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Critical synthesis on the very ideaof an opportunityPaul Corcoran aa Department of Politics, University of Adelaide, Adelaide,South Australia, 5001, Australia

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SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY, 1990, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 57-73

Critical synthesis on the very idea of anopportunity

PAUL CORCORAN

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of words . . . inthe confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking . . .(Hobbes. Leviathan II. 25)

1. Is there a right to 'opportunity'?

We all want as many of them as possible, but do we really know what an 'opportunity'is? In the everyday rhetoric of radical and reform politics, no less than in the literaturedevoted to 'justice' and 'rights', the word 'opportunity' is used to characterize what isjust, fair and deserved by individuals whose needs, liberties and personal growth arebasic requirements of a free and just society. But is the 'good life' a life of'opportunity'?I shall argue that the term 'opportunity' is in important respects used unreflectivelyand, perhaps for that reason, paradoxically.

The typical argument runs along these lines. 'Opportunity' in the realm of moralvalues and political action is taken to be an unquestioned good. Indeed, for John Rawls,it is a 'primary good'.1 Not to have an opportunity is to be denied an opportunity and is, apriori, a wrong suffered by a moral subject. In parallel with the language of political,legal and moral rights, merely to claim an opportunity (or a right) tends to shift theburden of proof onto another party, while the claimant occupies a privileged moralground. The claim, in other words, enjoys a presumption of truth until the other partysets forth not simply a convincing argument against the coherence, moral worth orpractical relevance of the claim, but a defence of the allegedly offending status quo withinwhich the claim has arisen.

One rarely comes across an argument either for or against 'opportunity' itself.2

Rather, in the manner of Rawls, it is simply taken for granted that a fair or 'equal'distribution of'opportunity' is a basic element of social justice. Any further discussionrelating to the matter focuses on equality: of persons, procedures or consequences.

No one would dispute the fact that 'opportunities', much less equal opportunities, arealways and everywhere unevenly distributed. In the face of this practical experience,'realistic' arguments which accept3 or actually advocate4 unequal opportunity are rare.Arguments on behalf of equal opportunity tend to be defensive, conceding that theconcept is itself vague5 and, for any practical application, in need of qualificationsconcerning the meaning of 'equality' and whether it should be measured in terms ofresources or results. Thus 'equality' and 'equality of opportunity' are typicallyconflated in arguments about 'rights', 'justice', 'liberty' or 'democracy'. The debate is

Author. Paul E. Corcoran, Department of Politics, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia 5001,Australia.

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over the alternative meanings or locations of'equal' and 'equality': equality of persons,of facilities, of procedures, of results. 'Opportunity', by contrast, is relegated to a meresynonym for other supposedly transparent terms such as 'unobstructed action','favorable condition', 'life chances' or 'fairness'. Thus in common political discourse noclear distinction is made between 'opportunity' and 'equal opportunity'. Metaphor-ically, the term 'opportunity' is a sacred cow. One simply assumes that to have an'opportunity' to do or be something is a good; further, it is not merely a good but a moralimperative to facilitate or at least acknowledge an opportunity whenever a claim ismade that an opportunity has been practically denied.

2. 'Equality'and opportunity

2.1 Human equality

If the term 'opportunity' is conceptually ambiguous, the term 'equal opportunity' mustbe compounded in ambiguity. Obviously, 'equal opportunity' presupposes a link withstandard democratic concepts: 'human equality', 'political equality', and the ideal ofdemocracy itself, a government of'free' and 'equal' human beings. The ideal of'humanequality' has a venerable tradition dating to Cicero's eloquent exposition of the idea inthe first century B.C. Yet it will suffice to note in passing that this concept has been metwith anything but universal adherence. From the time of Plato down to contemporaryfeminist debates, questions persist about the extent to which the concept of humanequality is tainted by masculine presuppositions and characteristics. Reason, moralityand public action — capacities of'human nature' which underwrite 'the equal rights ofman' - have in particular been re-examined as 'male' constructions, rendering themdubious as basic elements in a political theory advocating equality of the sexes.6 Morerecently, the case for a simple notion of'human equality' founders on the question ofintractable 'differences' between males and females.7

2.2 Legal equality and justice

Quite apart from difficulties inherent in the concept of human equality, much less anyapplication of a strong definition of that idea in practice, the connection of opportunityand equality raises much the same paradox as that existing between freedom andequality. This stems from a conservative strain in liberal thought that exists despite thenoble aims of both Locke and Rousseau to sweep away hierarchy and feudal privilege,enabling all men (though not women) to stand on a level plain of civil equality. Both intheory and political practice, the notions of 'equality before the law', 'politicalequality', and even 'equal opportunity' have implied a narrow and proceduralequality. Anatole France scorned this in his famous observation: 'The majesticegalitarianism of the law . . . forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg inthe streets and to steal bread'.8

There are probably as many descriptions of 'equal opportunity' as there are socialscience disciplines attempting to define it and government portfolios charged withachieving it. Yet, however defined, equal opportunity is deeply rooted in liberalpolitical theory dating to the seventeenth century. The notion permeated eighteenthcentury democratic thought,9 and has been central to the egalitarian and individualist

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doctrines of modern liberal democratic theory. Even Hobbes, in his typically negativetones, describes justice and equity in terms of equal treatment before the law:

The safety of the People, requireth further, from . . . the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equallyadministered to all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscurepersons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope ofimpunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one ofthese, does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of theLaw of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his People.10

Liberal democratic doctrines of human and political equality typically accord, to'persons of every rank and degree', life (an a priori moral status) and liberty (atheoretically equal participation in electoral and juridical procedures).11 What is notguaranteed is happiness (equality of material conditions and the results of one'sproductive life). To use Hobbes' image of social life as a kind of race,12 the notion of'equality before the law' guarantees that we shall all commence the race at a point ofessential equality (free birth) and run it according to a common set of rules (civil law).The race must not be fixed: the law shall be no 'respecter of persons', rich or poor, swiftor slow. Such equality thus implies that there will be winners and losers (naturaljustice).13

This, of course, is not to say that all advocates of'equal opportunity' and juridicalequality intend to be socially and politically conservative in this way, that is, acceptingsubstantive inequality in principle. In fact it is truer to say that liberals, while espousingtheories of procedural equality, have often promoted the intervention of government onbehalf of classes and persons, e.g. in not merely providing an 'opportunity' for blackAmericans to vote, but establishing ways, means and mandates such that theopportunity be taken up in order to achieve the desired results. Nevertheless, the moralprinciples inherent in liberal theory are based upon a priori notions of what is right andjust, as distinct from externally determined substantive aims and teleological criteria todirect political action toward a posteriori equality of results.,14 This strongly implies thatequality of rights is not a goal to achieve but an a priori principle of justice whichgovernment is intended to protect, even when that protection over time gives rise to'just entitlements' which become unequally, but neverthelessj«.r</)> distributed.15 Given anaturally uneven distribution of talents, procedural equality combined with a principleof merit (la carriere ouverte aux talents) for distributing offices and rewards, will lead tosubstantial social and material inequality. Despite these consequences, some haveargued, on a premise of'efficiency', in favor of strict procedural equal opportunity.16

Others have argued against it on the premise of'fairness' and the elitist, undemocratictendencies of meritocracy.17

3. 'Substantive equality' and opportunity

There are many obvious practical denials or privations of equal opportunity - if we takethe term in its common acceptation as the equal provision of, or access to, facilities,goods or liberties - across a range of political, social and institutional experience. Forexample, a new-born Aboriginal child in Australia does not have, in comparison withEuropean Australians, an equal opportunity to enjoy sound physical health, universityeducation, professional employment or 20/20 vision in middle age. Less striking but noless clear examples of practical denials of equal opportunity exist at every hand: boys

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have fewer opportunities to play field hockey than girls; women are systematicallydisadvantaged in entry into highly paid administrative positions in school systems; theproductive labor of the elderly is restricted, by pension and taxation laws, comparedwith the young. Given the sensitive nature of the issues when opportunity is manifestlydenied — racial discrimination, sexism, educational failure and poverty — it is notsurprising that the ethical basis of 'opportunity' is accepted as axiomatic. Theimplication is that 'equal opportunity', even when it is acknowledged as a 'difficult' andproblematic concept, is a generally accepted moral axiom which, if not entirely clear, isnevertheless certain.16

Attempts by political theorists to reconcile manifest social inequalities withcompeting claims of rights have led to a dichotomy in the understanding of 'equalopportunity'. The dichotomy is normally expressed by several analytical oppositions:formal or procedural vs. substantive, rights based vs. end-state, rights vs. fairness,weak vs. strong, and so forth. They all emphasize a contrast between minimal (formalor procedural rules stipulating an 'equal start' with the same rules for all) and optimal('fair', though not always equal, prescription of egalitarian results) guarantees ofequality of treatment.19 We do not enter new ground in reviewing these issues, but it isimportant to recognize that the ambiguities inherent in the notion of'equality' and thedisputes concerning what it is we are or ought to be equal in — a priori moral rights, orteleological 'prescriptive rights', or substantive material wealth — all inevitably cloudthe notion of 'equal opportunity'.

John Plamenatz's definition of'the principle of equality of opportunity' is expressedin an idiom which would now be seen by many as not only sexist but antithetical to thespirit of genuine or 'substantive' equality.

Man, as a worker, has equality of opportunity with other men when he is free to choose any occupationhe is fit for, and when his chance of acquiring that fitness is limited only by defects of nature or moralsand not by lack of education or wealth or social prestige. Tests of fitness must be the same for all men,and they must be genuine. They must seek to discover only whether a man has the qualities whichexperience teaches are needed in that occupation; they must be relevant tests [never requiring] of aman that he should have qualities that he does not need to enable him to do the work he has appliedfor.

Plamenatz was concerned to make the point that 'all inequalities that rest on birth andinherited property ough t . . . to be abolished, and none remain unless it is an effect ofsuperior talents or industry'.20 In a curious and yet telling way, this undoubtedlyegalitarian doctrine is confined to cases of individual merit and quietly bound up in animplicit defence of inequality: the 'effects' of 'superior' capacities.

Rawls, with a legion of liberal theorists from a later generation, argues that thisconcept of'careers open to talents' is insufficient and so proposes what he calls 'equalityof fair opportunity':

in all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement foreveryone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the same abilities andaspirations should not be affected by social class . . .21

Rawls goes on to state that institutions, such as schools, 'should be designed to even outclass barriers' and other 'social contingencies'.

Fishkin relies on the standard dichotomy between formal and substantive theories ofequality of opportunity. A 'formal or narrow' definition of equal opportunity requires'no more than an impartial assessment of talents and other qualifications relevant tothe positions to be filled'. By contrast, a 'strong doctrine of equal opportunity', of which

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Rawls' model of democratic equality is mentioned as a 'prime example', looks tosupplementary criteria which specify 'an appropriate chance to develop the desiredtalents and . . . qualifications in the first place'. This involves what he calls

a two-fold commitment: a principle of merit (or impartial competition of talents and qualifications, asdeveloped) and a principle of equal life chances specifying roughly equal expectations for everyoneregardless of the conditions into which they were born.

This commitment — i.e. assignment on the basis of both merit and equal life chances —could only be realized 'when the causal conditions for talent development weresubstantially equalized across all sectors of society'.22

William Galston uses different terms to make much the same distinction. 'Formal'equality of opportunity or 'open competition' is a meritocratic principle defended bythose seeking a restrictive or inegalitarian scope of application. 'Substantive' equalityof opportunity is a principle of distributive justice which he likens to a 'struggle' to'eliminate racial, sexual, and religious barriers and to offer universal access to sourcesof training and development'.23

Similar dichotomies have been used by those who have addressed the issue of equalopportunity in education, where it is common for poverty, racism and social class tointersect. The most influential study on the issue in America was the 'Coleman Report',authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, commissioned by the us Congress andundertaken by the Office of Education. Perhaps equally influential was the review ofthe massive Coleman Report published by Harvard University. It commences withthis unhopeful passage:

The ambiguity of the [Coleman] report begins with the statute that commissioned it. What is'equality of educational opportunity'? Congress gave no explanation of the term, nor did the executivebranch provide any. This left the matter up to the authors . . . They in turn adopted not one but, insuccession, two definitions . . . Stated briefly, 'equality of educational opportunity' was [initially]measured in terms of school inputs, including racial mixture. By inputs we mean physical facilities ofschools and training of teachers; by racial mixture . . . integration. [Eventually] it becameincreasingly the practice, even the demand, that equality be measured by school outputs; that is tosay, by the results of tests of academic achievement.24

In England, John Vaizey attributes the distinction between 'weak' and 'strong'definitions of equal opportunity to a point made by Anthony Crosland in 1960. Indeed,this distinction was adopted in Britain's 1963 secondary education review, the NewsomReport, of a system which until then had 'been based on the assumption that childrenare born - intellectually — sheep or goats'.

The weak definition [of equal opportunity] (which had been generally accepted as the only definitionup till that time) is that all children of equal (measured) ability should have roughly the same start inlife. The strong definition takes account of recent psychological knowledge which points out thatability is largely acquired [and] asserts that subject to differences in heredity and infantile experienceevery child should have the same opportunity for acquiring measured intelligence, in so far as this canbe controlled by social action.25

3.1 Purposive inequality

A major paradox faced by theorists of equal opportunity is the survival of substantialsocial and economic inequalities not only in a meritocratic, competitive system, butalso in a system which directly intervenes in a distributive way to foster a fair equality ofoutcomes. Indeed, in both cases, the persistence is regarded as structural andpurposive rather than merely incidental.

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In a meritocracy inequality is a given. Formal opportunity — i.e. equal individual'starting points' — and superior performance as criteria for assignment to highlyrewarded positions would, even in the 'first instance', favor individuals whose talentsderived from the morally arbitrary distribution of genetic endowments of intelligenceand ability. Over time, a system of competitive assignment would almost certainlyadvantage persons from families whose success had already been recognized by themeritocratic system.

Inequality also persists as a feature of the 'strong' theory of distributive equality,despite aims to achieve a substantive equality of outcomes by narrowing the gapbetween rich and poor and leveling the hierarchies of social power. The inequalitiesenvisaged, on the one hand, by preferential treatment and 'unequal provision' for thedisadvantaged and, on the other, differential office and reward as the 'rent' society paysto ability, are justified on the basis of efficiency and utility.26 Both are arguments formaximizing social equality by recognizing and acting upon subsidiary principles ofinequality.

Preferential or unequal provision is a 'substantive' case against employment on thebasis of status-blind, 'genuine', job-related or competency criteria. In the place of'equal opportunity', one attempts to mitigate the conservative, inegalitarian bias ofmeritocratic, formal or procedural equality (always distorted by morally arbitrary andhistorically unfair inequalities of'background endowments') with quotas or 'affirma-tive action' strategies in hiring or, in the case of education, 'enrichment' programs andpreferential (or 'open') admissions to redress historic patterns of discrimination.Unequal provision is a 'weak' utilitarian argument in the sense that inequality is not anend but merely a means to an end — a necessary evil in the service of greater equality.

The second case of promoting equality by unequal means arises from a stronger,'functional utilitarianism' based on the idea that inequalities are conducive, througheconomic efficiency, to enhanced equality. This argument appeals to necessity in twoquite different ways: by reconciling nature's arbitrary assignment of talents with socialjustice and by redressing historic injustice. Thus inequality of position and differentialrewards - by securing the right talents for the proper posts - are justified because theyproduce greater abundance and welfare for all. An efficient, productive, well-administered economy will actually maximize social equality by improving the lot ofthose who are at any given time least advantaged in position and reward.27

Many writers have argued that a principle of distributive justice to achieve equality ofoutcomes will always distort the optimal use of resources and production of benefit.28

Strict equality simply has to be compromised by assigning unequal positions andpaying unequal reward in order to achieve economic efficiency (getting things donemost easily and cheaply) and optimally (getting more, and more things, done). Even suchadvocates of 'strong' equality as Grosland have accepted that 'exploiting' specialabilities with greater economic rewards may be economically useful.

Such an argument relies on an assumption that, without differential rewards, certainjobs may not be done29 or certain services and commodities would not be produced insufficient abundance. The argument for efficiency, of course, extends further: to thecost-effective use of scarce human and material resources, the fostering of greater totaloutput, or the assurance that goods and services (e.g. food, schooling, or brain surgery)be provided at the highest possible level of quality. These arguments accept, on the onehand, that the arbitrary distribution of genetic endowments of ability and intelligencecan be given productive scope through meritocratic assignments to unequal positions.On the other hand, the desert for the inequality of reward attached to such positions is

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based, not upon the (arbitrary, non-moral) endowment, but upon the consequence ofbenefit, from society's enhanced efficiency, accruing to those less advantaged. One'slarger pay packet is due not to one's greater talents but to the marginal socialproductiveness (efficiency) which improves the welfare of those less endowed (justice asfairness).

There are several strategies for circumventing the paradox of subsidiary inequality.A libertarian such as Nozick would deny its existence, insisting that inequality andjustice are fully compatible. At the other extreme, a radical egalitarian, insisting uponan unswerving 'egalitarianism of result', would deny both the need and utility ofinequality in a fully democratic society. The assumption that jobs will not be done, ordone well enough, without material incentives and unequal payments, is dismissed as abankrupt idea derived from a distorted assessment of motivations and social relationsfrom within the competitive ethos of capitalism. Steven Lukes, for example, argues thatsuch a view underestimates the value of other types of incentives and motivations —'intrinsic job satisfaction, the desire for knowledge', a sense of public service — which areregistered by persons of varying aspirations, talents and skills.30 While this argument isa challenging critique of the rationale for unequal material rewards and socialinequalities, it only reinstates a defence of inequality in another coinage. Leftunanswered is the question why the range of non-material incentives it appeals towould not eventually constitute - or perpetuate - forms and conditions of socialinequalities that would be morally equivalent to the inequalities arising from materialincentives.

The second form of 'circumvention', in contrast to the egalitarian denial of theproblem, simply accepts the inevitability of unequal positions and rewards. Fishkin, forexample, calls it 'the problem of assignment': 'the basic liberal approach to equalopportunity [is] the assignment of persons to unequal positions according to a faircompetition'.31 While such a view seems callous in comparison to the egalitarianaspirations of social democratic thinkers, it is refreshingly apropos in the matter of thepractical dilemmas of hiring practices or school admissions. Indeed, the inequalityacceded to by Fishkin is nothing more than the altogether familiar situation ofnumerous applicants for appointment to an advertised position. Whatever the qualitiesand backgrounds of the several applicants, however high or low the salary, andhowever fair or biased the ultimate choice among them, the simple fact remains that allthe applicants want the job, only one will get it, and all the rest will be rejected, even whenscrupulously fair procedures are adhered to and affirmative action guidelines arevigorously applied. Unequal assignment will occur whether there are far more jobsthan applicants (and thus a pressure to bid with greatly differential salaries) or moreapplicants than jobs (and thus an intensity of competition and more rejection letters).

4. Institutionalized 'equal opportunity'

The concept of equal opportunity, however it is denned, has been accorded a remarkablelegal and bureaucratic panoply of conferences, committees, tribunals, commissions,councils and boards. One might easily conclude that 'equal opportunity' must meansomething if so much activity surrounds it and so many budgets support it. But how arewe to get at that meaning?

'Equal opportunity', in the substantive or 'fairness' version of the concept, has beenfor some time identified with the moral and political claims of the civil rights movement

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and the women's liberation or feminist movement.32 In the former, the claim for equalopportunity singles out racial discrimination of all kinds and calls for an expansiveinterpretation and application of the law to overthrow inequalities heretoforesanctioned by legislation or the judiciary (e.g. in the area of voting rights or segregatedschools), social inequalities (e.g. patterns of de facto segregation of neighborhoods,public amenities and clubs) and economic inequalities (e.g. discriminatory hiring andfiring practices, banking and credit services, training programs, etc). In the women'sliberation movement, equal opportunity claims have been directed toward many ofthese same discriminatory practices (although an additional 'area' is emphasized: thedomestic, marital and sexual), but on the basis of sex or gender, that is, unequal'opportunities' for women.33

Implicit in such acceptations of equal opportunity are three ideas:

1. that 'opportunities' can be rationally identified as separate spheres of personal capacity or status,individual action, or social relationship;2. that 'all' citizens have a legal or moral 'right' to these opportunities; and3. that the state has the competence and power (indeed the responsibility in clear patterns of denial ordiscrimination) to foster, enjoin or coerce in pursuit of guaranteeing that 'all' citizens have 'equal'access to the 'opportunities' so identified.

These are tall orders when set out schematically, but it will be readily appreciated thatthese aims and assumptions are commonplace across a large portion of the spectrum ofcontemporary political thought and governmental policy. However, the threepresuppositions are far from self-evident. In fact, they beg a number ofepistemological,34 to say nothing of legal and moral,35 questions. Nevertheless, I wantto leave these questions aside and focus upon how the concepts 'opportunity' and'equal opportunity' have been elevated in contemporary public discourse to the statusof personal and public goods of which persons may be possessed, unpossessed or even(/^possessed. The point I draw attention to here is how the term 'opportunity' is reified.It is transformed into a stable and overarching concept which presupposes the existenceof objective categories, respective exempla and 'types' of 'opportunity'. Moreover,these types, when identified35 (that is, claimed) in political discourse, necessarily appearas 'rights', since they refer to human capacities which are by definition properlyenjoyed - by 'nature', before 'the law' - by 'equal individuals'. Thus the denial of anopportunity is aforteriori the denial, politically, of one's right to social and legal equalityand, morally, of one's integrity and potential worth as an individual.

It is worthwhile remembering how far reaching are the issues at stake - howfundamental to theories of democracy and human rights - when 'equal opportunity' isdebated at the level of practical policy. This is perhaps easy to overlook when the latest'Equal Opportunity Guidelines' appear in the mail box, and one's first reaction is toassume that the 'women's lobby' has won another bureaucratic victory, the pressure for'affirmative action' has been turned up another notch and there will be hell to pay if thenext person hired is not a woman.

5. Divine 'opportunity' and the state

I have argued that, in spite of the ambiguities inherent in both the theoretical andpractical discourse on equal opportunity, the notion of 'equal opportunity' or simply'opportunity' has been reified to a generality, a class of things-in-the-world. In this

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special sense 'opportunity' has become 'objectified', since (notwithstanding theambiguities) 'opportunities' have been specified, subdivided, enumerated, measuredand financed. Thus an 'opportunity' is this or that thing, here well and there badlydistributed, possessed by A but not by B, etc. One is assured that, if the 'target groups'are identified and the 'guidelines' are followed, the designated 'protected classindividuals'37 will be accorded the relevant 'opportunity'. Both politically and morally,all must and ought to have access to 'it'. But what is the meaning of 'it'? Does theetymology of'opportunity' or, if you like, the archeology of its meanings, shed any lighton its use as a signifier of the just distribution of political goods?

5.1 Portunus in Ancient Rome

The Oxford English Dictionary initially cites the root word 'opportune' for the basicdefinition. It is interesting, considering my proposition that the notion has been reified,that 'opportune' is now relegated in common parlance to a somewhat archaic adjective— the opportune moment' - while the chief usage today is the nounal derivation,'opportun-ity'. 'Opportune' is defined by five main meanings38 as an adjective oradverb, with each definition supported by reference to usages dating from the earlyfifteenth century and continuously through the nineteenth century.

1. Adapted to an end or purpose for the circumstances of the case; fit, suitable, appropriate;convenient, a. Of a time and b. Of a place. (The latter is declared 'obsolete'.)2. Of an event, action, or thing: Fitting in regard to time or circumstances, seasonable; now chiefly inmore restricted sense, Meeting the requirements of the time or occasion, timely, well-timed.3. Advantageous, serviceable, useful. Obs.4. Conveniently exposed; liable or open (to attack or injury). Obs.5. Adopted with a view to expediency; cf. Opportunism, rare.

While these definitions are relatively similar to current usage and the range ofmeanings is comparatively steady and coherent, one is left puzzling about theetymology of the term. The brief Latin derivation given by the Oxford English Dictionaryis only sufficient to tantalize: 'cf. Portunus, the protecting god of harbours, f. portu-s,harbour, Port.' Looking further afield, one discovers that 'opportunus'or 'obportunus' wasa reference to the wind 'blowing toward the harbour'. Divinized as Portunus,*0 thispower enabled the Roman navy and, more generally, the heavily laden trading vesselswith their valuable cargoes, to move safely into port: but only if there were 'opportune'wind and tide. By the same token, 'importunus'meant 'without a port', difficult of access,unfit or unsuitable, a term which gave rise to the Medieval Latin 'importunari', to betroublesome, and is the root of the English word 'importune'.

At least as early as the time of the Roman Republic, on the evidence of the great Latinauthors,41 the god of the harbors had lent his powers to conventional language(including 'opportunitas') for the still familiar range of meanings of 'opportune':advantageous, useful, convenient, fit or suitable with respect to time, things andpersons.

All of this may h*. of philological interest, but are there larger implications fortheories of equal opportunity? The first point concerns the very origin of the term: 'afavorable wind blowing to port'. Tying this sense to our earlier discussion ofopportunity leads to the observation that the 'opportunity' in question relates to a forceof nature — the wind — that is anything but stable and certain, yet may be turned tohuman advantage by the special divinity who assists those in need of making safely to

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harbor. In this most primitive sense, the compelling and potentially dangerous force isexternal to the individual and society; and the appropriate human disposition towardthis force is to appeal to or invoke a divine power. What is 'opportune', therefore, is thefleeting character of a natural condition — the favorable wind — that has beenmomentarily constrained by the god. Divine intervention is by no means a guarantee.Safe passage still requires human virtues. Even with a 'favorable wind to port', itremains the seafarer's task to sail safely into harbor. The mortal recipient of this divinebeneficence has a two-fold 'duty', to preserve his life and the lives of his shipmates, andto seize the opportunity,,42

It is clear that this notion of 'opportunity' is substantially different from thecontemporary idea. The ancient usage concerns what we might call, althoughanachronistically, an existential moment. The 'opportunity' relates to a specificconjoining of time, place, the type and condition of one's boat, the skill of the crew and,literally, the weather. The absence or uncooperativeness of Portunus may require that,Hmportunus', we await 'opportunity' at a new tide and time, or seek it elsewhere, at adifferent harbor. Certainly nothing can be taken for granted on behalf of nature, andmortal power is impotent to devise a guarantee of safe passage, any attempts at whichwould be 'importunate' and, therefore, reliant upon the beneficence of a different deityaltogether.43

It hardly needs to be pointed out that the existential, provisional and providentialelements constituting the ancient conception of 'opportunity' are strikingly at oddswith the modern idea that opportunity is inherent in the good life, that it is or ought tobe possessed equally and by all, and that its favorable conditions for flourishing aresecular rather than divine, bestowed by our fellow citizens and the state.

5.2 Opportunity and the state

What may we conclude from the contemporary deviation from the ancient meaning ofthe term opportunity? Indeed, is it necessary to conclude anything? Perhaps the leastattractive consequence of the inquiry is to point out the imprecision of political andlegal rhetoric which conflates the terms 'equal', 'opportunity' and 'right'. Conceptual-ly, these three terms are crucial to liberal democratic theory and, perhaps even moreimportantly, they are fundamental axioms of modern political debate right across thepolitical spectrum. The terms have been most actively adopted by movements aimingto break down invidious discriminations based upon race, sex and religion; byadvocates of social reform; and by the emerging political voice of women, whose fightfor 'equal opportunity' serves all of society by intensifying demands for accountabilityfrom those in positions of political and economic power. If these are beneficialconsequences, as I have no doubt they are, one is still left with a lingering feeling thatwidespread conceptual confusion cannot be all to the good, especially when it concernslanguage and ideas which are central to political values.

Let us take the most obvious 'confusion'.44 The term 'opportunity' has been 'used' inour literary tradition - forgetting for the moment the fickle intentions or loftier concernsof the Roman gods — to mean a momentary 'chance', a 'convenience', something that isspecially timely, such as a 'break' or a sudden advantageous occurrence that makes one'liable' to act. Somehow or other these meanings appeal to our sense of historical andpersonal experience, and they enable us to speak or understand vivid expressions: anactor's 'getting a break in show business', 'opportunity knocks but once', and so forth.

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It is doubtful that anyone would want to attack these senses of the term 'opportunity' asinherently immoral, at odds with reality, meaningless or, worse than that, fun-damentally corrosive of humane understanding.45

Yet if opportunity is understood as involving the fleeting and fortuitous, if it is a'chance' to be grabbed, how can this be reconciled with such ideas as moral 'right' andpolitical 'equality'? At its extreme, the confusion would amount to saying 'I have a rightto a piece of luck' or 'my advantageous position must be equal to yours'. In the first caseone is insisting upon a logical contradiction: making the indeterminate (chance)determinate. The second case is also a semantic nonsense: an advantage would not bean advantage if it were the same as another's position, much less if it were equal to allother positions.

It is difficult, then, to overlook the implications that 'opportunity' as a concept islogically in tension, to say the least, with 'equality' and 'right'. Clearly, on the onehand, it makes little sense to insist that 'I have a right to an opportunity', or that 'myopportunity must bejust like yours'; on the other hand, it is clear that I am really sayingmuch more than this. What I am really saying is that I want, need to have a right tocitizenship, or to vote, or to a good education, or to ajob, or to promotion. I do not wantto (nor in any meaningful sense can I) possess, by right, an opportunity. This, as has beenargued above, is merely to reify the term, even if it does render the concept moreamenable for a bureaucracy to preside over the elaboration of ever more 'objective'procedures. Nor, for that matter, do I want an equal chance of these things. My getting aneducation, ajob, etc., may well depend in the practical world upon genetic endowment,chance, whim or timeliness, but any (necessarily futile) attempts to equalize thoseconditions will be of little immediate sense or benefit to me.

This may sound a little strong, but two separate points are intended. In the firstplace, we do not want a 'chance' to have what is rightfully ours, we simply want it.Secondly, and more broadly, it is doubtful that the state, any more than Portunus, willreliably control conditions that are favorable to all in a context of multiple andconflicting needs, material scarcity, and the brevity of mortal life. I have no interest inwaiting a long time for equality of treatment. For example, children who are unequal anddisadvantaged in one capacity (say, nutrition) will not be able to make 'equal' use ofanother (primary education) even when the facilities are equal.46 The point is that themeaning of 'equalizing conditions' is itself far from clear, just as its practicalapplication is far from being a foregone success.

At the risk of being misunderstood, I observe that there are elements of confusion,and perhaps ambition and hypocrisy, in the rhetoric and bureaucracy of institutional'equal opportunity'. Many women today, I would argue, are not nearly so interested inthe opportunity, 'equal' or otherwise, of having ajob and a rewarding career as they are ingetting them. The same is true of any unemployed worker. (Women who do not want ajoband career, however, may well be genuinely interested in having them if, at some timelypoint, the moment is 'opportune'.) Clearly, the prevalence of rhetoric about 'equality'to the contrary notwithstanding, that is what the legal and administrative initiativesare all about, as is evidenced by such terms as 'affirmative action' and 'positivediscrimination' to benefit 'protected class individuals' and 'minorities'.

These terms are revealing euphemisms. While evidently intended to 'implement'standards and practices of'equal opportunity', the actual function of the terms is tosweeten the medicine. What is wanted, to take only one case, is jobs. This aim has beenpursued by legislative and executive measures which address a discriminatory jobmarket (where few or no jobs for women have existed) with a new form of'preferential

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consideration' or 'reverse' discrimination.47 This has, indeed, constituted an 'oppor-tunity' in the strict sense for women in recent years, but it has, as all would agree,48 verylittle to do with 'equality'. The movement of women into the workforce at all levels, andin particular into management, professional and executive levels, has occurred, onemight say, at a moment in history that is 'opportune'. But any such characterization ofrecent history would be unrelated to the principles and procedures of the 'equalopportunity' debates. Considering the inverted or contradictory use of'opportunity' inrelation to 'equality' in contemporary parlance, perhaps a way out of this problem is arevival of the ancient Roman meaning, but with a necessary revision. If'opportunity' isvalued as a 'primary good' to be redistributed in order to amend and ameliorate theplight of persons suffering from historic, deeply ingrained discriminations orprivations, it might be prudent to call quite frankly upon the intercession of higherpowers. In the modern case, of course, we would not invoke the resourceful Portunus orany other deity, but the state, the only 'higher power' recognized today as having theauthority and resources to alter the conditions of moral and material life.

The point here is that the state's provision of'opportunity' would thus be seen as anact of taking special action on behalf of the party in question: those who are, as it were, atthe mercy of the wind and the deep. Gone would be the (often hypocritical) pretence ofguaranteeing 'equal' procedures and conditions. The central aim would be to deployresources for those beset by special needs and manifestly unequal circumstances. 'Fair'for such persons is not what is 'equal' but what is very unequal, special andextraordinary.

Such a policy would have serious implications. In the first case, it would invite thefamiliar, and usually politically conservative, caution that one exception to theprinciple (equality of treatment) will lead to other exceptions. More importantly, itwould involve the bankruptcy and loss of the principle itself: If A (is accorded Q byOpportunus), then why not B, C, D, E . . . n? This is indeed a serious question onseveral counts. It leads to the utilitarian question of whether the state has enoughresources and power to provide, or enough wisdom to optimize, opportunity for everygroup or individual at sea. More importantly from a theoretical point of view, it raisesquestions about the (undemocratic) nature of the (necessarily powerful and arbitrary)state: on whose behalf does it exercise authority; by what principles does it determine casesto be specially needful; what institutions and methods will it require to provideopportunity? Answers to all of these questions are far from obvious, and lack ofconfidence about the desirability of any proposed answers is understandable.

In the second case, and by implication from the first, the use of a new principle of'opportunity' would pose serious legal questions. How could one ever reconcile with theprinciple of 'equality before the law' a principle of 'opportunity' that specificallyendorses procedures that would, in a world of finite time and resources, treat peopleunequally, providing with the full force of the law 'opportunities' to some that are deniedto others. The logical implication, at least, is that you cannot reconcile it. It would haveto be replaced with what amounts (if A, not B . . . n) to a principle of inequality. Thiswould have to be a legal and political principle of inequality very different from, say, theAristotelian idea of inequality. Aristotle held that it wasjust for the state to assign equalhonors and privilege to equal persons, and unequal things to unequal persons:distributive justice, but not in the interest of egalitarian redistribution.49 A secondproblem is that we are (as indeed Aristotle was) talking about distribution by legal andpolitical means which presumably citizens will in some way hold accountable. Bycontrast, Fortune's smile and the winds of Portunus are never expected to be

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even-handed, consistent or answerable to logic, much less to democratic deliberation.Significantly, when the state goes in search of Justice, its proper deity, she is Blind. Herscales are obviously not intended for meting out unequal treatment.

In strict democratic theory (i.e. equality before the law, and the law as no respecter ofpersons), then, implementing the new idea of'opportunity' involves problems of logic,law, constitutional theory and, finally, an appeal to a 'higher power'. This is an appealoutside of logic, law and the political constitution; or, alternatively, a substitution of anew theory explicitly endorsing inequality: law as a respecter of persons and unequaltreatment.

Of course political life does not occur in 'strict theory'. Current policy andadministration of 'equal opportunity', despite its euphemisms, is not merely adeviation from legal and theoretical rigor. In fact the notions of'equality before the law'and 'law as no respecter of persons' have often and historically been violated in waysthat cease to offend logic and morals. The law has a long tradition of prescribingunequal treatment: the long list includes 'progressive' taxation of incomes; providingthe old and disabled (only) with pensions and special benefits; providing advantages ineducation to the young over the old; affirming constitutional and proceduralprotections in a court of law to rapists that are denied to their victims. Nevertheless, oneshould not underestimate the intensity of political (and juridical) resistance toencroachments on the still venerable tradition of equality before the law. This isespecially true when proposals for 'quotas' and 'reverse discrimination' are not onlydiametrical contradictions to that principle, but also concern such fundamentalinterests as jobs, promotions, professional appointments, access to higher educationand other areas in which vigorous competition is typical, and where free, fairconsideration is assumed to involve objective, impartial criteria of judgment.

6. Conclusion

The logical and semantic tensions underlying the concept of 'equal opportunity' are,therefore, reflected in the political and judicial tensions generated by racial quotas,affirmative action, preferential procedures and other apparent departures from anideal of equality and impartiality. Where the matter becomes divisive is perhaps alsowhere it becomes theoretically interesting. One might well argue that the term'opportunity' should be regarded an 'essentially contested concept'.50 That it alwayshas been is perhaps attested to by Aristotle's frequent complaints about the excessivedemands — for liberty and possessions — in democratic society.51 In 'opportunity's'qualification as a 'right' in philosophical and moral inquiry, and as a sphere of'equality' in both democratic theory and ordinary political discourse, we haveencountered cross-currents, ambiguities and deep-seated interests in the rhetoric of'opportunity' that reflect much more than careless speech or simple logical confusions

In closing, it is worthwhile to note that contested, ambiguous and paradoxicalconcepts have at times remarkable political consequences. They are not merely'fallacious', even when the terms are emotive or, as Hobbes observed, 'imperative'. Theterms and ideas of 'ordinary language' are properly admitted into the vocabulary ofpolitical theory and social inquiry especially when they are directly expressive of thepolitical life under investigation, 'for those concepts that help to shape the fabric of our politicalpractices necessarily enter into any rational account of them.52

The meaning of'opportunity', therefore, seems to lie most tellingly in its essentially

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contested uses in both theoretical and everyday discourse. It is not a concept to bedefined in any stable semantic range, but rather to be contested as a concept that capturescertain values and aspirations which we share, but perceive differently.

Notes

1. In A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971), p. 303, Rawls identifies the'social primary goods' as 'liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect'.Justice requires that these primary goods 'are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution ofany or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured'.

2. The term 'opportunity' is never found in the indexes of theoretical studies of justice, rights, democracy,etc. Rather, listings are habitually 'equality: of opportunity' or 'equal opportunity'.

3. R. Nozick's Anarchy,State,and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974), pp. 180-82, 186-9 and esp. 232-35,is perhaps the clearest case of this: his 'entitlement conception of justice in holdings makes nopresumption in favor of equality, or any other overall end state or patterning' (p. 233). F. A. Hayekexpresses the idea unapologetically: 'Attractive as the phrase equality of opportunity at first sounds, oncethe idea is extended beyond the facilities [such as education, appointments to public office] which . . .have to be provided by government, it becomes a wholly illusory ideal, and any attempt concretely torealize it apt to produce a nightmare'. Quoting Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 2, The Mirage of SocialJustice, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1976), p. 85. Other economists defend the idea ofinequality, for example in education and employment, on the grounds of efficiency as opposed todesert.

4. Ironically the most explicit critique of 'equal opportunity' has arisen from within the civil rights andfeminist movements. In this argument equality of opportunity is deemed insufficient to redress historicdiscriminations in a timely fashion. Thus 'unequal provisions' and 'affirmative action' are required.Educators have also argued that disadvantaged children are incapable of taking equal advantage of, forexample, excellent educational facilities, while advantaged children in fact marginally increase theirachievement from such facilities. Since the 'equal provision and access' actually works to increaseeducational inequality, the argument follows that disadvantaged persons should be accordedpreferential and special facilities and services. Much the same argument underlies the critique of equalopportunity by feminist advocates of affirmative action, and indeed from equal opportunity boards,commissions and administrations established by 'equal opportunity' legislation.

5. See: PENNOCK, J . R. Democratic Politial Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1979), pp.28-29, 35-39; MCLEOD, A. M. 'Equality of opportunity: some ambiguities in the ideal', in DORSEY, G.(ed.), Equality and Freedom, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, NY (1977), pp. 1077-1084.

6. An enlightening development of this theme in the Western philosophical tradition is given by LLOYD, G.The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, Methuen, London (1984), summarizedeffectively at pp. 103-110. A Marxist (and a man's) account of the social construction of masculinity isgiven by H E A R N , J . The Gender of Oppression: Men, Masculinity and the Critique of Marxism Wheatsheaf,London (1987).

7. The question of sexual 'difference' is an issue theoretically distinct from the question of 'bias' or sociallyconstructed and oppressive 'gender' and of course it is an extremely serious departure from the primacyaccorded to 'equality' (of the sexes) in moral, legal and political inquiry. This issue is briefly discussed inG. LLOYD, op cit., pp. 105-7. See also: IRIGARAY, L. Ce Sexe Qui n'en Est pas Un, Minuit, Paris (1977),portions of which are translated in MARKS, E. and DE COUTIVRON, I. (eds), New French Feminisms: AnAnthology, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst (1980), which includes other pieces touchingupon this issue. A wider consideration is given in EISENSTEIN H. and JARDINE, A. (eds), The Future ofDifference, G. K. Hall, Boston (1980).

8. FRANCE, A. Le Lys Rouge, Paris, (1984), Chap. 7.9. Rousseau's Social Contract and, especially, the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft and Thomas Paine are

exemplary of this point.10. HOBBES, T. Leviathan, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth (1986), Vol. II, Chap. 30, p. 385.11. The 'right of every Englishman' to equality before the law is given a classic statement by BLACKSTONE,

W. Commentaries on the Laws of England, 2 Vols, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1765), Vol. I, p. 137, where hequotes Sir Edward COKE'S Institutes, Vol. II, p. 55: 'and therefore every subject, for injury done to him inbonis, in terris, vel persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal without any expression,may take his remedy by the course of law, and have justice and right for the injury done to him, freelywithout fale, fully without denial, and speedily without delay'.

12. 'It is in the Lawes of a Commonwealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agreeon, is Injustice to none of them . . . For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bindthe people from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurtthemselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop

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Travellers, but to keep them in the way' (Leviathan, II, 30, p. 388). GALSTON, W. A. Justice and the HumanGood, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1980), pp. 182-83, argues that the 'slower runner has anequal "legal" opportunity to enter the race'. '[T]he naturally gifted sprinter . . . does not "deserve" hisspeed, but he certainly deserves to win the race that measures speed.' Galston points out that 'the race isnot natural in the same sense as the sprinter's ability', but is 'brought into being through a collectivedecision, as is the prize or entitlement created by victory'. Here Galston explicitly assumes that 'everyonehas the same opportunity to develop skills as a sprinter', and that winning the race, and the prize, doesnot mean the winner will be otherwise privileged. Cf. Nozick's opposing view, infra.

13. For NOZICK, R. (op cit., pp. 150-55) this implication, in an ironic consequence of his theories ofjustice, isnot an 'end result' but simply an instance of 'historical entitlement'. Indeed, Nozick explicitly rejects(pp. 235-36) the Hobbesian image of the 'rules of the game': 'The model of a race for a prize is often usedin discussions of equality of opportunity. A race where some started closer to the finish line than otherswould be unfair, as would a race where some were forced to carry heavy weights, or run with pebbles intheir sneakers. But life is not a race in which we all compete for a prize which someone has established;there is no unified race, with some person judging swiftness. Instead, there are different persons givingother persons different things. Those who do the giving (each of us, at times) usually do not care aboutdesert or about the handicaps labored under; they care simply about what they actually get'.

14. These ideas are, of course, fundamental to the distinction between concepts ofjustice that are descriptive('rights based') and prescriptive ('end-state') used by John Rawls and his many commentators. See R.NOZICK, op cit., esp. pp. 151-55, and GALSTON, op cit., pp. 177-91, who distinguishes between 'formal' and'substantive' opportunity and provides a concise, lucid critique of recent accounts of what he calls 'theformal and material principles of justice'.

15. NOZICK, ibid., pp. 150-55, defends an 'entitlement' theory of justice which establishes principles of'justice in acquisition' and 'justice in holdings'. He argues that this as a theory ofjust distribution that 'ishistorical; whether a distribution is just depends upon now it came about' (p. 153). Opposed to this aretwo related theories which are not historical, but rather teleological: the 'current time-slice principle ofjustice' which holds a purely utilitarian or 'welfare economies' view 'that the justice of a distribution isdetermined by how things are distributed . . . as judged by some structural principle(s) of justdistribution', i.e. the matrix of distribution leading to the greatest sum of utility; and the thoery ofdistributive justice based upon 'end-result principles or end-state principles' (p. 155).

16. For a detailed discussion of the argument of efficiency and inequality see: KLAPPHOLZ, K. 'Equality ofopportunity, fairness and efficiency', in PESTON, M. and CORRY, B. (eds), Essays in Honour of Lord [Lionel]Robbins, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London (1972), pp. 256 ff; HAYEK, F. A. The Constitution of Liberty,University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1960), p. 92, describes the meritocratic situation thus: 'allman-made obstacles to the rise of some should be removed . . . [W]hat the state contributed to thechance of improving one's conditions should be the same for all'.

17. YOUNG, M. in The Rise of the Meritocracy, Random House, New York (1959), describes a societyincreasingly dominated by a highly efficient technocratic elite. SCHAAR, J . 'Equality of opportunity andbeyond', in PENNOCK, J . R. and CHAPMAN, J . W. (eds), Nomos 9: Equality, Atherton, New York (1967),argues that equal opportunity is inherently conservative in the way it unfairly rewards the existing rangeand distribution of talents, emphasizes competitiveness, raises false hopes, relies upon an unwarrantedconception of what is 'natural' and is compatible with oligarchic and hierarchical social structure.

18. KLAPPHOLZ, K. op cit., p. 247, concedes that 'it is not easy to say exactly what it means or to find in itconsistent identity'. NOZICK, op cit., pp. 234-35, complains of the general acceptance of the concept andthe lack of attention to 'essentialist issues' that 'becloud the discussion' of egalitarian goals. In PENNOCK,J. R. Democratic Political Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton (1979), p. 37, Pennock's reflectionupon equality of opportunity emphasizes that the concept is rather ambiguous, but this does not inhibithim from drawing a foregone conclusion: 'A strong argument can be made for [equality of opportunity],but my concern here is not to appraise arguments; it is simply to point out the problems involved inapplying the principle of equality of opportunity. . . The definition of equality as equality of opportunityleaves many questions unanswered.' Pennock here implies that the difficulty of'application' is unrelatedto the clarity of the concept.

19. GORDON, E. W. 'Defining equal opportunity', in MOSTELLER, F. and MOYNIHAN, D. P. (eds), On Equalityof Educational Opportunity: Papers Deriving from the Harvard University Faculty Seminar on the Coleman Report,Vintage Books, New York (1972), p. 431, expresses this dichotomy by the casual but critical use of thehypothetical 'if' in his definition of equal opportunity and 'the purpose of education in a democraticsociety. If that purpose is to broaden opportunities for meaningful participation in the mainstream ofsociety through the development of necessary skills and credentials, then educational opportunity isunequal unless it serves that purpose for all learners'.

20. Quoting from 'Equality of opportunity', in BRYSON, L. et al. (eds), Aspects of Human Equality, London(1956), pp. 100, 104.

21. Op cit., p. 73. Rawls notes that with the continued existence of the family 'the principle of fair opportunitycan only be imperfectly carried out'. This point is repeated at p. 511.

22. FISHKIN, J . S. Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family, Yale University Press, New Haven (1983), pp.19-20.

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23. GALSTON, op cit., pp. 176-77.24. MOSTELLER, F. P. and MOYNIHAN, D. P. 'A pathbreaking report', op cit., p. 6.25. VAIZEY, J . Education for Tomorrow (1962), Penguin, Harmondsworth (1966), pp. 7, 17, quoting from note

18. The 'strong' view is what Rawls subsequently defined as 'democratic equality', which combines a'presumptive equality' with a theory for justifying any inequality in terms of its advantaging the leastadvantaged class. The views ofjustice and equal opportunity shared by Crosland and Rawls are examinedby PLANT, R. 'Democratic socialism and equality', in LIPSEY, D. and LEONARD, D. (eds), The SocialistAgenda: Crosland's Legacy, Jonathan Cape, London (1981), pp. 138-153.

26. CROSLAND, C. A. R. The Future of Socialism, Jonathan Cape, London (1956), p. 145. Attempting to resolvethe apparent paradox between presumptive equality and economic inequalities justified by Crosland'sprinciple of a 'rent of ability' for critical tasks, Plant, an exponent of democratic socialism, makes aremarkable claim: 'What matters in society is not the sheer fact of inequality but how these inequalitiesare perceived, in particular whether they are perceived as fair or unfair, just or unjust'. He goes on todefend this sophistic position with a distinction between whether or not a particular resentment is'legitimate' (PLANT, R. op cit., p. 145).

27. No effort is made here to exhibit the multitudinous modifications and criticisms of the Rawlsian model ofsocial justice, either as to the internal coherence and logic of such critical concepts as 'right', 'fairopportunity' and 'desert' or the validity of his larger understanding ofjustice.

28. Here I purposefully lay aside the oft expressed concern for the curtailment of personal and politicalliberties implied in interventionist policies of egalitarian redistribution which, as one commentatornotes, 'seems to require a political system in which the state is able to continually hold in check thosesocial and occupational groups which, by virtue of their skills or education, might otherwise attempt tostake claims to a disproportionate share of society's rewards. The most effective way of holding suchgroups in check is by denying them the right to organize politically . . .', (PARKIN, F. Class, Inequality andPolitical Order, MacGibbon & Kee, London (1971), p. 183, quoted from PLANT, R. op. cit., p. 140.)

29. Many differentials in payment for dangerous, stressful or otherwise unsalubrious tasks should perhapsnot be classed as inequalities of reward or even 'incentives', but as fair compensation. We would beadding unnecessary confusion to use the common term for this idea, namely, 'opportunity costs',although the appropriateness of this term will become apparent below.

30. LUKES, S. Essays in Social Theory, Macmillan, London (1977), quoted from PLANT, op. cit., p. 143.31. FISHKIN, op. cit., p. 6.32. Indeed the inclusion of a prohibition against sex discrimination in the original us Equal Opportunity act

of 1964 came about as the result of an opposition tactic by a southern legislator which backfired. See: usEqual Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of1964, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC (1968).

33. There are other 'movements' for equality of opportunity whose arguments are based upon a rejection oftraditional constraints and prohibitions based on age (both youth and the elderly), status (e.g. students,workers, mothers, etc.) and social characteristics (e.g. language, religion, homosexuality, etc.). Theemphasis given here to civil rights and women's liberation is illustrative and in no way intended toaddress, much less resolve, the distinctness or systematic relationship between these and otherdimensions of the politics of 'equal opportunity'.

34. For example, point ( 1 ) leaves in abeyance whether 'opportunity' is to be identified in terms of descriptive(a priori) or prescriptive (teleological) criteria. Quite a different problem arises over whether some or allopportunities can be understood as 'separate spheres'.

35. The De Funis and Bakke us Supreme Court cases, concerning the use of preferential racial quotas foruniversity admissions, illustrated the moral and legal problems surrounding the application of theconcept of'affirmative action' in the effort to overcome traditional inequalities of opportunity. Amongthe many legal and philosophical studies of this subject are: SANDALOW, T. 'Racial preferences in highereducation', University of Chicago Law Review, (Summer 1975), 42: pp. 691 ff; FULLINWINDER, R. K. TheReverse Discrimination Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis, Rowman & Littlefield, Totawa, NJ (1980),DWORKIN, R. 'Why Bakke has no case', The New York Review of Books, (10 November 1977) pp.(1980);GOLDMAN, A. H. Justice and Reverse Discrimination, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1979);GROSS, B. R. Discrimination in Reverse: Is Turnabout Fair Play?, New York University Press, New York(1978); THOMPSON, J . J . 'Preferential hiring', Philosophy and Public Affairs, (1973) 2: pp. 364-84; and SHER,G. 'Ancient wrongs and modern rights', ibid., (1981), 10: pp. 3-17. For a comprehensive bibliography ofthe us legislation and litigation concerning sex discrimination, employment and affirmative action, see:WEATHERSPOON, F. D . (ed.), Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action: A Sourcebook, Gar landPress, New York (1985), esp. pp. 47-101 and 203-227.

36. For example, the 'opportunity' for wives and mothers to participate in the paid workforce and pursueproductive careers.

37. In the us, the aim of the Executive Order issued to implement the 'affirmative action' provisions of theCivil Rights Act of 1964 through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was frankly andsympathetically described in these words: 'to improve the economic and social status of protected classindividuals, e.g., minorities and women'. WEATHERSPOON, op. cit., pp. xxii-xxiii.

38. Listed as obsolete and rare, two further usages are cited: 'opportune' as a transitive and intransitive verb.

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THE VERY IDEA OF AN OPPORTUNITY 73

39. The Oxford English Dictionary, micrographie edition, Vol. 2, p. 1998.40. The divinity Portunus appears to date from the archaic Roman period, and in particular served as

guardian over the port of Rome on the Tiber. Like most Roman divinities, Portunus was identified with aGreek deity. The infant Melicertes was plunged into a cauldron of boiling water by his mother, Ino, whowas driven mad by Hera, the jealous wife of Zeus. Ino then carried his body with her as she threw herselfinto the sea. This tragedy was rewarded by his admission to the deities of the Sea, under the name ofPalaemon, along with his mother, renamed Leucothea. The latter, thought to have sought refuge on thecoast of Italy, was identified by Roman women with their ancient goddess, Mater Matuta, adored for herpromotion of fertility - Larousse Greek and Roman Mythology, McGraw-Hill, New York (1980).

41. Usages from Julius Caesar, Cicero, Livy, Sallust inter alia are cited in Cassell's New Latin-EnglishDictionary, 5th edition, Cassell, London (1968), p. 414.

42. It does not alter the argument to add (or delete) mention of the duty to protect the valuable cargo and theship itself, since at sea the fate of one is the fate of all.

43. In this regard, one is tempted to think of what is virtually a pun - concerning 'portuna' and 'fortuna'. In theclassical view, Fortuna beckons beguilingly at some times and at other times flies past to evade our grasp.Nevertheless, Fortuna must, as Machiavelli so vividly explained, often be seized with force, youthfulvigor and impetuosity. Needless to say, if Portunus and Fortuna are related deities that would onlystrengthen the interpretation here, namely, that opportunity is contingent and 'accidental', as opposedto being a necessary and immanent feature of individual life. The Oxford Classical Dictionary gives scantsupport to any connection between Portunus and Fortuna: one of two Roman ruins thought to be templesto Fortuna may have been a temple to Portunus.

44. By 'confusion' I mean, specifically, the etymological and semantic divergences arising from the usage ofterms to signify not simply something that is different from or inconsistent with a strict or older usage, butrather involves a conceptual incoherence on its own terms of usage.

45. Or would they? We are now all aware that any 'discursive practice' serves to veil fundamentally illicitpower and is therefore liable to deconstruction.

46. ARMOR, D. J . 'School and family effects on black and white achievement', in MOSTELLER and MOYNIHAN(eds), op. cit., pp. 168-229, is a detailed study of the multiple factors which advantage and disadvantagelearning.

47. Both politics and the justice of affirmative action become more complex in an economic climate,such as exists in many parts of the West today, of real decline in jobs in many traditional, and even manynew, employment sectors.

48. But for different reasons: opponents of 'reverse' or 'positive discrimination' would protest that it is apatent violation of equal treatment; proponents of affirmative action would be the first to point out thatthe 'advances' so far made for women are far from constituting equality and that the legislative initiativesin their respective countries fall far short of recognizing and facilitating the rights of women, much lessany equality (political or economic) with men. See Economic Opportunities for Women: Medium TermCommunity Programme, 1986-1990, Commission of the European Communities, Women's InformationCentre, Brussels (1985).

49. Politics, III, xii, 1282b-1283a.50. 'Opportunity' does not appear on Connolly's list of 'essentially contested concepts'? CONNOLLY, W. E.

The Terms of Political Discourse, 2nd edition, Martin Robinson, Oxford (1983), expands upon the matteroriginally addressed by GALLIE, W. B. 'Essentially contested concepts', Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, (1955-56) 56, who argued that people committed to partly discrepant assumptions and ideas arelikely to construe shared concepts in rather different ways as well'.

51. Politics, IV, iv, 1292a; V, i, 1301b and ix, 1310a; VI, ii, 1317b; etc. For Aristotle's own solution to theproblem of 'a system of payment' to the poor and the 'ideal method of distribution', see VI, v, 1320a-b.

52. Connolly's emphasis, op cit., p. 39.

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