Critical Discourse Analysis of Barack Obama (War on Terror)
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A Critical Discourse Analysis of President Barack Obama’s War on Terror Edward Ellison Dissertation submitted in part-fulfillment of the Masters Course in Human Rights, UCL, September 2013
Transcript of Critical Discourse Analysis of Barack Obama (War on Terror)
A Critical Discourse Analysis of PresidentBarack Obama’s War on Terror
Edward Ellison
Dissertation submitted in part-fulfillment of the Masters Coursein Human Rights, UCL, September 2013
List of Contents
Abstract Page 3
IntroductionPage 4
Methodology Page 6
Materials Page 7
Thesis Page 7
Chapter 1 - Departure from BushPage 8
Literature reviewPage 8
Critical Discourse AnalysisPage 10
Chapter 2 - Legality of the War on TerrorPage 17
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Literature reviewPage 17
Critical Discourse AnalysisPage 18
Chapter 3 - Legitimacy of the War on TerrorPage 27
Literature reviewPage 27
Critical Discourse AnalysisPage 28
ConclusionPage 37
Bibliography Page 38
Appendix 1: Speech at the National Archives Museum - 21/05/2009Page 42
Appendix 2: Speech at the National Defence University - 23/05/2013Page 50
Abstract
This paper aims to analyze the Discourse of Barack Obama on the War on Terror using the
method of critical discourse analysis. It shall use two of his speeches on national defence;
one in May 2009 and another in May 2013. Obama’s narrative will be scrutinized to
provide a subjective reading, supported empirically, of his ideology and the way in which
he crafts the perception that it is commonsensical and inevitable. The analysis uses the
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theory of Michel Foucault that power can be used to influence knowledge and morality.
This paper, therefore, aims to show how Obama uses his power through his discourse to
create the belief that his policies on the War on Terror are necessary, ethical and
pragmatic. I shall argue this by focussing on two of his policies (drones and removal of
due process) over 3 chapters. Firstly, I shall argue that he uses his discourse to create the
image of a clean break from the policies of George W. Bush in order to reinvent the War
on Terror, as its legitimacy had faded. Then I shall look at how his narrative promotes the
idea that compliance with the law is at the heart of his policies, and how he portrays
himself as a ‘lawyer-in-chief.’ Finally, I shall examine how he creates the perception that
the campaign is legitimate; an ethical and successful battle against an uncompromising,
dangerous ideology. I shall conclude that while Obama does not represent a departure
from Bush’s metanarrative on the War on Terror, and furthermore the legality and
legitimacy of his policies can be questioned, he is able to use his power over knowledge to
define the conflict in a way that suggests otherwise.
Word Count: 9.989
How does Barack Obama use discourse to legitimize and normalize
his global campaign against terrorism?
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Introduction
Barack Obama’s 2008 electoral victory was an iconic moment in
recent American history. The liberal Democrat ran an enthusiastic
campaign centered on the slogan of ‘change we can believe in.’ His
rhetorical charisma brought great optimism to a nation
increasingly disillusioned with the administration of George W.
Bush. Much of this optimism was reserved for the idea of a
significant transformation in US foreign policy. After the
terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 (9/11), the ensuing
‘global war on terror’ (GWOT) had seen the occupation of both
Afghanistan and Iraq, restrictions of civil liberties, increased
executive power and a worldwide perception of a jingoistic America
guilty of double-standards. In Bush’s second term, polls showed
that 80% of Americans thought the country was heading ‘in the
wrong direction’ (Letts, 2009; 7).
However, despite this optimism, Obama’s continuation of the GWOT
can essentially be seen as prolonging the same campaign that had
been enacted under Bush. Although he has reinvented the conflict
to re-legitimize it, the core narrative (metanarrative) of the war
remained unchanged. Abrogating torture, pledging to close the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility, and announcing the withdrawal
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of US troops from Iraq encouraged the perception that Obama would
fulfill his rhetoric of change. These moves are however best seen
as mere alterations to, not an abandonment of, Bush’s GWOT. The
metanarrative that the 9/11 attacks were a declaration of war, in
response to which the US has a right to use unilateral lethal
force in other states as preemptive self-defence, has not changed,
even if the promotional linguistics have.
The GWOT and its perceived legality and legitimacy are dependent
on the use of language. An interpretation of the threat and
meaning of terrorism is provided by Washington through its
discourse. The state has to construct the war discursively in
order for its aggression to be viewed within its chosen paradigm.
The material world (e.g. military action) and the adjoining
discourse create a dialectic, resulting in what is to be perceived
as the political reality (i.e. the meaning of the political
reality is created through language) (Sarfo, 2013; 379). Reality
is thus a partly discursive creation, making the GWOT a social
construct. For example, were the central narrative on the GWOT to
be that of criminal enforcement (similar to the war on drugs),
then US aggression would not fit the narrative and would not be
legitimate. Power thus shapes perceived political reality. The
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Washington foreign policy consensus metanarrative states that
intervention in the Middle-East is the solution, not the cause, of
terrorism. It therefore uses its discourse to promote this
narrative as conventional wisdom to the public, and as a result
can pursue its hegemonic interests in the region (Dunmire, 2009;
217).
This thesis shall argue that war against terrorism has been
socially constructed/reinvented by Obama to make his ideological
stance seem pragmatic and commonsensical. It shall use a critical
discourse analysis to examine how he creates the perception that his
policies are valid. Here, I shall look at how Obama creates the
image of a departure from Bush, how he establishes the idea that
he is a law-abiding president and that the war is being fought
legally, and finally how he creates the assumption that he is a
liberal fighting an inevitable, successful and ethical campaign,
thus making it legitimate. I have chosen these three areas because
his campaign and rhetoric have constantly appeared different from
Bush’s while his policies haven’t; creating the belief that the
war is legal is essential for its validity, as is the need for it
to be seen as a legitimate conflict (as a policy can be legal but
illegitimate, or vice versa).
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I shall focus my thesis on two of Obama’s policies within the
broader debate: targeted assassinations (commonly with unmanned
aerial vehicles - or ‘drones’) and indefinite detention without
due process, such as at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
These are the most controversial policies adopted in the GWOT, as
one could be argued to be institutionalized murder (and has
increased exponentially under Obama), while the other is the
abandonment of due process, a key principle in Western legal
proceedings. At the time of writing, there are currently 166 men
being held at Guantanamo, while there have been up to 3,377 deaths
(exceeding that of 9/11) without trial from US drone strikes (New
America Foundation, 09/08/2013). I believe that the importance of
this work lies in its questioning of the metanarrative used to
justify extreme human rights violations and its contribution to
the broader debate on alternatives to combatting terrorism; that
the Bush/Obama doctrine does not have to be viewed as inevitable.
There are other human rights issues on this subject, such as the
controversial surveillance programs and civil liberties, however I
am choosing to focus on just these two to give further depth in my
research.
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Methodology
This thesis shall employ a critical discourse analysis (CDA) as
its methodology. The definition of discourse adopted will be that
of Teun Van Dijk: discourse being data that can be empirically
analyzed, not exclusively text, but the entire social interaction
in which the text is one aspect. Van Dijk sees CDA as “neither a
school or paradigm, but at most a shared perspective of
linguistics, semiotic or discourse analysis” (Van Dijk, 1996, 84).
This methodology is therefore a subjective reading, supported
empirically, used to identify manifest or latent themes/patterns
in discourse that are employed to benefit ideology and power.
The paper will also use Michel Foucault’s theory of how discourse
is used by power for the creation of knowledge. For Foucault,
truth and morality are discursive creations (Foucault, 1980; 109).
Political power can create a social paradigm to which knowledge is
grounded (Hall, 2001; 4). This paradigm (or episteme/metanarrative) can
therefore hold an ideology as reality. Power creates reality
through discourse and can normalize its own ideology preventing
conflicting alternatives from being viewed as valid or realistic.
Adopting Foucault’s poststructural understanding of the
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relationship between power, discourse and knowledge, this paper
will use a CDA to show how Obama’s discourse attempts to shape a
reality of the war on terror, a reality which favors and disguises
his own ideology.
Materials
This paper will use a CDA on two key speeches made by Obama (see
appendix), each one addressing his policy on the war on terror,
each also occurring shortly after inauguration. For depth,
limiting the CDA to two speeches can provide a clearer
extrapolation of the implicit ideology and how it’s normalized. If
the same data were extracted from numerous speeches, then it would
have a weaker density and be less valid.
i) Speech at the National Archives Museum - 21/05/2009
ii) Speech at the National Defence University, Fort McNair -
23/05/2013
The Thesis
My thesis shall therefore be that Barack Obama uses discourse to
portray himself as departing from Bush in the GWOT (when this is
not the case), while his use of detention and drones attacks are
discursively constructed to be perceived as legal and legitimate.
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Chapter I
Literature Review
Since Obama’s inauguration, academics have sought to compare the
ideologies, practices and rhetoric with those of his predecessor,
George W. Bush. Analysis of Obama’s foreign policy, and thus his
attitude to his inherited war on terror, has created both
consensuses and divisions among scholars.
It is commonly agreed that Obama liberally revised Washington’s
rhetorical approach towards international affairs (McCrisken,
2011; Klaidman, 2012; Woodward, 2010; Sanger, 2013; Gerges; 2012).
America’s role as the active promoter of democracy and human
rights, while justifying a military solution to a reductionist
view on Islamic fundamentalism, was linguistically abandoned by
Obama. Instead, Obama’s speeches portrayed his America as striving
to return to being a “benign superpower and paragon of
international law” (Klaidman, 2012; 117).
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Literature on the subject however conflicts over whether
ideologically Obama operated within the same paradigm as Bush;
i.e. whether the ‘Bush doctrine’ continued into 2009 and beyond.
For example, while Klaidman argues that Obama’s pragmatism and
domestic concerns moderated his war on terror, McCrisken and
Jackson claim his rhetoric and lack of transparency merely created
an image of this, and in reality policies continued along the
neoconservative agenda. To him, this narrative thus became
Washington’s counterterrorism consensus (Klaidman, 2012; 271;
McCrisken, 2011; 18; Jackson, 2013; 406).
Jackson showed how Bush constructed the GWOT (using a CDA) to
legitimize occupying Afghanistan and Iraq. He extrapolates Bush’s
ideological conviction needed to bring the war on terrorism into
the light of a just war - one where the US acts in self-defence
against a non-negotiable, ‘evil’ entity (Jackson, 2005; 22).
Jackson goes further claiming that by the end of the Bush
presidency, the metanarrative of the war on terror had become a
fixed foreign policy consensus. The narratives within the
metanarrative (or episteme) asserted that 9/11 was an act of war;
terrorism is the greatest threat to US security and interests;
negotiation is not possible; and regimes aiding and abetting
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terrorists are culpable and great threat, while the prospect of
one of these regimes providing an extremist group with a weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) is a real and existential threat
(Jackson, 2011; 393).
Largely absent from the literature is a discussion of to what
extent and how Obama uses discourse to create an interpretation of
new non-ideological war on terror, and how rhetoric is used to
help justify his military campaign by distancing himself from
Bush; a persuasion of change for the sake of continuity. Horvath
and Sarfo note how Obama attempts to change the perception of the
GWOT away from the theme of revenge to that of defence (Horvath,
2010; Sarfo, 2013). Additionally, Gerges argues that Obama’s
abandonment of Bush’s terminology, such war on terror, is used to
distinguish the legitimate war against Al-Qaeda from the
illegitimate global war on terror (Gerges, 2012; 101). Aspects
such as this appear within the broader debate on the GWOT, in how
the metanarrative has been tidied up to adjust to a change in
public opinion.
Literature also asserts that Obama simply cannot manoeuvre away
from the American foreign policy consensus, where the GWOT has
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become too institutionalized and profitable to be abandoned, in
what is referred to as the national-security industrial complex (Jackson,
2011; 402). National security employs 854,000 staff with an $80bn
annual budget, the biggest industry in Washington D.C. (Gerges,
2012; 209). As Eisenhower warned, the entrenched nature of the
relationship between defence and private self-interest leads to a
fixed metanarrative on threats to justify the expenditure
(Ledbetter, 2011; 20).
Critical Discourse Analysis
Bush’s discourse had unequivocally advocated a Manichaean perception
on the GWOT. A clear binary between the ‘good’ Americans and
‘evil’ terrorists was paramount to the rhetoric as a method of
incorporating a moral certainty to his doctrinal policies
(Jackson, 2005). The dehumanization of terrorists paved the way
for the legitimacy of an ideology that asserts the right of
unilateral, lethal preemption, seen with both presidents - the
‘prevention paradigm.’
Public relations catastrophes, such as the Abu Ghraib scandal and
waterboarding, meant the war had to be reinvented to again place
Americans as the innocent, moral victims in a just war. The
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contradiction between US war crimes and the constructed image of
America as the bastion of freedom, law and justice needed to be
undone (Jackson, 2011; 402). As with Bush, Obama has used
discourse to mould his GWOT back into the paradigm of just war
theory, but to do this he needed to show a revolution in its
management.
Obama’s speech at the National Archives Museum (May 21, 2009), 4
months into his presidency, outlined his policy on the war on
terror. As this speech set out to define his policy on terrorism
just after taking office, it is the most fitting one to analyze
critically how he advances the presumption of departure from Bush,
and will be the only one considered in this chapter.
Referring to the assassinations of foreign nationals, Obama makes
a noticeable attempt to appear distinct from Bush. He refers to
the conflict as being “at war with Al-Qaeda.” As Gerges stated,
this is used as oppose to being at ‘war with terrorism’ (Gerges,
2012; 101). This rhetorical alteration is used to focus on the
only legitimate perpetrator of 9/11. Bush’s declaration of
conflict against a vaguely defined tactic was used to create an
umbrella to which foreign policy excursions could legitimized.
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I.e. the invasion of Iraq could be linked to 9/11 by having the
Saddam regime considered within the definition of terror, thus
discursively making it a threat that can be neutralized in self-
defence. Klaidman notes how ‘war on terror’ became alienating to
the public, and removing it would be symbolic but not force a new
policy trajectory (Klaidman, 2012; 60).
The subsequent fiasco of the Iraq War (the cost and lack of WMDs)
meant Obama had to show that this ideology had been rescinded and
his GWOT was solely against a tangible entity that had attacked
America on 9/11. Being at war with an ideological militant group
instead of an abstract indiscriminate term helps portray himself
as non-ideological, and that he is only responding to a military
threat, not inducing a broader ‘clash of civilizations,’ or being
seen as at war with the world (Gerges, 2012). This group
specification dismantles the idea that the US is at war with
Islam, helping to neutralize criticism of jingoism and xenophobia
in foreign policy.
However, Islamic extremist groups (such as the Nigerian Boko Haram
or Somalian Al-Shabaab) can easily be linked by Washington to Al-
Qaeda, and categorized as a global threat and therefore a valid
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target for assassinations (Odunsi, 2013). Discursively
substituting the title of the adversary shows a reinvention but by
no means limits the potential for aggression.
Globally, Bush was subject to criticism for not distinguishing
between jihadist groups, like Al-Qaeda, and moderate Islamic
political organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Gerges,
2012; 204). Obama, however sought to benefit from recognizing the
ideological divisions between these entities. By refining Bush’s
reductionist view of the Islamic world, Obama can again validate
US aggression by showing it to be against jihadism, not Islamism,
without changing policies. The rhetoric tidy portrays change while
disguising ideological protraction.
Obama in this speech goes on stress that his war would be fought
within the American ideals sacrificed by Bush. He calls for “a new
approach - one that rejects torture [used under Bush], and
recognizes the imperative of closing Guantanamo Bay.”
Here, what Obama is essentially is doing is highlighting his
distance from policies extremely hard to justify and that had
proven counterproductive to be able to demarcate his
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administration from Bush’s. In a similar fashion to the way in
which Bush used a binary between the ‘good’ US and the ‘evil’
terrorists, Obama uses dualism between himself and Bush, showing
the negative results of unethicality as a way of self-promotion.
With Bush’s extremely poor approval both domestically and
internationally, polarization is vital for perceived
legitimization. By structuring Bush as a rogue neoconservative,
Obama can shape himself as the antithesis liberal, and with the
perception of being liberal comes one of a stronger ethical
considerations and legitimacy (Chomsky, 1988). Claiming to be
anti-Bush can thus be read as a potential to be back in line with
US values and international law.
While Obama stresses the new mandate in Washington, his discourse
fails to reference any continuations. What Obama doesn’t say can
be as important as what he does. Policies such as assassination,
when briefly mentioned are devoid of any rhetorical connection to
the previous administration. In reality, Obama’s 2008 election did
not represent the start of a revolution in Washington. Iraq,
Afghanistan and the more general terror operations continued much
in the same manner, employing the same tactics, with Bush’s
Secretary of Defence Robert Gates among many foreign policy staff
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maintaining their positions in the new administration (Jackson,
2011). Obama, however preaches only the differences at the
National Archives. He may have endeavored to close Guantanamo and
did immediately abrogate institutionalized torture, but these
policy alteration are should not be viewed as the creation of a
new metanarrative. The essential metanarrative of being in a
dualist, moral war with terrorism, and thus being able to
legitimately cause civilian deaths as collateral damage, did not
change with these two policy amendments (Jackson, 2011; 402).
Obama thereby omits discourse that might associate him to Bush as
that could compromise the ability to enforce this ideology.
Along with the abandonment of Bush’s good-evil rhetorical
dichotomy, Obama’s discourse differs in that it complies with the
liberal narrative of US politics. This narrative, in comparison to the
conservative narrative used by Bush, is fixated in the ideals of the
Enlightenment. The perception of America being a liberal, secular,
pluralist and humanistic state is an underlying ideology in
Obama’s discourse (Horvath, 2010; 48). Obama thus defines
America’s superior role in the world as a result of its commitment
to its values. The conservative discourse instead tends to relate
to Christian principles. Reference to religious belief is
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generally absent in Obama’s speech, with God only mentioned in the
customary presidential closing of “God Bless America.” In
contrast, the term ‘values’ (and its variations) is mentioned 15
times, “law/legal” 36, “court” 21, “constitution” 11, “justice” 8,
‘principles’ 7, ‘ideals’ 3, “rights” 3 and “moral” twice.
Collectively, these terms have a density (frequency) of 1.7%,
while in comparison, in Bush’s final Address to Congress they had
a density of 0.36%. Obama’s dropping of the biblical term ‘evil,’
which was ubiquitously used by Bush, can also be seen as promoting
the liberal narrative (Viberg, 2011; 16). The significance here is
the thematic shift between the presidents from conservative to
liberal narrative. A discursive modification to disguise a
political continuation.
To a diverse population, biblical references can exclude different
demographics. Removing the unpopular ‘crusader’ narrative of Bush
also helps to depict Obama as a pragmatist; neither driven by
ideology or faith; rather by reason alone. With the war fought
against Islamic extremists and in Muslim countries, the detachment
from the idea of it being a religious war is important for its
legitimacy (Horvath, 2010; 48). Obama, by using the liberal
instead of conservative narrative, is therefore able to remove
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himself from the crusader image left by Bush; Bush, who had
previously claimed inspiration for invading Iraq from divine
authority (MacAskill, 2005). This reinvents the narrative, and
thus the perceived political reality - as a war of necessity, not
ideology - while distinguishing himself from Bush.
Obama uses his discourse to portray Bush as an ideologue and
himself as a pragmatist. He does this by focusing on the
bipartisan, consensus-led nature of his policies. He points to
consensus between himself and his Republican Presidential Election
opponent, Senator John McCain, on closing Guantanamo Bay, while
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham is favorably quoted in the
speech. Obama then depicts there being two absolutist extremist
ideologies on the war; the ‘anything goes’ camp (in which, he
implies, is Bushism), and those who “make little allowance for the
unique challenges posed by terrorism.” Obama however declares
“neither side is right.” Creating a middle-ground for him to take
depicts himself as a non-ideological and pragmatic president.
Dialectical thinking and triangulating the liberty-security
dichotomy shows himself to be driven by reason as oppose to
doctrine. (Horvath, 2010; 50). However, striking a balance doesn’t
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equate to commonsense. Policies removing due process arguably need
no compromise and could simply be dismissed.
Establishing himself as the antithesis of Bush, Obama attacks his
predecessor's legacy to legitimatize his own policies. In the
Archives speech, he notes his intended departure from the “climate
of fear” of the previous 8 years. Describing the Bush doctrine an
ideology of ‘fear,’ Obama creates the interpretation of the former
regime’s policies being rash and emotive, instead of realist and
pragmatic (similarly referring to its “hasty decisions.”) The
climate of fear is also redolent of the red scare of McCarthyism in
the 1950’s, which history now deems as irrational hyperbole, using
fear-mongering to consolidate power (Jackson, 2005; 118).
Rejecting this fear that engulfed the Bush presidency, Obama
creates the image of himself being valiant and composed. Thus,
when deliberating over the eradication of a member of a militant
group, Obama is not enslaved by the same anxiety-induced ideology
Bush was, a paranoid doctrine that lead to the costly Iraq War.
Rather, Obama epistemologically frames himself as a just and
balanced decision-maker, devoted to the national interest, not
irrational doctrinism.
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Obama contends that he “has no interest in re-litigating the
policies of the last 8 years,” and that he wants to “solve [the
problems] together as Americans.” This text also crafts the
perception of himself as non-ideological. He shows his only
concern as moving the country forward in unity. This is
essentially progressive pragmatism and a departure from divisive
doctrinism, thus Bushism. To advance this theme, Obama states that
he’s “heard words that are calculated to scare people rather than
educate them; words that that have more to do with politics than
protecting our country.” The reference to politics here can be
understood as ideology. It is paramount for Obama to depict
himself as not risking the security of America for a principled
doctrine (tacitly implying Bush did). Obama’s war is
epistemologically shaped around security and pragmatism; this
being a withdrawal from fear-mongering and demagoguery.
Additionally, the theme of looking forward can be seen as a method
of relieving Washington of the accountability of its controversial
recent-past. A discursive self-acquittal of the US by Obama.
Renewal tends to benefit the aggressor, not the victim (Chomsky,
2012; 148).
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The venue of the deliverance is also a discursive construct to
represent a break from Bushism. The National Archives Museum hosts
both the US constitution as well as the Bill of Rights. Obama’s
decision to promote his terror strategy here can be semiotically
viewed as an attempt to frame his policy within a legal and
constitutional framework, unlike Bush’s ‘security trumps rights’.
This non-textual part of his discourse implicitly symbolizes the
metamorphosis of the war under his helm into that of values and
regulation, and was suggested by White House Chief of Staff, Denis
McDonough, for that very reason (Klaidman, 2012; 132).
In his National Archives Speech, Obama therefore can be seen to
create the image of a departure from Bush discursively. By using a
liberal narrative to reinvent the GWOT, Obama is able to
epistemologically fashion the knowledge that the US has changed
course. This restores its moral standing and dismantles the
contradiction between the great American narrative of its place in
the world as the defender of freedom and rights, and the reality
of a nation that frequently committed crimes of aggression,
torture and shunned habeas corpus. By portraying himself as non-
ideological, the GWOT is constructed as a new war; a war fought
pragmatically and only out of necessity, within US values. This
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obscures the reality that the Obama doctrine is essentially the
same narrative as Bushism, propagating a foreign policy that
furthers US economic and military supremacy (Dunmire, 2009; 217).
Chapter II
Literature review
The legality of Obama’s GWOT - specifically his use of drones and
detention without trial - is greatly debated within the literature
on his administration. It has lacked official condemnation by the
UN, US Congress or Supreme Court; although this does not
necessarily legally validate it. There is literary consensus that
the former lawyer and law professor uses his discourse to portray
his policies as being conducted within a legal framework, both
domestically and internationally.
The debate on the legality of Obama’s policies stretches to both
extremes. To Daniel Klaidman, Obama is a pragmatist pressured by
the Republican Party to prioritize security over legality, while
opting instead for a compromise of a tough stance within the
legally accepted boundaries (Klaidman, 2012; 178). Gerges however
implies that Obama breaches the limits of executive power and
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commits war crimes against an entity that in reality poses little
threat (Gerges, 2012; 213). For Woodward, Obama enjoys exploiting
the flexibility and ambiguity of the conflict, while obfuscating
his intentions (Woodward, 2010; 281).
Jackson instead argues that this legal emphasis in the discourse
is used to establish the US as a ‘good,’ exceptional nation,
unlike terrorist organizations that have no regard for
international law, thus being a construct for perceived
legitimacy. Both Jackson and Posner state the benefits of
combatting terrorism under the paradigm of a war for its legality
(Jackson, 2011; 408; Posner, 2013). Turley attacks the lack of
separate oversight, sighting Federal Judge Rosemary Collyer’s
statement; “the executive is not an affective check on the
executive” (Turley, 2013).
Within this debate, however, is the question of how Obama actively
creates a legal discourse to enable Washington’s GWOT to continue
to be viewed as a war within the good versus evil narrative: the
epistemological fastening of a conflict run by a law-abiding
administration in a legal manner. If Jackson and Gerges’s
hypothesis that the discourse of the GWOT is to a large extent
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already ingrained in the US psyche (and that this is an effect of
the national-security industrial complex) is to be believed, then
Obama cannot change policy, he can only try to re-legitimize it
within a legal framework (Jackson, 2011; 407, Gerges, 2012). To do
this, he has to construct an image of his administration as law-
bound, thus legitimate. His discourse must disguise his ideology
under the rhetoric of law to persuade the public that he and his
policies are rooted in law.
Critical Discourse Analysis
This chapter will therefore argue, using Foucault’s theory that
knowledge is a product of power, that Obama uses discourse to
epistemologically envelop the GWOT within a legal framework by
discursively creating an image of himself as a lawyer-president.
The metanarrative ingrained is that this war is commonsensical,
and the encouraged debate is over the extent to which the legality
can be improved, not whether it is legal in itself. Accordingly,
Obama’s agenda is already fixed within the metanarrative.
To examine the discourse, I shall firstly show how he
epistemologically constructs his policy to fit into US and
international law (this is to say, how he discursively manipulates
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a reality in which his actions are legal). Secondly, I shall focus
on how Obama’s narrative is used to shape a perception that legal
consideration is a key component of his personality, and thus his
presidency; the creation of a lawyer-in-chief. I shall argue that
he creates the belief that as a liberal and former professor of
constitutional law, he will not consciously betray the American
ideals, constitution or international law. I therefore hypothesize
that the identity of Obama thus is a discursive construct, used so
his actions are judged by his reputation, not vice versa.
Obama’s policies of indefinite detention, removing habeas corpus
for suspected terrorists, and targeted killings are arguably
violations of the US constitution and international humanitarian
law (Robertson, 2011). Having constructed himself to the
electorate as a president determined to bring change with a new
counterterrorism mandate anchored in American law and values,
Obama had to create the impression that his policies are legal and
that he is a ‘law president,’ unlike his predecessor, the self-
proclaimed ‘war president’ (Bush, 2004).
The extra-judicial killing of Anwar al-Awlaki and his 16 year old
son, both US citizens, has been condemned as an unconstitutional
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execution, lacking due process and as an overstretch of executive
power (Turley, 2013). Additionally, the high level of civilian
causalities, the breaching of another state’s sovereignty, the
overemphasis on killing instead of capturing, the targeting of
groups that don’t pose a direct threat to the US, the
indiscriminate ‘signature strikes,’ and an ambiguous and extensive
qualification for being on the ‘kill list,’ have been legally
debated. It has been claimed that if these policies had been
executed by Bush or a Republican, then the public reaction would
have been less subdued than it has been (Klaidman, 2012; 17). If
this were true, I believe it would be an intended consequence of
the epistemological creation of his image.
To analyze Obama’s legal discourse on the drone and detention
policies, I shall use his May 2013 Speech at the National Defence
University. This address occurred months into his second term, and
was used to outline defence strategy as well as justify current
policy. It is also his most recent and most notable speech on
counterterrorism. I will therefore extrapolate from this oration
how the law is depicted as being at the heart of his decision-
making process as a key example of how he legally legitimizes
himself through discourse. This can be considered important as
29
defining the GWOT as ‘legal’ removes the greatest attack on that
narrative, giving alternative, counter US hegemonic narratives
less influence (Jackson, 2011; 402).
Obama unequivocally proclaims that, “America’s actions are legal.”
He legitimizes this maxim by anchoring his drone policy in the
9/11 attacks and referring to the conflict as a ‘war,’ instead of
a criminal operation like the counterterrorism narrative in the EU
(Jackson, 2011; 402). Maintaining the 9/11 link is crucial with
Bin Laden dead and Khalid Sheik Mohammed detained. Twelve years
on, the US needs to be portrayed as still defending itself against
a guilty entity to be compatible with the Article 51 of the UN
Charter. He characterizes the assassinations as removing
belligerents from the “battlefield” - instead of for example from
‘their homes’ - as a method of discursively assembling this
reality. Technically though, only Afghanistan can be defined as a
battlefield, and other attacks are violations of the norms of
international law. The US has not officially at war against
Pakistan, Yemen or Somalia (Turley, 2012). The notion of this
being a global war on terror helps to obscure this contradiction.
30
Through using war terminology, Obama is epistemologically
reinforcing the paradigm of thought, initiated under Bush, that
this is a war. Without shaping the conflict as a war, the
aggressive kill-not-capture policy is less legally persuasive.
Classifying the conflict as ‘war,’ not ‘law enforcement,’ means
targets can be killed on sight. It also means captured
belligerents are handed POW rights, where charges and trials are
not necessary procedures for detention (Posner, 2013).
Additionally, with war, civilian casualties are seen as
unavoidable, or as Obama states, they are “a risk that exists in
all wars.” In law enforcement, this inevitability would be
rejected. Obama has to continually stress that it is a war,
exercising the term and its variations 44 times in this speech.
This ontologically maintains the political reality where the US is
in a perpetual war and, as Cicero asserted, “laws are silent in
times of war” (S.O.M.A, 2010; 15). The location of the speech, the
National Defence University at Fort McNair, is discursively used
for the same reason. Obama fails to mention how drone strikes are
largely conducted by the CIA, a civilian organization, instead
merely administering that America is at war as an a priori belief.
31
Having asserted that he is fighting a legal war, Obama concedes
that the self-defence justification, “cannot be the end of the
discussion.” Similarly, he claims to have, “established a
framework that governs use of force.”
Even though this is not an adjustment of policy, it leads to the
image of himself being deliberative and constrained. Although he
may act within a framework, this does not necessarily mean the
framework is limiting or internationally legal. Likewise, it is
not made clear when exactly the self-defence paradigm expires. His
assertions merely portray restraint and discipline, while
providing him the advantage of the ambiguity to cover his
ideology. It is a discursive manipulation to give the impression
of a president using self-restraint and promoting tight
regulation. It also appears to encourage debate (although only
within the doctrine). This then epistemologically projects a
belief of a ‘good’ America, not willing to exceed legal boundaries
(unlike its enemies), reinforcing the good-evil binary (Jackson,
2011).
In this speech, Obama clarifies the legal criteria for targeted
assassinations. This is that they must be a member Al-Qaeda or its
32
affiliates, unable to be captured, pose an ‘imminent’ threat,
there must be an absence of probable civilian casualties, and the
sovereign state whose territory’s involved must be informed.
Washington’s use of signature strikes (where unknown targets are
identified by a behavioral pattern and are of militant age) is in
clear violation of these criteria (Huffington, 2013). Unknown
targets cannot be rationally seen to be an ‘imminent’ threat and
may be civilians (these strikes are also war crimes, violating the
principles of distinction and necessity established under
international humanitarian law). A leaked white paper justice memo
exposed the definition employed for ‘imminent,’ stating no
evidence of forthcoming terrorist activity is required; instead a
tenuous association to extremist ideology suffices (MSNBC, 2013).
This essentially vacuous term portrays conformity to the criterion
in international law for nonconsensual military action in another
state; a response to an imminent threat as self-defence. Obama
uses it to legally legitimate a preemptive assassination doctrine
by exploiting a created deixis, whereby the public presumption of
the meaning is not the meaning in its context, avoiding either a
mendacious or aggressive statement. Thereby, the conflated
terminology justifies a limitless war beyond Afghanistan,
33
undermining the UN Charter, Security Council and the Nuremberg
Principles, which stress self-defence over preemption against
vaguely defined targets (Dunmire, 2009; 203).
Furthermore, the use of the term ‘imminent,’ helps to create an
assumption that Al-Qaeda is constantly ready and able to launch
attacks; a fear-inducing tactic. It reinforces the idea that it is
a constant, potentially existential threat, like the Soviet Union
was, rather than a handful of men thousands of miles away with few
resources (Gerges, 2012; Jackson, 2011). By promoting a reality of
constant fear and a state of emergency, flexibility in law is
further justified. Obama thus epistemologically creates the belief
of constant suspense and danger, validating his deviation from
peacetime laws.
Although ‘consulting’ Pakistan, the government there has
repeatedly objected to the use of unauthorized force in its
territory (Turley, 2012). By using the word ‘consulting,’ Obama
can appear to be acting with the Pakistani government’s tacit
consent, preventing Washington from being seen as using hegemonic
exceptionalism, which leads to the perception of American
disregarding international law. With the demonstration of
34
Washington being in accord with other states, the image of the US
as a unilateral actor that was established under Bush is revoked.
Obama has to show the US as being in adherence to an international
consensus, which strengthens the idea of compliance to
international law (Horvath, 2010; 52). Thus, tying assassinations
to state consent generates the image of legal legitimacy.
Another method used to discursively create legal legitimacy is by
emphasizing the separation of power and the limits of the
executive. Obama underlines the fact that assassinations only
occur with congressional approval. Fashioning a perception of
checks and balances against his executive power creates the idea
that he is constrained and the program is tightly regulated.
Similarly, his constant reference to his adherence to the US
constitution is a legally reinforcing tactic. However, the white
paper memo states that the administration does not recognize the
right of courts or Congress to intervene in the drone program, and
neither has attempted (Webber, 2013). Congress has further been
reluctant to repeal the AUMF bill that authorizes militant action
against the 9/11 conspirators. This executive prerogative is still
liberally used 12 years on to target militants with only an
ideological link to the attacks.
35
Confronting the killing of Awlaki, Obama asserts he “waged war
against America.” He then declares that, “his citizenship should
no more serve as a shield [from a drone] than a sniper shooting
down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a SWAT team.”
This is a valid point. Legally (and morally), it is justifiable to
perform a preemptive execution to save innocent lives that would
otherwise be lost. Likewise, he is right that the nationality of
the belligerent should not determine the outcome. However, this
discourse is merely reinforcing dubious conjectures. Firstly, it
assumes Awlaki is an imminent threat (by its common, not US
Justice Department, definition), where without immediate action
there will be US causalities. However, he was assassinated unarmed
in Yemen, not the US. The temporal obfuscation of a latent threat
and a ‘visible manifestation of aggression’ is needed for legality
(Dunmire, 2009; 205). The allegory of the sniper also implies that
he is irrational and indiscriminate. This discursively maintains
the consensus on terrorist profiling; they are not ‘freedom
fighters,’ just murderers.
36
Furthermore, the use of the word ‘innocent’ in the analogy is used
reflect how the US should be viewed in conflict; the victim, not
aggressor, of an unprovoked attack. In Obama’s ‘war,’ it is a
battle between innocent civilians protected by their law
enforcement and ‘bloodthirsty,’ ‘evil’ murderers. It more subtlety
enforces the assumptions framed by Bush of a conflict between
civilization and barbarianism (Jackson, 2005; 49). Obama however
constructs this without using transparent dogma, rather implicit
metaphor.
The assassination of Awlaki is thus manipulated by Obama to spin
the fact that a US citizen was killed without due process. He does
maintain his belief that an extra-judicial killing of an American
should be seen as unconstitutional. The fact he says he ‘believes’
it is unconstitutional, rather than it simply is (which it is
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments), allows him to suggest an ambiguity, where he sides
with human rights as opposed to executive power. Obama thus uses
his discourse to appear legally considerate, while in reality
abandoning the principle of the presumption of innocence that been
the cornerstone of Western law since the Magna Carta was sealed
nearly 800 years ago (Chomsky, 2013).
37
When addressing the issue of illegal detention, symbolized by
Guantanamo Bay, Obama strengthens his discourse as a
constitutional president. He continually stresses the illegality
of the facility, his attempts to close it being blocked by
Congress, and his perennial commitment to its abrogation with a
judicial review for detainees. Accounts affirm this statement,
with Congress preventing him from doing this due to the lack of an
adequate option for relocating detainees (Klaidman, 2012; 145).
However, the debate on Guantanamo is a debate within the agenda of
the war on terror, rather than a debate about the agenda itself.
Obama, by highlighting his disapproval of this inherited policy,
is showing that he wants to bring this aspect of the war on terror
into line with the law. This then creates the idea of him being a
law-abiding, constitutional president, shifting attention away
from the questioning of the metanarrative.
The reality however is that even though the attempts to close
Guantanamo may be sincere, this is merely one minor deviation from
a structured war on terror consensus (Jackson, 2011; 402). The
continuation of indefinite detention through military commissions
shows that the attempt to close Guantanamo is simply a symbolic
38
act. Furthermore, since he banned torture for the same reason
(although the force-feeding program at Guantanamo could still be
described as that), Obama’s war on terror can be seen to focus
almost solely around killing, not capturing (Klaidman, 2012; 201).
Through altering the doctrine to appear to be legally determined,
Obama is merely diverting attention from this new policy
preference; one that contradicts the image of him as a liberal. To
bypass the legal quagmire of detention without evidence or trial,
a reality of imminent threats requiring immediate assassination is
moulded. This deliberate avoidance of law is exampled by the
assassination of the unarmed Bin Laden in Pakistani territory.
Obama’s speech is saturated with legal terminology: law/legal (and
variations) (29), constitution (7), justice (6), court (9) and
judicial (5) are spread throughout it. These keywords have a
density of 0.79%, and therefore the high frequency of the repeats
show the rhetorical attention placed on law. For comparison,
Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address had a density of 0.22% for
the same terms. The legal periergia in the narrative
epistemologically creates the belief that Obama is preoccupied by
law; the contrasting reality however is of a president that has
who has furthered executive prerogative more excessively than any
39
predecessor and abandoned fundamental Western legal principles
established nearly a millennium ago (Chomsky, 2013; Gerges, 2012;
218). Aggressive antiterrorism though will be further accepted by
the public if it is associated with legal procedures, hence the
linguistic legal repetition (Sarfo, 2013; 382).
Obama, in his 2013 Defence speech, can thus be seen to use his
discourse to shape a political reality of himself as a law-driven
president. His epistemological creation of a perpetual war allows
him the flexibility to use executive power to an extreme that
would not be tolerated in peacetime; giving himself the legal
freedom of war. Referencing legal terminology, closing Guantanamo
Bay and ending torture allow for this epistemological belief to
help frame his policies around his reputation; the reputation of a
president devoted to upholding US and international law.
Chapter III
Literature review
The Obama administration's continuation, and arguably escalation,
of the GWOT has divided commentators on its legitimacy. Woodward
40
and Klaidman credit the president for his pragmatism and the
success in weakening al-Qaeda, most notably with the assassination
of Osama Bin Laden. Gerges, however condemns the drone escalation
as unnecessary and unethical. His thesis claims that the threat
posed by al-Qaeda is negligible, and that Obama fails to
distinguish between domestic and transnational jihadism (Gerges,
2012; 225). Gerges - supported by Chomsky - further reasons that
while 9/11 all but destroyed sympathy for international jihadism,
US operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq have rejuvenated
it; making the war narrative counter to US security (Gerges, 2012;
207; Chomsky, 2013). Robertson likewise condemns summary
executions over arrest and trial as illegitimate US-exceptionalism
(Robertson, 2013).
Other commentators on the right, including former vice president
Dick Cheney, criticize Obama for being too moderate in his GWOT,
prioritizing terrorists’ rights over American security (Klaidman,
2012; 191). Stephen Walt instead questions whether deterrence and
killing should be seen as preferable to removing incentives and/or
addressing grievances (Walt, 2013).
41
Within the debate of legitimacy remains the question of how Obama
creates the idea of the conflict being commonsense, thus
ostensibly legitimate. In order for the GWOT to be viewed in this
light, Obama has to maintain the illusion that terrorism
represents a real threat to the homeland, that the policies are
ethical and successful and that any other option (such as
negotiation) would be ineffective. i.e. Obama has to normalize his
ideology so competing agendas appear inherently flawed in
comparison and can be marginalized, while being seen as
encouraging debate, albeit within the boundaries of the foreign
policy consensus.
Critical Discourse Analysis
This chapter will look at how Obama discursively constructs the
idea of the GWOT being a just war. It will examine how he uses
rhetoric to guard the post-9/11 Washington consensus on battling
extremism, while portraying himself as a non-ideological,
benevolent, liberal who will only act out of moral necessity. With
policies of targeted killings and indefinite detention, Obama has
to create certain assumptions within his discourse to portray the
status quo as the only viable option. By doing this, his departure
from liberal US Enlightenment values - bypassing standard legal
42
procedures; assassinating people who can’t legitimately to
considered an ‘imminent’ threat; flouting the norms of
international law; and the high level of civilian causalities
(including women and children) - can be justified. Just as Obama
uses the image of himself as a law-abiding president to make the
GWOT appear to be conducted within a strict legal framework, he
also discursively creates himself as a liberal, compassionate and
emotional individual to allow his policies to be judged by this
reputation. This can then disguise the implicit ideology that
unilateral preemptive strikes are legitimate and that deaths of
civilians from other states are an acceptable cost to protect
those from America, while maintaining the image of America as a
benevolent superpower.
I will use both his 2009 National Archives and 2013 Defence
University speeches to analysis how his ideology is normalized and
legitimized in this chapter. These have been the two main
addresses on his GWOT, each one summarizing his policy right after
electoral victory. They will therefore be appropriate as an
example for an in depth discourse analysis on the process of
making his normative stance seem inevitable and pragmatic.
43
One method used in Obama’s discourse to normalize the GWOT as a
just war is by linking it back to other US conflicts. In 2009, he
defends military commissions by stating that they “have a history
in the United States dating back to George Washington in the
Revolutionary War.” Here, Obama is able to pursue his agenda by
appealing to the ethos of George Washington; arguably the most
iconic and revered president in US history. If military
commissions were acceptable to the ‘father of the nation,’ then
that provides them a strong source of supposed legitimacy by
authority. Obama is also rhetorically fallacious in appealing to
tradition (argumentum ad antiquitatem); the fact that a practice has
been maintained for over 200 years doesn’t alone render it
legitimate, although rhetoric can suggest the opposite. At the
same time, he is tying the war on terror to the war of
independence - a war between freedom and tyranny (Horvath, 2010;
51).
Obama further structures the GWOT as the latest conflict defending
liberty in the 2013 speech: “We have overcome slavery and the
civil war; fascism and communism.” In 2009, he stated, “unlike the
Civil War or World War Two, we cannot count on a surrender
ceremony to bring this journey to an end,” while also claiming
44
“our constitution has endured through secession, and civil rights
- through World War and Cold War.”
This rhetoric uses the grand narrative of America’s past (Horvath,
2010; 51). America’s heroic past is commonly used in US political
discourse as a method to summon strength and morale through
turbulent periods, while appearing resistant to the temptation to
drift from its exceptional founding values (Larngrova, 2010 ;15).
Discursively, these conflicts (and subsequent victories) are
strongly perceived in the US as just wars defending individual
liberty and Enlightenment values, and thus fall into a good-
verses-evil dichotomy; the key to legitimacy (Jackson, 2005; 46).
For this reason these conflicts, instead of Vietnam or Iraq Wars,
are embedded in the narrative.
Unique in each conflict is the threat not just to American lives,
but to the American way of life (through monarchy,
slavery/secession, fascism and communism). Al-Qaeda camps in Yemen
or Pakistan are used in this context to induce a fear of the
vulnerability of US values, while using the grand historical
narrative to bind the GWOT to the founding ideology of America’s
place in the world; the defender of justice and liberty (Horvath,
45
2010; 52). Obama’s appeal to pathos in the 2013 peroration claims
victory will be, “parents taking their kids to school; immigrants
coming to our shores; fans taking in a ballgame; a veteran
starting a business.” It discursively sets the GWOT as the latest
just struggle for freedom and justice, and the perennial defence
of not just American values but its liberal, opportunistic
lifestyle. Thereby, the threat posed by terrorism is portrayed to
the audience as incompatible with their values and lifestyle; thus
making the nullifying counterterror policy in the public’s best-
interest (Sarfo, 2013; 385).
To maintain the legitimacy of an aggressive and costly
counterterrorism strategy, Obama stresses that although the war
will continue for many years, it can be won. He declares the need
for a conclusion of the conflict, quoting James Madison: “no
nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual
warfare.” He also frankly asserts, “this war, like all wars, must
end.”
In doing this, Obama is repudiating the idea that this could be a
self-perpetuating war; a drain on resources and a failure to
target the direct cause of extremism. It counters the (correct)
46
interpretation that strikes against extremists recruit as well as
kill (Chomsky, 2013). This has to be refuted to maintain the idea
of the status quo being a success while distancing the need for a
new agenda. By claiming the end is in sight (although making no
specifications as to when), Obama mitigates the demand for a
change in trajectory. By asserting its upcoming conclusion, he is
also presuming victory, as cessation could not occur if a threat
still existed. Thereby, the continuation of the drone campaign is
seen as the inevitable solution to defeating jihadism.
Legitimacy cannot be perceived if the policy isn’t proving
successful. Obama boasts that, “bin Laden is dead, and so are most
of his top lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on
the United States, and our homeland is more secure...Today, the
core of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to
defeat”.
The narrative of the war and its great expense needs to be
constructed as tough but worthwhile. This opposes the view that it
could result in a Pyrrhic victory or a drawn out defeat, such as
in Vietnam. As this address was made 12 years after the start of
the war, progress needs to be embedded in the discourse.
47
Addressing the controversial drone program (which he was reluctant
to mention in 2009), Obama portrays it as the only option
available to him. He describes the use of conventionally-piloted
missile strikes as a less accurate alternative and therefore a
greater risk to civilians. Additionally, the ‘boots on the ground’
option risks “more Blackhawks down” (a reference to a failed
humanitarian mission in Somalia). He claims using troops could
also lead to escalation, and that the, albeit successful, raid on
Osama Bin Laden’s compound endangered relations with Pakistan,
meaning it should only be a one-off scenario.
This creates the impression that the avoidance of American troop
and non-American civilian casualties is the top priority for the
administration, as well as maintaining secure diplomatic relations
with the relevant states. It is true that avoiding US casualties
is a priority, as these are always unpopular with the electorate.
However, data shows that in 2012, at least 38 civilians were
killed by the assassination campaign, including women and children
(New America Foundation, 2013). Furthermore, even if drones do
increase precision, their indiscriminate use in the ‘signature
strikes’ policy render this of little importance in minimizing
48
civilian deaths. Obama portrays drone strikes as the only option
available. This again depicts deliberation over policy, while in
reality there is no question raised on his agenda that foreign and
US nationals can be assassinated without trial - whether through
Navy Seals or drones. Obama gives the impression of encouraging
debate, although again only within the allowed boundaries of the
metanarrative.
A different ideological approach to terrorism could be negotiation
and the addressing of grievances. This has been successful before,
such as with the British/IRA and Spanish/ETA truces, and could be
a legitimate alternative to drone strikes. This paradigm however
runs counter to the national-security industrial complex, as well
as US regional hegemonic interests (Jackson, 2011; 406).
Obama does mention “addressing the underlying grievances and
conflicts that feed extremism.” However, drone strikes can be seen
to have increased extremism and anti-Americanism, and are the
cause of rather than solution to these grievances. It is erroneous
to assume that, if rural villages are terrorized and civilians
killed, people won’t respond with the same anger seen in America
after 9/11 (Chomsky, 2013). Historian Anatol Lieven argues that
49
drones are “destabilizing and radicalizing” Pakistan (Lievan,
2011). Referring to grievances, Obama is simply recognizing some
injustice caused by the US, thus making him appear compassionate
and reasonable. The grievances that facilitated 9/11 (US military
and financial aid to tyrannical regimes in the Middle-East,
military bases in the region, exploitation of oil and
unquestioning patronage to Israel) have not been altered by the
administration (Robertson, 2002; 132). It is important however to
construct the idea that Washington is willing to make moves
towards peace, and is not using unnecessary aggression. It
furthers the idea of Obama being non-ideological, rather a
pragmatist.
Another discursive method used by Obama to legitimize the war
against al-Qaeda is to characterize himself as solicitous about
the deaths he causes. For belligerents, he describes the decision
to execute them as “the hardest thing I do,” and that the
threshold for the ‘kill list,’ “respects the inherent dignity of
human life” (a use of Enlightenment terminology). As for the
civilians accidentally killed, “no words or legal construct can
justify their loss...these deaths will haunt us for as long as we
live.”
50
These words attempt to add moral considerations to the policy of
targeted executions and play to the liberal Enlightenment
narrative of the benevolent America. By creating a perception of
Obama as an emotional and empathetic president, then this
perpetuates the idea that he will assassinate only when necessary.
It constructs the image of America as ‘good,’ while countering the
perception that it is the aggressor. Obama is merely accepting the
inevitable, which means deaths. It furthers the belief that Obama
is a liberal in an appeal to American pathos. This is in contrast
to the informal and cavalier manner in which the drone campaign
actually operates; profiled ‘baseball cards’ being debated over in
their addition to the ‘disposition matrix’ (or kill list) on
‘terror Tuesdays’ (Cobain, 2013).
To further legitimize the status quo, Obama uses his rhetoric to
dismiss the narrative of US exceptionalism. He refers to engaging
in “partnerships with other countries,” before giving examples of
joint operations with French or African forces against extremists.
He also mentions working “with European allies to disrupt plots
from Denmark to Germany to the United Kingdom.”
51
The perception of multilateralism and international cooperation is
an important narrative in legitimizing the war. It shows an
international consensus on the need to use military force, as well
as distancing the US of charges of unilateralism - further needed
as a result of the international rejection of the invasion of Iraq
and lack of a UN resolution supporting force outside Afghanistan
(Horvath, 2010; 52). In reality, drone strikes have been executed
unilaterally and condemned by the UN Special Rapporteur on human
rights as indiscriminate and nonconsensual (OHCHR, 2013).
The GWOT could not be legitimized in the public consciousness
without it being deemed as a response to a threat. Obama therefore
uses his discourse construct the belief that inaction would leave
a great danger to US citizens. As with the Cold War narrative, the
terror narrative relies on a perpetual fear for it legitimacy. In
the 2013 speech, Obama uses the term ‘threat’ (or its variations)
23 times, ‘attack’ 14, ‘kill’ 14, ‘danger’ 8 and ‘enemy’ 2; this
gives a total repeat density of 0.86%. His 2009 however speech had
only a 0.41% density for the same vocabulary, showing his need to
reinforce the fear of an attack another 4 years on from 9/11 and
in response to criticism of his first term to reaffirm his
52
mandate; he was no longer able merely to criticize Bush (Klaidman,
2012).
To create the image of a threat to justify his policies, Obama
references terrorist attacks against the US that have happened
during his administration. The Benghazi consulate attack, Boston
marathon bombing, and the Christmas Day airplane plot are raised
to show that there are people trying to cause American deaths.
However, the Benghazi attack was motivated to avenge the drone
assassination of Abu Yahya al-Libi. The motive for the Boston
attack was US foreign policy (with perpetrator Dzhokhar Tsarmaev
describing that, “innocent victims have been collateral damage
[like] in US wars”), and the Christmas Day plot was a response to
innocent civilian Muslim deaths by US forces, as well as support
of Israel (McGovern, 2013). Therefore, while Obama paints an image
of the dangers of terrorism - and thus the need to counter it -
the reality shows that it is grievances to counterterror policy
that creates this threat originally; or ‘blowback’, to use the
CIA’s own euphemism (Johnson, 2001).
Obama’s discourse deliberately attempts to prevent the grievance-
terror narrative entering the public consciousness. Instead, Obama
53
promotes the narrative that Islamic terrorism is based on
ideology, not previous injustice. He notes that it is “a belief by
some extremists that is Islam is in conflict with the United
States and the West.” Obama refutes this thesis, claiming this
ideology is “rejected by the vast majority of Muslims, who are the
most frequent victims of terrorist attacks.” He refers to this
radical Muslim minority as being “fueled by a common [anti-
Western] ideology.”
Fighting an ideology suggests that there is an inherent belief
that coexistence and compromise are not possible; that the
conflict is a result of US values, not actions, and that the
terrorists view innocent deaths as acceptable for a greater cause.
As grievances, not ideology, have been stated for every Islamic
terrorist attack on the US (including 9/11), this is merely a
discursive manipulation used to maintain Washington’s foreign
policy consensus and the status quo, allowing for the US to pursue
a hegemonic agenda (Jackson, 2011; 406). It prevents the
assumption that terrorism would be reduced if the US were to
withdraw its presence and influence from the Middle-East, which
would be counter to its hegemonic interest and pursuit of
resources. Instead, Obama’s implicit ideology, normalized through
54
discourse, is that the US should maintain presence in the region
as self-defence against religious fanaticism (Grayling, 2010; 89).
Obama is further distancing America from being perceived as
ideological. In this discursive dichotomy, only the enemy has an
ideology. American policy (promoting freedom and human rights) is
not ideological, but rather a desired state of affairs (Viberg,
2011; 11). ‘Ideology’ is thus pejoratively used, as with
communism, as a challenge to US values, which have
epistemologically been created as non-ideological, merely
idealistic.
Obama’s discourse is therefore used to depict the GWOT as a
legitimate conflict. By portraying al-Qaeda as a real threat
arising from an irrational, uncompromising ideology, against which
the US has to defend itself, and does so multilaterally, Obama
normalizes the concept of assassination and detention without
charge. Additionally, he is able to create the idea of himself as
emotional and compassionate (unlike the extremists), while
maintaining that after a long struggle success is inevitable and
the eventual result will be victory; the next victory in a long
line of victories against evil in the grand history of America.
55
Conclusion
Obama’s use of discourse therefore enables him to manipulate the
perception of the GWOT by the public. Using a CDA, his implicit
ideology can be extrapolated to show how he normalizes policies to
the benefit of Washington. He is able to shape a reality where his
ideology can be portrayed as commonsensical, when in fact it can
be argued as radical. Obama’s linguistics are employed to distance
himself from Bush, as well as create the image of a legal and
legitimate conflict. He is able to use his power to craft a
political reality that accepts his policies as justifiable.
However, were he not to mould this paradigm, his policies would be
seen as in clear contradiction with law and legitimacy, and he
would be perceived as merely continuing the campaign enacted under
Bush. Thus, Barack Obama uses his discourse to create a
metanarrative; a metanarrative that appears compassionate,
emotive, pragmatic, legal and inevitable - while being perceived
as encouraging criticism and debate - for the purpose of promoting
the ideological consensus in Washington that ensures continued US
hegemony and military and economic supremacy. The continuation of
Pax Americana.
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Appendix 1: Barack Obama’s Speech at the National Archives Museum - 21/05/2009
These are extraordinary times for our country. We are confronting an historic economic crisis. We are fighting two wars. We face a range of challenges that will define the way that Americans will live in the 21st century. There is no shortage of work to be done, or responsibilities to bear.
And we have begun to make progress. Just this week, we have taken stepsto protect American consumers and homeowners, and to reform our system of government contracting so that we better protect our people while spending our money more wisely. The engines of our economy are slowly beginning to turn, and we are working toward historic reform of health care and energy. I welcome the hard work that has been done by the Congress on these and other issues.
In the midst of all these challenges, however, my single most importantresponsibility as President is to keep the American people safe. That is the first thing that I think about when I wake up in the morning. Itis the last thing that I think about when I go to sleep at night.
This responsibility is only magnified in an era when an extremist ideology threatens our people, and technology gives a handful of
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terrorists the potential to do us great harm. We are less than eight years removed from the deadliest attack on American soil in our history. We know that al Qaeda is actively planning to attack us again.We know that this threat will be with us for a long time, and that we must use all elements of our power to defeat it.
Already, we have taken several steps to achieve that goal. For the first time since 2002, we are providing the necessary resources and strategic direction to take the fight to the extremists who attacked uson 9/11 in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are investing in the 21st century military and intelligence capabilities that will allow us to stay one step ahead of a nimble enemy. We have re-energized a global non-proliferation regime to deny the world’s most dangerous people access to the world’s deadliest weapons, and launched an effort to secure all loose nuclear materials within four years. We are better protecting our border, and increasing our preparedness for any future attack or natural disaster. We are building new partnerships around theworld to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates. And we have renewed American diplomacy so that we once again have the strength and standing to truly lead the world.
These steps are all critical to keeping America secure. But I believe with every fiber of my being that in the long run we also cannot keep this country safe unless we enlist the power of our most fundamental values. The documents that we hold in this very hall – the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights –are not simply words written into aging parchment. They are the foundation of liberty and justice in this country, and a light that shines for all who seek freedom, fairness, equality and dignity in the world.
I stand here today as someone whose own life was made possible by thesedocuments. My father came to our shores in search of the promise that they offered. My mother made me rise before dawn to learn of their truth when I lived as a child in a foreign land. My own American journey was paved by generations of citizens who gave meaning to those simple words – “to form a more perfect union.” I have studied the Constitution as a student; I have taught it as a teacher; I have been bound by it as a lawyer and legislator. I took an oath to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen, I know that we must never – ever – turn our back on its enduring principles for expedience sake.
I make this claim not simply as a matter of idealism. We uphold our most cherished values not only because doing so is right, but because it strengthens our country and keeps us safe. Time and again, our values have been our best national security asset – in war and peace; in times of ease and in eras of upheaval.
Fidelity to our values is the reason why the United States of America grew from a small string of colonies under the writ of an empire to thestrongest nation in the world.
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It is the reason why enemy soldiers have surrendered to us in battle, knowing they’d receive better treatment from America’s armed forces than from their own government.
It is the reason why America has benefited from strong alliances that amplified our power, and drawn a sharp and moral contrast with our adversaries.
It is the reason why we’ve been able to overpower the iron fist of fascism, outlast the iron curtain of communism, and enlist free nationsand free people everywhere in common cause and common effort.
From Europe to the Pacific, we have been a nation that has shut down torture chambers and replaced tyranny with the rule of law. That is whowe are. And where terrorists offer only the injustice of disorder and destruction, America must demonstrate that our values and institutions are more resilient than a hateful ideology.
After 9/11, we knew that we had entered a new era – that enemies who did not abide by any law of war would present new challenges to our application of the law; that our government would need new tools to protect the American people, and that these tools would have to allow us to prevent attacks instead of simply prosecuting those who try to carry them out.
Unfortunately, faced with an uncertain threat, our government made a series of hasty decisions. And I believe that those decisions were motivated by a sincere desire to protect the American people. But I also believe that – too often – our government made decisions based upon fear rather than foresight, and all too often trimmed facts and evidence to fit ideological predispositions. Instead of strategically applying our power and our principles, we too often set those principles aside as luxuries that we could no longer afford. And in this season of fear, too many of us – Democrats and Republicans; politicians, journalists and citizens – fell silent.
In other words, we went off course. And this is not my assessment alone. It was an assessment that was shared by the American people, whonominated candidates for President from both major parties who, despiteour many differences, called for a new approach – one that rejected torture, and recognized the imperative of closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay.
Now let me be clear: we are indeed at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates. We do need to update our institutions to deal with this threat. But we must do so with an abiding confidence in the rule of lawand due process; in checks and balances and accountability. For reasonsthat I will explain, the decisions that were made over the last eight years established an ad hoc legal approach for fighting terrorism that was neither effective nor sustainable – a framework that failed to relyon our legal traditions and time-tested institutions; that failed to
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use our values as a compass. And that is why I took several steps upon taking office to better protect the American people.
First, I banned the use of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques by the United States of America.
I know some have argued that brutal methods like water-boarding were necessary to keep us safe. I could not disagree more. As Commander-in-Chief, I see the intelligence, I bear responsibility for keeping this country safe, and I reject the assertion that these are the most effective means of interrogation. What’s more, they undermine the rule of law. They alienate us in the world. They serve as a recruitment toolfor terrorists, and increase the will of our enemies to fight us, whiledecreasing the will of others to work with America. They risk the livesof our troops by making it less likely that others will surrender to them in battle, and more likely that Americans will be mistreated if they are captured. In short, they did not advance our war and counter-terrorism efforts – they undermined them, and that is why I ended them once and for all.
The arguments against these techniques did not originate from my Administration. As Senator McCain once said, torture “serves as a greatpropaganda tool for those who recruit people to fight against us.” And even under President Bush, there was recognition among members of his Administration – including a Secretary of State, other senior officials, and many in the military and intelligence community – that those who argued for these tactics were on the wrong side of the debate, and the wrong side of history. We must leave these methods where they belong – in the past. They are not who we are. They are not America.
The second decision that I made was to order the closing of the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay.
For over seven years, we have detained hundreds of people at Guantanamo. During that time, the system of Military Commissions at Guantanamo succeeded in convicting a grand total of three suspected terrorists. Let me repeat that: three convictions in over seven years. Instead of bringing terrorists to justice, efforts at prosecution met setbacks, cases lingered on, and in 2006 the Supreme Court invalidated the entire system. Meanwhile, over five hundred and twenty-five detainees were released from Guantanamo under the Bush Administration. Let me repeat that: two-thirds of the detainees were released before I took office and ordered the closure of Guantanamo.
There is also no question that Guantanamo set back the moral authority that is America’s strongest currency in the world. Instead of building a durable framework for the struggle against al Qaeda that drew upon our deeply held values and traditions, our government was defending positions that undermined the rule of law. Indeed, part of the rationale for establishing Guantanamo in the first place was the misplaced notion that a prison there would be beyond the law – a
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proposition that the Supreme Court soundly rejected. Meanwhile, insteadof serving as a tool to counter-terrorism, Guantanamo became a symbol that helped al Qaeda recruit terrorists to its cause. Indeed, the existence of Guantanamo likely created more terrorists around the worldthan it ever detained.
So the record is clear: rather than keep us safer, the prison at Guantanamo has weakened American national security. It is a rallying cry for our enemies. It sets back the willingness of our allies to workwith us in fighting an enemy that operates in scores of countries. By any measure, the costs of keeping it open far exceed the complications involved in closing it. That is why I argued that it should be closed throughout my campaign. And that is why I ordered it closed within one year.
The third decision that I made was to order a review of all the pendingcases at Guantanamo.
I knew when I ordered Guantanamo closed that it would be difficult and complex. There are 240 people there who have now spent years in legal limbo. In dealing with this situation, we do not have the luxury of starting from scratch. We are cleaning up something that is – quite simply – a mess; a misguided experiment that has left in its wake a flood of legal challenges that my Administration is forced to deal withon a constant basis, and that consumes the time of government officialswhose time should be spent on better protecting our country.
Indeed, the legal challenges that have sparked so much debate in recentweeks in Washington would be taking place whether or not I decided to close Guantanamo. For example, the court order to release seventeen Uighur detainees took place last fall – when George Bush was President.The Supreme Court that invalidated the system of prosecution at Guantanamo in 2006 was overwhelmingly appointed by Republican Presidents. In other words, the problem of what to do with Guantanamo detainees was not caused by my decision to close the facility; the problem exists because of the decision to open Guantanamo in the first place.
There are no neat or easy answers here. But I can tell you that the wrong answer is to pretend like this problem will go away if we maintain an unsustainable status quo. As President, I refuse to allow this problem to fester. Our security interests won’t permit it. Our courts won’t allow it. And neither should our conscience.
Now, over the last several weeks, we have seen a return of the politicization of these issues that have characterized the last severalyears. I understand that these problems arouse passions and concerns. They should. We are confronting some of the most complicated questions that a democracy can face. But I have no interest in spending our time re-litigating the policies of the last eight years. I want to solve these problems, and I want to solve them together as Americans.
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And we will be ill-served by some of the fear-mongering that emerges whenever we discuss this issue. Listening to the recent debate, I’ve heard words that are calculated to scare people rather than educate them; words that have more to do with politics than protecting our country. So I want to take this opportunity to lay out what we are doing, and how we intend to resolve these outstanding issues. I will explain how each action that we are taking will help build a framework that protects both the American people and the values that we hold dear. And I will focus on two broad areas: first, issues relating to Guantanamo and our detention policy; second, issues relating to security and transparency.
Let me begin by disposing of one argument as plainly as I can: we are not going to release anyone if it would endanger our national security,nor will we release detainees within the United States who endanger theAmerican people. Where demanded by justice and national security, we will seek to transfer some detainees to the same type of facilities in which we hold all manner of dangerous and violent criminals within our borders – highly secure prisons that ensure the public safety. As we make these decisions, bear in mind the following fact: nobody has ever escaped from one of our federal “supermax” prisons, which hold hundredsof convicted terrorists. As Senator Lindsey Graham said: “The idea thatwe cannot find a place to securely house 250-plus detainees within the United States is not rational.”
We are currently in the process of reviewing each of the detainee casesat Guantanamo to determine the appropriate policy for dealing with them. As we do so, we are acutely aware that under the last Administration, detainees were released only to return to the battlefield. That is why we are doing away with the poorly planned, haphazard approach that let those detainees go in the past. Instead, weare treating these cases with the care and attention that the law requires and our security demands. Going forward, these cases will fallinto five distinct categories.
First, when feasible, we will try those who have violated American criminal laws in federal courts – courts provided for by the United States Constitution. Some have derided our federal courts as incapable of handling the trials of terrorists. They are wrong. Our courts and juries of our citizens are tough enough to convict terrorists, and the record makes that clear. Ramzi Yousef tried to blow up the World Trade Center – he was convicted in our courts, and is serving a life sentencein U.S. prison. Zaccarias Moussaoui has been identified as the 20th 9/11 hijacker – he was convicted in our courts, and he too is serving alife sentence in prison. If we can try those terrorists in our courts and hold them in our prisons, then we can do the same with detainees from Guantanamo.
Recently, we prosecuted and received a guilty plea from a detainee – al-Marri – in federal court after years of legal confusion. We are preparing to transfer another detainee to the Southern District of New York, where he will face trial on charges related to the 1998 bombings
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of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania – bombings that killed over 200 people. Preventing this detainee from coming to our shores would prevent his trial and conviction. And after over a decade, it is time to finally see that justice is served, and that is what we intend to do.
The second category of cases involves detainees who violate the laws ofwar and are best tried through Military Commissions. Military commissions have a history in the United States dating back to George Washington and the Revolutionary War. They are an appropriate venue fortrying detainees for violations of the laws of war. They allow for the protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence-gathering; for the safety and security of participants; and for the presentation of evidence gathered from the battlefield that cannot be effectively presented in federal Courts.
Now, some have suggested that this represents a reversal on my part. They are wrong. In 2006, I did strongly oppose legislation proposed by the Bush Administration and passed by the Congress because it failed toestablish a legitimate legal framework, with the kind of meaningful dueprocess and rights for the accused that could stand up on appeal. I did, however, support the use of military commissions to try detainees,provided there were several reforms. And those are the reforms that we are making.
Instead of using the flawed Commissions of the last seven years, my Administration is bringing our Commissions in line with the rule of law. The rule will no longer permit us to use as evidence statements that have been obtained using cruel, inhuman, or degrading interrogation methods. We will no longer place the burden to prove thathearsay is unreliable on the opponent of the hearsay. And we will give detainees greater latitude in selecting their own counsel, and more protections if they refuse to testify. These reforms – among others – will make our Military Commissions a more credible and effective means of administering justice, and I will work with Congress and legal authorities across the political spectrum on legislation to ensure thatthese Commissions are fair, legitimate, and effective.
The third category of detainees includes those who we have been orderedreleased by the courts. Let me repeat what I said earlier: this has absolutely nothing to do with my decision to close Guantanamo. It has to do with the rule of law. The courts have found that there is no legitimate reason to hold twenty-one of the people currently held at Guantanamo. Twenty of these findings took place before I came into office. The United States is a nation of laws, and we must abide by these rulings.
The fourth category of cases involves detainees who we have determined can be transferred safely to another country. So far, our review team has approved fifty detainees for transfer. And my Administration is in ongoing discussions with a number of other countries about the transferof detainees to their soil for detention and rehabilitation.
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Finally, there remains the question of detainees at Guantanamo who cannot be prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people.
I want to be honest: this is the toughest issue we will face. We are going to exhaust every avenue that we have to prosecute those at Guantanamo who pose a danger to our country. But even when this processis complete, there may be a number of people who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, but who nonetheless pose a threat to the security of the United States. Examples of that threat include people who have received extensive explosives training at al Qaeda training camps, commanded Taliban troops in battle, expressed their allegiance to Osamabin Laden, or otherwise made it clear that they want to kill Americans.These are people who, in effect, remain at war with the United States.
As I said, I am not going to release individuals who endanger the American people. Al Qaeda terrorists and their affiliates are at war with the United States, and those that we capture – like other prisoners of war – must be prevented from attacking us again. However, we must recognize that these detention policies cannot be unbounded. That is why my Administration has begun to reshape these standards to ensure they are in line with the rule of law. We must have clear, defensible and lawful standards for those who fall in this category. Wemust have fair procedures so that we don’t make mistakes. We must have a thorough process of periodic review, so that any prolonged detention is carefully evaluated and justified.
I know that creating such a system poses unique challenges. Other countries have grappled with this question, and so must we. But I want to be very clear that our goal is to construct a legitimate legal framework for Guantanamo detainees – not to avoid one. In our constitutional system, prolonged detention should not be the decision of any one man. If and when we determine that the United States must hold individuals to keep them from carrying out an act of war, we will do so within a system that involves judicial and congressional oversight. And so going forward, my Administration will work with Congress to develop an appropriate legal regime so that our efforts areconsistent with our values and our Constitution.
As our efforts to close Guantanamo move forward, I know that the politics in Congress will be difficult. These issues are fodder for 30-second commercials and direct mail pieces that are designed to frighten. I get it. But if we continue to make decisions from within a climate of fear, we will make more mistakes. And if we refuse to deal with these issues today, then I guarantee you that they will be an albatross around our efforts to combat terrorism in the future. I have confidence that the American people are more interested in doing what is right to protect this country than in political posturing. I am not the only person in this city who swore an oath to uphold the Constitution – so did each and every member of Congress. Together we have a responsibility to enlist our values in the effort to secure our
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people, and to leave behind the legacy that makes it easier for future Presidents to keep this country safe.
The second set of issues that I want to discuss relates to security andtransparency.
National security requires a delicate balance. Our democracy depends upon transparency, but some information must be protected from public disclosure for the sake of our security – for instance, the movements of our troops; our intelligence-gathering; or the information we have about a terrorist organization and its affiliates. In these and other cases, lives are at stake.
Several weeks ago, as part of an ongoing court case, I released memos issued by the previous Administration’s Office of Legal Counsel. I did not do this because I disagreed with the enhanced interrogation techniques that those memos authorized, or because I reject their legalrationale – although I do on both counts. I released the memos because the existence of that approach to interrogation was already widely known, the Bush Administration had acknowledged its existence, and I had already banned those methods. The argument that somehow by releasing those memos, we are providing terrorists with information about how they will be interrogated is unfounded – we will not be interrogating terrorists using that approach, because that approach is now prohibited.
In short, I released these memos because there was no overriding reasonto protect them. And the ensuing debate has helped the American people better understand how these interrogation methods came to be authorizedand used.
On the other hand, I recently opposed the release of certain photographs that were taken of detainees by U.S. personnel between 2002and 2004. Individuals who violated standards of behavior in these photos have been investigated and held accountable. There is no debate as to whether what is reflected in those photos is wrong, and nothing has been concealed to absolve perpetrators of crimes. However, it was my judgment – informed by my national security team – that releasing these photos would inflame anti-American opinion, and allow our enemiesto paint U.S. troops with a broad, damning and inaccurate brush, endangering them in theaters of war.
In short, there is a clear and compelling reason to not release these particular photos. There are nearly 200,000 Americans who are serving in harm’s way, and I have a solemn responsibility for their safety as Commander-in-Chief. Nothing would be gained by the release of these photos that matters more than the lives of our young men and women serving in harm’s way.
In each of these cases, I had to strike the right balance between transparency and national security. This balance brings with it a precious responsibility. And there is no doubt that the American people
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have seen this balance tested. In the images from Abu Ghraib and the brutal interrogation techniques made public long before I was President, the American people learned of actions taken in their name that bear no resemblance to the ideals that generations of Americans have fought for. And whether it was the run-up to the Iraq War or the revelation of secret programs, Americans often felt like part of the story had been unnecessarily withheld from them. That causes suspicion to build up. That leads to a thirst for accountability.
I ran for President promising transparency, and I meant what I said. That is why, whenever possible, we will make information available to the American people so that they can make informed judgments and hold us accountable. But I have never argued – and never will – that our most sensitive national security matters should be an open book. I willnever abandon – and I will vigorously defend – the necessity of classification to defend our troops at war; to protect sources and methods; and to safeguard confidential actions that keep the American people safe. And so, whenever we cannot release certain information to the public for valid national security reasons, I will insist that there is oversight of my actions – by Congress or by the courts.
We are launching a review of current policies by all of those agencies responsible for the classification of documents to determine where reforms are possible, and to assure that the other branches of government will be in a position to review executive branch decisions on these matters. Because in our system of checks and balances, someonemust always watch over the watchers – especially when it comes to sensitive information.
Along those same lines, my Administration is also confronting challenges to what is known as the “State Secrets” privilege. This is adoctrine that allows the government to challenge legal cases involving secret programs. It has been used by many past Presidents – Republican and Democrat – for many decades. And while this principle is absolutelynecessary to protect national security, I am concerned that it has beenover-used. We must not protect information merely because it reveals the violation of a law or embarrasses the government. That is why my Administration is nearing completion of a thorough review of this practice.
We plan to embrace several principles for reform. We will apply a stricter legal test to material that can be protected under the State Secrets privilege. We will not assert the privilege in court without first following a formal process, including review by a Justice Department committee and the personal approval of the Attorney General.Finally, each year we will voluntarily report to Congress when we have invoked the privilege and why, because there must be proper oversight of our actions.
On all of these matter related to the disclosure of sensitive information, I wish I could say that there is a simple formula. But there is not. These are tough calls involving competing concerns, and
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they require a surgical approach. But the common thread that runs through all of my decisions is simple: we will safeguard what we must to protect the American people, but we will also ensure the accountability and oversight that is the hallmark of our constitutionalsystem. I will never hide the truth because it is uncomfortable. I willdeal with Congress and the courts as co-equal branches of government. Iwill tell the American people what I know and don’t know, and when I release something publicly or keep something secret, I will tell you why.
In all of the areas that I have discussed today, the policies that I have proposed represent a new direction from the last eight years. To protect the American people and our values, we have banned enhanced interrogation techniques. We are closing the prison at Guantanamo. We are reforming Military Commissions, and we will pursue a new legal regime to detain terrorists. We are declassifying more information and embracing more oversight of our actions, and narrowing our use of the State Secrets privilege. These are dramatic changes that will put our approach to national security on a surer, safer and more sustainable footing, and their implementation will take time.
There is a core principle that we will apply to all of our actions: even as we clean up the mess at Guantanamo, we will constantly re-evaluate our approach, subject our decisions to review from the other branches of government, and seek the strongest and most sustainable legal framework for addressing these issues in the long-term. By doing that, we can leave behind a legacy that outlasts my Administration, andthat endures for the next President and the President after that; a legacy that protects the American people, and enjoys broad legitimacy at home and abroad.
That is what I mean when I say that we need to focus on the future. I recognize that many still have a strong desire to focus on the past. When it comes to the actions of the last eight years, some Americans are angry; others want to re-fight debates that have been settled, mostclearly at the ballot box in November. And I know that these debates lead directly to a call for a fuller accounting, perhaps through an Independent Commission.
I have opposed the creation of such a Commission because I believe thatour existing democratic institutions are strong enough to deliver accountability. The Congress can review abuses of our values, and thereare ongoing inquiries by the Congress into matters like enhanced interrogation techniques. The Department of Justice and our courts can work through and punish any violations of our laws.
I understand that it is no secret that there is a tendency in Washington to spend our time pointing fingers at one another. And our media culture feeds the impulses that lead to a good fight. Nothing will contribute more to that than an extended re-litigation of the lasteight years. Already, we have seen how that kind of effort only leads those in Washington to different sides laying blame, and can distract
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us from focusing our time, our effort, and our politics on the challenges of the future.
We see that, above all, in how the recent debate has been obscured by two opposite and absolutist ends. On one side of the spectrum, there are those who make little allowance for the unique challenges posed by terrorism, and who would almost never put national security over transparency. On the other end of the spectrum, there are those who embrace a view that can be summarized in two words: “anything goes.” Their arguments suggest that the ends of fighting terrorism can be usedto justify any means, and that the President should have blanket authority to do whatever he wants – provided that it is a President with whom they agree.
Both sides may be sincere in their views, but neither side is right. The American people are not absolutist, and they don’t elect us to impose a rigid ideology on our problems. They know that we need not sacrifice our security for our values, nor sacrifice our values for oursecurity, so long as we approach difficult questions with honesty, and care, and a dose of common sense. That, after all, is the unique geniusof America. That is the challenge laid down by our Constitution. That has been the source of our strength through the ages. That is what makes the United States of America different as a nation.
I can stand here today, as President of the United States, and say without exception or equivocation that we do not torture, and that we will vigorously protect our people while forging a strong and durable framework that allows us to fight terrorism while abiding by the rule of law. Make no mistake: if we fail to turn the page on the approach that was taken over the past several years, then I will not be able to say that as President. And if we cannot stand for those core values, then we are not keeping faith with the documents that are enshrined in this hall.
The Framers who drafted the Constitution could not have foreseen the challenges that have unfolded over the last two hundred and twenty two years. But our Constitution has endured through secession and civil rights – through World War and Cold War – because it provides a foundation of principles that can be applied pragmatically; it providesa compass that can help us find our way. It hasn’t always been easy. Weare an imperfect people. Every now and then, there are those who think that America’s safety and success requires us to walk away from the sacred principles enshrined in this building. We hear such voices today. But the American people have resisted that temptation. And though we have made our share of mistakes and course corrections, we have held fast to the principles that have been the source of our strength, and a beacon to the world.
Now, this generation faces a great test in the specter of terrorism. Unlike the Civil War or World War II, we cannot count on a surrender ceremony to bring this journey to an end. Right now, in distant training camps and in crowded cities, there are people plotting to take
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American lives. That will be the case a year from now, five years from now, and – in all probability – ten years from now. Neither I nor anyone else can standing here today can say that there will not be another terrorist attack that takes American lives. But I can say with certainty that my Administration – along with our extraordinary troops and the patriotic men and women who defend our national security – willdo everything in our power to keep the American people safe. And I do know with certainty that we can defeat al Qaeda. Because the terroristscan only succeed if they swell their ranks and alienate America from our allies, and they will never be able to do that if we stay true to who we are; if we forge tough and durable approaches to fighting terrorism that are anchored in our timeless ideals.
This must be our common purpose. I ran for President because I believe that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless we solve them together. We will not be safe if we see national security as a wedge that divides America – it can and must be a cause that unites us as onepeople, as one nation. We have done so before in times that were more perilous than ours. We will do so once again. Thank you, God Bless you,and God bless the United States of America.
Appendix 2: Barack Obama’s Speech at the National Defence University, Fort McNair - 23/05/2013
It is a great honor to return to the National Defense University. Here, at FortMcNair, Americans have served in uniform since 1791 — standing guard in the earliest days of the Republic, and contemplating the future of warfare here in the 21st century.
For over two centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding documents that defined who we are as Americans, and served as our compass through every type of change. Matters of war and peace are no different. Americans are deeply ambivalent about war, but having fought for our independence, we know a price must be paid for freedom. From the Civil War to our struggle against fascism, on through the long twilight struggle of the Cold War, battlefields have changed and technology has evolved. But our commitment to constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an end.
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad, and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived here at home. And for a moment, itseemed the 21st century would be a tranquil time. And then, on September 11, 2001, we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us, as clouds of fire and metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning. This was a different kind of war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was notthe principal target. Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they could.
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And so our nation went to war. We have now been at war for well over a decade. I won’t review the full history. What is clear is that we quickly drove al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, but then shifted our focus and began a new war in Iraq. And this carried significant consequences for our fight against al Qaeda,our standing in the world, and — to this day — our interests in a vital region.
Meanwhile, we strengthened our defenses — hardening targets, tightening transportation security, giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror. Most of these changes were sound. Some caused inconvenience. But some, like expanded surveillance, raised difficult questions about the balance that we strike between our interests in security and our values of privacy. And in somecases, I believe we compromised our basic values — by using torture to interrogate our enemies, and detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law.
So after I took office, we stepped up the war against al Qaeda but we also sought to change its course. We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda’s leadership. We ended the war in Iraq, and brought nearly 150,000 troops home. We pursued a new strategy in Afghanistan, and increased our training of Afghan forces. We unequivocally banned torture, affirmed our commitment to civilian courts, workedto align our policies with the rule of law, and expanded our consultations with Congress.
Today, Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure. Fewer of our troops are in harm’s way, and over the next 19 months theywill continue to come home. Our alliances are strong, and so is our standing inthe world. In sum, we are safer because of our efforts.
Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. But we haveto recognize that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a decade of experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard questions — about the nature of today’s threats andhow we should confront them.
And these questions matter to every American.
For over the last decade, our nation has spent well over a trillion dollars on war, helping to explode our deficits and constraining our ability to nation-build here at home. Our servicemembers and their families have sacrificed far more on our behalf. Nearly 7,000 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice. Many more have left a part of themselves on the battlefield, or brought the shadows of battle back home. From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the decisions that we are making now will define the type ofnation — and world — that we leave to our children.
So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning that “No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human
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beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do — what we must do — is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintainingthe freedoms and ideals that we defend. And to define that strategy, we have tomake decisions based not on fear, but on hard-earned wisdom. That begins with understanding the current threat that we face.
Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi orBoston. They’ve not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.
Instead, what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al Qaeda affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with Al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula — AQAP — the most active in plotting against our homeland. And while none of AQAP’s efforts approach the scale of 9/11, they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009.
Unrest in the Arab world has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries like Libya and Syria. But here, too, there are differences from 9/11. In some cases, we continue to confront state-sponsored networks like Hezbollah that engage in acts of terror to achieve political goals. Other of these groups are simply collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory. And while we are vigilant for signs that these groups maypose a transnational threat, most are focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. And that means we’ll face more localized threats like what we saw in Benghazi, or the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local operatives — perhaps in loose affiliation with regional networks — launch periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies, and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to fund their operations.
And finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States. Whether it’s a shooter at a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin, a plane flying into a building in Texas, or the extremists who killed 168 people at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, America has confronted many forms of violent extremism in our history. Deranged or alienated individuals — often U.S. citizens or legal residents — can do enormous damage, particularly when inspiredby larger notions of violent jihad. And that pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort Hood and the bombing of the Boston Marathon.
So that’s the current threat — lethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates; threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad; homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We have to take these threats seriously, and doall that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.
In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our Embassy in Beirut; at our Marine Barracks in Lebanon; on a cruise ship at sea; at a disco in Berlin; and on a Pan Am flight — Flight 103 — over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center; at our military facilities in
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Saudi Arabia; and at our Embassy in Kenya. These attacks were all brutal; they were all deadly; and we learned that left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise to thelevel that we saw on the eve of 9/11.
Moreover, we have to recognize that these threats don’t arise in a vacuum. Most, though not all, of the terrorism we faced is fueled by a common ideology —a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States andthe West, and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is not at war with Islam. And this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims, who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks.
Nevertheless, this ideology persists, and in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to wina battle of wills, a battle of ideas. So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.
First, we must finish the work of defeating al Qaeda and its associated forces.
In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for that country’s security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force, which ensures that al Qaeda can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.
Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless “global war on terror,” but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America. In many cases, this will involve partnerships with other countries. Already, thousands of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting extremists. In Yemen, we are supporting security forces that have reclaimed territory from AQAP. In Somalia,we helped a coalition of African nations push al-Shabaab out of its strongholds. In Mali, we’re providing military aid to French-led intervention to push back al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and help the people of Mali reclaim their future.
Much of our best counterterrorism cooperation results in the gathering and sharing of intelligence, the arrest and prosecution of terrorists. And that’s how a Somali terrorist apprehended off the coast of Yemen is now in a prison in New York. That’s how we worked with European allies to disrupt plots from Denmark to Germany to the United Kingdom. That’s how intelligence collected with Saudi Arabia helped us stop a cargo plane from being blown up over the Atlantic. These partnerships work.
But despite our strong preference for the detention and prosecution of terrorists, sometimes this approach is foreclosed. Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth. They take refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They train in empty deserts and rugged mountains.
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In some of these places — such as parts of Somalia and Yemen — the state only has the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state lacks the capacity or will to take action. And it’s also not possible for America to simply deploy a team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. Even when such an approach may be possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians — where a terrorist compound cannot be breached without triggering a firefight with surrounding tribal communities, forexample, that pose no threat to us; times when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis.
To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case were immense. The likelihood of capture, although that was our preference, was remote given the certainty that our folks would confront resistance. The fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties, or embroiled in an extended firefight, was a testamentto the meticulous planning and professionalism of our Special Forces, but it also depended on some luck. And it was supported by massive infrastructure in Afghanistan.
And even then, the cost to our relationship with Pakistan — and the backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory — was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership.
So it is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones.
As was true in previous armed conflicts, this new technology raises profound questions — about who is targeted, and why; about civilian casualties, and the risk of creating new enemies; about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law; about accountability and morality. So let me address these questions.
To begin with, our actions are effective. Don’t take my word for it. In the intelligence gathered at bin Laden’s compound, we found that he wrote, “We couldlose the reserves to enemy’s air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives.” Other communications from al Qaeda operatives confirm this as well. Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.
Moreover, America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war — a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.
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And yet, as our fight enters a new phase, America’s legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a military tactic is legal,or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance. For thesame human progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power — or risk abusing it. And that’s why, over the last four years, my administration has worked vigorously toestablish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists –- insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance that I signed yesterday.
In the Afghan war theater, we must — and will — continue to support our troops until the transition is complete at the end of 2014. And that means we will continue to take strikes against high value al Qaeda targets, but also against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces. But by the end of 2014, we will no longer have the same need for force protection, and the progress we’ve made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.
Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated forces. And even then, the use of drones is heavily constrained. America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists; our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute. America cannot takestrikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty.
America does not take strikes to punish individuals; we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when thereare no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured — the highest standard we can set.
Now, this last point is critical, because much of the criticism about drone strikes — both here at home and abroad — understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There’s a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports. Nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in every war. And for the families of those civilians, no words or legal construct can justify their loss. For me, and those in my chain of command, those deaths willhaunt us as long as we live, just as we are haunted by the civilian casualties that have occurred throughout conventional fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But as Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties — not just in our cities at home and our facilitiesabroad, but also in the very places like Sana’a and Kabul and Mogadishu where terrorists seek a foothold. Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes. So doing nothingis not an option.
Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in theirterritory, the primary alternative to targeted lethal action would be the use of
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conventional military options. As I’ve already said, even small special operations carry enormous risks. Conventional airpower or missiles are far lessprecise than drones, and are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage. And invasions of these territories lead us to be viewed as occupying armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences, are difficult tocontain, result in large numbers of civilian casualties and ultimately empower those who thrive on violent conflict.
So it is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths or less likely to create enemies in the Muslim world. The results would be more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars.
Yes, the conflict with al Qaeda, like all armed conflict, invites tragedy. But by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life.
Our efforts must be measured against the history of putting American troops in distant lands among hostile populations. In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of civilians died in a war where the boundaries of battle were blurred. In Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the extraordinary courage and discipline of our troops,thousands of civilians have been killed. So neither conventional military action nor waiting for attacks to occur offers moral safe harbor, and neither does a sole reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning police or security services — and indeed, have no functioning law.
Now, this is not to say that the risks are not real. Any U.S. military action in foreign lands risks creating more enemies and impacts public opinion overseas. Moreover, our laws constrain the power of the President even during wartime, and I have taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. The very precision of drone strikes and the necessary secrecy often involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a President and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.
And for this reason, I’ve insisted on strong oversight of all lethal action. After I took office, my administration began briefing all strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan to the appropriate committees of Congress. Let me repeat that: Not only did Congress authorize the use of force, it is briefed on every strike that America takes. Every strike. That includes the one instance when we targeted an American citizen — Anwar Awlaki, the chief of external operationsfor AQAP.
This week, I authorized the declassification of this action, and the deaths of three other Americans in drone strikes, to facilitate transparency and debate onthis issue and to dismiss some of the more outlandish claims that have been made. For the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen — with a drone, or with a shotgun— without due process, nor should any President deploy armed drones over U.S. soil.
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But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the United States, nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a SWAT team.
That’s who Anwar Awlaki was — he was continuously trying to kill people. He helped oversee the 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S.-bound cargo planes. He was involved in planning to blow up an airliner in 2009. WhenFarouk Abdulmutallab — the Christmas Day bomber — went to Yemen in 2009, Awlaki hosted him, approved his suicide operation, helped him tape a martyrdom video tobe shown after the attack, and his last instructions were to blow up the airplane when it was over American soil. I would have detained and prosecuted Awlaki if we captured him before he carried out a plot, but we couldn’t. And asPresident, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strikethat took him out.
Of course, the targeting of any American raises constitutional issues that are not present in other strikes — which is why my administration submitted information about Awlaki to the Department of Justice months before Awlaki was killed, and briefed the Congress before this strike as well. But the high threshold that we’ve set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens. This threshold respects the inherent dignity of every human life. Alongside thedecision to put our men and women in uniform in harm’s way, the decision to use force against individuals or groups — even against a sworn enemy of the United States — is the hardest thing I do as President. But these decisions must be made, given my responsibility to protect the American people.
Going forward, I’ve asked my administration to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of warzones that go beyond our reporting to Congress. Each option has virtues in theory, but poses difficulties in practice. For example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a third branch of governmentinto the process, but raises serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority. Another idea that’s been suggested — the establishment of an independent oversight board in the executive branch — avoids those problems, but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national security decision-making, without inspiring additional public confidence in the process. But despite these challenges, I look forward to actively engaging Congress to explore these and other options for increased oversight.
I believe, however, that the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy — because for all the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe. We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root; and in the absence of a strategy that reduces the wellspring of extremism, a perpetual war — through drones or Special Forces or troop deployments — will prove self-defeating, and alter our country in troubling ways.
So the next element of our strategy involves addressing the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism — from North Africa to South Asia.
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As we’ve learned this past decade, this is a vast and complex undertaking. We must be humble in our expectation that we can quickly resolve deep-rooted problems like poverty and sectarian hatred. Moreover, no two countries are alike, and some will undergo chaotic change before things get better. But our security and our values demand that we make the effort.
This means patiently supporting transitions to democracy in places like Egypt and Tunisia and Libya — because the peaceful realization of individual aspirations will serve as a rebuke to violent extremists. We must strengthen the opposition in Syria, while isolating extremist elements — because the end ofa tyrant must not give way to the tyranny of terrorism. We are actively workingto promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians — because it is right and because such a peace could help reshape attitudes in the region. And we must help countries modernize economies, upgrade education, and encourage entrepreneurship — because American leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with people’s hopes, and not simply their fears.
And success on all these fronts requires sustained engagement, but it will also require resources. I know that foreign aid is one of the least popular expenditures that there is. That’s true for Democrats and Republicans — I’ve seen the polling — even though it amounts to less than one percent of the federal budget. In fact, a lot of folks think it’s 25 percent, if you ask people on the streets. Less than one percent — still wildly unpopular. But foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our national security. And it’s fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism.
Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent. For what we spent in a month in Iraq at the height of the war, we could be training security forces in Libya, maintaining peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors, feeding the hungry in Yemen, building schools in Pakistan, and creating reservoirs of goodwill that marginalize extremists. That has to be part of our strategy.
Moreover, America cannot carry out this work if we don’t have diplomats serving in some very dangerous places. Over the past decade, we have strengthened security at our embassies, and I am implementing every recommendation of the Accountability Review Board, which found unacceptable failures in Benghazi. I’ve called on Congress to fully fund these efforts to bolster security and harden facilities, improve intelligence, and facilitate a quicker response time from our military if a crisis emerges.
But even after we take these steps, some irreducible risks to our diplomats willremain. This is the price of being the world’s most powerful nation, particularly as a wave of change washes over the Arab World. And in balancing the trade4offs between security and active diplomacy, I firmly believe that any retreat from challenging regions will only increase the dangers that we face in the long run. And that’s why we should be grateful to those diplomats who are willing to serve.
Targeted action against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic engagement and assistance — through such a comprehensive strategy we can
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significantly reduce the chances of large-scale attacks on the homeland and mitigate threats to Americans overseas. But as we guard against dangers from abroad, we cannot neglect the daunting challenge of terrorism from within our borders.
As I said earlier, this threat is not new. But technology and the Internet increase its frequency and in some cases its lethality. Today, a person can consume hateful propaganda, commit themselves to a violent agenda, and learn howto kill without leaving their home. To address this threat, two years ago my administration did a comprehensive review and engaged with law enforcement.
And the best way to prevent violent extremism inspired by violent jihadists is to work with the Muslim American community — which has consistently rejected terrorism — to identify signs of radicalization and partner with law enforcementwhen an individual is drifting towards violence. And these partnerships can only work when we recognize that Muslims are a fundamental part of the American family. In fact, the success of American Muslims and our determination to guardagainst any encroachments on their civil liberties is the ultimate rebuke to those who say that we’re at war with Islam.
Thwarting homegrown plots presents particular challenges in part because of our proud commitment to civil liberties for all who call America home. That’s why, in the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means reviewing the authorities of law enforcement, so we can intercept new types of communication, but also build in privacy protections to prevent abuse.
That means that — even after Boston — we do not deport someone or throw somebodyin prison in the absence of evidence. That means putting careful constraints onthe tools the government uses to protect sensitive information, such as the state secrets doctrine. And that means finally having a strong Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to review those issues where our counterterrorism efforts and our values may come into tension.
The Justice Department’s investigation of national security leaks offers a recent example of the challenges involved in striking the right balance between our security and our open society. As Commander-in-Chief, I believe we must keep information secret that protects our operations and our people in the field. To do so, we must enforce consequences for those who break the law and breach their commitment to protect classified information. But a free press is also essential for our democracy. That’s who we are. And I’m troubled by the possibility that leak investigations may chill the investigative journalism thatholds government accountable.
Journalists should not be at legal risk for doing their jobs. Our focus must beon those who break the law. And that’s why I’ve called on Congress to pass a media shield law to guard against government overreach. And I’ve raised these issues with the Attorney General, who shares my concerns. So he has agreed to review existing Department of Justice guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters, and he’ll convene a group of media organizations to hear
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their concerns as part of that review. And I’ve directed the Attorney General to report back to me by July 12th.
Now, all these issues remind us that the choices we make about war can impact — in sometimes unintended ways — the openness and freedom on which our way of lifedepends. And that is why I intend to engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue to fight terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing.
The AUMF is now nearly 12 years old. The Afghan war is coming to an end. Core al Qaeda is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States. Unless we disciplineour thinking, our definitions, our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight, or continue to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation states.
So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s what our democracy demands.
And that brings me to my final topic: the detention of terrorist suspects. I’mgoing to repeat one more time: As a matter of policy, the preference of the United States is to capture terrorist suspects. When we do detain a suspect, weinterrogate them. And if the suspect can be prosecuted, we decide whether to try him in a civilian court or a military commission.
During the past decade, the vast majority of those detained by our military werecaptured on the battlefield. In Iraq, we turned over thousands of prisoners as we ended the war. In Afghanistan, we have transitioned detention facilities to the Afghans, as part of the process of restoring Afghan sovereignty. So we bringlaw of war detention to an end, and we are committed to prosecuting terrorists wherever we can.
The glaring exception to this time-tested approach is the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. The original premise for opening GTMO — that detainees would not be able to challenge their detention — was found unconstitutional five yearsago. In the meantime, GTMO has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law. Our allies won’t cooperate with us if they think aterrorist will end up at GTMO.
During a time of budget cuts, we spend $150 million each year to imprison 166 people — almost $1 million per prisoner. And the Department of Defense estimates that we must spend another $200 million to keep GTMO open at a time when we’re cutting investments in education and research here at home, and when the Pentagon is struggling with sequester and budget cuts.
As President, I have tried to close GTMO. I transferred 67 detainees to other countries before Congress imposed restrictions to effectively prevent us from
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either transferring detainees to other countries or imprisoning them here in theUnited States.
These restrictions make no sense. After all, under President Bush, some 530 detainees were transferred from GTMO with Congress’s support. When I ran for President the first time, John McCain supported closing GTMO — this was a bipartisan issue. No person has ever escaped one of our super-max or military prisons here in the United States — ever. Our courts have convicted hundreds ofpeople for terrorism or terrorism-related offenses, including some folks who aremore dangerous than most GTMO detainees. They’re in our prisons.
And given my administration’s relentless pursuit of al Qaeda’s leadership, thereis no justification beyond politics for Congress to prevent us from closing a facility that should have never have been opened.
Today, I once again call on Congress to lift the restrictions on detainee transfers from GTMO. (Applause.)
I have asked the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States where we can hold military commissions. I’m appointing a new senior envoy at the State Department and Defense Department whose sole responsibility will be toachieve the transfer of detainees to third countries.
I am lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen so we can review themon a case-by-case basis. To the greatest extent possible, we will transfer detainees who have been cleared to go to other countries.
Where appropriate, we will bring terrorists to justice in our courts and our military justice system. And we will insist that judicial review be available for every detainee.
Now, even after we take these steps one issue will remain — just how to deal with those GTMO detainees who we know have participated in dangerous plots or attacks but who cannot be prosecuted, for example, because the evidence against them has been compromised or is inadmissible in a court of law. But once we commit to a process of closing GTMO, I am confident that this legacy problem canbe resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law.
I know the politics are hard. But history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of our fight against terrorism and those of us who fail to end it. Imagine a future — 10 years from now or 20 years from now — when the United States of America is still holding people who have been charged with no crime ona piece of land that is not part of our country. Look at the current situation,where we are force-feeding detainees who are being held on a hunger strike. I’mwilling to cut the young lady who interrupted me some slack because it’s worth being passionate about. Is this who we are? Is that something our Founders foresaw? Is that the America we want to leave our children? Our sense of justice is stronger than that.
We have prosecuted scores of terrorists in our courts. That includes Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit; and Faisal Shahzad, who put a car bomb in Times Square. It’s in a court of law that we will
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try Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is accused of bombing the Boston Marathon. Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, is, as we speak, serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison here in the United States. In sentencing Reid, Judge William Young told him, “The way we treat you…is the measure of our own liberties.”
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How about Abdulmutallab — locking up a 16-year-old — is that the way we treat a 16-year old? (Inaudible) — can you take the drones out of the hands of the CIA? Can you stop the signature strikes killing people on the basis of suspicious activities?
MR. OBAMA: We’re addressing that, ma’am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — thousands of Muslims that got killed — will you compensate the innocent families — that will make us safer here at home. I love my country. I love (inaudible) —
MR. OBAMA: I think that — and I’m going off script, as you might expect here. (Laughter and applause.) The voice of that woman is worth paying attention to. (Applause.) Obviously, I do not agree with much of what she said, and obviouslyshe wasn’t listening to me in much of what I said. But these are tough issues, and the suggestion that we can gloss over them is wrong.
When that judge sentenced Mr. Reid, the shoe bomber, he went on to point to the American flag that flew in the courtroom. “That flag,” he said, “will fly therelong after this is all forgotten. That flag still stands for freedom.”
So, America, we’ve faced down dangers far greater than al Qaeda. By staying true to the values of our founding, and by using our constitutional compass, we have overcome slavery and Civil War and fascism and communism. In just these last few years as President, I’ve watched the American people bounce back from painful recession, mass shootings, natural disasters like the recent tornados that devastated Oklahoma. These events were heartbreaking; they shook our communities to the core. But because of the resilience of the American people, these events could not come close to breaking us.
I think of Lauren Manning, the 9/11 survivor who had severe burns over 80 percent of her body, who said, “That’s my reality. I put a Band-Aid on it, literally, and I move on.”
I think of the New Yorkers who filled Times Square the day after an attempted car bomb as if nothing had happened.
I think of the proud Pakistani parents who, after their daughter was invited to the White House, wrote to us, “We have raised an American Muslim daughter to dream big and never give up because it does pay off.”
I think of all the wounded warriors rebuilding their lives, and helping other vets to find jobs.
I think of the runner planning to do the 2014 Boston Marathon, who said, “Next year, you’re going to have more people than ever. Determination is not something to be messed with.”
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That’s who the American people are — determined, and not to be messed with. Andnow we need a strategy and a politics that reflects this resilient spirit.
Our victory against terrorism won’t be measured in a surrender ceremony at a battleship, or a statue being pulled to the ground. Victory will be measured inparents taking their kids to school; immigrants coming to our shores; fans taking in a ballgame; a veteran starting a business; a bustling city street; a citizen shouting her concerns at a President.
The quiet determination; that strength of character and bond of fellowship; thatrefutation of fear — that is both our sword and our shield. And long after the current messengers of hate have faded from the world’s memory, alongside the brutal despots, and deranged madmen, and ruthless demagogues who litter history — the flag of the United States will still wave from small-town cemeteries to national monuments, to distant outposts abroad. And that flag will still stand for freedom.
Thank you very, everybody. God bless you. May God bless the United States of America.
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