, the unfavourable natural geographic conditions, which 83 Lučić (2008): 138. 84 M. Tuđman (2005): 146-50. 85 Begić (1997): 88-91. 86 Lučić (2008): 139.


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caused dread considering the American experience in Vietnam.87 International weakness became, above all, an impetus for the Serbian and Muslim side to stall and to put off the negotiations. This type of ʻfingers crossedʼ negotiation tactic consisted of consent in principle and of sudden withdrawal if the others accepted it and would remain a characteristic of Muslim diplomacy throughout the war. The Muslim goal was an integral state exclusively under their rule, and then, if that was not possible, to acquire a larger part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cutileiroʼs Plan offered the Muslims 44% of the territory, which matched their representation in the country, and included urban areas with numerous mineral, industrial and infrastructural resources. This meant that the Muslim side was offered the most out of all three nations. The Serbs were also offered 44% of the territory which was more than their share of the population. However, the given areas were not as developed and did not enable a complete link to be made with the occupied areas in Croatia. The Croats were to be given less territory considering their share of the population, but they accepted the plan in principle.88

According to the Cutileiro Plan, the Parliament was to be bicameral. One House would be directly elected, while the other would have an even number of representatives from all three communities to prevent over-voting. The central government would be in charge of defence and foreign affairs, the economy and finances, infrastructure and the basic needs of the population. Every community would have broad regional authority and the possibility of veto in the Parliament on everything that could damage their interests. Besides, all communities were allowed to decide for themselves as long as this did not endanger the independence and territorial integrity of the whole of the country.89

The rejection of the Cutileiro Plan by the Muslim side was accompanied by three documents published by the Presidency and the Government – ʻThe Platform for Actions of the BiH Presidency in Warfareʼ, ʻStandpoints on the Administrative and Territorial Arrangement of BiHʼ and ʻConstitutional Principles for the Internal Arrangement of the Republic of BiHʼ. The documents shared a negative attitude towards cantonization, i.e. the organisation of the state upon (albeit not solely) the ethnic principle. 87 Gow (1997): 97. 88 Nobilo (2000): 548-49. 89 Gow (1997): 85-86.


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Therefore, the Muslims, who controlled 21% of the territory, would decide for all citizens, regardless of the fact that the Cutileiro Plan was a precondition for international recognition. According to these documents, an arrangement similar to the plan was proposed, but differed from it by renouncing sovereignty for the regions. The Cutileiro Plan saw the regions as the source of sovereignty i.e. as units with constitutionality, in which national majorities could form their own administration. This is why the Muslims resisted the ʻethnic criteriaʼ so strongly. According to Muslim plans, the regions were to be established by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and most of them would not have been able to make independent political decisions, but only economic and cultural decisions. The central government was to be constructed so as to ensure the dominance of the majority without the possibility of being endangered, that is, through a control mechanism.90 This was the Muslim idea shown in Izetbegovićʼs statement talking about “… some kind of sovereignty, some national rights and some regions.”

On July 21, Tuđman and Izetbegović signed the ʻAgreement of Friendship and Cooperationʼ, but Izetbegović refused to sign a military agreement, stating that the Serbian people would “… surely see it as a threat” and that “… it would be better to leave more room for the operations of international factors.”91 The Cutileiro mission officially failed on August 26, 1992 at the London conference when Cutileiro and Lord Carrington resigned, and were replaced by Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen.92 It is interesting to note, though one should conduct further research into the matter, that during the first 6 months of the conflict, the number of killed counted for four fifths of the total number of killed in the entire war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the most of the war crimes were committed by the JNA and Serbian paramilitary troops.93 The Vance-Owen plan as the first attempt to establish a unitary BiH As regards the aforementioned Muslim objections, the newly elected Vance and Owen started working on a new plan which would partly satisfy the demands of all sides. According to this new plan BiH would be organized

90 Mrduljaš (2009): 126-28. 91 Marijan (2004): 229. 92 Begić (1997): 101. 93 Gow (2003): 268.


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into ten regions (provinces) – three for every nation and a neutral Sarajevo district. It would be a unitary decentralised state which would mean a loss of sovereignty for Croats and Serbs under the disguise of multi-ethnicity, whereas Muslims would only be fully sovereign as the most numerous people. Croats and Serbs would have only national-cultural identities without special local and state political rights. The Muslim strategy was to provoke military interventions against the Serbs or to diplomatically force the international community to coerce the other two sides to accept their conditions.94

The Vance-Owen Plan was supported by the European Community and Russia, but the main role in its rejection was played by the United States. The Bush administration had kept away from Bosnia and Herzegovina since the beginning of the crisis, possibly because of the economic relationships established with Serbia by some high officials such as Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger. Also, the territory of Yugoslavia lost its geostrategic importance so that the United States left the resolution of the crisis to the European Community.95 After the Vance-Owen plan was presented, the Muslims seemed clearly satisfied with its propositions. The plan consisted of three parts: military, political and a map of delineation. The military part included the separation of the warring sides, demilitarization of Sarajevo and placing heavy armament under control. According to the political part, every unit had to have an administrative and economic centre, but without political autonomy. A bicameral parliament was to be organized with a directly elected House of Representatives and House of Peoples which would consist of members of the regional governments. The House of Representatives would be elected by the principle of proportional representation which would have led to the domination of the most numerous peoples according to the principle of ʻone man – one voteʼ. This was clearly the result of a compromise according to the idea of either a ʻcivil state or civil warʼ. To ensure majority domination completely, it was proposed that in the case of disagreement between the Houses, the last word would be the one of the House of Representatives.96

The situation changed drastically when presidental candidate Bill Clinton started to mention possible military intervention against the Serbs in 94 Mrduljaš (2009): 129. 95 Gow (1997): 205. 96 M. Tuđman (2005): 178-79.


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Bosnia and Herzegovina in his campaign. Since then the Muslim side started to linger in negotiations. In the case of military intervention against the Serbs, they could establish control over most parts of BiH. The Serbs rejected the unitary plan and seized mostly Muslim territories in eastern Bosnia, except the enclaves of Srebrenica, Goražde and Žepa.97 A potential reason for the Serbian rejection may be linked to the third unit in the Vance-Owen plan, which would have split the unification of all territories under Serbian control, causing problems of supply in western Bosnia and the Serb-held parts in the Republic of Croatia.98

The Vance-Owen plan led to an open Muslim-Croat war in territories under joint control. Bearing in mind that the Croatian side was interested in accepting the plan, while the Serbian side even proclaimed a ʻDeclaration of the conclusion of warʼ on December 17, it is obvious that the Muslim side was dissatisfied with the plan, although they publicly proclaimed their acceptance of it. Muslim attacks on Croats followed in central Bosnia, where the Muslims were numerically able to overpower the Croats.99 One of the strongest pieces of evidence for this can be found in the statement of Rasim Delić, Commander-in-Chief of ABiH in February 1994 on how:

“ … the HVO was eliminated from the territories of Jablanica, Konjic, Fojnica, Kakanj, Zenica, Travnik and Bugojno. Therefore, one complete province according to the Vance-Owen plan with its centre in Travnik.”100

After the Serbian rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia decided to move from Geneva to New York so that the Security Council could adopt the resolution on its implementation. Its implementation was overruled by the votes of the five permanent members after the objection of the United States. After unsuccessful negotiations with his former deputy from the State Department, Warren Christopher, Cyrus Vance resigned from duty. He was replaced by the former Norwegian minister of defence and actual minister of international affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg on May 1. In order to retain good relations with their European allies, on Ferbruary 10, 1993, the United States

97 Mrduljaš (2009): 139-40. 98 Gow (1997): 240. 99 Marijan (2004): 222. 100 Marijan (2004): 227.


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announced its six statements on American policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina: all agreements must be the result of negotiations, not imposed, sanctions against Serbia should be stricter; the use of military force in the case of Serbian involvement in Kosovo; the cessation of murders and destruction; and all agreements needed to be conducted on the field after consultation with the allies of the US.101 The United States rejected the Vance-Owen plan beacuse of its unreadiness to send combat troops and in order to establish closer connections with the Islamic world and the Muslim lobby in the United States, which surely made a big impression on politicians who lived in the United States such as Ejup Ganić and Muhamed Šaćirbey.

The Security Council adopted Resolution 820 on April 17 1993 in order to force the Serbian side to sign the Vance-Owen plan within a period of 9 days under the threat of the enlargement of sanctions. Lord Owen was in Belgrade from April 21 to 26 trying to convince Milošević and Dobrica Ćosić to force the Serbs from BiH to sign the plan. On April 25 and 26, the Serbs from BiH decided to conduct a referendum on whether to accept the plan. The purpose of conducting the referendum was probably to buy more time and not to suffer more sanctions. Such a plan proved to be wrong because of the Security Councilʼs Resolution 821, which expelled Yugoslavia from ECOSOC (UN economic and social committee). The last attempt to save the Vance-Owen Plan occurred at the beginning of May in Athens when Milošević, Ćosić and Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis tried to convince Karadžić to sign the plan. Karadžić signed the plan, but stated that his signature had to be ratified by the Parliament.

Milošević, Ćosić, Mitsotakis and the Montenegrin president Momir Bulatović were present during the assembly in order to force a positive outcome. A great majority of Parliament members (96%) supported the referendum.102 Although Milošević was disappointed, it was only due to the sanctions against Yugoslavia. That moment was a turning point because local Serbian leaders were not ready for a compromise and wanted the promised unification with, or federal status within, Yugoslavia. In 1994, Milošević tried to get better cooperation by appointing Borislav Mikelić as Prime Minister of the RSK. That action proved to be unsuccessful due to the rejection of cooperation with Croatian authorities by RSK politicians. Serbs

101 Gow (1997): 242-44. 102 Gow (1997): 245-47.


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in BiH had a ʻplan Bʼ which was stated in the ʻDeclaration of the continuation of the peace processʼ103 on May 19. After rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, the main idea of this new plan was a Serbian republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Progressive implementation and the Joint action plan The international community and Russia held a meeting on May 16 in Moscow on a Russian initiative. The main topic was the progressive implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. An agreement was generally accepted, but the biggest problem was the sending of military troops and observers. The United States promised to send air forces without ground troops. Lord Owen held a meeting with the Croatian and Bosniak side on May 18 in Međugorje at which a progressive implementation of the plan was accepted. The Vance-Owen Plan was to be put into action in territories under Croatian and Bosniak control. During the next two days, Lord Owen travelled to NATO headquarters in Naples, as well as to Minsk and Kiev to find military troops and observers for the mission. Although Belarus and Ukraine accepted the deployment of troops, the plan of progressive implementation was not carried out because the strongest forces rejected sending ground troops, probably because a potential failure would be hard to explain to their domestic public.104

The major forces published the ʻJoint statement of Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ105 on May 22, also known as the ʻJoint Action Planʼ. The plan was adopted by states which were to provide the majority of troops: United States, Russia, Spain, France and United Kingdom. This plan meant the final ending of the Vance-Owen plan. The main points of the new plan were: sending humanitarian help, enlargement of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro until their withdrawal from the occupied territories, closure of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially with Serbia), founding of protected areas, continuing the prohibition of flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina, founding of a court for war crimes, establishing permanent peace in order to prevent the conflict from spilling over into neighbouring countries. Point 8 is worthy of note because it was probably inserted by the American side on the insistence of the Bosniaks: 103 M. Tuđman (2005): 384-85. 104 de Rossanet (1997): 26-32. 105 M. Tuđman (2005): 388-90.


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“Central Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are deeply worried because of conflict between Bosnian Croats and forces of the Bosnian government and the ʻethnic cleansingʼ that follows; therefore we are willing to send Croatia a warning if they continue to send help to the Bosnian Croats in combat, in which case they could be punished by sanctions of the international community.”106

This type of formulation was only possible amongst pro-Bosniac circles, which was primarily reflected in the meaningless phrase ʻCentral Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ. There is the geographic term of central Bosnia, but it remains unclear how this is connected with Herzegovina and which area precisely comprises ʻCentral Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ. Secondly, the formulation ʻforces of the Bosnian governmentʼ had the aim of covering up the fact that these were actually Bosniak forces, thereby attempting to provide them with state legitimacy. It is interesting to note that in the statement “… the conflict between Bosnian Croats and the forces of the Bosnian government” there is no mention of Herzegovina which was mentioned in the previous sentence. The tragicomic situation concerning the introduction of international sanctions against Croatia because of its assistance to the ʻBosnian Croatsʼ is primarily reflected in the documents of the time from which it is visible that the Bosniak side demanded (and received) arms and military equipment from Croatia throughout the entire period.107 Croatia risked international sanctions by sending weapons packed in food through humanitarian convoys.108 It is also interesting to note the order from the Third Zenica Corps of ABiH relating to the shooting down of a Croatian helicopter even though the flight was previously announced.109 This led to the somewhat paradoxal situation in which the Bosniak side demanded that Croatia cease sending help to its own people while requesting the same help for itself, regardless of the fact that they were launching offensive operations precisely against those Croats.

The shortcoming of the Joint Action Plan was that there was no specific mention as to what would happen, apart from sanctions, if the Serbs continued their offensive or how much time was anticipated for a Serbian 106 M. Tuđman (2005): 389. 107 Praljak (2007): 41, 52, 68, 69 (Only the first four pages of the publication are numerated, and the page number of documents is an extension of the same numeration). 108 Praljak (2007): 70-73. 109 Praljak (2007): 63.


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retreat from the occupied territories. A meeting was supposed to be held on June 3 and 4, but did not take

place because Mate Bobanʼs helicopter was fired upon. In the agreement with representatives of the international community concerning the meeting, Izetbegović requested that Serbian positions in the presidency belonging to the legitimately elected SDS should be replaced with Serbs from other parties, granting himself the right to choose people who should represent the Serbs. As the meeting failed to take place, negotiations were led with each side individually. Karadžić wanted observers to be sent and emphasised the Bosniak attacks on all fronts.110 A problem occured relating to the attack on Goražde which was skilfully used by the Bosniak side to pressure the international public which was consistent with their ʻstrategy of the weakʼ, even though Goražde was a legitimate military goal as it had ammunitions factory ʻPobjedaʼ, which had an underground section for wartime operations.111

After the attacks on buses in Novi Travnik, it was decided that negotiations would be continued in Geneva on June 13 and 14.112 Even though the Bosniak side publicly stressed its desire for an end to the war, but, due to the unaccomplished war aim of establishing a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina (preferably including the entire country) and American support, in finding themselves in the likely situation of a cessation of military operations Alija Izetbegović and Ejup Ganić refused to sit at the same table with Karadžić in Geneva, clearly showing that they had no intention to join any negotiations. This type of mentality inherited from the Communist system was visible not only on the Bosniak side, but also during the negotiations on the Z-4 Plan when Milan Babić refused to touch the paper on which the agreement was written. It was also seen during the negotiations in Rambouillet when Slobodan Milošević sat with his arms crossed, refusing to take a pen to correct what he considered wrong. According to the agreement, the establishment of provinces and local jurisdictions was to be enabled, as well as the creation of a court for human rights which would support international humanitarian law, and cooperation with the international humanitarian mission. The result of the voting was three in favour, three opposing and three sustained, after which the agreement was then forwarded 110 de Rossanet (1997): 39-40. 111 Gow (2003): 186. 112 de Rossanet (1997): 42.


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to the Presidency for voting.113 Izetbegović categorically rejected the agreement primarily because it was not of a unitary character, and enabled the national communities to create provinces and local jurisdictions. The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan After the Serbian rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan, and the short failed episode with progressive implementation and the Joint Action Plan, which collapsed because of the Bosniak rejection, the international community attempted to find a solution with the new Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan which was very much like the Cutillero plan, a plan generally accepted by the Serbs. Owen and Stoltenberg organized negotiations on June 15 and 16 in Genthod, Switzerland, which was attended by presidents Milošević, Bulatović, Tuđman and Izetbegović, as well as Radovan Karadžić and Mate Boban. Presidents Tuđman and Milošević suggested the idea of a Federative Republic of BiH, consisting of three constitutive republics without international subjectivity, the securing of Bosniak territory with a gateway to the sea, the right of return for refugees and respect for human rights. After it seemed that all was arranged, on June 23 Izetbegović promised to discuss the model with the Presidency, but immediately after leaving the meeting told the journalists outside that he had given up on that plan.114 In a statement for the BiH radio-television on July 8, Izetbegović claimed the following with regard to the peace initiative: “It is a very ugly option, that is all I can say to you at the moment.”115 The following day, the Office of the BiH Presidency issued a denial on agreeing to confederalize BiH, in which it was stated that confederalization, that is, ethnic division can:

“ (…) be imposed as a solution only under the condition that there is no other choice, in other words, if the the following choice is presented – either that [ethnic division] or starting a neverending war, which would lead us back to living in caves.”116

The risk of living in caves was obviously not a great problem for the Muslims, since they continued to reject the agreement even though they were

113 de Rossanet (1997): 43. 114 de Rossanet (1997): 45-46. 115 M. Tuđman (2005): 404. 116 M. Tuđman (2005): 405.


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not able to occupy and secure any larger city. The only offensive success of the ABiH was noted against the drastically outnumbered Croats in central Bosnia.

On July 17, 1993, the Presidency of BiH issued a ʻStarting Point of the BiH Presidency for Negotiations in Genevaʼ.117 The ʻStarting Pointʼ again stressed that the Parliament should be bicameral, with the Lower House being represented proportionally to the population, which would give the starting advantage to the most numerous nation – the Bosniaks, and also enable the unitarization of BiH. At the end of the document, it was noted that, in the case of the rejection of the proposal, the Presidency was prepared to propose to the Security Council the establishment of an international protectorate over BiH.

In Geneva, on July 30, the ʻConstitutional agreement on the Union of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ was concluded and was supposed to be implemented once agreement over maps and humanitarian rights was reached. Each republic would have a right to veto, while the Parliament would consist of 120 positions according to the principle of parity – equal representation from each member of the Union. The Presidency was to consist of presidents of the three republics who would change every four months, and would decide by consensus. The competencies of the Union were to be foreign affairs, foreign trade and the functioning of common institutions, while all other power would be handed to the republics. None of the constitutive republics would be allowed to leave the Union without the consent of all republics.118

The next day Alija Izetbegović withdrew his signature on the advice of his legal advisor, Francis Boyle, because the membership of BiH in the UN seemed to be in question. Even though Izetbegović was promised that the status of the Union in the UN would not be changed, the Bosniak side sought an immediate guarantee from the Security Council and the General Assembly.119 On August 4, Alija Izetbegović sent a letter to Tuđman in which he suggested a union between the territories of the Bosniak and Croatian Republics and the continuation of the fighting against the Serbs. Also, the resignation of people who had brought about the current state of

117 M. Tuđman (2005): 410-12. 118 M. Tuđman (2005): 414-15. 119 M. Tuđman (2005): 416.


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affairs was sought and offered by Izetbegović.120 This move once again shows the unwillingness to stop the conflict and a willingness to continue the war against the Serbs, i.e. a desire for acquiring even more territory whilst trying to lure the Croats to the Bosniak side by offering them part of government power which would, in practice, mean majority rule over the Serbs. The maximum that the Bosniaks were willing to offer was cultural autonomy, while political autonomy was not mentioned at all. It is interesting to note that, by directly sending the letter to the Croatian president, Izetbegović ignored the legitimate Croatian representatives in BiH. The answer from Tuđman arrived on August 10, in which it was stressed that Croatia was ready for cooperation between the two constitutive units, but that this agreement had to be reached by the legitimate representatives of those republics and that Bosniak offensive operations against Croatian areas had to be stopped.121 The military chiefs of all three sides signed a truce on August 11 at Sarajevo Airport. It was agreed upon to postpone discussion on the disputed areas of Brčko, Posavina, eastern Bosnia, Bihać pocket, eastern Herzegovina, central Bosnia and Sarajevo for a later date.

In line with the idea of a union between the three republics, on August 28, 1993 the Croatian side proclaimed the HR HB in Grude. Even though HR HB is commonly regarded as a creation of a Greater Croatia and a unilateral act, the fact is that the stimulus for this idea originated from circles of the international community. Besides, in the resolution of its establishment it was stressed that the Croats, as a constitutive nation, were establishing a state community with other nations as the bearers of sovereignty. However, there was no mention of the right to secession or the desire for annexation to Croatia.122 On the contrary, the HR HB House of Representatives issued the ʻDeclaration for an independent BIH as a union of equal republicsʼ in which it was stressed that: “ … we are in favour of Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼs independence in internationally recognised borders, as a state of three equal constitutional nations” and:

“ … the founding of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as an independent and internationally recognised state, is only possible with the consent of all three equal and

120 M. Tuđman (2005): 418. 121 M. Tuđman (2005): 419. 122 M. Tuđman (2005): 421-24.


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constitutional nations and all together, through the Union of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”123

On September 20, negotiations were held on the British HMS Invincible war ship between the representatives of the international community and Tuđman, Izetbegović, Milošević, Bulatović and Radovan Karadžić and Mate Boban. It seemed that all parties agreed to the proposed arrangements and territorial solutions, but the Bosniak side rejected the agreement. The treaty offered 30% of the territory to the Bosniak Republic with access to the Brčko and Neretva ports, which would be connected with the Adriatic at the Port of Ploče, through a concession of 99 years provided by Croatia. Sarajevo would be under UN administration, and Mostar under EU administration.124

After yet another rejection of the amended version of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan known as the ʻThe Peace Packet on Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ from late September 1993, on October 20 Alija Izetbegović issued a resolution on the recall of the Croatian members of the Presidency, Franjo Boras and Vitomir Miro Lasić, and replaced them with Ivo Komšić and Stjepan Kljuić, who both enjoyed Izetbegovićʼs favour.125 The Action Plan of the European Union After the Bosniaks refused the plan from HMS Invincible, Lord Owen started the initiative for the wider pacification of the region, including Kosovo, RSK and BiH. If a solution could be found for RSK, then sanctions against Yugoslavia would be removed. This plan failed when Tuđman announced after talks in Norway in early November that he was prepared, at most, to acknowledge the local and cultural autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia.126

In his peace initiative from Novemeber 2, President Tuđman requested that the international community impel all conflicting sides to sign in favour of the Union within 14 days, under the threat of sanctions.127 Following this, the international community started a peace initiative known as the Action Plan of the EU, the primary goal of which was to convince the Bosniak side

123 M. Tuđman (2005): 519-20. 124 Gow (1997): 255-56. 125 M. Tuđman (2005): 483-84. 126 Burg & Shoup (1998): 282. 127 M. Tuđman (2005): 495.


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to accept the Union, and was set in motion by Germany and France. The Bosniak side was offered a small expansion of its territory, according to which they would be given 33.56%, and the Croats 17.5%. The starting point for the negotiations was the packet from the HMS Invincible, while the Bosniak side was advised to agree with the other sides under the threat of reducing international support. Izetbegović demanded the opening of the airport in Tuzla, which was not agreeable to the Serbs because they were (justly) afraid that it would be used for military purposes, and he also requested, somewhat nebulously, the sending of peace troops to only the Bosniak parts of the territory for a period of 5 years, in order to protect the Bosniak side until it developed an armed capacity for self-defence. Milošević requested the removal of sanctions because he had fulfilled all conditions, while the acceptance of the plan depended on the Bosniaks. In the meantime, during November the ABiH expelled Croats from Vareš, and in December laid siege to Vitez.128

At the meeting in Bruxelles between the three BiH sides and the ministers of foreign affairs of the European Twelve, on December 22 and 23, Izetbegović rejected the solution offered, and after that Karadžić no longer agreed to the UN administration in Sarajevo.129 As a response, the Bosniak side attacked the Serb-held suburb of Grbavica in Sarajevo in the first weeks of January. On the initiative of Tuđman, Milošević and Bulatović, a meeting was held on January 18 and 19 in Geneva with Izetbegović, Karadžić and Mile Akmadžić (Prime-minister of HR HB). The Bosniak side remained inflexible and demanded 40% of the territory, access to Neum, the merging of the eastern enclaves and access to the Sava River.130

The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and the Action Plan of the EU collapsed due exclusively to the disagreement of the Bosniak side with American support. These plans did not satisfy Bosniak appetites for as much territory as possible, if not the entire territory, while the American rejection was primarily due to the unwillingness to send a large number of combat troops. According to the budget, the peace mission would have totalled approximately 60,000 men, and one third of this was to be secured by the USA. 128 Burg & Shoup (1999): 282-83 129 Gow (1997): 257 130 Burg & Shoup (1999): 284


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The Washington Agreement At a meeting on January 18, 1994, Presidents Tuđman and Izetbegović, together with Haris Silajdžić (Bosniak minister of Foreign Affairs) and Krešimir Zubak (the President of HR HB), signed a proposal drafted by the BiH Federation Constitution and a preliminary agreement on the future economic and military cooperation between the Federation of BiH and Croatia. According to the treaty, there had to be ethnic parity in parliamentary representation, while cantonization was a subject for future discussion. Silajdžić was in favor of the deal, but Izetbegović was against it. The new initiative brought the active involvement of the USA toward solving the crisis in which it had previously stood to the side and was the one to blame for the failure of all previous peace plans. Meanwhile, Mate Boban was removed from office, and replaced by Krešimir Zubak. Prime ministers Silajdžić and Granić were invited to a new round of negotiations in the State Department from February 27 to March 2. Both prime ministers were left surprised by the radical turn in the negotiations.131

Specifically, it was no longer possible to hold long negotiations, as was the practice before, or to change key points of the agreement. All that was left to them was to agree over trifles. It was the principle of take it or leave it, which would now be promoted by the USA, and the ʻleave itʼ option meant severe sanctions and air raids. This was best seen during the Dayton Peace Talks during which the negotiators were in kept semi-incarcerated conditions found in the Wright Patterson military base. Besides the inability to stall, these conditions did not allow the sides to use statements made for the domestic media as a means of creating pressure on the international public.

According to the agreement, the central government would control foreign affairs, citizenship, national currency, monetary and fiscal policies, finances, telecommunications, energy and infrastructure. Jurisdiction was to be divided between the central and local authorities in the areas of human rights, health care, environment, social policies, immigration and asylum, tourism, infrastructure and the use of natural resources. Canton jurisdiction would cover the police, education, culture, public services, radio and so on. Besides this, the Federation of BiH should form a confederation with Croatia and enter into a customs and monetary union with it. The Washington

131 Nobilo (2000): 606-07.


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Agreement was signed on March 18,132 and its signing marked the start of the unitarization of BiH, considering the fact that the agreement did not state that the cantons were bearers of sovereignty. Even though the treaty was signed, the Croatian areas remained under the rule of HR HB, and the Bosniak areas under the government in Sarajevo.133 The Washington agreement was in practice a military-political alliance designed by the USA to force the BiH Serbs to the negotiating table. It served its main purpose, but proved to be completely outdated by the end of the war.

One of the primary tasks of the American ambassador in Croatia, Peter Galbraith, according to his own testimony, was to convince President Tuđman to stop supporting the BiH Croats under the threat of sanctions if he decided to continue his support. The abandonment of the HR HB was dependent on the liberation of the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia and the promised aid of the USA concerning the establishment of stronger connections with the West. It seems that the crucial role in convincing Tuđman was played by foreign minister Mate Granić.134 The agreement itself was in fact a modification of the Action Plan of the EU, because the federation was basically meant to be comprised of the Croatian and Bosniak territories which was anticipated by the previous plan. Neither side was particularly satisfied with the agreement, but there was no more choice to make, except over details. Plans of the Contact Group for Croatia (Z-4) and BIH After the signing of the Zagreb Agreement on the cessation of fire between the RSK and Croatian authorities on March 30, a new round of negotiations began which included the USA, Russia, UN and EU, so that they became known as the – Z-4 (Zagreb Four Talks). According to the agreement, the delineation line was to be 2km long, while the treaty itself was understood by the Krajina Serbs as a chance to stabilize the RSK. After the signing, the UN mandate was prolonged which gave Serbs an extra feeling of security. Even though they did not acknowledge Croatian authority, the Serbs were demanding pension payments, which was partially agreed to by Croatia. Economic relations were also discussed, but prime minister Mikelić said that he needed the confirmation of the RSK Skupština which in practice meant 132 Nobilo (2000): 609-10. 133 Ilić (2008): 110. 134 Galbraith (2002): 138-41.


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that it was a failure. The economic part of the deal was only signed before the end of December through the direct telephone intervention of Slobodan Milošević.135

The Contact Group was formed in April 1994, and consisted of Russia, the USA, and – as the representatives of the EU, UN and the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia – Germany, France and Great Britain. According to the plan for Croatia, named Z-4, Serbs were to be given broad autonomy with their own symbols, separate legislative bodies, a president and ministry cabinet (government), a separate currency and a police force. At the request of the American ambassador Galbraith a meeting took place with Tuđman on September 12 1994, at which the ambassador proposed that two majority Serbian districts, Glina and Knin, linked via Slunj, should have some elements of statehood, while the rest of the occupied territories in Slavonia should be reintegrated into Croatia. The next meeting was held on October 10, at which Galbraith introduced an expanded version of the plan. According to this version, besides the above, it was suggested that the area of Serbian autonomy be called Krajina, and that it should have a president, a parliament and courts. There would be no border between Krajina and Croatia, and Krajina would have autonomy in the areas of education, culture, energy, tourism, trades, taxes and police. It would be allowed to sign state treaties in agreement with Zagreb, and in the area of autonomy it could also sign treaties with other Serbian states. The currency would be controlled by the Croatian National Bank, but Krajina could have its own banknotes. A separate constitutional court was to be established, consisting of two judges from Krajina, two from Croatia and three representatives of the international community. Krajina would enjoy the rights to its own flag and coat of arms. A precondition for acquiring Krajina citizenship was possession of Croatian citizenship. State borders with BiH would be controlled by the central government, while Krajina would be demilitarised within 5 years.

Tuđman opposed such a proposal, stating that he could agree to the cultural autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia, and territorial autonomy in the districts of Glina and Knin, but without the elements of statehood. In a meeting on January 30, 1995, Tuđman stated that he would consider the plan, which could be a starting point, but could not depart from the constitutional decrees of Croatia. The Krajina Serbs rejected the plan

135 Barić (2005): 261-65.


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claiming that it was made in agreement with the Croats at the expense of the Serbs, and on the same day they refused to receive an international delegation. Croatia was opposed mainly due to the possibility that Krajina could sign international agreements, thus providing it with subjectivity and a basis for potential separation from Croatia in the future.

The rejection of the plan was one of the last acts which had shown that negotiations were not possible and that the occupied territories had to be returned to the state-legal framework of Croatia by military means. The uncompromising politics of the Krajina Serbs led to a situation where it was no longer possible to discuss arrangements of any kind or coexistence with Croatia, even though there definitely were people in the leadership who understood that the plan was the best they could get. Prime minister of RSK Mikelić also rejected the Plan, which, considering his loyalty to Milošević, also meant that it was not agreeable to Belgrade. This proved to be true after the international representatives, who were not received by Krajina authorities, were also not welcomed in Belgrade the next day. This type of behaviour can primarily be interpreted by Miloševićʼs abandonment of the maximum Serbian demands for a Greater Serbia with the western borders of Virovitica–Karlovac–Karlobag and his desire to strengthen Serbian authority in east Bosnia. Besides, it was becoming clear that, due to international factors, Krajina would not be internationally recognised. Milošević could not publicly declare his rejection of the plan because he would have probably been accused of betraying national interests. Rather he ordered Knin to reject the plan and distanced himself from further political moves by the Krajina leadership.136 To Milošević, Krajina served as a means to blackmail Croatia in the negotiations over BiH.137 The Plan of the Contact Group for BIH According to the plan of the Contact Group, BiH would be organised into two entities, the Federation of BiH and the RS as well as Sarajevo under the jurisdiction of the UN. Since 1994 Croatian-Bosniak cooperation had led to the conquest of territories under Serbian rule. In the case of a Serbian rejection of the plan, threats were made to lift the arms embargo and impose stricter sanctions as well as to withdraw UNPROFOR. For the first time

136 Barić (2005): 474-80. 137 Bing (2007): 391.


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Milošević distanced himself from the politics of the BIH Serbs. The Contact Group did not officially withdraw after its failure and nor did it undertake some sort of action which would bring significant changes on the field.138 In July, the Group presented a map according to which the ratio between the Federation of BiH and the RS would be 51%:49%. The Bosniak side felt that the Federation should have 58%, but it agreed in principle, stating publicly its conviction that the Serbs would not agree, which soon turned out to be true. According to the suggested constitutional principles, the presidency was to consist of one member of all constitutive nations, and would change every four months. The parliament would make decisions upon the basis of a two-thirds majority, which would have to include a simple majority of every nation. The American demands on lifting the arms embargo was heavily critized by the other members of the Group, who feared for their combat troops and threatened to withdraw them. As a counter-proposal they put forward the idea of stricter sanctions.139

The different interests of the Groupʼs members proved to be too big of a problem when decisions had to be made on how to act after the Serbian rejection of the plan, that is, should the embargo be lifted (USA), await Serbian approval (Russia) or tighten sanctions (Germany, France and Great Britain). The Dayton Agreement In the autumn of 1994, the Bosniak side started a series of operations in the Bihać area, most probably encouraged by the Americans, for the purpose of sensitizing the global public and instigating operations against the Serbs which soon occured. The autumn attack operations revealed the weakness of the ABiH which was winning territories, but was not capable of keeping them, resulting in Serbian re-conquests.140 The Croatian side undertook successful actions in the late autumn of 1994 in the Livno and Kupres areas. The Croatian actions were, among other causes, boosted because a part of the military intelligence structures from the Pentagon was in favour of halting the conflict based on the situation on the field in Croatia and BiH.141 Contrary to the expected, international attacks did not discourage the Serbs

138 Gow (1997): 261-64. 139 Burg & Shoup (1999): 303-04. 140 Daalder (2000): 31-33. 141 Bing (2007): 390.


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who stopped UN movements and captured their observers. According to some opinions, the Serbs had intentionally provoked the intervention to gain legitimacy and to speed up the continuation of their operations. The USA demanded that NATO continue their offensive, which was against the opinion of all the NATO members which had troops in BiH. The former American President Jimmy Carter arranged a four-month truce with the BiH Serbs, which was activated on January 1, 1995. Tuđman threatened that he would not prolong the UNPROFOR mandate, which was to expire on March 31, 1995, if the situation did not change. The UN mission was renamed the UN Peace Force on March 31, and divided into UNCRO for Croatia, UNPROFOR for BIH and UNPREDEP for Macedonia. Whilst stressing the truce, all sides were preparing for the continuation of combat which was to continue in April.

On May 22, the Serbs captured an amunitions storehouse near Sarajevo, despite the ban on heavy weaponry. After the unfulfilled 48-hour ultimatum to return the captured munitions, NATO air raids followed. In retaliation, the Serbs struck Tuzla and killed 67 civilians as well as taking observers as hostages. General Rupert Smith sought the continuation of the air raids, but the command was refused. In June, Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was founded on a French suggestion to secure UNPROFOR.142 The RRF was meant to be a mobile military formation prepared to perform offensive operations. To this day its role is not completely clear, but there are signs that the RRF formations were to serve as wedges for the stopping of further Croatian and Bosniak offensives against the Serbs, that is, to secure the interests of France, Great Britain and The Netherlands, which were the sole contributers to the RRF.

Joint Croatian-Muslim forces managed to capture, from June to October, a significant amount of territory, including Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoč, Drvar, Jajce, Mrkonjić Grad and were stopped around Banja Luka to keep the power balance intact, that is, to prevent a total Serbian defeat. With the Serbs defeated, a completely new situation would emerge, and the international intention was the end of the conflict as soon as possible. The biggest problem would have been the complete change of the demographic structure of BiH in the case of a complete Serbian defeat. The loss of territory forced the previously unyielding Karadžić to seek help from

142 Daalder (2000): 37-44.


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Milošević and to accept that Milošević was internationally representing the BiH Serbs.143

In February 1994, Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested that NATO create a possible plan for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from BiH. The withdrawal plan was named the Oplan 40104, and its seriousness was visible in the fact that it consisted of 1,300 pages of text and 24 appendices. According to the plan, 82,000 NATO troops were to be involved in the extraction of UNPROFOR, 25,000 of these to be contributed by the USA. Bearing in mind the American share, it is clear why they decided to solve the BiH conflict rapidly. The duration of the operation was to be 22 weeks, while the expense just for the United States would be over 700 million dollars. A significant problem in the operation was the mountainous terrain in BiH with poor and mined roads. The UNPROFOR withdrawal also raised humanitarian issues. The civil population would be left unprotected, and a massive immigration wave to Europe was at risk.144 Considering all of the risk-full situations, the USA forced the conflicting sides to accept a treaty, so as not to risk the engagement of a large number of combat troops and financial expense which would have to be justified to the American public.

The negotiations on the establishment of a permanent peace began on November 1 at the American military base Wright Patterson, Dayton, Ohio, after which the treaty was named. Negotiations lasted for three weeks, and one of the preconditions was the international recognition of BiH by Serbia. The delegations were separated during the meeting, and met only during bilateral meetings. There was no press or radio conferences so as to prevent the development of various interpretations and public pressure, although there was some leakage of information. For Croatia, it was agreed that the reintegration would last one year, with the possibility of extending it for one more year, if everything was not done in time. The Bosniak side managed to secure Sarajevo and the corridor to Goražde, which was the subject of numerous discussions. Milošević wanted a more narrow corridor, but gave up after he was shown on a computer that it was as narrow as possible. After the agreements were made, a problem occured concerning the fact that the Serbs got 45% of the territory, and not 49% as was predicted. This was solved by giving the Serbs Mrkonjić Grad, while the Bosniak side was given

143 Gow (1997): 279. 144 Daalder (2000): 48-49.


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arbitration for Brčko.145 The Dayton peace agreement was signed on December 14 in Paris and

consisted of 10 articles, 11 appendices and 102 maps. According to appendix 1a146, a time and program was calculated for the separation of the conflicting sides and the redeployment of IFOR (Implementation Force) which had the task of implementing the peace. Its basic task was to protect the delineation line, and it numbered about 60,000 personnel. Besides the above, they were meant to be a ʻreminderʼ to the warring sides to exclude the possibility of further conflicts. The delineation line held by IFOR was 4 km wide.147 The number of personnel would have surely been higher if the progressive implementation had been agreed upon earlier, which would have raised the problem of finances.

The official name of the country was no longer The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the BiH Constitution (appendix 4)148 in article III, point 1, the central institutions governed foreign affairs, foreign trade, customs, monetary policies (which was limited considering the fact that the governer of the central bank was chosen by the International Monetary Fund), the financing of institutions, international obligations of BiH, policies concerning immigration, refugees and asylum, international implementation of criminal law, implementation of entity rights, control over common resources, regulation of traffic between entities and air traffic control. The jurisdiction of the entities covered the functioning of human rights, making agreements with countries and international organisations, with the acceptance of the Parliament. According to article VI, the Parliament consisted of two houses: Dom naroda (House of the Peoples) and Zastupnički dom (House of the Representatives). Dom naroda had 15 delegates, five from each nation. Nine members were needed to reach a quorum, at least three from each nation. The Zastupnički dom consisted of 42 representatives, with two thirds from the Federation and one third from RS. To reach a quorum a majority was needed. To proclaim any law the consent of both houses was required. Each nation had the right to veto in case its vital interests were endangered. In that case, the president of the Dom naroda had to immediatelly call a commission consisting of three 145 Gow (1997): 279-85. 146 M. Tuđman (2005): 652-69. 147 Gow (1997): 287. 148 M. Tuđman (2005): 669-82.


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representatives whose task would be to solve the issue within five days. In case of failure, the issue was forwarded to the Constitutional Court.

Ministers and their deputies had to be of different nationalities in order to secure control. The coordination of civil implementation was given to the High Representative who was named by the Security Council. Foreign bodies included in governing were the human rights attorney named by the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the central bank governer who was named by the International Monetary Fund with a six year mandate and three of nine members of the Constitutional Court were to be named by the President of the European Human Rights Court.

A security guarantee or a cause of instability? The Dayton Agreement established the paradoxal formulation of ‘two entitites and three nations’. The Serbian nation has its own entity through which it achieves its sovereign rights, and has the future possibility of exercising its legitimate right of self-determination, which is a common topic to this day. The Bosniak elites consider the Federation primarily as their own national unit in which supremacy is achieved through a numerical majority, including in the system a few Croats without legitimacy to create an illusion of legality. The ethnic division which was mostly opposed by the Bosniak leadership continued to be visible and has even deepened further. Creating this order was used by the USA as a guarantee of avoiding the deployment of a large number of combat troops and avoiding financial expense in the case of a further armed conflict. The role of Croats and Serbs in BiH was to prevent the development of radical Islam in Europe, which was feared by the West. The Croats would thus control government at the level of entities and the Serbs at the state level. It is worth mentioning Karadžić's recorded statement from May 1992:

“Europe wonʼt and doesnʼt want to accept the risk of letting a Muslim state be organised here. This is our biggest problem. They want us to stay united with the Croats in a single state of Bosnia in order to control the Muslims.”149

This kind of BiH was (and remains) sustainable only because of the

149 Hartman (2007): 93.


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international protectorate and financing. BiH is unable to function independently which is visible in the role of the High Representative as an independent sovereign who can stop any decision, which means that BiH is a country of limited sovereignty or a quasi-state.150 The BiH elites wish to retain their economic and social power, which they try to achieve by preserving the current state of the country's division and isolation.151

The prewar ‘sacrificing peace for a sovereign Bosnia’ failed and resulted in the ‘sovereign Bosnia being sacrificed for peace’, handing over a crucial part of its sovereignty to the High Representative in the process. The Bosniak elites have remained somewhat satisfied by sacrificing sovereignty to the international community in exchange for dominating the Federation. The question remains whether BiH will be able to transform itself into a functioning state and how long will the international community be prepared to finance the current state. The Erdut Agreement After the return of the territories of Krajina and west Slavonia to the state-legal framework of Croatia, the American President Bill Clinton stated that the problem of occupied territories in east Slavonia had to be solved within the framework of a solution to the conflict in BiH. The task of renewing contacts with the Serbs in the Danube basin was given to the American ambassador Galbraith and to the UNʼs ambassador Stoltenberg. The meetings between the representatives of the international community and the Serbian leadership were held during September and October in 1995 in Erdut. As a starting point for a solution the Z-4 Plan was suggested, but the situation changed significantly when the political autonomy of Serbs who formed the majority in those areas before the war was called into question. The Croatian delegation responded to the international mediators by noting that the Serbs had not formed a majority in any municipality in any prewar census and that military action was not excluded. In early October, the Croatian and Serbian delegations in Erdut managed to agree to the acceptance of eleven agreement articles on solving the conflict. The question of Croatian Podunavlje was meant to be solved before the start of the Dayton negotiations, but this was rejected by Milošević so that he could negotiate in

150 Chandler (2006): 34. 151 Lučić (2005): 171.


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case the talks somehow turned in an unexpected direction. One of the reasons for finding a quick solution was the artillery bombardment of Croatian areas from the territory of the BiH Serbs.152 In considering the implementation of a military operation a large number of military victims was predicted, as well as the possible interference of the Army of Yugoslavia and the bombings of Croatian cities, which resulted in the plan being rejected.

At the request of the Croatian delegation in Dayton, on November 2, the question of the reintegration of the Croatian Podunavlje was raised, and both sides agreed to it on November 11. Opinions differed on the question of the duration of the UN mandate in the transitional period. Finally it was agreed that the UN mandate would last one year with the possibility of it being extended for one more year in case one of the parties sought an extension. After reaching the agreement, Galbraith and Stoltenberg travelled to the signing of the treaty in Erdut which occured the next day. Hrvoje Šarinić signed the treaty on behalf of the Croatian government, and Milan Milanović on behalf of the Serbian. According to the agreement, the territory was to be under UN administration for a period of between one to two years. The basic task of the UN was to organize a multinational police force, organize local elections and conduct demilitarization. The agreement was fulfilled in early 1998, which resulted in the establishment of the total territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia.153 Conclusion The calling of the first democratic elections in Yugoslavia with the encouragement of the international community, especially of its European part, for the purpose of democratization and transformation to a market economy, led, in the eyes of the international community, to the unexpected collapse of Yugoslavia.

International mediation during the war in the area of the former Yugoslavia, observed in detail through the proposed peace plans, highlighted a lack of consensus between the main members in key issues regarding the prevention and conclusion of the war. Besides, it also highlighted the weakness of the European part of the international community in imposing

152 Bing (2007): 397-401. 153 Bing (2007): 401-03.


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its own solutions due to the lack of military capacity. The USA as a global superpower had the potential to control the development of the war, refusing to send combat troops which were requested by Europe and the UN to implement a peace process. By establishing the Vance Plan in Croatia, the infirmity of international peace mediations via the UNPA zones was revealed, since they were unable to complete their primary mission – demilitarization, establishment of civil life and the return of refugees.

The war ended relatively shortly after the active involvement of the USA in early 1994. American diplomacy was led by the simple principle of forcing peace under physical threats of military force, in which the conflicting sides were left merely with the details during negotiations. It is interesting to note two completely different principles in relation to ending the conflict, which could be interpreted primarily as diplomatic experiments of the USA. Even though BiH and Croatia were structurally completely different countries, in Croatia the war ended with peaceful reintegration, and in BiH with a freezing of conditions on the field. To put it simply, in BiH Serbian territorial conquests were recognised, which was not the case for Croatia. One could presume that the United States intentionally arranged this in order to see the advantages and disadvantages of both principles in practice for the purpose of future dealings with potential conflicts.

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priznanju Republike Hrvatske 1991. godine’, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 42(2): 339-366.

Bing, A. (2007): ‘Put do Erduta – Položaj Hrvatske u međunarodnoj zajednici 1994. - 1995. i reintegracija hrvatskog Podunavlja’, Scrinia Slavonica 7: 371-404.

Burg, S.L. & Shoup, P.S. (1998): The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina – Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, New York & London).

Caspersen, N. (2007): ‘Belgrade, Pale, Knin: Kin-state control over rebellious puppets?’, Europe-Asia Studies 59(4): 621-641.

Chandler, D. (2000): Bosnia – Faking democracy after Dayton (London & Sterling, Virginia).

________. (2006): Empire in Denial – The Politics of State-building (London & Ann Arbor).

Crawford, B. (1996): ‘Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s unilateral Recognition of Croatia’, World Politics 48(4): 482-521.

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Filipović, V. (2008): ‘Kontroverze Vanceova plana’, Polemos 11: 91-110.

Geertz, C. (1983): Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology (New York).

Glaurdić, J. (2011): Vrijeme Europe: Zapadne sile i raspad Jugoslavije (Zagreb). Croatian translation of: The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (New Haven, 2011)

Gow, J. (1994): ‘Serbian Nationalism and the Hissssing Ssssnake in the international order: Whose soveregnity? Which nation?’; The Slavonic and East European Review 72(3): 456-482.

________. (1997): Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London).

________. (2003): The Serbian Project and its Adversaries – A Strategy of War Crimes (London).

Hartmann, F. (2007): Mir i kazna (Zagreb). Croatian translation of Paix et châtiment, (Paris, 2007)

Ilić, G. (2008): ‘Hrvati u BIH 1991.-1995. godine: Nacionalni sukobi i uloga Međunarodne Zajednice u mirovnim procesima’, National Security and the Future 9(3): 73-118.

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Kraljačić, T. (1987): Kalajev režim u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo).

Lučić, I. (2003): ‘Karađorđevo: politički mit ili dogovor?’, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 35(1): 7-36.

________. (2005): ‘Evolution and Condition of the Elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina – A Personal View’, National Security and the Future 6(3-4): 151-173.

________. (2005a): ‘Etika ili Kangrga’, Status: Magazin za političku kulturu i društvena pitanja 6: 142-149.

________. (2008): ‘Bosna i Hercegovina od prvih izbora do međunarodnog priznanja’, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 40(1): 107-140.

________. (2013): Uzroci rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine (Zagreb).

Lukić, R. (2006): ‘Vanjska politika Clintonove administracije prema ratovima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini (1993.-1995.)’, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 38(1): 7-39.

Mahmutćehajić, R. (2000): Bosnia the Good: Tolerance and Tradition (Budapest).

Mann, M (2005): The Dark Side of Democracy; Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge)

Marijan, D. (2004): ‘Vještački nalaz: o ratnim vezama Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine’, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 36(1): 211-247.

________. (2008): ‘Sudionici i osnovne značajke rata u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1991.’, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 40(1): 47-63.

Miškulin, I. (2010): ‘“Sladoled i sunce” – Promatračka misija Europske Zajednice i Hrvatska, 1991.-1995.’, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 42(2): 299-337.

Mrduljaš, S. (2009): ‘Prvi međunarodni pokušaj unitarizacije Bosne i Hercegovine: Vance-Owenov plan (2. siječnja 1993.)’, National Security and the Future 10(2): 117-150.

Ničota, M. (1992a): ‘Pri kraju puta – intervju s Mariom Nobilom’, Danas Weekly 11 (no. 516).

________. (1992b): ‘Trkači olovnih nogu’, Danas Weekly 10 (no. 517).

Nobilo, M. (2000): Hrvatski feniks : diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata: 1990. - 1997. (Zagreb).

Okey, R. (2007): Taming Balkan Nationalism: The Habsburg ‘Civilising Mission’ in Bosnia, 1878–1914 (Oxford).


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Pehar, D. (2011): Alija Izetbegović i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini (Mostar).

Praljak, S. (2007): Pomoć Republike Hrvatske Muslimansko – Bošnjačkom narodu i Armiji Bosne i Hercegovine tijekom 1991.–1995. godine (Zagreb).

Raspudić, N. (2011): ‘Visoki predstavnik metafizičke Bosne’, Status: magazin za političku kulturu i društvena pitanja 15: 220-225.

de Rossanet, B. (1997): War and peace in the former Yugoslavia (The Hague, London & Boston).

Schopflin, G. (2000): Nations, identity, power – The New Politics of Europe (London).

Shatzmiller, M (ed.) (2002): Islam and Bosnia: conflict resolution and foreign policy in multi-ethnic states (Montreal).

Simić, N. (2011): Operacija ‘Koridor – 92’ (Banja Luka).

Starešina, V. (2004): Vježbe u laboratoriju Balkan (Zagreb).

Štulfhofer, A. (1993): ‘Testirajući teorije etničkog sukoba: Occamova oštrica i početak rata u Hrvatskoj’, Društvena istraživanja, 2(2/3): 365-382.

Tuđman, F. (1981): Nacionalno pitanje u suvremenoj Europi (Munich).

Tuđman, M. (2005): Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini: [dokumenti 1991.-1995.] (Zagreb).

________. (2012): Programiranje istine – Rasprava o preraspodjelama društvenih zaliha znanja (Zagreb).

Weller, M. (1992): ‘The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, The American Journal of International Law 86(3): 569-607.

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http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=51771

http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=51771


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Sažetak

U radu se daje prikaz rata koji se vodio na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije s posebnim naglaskom na mirovne planove međunarodne zajednice. Preispituje se svrha i učinkovitost međunarodne diplomacije te uloga Republike Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine u novim geopolitičkim odnosima nastalima nakon pada komunizma.Osim navedenoga, daju se odgovori na pitanja što je uzrokovalo sukob, je li sukob mogao biti spriječen te ratni ciljevi zaraćenih strana. Nadalje, autor ističe suprotstavljene interese glavnih aktera u međunarodnoj zajednici te vojnu nemogućnost europskog dijela međunarodne zajednice da implementira mir. Konačno, rad se bavi promjenom vanjske politike Sjedinjenih Američkih Država prema ratu u bivšoj Jugoslaviji od nezainteresiranosti do aktivne politike okončanja rata pod svaku cijenu.


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Walter V. Lalich: “From diaspora to transnational flows”

Walter F. Lalich Department of International Studies Macquarie University Sydney, Australia [email protected]

Croatia has felt the deep impact of its dynamic migrations, voluntary and involuntary, economic and political, to neighbouring and New World countries. Diverse migration flows preclude any uniform analysis of the process, starting with the creation of its early diaspora communities centuries ago, which was followed by economic migration to overseas and European countries, with political and renewed economic migration over the last decades. Major technological and communication changes over the last several decades have had an impact on the dynamics of diverse links established with the country of origin. The independence of Croatia and the breakdown of ideological barriers did not eliminate emigration but provided a new stimulus to the development and expansion of personal and business links, as well as contacts and networks of migrants and their descendants with the place of origin. These global and local structural changes have brought about new dynamics with regard to transnational social spaces grounded in institutional frameworks established from below by migrants. However, it encounters new challenges due to aging demographic structures both in Croatia and among its migrant community. This article analyses complexities of the transnational aspects of the migration process experienced by diverse migrant generations.

Key words: migration flows, diaspora, dynamics, transnational, Croatia, Australia, Croatian-Australians


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From diaspora to transnational flows This contribution reflects on the complexity of Croatian migration experience in a range extending from late medieval diaspora to the second generation community in a dynamic transnational social space generated from below by more recent migrant flows. In the classical interpretation, diaspora implies deterritorialisation,1 migration and settlement in a foreign land far from the place of origin. Diaspora signifies ‘construction of home away from home’ as a consequence of some form of human displacement.2 It implies not only the breakdown of the immediate spatial and organisational links with home but also a yearning for the lost homeland. The centuries-old Croatian diaspora now identified as an ethnic minority in neighbouring European countries continues to uphold transmitted customs and use its ancestral language, or part of it, in everyday communication.3 However, the contemporary comprehension of diaspora has to account for the global dynamics underlined by the prevalent communication and technological revolution, or ‘time-space compression’.4 Moreover, the end of the Cold War initiated new social and political dynamics that generated interaction across a transnational space, between home and abroad, which is of major relevance for Croatia and some other European countries. The migration process was instrumental in the production, expansion and continuity of a transnational social space generated from below by migrants.5 The dynamics of interaction are further enriched by new agents in a vivid transnational social space: migrant descendants or the second generation. They are taking the place of their parents, but under different circumstances and often with an identity crisis and questions of belonging.6

Although some migrants never return and even break links with home, migration is not a one-way process. It is very often followed by continuous communication with the place of origin and through diverse exchanges such as money remittances, private and public investments, as well as involvement in public life and visits. Such links persisted throughout the modern Croatian migration experience too, despite disruptions that were

1 Deleuze & Guattari (1992): 141-45. 2 Totölyan (1996): 8; Clifford (1997): 244; Vertovec (2009): 4-5, 128-37; Glick Schiller (2010): 30-31; Faist (2010): 73-74. 3 Holjevac (1968): 9-16. 4 Harvey (1989): 240. 5 Guarnizo & Smith (2003): 3; Vertovec (2009): 137. 6 Harvey (1996): 246.


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mostly caused by spatial, political and material reasons. The development of a transnational social space as a major feature of migration was followed by diverse institutional inclusions, either through migrant created institutions or diverse official ones from the country of origin. The fluidity of social space across the globe, diminished spatial distances, and increased institutional involvement and agency transfer in the post-migration era expands grounds for interaction within a dynamic transnational social space.

Croatian migration to Australia is diminishing. The aging of the post-World War II migrant generation also changes the intensity of transferred social capital,7 while the hybrid second generation is identified by multiple loyalty and belonging.8 Australia has experienced major immigration, cultural, economic and even political changes that include the application of multicultural policies and practices.9 Together with the reduction of spatial barriers10, these developments reframe the morphology of transnational social space with opportunities unknown until recently. The dynamics of interaction across spatial distances has changed, while the hybrid second generation appropriating a major role within the expanding transnational flows. The application of these key conceptual tools provides a basis for further analysis on the interaction between Croatia and its migrant community, with particular reference to Australia.

The experience of Croatian overseas migrants far away from their country of origin greatly differs from that of the Croatian national minorities and contemporary guest workers, or gastarbeiters, who first went to western European countries in the late 1950s.11 A brief historical introduction to the Croatian migration experience provides a framework for the analysis of the interaction between the home and periphery (migrants), displaying diverse intensities and dynamics, in a range extending from diasporic nostalgia, transnational flows, circular migration and visits to the second generation feeling of ‘neither here, nor there’.12

7 Putnam (1993):163-76; Portes (1995):12-16. 8 Bourque & Duchastel (1999): 195; Papastergiardis (2000): 4, 143. 9 Jupp (2002): 83-104. 10 Harvey (1996): 245. 11 Holjevac (1968): 357-61. 12 Prusac (2006); Totölyan (1996): 29-30.


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From diaspora to transnational flows The existence of various spatial, political, social and economic hindrances presupposes the appearance and existence of diaspora communities as a result of human movements. Their communal space is a product of the reterritorialisation of people and their detachment from the source, except through memory and culture transfers. The diaspora historically implied not only spatial discontinuity but also prevailing difficulties in crossing barriers to communicate with and actively participate at home or even to return. This experience is, to diverse degrees, shared by some other related forms identifying consequences of human spatial movements: immigrants, refugees, exiles, expatriates, guest workers and ethnic communities.13 Various Croatian migrations over different periods and under diverse circumstances, either collectively or individually, forced or voluntary, can be identified within such a broad spectrum of human experiences.

The diaspora is a product of developments in two different social environments, in a country of origin, or home, and in a country of settlement, or host, hence the emphasis is placed on its spatial duality where “the agency is in the diasporic group”.14 It is often a major and sometimes the only medium of interaction between two different and distant localities. However, the diaspora is inevitably influenced by social conditions in the place of settlement, such as its own fragmentation due to diverse factors, including locality of origin, politics, social and class structure. Also, the encounter with forces of acculturation and assimilation, as in Australia until recently,15 impacts deterritorialised cultures.16 The application of multicultural policies and practices was concurrent with contemporary global dynamics identified by radical communication and technological developments,17 which further influenced the creation of distant proximities in a transforming world.18 While accommodating to the prevailing economic conditions in Australia and dealing with social and cultural discrimination, pre-World War II Croatian migrants, and others from the former Yugoslavia, generated a rich cultural life within the intensive parallel public sphere that was attuned to the events at home despite huge spatial distances and hindrances.19

Political, ideological and social changes experienced by many European countries towards the end of the last century eliminated reasons

13 Kalra, Kaur & Hutnyk (2005): 2, 12-16; Clifford (1997): 245, 247-48. 14 Kalra, Kaur & Hutnyk (2005): 3, 17. 15 Jupp (1991): 103-07. 16 Papastergiadis (2000): 115-18. 17 Hutnyk (1997): 128; Clifford (1997): 247. 18 Rosenau (2003): 4-5, 409; Sassen (1999): 135. 19 Price (1963): 241, 303; Tkalcevic (1988): 22-33.


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for the existence of a politically and ideologically defined diaspora that was strongly identified with the “foreign homeland beyond the borders” of the host-state.20 The blockages to return21 have vanished but certain other difficulties remain, which are mostly personal (family reasons, aging, health), social (community life, social security) and economic (finances, investment, housing) reasons. A politically defined contemporary diaspora existed for a much shorter period, unlike the preceding economic migrant community from Croatia that traces its origins to the 19th century. Nevertheless, it was also regenerated by expanding transnational connections through which new forms of interaction are created in conjunction with contemporary global changes.

Upon settlement in a new environment, hybrid identities emerge through everyday encounters, differences and transformations.22 Cultural hybridity or a sense of identification with, and belonging to, different cultures and localities is a major consequence of migrations and diaspora life. It is generated at the point of interaction between different public spheres23 through the process of “intercultural mingling”,24 and represented by self-identification of being in-between. It can be considered as a product of ruptures and discontinuities, integral to the process of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’.25 Cultural hybridity has its own history and, as a dynamic construct, is undergoing continuous transformation and fusion.26 A multivocality of belongings is hence being emphasised rather than a simple affiliation to ethnicity or nation.27 This is of particular significance to the second generation that, although it has inherited culture and transferred social capital, nevertheless has weaker direct links and social capital with the place of origin. On the other hand, their aims and possibilities differ from the former migrant generation within the wide scope of opportunities generated in the transnational social space beyond the ‘myth of return’.28 Within such developments the initial points of departure often become a potential destination, either permanent or temporary. In his analysis, Hesse applies Derrida`s concept of ‘near and far’29 to analyse the diasporic disjuncture of ‘comings and goings’, or home and abroad, that is being deconstructed within the dynamics of transnational social space.

20 Friedman (1997): 71. 21 Kalra, Kaur & Hutnyk (2005): 10. 22 Hall (1990): 235. 23 Papastergiadis (2000): 143; (1997): 259; Werbner (1997): 1-26. 24 Pieterse (2004): 54, 110. 25 Hall (1990): 225. 26 Friedman (1997): 75. 27 Kalra, Kaur & Hutnyk (2005): 10. 28 King (1986): 12-13. 29 Hesse (1993): 176.


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Transnational social space The migration process and the consequent deterritorialisation of cultures generates a transnational social space from below, in other words by the migrants themselves. Migrants, individually or collectively, generate diverse links between the place of settlement and their home through their own activities, including continuous flows of ideas, symbols, money, goods and services.30 The established nodes of transnational social space generate new opportunities across space within the global communication revolution that is identified by changes in the nature, intensity and density of communication flows.31 Similarly to transnational space generated from above by diverse public bodies, government, religious institutions, business and media activities,32 it transcends spatial and political boundaries with diverse intensity. Such migrant activities impact on both social environments: the countries of origin and settlement. Transferred ancestral languages are a major medium of exchange in the transnational social space generated from below. They will be replaced by the host country language (English in this case) in a later stage through intergenerational changes and gradual disappearance of the transferred maternal languages.

Changes in social environments at both ends also have implications on the nature and dynamics of transnational social space. Australia accepted a multicultural policy, opened doors to non-European migrants, and incorporated into the mainstream many aspects of the cultures brought by diverse European and other migrants. Croatia became an independent state. However, Croatian emigration to Australia has radically decreased over the last decades, while return migration is accompanied by the flow of investment and tourists. Trips to and from Australia to Europe now take a day or two, not weeks, an important factor if viewed in comparison to much closer European migration destination countries where much larger number of Croatian migrants settled. The telephone and internet have replaced letters, while TV programs are being transmitted globally. Migration extended social space, while dramatic communication changes created new proximities that facilitate dynamic transnational flows.

The development, existence and sustainability of a transnational social space depend on people, their needs, activities, and social capital, including the established networks at home and in the place of settlement. People arrive with their own cultural needs and customs, and desire to satisfy and maintain it irrespective of circumstances. They send money and diverse goods to the ancestral home, but also satisfy certain needs by importing goods and ideas unless they are found locally. However, because of cultural 30 Faist (2000): 240; Portes (1998): 47; Light & Gold (2001): 151. 31 Castells (1991): 167, 350. 32 Guarnizo & Smith (1998): 3.


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differences migrants often experience scarcity of opportunities and suitable places where they can satisfy their perceived social needs. With their own, and often very scarce means, migrants create their own environment or habitus33 while adapting to new social environments.

To satisfy their diverse collectively perceived social needs, migrants often mobilise human and bonding social capital, as well as organisational and material resources to establish formal organisations with the aim to appropriate critical physical resources, e.g. buildings, that can satisfy a perceived collective spiritual and secular need. Migrants’ willingness to contribute to a collective good is determined by diverse factors, such as the experienced settlement constraints, the availability of close substitutes, unknown alternatives, communication networks, as well as the strength of personal ties and mutual dependency that include the cost of leaving or not joining a group.34 Collective homogeneity, the intensity of the felt need, and the degree of commitment and compliance also impacts on the appropriation of needed collective goods.35 According to Rex36 a sense of identity and belonging, as a major ethnic resource, provides an advantage in forming community infrastructure in comparison to ‘mainstream’ community groups and social movements. The experience of many migrant groups that appropriated their own communal place underlines a point raised by Simmel37 and Olson38 that small homogeneous groups can much more easily respond to perceived needs and mobilise resources than larger and latent groups.

Secular and spiritual communal places appropriated by migrant collectives are a major channel of communication towards other segments of the ethnic group, host society and home. Such communal mobilisation affects community life over a longer period and generates a social space with dynamic local and transnational relations that are mutually interlocked and constitutive in a communicative process.39 These places facilitate continuous communication between social actors, i.e. migrants with the outside world, enabling cultural maintenance and intensive exchange with the place of origin. Such culturally and symbolically defined communal places are major symbolic, material and communication nodes of a transnational social space. Their importance is emphasised by the endeavour of over 450 ethnic collectives that have appropriated their spiritual and

33 Bourdieu (2000): 157. 34 Hechter (1987): 47. 35 Frank (1997): 240. 36 Rex (1994): 3-12. 37 Simmel (1964): 9. 38 Olson (1971): 28. 39 Smith (2001): 92.


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secular communal homes in Sydney since World War II.40 The pre-war Croatian migrants had a key role in the creation of the now extinguished Yugoslav Migrant Association41 with thirty branches throughout Australia. The post-World War II Croatian migrants appropriated 70 spiritual and secular communal places across Australia.42 These historically and socially diverse institutional frameworks had a crucial role in the development of the Australian–Croatian transnational social space generated from below despite diverse hindrances.

The new interactive social space is being created as a consequence of human movement transcending cultural, spatial and political boundaries. However, its structure and dynamics are influenced by diverse internal and outside factors. Besides the aging and subsequent weakening of transferred social capital, intergenerational changes in both social environments also create certain limitations to the configuration and dynamics of transnational social space. The perception of migration is changing at home too, and with it the response to the changes in the diaspora. Such developments inevitably change the perception of a transnational social space within which new opportunities appear that were not perceived until recently. The aspirations of the second or ‘new’ generation differ from their parents, as they seek new opportunities for themselves that differ also according to the place where they could be realised, which for some could mean in the ancestral country. The coming mid-century will see new challenges, emerging within a transnational social space generated by the former migrants, of interest to both the ancestral and new home country.

The independence of Croatia and the breakdown of political and ideological barriers did not eliminate emigration but provides a new stimulation to the development and expansion of personal and business links, contacts and networks of migrants and their descendants with the place of origin. The transnational social space established from below and grounded in migrant appropriated institutional frameworks acquired new dynamics due to major global, communication and local structural changes. However it encounters new challenges due to aging demographic structures, both in Croatia and its migrant community. The mutuality of the interests of the new generations in both environments is more diffuse and differs from the intensive social capital prevailing among the older generations, either transferred or developed during settlement in the new environment. These disparate developments will continue to occur within the process of the further transition of Croatian society inside the European Union.

40 Lalich (2004). 41 Alagich & Kosovich (2001): 236; Tkalčević (1988): 46. 42 Lalich (2004/05): 95, 118.


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The Croatian migration experience Croatia has felt the deep impact of voluntary and involuntary migrations, economic and political, to neighbouring countries and the New World. Current post-independence transition difficulties following the social, political and economic structural changes since independence in 1991 have generated the latest emigration. The country’s diverse migration experiences, centuries apart, preclude any uniform analysis. Croatian diaspora communities were established in neighbouring countries as the outcome of the several centuries of wars against Ottoman Turkish invasions, beginning in the late fifteenth century. These communities were detached from the home country for centuries, but have preserved the customs and language in their original form in localities that even bore Croatian names. The classical interpretation of the term diaspora applies to the estimated number of 186,000 members of Croatian minorities in neighbouring countries, such as Austria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Czech Republic.43 These communities share the diaspora experience of the much better known Greek, Jewish and Armenian diasporas.44

Croatians living in other parts of the former Yugoslavia are either autochthonous to the area or had settled there in search of better living conditions over the last several centuries and decades. In neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian national segment is one of three constitutive population national bodies, alongside the Serbs and Bosniaks. A much smaller number of the autochthonous Croatian population live across the borders in Montenegro and Serbia,45 while many migrated to Slovenia for employment and career reasons after the Second World War. Their status is a consequence of political upheavals and continuous border changes until recent times. However, despite such political disconnections, these entities are much more integral to the social, political and cultural life in Croatia proper than the Croatian minority communities in other European countries. Moreover, many share their lives, including dual citizenship, between two countries, the home country and Croatia.

In the early decades of the 20th century, industrialisation opened employment opportunities to several generations of economic migrants to European and overseas countries from impoverished Croatia, which was considered one of the economically most backward parts of the Habsburg Empire.46 This was followed by emigration from Yugoslavia between two world wars, and from the post-war communist-run state, in spite of its own

43 Holjevac (1968): 14. 44 Clifford (1997): 249. 45 Agičić et al. (2000): 160. 46 Good (1984): 244-46, 278; Holjevac (1968): 32-34, 37-38.


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industrialisation efforts.47 Moreover, some migrated even before the Great War because of political reasons, including to Australia.48 Political migration continued from royal Yugoslavia between the wars and greatly expanded during the communist Yugoslav regime, leading to the creation of a major Croatian political diaspora. There were some five hundred thousand Croatian migrants before World War II, but only approximately one percent settled in Australia by 1947; that is at least 5,020.49 Still, this was a fivefold increase since 1921 making them, after Germans, Italians and Greeks the fourth largest group of continental European settlers in Australia at that stage. However, the post-World War II migration dynamics involving the arrival of refugees and displaced persons revived chain migration and increased economic migration after Australia signed an immigration agreement with former Yugoslavia in 1970.50 This development had a deep impact on the numbers, as well as the social and political orientation of Croatian migrants in Australia.

There was a significant voluntary return migration from overseas countries to Croatia throughout this period.51 Often it was a circular migration back to the place of former settlement or even change in migration destinations. However, there were two major return migration events that have few parallels in modern migration history. The first was the forced repatriation from Australia in 1919 of around 574 Croatians who, as Austro-Hungarian citizens, were interned during the War.52 Despite this experience some returned to Australia during the 1920’s. The second was the return of 8,320 Croatian migrants and their families from overseas between 1945 and 1951,53 making up 52% of all returnees to communist-run Yugoslavia. Croatian returnees from Australia made up 14% of all Croatians who returned over that period. Also, they made up 90% of all returnees from Australia, a ratio that approximately corresponds to their share among all migrants from Yugoslavia on this continent.54 Return migrations had a major impact not only on migrant communities, but also on the increased awareness of Australia as a potential migration destination in many parts of a country that had no such migration experience. Such diverse movements significantly influenced the rapid increase in increased Croatian migration in the post-World War II period. There was continuous individual return migration in later decades, but its significance increased during the war for 47 Holjevac (1968): 360-65. 48 Darveniza (1986): 30. 49 Holjevac (1968): 33, 51; Price (1963): 11. 50 Jupp (1991): 77. 51 Holjevac (1968): 51, 55-57; Wyman (1993): 10-11. 52 Budak & Lalich (2008): 91. 53 Šegvić (1953): 18. 54 Lalich (2010): 68.


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independence and in later years, when it overshadowed emigration to Australia.

The Australian –Croatian transnational social space Migrants created the first communication bridge between Croatia, including its regions and villages, and Australia, with its mining centres and suburban market gardens, lasting for many decades. Migrant departures, return visits, letters and remittances introduced Australia to their families and neighbours at home. The Australian-Croatian transnational social space generated by migrant actions had overcome not only the spatial, but for decades many other hindrances, including material, ideological and administrative ones. It is a product of human labour generating new perspectives in a changing world. As a consequence of changes in the profile of migrants, transport and communication modes, the patterns and dynamics of the established linkages evolved over time as well.

Migration from Croatia to Australia began after the opening of the Suez Canal. The first migrants came mostly from the coastal region of Dalmatia and other littoral areas, arriving initially as Austrian and later as Yugoslav citizens. Consequently, they were for decades identified either as Austrians or ‘Yugo-Slavs’,55 although the second attribute also incorporated other migrants from former Yugoslavia. The post-World War II migration originated from diverse parts of the country and included political migrants too. With it begins a clear identification according to national background (and not current citizenship) on the part of the majority of the Croatian migrants. Moreover, this arrival further contributed to community fragmentation and even internal animosities.

Migration to Australia The number of Croatian migrants to Australia increased quickly after the war; around 10,500 arrived within the initial five year refugee program.56 Very soon chain migration was revived as well. The 2001 Census records 51,909 persons born in Croatia, besides those born in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other parts of former Yugoslavia.57 The increase in numbers is very much indicative of post-war changes in Australian immigration policy, migration patterns and consequently of the country’s demographic structure. The new immigration policy was very much supported by the signing of immigration agreements with various European countries with the aim of attracting migrants, including with former Yugoslavia in 1970. According to the 2006 Census data, at least 118,046

55 Price (1963): 239-43; Darveniza (1986): 35. 56 Kunz (1988): 43; Drapac (2001): 246. 57 DIMA/CRC (2003): 21-27.


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persons claimed Croatian origin in Australia,58 (though some observers indicate much larger numbers),59 of whom 30,000 persons have at least one parent born in Australia. Recent migrations did not contribute significantly to an increase in their numbers, but the increased awareness of a Croatian background after independence by many who had earlier identified as Yugoslavs very likely did have an impact on reporting ethnic origin. In comparison, there were 105,747 persons of Croatian origin Australia-wide in 2001, ranking at that stage as the eleventh largest among the non-English speaking ethnic communities. Unlike the pre-war migrants who went inland, mostly to mining centres like Boulder-Kalgoorlie and Broken Hill, or to Mildura and the cane-cutting fields in northern Queensland, post-war settlers mostly settled in major coastal capital and industrial cities.60 Despite renewed chain migration, housing and prevailing employment opportunities, no significant spatial concentration of Croatian settlers emerged. Their largest concentrations in the Sydney metropolitan area in 2001 is dispersed across the western suburbs of Fairfield, Blacktown and Liverpool, where nearly 8,000 Croatian-speaking persons made up only three per cent of all settlers who use a language other than English at home.61 Although as many as five social clubs and two churches were established throughout the vast Western Sydney area, the dispersed spatial settlement made it difficult to sustain social and cultural activities.

The Australian-Croatian transnational social space is framed not only by distance, but also by demography, its aging structure, decrease in new arrivals, language use and maintenance, and by the political and social changes in Croatia. The following indicators on language usage are indicative: the 2006 census identifies 69,851 persons who speak the Croatian language at home in different degrees (a decrease of 6,014 since 1996), including 22,962 persons in Sydney, and 21,688 members of the second generation.62 This indicates not only the decrease in language retention but also the perceived future potential within the established transnational social space, indicating how the English language will appropriate a major role in communication with the ancestral home.

In his analysis, Škvorc63 underlines that as little as a third of the first generation uses Croatian language regularly while another third uses it occasionally. Out of an estimated 41,179 members of the second generation, fifty per cent have only limited knowledge of the language. The decrease in

58 ABS (2008). 59 Drapac (2001): 246; Hoško (1996): 5; Tkalčević (1992): 40; Škvorc (2005): 190. 60 Tkalčević (1988): 75. 61 DIMA/CRC (2003). 62 DIMA/CRC (2003): 14, 128; ABS (2008); ABS (2003); EAC (1988). 63 Škvorc (2005): 28.


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language use is no surprise, as language use and maintenance decreases with the intergenerational changes in migration. On the other hand, Alba64 claims that although 50% of those who feel their ethnicity (in the USA) use a re-territorialised mother tongue to some degree, they do not consider it to be of exclusive importance in their identification. However, language retention is just one of the transnational social space indicators as it is also identified through various everyday activities and the less visible symbolic representation. Probably, the most significant one is the experience of a sense of home, belonging to different places, being in-between, leading to the willingness of migrant descendants to acquire second or dual citizenship, even if they have little knowledge of both the language and the country of origin. Although many members of the first generation appropriate such a diffuse sense of belonging through a process of acculturation, the future transnational social space provides a basis for the second and coming generation to find themselves within its fluid scope. The aspirations and paths of the younger generations are not necessarily the same as those of their parents who left home in search of a better life. Among the reasons for this difference is the educational gap between the diverse generations’ prospective professional and career aspirations and potentials. Australian population dynamics A major feature of contemporary Australian demographic dynamics is the increasing number of its inhabitants living abroad for an indefinite time period.65 Such developments identify Australia as a migration or expat source country as diverse population segments leave the continent without an expressed plan to return in the near future. However, not only former migrants return to the country of origin. Over the last three decades the ratio of permanent departures to arrivals increased from 21.7% in 1979-89 to 50.5 % in the first decade of this century. According to the age structure from 1959-60 to 2008-09, the active working age group from 25 to 64 made up nearly 61% of all permanent departures in comparison to over 13% of persons over 65. Dependants up to 14 years represented 17% of all permanent departures, while there were 9% in the group between 15 and 24 years. This data concurs with findings by Hugo and his collaborators,66 according to which the vast majority among a researched sample of 2,070 permanent departures were due to career, professional development and higher wages. Life style changes, marriages and job transfers followed in significance, well ahead of education and various personal reasons such as a desire to join family and friends, divorce and expand business opportunities.

64 Alba (1990): 79. 65 Hugo et al. (2003). 66 Hugo et al. (2003): 44.


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The background of people leaving Australia permanently and their destinations in continental Europe is also very indicative. Among 81,000 departures in the year 2008-09, over half were born in Australia, but only 1.2% in South-Eastern Europe, including 133 persons in Croatia. Of those born in Australia nearly 68% were in the active age group from 24 to 54 years, but among those born in South-Eastern Europe, including Croatia, persons older than 55 years make up over 50% departures in comparison to 6.6% born in Australia and 11% of all permanent departures. While the Australian-born are leaving in search of career and employment opportunities, the South-Eastern European-born mostly leave because of retirement. According to various estimates, approximately 4,000 persons from Australia now live in Croatia, and probably half are retirees, representing around 3-4% of the estimated Croatian settlers in Australia.

It is recorded that, out of about 9,850 persons who left Australia with the intent to settle in one of the South-Eastern European countries over a ten year period starting from the 1998/1999 statistical year, 17% departed with the intent to remain for good in Croatia. Of the 2,919 persons who were born in Australia, 11% planned to stay in Croatia, while 19.7% of those born outside Australia had the same intent. This indicator can be compared with the historical data by Price,67 who claimed that 45% of inter-war migrants returned to former Yugoslavia, while Šegvić68 was more circumspect, indicating a return of 17.7% migrants. In the largest ever collective ethnic departure from Australia, nearly 20% of all pre-war Croatian settlers left for Yugoslavia in 1948-49, but only 14 % were older than 55 years of age.69

Transnational social space: a new landscape Recent political and social changes in Europe reignited links between the involuntary older diasporic minorities in neighbouring countries and the country of origin after a long-time gap. A spatial proximity facilitated expanding communication and generated new exchanges. The effects of such spatial proximity are shared by the post-1950s economic migrants or ‘guest-workers’ in Western European countries. Despite larger spatial distances, migrants in overseas destinations also benefited as major contemporary transport and communication/technological changes made major inroads into the sense of spatial distances. Those communities became spatially closer to the country of origin. The last segment of this article is about the changing transnational perspectives for the deterritorialised but heterogeneous overseas migrant communities. 67 Price (1963): 102. 68 Šegvić (1953): 8. 69 Lalich (2010): 98.


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The migration story is a history of settlement and of various paths and degrees of inclusion in the host society. Also, many migrants, despite diverse hindrances, kept some form of connection with the home country besides the emotional one. Migrants and their particular collectives are included in transnational social space in different modes marked by diverse activities, density and intensity. However, Croatian and many other European emigrants are aging, and many who arrived in their early twenties during the 1970s are already close to retirement.70 To some it could mean retirement in Croatia, but probably not for the majority, since they do not want to, or cannot, part from their families, descendants and perceived advantages of the social system to which they have become accustomed. It is very much indicative that, though the number of retirees who returned to Croatia since independence doubled within a decade,71 it still represents a small proportion of Croatian migrants in Australia. The vast majority of persons who travel to Croatia with the intent to remain permanently are retirees. This indicates the current reluctance of people of working age to go to Croatia for a longer time period.

The war for independence during the first half of the 1990s had a major role in mobilizing the Croatian diaspora and re-energizing the transnational social space; this led to the enhanced participation of migrants during the war and post-war transition. This was accompanied with a flow of funds, experience and ideas. Something similar occurred in the post-1945 years, with active migrant involvement through aid collections and their return to help families, rebuild the country and participate in the development of a new social system.72 A new discontinuity was then caused by the grave economic crisis and hardline communist politics in Yugoslavia that soon brought return migration and active participation to an abrupt end. Also, the breakdown of Yugoslavia’s relationship with its former major ally, the USSR, confounded many migrants and led to the breakdown of the supportive institutional network. However, even before independence various agencies had appropriated a major role within the migrant developed transnational social space. Among such important institutional involvements was the establishment of a Roman Catholic network in Australia, Croatian Heritage Association media and cultural activities, and cultural and sport exchanges. Similarly, the SBS media program in Australia had a significant role in expanding transnational social space.

Both former Yugoslav and Croatian governments had an active role in expanding transnational space, by opening diplomatic and consular representations, promoting return, tourism, and even investment. Moreover,

70 Peiskar (2009/10): 54-55. 71 Hugo et al. (2003): 23. 72 Lalich (2010).


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the Australian authorities also appropriated a major role through diplomatic recognition of Croatia, immigration policies, dual citizenship, establishment of diplomatic and consular representations, migration agreements, pension transfer accords, acceptance of the Croatian language in the education system, and the initial support for the Croatian language program at Macquarie University. To this could be added inter-University agreements signed with diverse Croatian universities, by Macquarie and some other Australian universities, participation in financing Croatian Studies by the Croatian government, Summer schools in both countries, scholarships and other activities. Various Croatian sporting and cultural representations at international events had a major impact on the migrants’ sense of belonging and led to public representations of multi-vocal belonging during important international sporting events.73 Such developments are indicative of continuous dynamics and changing patterns well beyond the initial migrant activities in a transnational social space established from below.

Among exogenous agencies that impact on the nature of the earlier established transnational social space are media in both the English and Croatian languages, and in particular segments that promote Croatia as a travel destination.74 Foreign investment in this transition country is still very low, though some major investment was made by migrant entrepreneurs, including those from Australia. Likewise, the official recognition of Croatia as an independent state in 1992, and UN and NATO membership, had an important symbolic effect on the transnational social space by expanding its scope and providing a new impetus. A similar impact came through the establishment of Croatian diplomatic and consular representations throughout the world, and even by the participation of migrants in providing necessary facilities for such purposes, like the construction of the embassy in Canberra and purchasing consular offices in Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. EU membership from mid-2013 is expected to further expand opportunities that could be of particular interest for the second generation holding dual citizenship. Such diverse influences, compounded by major political events and social changes, brought the home country closer to migrants and their descendants, expanding the potential of the transnational social space generated through the migration process.

New generations in the transnational social space The major landmark in modern Croatian history will be its forthcoming EU membership. The post-war migration generation welcomed independence; however, the forthcoming event, though politically gratifying to many, is

73 Tadić (2007): 148-49. 74 Anonymous (2008); Crouch (2012).


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nevertheless an event within which the second or subsequent generations could look forward to new opportunities. To the first generation, such a perspective is primarily of symbolic significance, but to their descendants such an event has the potential to impact on their lives, experiences and open career fields beyond the confines of the limited Australian social and market potentials. It comes as no surprise that a significant number of the second generation have acquired dual citizenship, irrespective of their inadequate knowledge of heritage, history, culture and language. Such decisions indicate that contemporary Croatia is already considered by a section of the new generations as a place where alternative opportunities could be found.

Various endogenous and exogenous factors could nevertheless impact on the second or new generations’ inclusion in the dynamic transnational social space. The most obvious endogenous influence comes from the degree of successful intergenerational transfer of heritage, culture and social capital within the family and immediate community, including the transfer and use of the ancestral language. The exogenous factors are located in social environments in both countries and in the role of governments in creating a positive climate and policies, such as multicultural policies and practices in Australia, and in the pursuit of policy measures and channels of communication with migrants and their descendants on the part of Croatia. Among various practices is the support of language education and culture transfer in Australia, which is to a very large degree left to the aging local community, in comparison to the emphasis given by Greek and Italian government policies on language maintenance.75 Another major consideration is found in the growing awareness in Australia of its own large expatriate community and the suggested need to develop adequate policies to keep in touch with it and procure national benefit out of its overseas experience.76 Considered as Australian expatriates, the hybrid second generation would more likely, but not necessarily, be much more inclined to turn their attention to the ancestral home than other segments of the expatriate community.

It comes as no surprise that a well known former footballer of Croatian descent, Tony Popovic, declares in the The Sun Herald77 regarding his travel plans that “… My family is from there and I enjoy the history of the place; … old and new… But I admit I am biased…” Many belonging to this generation probably will not change their place of residence, but to some the symbolic attachment will define their favourite travel destination,

75 Giorgas (2008): 62-63. 76 Hugo et al. (2003): 14-15. 77 Anonymous (2009): 6.


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as it is in his case, Dubrovnik and Croatia. Aging migrants are leaving behind a symbolic cognisance of their heritage, origin, place of birth, and some words and idioms. With exceptions, such inheritance leaves a mark on the second generation. Helped by strong feelings of symbolic attachment, the appropriation of the Croatian language or some words is within reach, as it will confirm the feeling of being at home whilst making a visit or pursuing some other life opportunities.

The effects of such dynamic changes have replaced in significance the former large scale migration from Croatia to Australia. These developments are further accompanied by the flow of investment, tourism and even return migration to Croatia. Such developments generate new perspectives for the Croatian language in this transnational social space established from below. Despite the disappearance of some other small community continental European languages at Macquarie University, the number of students enrolled in Croatian language studies has been well sustained despite intergenerational changes,78 though there is continuous increase in the proportion of students coming from other ethnic backgrounds and mixed marriages. This offers positive expectations about the perspectives for this language as an important medium of communication in transnational social space.

However, such expectations are constrained by a decrease in the numbers of students of schoolage studying the Croatian language and the intergenerational transfer of a local dialect and vernacular language that causes difficulties in contact with standard Croatian language speakers. The other major constraint in language transfer is the inadequate institutional support for language teaching. Despite securing financial support from the Croatian government and inter-University agreements for the tertiary Croatian language studies, little has been done to support such measures with the needed teaching staff.

To the first generation, the transnational social space formed through their own diverse individual and collective activities was a mode of survival and continuous pattern of inclusion at home, and also in the receiving country. It was an important channel through which many secured a possible retreat from diverse difficulties and obstacles encountered in the place of settlement. To the new generations it has a different meaning as it provides additional dynamics or a ‘playing field’ in a new world of communication. The transnational space of the first generation fades away, but the dynamics of social, political, communication and technological changes impacts on trans-national social space morphology and opens new possibilities for second and subsequent generations on a scale unknown to

78 Budak (2008): 177-84; (2002/03): 370.


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their parents. However, like any entrance in a new communication field it is not necessarily a smooth process, since difficulties could emerge from different sides. Among such hindrances are the unresolved property ownership issues in Croatia that are an outcome of emigration. This could cause not only a certain disadvantage to migrants and their descendants, but also ill-will among relatives who used the land in their absence. Similar tensions could also surface in dealings with other segments of ancestral society, and in particular at the time of economic crisis the country is experiencing.

A very recent Croatian government decision, imposing strict language, culture and heritage knowledge test requirements for citizenship application,79 without providing assistance, would pose a major obstacle to many applicants. Such a decision is made despite many publicly voiced problems in the relation of the home country to its own overseas migrant community or diaspora. It tells us that the decision makers did not make consultations before making such legislation. Least of all did it take into account that a weekly, Hrvatski vjesnik (Croatian Herald) from Melbourne, is now published by the second generation; its rich English-language supplement The New Generation is published regularly, and has already seen 775 editions. Such decisions would cause unnecessary pain and expense to individuals who may have desires to return and would also have a negative impact on the goodwill of migrants and their descendants. This could have negative effects on transnational perspectives and on aging Croatia facing major social and economic issues. The transnational context is changing with the inevitable loss of the first generation, when migrant remittances will fall and when tourist visits will replace family visits and connections. Hence a need for this small country with a large migrant population to go beyond its borders and take into account the potentials of its large deterritorialised population segment, towards which it would have to show much greater flexibility than has been indicated so far.

With such a stringent move Croatia is taking an adverse attitude towards positively oriented migrant descendants on distant shores. Good advice can be derived from a warning made at the height of the current global financial crisis by the president of the leading Italian cultural institution in Australia, CO.AS.IT, that a major decrease in the financing of Italian language classes overseas would not only have a negative impact on Italian economy through a decrease in tourist visits.80 There is a need for more openness by the mainstream Croatian society towards its scattered diaspora and a better understanding of its migrants; and even more so when

79 MUP (2012). 80 Comastri (2009):8.


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the number of emigrants is still higher than that of immigrants to Croatia. The ancestral home is in a position to adapt to current global changes

and to gain better understanding of migrants and in particular the complexity of issues encountered by their descendants. The significance of the Croatian language as a medium of exchange in transnational social space inevitably gradually diminishes through decline in the numbers of its speakers due to a decrease in migration and aging. The fortunes of the Croatian language primarily appropriates a role of identity representation in a culturally diverse society while decreasing in significance in cultural and commercial exchange, except where the first generation still has the main role. It is a medium of identification within a dynamic social environment as the English language is spoken by the second generation. To a culturally hybrid second generation and other travellers, the Croatian language is a companion or second language to a major global language in an ever expanding communication space. It is noted by Alba81 that a knowledge and occasional use of several words inherited from their migrant parents serves as symbolic identification within the wider community. This statement identifies the symbolic significance of transferred cultures through the migration process and the seeds of a transnational social space, irrespective of intergenerational shifts and the weakening of bonding social capital with the ancestral home.

Concluding remarks The dynamic Australian-Croatian transnational social space built by migrants is at the point of major changes. The new configuration appears due to current global changes and the perceived mobility of the hybrid second generation. Croatia, like other former European emigration source countries, has an aging population and it could be expected that it can find its own economic and demographic interest in attracting the attention of the new generations of Croatian descent beyond their symbolic identification, acceptance of dual citizenship, and support for its national sports teams. It is a complex process that is outside the scope of aging migrants who generated such potent communication opportunities with the ancestral home, which still has to discover opportunities arising out of former migration. Additional ingenuity by all concerned parties is required if the Croatian language is to continue to keep its role as a medium of exchange in a dynamic transnational space. In this respect, the transnational space established by the overseas migrants differs from the local European transnational space generated through the centuries old diaspora and guest workers that will be further supported by the forthcoming EU membership.

81 Alba (1990): 84.


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Inevitably, the sustainability of ties made through migration and transnational dynamics is a matter of a personal, cultural and economic interest alongside the public interest of the place of origin and the home country of a new generation. Sustainability of dynamic transnational ties would benefit both countries. The prospective further social and economic changes in Croatia would benefit from a proactive policy of language education and maintenance beyond its shores.

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King, R. (1986): ‘Return Migration and Regional Economic Development: An Overview.’ In: Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems, ed. R. King (Beckenham): 1-37.

Kunz, E.F. (1988): Displaced Persons: Calwell’s New Australians (Canberra).

Lalich (Lalić), W.V. (2004): ‘Ethnic Community Capital: The development of ethnic social infrastructure in Sydney’, Unpublished PhD Thesis (UTS, Sydney).

________. (2004/05): ‘The Development of Croatian Communal Places in Sydney’, Croatian Studies Review 3-4: 95-124.

________. (2010): ‘Exodus iz Australije u doba Hladnog rata: Povratak hrvatskih iseljenika iz Australije brodovima Partizanka i Radnik godine 1948-1949’, Gordogan 8 (19-22): 66-126.

Light, I. & Gold, S.J. (2000): Ethnic Economics (London).

MUP (Ministarstvo Unutarnjih Poslova) (2012): 'Pravilnik o načinu provjere poznavanja hrvatskog jezika i latiničnog pisma, hrvatske kulture i društvenog uređenja u postupcima stjecanja hrvatskog državljanstva’, Narodne Novine 118/2012

http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2012_10_118_2563.html

Olson, M. (1965): The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass. & London).

Papastergiadis, N. (2000): The Turbulence of Migration (Cambridge).

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________. (1997): ‘Tracing Hybridity in Theory’. In: Debating Cultural Hybridity, eds. P. Werbner & T. Madood (London): 257-281.

Pieterse, J.N. (2004): Globalization & Culture: Global Mélange (Lanham).

Portes, A. (1995): ‘Economic Sociology and Sociology of Immigration: A Conceptual overview’. In: The Economic Sociology of Immigration, ed. A. Portes (New York): 1-46.

Price, Ch. (1963): Southern Europeans in Australia (Melbourne).

Prusac, T. (2006): ‘Neither Here, Nor There` Becomes Best of Both Worlds-Thanks to Sport, Not Politics’, The New Generation: Croatian Herald English Supplement 9 (403) 11/08/2006 (Melbourne): 1.

Putnam, R.D. (1993): Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton).

Rex, J. (1994): ‘Ethnic Mobilization in Multi-Cultural Societies’. In: Ethnic Mobilisation in Multi-Cultural Europe, eds. J. Rex & B. Drury (Aldershot): 3-12.

Rosenau, J.N. (2003): Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization (Princeton).

Sassen, S. (1999): ‘Cracked Casings: Notes toward an Analytics for Studying Transnational Processes’. In: Sociology for the Twenty-first Century, ed. J. L. Abu-Lughod (Chicago & London): 134-145.

Simmel, G. (1964): The Sociology (New York).

Smith, M.P. (2001): Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization (Malden, Mass. and Oxford).

Šegvić, V. (1953): Povratak jugoslavenske ekonomske emigracije 1945-51 (Belgrade).

Škvorc, B. (2005): Australski Hrvati: Mitovi i Stvarnost (Zagreb).

Tadić, I. (2007): Marija Kraljica Hrvata: Hrvatski Katolički Centar (Wollongong & Zagreb).

Tkalčević, M. (1992): Hrvati u Australiji (Zagreb).

________. (1988): Croats in Australia (Melbourne).

Totölyan, K. (1996): ‘Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 5(1): 3-36.

Vertovec, S. (2009): Transnationalism (London & New York).

Werbner, P. (1997): ‘Introduction: The Dialects of Cultural Hybridity’. In: Debating Cultural Hybridity, eds. P. Werbner & T. Modood (London & New Jersey): 1-26.

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Sažetak Hrvatska dugo osjeća utjecaj migracijske dinamike, dragovoljne i prisilne, gospodarstvene i političke, prema susjednim zemljama i Novom svijetu. Migracija je i dalje nazočna premda se politička i gospodarstvena struktura Hrvatske izmijenila od neovisnosti 1991. godine. Različita migracijska kretanja prijeće jednostranu analizu procesa, počevši od stvaranja dijaspore stoljećima unazad, koju je slijedila ekonomsko iseljavanje u prekomorske i Europske zemlje do političke i obnovljene ekonomske migracije tijekom zadnjih desetljeća. Prisutna povratna migracija, uključivo i večih grupa, imala je znatan utjecaj na domicilno i iseljeničko okruženje. Velike tehnološke i komunikacijske promjene tijekom zadnjih desetljeća utjecale su na dinamičnost različitih spona iseljenika s domovinom. Samostalnost Hrvatske i lom ideoloških prepreka nisu zaustavili iseljavanje, ali su utemeljili nove poticaje za razvoj i širenje osobnih i poslovnih spona te izmreženosti kontakata iseljenih i njihovih potomaka s maticom. Transnacionalni društveni prostor utemeljen na društvenoj infrastrukturi uspostavljenoj odozdo od strane iseljenih dobio je novu dinamiku s evidentnim globalnim i lokalnim strukturalnim promjenama. Međutim, suočava se istodobno s novim izazovima podstaknutim i starenjem demografskih struktura Hrvatske i iseljeničkih zajednica. Zajedništvo novih generacija oba okruženja je uvjetovano raspršenošću njihovih interesa i razlikuje se od jakog društvenog kapitala koji je postojao kod starijih generacija. Ovaj novi proces nastaviti će se tijekom daljnje tranzicije hrvatskog društva unutar Europske Unije. Ovaj rad analizira složenost transnacionalnih aspekata iseljeničkih iskustava različitih iseljeničkih generacija.


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Dragan Komadina: “A Short history of Croatian theatre in Bosnia and Herzegovina”

Dragan Komadina Faculty of Performing Arts University of Sarajevo Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegiovina [email protected]

Abstract The history of Croatian theatre in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be separated from the Western European theatre – from poorly documented ancient to somewhat stronger and more visible medieval influences. However, the development of Croatian drama and theatre in Bosnia and Herzegovina, interrupted during the Ottoman occupation, was renewed in the spirit of national revival during the 19th century, first in Mostar, and then in Sarajevo. The peak of the theatrical development was reached in the late 1990s, when the Croatian National Theatre was established in Mostar. It was the first theatrical institution with the prefix Croatian. Over the course of nearly half a millennium, Croatian dramatic works succeeded in not only preserving the national identity, but also in making a significant contribution to intercultural exchanges in this part of Europe through the rich and stormy political past of the Balkans.

Key words: Croatians, Bosna and Herzegovina, theatre, Croatian drama in Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Croatian National Theatre in Mostar


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The history of theatre in Herzegovina could be extended to the primordial image from the cave of Badanj at the locality of Borojevići in the surroundings of Stolac: the indigenous inhabitants of present day Herzegovina gather round a fire telling stories. One of them unexpectedly rises to conjure up the tale of the hunt so that it is convincing for the audience. Suddenly, a figure larger than the story-teller appears on the crag of the cave. This first stage effect before an audience in the early Stone Age could be one of the entirely probable hypotheses regarding the emergence of theatrical phenomena in Herzegovina.

One had to wait a few thousand years for the codification of agricultural rituals or rituals of fertility from which, according to historians and anthropologists, the first theatre emerged. Equally, we can only presume that Greek influences reached the Illyrian city of Daorson – modern day Ošanići near Stolac. Did the inhabitants living behind the thick megalithic walls of Daorson enjoy the Dionysian festivities, out of which Greek tragedy later developed, as well as the scenes of the works of Aeschylus, Sophocles or Aristophanes? Or is it more probable that, through the concentrated network of their roads which traversed Herzegovina in all directions, it was the Romans who served as the medium between the indigenous people of Herzegovina with the theatre of antiquity? It is not impossible that Roman comedians performed their Attelan farces, which began in the second century BC, in one of the Roman municipia throughout Herzegovina – in Delminium (Tomislavgrad), Bistue Vetus (Rama), Pelvium (Livno) or Diluntum (Stolac). Or did the Herzegovinian theatre lovers have to be dragged to Narona – which, alongside Epidaurum and Salona, was the largest city of this part of the Empire – in order to enjoy the comedies of Plautus and Terence?1 These are all hypotheses …

What is certain is that Christianity did not look favourably upon the theatre as it existed in Rome in the fourth century, when the Church Fathers suggested to the people that they avoid the theatre because it was considered a nursery of impious deeds and debauchery. Nevertheless, thanks to travelling actors (buffoons, histriones, jesters, joculators, minstrels), who were skilled in dance, music and circus juggling, the theatre would, as a

1 For the Roman settlement in hinterland of Roman Dalmatia, modern-day Herzegovina and Bosnia see in Croatian Bojanovski (1988), and in English Wilkes (1969).


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public deed, survived the Middle Ages.2 They amused audiences with a stable repertoire as well as free improvisations with the occasional sharp satire.

Owing to its proximity to Dubrovnik (Ragusa), the nobles of Hum (Chelmia – future Herzegovina) also followed the European trends of the day with regard to medieval forms of theatre. Hence, permanent acting companies existed at the courts of Bosnian and Hum rulers in the mid-fifteenth century, founded on the model of similar musical and entertaining groups in Renaissance Ragusa, while the archives mention the name of the first authentic actor from this area – Mravac. Alongside the court of the Kosača family, the courts of the Pavlović, Vujinić and other noble families of Hum also hosted performances by jesters and entertainers of the most varied kind.

Amongst the inhabitants of villages, gatherings linked to periods of the year and cultivation of the land were popular, including songs and carols such as koledarske i kraljičke pjesme, ladarica, dodola and others. The first musical-dramatic plays developed from such folkloric forms, and this is indicated by images found on medieval tombstones stećci (sing. stećak) or bilizi (sing. bilig) One should also single out the theatre of masks as the most widespread example of the people’s oral theatre, which is attested by “… an archaeological discovery which contains an image of a youth with a goat mask leading a kolo of girls.”3

After the fall of the Bosnian kingdom (1463) and the duchy of Herzegovina (1481) under the Ottoman rule, and the subsequent ruin of the nobility, the acting craft also noticeably declined and became one of the most contemptible of professions. Popular forms of entertainment and street theatre with its acrobats, impersonators, tamers, musicians and ‘those that walk on stilts’ existed from the sixteenth century onward.4 The most significant form of theatre during the period of Turkish occupation was the karagöz or Karagöz-Hacivat, (Croatian: karađoz) – shadow theatre, Ottoman Turkish puppet play, which traces its origins to the Indonesian shadow theatre: “The last known performance of karagöz theatre in Mostar 2 One should not understand the negative attitude of the Church toward the theatre as contempt towards all forms of art. “Medieval culture had a sense for novelty, but it endeavoured to conceal it under the cover of repetition (in contrast to modern culture, which pretends to create novelty even when it repeats). Eco (2007): 12. 3 Palameta (1996): 176. 4 Šarić (2006): 8.


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occurred in the summer of 1921 in the garden of the Balinovac coffee-house, when a Bosnian with a karagöz show entertained guests for a few days.”5 In spite of all these forms, the Ottoman authorities essentially interrupted continuity and the influence of Western theatre in Bosnia and in Herzegovina, so that a true theatrical life in this area only begins under the conditions of the Habsburg Austro-Hungarian administration (1878-1918). The last decades of the Ottoman rule correspond with the rise of national movements in the South Slavic lands. As the Croatian national revival in Bosnia and in Herzegovina was an echo of the Croatian national revival in Zagreb, the former emerged a few decades later due to the socio-political conditions in Bosnia and in Herzegovina. Although the revival began in Sarajevo, its rise occurred in Mostar, political and cultural centre of Herzegovina, which had more favourable national and other socio-political circumstances. The first reading school was opened in Mostar in 1852, while a library and reading-room were opened in the same town in 1861.

The first Croatian printing press was founded in Mostar in 1872 and was directed by Don Franjo Miličević. The opening of the printing press heralded the appearance of the first newspapers, textbooks and manuals in the Croatian language in Bosnia and in Herzegovina. Inspired by the national revival, in 1888 the Croats of Mostar established the National Singing and Musical Society Hrvoje, which changed its name in 1897 to the Croatian Singing and Musical Society ‘Hrvoje’. The first performance in the repertoire of Hrvoje was Josip Freudenreich’s Graničari (Frontiersmen). It was performed on 2 December 1888, and its director was the son of the play’s author, the actor Dragutin Freudenreich. The first significant playwrite amongst the Croats of Mostar was Ante Jukić (1873-1906), who, under the pseudonym of Veljko Obradov, adapted to stage the novel by Eugen Kumičić, Urota Zrinsko-Frankopanska (The Conspiracy of Zrinski-Frankopan), under the title of Mučenici (Martyrs). The first permanent director in Hrvoje was the choir conductor from Zagreb Vinko Šubir, who was succeeded by Petar Soldo.

Nevertheless, the real revival of activity in Hrvoje begins with the appointment of Marko Veble (1873-1926) from Zagreb as artistic director of the theatre. This young student of Dragutin Freudenreich worked as a producer, actor, dramaturg, set designer, musician, singer and administrator.

5 Šarić (2008): 9.


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During his seven year stay in Mostar, he succeeded in consolidating the acting ensemble, breaking standard stereotypical dilettantism and establishing a professional attitude toward the theatre. During his mandate, the stage of Hrvoje hosted premier plays such as Gogol’s Marriage, Around the World in Eighty Days, by Jules Verne and Adolphe-Philippe D’Ennery, while in 1902 Mostar hosted its first performance of a work by Ivo Vojnović – Ekvinocij (Equinox). During this period, theatrical companies from Croatia also performed in the Habsburg Bosnia and Herzegovina (in Sarajevo and Mostar), which was closely followed and encouraged by Silvije Strahimir Kranjčević in his journal Nada (Hope). It was due to his efforts that the Circle of Sarajevo writers (including 15 writers) was founded, while Adalbert Kuzmanović, a member of this association and a diligent collaborator and co-editor of Nada, wrote, among others, the play Vitropir (Vagabond) in 1901.

During the interwar period, several dramatic writers were active in Bosnia and in Herzegovina, including, above all, Jakša Kušan and his drama Nevjerojatni san gospodina ministra (The Incredible Dream of Mr. Minister), and Verka Škurla Ilijić and her expressionist drama Na tankom ledu (On Thin Ice). At the beginning of the 1920s, Ilija Jakovljević published his drama Na staklenim nogama (On Glass Legs). During the Second World War, Ruža Lucija Petelinova was active and received Demeter’s award in 1943 for her drama Petra. From the end of the Second World War until the present day, fifty Croatian playwrites from Bosnia-Herzegovina are known to have published (in print or through performing) around 200 plays. One should also not forget Nikola Šop and his Bosanska trilogija (Bosnian Trilogy); Jurislav Korenić, the renowned theatre director, the founder of the Kamerni teatar ’55 (Chamber Theatre ‘55) and one of the founders of the Festival of Small Scenes in Sarajevo (today better known under the abbreviation MESS). Korenić wrote comedies with the actor Rejhan Demirdžić such as Karađoz and Fistikovi šejtanluci (Fistik’s mischiefs). There is also Radovan Marušić and his plays Otočanke (Female Islanders) and Katarina Kosača, Ivan Kušan and his play Svrha od slobode (The Purpose from Freedom); Tomislav Bakarić and the play Hasanaga (Hassan-Aga) or Darko Lukić and his play Važno je biti pozitivan (It is Important to be Positive). When one adds another fifty playwrites who were born before 1900 and worked in the 20th century, then we arrive at the


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number of 65 Croatian playwrites who have written a total of 230 plays. The Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina acquired their first

professional theatre during the last war (1992-1995), when the government of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia founded the National Theatre in 1993, which, beginning in 1994, bears the current title of the Croatian National Theatre of Mostar. The first play performed in this theatre was Božićna bajka (A Christmas Fable) by Mate Matišić. The majority of the current ensemble consists of actors from the National Stage of Mostar who, together with technical staff, joined the newly established theatre, including Dana Kurbalija, Tatjana Feher, Ante Vican, Jozo Lepetić, Toni Pehar, Velimir Njirić, Sanda Krgo, etc. One of the successes of the theatre from this period was certainly the duodrama Rodijaci (Cousins), based on the text by Petar Miloš, with the leading roles performed by Toni Pehar and Velimir Njirić.

Nevertheless, the first decade of the existence of the Croatian National Theatre (HNK) of Mostar, the plays of which are performed on the large and small stages of the Croatian club Herzog Stjepan Kosača, was marked by works with a national-romantic pathos. Good examples are the adaptation of the novel Tena by Ivan Kozarac directed by Bobo Jelčić, as well as the historical spectacle U godinama gladi (In the Years of Hunger), written by the Franciscan Ante Marić and directed by Želimir Orešković. The play portrays the Franciscan Didak Buntić (1871-1922) and his mission to save children from an outbreak of hunger in 1917. HNK Mostar performed this play whilst on tour in Germany. Alongside Jelčić and Orešković, other directors included Joško Juvančić, who was also at one stage an artistic advisor, Robert Raponja, Dražen Ferenčina, Vanča Kljaković and Nina Kleflin.

At the beginning of 1996, a foundation stone was laid for the new building of HNK in Mostar, into which the theatre relocated – albeit on the small stage in the basement – which concluded the first phase of construction, after almost ten years. Whilst they were still performing on the small stage in the rear part of the Croatian Club of Herzog Stjepan Kosača, the ensemble of HNK Mostar produced two significant plays, which were directed by Robert Raponja: Fernando Krapp mi je napisao ovo pismo (Fernando Krapp Wrote me this Letter, written by T. Dorst) and U agoniji (In Agony, written by Miroslav Krleža). After the relocation to the small


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stage, the most praiseworthy and most performed projects were the plays directed by Nina Kleflin – particularly Bljesak Zlatnog zuba (The Flash of the Golden Tooth) and Ujak Vanja (Uncle Vanya, by Chekhov). The repertoire generally consists of classic Croatian dramas and the dramatization of the works of local authors. Despite difficulties caused by the lack of suitable space and enduring all the consequences of socio-political turmoil, the theatre has succeeded, in the space of little less than two decades, in producing 38 premieres and hundreds of repeat performances throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and overseas, thereby gaining the artistic, cultural and national legitimacy of a worthy and viable institution, before which there are decades of maturation and expansion of repertoire.

Bibliography Bojanovski, I. (1988): Bosna i Hercegovina u antičko doba. Djela 66/6 (Sarajevo).

Eco, U. (2007): Umjetnost i ljepota u srednjovjekovnoj estetici (Zagreb). Croatian translation of Art and beauty in the Middle Ages (New Haven, 1986).

Palameta, M. (1996): Usmeni narodni teatar u Hercegovini (Split & Mostar).

Šarić, S. (2006): Pozorišni repertoar u Mostaru od 1879-2001 (Mostar).

Wilkes, J.J. (1969): Dalmatia (London).

Sažetak Povijest hrvatskog kazališta u Bosni i Hercegovini se ne može gledati razdvojeno od zapadnoeuropskog kazališta – od slabo dokumentiranog antičkog teatra, do nešto bolje vidljivih srednjovjekovnih utjecaja. Razvoj hrvatske drame i teatra u BiH se prekida tijekom Otomanske okupacije, i nastavlja u duhu narodnog preporoda However, development of Croatian dramaand theatre in BiH, interrupt 19. stoljeću, prvo u Mostaru a potom i u Sarajevu. Vrhunac teatarskog razvoja se dostiže u kasnim 1990-tim kada je ustanovljeno Hrvatsko narodno kazalište u Mostaru, kao prva teatarska institucija s hrvatskim predznakom. Tijekom skoro pola milenija, hrvatska drama uspijeva ne samo u očuvanju nacionalnog identiteta, već također u značajnom doprinosu međukulturnoj razmjeni u ovom dijelu Europe kroz bogatu i turbulentnu političku povijest Balkana.


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Book Reviews


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Igor Vranić: “What is and what should never be – Review of I. Lučić, Uzroci rata and J. Glaurdić, Vrijeme Europe”

Igor Vranić Department of History Central European University, Budapest [email protected] Ivica (Ivo) Lučić, Uzroci rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine. Zagreb: Despot Infinitus, 2013, pp. 522; bibliography; hb; 79.90 HRK; ISBN 9789537892067. Josip Glaurdić, Vrijeme Europe: Zapadne sile i raspad Jugoslavije. Mate d.o.o.: Zagreb, 2011, pp. 440, index; bibliography; hb; 350 HRK; ISBN 9789532461381. Croatian translation of: The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. Yale University Press: New Haven, 2011. When an historian decides to explore a recent topic, (s)he usually has a lot of already published material to begin work with. Ivo Lučić did not have that privilege, making his book Uzroci rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine (Causes of the War: Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1980 and 1992) even more valuable. Most of the primary material used in the book are unpublished documents from the archives, collected by the author over the years. I would dare to say that his book is truly the first study that deals with the social and political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1980s in a serious and scholarly way. I hope his work inspires other scholars to take the same approach in research of the other ex-Yugoslav republics. This study is a real refreshment after numerous books about ʻBosniaʼ,1 in which their authors show, more or less, a visible lack of basic local knowledge, reproducing predominant narrative constructs about this country and its past.

The book consists of three parts. The first part explores various aspects of cultural and political life after the death of Josip Broz, such as the militarization of society, the cases of Međugorje and Duvno, the Agrokomerc affair, the Kecmanović affair, ʻnaziʼ birthday in Sarajevo, etc. The second part deals with Bosnia and Herzegovina during the early 1990s, while the third part provides detailed deconstruction of the Karađorđevo myth concerning the ʻpartitionʼ of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman.2

One of the myths about Bosnia-Herzegovina is that of prewar unity and 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina is frequently refered to as ʻBosniaʼ in Western discourse. The shortening of this countryʼs long name is not as benign as it might look at first sight. It simplifies the picture of Bosnia to a national state of the Bosniaks, and eliminates from the narrative the Serbs and Croats who represent around 50% of the population. 2 The ideas were developed earlier in Lučić (2003).

mailto:[email protected]


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multiculturalism among its constituent nations. The author points out numerous examples which suggest that the situation was quite the opposite. For example, after the death of Josip Broz the number of political prisoners in Bosnia and Herzegovina rose no less than 83%. Lučić also presents the evidence that only 12% of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina were members of the Communist party and that their political leaders did not have any legitimacy among the people. Singing Croatian national-patriotic songs in Herzegovina in the 1980s resulted in regular incarceration of the singers and lengthy jail sentences. At the same time, an eccentric private birthday in Sarajevo, which used iconography from the times of Nazi Germany, resulted only in verbal warnings due to the high social status of participants. Lučić convincingly shows that the fabric of society in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1980s was already deeply divided and the feeling of unity was not related to this republic's identity but rather to Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism.

In the second part of the book the author discusses the first democratic elections and the problems that arose afterwards amongst the winning political parties. The main problem of disagreement was the political and constitutional arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as each of its constituent nations had different visions for its future. Paradoxically, the situation today in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not much different.

Although it is difficult to disagree with most of what is written in the book, I cannot agree with two details. The first one is Lučićʼs statement about the constituent position of the Serbs in Croatia (p. 19). The author correctly points out that the Constitution in the Communist regime does not have any significant importance (p. 379). The Yugoslav Constitution was written with very unclear wording, leaving it open to different interpretation. The formulation of Croatia as: the “national republic of Croats, republic of Serbs and republic of other minorities” is an example of such double meaning, because nowhere is it explained what this means. Some say this formulation means that Croatia is also a national republic of the Serbs, however, it can also point out the special status of the Serbs who are more than a minority but less than a constituent nation. The second detail is the statement that “ethnic cleansing was legalized in Dayton” (p. 470). I would rather agree with Pehar,3 that this is legally and ethically impossible, because crimes can not be legalized in the Constitution, although, indeed, ethnic cleansing did occur.

It is a pity that on occasion the author does not elaborate more on presented facts (especially in the first part of the book), beacuse it is obvious that he has much more to say. After reading the book, I hope we will soon have the chance to read its natural second part about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

XXX

Another book discussed here is: Vrijeme Europe: Zapadne sile i raspad Jugoslavije, the Croatian translation of The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and Breakup of Yugoslavia, published in 2011 by Josip Glaurdić. Altough the book deals with almost the same problems as the second part of Ivo Lučićʼs book, it approaches

3 Pehar (2011): 133.


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them in quite the opposite way. The book is methodologically inconsistent; the author tells stories in poetic language inappropriate for a scientific book and ʻresolvesʼ problems without pointing out that something is not known or something should be explored more. For example, the author takes an interview of the elderly former Yugoslav admiral Branko Mamula in Death of Yugoslavia in the 1990s as trustworthy, although Mamula spoke about the events from the 1980s – how he had told Milan Kučan that opposition will overthrow him and breakup Yugoslavia (p. 25). He also takes the statements about the Milošević-Tuđman meeting at Karađorđevo by Stipe Mesić and Dušan Bilandžić as trustworthy. However, he does not bother to mention the role of Mesić in overthrowing the moderate Stjepan Kljuić as president of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian HDZ. Instead of mentioning Mesić by name, he gives an expression that does not reveal much – it was the ʻBoban wingʼ which overthrew Kljuić (p. 264).

Beside methodology, Glaurdić incorrectly uses terminology on occasions. For example, he continually uses the term ʻYugoslavsʼ when referring to the population of Yugoslavia. The term ʻYugoslavsʼ has been used to describe the people who declared themselves to be of Yugoslav nationality, while the population of Yugoslavia should rather be referred to as ʻcitizens of Yugoslaviaʼ. Another term that the author continually uses wrongly is ʻethnicalʼ instead of ʻnationalʼ. In Yugoslavia (and elsewhere in the Balkans) nationhood rather than citizenship provided membership in a nation, unlike most Western countries.4

Glaurdić is highly subjective and biased throughout the whole of his book. For example he blames Western powers for not helping the last Yugoslav primeminister Ante Marković (p. 69), which is an idea already found in the work of David Gibbs.5 The author also shows a complete misunderstanding of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He claims that “Bosnia and Herzegovina was defined in the Yugoslav constitution as a state, just like other republics” (p. 217). The main problem is that Bosnia and Herzegovina was not like the other republics because it had three constituent nations instead of one. This basic misunderstanding leads Glaurdić to think about Bosnia and Herzegovina as a national unitary state of Muslims/Bosniaks, in which they are supremely sovereign and have the right to decide for the rest. The author thus considers sovereignty as something that can be confirmed and established by the declaration of a Communist republic assembly (p. 217). He does not take into account that a Communist republic assembly in former Yugoslavia was not legitimately elected, so that sovereignty must be partially usable in practice, not only on a piece of paper. Bosnia and Herzegovina was not sovereign in 1992 either, because the organized political power fell apart after the establishment of the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna and the separation of the territories held by the Serbs. Glaurdić here again shows a basic misunderstanding of the situation by comparing Herceg-Bosna, which consistently supported the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its authority, to the Republika Srpska which openly challenged the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The central (Bosniak-majority) government of Bosnia and Herzegovina also lacked control of state organs of

4 Roudometof (2002): 20. 5 Gibbs (2009).


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coercion (police, military and territorial defence) on more than half of the territory claimed as their own. Besides this, in the referendum on independence day held on 29 February and 1 March 1992, at least one third of the population explicitly said that they did not want to live in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Both books are their authorsʼ debut. Ivo Lučić showed innovation in providing new facts and the deconstruction of myths and stereotypes, providing a stimulus for new perspectives in this field. Josip Glaurdić reflects existing myths and stereotypes despite new literature, which is quite the opposite, providing an excellent example of what scientific historical work should not be.

Bibliography Gibbs, D.N. (2009): First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Nashville TE).

Lučić, I. (2003): ‘Karađorđevo: politički mit ili dogovor?’, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 35(1): 7-36.

Pehar, D. (2011): ‘Deparlamentarizacija ustavotvorstva, Daytonske ustavne aporije i simulakrum “bosanske nacije“ – svjedočanstvo o dovršetku teritorijalizacije pravno-političke misli u BiH”, Status: Magazin za političku kulturu i društvena pitanja 15: 125-147.

Roudometof, V. (2002): Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict – Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question. Westport.


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Danijel Dzino: “Some thoughts on fashion culture and racial discourses. The review of Simončič, Kultura odijevanja and

Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia” Danijel Dzino Department of Ancient History Macquarie University Sydney, Australia [email protected] Katarina Nina Simončič, Kultura odijevanja u Zagrebu na prijelazu iz 19. u 20. stoljeće. Zagreb: Plejada, 2012; pp. 223; index; bibliography; hb; 195 HRK; ISBN 9789537782153. Nevenko Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory. Regional Perspectives in Global Context 4. Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2014, pp. 244; index; bibliography; hb; £99/US$128; ISBN 9789004262836 Kultura odijevanja u Zagrebu na prijelazu iz 19. u 20. stoljeće (The Fashion Culture in Zagreb in the late 19th and early 20th Century) is the first monograph of Katarina Nina Simončič, senior lecturer at the Faculty of Textile Technology, University of Zagreb. It is an adapted version of her PhD thesis awarded at the University of Zagreb in 2010. The book explores urban, mostly elite and middle-class fashion culture in Zagreb in the later 19th and early 20th centuries, focusing on several different social aspects such as identity, social significance, the relation of fashion and art, fashion and tradition, etc.

The book is structured chronologically, starting with the introductory chapter (pp. 9-28). The author defines her research of fashion culture in Zagreb very precisely at the beginning (pp. 1-2). Fashion culture is a complex way of codifying messages about cultural habitus and socio-political narratives of a particular period, through employing visual language which is understandable in dominating local and global paradigms. The choice of Zagreb as a case-study for research is rather obvious, as it develops into an important urban centre in this period. At the same time Zagreb exists within two overlapping social paradigms, which affect the development of urban culture and heavily impact on fashion culture at the time. The first paradigm is centrality and focalisation in relation to the ongoing processes of the construction of a Croatian nation. The other is one of ultimate peripherality, as Zagreb was positioned on the imperial periphery of the Habsburg Empire, which was itself becoming peripheral to the major imperial powers of the time: the British Empire, France and Germany. The chapter further discusses basic terminology and the concepts employed in the book, including the terms ‘fashion culture’,


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‘confection’, ‘anti-fashion’, etc. (pp. 11-14). The introduction also provides a literature review of major works dealing with the history of clothing, as well as the overview of the sources used in the study. The author has used a variety of relevant sources such as historical photography, contemporary fashion journals, visual arts (especially contemporary prints, paintings, caricatures), and preserved clothing objects (pp. 14-28).

Chapter 2: Fashion in the 19th century (pp. 29-68) provides comprehensive coverage of urban fashion culture in Zagreb during this period. Simončič sets the stage by presenting and describing global changes in clothing fashion throughout imperial centres of the time, especially Britain and France. Structural changes in the architecture of power and the beginning of global processes, amongst other things, also result in a slow but certain standardisation of clothes within the Western world and even further (pp. 29-33).1 Focus then shifts to local aspects, paying particular attention to the fashion culture of the ‘Illyrian movement’, a prominent political movement in 1830s and 1840s Croatia (pp. 35-46). The ‘Illyrians’ were attempting to articulate the construction of a Croatian nation through the reappropriation of the pre-Slavic past and within a supra-national framework shaped by shared political interests of the South Slavs.2

It is quite fascinating to see the different ways in which the affiliation with the Illyrian movement was codified through contemporary clothes in mid-19th century Zagreb. The crucial object of clothing, appropriated for ‘Illyrian fashion’ in both male and female clothing, was the surka. It was a short coat inspired by the uniforms of the serežani – troops from the Croatian military frontier of the Habsburg Empire facing the Ottoman Empire.3 While the surka came from a recognisable local context, another clothing object, reappropriated as a symbol for display of affiliation with the Illyrian movement, came from a more global perspective. It was the so-called Illyrian red cap, which was inspired by the liberty cap (bonnet rouge) – an ancient symbol of liberated slaves appropriated in the context of American and French revolutions. The Illyrian red cap was usually adorned with the ‘Illyrian’ coat of arms – a crescent moon with a six-pointed star. Simončič also notices the prominent display of red, white and blue on Zagreb streets at the time – these were the Croatian tricolours which began to be used around 1848 on the standard of the ban (viceroy) Josip Jelačić, but became adopted as the colours of the national flag.

Political changes in the post-revolutionary 1850s and political pressure from the Habsburg imperial centres of Vienna and Budapest suppressed Illyrian fashion and the expression of Croatianness for some time. The neo-Illyrian style appears in the 1860s in a more relaxed political atmosphere, so the surka shortly returns into use in the Zagreb fashion culture. This local clothing style, however, did not last long because it could not compete with global fashion trends coming from Vienna 1 See Ferguson (2012): 215-27, who shows patterns of early globalisation and impacts of Western dominance on the power superstructure of this period through the standardization of clothing. 2 The Illyrian movement, recently Maissen (1998); Baric (2002), while in English the standard work is still Despalatovic (1975). See also n.7 below. 3 The military frontier (Vojna krajina or Militärgrenze) was organised as a separate administrative region within the Habsburg Empire.


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and Budapest: it finally died out in the early 1870s. At this time Zagreb fashion started to be dominated by conservative trends in global clothing - in particular crinoline amongst females and the fuscous colours of male suits (pp. 46-68). It is indeed a paradox that when the construction of national discourses was the dominating discourse amongst most of Europe’s intellectual communities, the mode of dress throughout the western world actually became more standardized.4

Chapter 3 is entitled Reform movements at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century – from female clothes without corsets to reform clothes (pp. 69-86). It follows a new social climate, in particular the process of women’s liberation, codified in fashion culture through the simplification of female clothes and the development of new shapes and models of dress (pp. 69-75). The author also devotes some attention to attempts to merge art and fashion culture through so-called ‘reform clothes’. This movement started in Germany but was also very popular in the heart of the Habsburg Empire - Vienna (the painter Gustav Klimt and Wiener Werstätte). ‘Reform clothes’ left their trace in Zagreb too. Especially prominent was the painter Bela Čikoš Sesija, who experimented with reform clothes, and Tomislav Krizman, who designed textile patterns in the spirit of Wiener Werstätte (pp. 75-86).

Chapter 4: Zagreb fashion from 1900 to the beginning of World War I (pp. 87-132) continues the historical narrative of Zagreb fashion culture in the last decades of the Habsburg Empire. The chapter discusses different topics, such as the relation of fashion and social gatherings, especially through public dances (pp. 92-97), the relationship between Zagreb newspapers and fashion (pp. 98-99), and contemporary arguments for and against the wearing of corsets at the time (pp. 99-103). The largest section of the chapter is devoted to two distinct fashion styles in Zagreb, existing during the time of Art Nouveau. The first is what the author calls a more restrictive or conservative style, which dominated the period between 1900 and 1909 (pp. 103-126). This style had ‘orientalising’ influences, in particular from Asian (especially Japanese) traditional clothes, as well as inspiration from clothing from the past, especially the Bidermeier and Rococo periods, and large decorated female hats. A more liberal Art Nouveau-era style dominated the last years before World War I (1909-1914) (pp. 126-132). Fashion culture engages in more exotic experiments, which were merging secession with art deco, probably with some influence from reform clothes.

Chapter 5: Croatian heritage (anti-fashion) in the service of orientalising fashion in the era of Art Nouveau (pp. 133-158) looks at the local impact of orientalising fashion. While Zagreb fashion culture looked primarily to imperial centres of the time for influences, as shown in the previous chapter, it drew some local influences from the Croatian countryside, and also Herzegovina and Bosnia. The rural elements came from all Croatian regions, and patterns and especially colourbecame somewhat more accepted in Zagreb fashion newspapers of the time. A greater fascination with influences from Bosnia and Herzegovina is visible, especially after the influx of refugees following the Habsburg annexation in 1908. Part of the chapter is devoted to the industry of Salomon Berger, a Slovakian-born 4 Ferguson (2012): 215-16.


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Jewish industrialist from Zagreb (pp. 140-158). Berger developed the textile industry in Zagreb, inspired by patterns and colours from Croatian traditional clothes but adapted to the urban fashion culture. He achieved significant success on the world stage by exhibiting and selling his designs outside Croatia. Paradoxically, Berger did not have significant success at home, as Zagreb fashion culture was not interested in incorporating the local, but rather in adopting global orientalising patterns, especially Japanese.

Chapter 6: Confection and fashion tailoring in Zagreb at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century (pp. 159-164). This chapter briefly explores the development of the clothing industry, as either mass-produced confection or fashion tailoring. The contemporary Zagreb fashion press recognized high fashion (velika moda – haute couture) for the richest circles of the Zagreb elite who were buying clothes from Paris, Vienna, Budapest and London, and clothes purchased and sewn locally (mala moda). Zagreb fashion tailors developed in numbers and importance at the beginning of the 20th century, concentrating their shops on the main street of Ilica. The Conclusion (pp. 165-166) restates major points of the book.

Simončič manages to reconcile intellectualizing scholarship with an engaging style of narration, opening a completely new chapter in the research of Croatian history and ethnography.5 She strikes the right balance between documentary and scholarly. At first sight, this is an incredibly informative and entertaining work, which brings to light many forgotten elements of the recent past in Croatia and Zagreb. It is splendidly illustrated with 157 pictures and 37 tables - mostly reproductions from contemporary newspapers - a large bibliography and index. However, the paradigms of local and global, central and peripheral actually represent a key for understanding deeper layers of this book. This is an important case study of the interaction between the early stages of globalisation and its local receptions in Zagreb, focusing on the narrative of fashion culture. Simončič exposes the different strategies used by Zagreb elites and middle classes, revealing how they used clothes to position themselves between imperial allegiances and the development of Croatian national discourse. Even more, the book provides a case study which shows how late 19th and early 20th century urban Central Europeans adjusted their strictly locally defined settings according to globalising and standardising cultural impulses, originating from imperial centres of the time.

X X X

The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory is the second monograph of Nevenko Bartulin, graduate of the University of NSW, former lecturer at the University of Split and soon-to-be affiliate of the Centre of Croatian Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney. This study discusses the intellectual origins and theory behind racial theories in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) 1941-1945. It is a very sensitive topic taking into account, on one side, the wide-spread discrimination and killing of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies in the NDH, and on 5 This field is in its very beginnings in Croatia, e.g. Bartlett (1999); Černelić Cvitan et al. (2002); Paić (2007). There is also the academic journal TEDI: International Interdisciplinary Journal of Young Scientists from the Faculty of Textile Technology, published in Zagreb, of which Simončič is co-editor.


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the other side, the use and over-exaggeration of these crimes in later Yugoslav and Serbian propaganda to impose collective guilt on the Croats. The main point of the book is that the racial theories employed in the NDH used as their foundation theories of ethnolinguistic origin and racial anthropology, which were also used in the construction of Croatian nationhood in the 19th and 20th century. The racial ideologists of the NDH governed by the Ustasha regime6 also reacted to dominating discourses in racial anthropology of the time, especially those discourses developed in the period of the Yugoslav kingdom (1918-1941).

In the Introduction (pp. 1-19) Bartulin underlines the problem of researching the NDH, which in the past has led either to the vilification or apologist defence of the Ustasha regime. More popular examples of vilification saw the NDH as a Nazi-Fascist puppet state, characterised by rabid political Catholicism, or it was viewed through the paradigms of integral nationalism and/or fascism and fascist collaboration. In the author’s opinion these views are either misleading or at best represent very limited interpretations of questions concerning the issue of race in the NDH. In his opinion, the Ustasha regime was part of its zeitgeist, drawing upon the existing tradition of racial discourse in world (especially German) scholarship, but also following the traditions of Croatian scholarship and political thought.

The first chapter, Language and race: Croats, Illyrians, Slavs and Aryans (pp. 20-32), discusses the foundations of later racial discourses in the NDH. In Bartulin’s opinion the most relevant early influences were the ideology of Pan-Slavism and the Illyrian movement. Discourses on race in the Illyrian movement7 were positioned strategically towards the Hungarians and Serbs. The former were considered as political opponents and the latter as allies in the fight for improving the Croats’ position within the Habsburg Empire. The Hungarians were denigrated as ‘Asiatics’, since their origin myths in the 19th century stressed that medieval Magyars originated from the ancient Huns. Hungarian intellectuals were thus ‘justifying’ their right to rule over non-Magyar peoples in the Carpathian basin, the core of the Hunnic Empire in the 5th century. Croatian writers and intellectuals responded to these claims, ‘proving’ that the Hungarians, as descendants of the ‘Asiatic’ and ‘barbarian’ Huns, did not truly belong to Europe. The Serbs were perceived in this paradigm as Slavic ‘brethren’, also reflecting the intellectual and political influences of Pan-Slavism. Croatian Yugoslavism emerged from the Illyrian movement, integrating most of the Illyrian ideas into a new political program which developed in intellectual circles around the archbishop of Đakovo, Josip Juraj Strossmayer. Croatian Yugoslavism denied the distinct ethnocultural identity of the Croats, as it was more interested to promote the authenticity of the

6 The Ustasha Organisation was a right-wing, anti-Yugoslav group established by Ante Pavelić (1889-1959), former secretary of the Croatian Party of Right, who enjoyed the protection provided by Mussolini in Italy from 1930. After the disintegration of the Yugoslav kingdom in 1941, the Ustashas established a government in Croatia with the help of victorious Axis forces. 7 The Illyrian movement traced its roots to ideas of Slav indigenousness, developed within the networks of intellectual communities of Dalmatian and Croatian humanists (rather than Renaissance writers, as in Bartulin, p.26), see Blažević (2007a) and (2007b) in English.


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South Slav ‘nation’ and Slavic ‘race’.8 The works of scholars such as Natko Nodilo (1834-1912) asserted the antiquity of the Slavs, but did not define Croat authenticity within this discourse.

The next chapter, Ante Starčević: Historic State Right and Croat Blood (pp. 33-43), focuses on the thought of the Croatian politician Ante Starčević, the founder of the Croatian Party of Right (1823-1896). Bartulin views Starčević as the first Croat ideologist who began to resolve the confusion emanating from issues of language and racial origins. Starčević rejected Yugoslavism and pan-Slavism similarly as he rejected Slavs as a distinct unit in an ethnic, racial or anthropological sense. He defined the Croats as a specific nation rather than a part of the ‘Slav ethnicum’, and defined belonging to the Croatian nation through ‘shared blood’, yet without defining the characteristics of a ‘true’ Croat. Starčević’s Croats are vaguely portrayed as a conquering people with a characteristic ‘ruling spirit’ inherited through ‘blood’. He distinguished the Croats from the Serbs (‘Orthodox Slavoserbs’) who are described as a heterogeneous pasmina (breed), rather than a people or nation sharing the same ‘blood’ as the Croats. Starčević, the son of an Orthodox mother who converted to Catholicism, unsurprisingly felt that Serbs could be assimilated through intermarriage with the Croatian nation. He minimized comparative linguistics, which included Croats in the pan-Slavist/Yugoslav circle, and instead resorted to history to prove that Croats and Serbs have different origins, or to claim that Bosnian Muslims are ethnic Croats.

The third chapter, Race Theory in Habsburg Croatia 1900-1918 (pp. 44-70), focuses on the works of archaeologist Ćiro Truhelka (1865-1942) and historian Ivo Pilar (1874-1933). Truhelka and Pilar followed Starčević in his attempts to construct a strict barrier between the Croats and Serbs; yet they both recognised that it was impossible to dispute the ‘Aryan-Slav’ origins of the Croats, which was an established ethnolinguistic and anthropological ‘fact’. Truhelka was the first Croatian intellectual to study the question of racial anthropology, locating the ‘Nordic-Dinaric’ racial type in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his anonymously published work, Hrvatska Bosna (Croatian Bosnia)9, Truhelka argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the Croatian kingdom by historic state rights, also employing Starčević’s arguments in order to appropriate the Bosnian Muslims as ethnic Croats. In Hrvatska Bosna Truhelka also placed significant emphasis on the apparent physical racial differences between the Croats and Muslims on one side and the Serbs on the other in both Herzegovina and Bosnia. Bartulin recognizes Truhelka as someone who provided anti-Yugoslav, Croatian nationalism with a foundation for the further elaboration of an anthropological

8 Bartulin does not mention the historian Franjo Rački or linguist Vatroslav Jagić, who were an important part of Strossmayer’s circle, see Ančić (2008) on Rački and Dzino (2010): 18-19 in English. 9 Anonym. (1907). It is important to mention that this work was written in the specific circumstances of the Habsburg colonial project in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878-1918), which attempted to construct a Bosnian nation and supress the national determination of the Serbs and Croats in these teritorries, see Okey (2007) and Dzino (2012): 180-83. In his published scholarly works before 1918, Truhelka was not able to express his real views as he could easily have lost his job in the Provincial (Zemaljski) Museum in Sarajevo, so this work was published anonymously. On Truhelka see the papers in Majnarić Pandžić (1994).


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theory on the question of racial identity and the origins of the Croats and other South Slavs. Ivo Pilar, for his part, (pp. 57-63) argued along similar lines, that the Croats preserved their ‘Nordic-Aryan’ racial and cultural heritage. Pilar also appropriated Bosnian Muslims for the Croatian nation, and defined the Serbs as the ‘Other’ by assigning them racial impurity, as they were ‘exposed to the corrupt Vlach blood’.10 The origins of racial Yugoslavism (pp. 63-66) are also touched upon through its two early exponents: Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijić (1865-1927) and Slovenian anthropologist Niko Županič (1876-1961).11 Cvijić described and defined the Dinaric ‘patriarchal’ racial type and saw it as dominant in the Balkans, while Županič was keen to show that all South Slavs had Aryan origins, thus justifying their political dominance over non-Aryan Greeks and Albanians. Truhelka and Pilar did not represent a majority opinion – racial Yugoslavism continued to be dominant in Croatian political and public discourses, in particular through the activities of the Radić brothers – the leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party (pp. 66-69). Yet, the Yugoslavism of the Radić brothers was different from that of both Cvijić and Županič as it continued in the footsteps of Illyrianism and Yugoslavism (although with a visible anti-Semitic note), defending political Croatian interests but arguing for cultural Yugoslavism.

The fourth chapter, Yugoslavist and Serbian racial theories in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (pp. 71-92), looks into new discourses on race and historical origins which developed after the establishment of the South Slav kingdom in 1918. The Kingdom was conceived as a new political creation, so it needed to justify its existence by reconciling ethnic heterogeneity with the dominating political position of the Serbs. Political discourse emphasised the idea of the trinominal South Slavic ‘nation’ whereby the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were considered three equal ‘tribes’ of one ‘people’ - basing Yugoslav homogeneity on a racial concept of nationhood. Cvijić and his concept of the patriarchal Serbian/Yugoslav Dinaric type came to significant prominence in this period. He developed a complex ethnographic and anthropogeographic theory in order to explain the peculiarities of the South Slav way of life and culture.12 The Dinaric ‘race’ of Cvijić is defined by soil, not by its origins, and it is embodied in the persona of the Dinaric ‘noble savage’: simple, brave, violent, honorable and freedom-loving. While the Dinaric ‘race’ encompasses most of the South Slavs, Cvijić presents it as still heavily dominated by its ‘Serb component’. Cvijić’s ideas resonated in the works of some pro-Yugoslav Croats - authors such as Vladimir Dvorniković, Branimir Maleš or Boris Zarnik, who described and defined the ‘Dinaric-Nordic race’. Bartulin concludes that Yugoslavist racial theories at this time placed emphasis on the Serbian Dinaric type and its ability to assimilate other racial types, thus reflecting the expansionist and assimilationist policies in a Serb dominated Yugoslavia.

Chapter 5 Interwar Croatian Ethnolinguistic-Racial Theories (pp. 93-126), deals with anti-Yugoslav ethnolinguistic and racial theories. These theories 10 'Vlach' is a generalised term covering several modern peoples descended from the Latinized population in the present-day territory of Romania and Moldova, as well as the southern part of the Balkan Peninsula and south and west of the Danube. See Winnifrith (1987) and Mirdita (2009). 11 On Županič and his works recently Milosavljević (2012); (2013). 12 Especially in Cvijić (1918).


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developed as a reaction to Yugoslav racial discourse, in particular the work of Cvijić. There are different approaches, for example the Croatian geographer Filip Lukas (1871-1958) appropriated Cvijić’s Dinaric race while pointing out that its ‘core’ was actually found amongst the Croats along the Adriatic coast. The historian Milan Šufflay (1879-1931) defined differences between the Croats and Serbs as a religious-civilisational divide, rather than a ethnic-racial distinction, seeing Croatia as a frontier of the white West. Different theories of the non-Slavic origins of the Croats, in particular the ‘Gothic’ and ‘Iranian’ theory (pp. 109-120), also came to prominence in this time; these theories aimed to de-Slavicise Croat origins and thus distance them from the Serbs.13 Another important aspect of this anti-Yugoslavist Croatian racial discourse was the appropriation of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina (pp. 120-124), developed by Truhelka in his paper on the origins of Bosnian Muslims (this time under his own name) as a continuation of his earlier ideas.14 Bartulin sees these Croatian theories placing great emphasis on the question of the ethnolinguistic and anthropological-racial origins of the Croats, attempting to prove the ethnic and national individuality of the Croatians. They were influential in the development of Ustasha racial theories, but it is important to note that the Ustasha regime selectively adopted aspects of these theories, rather than taking them as a full package.

Chapter 6, The Interwar Ustasha movement and ethnolinguistic-racial identity (pp. 127-143), looks at the early development of Ustasha ideology. In the author’s opinion, interwar Ustasha racialism was both biological and cultural. The Croats in this discourse were presented as the successors of the martial qualities of their ancestors, but were also regarded as a cultured warrior people, which corresponded with German race theories. While the Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić was more concerned with defining the political aims of the movement – the individuality of the Croatian nation and the right to independent statehood - the question of race in Croatian history was explored by the writer Mile Budak (1889-1945) and political scientist Mladen Lorković (1909-1945). They both followed in the footsteps of Starčević - Budak defined belonging to the Croatian nation as something which is defined by ‘blood’. The Croats are juxtaposed with the Serbs, who are seen as a racial potpourri – a Serbianised mixture of various ‘Balkan-Asian’ peoples. Lorković on the other hand, revisits the issue of historical rights, emphasising the antiquity and greatness of the Croatian nation. He utilises the theories of Hauptmann and Sakač on the Iranian origins of the Croats, seeing the ancient Croats as Slavicised Iranians who moved from Iran via White Croatia, becoming infused with an ‘Illyrian-Celtic blood admixture’ when arriving in Dalmatia and Pannonia. Lorković also constructs the Serbs in Croatia as a Balkan-Vlach-Asiatic racial admixture, and claims Bosnian Muslims as Croats (pp. 131-137). This chapter also looks at the place of Jews in the Ustasha racial discourse. The Jews were ‘identified’ as a ‘foreign racial element’ from the time of the Radić brothers. Truhelka, but also Budak, identified the Jews as a racial rather than

13 On the 'Gothic' and 'Iranian' theory of Croat origins see, in English, Katičić (1999): 160-63 and Dzino (2012): 20-21. 14 Truhelka (1934).


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religious group. Bartulin concludes that Ustasha anti-Semitism was also strongly influenced by their anti-communism, which linked the Jews with communism (pp. 138-140).

Chapter 7: The Ustasha Racial State (pp. 144-159), discusses the racial legal discourses within the NDH, which defined the ‘Others’, in particular the Jews and Gypsies. The racial laws of the NDH were modelled upon the Nurenberg racial laws, but were also consistent with pre-war Ustasha ideological principles (pp. 148-158). Bartulin sees the Ustasha state conferring legal rights on members of Croatian national community, rather than on individuals. The NDH was based on a racial world view, legally and ideologically, while nation and race were positioned above religion, which created tensions between the regime and the Catholic Church in Croatia.

Chapter 8, The Ideal Racial Type: Aryan Croat (pp. 160-202), looks at the self-definition of the Croats within racial discourses in the NDH. The Croats were presented as a unique and special outcome of the evolution of the Dinaric racial type, which possessed the strongest Nordic racial strain. Different theories of Croat origins were merged into the ‘historical’ narrative in which the Croats could trace their origins to the Nordic heartland (White Croatia), the homeland of the Nordic race in the Caucasus and the first great centre of Aryan civilisation – ancient Iran. Although emphasis was placed on the conquering nature of the Croats, they were still constructed as an ethnogenetic blend of conquerors and conquered with a Slavic-Gothic-Iranian ‘racial core’, which had a significant Illyrian-Celtic admixture.

Chapter 9, The Racial-Counter-type: The Near Eastern Race (pp. 203-233), discusses non-Aryans within racial discourses in the NDH. The Serbs in the NDH were in Bartulin’s view not seen as a homogeneous nation, not even as a truly Serbian entity. A theoretical distinction was established between the ‘authentic’ Slavic-Aryan Serbs in Serbia and Serbianised descendents of the pre-Aryan Vlachs and Near Eastern immigrants in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Official terminology emphasised the Asian-Balkan ‘racial component’ of the Serbs in the NDH. They were called ‘Greek-Easterners’, while the Orthodox Church was termed the ‘Greek-Eastern Faith’. This racial ideology in theory did not see ethnic Serbs as a racial threat needing to be eradicated – but rather, saw then as a nomadic, antisocial entity which was the fifth column of the Belgrade regime.

The overall argument of Bartulin that the racial ideas of the Ustasha state cannot be examined without exploring their intellectual and ideological roots appears very acceptable. The conception of the Croats as an example of an ethnogenetic racial blend of the Aryan race with autochthonous ancient Balkan peoples, and as a conquering but cultured race, is deeply embedded within racial ideas of Yugoslavism, Greater Serbianism and anti-Yugoslav Croatian nationalism. The racial arguments were invoked to establish the Croats as a separate people, using them against ethnolinguistic arguments that were employed in the construction of the Yugoslav people. This is a well written book which debates a very sensitive and overlooked subject in the best scholarly way, and will hopefully stimulate further discussions on racial discourse in Croatian and South Slavic intellectual traditions.


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Bibliography

Ančić, M. (2008): ‘Kako danas čitati studije Franje Račkog’ in: Franjo Rački, Nutarnje stanje Hrvatske prije XII. stoljeća, ed. M. Ančić (Zagreb): vii-xxx.

Anonym. (Ćiro Truhelka) (1907): Hrvatska Bosna. Mi i ‘oni tamo’ (Sarajevo).

Baric, D. (2002): ‘Der Illyrismus: Geschichte und Funktion eines übernationalen Begriffes im Kroatien der ersten Hälfe des 19. Jahrhunderts und sein Nachklang’. In: Transnationale Gedächtnisorte in Zentraleuropa, eds. J. Le Rider, M. Csáky & M. Sommer (Innsbruck): 125-140.

Bartlett, Đ. (ed.) (1999): Tijelo u tranziciji (Zagreb).

Blažević, Z. (2007a): Ilirizam prije ilirizma (Zagreb).

________. (2007b): ‘Rethinking Balkanism: Interpretative Challenge of the Early Modern Illyrism’, Études Balkaniques 2007(1): 87-106.

Cvijić, J. (1918): Péninsule balkanique. Géographie humaine (Paris).

Cvitan Černelić, M., Bartlett, Đ. & Vladislavić, A.T. (2002): Moda: povijest, sociologija i teorija mode (Zagreb).

Despalatovic, E.M. (1975): Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement. East European monographs 12 (Boulder CO & New York).

Dzino, D. (2010): Becoming Slav, Becoming Croat: Identity Transformations in Post-Roman Dalmatia. East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages (450-1450) 12 (Leiden/Boston).

________. (2012): ‘Archaeology and (De)Construction of Bosnian identity’, Archaeological Review from Cambridge 27(2): 179-188.

Ferguson, N. (2012): Civilization: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power (Harmondsworth).

Katičić, R. (1999): ‘The origins of the Croats’. In Croatia in the Early Middle Ages: A Cultural Survey, ed. I. Supičić. Croatia and Europe 1 (London & Zagreb): 149-167.

Maissen, A.P. (1998): Wie ein Blitz schlägt es aus meinem Mund: Der Illyrismus: Die Hauptschriften der kroatischen Nationalbewegung 1830-1844 (Bern).

Majnarić Pandžić, N. (ed.) (1994): Ćiro Truhelka: Zbornik (Zagreb).

Milosavljević, M. (2012): ‘Niko Županić i istorijska antropologija balkanskih naroda’, Etnoantropološki problemi 7(3): 681-708.

______. (2013): ‘Niko Županić i konstrukcija jugoslovenske etnogeneze’, Etnoantropološki problemi 8(3): 717-746.

Mirdita, Z. (2009): Vlasi: Starobalkanski narod (Zagreb).

Okey, R. (2007): Taming Balkan Nationalism. The Habsburg ,Civilizing Mission, in Bosnia, 1878-1914 (Oxford).


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Paić, Ž. (2007): Vrtoglavica u modi (Zagreb).

Truhelka, Ć. (1934): O porijeklu bosanskih muslimana (Sarajevo).

Winnifrith, T. (1987): The Vlachs: the history of a Balkan people (New York).


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Submission guide

The articles and book reviews for CSR should be submitted as email attachments in Microsoft Word format, with line spacing 1.5 to either of the editors. Before main text of the article, please provide short abstract (ca. 100-150 words), and keywords, and after bibliography supply 400-600 words summary. If article is in language other than English, summary should be in English. If article is in English 400-600 words summary should be in Croatian. Length of articles is limited on 10,000, and book reviews on 2,500 words, which includes bibliography, footnotes and (in a case of articles) abstracts and summaries. If review deals with more than one book at the same time, it can be longer than 2,500 words, with upper limit on 5,000.

CSR uses footnotes, not in-text referencing or endnotes. Referencing in footnotes should contain the author’s surname(s), the year of publication and, if necessary, page(s) in this way:

Biti (2002): 77

Pages in footnotes should be abbreviated in following manner.

Flaker (1977): 77-8

Budak (1994): 206-12, 225-7

If there are more than two authors, please reference publication in this way: Davidson, Gaffney et al. (2006): 219-66, supplying the names of all authors in bibliography. Do not include ‘ed.’ in a reference to an edited work: Easthope (2005), not Easthope ed. (2005). Cite works published by the same author(s) in the same year as (2004a), (2004b) etc, not (2004), (2004a) etc.

In a text articles and book chapters should be written under inverted comas (ʻNeki problemi padežnog sustava’), and book titles in italics (Jagićev zbornik).

Quoted paragraphs with more than 3 lines should have line spacing of 1.15.

Bibliography of cited works must be listed at the end of the article (before summary in second language, which comes last). Authors should be listed in alphabetical order with surname(s) in bold letters.

Books:

Barry, P. (2002): Beginning Theory. An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory (Manchester).

Ladmiral, J. R. & Lipianski, E.M. (1989): La Communication interculturelle (Paris).

Dragić, M. (2005): Hrvatska usmena književnost Bosne i Hercegovine: proza, drama i mikrostrukture. Hrvatska književnost Bosne i Hercegovine u 100 knjiga 5 (Sarajevo).

Pohl, W. & Reimitz, H. (eds.) (1998): Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300-800 (Leiden, Boston & Cologne).


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Chapter in edited book:

Eagleton, T. (1998): ‘Postcolonialism. The Case of Ireland’. In: Multicultural States. Rethinking Diference and Identity, ed. D. Bennet (London & New York): 48-52.

Articles from journal or conference proceedings:

Karaula, Ž. (2006/07): ‘The 1888 Bjelovar affair: The Theory behind the (Yugo)Slavic Idea and the Unification of Churches’, Transcultural Studies 2-3: 95-107.

Publications by the same author(s) should be listed chronologically in this way, without repeating name of the author (use 8 spaces).

Bešker, I. (1997): Rinascita serba e Illirismo croato (Napoli)

________. (2002/03): Il Rinnovamento culturale e letterario nell’Ottocento (Roma).

Newspaper articles must include author (otherwise write Anonymous), volume and number of the newspaper as well as the date of publishing and place of publication:

Prusac, T. (2006): ‘Neither Here, Nor There` Becomes Best of Both Worlds-Thanks to Sport, Not Politics’, The New Generation: Croatian Herald English Supplement 9 (403) 11/08/2006 (Melbourne): 1

Articles from websites must include author (if known, if unknown please put Anonymous), the name of the website, the date and year of publishing (if known), www link and the date of last access.

Dijanović, D. (2012): ʻLuka Budak: Hrvati u Australiji razočarani su hrvatskom politikom’, Portal Hrvatskog kulturnog vijeća website, published 2/4/2012. http://www.hkv.hr/razgovori/11164-l-budak-hrvati-u-australiji-razoarani-su-hrvatskom-politikom.html, last access 12/4/2013.

Anonymous (2012): ʻKonferencija “Mogućnosti ulaganja u Republiku Hrvatsku i Splitsko-dalmatinsku županiju”, Split’, Croatian Chamber of Economy website, published 2012. http://www.hgk.hr/sektor-centar/centar-za-investicije/konferencija-mogucnosti-ulaganja-u-republiku-hrvatsku-i-splitsko-dalmatinsku-zupaniju-split-05-i-06-listopada-2012, last access 12/4/2013

All the articles will be anonymously refereed by two peer-referees. After the review author might be asked to make changes suggested by referees, if deemed necessary by editors.

http://www.hkv.hr/razgovori/11164-l-budak-hrvati-u-australiji-razoarani-su-hrvatskom-politikom.html

http://www.hkv.hr/razgovori/11164-l-budak-hrvati-u-australiji-razoarani-su-hrvatskom-politikom.html

http://www.hgk.hr/sektor-centar/centar-za-investicije/konferencija-mogucnosti-ulaganja-u-republiku-hrvatsku-i-splitsko-dalmatinsku-zupaniju-split-05-i-06-listopada-2012




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Croatian Studies Review 9 (2013)

Documents

Transcript of Croatian Studies Review 9 (2013)