Woods..Hole Oceanographic Institution

DOCUM'ENTLIBRARY

Woods Hole Uceanographic

Institution

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Technical Report

July t995

Toward an Effective Protocol on,Land-Based tJarine Pollution

in the Wider Caribbean Region

by

. Porter HoaglandMary E.. S.chumacherArthur G.Gaines,Jr.

Marine Poliçy CenterWoods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Woods Hole, Massachusetts 02543-:1138. Phone 508-548:'1400 ..Telei(951679 .

!,.¡:

WHOI-95-10

Toward an Effective Protocol on Land-Based Marine Pollutionin the Wider Caribbean Region

by

Porter HoaglandMar E. SchumacherArthur G. Gaines,Jr.

DOCU~~1ENT

LIBRARYWoods Hole Oceanographic

Institution

Marine Policy CenterWoods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Woods Hole, Massachusetts 02543-1138

July 1995

Technical Report

Funding provided by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of InternationalActivities under Co-operative Agreement No. CX82IS40-01-0.

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of theUnited States Government. This report should be cited as:

Woods Hole Oceanog. Inst. Tech. Rept., WHOI-9S-1O.

Approved for publication; distribution unlimited.o/'i:i:Õ :r:i- i:~ 0:: 0ID-:i ,.-0/'oo

Approved for Distribution:

~dr~ ((. ~Andrew R. Solow, Director

Marine Policy Center

On the cover: Actual and Hypothetical Maritime Jurisdictions in the Wider Caribbean Region. Adapted from Fenwick (1992).Q 1995 by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

Hypothetial boundaris (thin lines) are those identified by the u.s. Department of State in its World Data Bank 2. In most cases, thehypothetial boundaris are approximate equidistant boundari, and they do not reflct any acceptance by the u.s. government. Some

claims may be based upon unilateral assertins; these claims may be subject to chatle by natinal legislatin or decree or through

internatinal boundry negotitins. Boundris as represented are approximations for general reference only.

Toward an Effective Protocol on Land-Based Marine Pollution

in the

Wider Caribbean Region

July 1995

by

Porter HoaglandMary E. Schumacher

Arur G. Gaines

Marine Policy CenterWoods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Woods Hole, Massachusett 02543

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share a common boundary, such as rivers and their deltas or estuaries. However, the systematiccollection and analysis of data on the extent and distribution of localized pollutants has oruyrecently gotten under way. Because inventories are limited to point-source pollutant loads, theresults so far are not useful for assessing the extent and distribution of pollutants generated bysome of the most significant non-point source activities in the region, including agriculture,forestr, and coastal development projects. In the absence of systematically collected data on

non-point pollutant loads for most of the WCR countries and territories, a more complete pictureof an individual state or subregion's relative contribution and exposure to LBMP must beinerred from other indicators. We examine a combination of indicators to help assess theinclination and abilty of states to undertke independent or joint action to control LBMPproblems.

We analyze several issues and arguments that often are assumed to be relevant to theCaribbean and therefore have been used as a basis for pursuing a regionwide approach to LBMPcontrol in the WCR. These issues and arguments include: common-pool pollution effects; scaleeconomies; common pollution problems; and the need for uniform standards (water quality orpollution control standards). Each of these issues must be evaluated carefully with respect to thewide variety of environmental, political, and economic characteristics found in the WCR states.We believe that all of these issues are indeed relevant and valid at some scale in the Caribbean.However, the extent to which they are applicable regionwide is not at all clear.

We believe that strong arguments can be made in favor of a regional protocol containingintitutional arrangements that help to resolve pollution problems at the domestic and subregionallevels, especially transboundary pollution between adjacent or neighboring states. This kind ofan effort can build upon existing bilateral arrangements, if deemed successful, such as thosebetween Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago, Mexico and Belize, or the United States andMexico. We advocate an approach that start out at a small scale so that valuable, andpotentially tranferable, experience can be gained at little risk of larger program ineffectiveness.If scientific research demonstrates the need to internlize pollutant effects that are morewidespread, then larger subregions might be delineated, building upon the experience gained atthe bilateral leveL. The best approach appears to be an incremental one, building uponsuccessful arrangements among those states that have appropriate incentives for solving realtransboundar pollution problems.

We also address the arguent for an LBMP protocol in the WCR tht gives priority toresolving localized but widely occurring pollution problems-an approach that is clearly morecompatible with the environmental realities of the region. We are concerned that the logic ofconcluding an international protocol to address primarily domestic problems depends uponcertin unproven assumptions about clearinghouse efficiencies and other scale economies, andabout the likelihood that an international program wil be more effective than effort by

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individual states in attracting funding and other forms of assistace from multilateral andbilateral donor agencies. We believe that these assumptions are valid to a point that stops shortof justifying a uniform, regionwide approach to LBMP problems and solutions. We recommendthat a protocol focusing on common, nontransboundary LBMP explicitly recognie that somecommon LBMP problems in the WCR are more common than others, by carefully delineatingsubregional groupings and approaches on the basis of shared marine environmental problems.We furter recommend that in such a case the "umbrella" function of a regional protocol shouldconcentrate on the need to ensure uniform access to all clearinghouse products and on the

resolution of issues concernng the internal allocation of financial and techncal assistace toindividual states and subregions.

We explore thee avenues to identifying promising opportnities for mutually beneficialcollaborations, or "gain from trade," in pollution control. First, economic commonalities

thoughout the region are identified, with the states grouped and ranked according to their levelof participation in relevant economic sectors. This information is useful in identifying statesengaged in a particular polluting activity on a relatively small scale, who could benefit frompollution control approaches and technologies that have already been adopted by another stateengaged in the same activity at a much larger scale. At the same time, states operating in thesame industries at roughly the same scale of activity may encounter the same LBMP problemsand thus might well be interested in cooperating on the development of common solutions. Alsoconsidered are the states' existing relations as trade parters, which could serve as an additionalbasis or support for collaborations and exchanges in LBMP control.

Second, we consider the relative identities of WCR states as polluters and polluteeswithn geographic subregional groupings, according to an approach developed by Broadus et al.

(1993). Specifically, relevant population and economic data are used to estimate the extent towhich each state is a source of LBMP; the extent to which it has a stae in controlling theproblem; and its relative economic capacity to undertke corrective action. This analysis yieldsseveral ilustrative examples of key match-ups among source, staeholder, and faciltator stateswith and across subregions, in which faciltator states (typically importnt trading parers oraid providers) inuence source states to control their LBMP emissions for the benefit of keystaeholder states. Although this anlysis is distinctly geared toward intances of tranboundarypollution, we believe that it wil be useful even if the negotiating parties concentrte their efforton collective responses to common, nontransboundary problems. In either case, an

understading of each state's relative stading with respect to source, stae, and capacity shouldenhance the abilty of negotiating parties to identify those specific collaborations and exchangesthat are most likely to be successfully implemented.

Thid, we develop a qualitative rating system that takes into account not only the siz butalso the direction of a state's economic incentive with respect to controlling LBMP, and not only

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its economic capacity but also its institutional capacity to underte corrective action. Like theeconomic groupings, this approach compares all the WCR states within a single, regionwidecontext. This rating system helps to predict which states are the most likely to engage insustained and successful action to control LBMP, and, for the other states, the general types ofassistance or special inducements that each is most likely to require in order to participatesuccessfully.

The Cartagena Convention establishes a broad goal with respect to the control of LBMPin the Convention area. As currently articulated, this goal is subject to variable interpretations.In order to improve the potential for protocol effectiveness, this goal must be clarified, its termsshould be made more explicit, and objectives should be specified to enable states, collectivelyor independently, to reach this goal. In particular, the term appropriate measures, found in theConvention's mandate that its Contracting Parties "shall take all appropriate measures to prevent,reduce, or control" LBMP, should be defined explicitly.

One important role for the prospective protocol wil be the clarification of rights to aclean marine environment. Broad language iI the Cartagena Convention, the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), and principles of customary international lawlend support to the notion tht states affected by pollution originating in another jurisdiction havethe right to a clean environment. The emerging "polluter pays" principle is consonant with thesesources of law, but appears to apply primarily at the subnational leveL. However, these sourcesof law are not unambiguous with respect to the assignment of rights. We develop a stylizedmodel to demonstrate the importnce of clearly defined rights and to help elucidate the potentialfor benefits from agreements, or "gains from trade," in pollution control (Appendix C).

Gains from trade can be facilitated with mechanisms for transfer payments. Thesemechanisms exist already and have been employed to assist in the resolution of Caribbean LBMPproblems to a limited extent. The United States, some European states, Sweden, Canada, andVenezuela already provide foreign aid of various types to many states in the region. Thesetranfer payments can be "tied" specifically to pollution control arrangements in the context ofthe subregional or bilateral agreements that we have suggested. It is not necessary that transfersbe financial; transfers can involve scientific or technological research, expertise, or equipment,or other goods and services.

Another importnt role for the protocol is the reduction of transactions costs among statesinvolved in pollution control negotiations. Transactions costs can involve costs of informationdisparities and uncertinty, negotiation, and enforcement. The protocol can also serve thetraditional roles of providing a forum to help focus pollution-related scientific research andmonitoring and to identify an array of feasible pollution control instruments that might beemployed by states in pollution control at the domestic and subregional levels.

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At this juncture, it is not yet possible to evaluate the effectiveness of a protocol on LBMPcontrol for the Caribbean. We can, however, say something about the general features andelements that might be incorporated into a protocol to improve its potential for effectiveness.Notably, the WCR resembles the Mediterranean as a regional sea, suggesting that many lessons,on what to adopt as well as what to avoid, can be drawn from the Mediterranean experience.Experience with the control of LBMP in other regional seas can provide useful lessons as well,

particularly in the areas of program finncing, political commitment, statements of goals, targetsand deadlines, and compliance.

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Contents

List of Tables .............................................. Xl

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xu

1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1A. Background: Land-Based Marine Pollution and the Wider Caribbean Region . . 1B. Purpose of the Study ....................................3C. Study Approach and Organization of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

ll. Natural Systems, Pollution, and the Interdependency of WCR States . . . . . . . . . . . . 9A. Regional Geography and Freshwater Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9B. Ocean Circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12C. Weather and Atmospheric Circulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12D. Spatial Scales of Pollution in the Wider Caribbean Region . . . . . . . . . . . . 17E. Subregional Scales of Pollution and the CEPPOL Pollutant Load Inventories 20F. Summary .......................................... 29

III. Commonly Advanced Arguments for Collective Action in the WCR . . . . . . . . . . . 30A. The Importnce of Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30B. Pollution Costs and Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31C. Common-Pool Effects .................................. 31D. Common Environmental Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '_' . . . . . . 34E. Scale Economies and Clearinghouse Efficiencies .................. 37

F. Uniform Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39G. Summary .......................................... 47

IV. Economic and Institutional Characteristics of the WCR ........ . . . . . . . . . . 49

A. Regional Diversity .................................... 49B. The WCR States and the Cartgena Convention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49C. Overview of Demographic and Economic Indicators .... . . . . . . . . . . . . 54D. Comparative Overview of the CEPPOL-Designated Subregions ......... 56

1. Economically heterogeneous subregions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562. Economically homogeneous suubregions ..................... 603. Marie pollution and resource degradation problems with

and across subergions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

4. Extra-regional trade as a unifying force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

E. Legal and Regulatory Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68F. Measures of Environmental Infastrctue ...................... 73G. Scientific Capabilties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76H. The Role of NGOs in the WCR ............................ 771. Other Regional Organations .............................. 78J. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . 82

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Contents (contd.)

V. Analysis of the Incentives and Prospects for Collective Action .............. 84

A. Analytic Approaches ................................... 84B. Economic Commonalities ................................ 84C. Sources and Stakes .................................... 92D. An Alternative Assessment of Capacities and Incentives to Control LBMP . 102E. Concluding Remarks .................................. 109

VI. Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112A. Regional Background Characteristics ........................ 112

1 . Delineation of Subregions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 112

2. Coherence Among Member States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1153. High-Level Political Commitment and Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . .. 117

4. Knowledge of Baseline Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 118B. Elements of Effective Program Design ....................... 119

1. Clear Goals and Objectives .......................... 1192. Obligation to Adopt Measures: Targets and Deadlines ......... 120

3. Efficiently Designed Program Measures .................. 121

4. Compliance Mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1225. Mechanisms for Trade .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1236. Adequate Financing Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1247. Effective Decisionmaking Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 125

8. Adaptability Over Time ..................... ~.' . . . .. 126

C. Dynamic Measures of Effectiveness .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1271. Level of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272. Achievement of the Program Goal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 1283. Increased Domestic Abatement Effort ................... 129

D. Summary ......................................... 130

AppendicesA.B.C.D.

E.

F.

Data Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1Estimation of Drainage Basin and Coastal Populations . . . . . . . . . . .. 147

Opportnities for Gain from Trade: A Stylized Model . . . . . . . . . .. 155Consultant Report: E. H. Gladfelter and J. C. Ogden. The status ofrelevant scientifc capabilties and knowledge of land-based marinepollution problems in the Caribbean. (unattched)Consultant Report: L. A. Kimball. Land-based sources marine

pollution: institutions and exchanges. (unattched)Consultant Report. E. F. Mandell. Land-based sources of marine

pollution, legal instruments, and institutional capabilties in theSpanish-speaking countries of the Wider Caribbean Region. (unattched)

References ............................................... 166

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List of Tables

1 Lessons Learned from a Comparative Assessment of LBMP in the Baltic,

North Sea, and Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 Principal Rivers Draining Into the Wider Caribbean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 CEPPOL Results: Waste Loads from Domestic Sources in the

Wider Caribbean Region by Subregion (t/y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 CEPPOL Results: Waste Loads from Industrial Sources in the

Wider Caribbean Region by Subregion (t/y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Regional Enviromnental Programs & Projects in the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 Pollution Control Instrments: A Qualitative Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447 Distributional Implications of Instrument Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 Political Units in the Wider Caribbean Region ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509 Participation in Law of the Sea, London Dumping, and Cartgena Conventions . . 52

10 Major Net Importers and Net Exporters of Fish and Fish Products in the WCR . . 5511 Observed Resource and Pollution Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6212 Authority for Enviromnental Policy and Enforcement in the WCR States . . . . . . 7113 Measures of Enviromnental Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7414 Regional Enviromnental Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8115 Leading Oil and Natural Gas Producers, Oil Refiners, and Producers of

Industrial Chemicals ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8616 Leading Agricultural, Sugarcane, and Banana Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8717 Coastal Development and Leading Fish Producers and Tourist Destinations .... 8918 Debt Service Ratios and Leading Recipients of Foreign Aid . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 9019 Major Export and Primary Importing States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9120 Opportnities for Exchange and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9321 Sources, Stakes, and Capacities within Subregions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9522 Key States and Trading Relationships in the Wider Caribbean Region . . . . . .. 10123 Qualitative Ratings of Capacity and Incentive to Undertke LBMP Control. . .. 10324 Overall Prospect of Sustained and Effective Action to Control LBMP . . . . . .. 10725 Checklist: Factors for Regional Program Success ................... 113

26 Commonality of Specific LBMP Problems as Basis for Subregional Groupings . 116A.l Economic and Population Data for WCR States .................... 132A.2 Lad Areas, Coastlines, and EEZs ............................ 133A.3 Selected Indicators of Land-Based Marine Pollution Inputs. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 134

A.4 Selected Fisheries Data, 1990 ............................... 136A.5 Selected Economic Data on Countries and Territories of the WCR,

Grouped by CEPPOL-Designated Subregions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 137A.6 Scientific Associations and Member Institutions in the WCR ............ 143

A.7 Participation in Global and Regional Organiztions .................. 144

B.l Estimated Drainage Basin and Coastal Populations of the WCR States . . . . . .. 150

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I.,.:.'.

I,l:

List of FiguresI~-.

1 Actual and Hypothetical Maritime Jurisdictions in the

Wider Caribbean Region .................................... 22 Surface Currents of the Wider Caribbean Region (March) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Surface Currents of the Wider Caribbean Region (June) ................ 14

4 Surface Currents of the Wider Caribbean Region (September) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Surface Currents of the Wider Caribbean Region (December) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 CEPPOL-Designated Subregions .............................. 217 Relative Contributions of Combined Pollutats from

Domestic and Industrial Sources by Five WCR Subregions .............. 26

8 Relative Contributions of Individual Pollutants from

Domestic and Industrial Sources by Five WCR Subregions .............. 27

9 Relative Contributions of Pollutats from Combined Domestic and Industrial

Point Sources by 25 WCR States, Grouped by CEPPOL-Designated Subregions . 2810 Relationship Between Pollution Emissions and Damages ................ 40

11 Regional Diversity as Measured by GDP Per Capita .................. 51

12 WCR Fish Exports and Per Capita Fish Consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5813 Major Regional Areas, Actions, and Actors in Environmental Management

and Sustainable Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

14 CEP Contributions (Deficits), 1981-92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8315 Comparison of Sources, Stakes, and Capacities withn CEP Subregions. . . . . . . 9616 Relative Capacities and Incentives to Control LBMP Throughout the WCR ... 105B.l Drainage Area of the Wider Caribbean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '_' . . . .. 149C.L A Model of Transboundary Pollution Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . . .. 158

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i. Introduction

A. Background: Land-Based Marine Pollution and the Wider Caribbean Re~ion

Lad-based marine pollution (LBMP) is the world's most serious marine pollutionproblem, estimated by the United Nations Joint Group of Expert on the Scientific Aspects ofMarine Pollution (GESAMP) to contribute more than 75 percent of the pollutants enterig thesea (GESAMP 1990). Negotiations are under way to develop a regional protocol for action tocontrol LBMP in the Wider Caribbean Region (WCR), which is derined by the 1983 Conventionfor the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,or Cartgena Convention, to include the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea proper, and thosepart of the western Atlantic within 200 nautical miles of the Bahamas and Florida, down to thenortern border of Brazil.

A map of the Wider Caribbean Region is found in Figure 1, which also depicts the actual

(heavy lines) and hypothetical (th lines) maritime boundaries of the WCR states. i Except fortwo "doughnut holes" in the Gulf of Mexico, there are no high seas in the region. Severalimportt international boundaries have been agreed upon, but the majority are stil undecided.

In Section V, we employ ths base map as an heuristic tool for displaying certin informationabout the characteristics of the states of the region.

The Caribbean basin is home to a large and diverse marine ecosystem, including roughly14 percent of the world's coral reefs; the barrier reef system off Belize is the world's secondlargest, measuring approximately 220 kI in length. Throughout the region, the reefs receiveprotection from extensive and productive sea grass beds, which also provide grazing for seaturtles, manatees, fish, and invertebrates. Also characteristic of the region are coastal

mangroves that support a grazing food chain and provide nursery grounds for fish and shellfish,while trapping sediments and exporting nutrients (Elder and Pernett 1991).

The diversity of the region includes not only its natural marine systems but also atremendously broad range of cultures, languages, political systems, and economies. Forexample, the WCR is home to the world's largest and most diverse economy (the United States);to countries tht are among the world's smallest (St. Kitt & Nevis, Grenada, St. Vincent & theGrenadines) and poorest (Haiti, Guyana, Nicaragua); and to one of the world's few remaing

i We have adated and updated this map from Fenwick (1992). Hypothetica boundares are those identified

by the U.S. Deparent of State in its World Data Ban 2. In most caes, the hypothetica boundares are

approximate equidistat boundares, and they do not reflect any accptance by the U.S. governent. Some claimsmay be based upon unilateral assertions; these claims may be subject to change by national legislation or decree orthough international boundar negotiations. Boundares as represented are approximations for general referenceonly.

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communist states (Cuba).

Despite this diversity, however, and the existence of several distinct subregional

identities, there is a relatively high degree of regional interdependence. To a large extent thiscohesion is attributable to perceptions by, and pattern of trade with, the United States and othermajor parters outside the region (United Kigdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands,

Canda). For many years these trading pattern emphasized bananas, sugarcane, and otheragricultul products. Although these remain importnt regional export, in recent decades they

have been joined by a variety of manufactured goods. Most significant, however, is the extentto which tourism has come to dominate a large number of WCR economies, with cruise tourismbecoming an especially powerfl unifying force thoughout much of the region.

As in all regions of the globe, local situations and priorities are reflected in the mi ofland-based marine pollution problems observed within the region. In addition to agrochemical

runoff and discharges of industrial effluents, characteristic conditions include poor sewagetreatment facilities; increasing urbaniztion, especially in coastal areas; upland erosion; anddeforestation (UNEP 1989a, 1994a). Even the region's tourist industr, which relies uponperceptions of a pristine environment, itself contributes substantially to degradation of the coastalenvironment in a variety of ways, including inadequate sewage treatment at tourist facilities,coastal erosion from beach dredging to accommodate accelerated hotel constrction, tag of

corals, and daage to corals by anchors, spearfishing, and ship waste.

Growing recognition in the 1970s of these and other environmental problems led to theadoption, in 1981, ofthe Action Plan for the Caribbean Environment Programe (CEP). Initialfunding for the CEP came in the form of "seed money" from the United Nations EnvironmentPrograme (UNEP), but gradually the governents of the WCR have taken over responsibiltyfor fuding and management of the program. Among the signs of the regional governents'"clear commitment" to the CEP, UNEP cites regular contributions to the Caribbean Trust Fund,which support the CEP, and ratification of the Cartgena Convention, which entered into forcein 1986, along with a Protocol concerng Co-operation in Combating Oil Spils in the WiderCaribbean Region (UNEP 1991a). Negotiation of a second protocol, on Specially ProtectedAreas and Wildlife, followed in Januar 1990. This report is intended to advance the basis forprogress in discussions among the WCR states toward negotiation of a thd protocol to the

Cartgena Convention, concernng land-based sources of marine pollution in the region.

¡~

,

B. Purpose of the Study

In May 1993, the US Environmental Protection Agency's Office of InternationalActivities awarded study grant assistance to the Marine Policy Center (MPC) of

the Woods Hole

Ocenographic Institution to compile inormation and produce analyses to enhance the

3

effectiveness of an international protocol for the control of LBMP in the Wider CaribbeanRegion. The analyses have been guided by four principal study objectives:

(1) a review and summary of LBMP problems to detennine common problems and priorityproblem areas;

(2) a survey of broadly defined environmental inrastrcture to help identify nationalcommitments and national capacities to prevent, reduce, or control LBMP;

(3) a survey and analysis of subregional differences in commitment or interest in regional

control of LBMP, to help direct and motivate recommendations for protocol mechanisms;and

(4) a comparison of program approaches from other regions, especially the Baltic, NortSea, and Mediterranean, providing lessons from which an effective program for theCaribbean might be designed.

Special attention to program experiences in the Baltic, Nort Sea, and Mediterraneanregions reflects the fact that these were the first regional environmental programs on LBMP tobe evaluated on a comparative basis, in a study also undertken by the Marine Policy Center(Broadus et al. 1993). That study identified precisely what effort have been made in these theeregions, what has worked best, what has not worked, and why. These lessons are displayed inTable 1 and are referred to thougho~t ths report, directly and indirectly, as we develop ouranalyses and recommendations concërnng an effective LBMP protocol for the Caribbean. Weemploy the tenn effective in the sense used by Broadus et al. (1993), where it refers to thedegree to which the program's actual effect achieves the program's goals. 2

C. Study Approach and Organition of the Report

Of all the lessons listed in Table 1, perhaps the most fundamental concerns the existenceof differences among states in outlook and capabilty, and the importnce of program design toaccommodate these differences and thereby serve the real national interests of participatig states

2 This definition is consistent with that developed by Bernauer (1995). Bernauer defines effectiveness as the

extent to which, holding other factors constant, an intitution contributes to "goal attinent." Goal attanment canbe meaured as the difference between, for examle, the quaity of the mane environment prior to the

implementation of a protocol and its quality when protocol effectiveness is evaluated.

4

Table 1

Lesons Lerned from a Comparative Assessment of LBMPin the Baltic, Nort Sea and Mediterranean

Clarity

Capacity toevolve

Politicalcoii tment

speciticityorobjectives

Scientificinvolvement

self-interesttest

Mechanisms~or trade

Reportingandcompliance

Transparency

Limitexpectations

Costly misunderstandings, false start and wasted effort can be avoidedby seeking maimum clarity in defining proram qoals, the relationsamonq parties, measures and rec01endations, and the role of thesecretariat. Particular effort should be made to excise hidden agendas(eq., if income transfer or lobbying of governents is to be a programobjective, this should be set out clearly and incorporated explicitlyinto program desiqn).

The ability to adjust the program to changed circutances and improvedknowledge is vital to its effectiveness over time. The method ofkeepinq the framework convention quite spare and leaving programelaboration to subsequent protocols, directives, recommendations, orflexible action plans is useful in this reqard.

Program effectiveness will depend inevitably on the political commitmentof the parties. Examples of movement toward enhanced effectiveness wereobserved in all three regions as a result of collective politicalintervention by parties at a ministerial level. The devJ.ce of anoverarchinq, hiqh-level political fnru above tb& reqionel program, asin the Nort Sea COnference.., appears tC' have been useful in thisreqard. Such a foru also provides a hiqhly-visible focal ('int forpublic pressure, and i t contrib~tes to program transpar.ency, whichenhances the relevance and effectiven6ss of public pressure.

Demonstratinq effectiveness and clarity in its measures is importntboth in sustaninq proram support and in operational programimplementation. For this it is necessary to specify objectives whoseaccomplishment can be measured and demonstrated. Targets and timetablesare useful. especially if they are sensitive to differences in thestakes and economic capabilities among the parties. Black lists andqrey lists are useful in spcifying the scope of concern, but experiencehas pointed to the need to narrow program focus in practice to prioritytarqets (sometimes called "red lists").

A mechanism for expert scientific input and advice is essential, toclarify the nature and magnitude of problems and to monitor changingconditions, but it is important to assure that scientific researchinterests do not altogether run away with program resources. Thepersuasive establishment of baseline conditions, both in term ofambient measures and emissions, must be a priority, as demonstrated bythe hindrances created by shortcominqs in doinq so in all the casesexamined. It should be recognized that the baseline profiles can beuseful even if somewhat crude, and that assembling credible baselineswill be expensive and time consuming.

States can be expected to serve their own self-interests, but programeffectiveness will be improved to the extent that program design takesaccount of this and explicitly seeks to accommodate the genuine (ratherthan presumed) self-interest of its parties. Program structures thatencourage or accommodate agreements and actions by sub-groups ofparties, that allow for flexible financial or technical assistance, orthat provide explicitly for variable schedules or an "opt out" option onsome measures, may also be helpful in this regard.

Because the seir-interests of states will dirrer, and because one of theprincipal rationales for collective action is to facilitate sharing andexchange, program effectiveness will be enhanced by provision ofmechanisms for explicit "trade" (quid pro quos, specialization) amongparticipants. Similarly, efficiency is served by implementationmeasures that take into account differences among states and thatfacilitate trading to accomplish mutual objectives (such as tradablequota schemes). Implicit trades or explicit quid pro quos lly beachieved through program funding schemes.

Assessing the degree of state compliance with program recommendationshas been obviated in all three cases by the poor performance of statereporting. Special emphasis in program design should be placed onspecifying expectations for compliance, means for monitoring compliance,and particularly, procedures that encourage accurate and timely statereporting. In this reqard, keeping the reporting burden simple and at aminimum is "important. It may also be useful to assure that the resultsof reporting are useful to all parties and to suggest a reporting systemthat meshes routinely and automatically into the states' own practices.Some provision for non-intrusive, third party inspection may also beuseful, though this is only implicit in the cases examined through theirlack of success with more conventional, passive means of collectingstate reports.

Most of the lessons proposed above speak to the value of transparency inprogram desiqn and execution, but it warrants explicit inclusion.Program effectiveness is enhanced (both in term of party state supportover time and of verifiability by other interests) by the maximumtransparency compatible with the protection of proprietary interests andthe sovereiqn rights of independent states.

Regional programs in the real world can at best be catalytic. Measuresto control land-based Ilrine pollution will necessarily occur almo~texclusively through domestic actions. The programs may succeed as amedium for exchange and consensus among memers and as a promoter ofexternl funding support, which can be used to reinforce internationallyagreed program objectives and reward compliance. The effectiveness ofthe reqional trust fund device is not clear from the cases examined andmust be carefully questioned. Aqain, clarity of purpose andtransparency cannot be over emphasized.

Source: Broadus et a1. 19935

(the "self-interest test").3 Without a doubt, WCR States are seriously concerned aboutenvironmental quality regionwide, but they are even more concerned about and motivated to acton activities that impinge upon or otherwise threaten the use of ocean resources within their ownjurisdictions .

Land-based marine pollution problems typically, and in the first instance, are treated asprimarily a domestic issue. Although a state may suffer from marine pollution generated by

other states or may benefit from actions taken by another state to improve its own marineenvironment, the existence of such externl effects does not signal automatic agreement oncollective actions. Rather, such actions must be perceived as beneficial by individual states iftheir participation is to be secured.

The data, analyses, and recommendations presented in this report reflect the followingbasic assumptions about the essential factors that shape a state's perceptions of the likely benefitsof participating in collective actions to control LBMP and its prospect of actually realizingbenefits:

A state's effective commtment to regional control of land-based marine pollution may be takenapproximately to be a fuction of the potential impacts it most feas from marine pollution, theproportion of its-population or economy most exposed to such impacts, its degree of trans boundarexposure to inputs from other source states, its own relative contribution as a source, its ownendowment of institutional and economic capabilties to tackle the problem, and the additionalresources or benefits that might be made available to it through exchange with regional nèighbors.

(MPC 1993).

These key factors wil tend to differ across the region, particularly in a region as diverseas the Wider Caribbean.

Our starting point for analyzing importnt differences among individual states orsubregions of the WCR is a review and summary characterition, in Section II, of the region'snatural systems and most significant LBMP problems, including their principal sources anddistribution. Special attention is devoted to inventories of selected domestic and industrial point-source pollutat loads for 25 of the WCR states, as collected and analyzed by the Program forMarine Pollution Assessment and Control (CEPPOL).

The evidence to date indicates that most land-based marine pollutats are not tranported

far from their sources of discharge, and that tranboundar pollution, where it occurs, appears

3 We adopt the perspective in this report that states are naturally "self-interested." The key to an effective land-

based mae pollution protocol is to haress the natural self-interest of these states to prevent, reduce, or controlmaine pollution.

6

to be confined to border regions.4 The potential remains for a generalized "pollution" of theWider Caribbean to develop or to be detected as more data are systematically collected, whichwould strengthen the case for a regionwide approach. Neverteless, an LBMP protocol for theregion can be effective if it focuses on tranboundary pollution problems at the subregional level

or on the numerous incidences of problems of a limited areal extent, whose resolution couldbenefit from shared experience or attention. The appropriateness of a focus on common, but notnecessarily transboundary, LBMP problems is reportedly acknowledged and planed for by thenegotiating parties (Wood-Thomas, pers. comm., 1995).

Much of the published literature and written records of WCR discussions have focusedon the establishment and implementation of a regionwide approach to the prevention, reduction,or control of LBMP. In Section III, we critique several of the more commonly advancedarguents and proposals and caution againt those that are not substantiated by environmentalrealities or do not reflect a balanced perspective on the costs and benefits of uniform approachesfor individual states. We argue that one of the most importnt challenges facing the ContractingParies is to correctly characterize the scale of LBMP problems and faciltate identification andimplementation of appropriate solutions at the subregional leveL.

Sections IV and V are concerned with the identification of commonalities andcomplementarities-environmental, economic, and institutional-that can serve as the basis forsubregional collaborations and exchanges. In Section IV, we present a broad range ofeconomic, environmental, and natural resource data for 37 political units, or states, in the WCR,as well as information on their environmental laws, inrastructure, regulation, and enforcement;the extent of their participation in relevant regional and global organations; and the extent ofmarine scientific capabilties and NGO involvement and activity. Comparisons are made withinthe subregional framework established by the CEPPOL program to faciltate its analysis of point-source pollutant loads and distributions thoughout the WCR.

In Section V, we pursue three alternative approaches to identifying promisingopportnities for mutually beneficial collaborations, or "gain from trade." First, commonexport products and economic activities are identifed as a potential basis for collaboration onscientific reseach and pollution control approaches among states at similar scales of activity,or for technology transfer from states operatig at larger scales to those operating at smallerscales. Next, we consider the relative identities of WCR states as polluters and pollutees withnthe CEPPOL subregional groupings, according to the approach developed by Broadus et al.(1993). Specifically, we estimate the extent to which each state is a source of LBMP, ha astae in controlling the problem, and has the economic capacity to tae corrective action. Our

4 We employ a broad defintion of tranbounda pollution to include direct impacts from discharges, impacts

on straddling fish stocks (including potential destruction of nursery areas), damge to export goods, impacts ontoursm, diminished passive use values. See Broadus and Varov (1994) for a description of potential daagesfrom transboundar pollution occurrences.

7

analysis yields several ilustrative examples of key match-ups among source, stakeholder, andfaciltator states (i.e., major trading partners or aid providers) with and across subregions.Finally, we develop a rating system that taes into account not only the size but also thedirection of a state's economic incentive with respect to controllng LBMP, and not only itseconomic capacity but also its intitutional capacity to underte corrective action. Although therating system is rather crude, the results are useful for predicting which states are the most likelyto engage in sustained and successful action to control LBMP and, for the other states, thegeneral categories of assistance or special inducements that each is likely to need in order toparticipate successfully.

In Section VI, we apply to the Wider Caribbean Region the lessons learned about

program effectiveness (Table 1) in the earlier, comparative study of programs in the Baltic,Nort Sea, and Mediterranean regions. We present a checklist of importt factors in theemain categories-relevant regional background characteristics, program design elements, andindicators of program effectiveness-and compare these factors with expectations about aprotocol for the WCR, based upon regional realities and the state of the policy debate over theestablishment of an LBMP protocol.

Following the main text of the report are thee appendices that provide additional dataor furter explanation of certin portions of the text. Appendix A contains a number of datatables that support the discussions in Sections iv and V, and Appendix B explains our approachto estimating the proportions of each state's population that live within the drainage area and thecoastal zone of the Wider Caribbean Region. (The information in Appendix B is relevantpriarily to the discussion of "Sources and Stakes" in Section V, but also to the review of

LBMP inputs in Section IV). Appendix C supplements the discussion of "EconomicCommonalities" in Section V with a stylized model that examines the effects of propert right

distributions, burden of proof, and lack of clarity in property rights on the range and extent ofpossible "gain from trade" to be realizd from agreements intended to reduce or control LBMPemissions.

Finlly, we note the availabilty of thee additional appendices not included with ths

report. These are papers prepared by consultats to the Marine Policy Center project to serveas the basis for discussions at a regional workshop of expert held at the University of the WestIndies in Barbados in December 1994, and also as expert source materials for the preparationof ths report. Gladfelter and Ogden (1994) provides a summary of the relevant scientificcapabilties and current knowledge of LBMP problems in the Wider Carbbean. Kiball (1994)presents an overview of the key functions, intitutions, and processes involved in the design andimplementation of an interntional protocol on LBMP. Mandell (1994) surveys the importntLBMP problems, legal instrents, and intitutional capabilties of the Spansh-speakingcountries of the WCR. Copies of each of these papers are available on a limited basis from theMarine Policy Center.

8

II. Natural Systems, Pollution, and the Interdependency of WCR States

A. Regional Geography and Freshwater Input

The Caribbean Sea is defined by the margin of Central and South America and the

Greater and Lesser Antiles Islands. The Caribbean Sea contains four deep basins separated by

prominent undersea ridges. Together with a fift basin, the Gulf of Mexico, ths larger waterbody comprises the American mediterranean, one of four mediterraneans on eart (the othersare the Arctic, the Asiatic, and the European mediterranean). A stil larger entity surroundingthe Caribbean is the Wider Caribbean Region (WCR), which adds to the Americanmediterranean the Bahamas and par of the sea off the Guianas. The WCR is defined in theCartgena Convention as comprising "the marine environment of the Gulf of Mexico, theCaribbean Sea, and the areas of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent thereto, south of 30° nort latitude

and within 200 nautical miles" of the Atlantic coasts of states from the Bahamas and Floridadown to the nortern border of BraziL. 1

The Wider Caribbean Region encompasses an area of 4.31 millon ki2 and has a meandepth of 2174m. The drainage basin, from which freshwater is delivered to the coast, has anarea of about 5.6 milion ki2, of which the largest portions are in the United States (62%),Venezuela (17%), Colombia (4%), and Mexico (4%). While not formally incorporated into thedefintion of the WCR, the lands draing into the marine area are clearly of. importce tomanagement of this area, and particularly so in a discussion of land-based pollution. Of thepricipal rivers entering this area (Table 2), which collectively deliver about 66,500 m3/sec offreshwater, 45% comes from the Orinoco (Venezuela), 28% from the Mississippi (U.S.), and11 % from the Magdalena (Colombia). Fifteen rivers comprise the remaining 16% of riverineinput. An additional, undefined freshwater input enters from the lagoons, mangrove swamps,and bayous that make up a large portion of the coastline, especially along the nortern YucatanPeninsula, eastern Florida, and the nort coasts of Colombia and Venezuela.

Also signficant is the freshwater input originating from the Amazon River, which \stechncaly outside of the Wider Caribbean Region defined by UNEP. The Amazon dischargeapproximates 170,000 m3/sec of freshwater on average, of which a porton enters the Carbbeanalong the coast near Trindad and Tobago. Froelich, Atwood, and Giese (1978) estimate thatabout half of the freshwater entering the Carbbean Sea, evident as salinty depressions extendingto about 100 m depth, is from this source. This water also contain signficant quantities ofdissolved silca, an importt nutrient for certin phytoplankon.

lA stil larger area, incorporating pars of the Sargasso Sea and Bermuda and the Gulf of Panam, is referred

to as the Intra-Americas Sea by IOCARIBE, the Carbbean and Adjacent Regions Task Force of theIntergovernental Oceanographic Commssion (IOC) of UNESCO.

9

Table 2

Principal Rivers Drainng Into the Wider Caribbean

River Draiage Water Sediment Specific Mea tubidityArea (km?) Discharge discharge tranport (mgll)

(m3sec-l) (106 tons/year) (tl2/yea)

USA

Mississippi 3,268,000 18,400 222 76 380

Apalachicola 44,000 620 0.16 6.8 15

Mobile 97,000 1,500 4.5 42 95

Brazs 114,000 160 15.9 0.14 3200

Colorado 107,000 79 1.9* 17.9

USA-Mexico

Rio Grande 467,00 23 very low*

Colombia

Magdaena 235,000 7,500 234 1000 1000

Venezuela

Orioco 950,000 30,000 85.0 91 90

*Low values due to dam.Sources: Borgese and Ginburg, 1982; UNEP, 1994a.

10

In addition to freshwater, rivers naturally deliver suspended sediments to the sea. In thecase of the Wider Caribbean Region, large amounts of sediment are delivered by the Mississippi

(222 milion tons/yr), the Magdalena (235 milion tons/yr), and the Orinoco (85 millon tons/yr;UNEP 1989a). The Amazon discharges a large quantity of sediment, of which some portionfinds its way into the WCR. For perspective, the dredging required for maintenance of all U.S.navigational waterways and harbors entails about 270 millon tons/yr (see Herbich 1992), someof which is disposed of at contained sites on land (see Mangone 1990:189). At the river'smouth, both freshwater and its suspended and dissolved loads become entrained in and dissipatedby the prevailng coastal and ocean circulation pattern. In the case of the Mississippi, theOrinoco, and the Amazon, sufficient water volumes are involved tht the fate of the river plumeca be detected remotely using satellte imagery (Müller-Karger 1993). River discharge directlyor indirectly affects sudace salinty, concentration and composition of phytoplankon, plantpigments, and suspended sediment concentration. Available satellte imagery shows the Amazonplume moving nortward along the Guiana coast from Februar though May (when the Nort

Equatorial Counter Current is weak), directly entering the Caribbean though passages betweenTridâd and Tobago and the mainland, and engulfing these islands and the island of Barbadosas well. Durig this time surface salinty at Barbados may drop from 34 0/00 to 31 0/00 (Hunte1994). From June to January, discolored water originating at the mouth of the Amazon veersoffshore near French Guiana and curves eastward into the open ocean, in a plume that can bedefied on satellte imagery in terms of its pigment concentration. According to Müller-Karger

(1993), ths period corresponds with the clearest water conditions at Barbados.

The Orinoco River also has a strong impact in the eastern Caribbean Sea, varyingseaonally with discharge. During the dry season from February though April, the Orinocooutfow enters the Caribbean between Trindad and Venezuela moving westward across thesouthern Caribbean. Eddies in the tropical Atlantic at this time can move Orioco wateroffshore to the east of the Antiles, engulfing Barbados in pigment-rich water during January-March. During the period of maximum discharge for the Orinoco, the Islands of Trindad,Tobago, Grenada, and St. Vincent are regularly affected. Imagery taen in October 1979 showsa plume of Orinoco water extending nortward nearly to Puerto Rico, along and west of thesubmerged Aves Ridge.

From other satellte imagery, Müller-Karger (1993) concludes that the Mississippi plumeordiny moves westward along the Texas shoreline. An October 1982 image of the Western

Carbbe shows dispersal of the Magdalena River plume, normally following the coast to thewest, extending nortwest intead, nearly to the Island of Jamaica. Clearly, much more is tobe learned from additiona and increasingly sophisticated satellte imagery.

The above demonstrates that the pathway exists for waterborne materials to travel greatdistances in the WCR, with measurable impacts on phytoplanon chlorophyll concentration,salinity, turbidity, and concentrations of certin chemicals. The extent to which human affect

11

the quantity or composition of river water suggests the extent of transboundary containationof marine waters in the WCR.

B. Ocean Circulation

The major ocean surface currents of the Caribbean area have been known in broad brushfor many years (e.g., Figures 2-5). These currents in general enter the Wider Caribbean Regionfrom the open ocean to the east and along the norteast coast of Brazil and the Guianas. Waterfrom both the South Atlantic and Nort Atlantic enter in ths way, ultimately feeding into theGulf Stream in the Straits of Florida in about equal quantities (Richardson, pers. comm., 1994).These surface currents establish a seemingly clear relationship among "upstream" nations to theeast and south and "downstream" nations to the west and nort. However, as ilustrated below,

ths gross understanding of surface circulation in the Caribbean is clearly incomplete, andimportnt refinements wil come from ongoing and future oceanographic research in this area,such as studies under way by IOCARBE (Maul, pers. comm., 1995).

For example, importnt departres from the general east-to-west surface circulationpattrn exist as a result of gyres along the coasts of Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela,

producing west-to-east inshore components of drift. Simlarly, eastward-moving back eddiesexist along the south coast of the Greater Antiles Islands. These natural pattern of circulationresult in trnsboundary exchange from Belize to Guatemala and Honduras, and from Nicaraguato Costa Rica, Panaa, and Colombia.

Deep water in the Caribbean is believed to enter periodically though the deeper passagesof the Lesser Antiles. Circulation in the deep water is probably far more quiescent than for

surface waters. Thus, the deep water occupying the four basins of the Caribbean Sea, whichlies entirely within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of adjacent coastal states, is subject tothe impacts of human activities in ways that are not well understood.

C. Weather and Atmospheric Circulation

Like the surface ocean circulation, prevailing easterly tradewinds result in an upstrea-downstrea relationship among nations in the Wider Carbbean Region. Lad-basedatmospheric pollutats, such as industrial stack effuent and other point source gases and

pariculates, as well as non-point source pollutats such as chlorinted hydrocarbon pesticides,are relevant to a discussion of tranbounda atmospheric containtion.

Between 1886 and 1986, 492 hurrcanes (storm of tropical origin with a cyclonic windcirculation of 75 mph or more) have theatened or actually reached the Wider Caribbean Region

(see Gray 1992). Damage caused by hurcanes results from direct impacts of wind (and theassociated cargo of wind-blown debris), torrential rainall, and ocean waves and storm

12

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I

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irQll-;iCl-r"'

surge-each of which has caused social havoc though devastating loss of crops, housing, civilinrastructure, and human life. The "hurricane season" for ths area is June though November,with peak hurricane incidence in August, September, and October. The economic impacts ofthese storms, and the associated human suffering, have been very severe. The shared naturalhazard represented by hurricanes suggests there are regional benefits to be derived fromcooperation in hurricane prediction and monitoring, damage relief, and natural hazard standardsfor industrial siting and construction (especially where use or storage of hazardous materials areinvolved).

D. Spatial Scales of Pollution in the Wider Caribbean Region

In our discussion of regional approaches and opportties to addressing land-based

marine pollution problems, two separate categories of issues are germane:

a) pollution problems of large areal extent, with regional transboundary

implications, whose resolution calls for action over a spatial area larger than oneor two nations; and

b) pollution problems of limted areal extent, but numerous localized occurrencesthoughout the region, whose resolution could benefit from shared experience orattention.

In the WCR, by far the most serious damages caused by effluents from land-basedsources ocur locally, with the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the source state.2Most land-based marine pollutats are not transported far from their sources of discharge, andtranboundary pollution events, where they occur, appear to be confined to border regions.

Overviews of land-based regional pollution in the Caribbean are given by several recentUNEP papers (see UNEP 1994a and references therein; WWF/ESI 1994 and references therein).The defintion of pollution problems in some existing report is blurred, with a resultingconfion of specific sites, sources, or pathways of pollution. For example, the identificationof cholera and inectious hepatitis as importnt land-based mare pollution problems in theWCR seems to ignore the distinction between contate dring water supplies and

contated coastal waters, as well as the geographical boundaes of the WCR. References

to inadeqtely treated sewage in some cases are based upon an a priori assuption tht

seconda wastewater treatment is the sole acceptable option for domestic wastewater disposalin the WCR. Natual processes that lin national jurisdictions are sometimes interpreted as

2 For example, in 1992, Jonathan Canon, the director of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico Program, was quoted as

saying: "(t)he general judgment, I believe, is that the gulf is not in a crisis state, although there are locaiz crisisarea" (BNA 1992).

17

tataount to a demonstration of transboundary pollution. And naturally occurring phenomena

such as red tides, ciguatera poisoning, natural diseases in corals and other marine anials,seagrass die-offs, and certin mass mortlities in the sea (cf., Brongersma-Sanders 1957), aretaen as evidence of human impacts. Effectively setting priorities and addressing abatement ofexisting pollution problems and their prevention in the future requires clear and techncally sounddefinition of the pollution problems or their potential to develop.

Gladfelter and Ogden (1994; see Appendix D) divide pollutants into two categories; a)enrchment of naturally occurring substances, and b) introduction of new containants. Theseauthors appropriately include other human-derived stresses, such as over-fishing and mangroveclearing, as sources of pollution. According to the US National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdminstration (NOAA), the following sources should ultimately be included in a pollutantdischarge inventory:

a). Point sources (industr and wastewater treatment facilties)

b) Urban non-point runoff (stormwater runoff and combined overfow discharges)

c) Non-urban non-point sources (agriculture and forest runoff)

d) Upstream sources (pollutants carried to the sea from inand sources)

e) Irrgation return flows (agricultural pollutants carried in irigation runoff).

To ths list should be added pollutants carried in direct groundwater discharge to the sea.

According to UNEP (1994a), the major land-based pollutants entering the Caribbean are:sewage, hydrocarbons, sediments, nutrients, pesticides, litter and marine debris, and toxicwastes.

Perhaps the most widespread coastal pollution problem globally is nutrientoverenrchment. It is also among the most common marie pollution problems in the Caribbean,where nutrients are added as sewage discharge and runoff of dissolved fertilizr. (Fertilizr use

is estimated to have increased 33% between 1979 and 1989.) Neverteless, nutrientoverenrichment, though widely occurring in the WCR, is believed to be a problem of localizedscale at the present time, as is the case in most regions of the globe.

Altered sediment delivery to coastal waters can have negative impacts, if increased, onmangrove, seagrass, and coral habitats; and if decreased, on deltaic wetlands. Clearing of forestlands, ming operations, and ocean disposal of dredged materials are sources of sediments thatare known to be increasing at the present time. (See Cortés and Risk 1985 for a discussion ofthe effects of deforestation on reefs.) Reefs near the Centrl America coast and areas of the

18

eastern Caribbean are believed to be suffering from sediment stress related to agriculturalpractices and tourism development, but it does not appear that the problem involves

transboundary or regional spatial scales. CEPPOL pilot studies intiated in 1992 at four regionallaboratories in the region may shed additional light on the impact of various pollutants, includingsewage, oil, and particularly sediments, on reefs and other coastal ecosystems (Mandell, pers.comm., 1995).

Disposal of sewage in coastal waters is a topic of great concern internationally, but alsoa topic of significant misunderstading. The two major elements of concern regarding sewageare public health and nutrient overenrichment (in extreme intaces, excessive organc loadingca be an issue as well). Combining industrial and domestic waste streams can compound the

problem by adding chemical toxicity to the above problems, which can frustrate effectivewastewater treatment and recycling and add an additional environmental impact. Where tourismand aesthetics are particularly importnt, sewage disposal can become a charged issue.Moreover, an emphasis in some quarters on deploying standardiz or best availabletehnologies has helped promote the idea that low-cost solutions to handling domestic wastes,such as on-site disposal in leaching beds, are ineffective, and that expensive high-technologywastewater treatment plants are always preferable. These perceptions are neither techncally

correct nor in the public interest. A more balanced and inovative view of wastewater treatmentis evident in UNEP (1991b). Salas (1994) points out, appropriately, that standard secndarywastewater treatment facilties do not eliminate nutrients from the effuent stream, often addtoxic disinectants for pathogen control (with undesirable secondary environmenta impacts), andleave disposal of solids (sludge) as an unresolved separate problem. Modem wastewatertreatment facilties are costly to build, operate, and maintain in monetary terms and in terms ofenergy and freshwater consumption.

We are not aware of any regional-scale impacts of sewage disposaL. Neverteless, acontinuing dialogue on suitable wastewater handling practices and technologies in the WCR isa neeed and appropriate element of regional collaboration. A key question is the determationof appropriate water quality standards. For example, certin bacterial standards, such as thefecal coliform water quality indicator, can give a high result tht is often falsely attibute to

human fecl containation where it does not exist, rather than to any of a number of other likelysources, such as warm-blooded anals and naturally occurring sediment bacteria.

According to Gladfelter and Ogden (1994), thermal pollution from power plantsrepresents a localizd but widely occuring problem in the WCR.3

3Reseach undertaken for the present study, as reported in Section IV of this report, indicates that thermal

pollution is a concern for Barbados, Colombia, the Dominica Republic, the Netherlands Antiles, Puerto Rico, St.Lucia, and the US Virgin Islands.

19

Oil hydrocarbons represent a pollutant category that one might expect to have regional-scale implications. For example, a 1979 collsion of the tank vessels ATLANTIC EMPRESand AEGEAN CAPTAIN near Trindad and Tobago spiled an estimated 300,000 tons of oil intothe ocean (Famighetti 1995), or approximately eight times the volume of the well-known 1989EXXON VALDEZ spil in Prince William Sound, Alaska; and oil released in the 1979 Ixtocwellhead blow-out accident in the Gulf of Mexico was about 16 times the Valdez spil. Neitherof these spils has received significant attention in the discussion of pollution or habitatdegradation in the WCR, however, including UNEP's (1994a) review of hydrocarbon pollutionin the WCR. Of course, the UNEP report focuses on land-based sources of pollution;nonetheless, it does include discussion of natural seeps entering the Caribbean (citing Harey1987) at a depth of 150 to 250 m (amounting to an estimated 1 millon tons, or 27 times thePrince Willam Sound spil).

The distribution of tar and dissolved/dispersed hydrocarbons was the subject of a majorsix-yea study by CARPOL (Atwood et al. 1987). The study revealed interesting trends in thespatial and time distribution of hydrocarbon residues. Neverteless, Gladfelter and Ogden(1994) conclude, "While pollution of this sort is unsightly and deadly to some large marineanals, it is not among the highest priority problems affecting the coastal ecosystems: the coral

reefs, the mangroves, and the seagrass beds." UNEP (1994a) concludes: ". . . inormationrequired to ascertin the ecological and health risks caused by long-term chronic oil discharges

into the coastal marine environment of the WCR, is stil very limited. . . ."

E. Subregional Scales of Pollution and the CEPPOL Pollutant Load Inventories

UNEP's 1994 Regional Overview of Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the WiderCaribbean Region (UNEP 1994a) sumarizes the results to date of national inventories of land-based mare pollution in the WCR as reported by the Program for Marine Pollution Assessmentand Control (CEPPOL), which is administered jointly by UNEP and the IntergovernentalOceanographic Commission (IOC). For purposes of assessing the geographical distribution ofthe pollution load and analyzing the results, the CEPPOL program divided the WCR into sixgeographic subregions (see Figure 6). With ths arangement, thee political units aredesignate as falling into more than one geographical subregion: Mexico spans Subregions I andII (Gulf of Mexico and Western Caribbean); Cuba spans Subregions I and il (Gulf of Mexicoand Norteastern-Central Carbbean); and the Netherlands Antiles span Subregions IV and V,with the islands of St. Maaren, St. Eustasius, and Saba assigned to the Eastern Carbbeansubregion (IV and the islands of Bonaire and Curacao to the Southern Caribbean (V). 4

4A1though not listed in Figure 6, Aruba, a member of the Netherlands Antiles Federation until 1986, is included

by CEPPOL as a separate politica unit within Subregion V.

20

ATlANTIC

OCAN

I'ICOCAN

\ (?.~ 0 __ D .. .'I~ \ ~ .'z \ ~~ .Sub-Region II \S~b-..R . IV~. \ .. . u egion~ ~\ ~~ -? - - Sub-Regioo"V. - \.: .\ '....\

m. Nonhea and Cetr Cabbe

Cuba, Mexco and the Unite State

Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala,Hondur, Mexco, Nicagua andPanBa, Caym Isds, CubaDomica Republic, Hati, JamcaPuer Rico and. Turks and CacosIslands

i. Gulf of Mexco

D. Weste Cabbe

IV. Eater Cabbe Angu Antigua and Bauda,Baos, Bntish Virn Islds.Dominica, Grenada. Guadaloupc,Maque, Monse 51. Maa.St. Luci, St. Kius and Nev, 51.Vincet and the Greines and USVirin Islds

V. South Cabbe Colombia, Netherlal\ds Antilles,Trida and Tobo and Venez

VI. Equatona AtlticFrech Guy, Guya and Sunne

Nor Wes

Figure 6. CEPPOL-designated subregions (Source: UNP 1994)21

As of 1994, the CEPPOL program had compiled data on biological oxygen demand

(BOD), total suspended solids (TSS), total nitrogen (TN), total phosphorus (TP), and oil andgrease inputs from domestic and industrial point sources in 24 WCR countries, and from pointand non-point sources combined in the U. S. Gulf Coast region. Additional information, suchas the presence or absence of phenols and various heavy metals, was also recorded though notquantified. The results, as summarized in the 1994 UNEP Regional Overview, are displayed inTables 3 and 4.

In considering the results, some importt limitations of the data should be taen intoaccount, especially: the non-comparabilty of data for the U.S. Gulf Coast; the absence ofcertin countries and of an entire subregion from the inventory; and the lack of inormation asto the basis for normalizing the data. S

Attempts by this study to ascertin the point-source share of U.S. Gulf Coast pollutantloads have been unsuccessful, but it is useful to bear in mind that non-point sources have beenestimated to contribute between 70 percent and 90 percent of the nutrent loads (i.e., nitrogenand phosphorus) entering the Gulf of Mexico from U.S. land-based sources (Broadus and

Vartov 1994), with industrial-scale agriculture being by far the largest of the non-point sourcecontributors. For certin other countries in the WCR, the proportion of all land-based nutrients

from non-point sources can be expected to be substantially greater than in the United States,because of such factors as the generally lower availability of domestic septic and municipalsewage treatment facilties and, in some countries, the more intensive use of fertilizers. Similarfactors hold true for non-nutrient pollutants from non-point sources, particularly pesticides, theuse of which has been dramatically curtiled in the United States in recent years but remainsintensive in Venezuela, Mexico, and the Central American countries (Henao et al. 1993; UNEP1994a).

The subregion completely missing from the inventory is Subregion VI (the EquatorialAtlantic Nort West), which includes French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname. To the extent thattransboundary pollution effects do exist, it is unfortnate indeed not to have any data onpollution sources within the subregion that is the furtest upstream of the six subregions in theWCR. Also missing from the inventory are data for Guatemala and Nicaragua (Subregion II);the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and Haiti (Subregion III); and Anguila, Martinque,Guadeloupe, and Montserrat (Subregion IV).6 As demonstrated in Section IV of ths report,

SIn assessing the value of the Regional Overview (UNEP 1994a), Gladfelter and Ogden (1994) note that the

information in the report is of limited value for assessing "pollutat load per year per (a) cubic meter of seawater,(b) acre of benthic communty impacted, (c) unit of coastline, (d) unit of human population, etc."

6According to Enrque Mandell (pers. comm., 1995), who paricipated in the analysis of the CEPPOL data,

fiancial assistace and guidelines for preparation of pollutat inventories were provided by CEPPOL to several ofthe missing states (i.e., Guyana, Suriame, Guadeloupe, Marinique, and the Cayman Islands).

22

Table 3

CEPPOL Results: Wase Loads from Domesic Sourcesin the Wider Caribben Region by Subregion (t/y)

Contr ISu b-Region BOD TS 1N TP Oil andGrea

Sub-Region ICuba(N Cot) 53,734 50,811 4,198 5,915 5,985Mexico(Gulf Coa) 24,529 20,964 4,184 1,810 8,379USA(Gulf Coat) 37,393 44,552 25,688 11,416 27,00

Sub-Tota 115,656 116,327 34,070 19,141 41,370

Sub-Rël!ion IIBeli 1,905 2,100 650 320 240Cost Rica 530 1,079 210 25 20Honduras 9,626 8,235 625 823 450Mexico(Ca. Coat) 3,756 3,232 607 261 1,256Pana 969 1,781 327 38 35

Sub-Tota 16,785 16,427 2,419 1,467 2,001

Sub-Rel!ion mCuba (Ca. Coast) 9,413 3,481 572 296 112Dom. Republic 40,573 60,00 3,027 4,182 5,125Jamaica 4,227 6,658 1,097 133 350Puert Rico 16,819 20,00 530 890 500Turk. & Cacos Is. 47 75 13 2 2

".

Sub-Tota 71,079 90.214 5,239 "5,503 6,089

Sub-Rel!ion TV

Antigu & Barbuda 29 45 7 1 1

Baados 3,838 3,300 290 378 290Bnt. Virgin Is. Dominca 85 145 26 3 2

Grenada 51 81 13 2 2St. Lucia 86 136 22 3 2

St. Kitts & Nevis 25 40 29 2 1

St. Vin. & Gren. 250 390 66 9 5

US Virgin Islands 26 40 7 1 1

40 44 250 132 200

Sub-Tota4,790 4,617 710 531 504

Sub-Re2ion VArba 61 52 20 4 1

Colombia 26,300 42,120 7,l1S 986 620

Netherlands Ant. 85 5 40 1 1

Tnnida & Tobago 1,00 1,567 1,585 59 28

Venezuela 232,725 185,00 77,575 32,425 18,325

Sub-Tot 26,171 228,744 86,338 33,475 18,975

GRA TOTAL 506,48 456,329 118,79 60,117 68,939

Source: UN 1994a 23

._, '~'.::~11l,:I~~~..,:i~;,:',: :.-

Table 4

CE

PPOL

Results: W

aste Loads from

Industrial Sources in the Wider C

aribbean Region

CC

lunl rylSuIi R

ecCI

BO

DT

SST

NT

rO

il &

ii~

NI

'"C

aC

rZ

a"'Is

Gre....

Sub-R

t2oQ I

C"h.

103,43879,731

3.1611,414

4,474X

XX

XX

XM

u. (G"ir C

n.1)1,073.66

Z7 .496,000

67341

615,6JOX

XX

XU

SA (G

"ir Coasl)

68,658146.151

13,JOO

16.15110,077

XX

XX

XX

XSub-T

ota1.145,761

17.1111,118417,1J4

17,717640,181

XX

XX

XX

X

Sub-R

mon II

;

nciie870

1,150190

8070

Cosla Rica

6,3595,571

1,057188

1,138X

IIcmduru

11 ,345

141,51039,115

4,IS06,310

Mexleo (Cari.)

r.....284

65554

I83

XX

Sub-Tota

126,858149,881

40,5164,519

8,611

Sub-R

eRlon 11

Caba (C

ar. Coas)

19,W27,350

3.8904,156

104X

XD

o... Republ

57,82611,516

19,1008,500

4,350X

XX

XX

J_oIa5,753

3,09817

6610

X

Puerto RIo

214,00850,00

10,0018

113,00X

XX

XX

Tarl ai Colos

Sub-Tota

357,441993,964

0,16511,690

118.074

Sub-Rt1lon IV

Anlilt'" &

Ø.rbud.

55110

II

IX

XX

Xn.rbados

91,0001",00

37,000IS

,0041,000

XX

XX

X

Dnlish V

ir. Is.5

131

\1

X

Do..iala

1,6501,511

100\00

180G

nn.d.151

17855

30\0

X

Si. Lul.

\90895

J834

10X

X

51. KillS &

Neri

10\73

5J

\X

XS

i. Via. &

Ibe Gredies

33\414

J1

1

U.S. V

ir. Isluds13

451

\1\

X' X

Sub-Tota

94,707170,170

J7 ,3061S,17\

41,117

Sub-Rmoo V

Anihi

1701110

40ii

liSC

olombl.

14,69313,738

4,JOO

1,100\,693

XX

NeeberlUldl Anlines

1,977876

1901

\.050X

X

Tniúd.d & Tobico

199,001,060,000

11\,000\7

\46,000X

X

Venuuel.

286,430\,600,154

95,47730,15\

13,750X

XX

XX

Sub- Tolü

603,3702,68,948

211,\0731,537

\62,608

TO

TA

L3,428,131

31,920,953349,438

11,634980,101

. . D.ia Indle.i. illl \l poUut~el dlaratd Inlo ibe ..ari e...inieal

Source: UN

EP 1994a

-.N

individual country omissions have varing degrees of influence on the picture that emerges fromthe CEPPOL data on point-source pollutant loads. For example, the lack of data for Guatemalaand Nicaragua probably has little effect on the point-source results for Subregion II (or overall),because the population centers and major economic activities of both countries are orientedtoward the Pacific coast and largely outside the Caribbean drainage basin (see Appendix B), andbecause both countries provide quite low access to sewage treatment services in rural areas.Within Subregion III, inclusion of the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, and Haiti all would likely havehad some effect on the observed distribution of domestic pollutants, though least so in the caseof Haiti, where sewage treatment services are available to a very low percentage of thepopulation. In addition, Haiti would likely have had observed industrial pollutants, althoughprobably at a lower level than Jamaica's. For Subregion IV, the omission of Guadeloupe islikely to have affected the industrial pollutant results, since both Guadeloupe and Barbadosprocess sugar, rum, and other sugar byproducts in amounts that can be inferred from GDP datato be roughly twice as large for Barbados as for Guadeloupe. In the case of Anguila,Martinque, and Montserrat, it appears unlikely, from what little data are available, that theirinclusion would have substantially altered the picture. The same can be said about all theeSubregion VI states with respect to industrial pollutants, but it is possible that domestic pollutatresults for Subregion VI might have approached those for Subregion II.

Figure 7 depicts the relative contributions of domestic and industrial pollutants by the fivesubregions for which CEPPOL data were reported. It is readily apparent that substantially morethan half the tota pollutant load included in the inventory is generated in Subregions I and V.Figure 8, which displays the subregional contributions of individual pollutants, indicates thatSubregion I contributes less nutrient loading (TN and TP) from domestic sources than SubregionV, and no more from industrial sources than any of the other subregions, notwithstanding thefact that the Subregion I data include both point and non-point source pollutants for the U.S.Gulf Coast.

The relative contributions of individual states are depicted in Figure 9. Among the morestriking results are the indications that Puerto Rico and Barbados each contributes more pollutantloading from industrial point sources than the United States, and that Mexico contributes morethan ten times the industrial pollutant loading of any other state in the CEPPOL inventory

(accountig for 82 percent of the entire WCR industrial pollutant load). As for domestic pointsources, it is noteworty that Cuba and the Dominican Republic is each responsible for a greaterpollutat load than Mexico, and that Venezuela contributes far more in domestic pollutats than

Colombia.

To a large extent, some of the more anomalous results of the CEPPOL inventory areexplained by its limitation to point sources of pollution. As noted in UNEP's 1994 RegionalOverview, for example, ths limtation has the effect of reporting the greatest domestic pollutionloads for those states that provide sewage treatment services to the greatest number of people,

25

700

60

50

.. 40i:~..:ioÉ. 30

20

100

o

35

30

25

20..c~~

15

10

5

0

Figure 7.

Combined Domestic Wase Loads(tons/year)

II II tV. Suogion (*00 dat provided

V *VI

Combined Industrial Waste Loads(tons/year)

II IVSu (*11 da pr

IIv *V

Relative Contrbutions of Combined Pollutats from Domestic and IndustrSources by five WCR Subreons (Source: UNP 1994a)

26

Domestic Source Loads(tons/year

300

250

- 200CJ"0Cci

150CJ::0.ct: 100

50

0II II IV V .Vi

Suegio (*l' da prvi

Industrial Source Loads(tons/year)

30

25

20-((i:

.Q 15::-

10

5

0 II II IV V .VISubregions (*no dat provided

IDBOD~TP

_TSS ~TN1::::1 Oil & grease

Fige 8. Relative Contrbutions of Individua Pollutats from Domestic and IndustralSources by five WCR Subregions (Source: UN 1994a)

27

Wast. from

Com

bin Dom

.stic Souc..

Qonsl..,)

llii,g

o100

20JO

(Tanl

4060

60

1li~"~

Waste from Coin Ind Soc.s

QonSi-i

0.51.6

q.l

Relative Contrbutions of

Pollutats from

Com

bined Dom

estic and Industral Point

Sources by 25 WCR States, Groupe by CEPPOL-Designated Subregions

(Source: U

NE

P i 994a)

Figure 9.

SL V

incenl & u&

~jd~~is~ Ifc¡a

si.I?~r. ~r.~

:k1~~rcfl:.G

Uii:~~ß:

Dom

iniaB

ritJl~ Virgin II.

Antigua (. ~

~:

.Ang~.

2:i

00N

.30, "t

..

while failing to capture the extent to which a population's domestic waste goes completelyuruanaged or inadequately treated. It also does not address (except for the United States, forwhich non-point source loads were included) pollution from such significant WCR non-pointsources as agriculture, forestry, marinas, construction, urban runoff, and automotive emissions.

F. Summary

All nation-states of the Wider Caribbean Region use the marine enviroruent as a sinkfor the discharge of pollutants from land-based sources. By far the most serious damages causedby effuents from land-based sources occur locally, within the territorial sea or exclusiveeconomic zone of the source state. Most land-based marine pollutants are not transported farfrom their sources of discharge, and transboundary pollution events, where they occur, appearto be confined to border regions.

As the WCR is an open system that exchanges massive amounts of water on a continuousbasis, it is understandable that there is no clear evidence that discharges from WCR statescontribute to a generalized "pollution" of the Caribbean Sea and its associated gulfs. Dischargesfrom the major river systems move considerable distances within and across subregions, andsediment loads and litter are transported long distances across the region. Our state of

knowledge regarding the transport of other pollutants is too limited, however, to suggest whatmovements occur beyond the local and subregional scales.

The systematic collection and analysis of data on the extent and distribution of localizedpollutants has only recently gotten under way. As of 1994, the CEPPOL program had preparedinventories and begun an analysis of the distribution of selected land-based marine pollutantsgenerated by domestic and industrial point sources in 24 WCR states, and by domestic andindustrial point and non-point sources combined in the United States Gulf Coast region. Becauseall but one of these CEPPOL inventories are limited to point-source pollutant loads, the resultsso far cannot be used to assess the extent and distribution of pollutants generated by some of themost significant non-point source activities in the region, including agriculture, forestry, andcoastal development projects.

In the absence of systematically collected data on non-point pollutant loads for most ofthe WCR countries and territories, a more complete picture of an individual state or subregion'srelative contribution and exposure to LBMP must be inferred from other indicators. Thecombination of indicators considered in Section IV is useful as well for assessing the inclinationand abilty of states to undertake independent or joint action to control LBMP problems.

29

III. Arguments for Collective Action in the WCR

A. The Importance of Scale

The published literature and written records of WCR discussions focuses on theestablishment and implementation of a regionwide approach to the prevention, reduction, orcontrol of LBMP. In this section, we examine several issues and arguments that are beingdebated as bases for pursuing a "regionwide" approach to LBMP control in the WCR. Theseissues and arguments include: common-pool pollution effects; common problems; scaleeconomies; and the need for uniform standards (water quality or pollution control standards).

Some of our discussion is critical of several broad arguments that have been made infavor of an LBMP protocol for the Caribbean. The intent of this criticism is constructive;whether or not an international agreement has the potential to be effective depends upon acareful assessment of the arguments made in favor of collective action. Our analysis cannot beused in place of the international negotiations that must occur to work out the details of aprotocol. But we hope to give the negotiators an understanding of the different sides of theissues involved.

All of these issues are indeed relevant and valid at some scaLe in the Caribbean.

However, the extent to which they are applicable regionwide is not at all clear. To a significantextent, protocol effectiveness wil depend upon whether or not the Contracting Parties cancorrectly characterize the scale of LBM pollution problems and tailor appropriate solutions. iThese activities are among the most importnt ones to be addressed by a protocol andimplemented though its institutions.

The occurrence of trans boundary movements of pollution (or of natural resources affectedby pollution) is among the most powerfl rationales for an international protocol on pollutionreduction. Increasingly, the existence of common, but nontransboundary, pollution problemswithin the jurisdiction of many states is being advocated as a justification for an internationalprotocol. An understanding of common socio-economic characteristics, as we describe inSections IV and V, can be useful in identifying potential benefits from agreements andrelationships to control pollution. We discuss the potential for these kinds of "gains from trade"in the Caribbean in Section V.

i Implicit in this statement is the point that region wide approaches to LBM pollution problems may be ineffectiveif the problems themselves are not regionwide.

30

B. Pollution Costs and Benefits

As we consider the arguments commonly advanced for collective action with respect toLBMP in the WCR, we should maintain a balanced perspective on the types of benefits and costsinvolved in pollution control.

Land-based waste discharges should be described as "pollution" only to the extent thatother human activities or valued characteristics of the marine environment are affected adverselyby the effluents.2 Discharges can affect such uses of the WCR coastal and marine environmentsas coastal tourism and recreation, nursery grounds for fish and wildlife, commercial and

recreational fisheries, and biological diversity. Scientists have begun to document the potential,and in some cases actual, impacts of land-based effuents in the WCR (Gladfelter and Ogden1994; UNEP 1994a and references therein). The social costs of these impacts have not beendocumented to date,3 but they are likely to vary considerably by state and geographic location.

WCR states face a great variety of economic development problems, including issuesassociated with effluents from human activities. The introduction of nutrients, pesticides,sewage, and industrial effuents into local marine environments is a direct consequence ofexpanding populations and the siting of industrial facilities in coastal zones or major watersheds.It is very important to recognize that Caribbean coastal and marine environments provide

substantial economic benefits as sins for agricultural runoff, sewage, and industrial effuents.Any measures taen to reduce or control discharges from land-based sources are likely to becostly, but solutions to some of the most significant problems can be achieved with minialfinancial investments, e.g., properly sited outfalls. Evaluation of these benefits and costs, and

considerations of their distribution among the citizens of a state or across states, are relevant tothe problems of LBMP control.

C. Common-Pool Effects

Consider a situation in which a set of states share a common-pool resource, such as aregional marine environment. Marine pollutants originating in one or more of the states of the

2 This definition is the anthropocentric one currently accpted and embodied in international environmental law(Hunter, Sommer, and Vaughan 1994). Note that the definition of "pollution" found in Article 1(4) of UNCLOSII appears more broad, in that it also encompasses "har to living resources and mare life." Kimball (1995)explains that the definition of pollution is being broadened in three ways: the precautionar principle has begun tobe adopted as a nonbinding norm; har to "living resources" now often includes har to "marine ecosystems"; andcoastal zones and related waters are begining to be considered a par of the marine environment.

3 Estimates of the benefits of natural marine environments in the Caribbean, such as coral reefs or marshes, are

only just emerging. See Pendleton (1994); Spurgeon (1992); van't Hof (1985); or Lynne, Conroy, and Prochaska(1981).

31

region flow across national boundaries. 4 Adverse impacts of pollution may occur in all states.

Because each of these states could benefit, at no cost, from expensive pollution controlundertken by any other state in the region, incentives for unilateral pollution control arediminished. If this kind of "free-riding" can be curtailed through regional collective action, thenit may be possible for pollution emissions to be reduced to a greater extent. Most regionalLBMP protocols are in the nature of contracts through which the states of a region attempt toobligate themselves to reduce the tendency to free-ride in the reduction and control of pollution.In fact, mechanisms designed to control or reduce free-riding behavior can be the most importantelements of such protocols.

In some regional seas, such as the Baltic, the rationale for an international protocol onland-based sources of marine pollution appears clear (Broadus et al. 1993). There are manysources of potential pollutants and many states affected by transboundary pollutant flows.Furthermore, substantial uncertinty exists about the precise source of any particular pollutant,making it costly to assign liability for pollution impacts. This statement is especially true forhistorical contributions to stocks of persistent pollutants. Multilateral pollution reduction isneeded to reduce impacts felt by all states in the region.

In the WCR, sources and effects are localized, and therefore the need for an internationalagreement on multilateral pollution reduction is not as clear as in the case of the Baltic. A

fundamental question for the WCR is why, within the context of a regional protocol, should astate assume a serious obligationS to other states to clean up discharges of pollution thatoriginate and remain within its own borders. 6 This is precisely the issue faced by theMediterranean states in their attempts to regulate LBMP in that region.

Unless voluntarily relinquished, each WCR state has the right to determine its own pathof economic development, subject to customary international law (HLR 1991). Any particularstate's choice of development path could involve discharges into its local coastal or marineenvironments. Each state has the right to perform its own evaluation of benefits and costsassociated with the release of effluents. Absent transboundary effects and subject to relevant

4 Analogously, natural resource stocks might cross national boundaries. If these stocks are hared by pollution

in one nation's waters, then adverse economic effects may be felt by another nation.

S Clearly there is a legal obligation on the par of state-paries to the Caragena Convention to prevent, reduce

and control pollution from land-based sources. Whether states take this obligation seriously depends upon theirdefinition of "appropriate measures" and, if defined, whether such measures are implemented. Protocol"effectiveness" depends critically upon the extent to which states take their obligations seriously.

6 Charey (1994) explains that UNCLOS II "effectively addresses" the issues related to reconciliation between

a nation's obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment and its sovereign right to exploit its naturalresources. Yet it would appear that the language of Article 193 and other language in the Convention relating to

the use of "best practicable means" to prevent, reduce or control pollution is broad enough to accommodate relaxedinterpretations in specific contexts.

32

international law, it is unclear that other states or the international community in concert havethe right to impose environmental standards on any particular state and thereby affect its choiceof development path.

According to principles of international law and custom, each state also has the right tovoluntarily relinquish its right to economic self-determination. Each WCR state has the rightto enter into trades, agreements, or other types of relations with other states in the region,including agreements to adopt policies for pollution control, such as the Cartagena Conventionor UNCLOS III. Two-thirds of the WCR states are Contracting Parties to the CartagenaConvention, which calls for the development of a protocol on land-based sources of marinepollution. Article 7 of the Convention provides a good example of the voluntary relinquishment;to an unspecified extent, of each state's right to economic self-determination. As agreed, partiesto the Cartgena Convention "shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and controlpollution" from land-based sources (emphasis added). The use of the term "shall" denotes anobligation on the part of each state-party. A difficult debate has now been initiated on whatmeasures might be considered "appropriate" (Wood-Thomas, pers. comm., 1995).7

Evolving international law of the marine environment, such as that embodied inUNCLOS III, has enlarged its focus to include pollution impacts both across state boundariesand within a state's exclusive economic zone and territory, including estuaries (see Charney1994). Historically, however, perceptions of the need for international control of marinepollution at the domestic level have arisen mainly from concerns about the potential forinterntional impacts of insuffcient domestic controls. Meng (1987) concludes, therefore, thatit "seems inevitable that the notion of trans frontier pollution wil remain one of the bases for thedevelopment of international law on marine pollution control, simply because to respect andprotect state sovereignty has always been a fundamental object of international law." Wesuggest that the existence of transboundary pollutant flows is one of the strongest reasons for aninternational LBMP protocoL8

The adverse effects of transboundary marine pollution often are uncertin or not

imediate. States may wish to avert the risks of any negative impacts of transboundary marine

7 The extent to which a LBMP protocol wil be considered effective, ex post, wil depend upon the clarity of

the definition of "appropriate measures" in this context.

8 To suggest that an international protocol must be negotiated and implemented to control pollution only at the

domestic level would appear, at best, to invite ineffectiveness. Can one reasonably expect that states unaffected byanother state's domestic pollution wil bear the burden of enforcement against the polluting state? Charey (pers.comm. 1985) argues that "third" states can protect a "commons," such as the marine environment, even if no stateis directly injured. However, a significant obstacle is the cost of bringing the action.

33

pollution on their own marine and coastal environments and resources. 9 In the presence of such

risks, it can be sensible for states to be conservative with respect to marine pollution problems.Risk-aversion with regard to the expected impacts of transboundary pollution provides a rationalefor collective action similar to that in the presence of actual impacts. However, in the absence

. of demonstrated impacts, the implementation of pollution reduction measures is likely to be moreproblematic.

In the WCR, adjacent or neighboring states can perceive more clearly the benefits andcosts of marine pollution and pollution controls than can states that are separated by greatdistances. LBMP problems can be observed more easily, benefits from pollution control aremore likely to be realized, and monitoring and enforcement costs may be much smaller in asubregional, especially bilateral, context. A central role of an LBMP protocol in the Caribbeanshould be to encourage states to agree to pollution reduction at bilateral or subregional levels,delineated on the basis of transboundary effects, where they are known to occur, or commonenvironmental problems. We discuss this role in greater detail in Section V.

Several international heritage sites and trans boundary fishery resources exist in theCaribbean (Elder and Pernetta 1991). States may have a legal obligation to reduce or toeliminate activities that have an adverse effect on internationally protected sites or species. Withrespect to the arguments discussed above, these resources and protected areas are analyticallyidentical to the problem of a common-pool resource. For stationary resources, such as marineprotected areas, the same arguments we have made already concenung the advantages ofsubregional approaches can be reiterated. For fugitive resources, such as some species of

marine fisheries, similar arguments can likewise be made, although the geographic distributionof cause and effect may differ from the distribution of marine pollution.

D. Common Environmental Problems ,~-'~'

In the WCR, transboundary pollution problems tend to occur across shared watercourses,in shared estuaries, or across nearshore marine boundaries. Other serious LBMP problemsexist, but these tend to be localized, affecting uses or harming resources of the state from whichthe pollution originates (Section II). Thus one of the strongest reasons for negotiating aninternational agreement to control LBMP, namely the occurrence of international pollutioneffects, appears not as strong in the Caribbean as in other regional seas, such as the Baltic orthe Nort Sea.

Because of localized intrastate pollution in the WCR, many observers have recommended

9 Aversion to risks does not necessarily imply avoidance of risks at all costs. In other words, we do not

recommend adoption of the extreme version of the "precautionar principle" (see Broadus 1992).

34

that an LBMP protocol should focus on approaches to the resolution of local, not transboundary,pollution problems. An importnt issue to raise in this context is whether or not an internationalagreement is needed to resolve local pollution problems. An alternative course of action wouldbe for each state to make its own decisions and take its own actions with respect to LBMPproblems that are clearly not international in effect. These independent decisions and actionsmight involve seeking or trading for financial or techncal assistance from other states, withinthe region or elsewhere.

What are the kinds of barriers that exist to prevent Caribbean states from acting on theirown to resolve localized LBMP problems? Several barriers have been identified, includinginsufficient financial or physical resources to control LBMP, inadequate institutions, such aslaws and policies, and even ignorance or lack of recognition of LBMP as an environmentalproblem.

In cases in which pollution control resources are insuffcient, analysts have suggested thatan international protocol may provide a partial solution. For example, Kimball (pers. comm.,1995) has pointed out that". . . a well-functioning agreement may attract international assistancefrom multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. Thus, the agreement leverages internationalassistance for domestic problems, creating incentives for the polluter state to join." We expectthat states may be able to attract international assistance, even in the absence of an internationalagreement. However, the conclusion of such an agreement may enhance the significance ofLBMP as an international problem relative to other social problems. If this is true, it is possiblethat financial resources that might have been directed to resolve other problems are more likelyto be directed toward LBMP.

Others have suggested that the conclusion of an LBMP protocol resolves a "fairness"problem in which international assistance is directed only toward an elite subset of states, orperhaps to specific groups of states in defined "subregions," on the basis of their perceived

capabilities. For example, Wood-Thomas (pers. comm., 1995) states that "(i)f we workexclusively at the subregional level, several sub-regional groups may not be able to takemeanigful action because they do not possess adequate human or financial resources. Externalresources (World Bank, US~, etc.) may not be able to support all of the subregions addressingsimilar problems, and they wil therefore most likely lend support to those sub-regions which

are best organized and institutionally capable." The extent to which this statement is truedepends upon how international assistance is allocated. Recently, the lion's share ofinternational assistance funds from the United States to the WCR has been flowing to Haiti andNicaragua, which arguably are not well-organied or institutionally capable. But otherorganiations, such as the World Bank, may employ different criteria. Even if an LBMPprotocol does level the playing field in terms of attracting international assistance, issues persistabout allocating this assistance internally among the Contracting Parties. Presumably, theseissues can be addressed through fairness rules incorporated into the protocol.

35

It is also possible that the Contracting Parties to a protocol can provide for contributionsfrom each party to a central fund. We discuss below in Section IV.I the status of contributions

(and unfulfiled pledges) to the CEP fund. Tietenberg (pers. comm., 1995) has suggested thatannual fees might be levied on WCR states (or individual pollution sources) to fund monitoringand enforcement activities, as is currently the practice with respect to some forms of airpollution in the United States. The size of the fee might be tied to the level of pollution so thatthere is an incentive for states to lower discharges. However, unless the fees are small, theremay be difficulties in getting states to agree initially to participate in such a program. And ifthe fees are small, they are unlikely to provide much of a source reduction incentive. Inaddition, a system for accurate and consistent measurement of point source and nonpoint sourcepollution must be established, unless fees are based on a fixed level of allowable discharges.

An even more difficult problem concerns the lack of institutional infrastructure in manyof the states of the region. We address the status of these institutions in Section IV. E below.The most serious cases are those states in which political power is held by those who benefitfrom using the marine environment for waste disposal and in which those who suffer fromLBMP have little or no political power. It may be difficult, if not impossible, to encourage suchstates to agree to a protocol, unless their participation is tied specifically to other issues.Lining LBMP to other issues wil require an examination of the relevant political conditionsfor those states that are reluctant to participate, and negotiation on a case-by-case basis.

Some analysts have argued that international collective action, such as that called for ina regional LBMP protocol, can stimulate the development of institutions and domestic programsto implement the provisions of the agreement. If domestic programs are developed, one mustbe concerned with the extent to which these programs can be determined to be effective at localand national levels.

Education about LBMP problems in the WCR wil always be impgrtant. Our

examination of the region suggests that there is a fairly good awareness in each of the statesabout the presence of localized marine pollution from land-based sources. More work needs tobe accomplished with regard to determining the extent of the problem in each state, includingthe nature of pollutant flows and the size of actual damages and risks. Some good work alongthese lines is already being accomplished though the CEP and other research programs.Institutions established under the auspices of an LBMP protocol might usefully draw upon orexpand existing programs, such as CEPPOL and others, to enhance the awareness andunderstanding of marine pollution in the region.

Most WCR states have made some measurable progress toward developing andimplementing the capacity to deal with localized LBMP problems. We discuss this progress ingreater detail in Section V below.

36

E. Scale Economies and Clearinghouse Efficiencies

Officials of international organizations, such as UNEP, have argued that a regionalprotocol can facilitate technology transfer, expedite information exchange, and focus theallocation of financial capital and other resources more effectively to solve LBMP problems(UNEP 1994c, 1992; Nollkaemper 1992). These and other coordinative-type activities are thekind commonly associated with a "clearinghouse."

Clearinghouse efficiencies are a type of "scale economy:" as the amount of a particularservice, such as information exchange, is increased, the cost per unit declines. In general,economies of scale are likely to be realized when an activity involves relatively high "fixed"costs, io when specialization in the performance of tasks is possible, or where risks can bepooled, such as through the establishment of emergency-response measures. It is important tonote that scale economies may exist over a range of certin levels of activity but disappear,resulting in "diseconomies" of scale, at higher levels. The relevant issue with respect to

clearinghouse effciencies is: what is the optimal size of the clearinghouse?

Economies of scale may exist in scientific research and monitoring of land-based sourcesof marine pollution, too. Table 13, in the next section, lists the research, coordination, andadvocacy organizations that focus on marine science in the Caribbean today. It is likely that atleast some, if not all, of the relevant economies of scale in scientific research and monitoringhave been realized alread though the activities of these organiations.

Officials at some international institutions, such as UNEP and the Caribbean Division ofthe World Bank, have begun developing synoptic views of the primary Caribbean regionalenvironmental institutions and their mandates. Table 5 lists these institutions and theircorresponding mandates. These institutions act in clearinghouse capacities, but, according toWorld Bank officials, the institutionaLframeworkis stil too fragmented, suggesting that evenmore centralization is warranted:

The fundamental problem is that these efforts have often led to the formulation of proposals andimplementation of activities that, while responding to a priority issue, do so from a paricularinstitutional or even funding source perspective. There is, in general, a need for coordination ona regional basis in order to increase the effectiveness of the regional efforts. (Elvis and Colbert1994)

10 As fixed costs are spread out over greater levels of the activity, their per unit contribution to total costs

declines. Fixed costs are by definition "recoverable" so that, for example, expenditures that are made on suppliesor infrastructure can be recouped if the activity termnates. If these expenditures canot be recouped, then the costsare "sunk." Sunk costs do not contribute to economies of scale.

37

Table 5Regional Environmental Progra & Projects in the Carbbean

DoDD. Pr K DlIlii/PIjK"

UNITD NATWNS AGENaRl

Unid N&OIU Envinmnt Prgram (UNE eCbbe Envirnment Prgram

Uni N&na OovcJ Pr¡ram oLad Use Planig, Hwr SeuJementand Tellestr PrLenCiacity 21 FWld

Uiid N&toiu Centr for Hwi Setements (UNCHS) -Lad Use Planning and Human SeuJemen13 Development _ OECS

Uii iiiu Foo and Agcullure Organizon (FAO) .rropicaJ Forstr Action Plans (CARJCOM)

Uiid lWolu Bcmic Commi..ion for Lat Am oEnvirnmenlA Management Issues in iourmand me Cabe (EC) oRegional Sewage Dispoal aid Coasla Coiuaton Stu~

P&4 Amc&4 Health (k¡¡&4ÏZon (pAHG) -Envirnffnta HeaJth in SustAnable Tourm Development

MULTITEIL DEVELPMENT INSTITUTINS:

Wod &i -Naoiu Envirnmenta Action PlA (N1i)oOEC Waste Management PrjectoWider Ciibbc Initiatve foe Shipgenccatd Waste (WClSW)

Inter-Amc&4 Develpment Bank (IB) oManagement of Coastaarne R.soCC3 - Widcc-Ciibbe

Cabu DeveJnt Ba (COB) -Natonal Eivirniiita Action Plas (N.) (with WB)

oOEC Waste maagement Prject (with WB)-PClticide Pollution in ile Windward ùlAdi (through CEHO

Eupe Coniit (B oCRlORUM Regional Environment Prgram wider Lomt IV

Eurpe Invutnt Ba (EID) oOEC Waste Management (with WB)

CÀ¡lIíi of Am Sla (OAS) .Natural Resoce Management - inc1Cl paki I;d prtete Arel

iy.lcm plan.oEnvirnmeii and Tourm Awarenes

BILTEL DEVELPMET AGENCII -,.-..,~:~

Brb DcvcJp~ Divilioa (BDD) -Renewable Natural ReIOurCes PrgrlJ - Trpical Fortr Acn

Pla (with FAO)oNatoiu Environmnta Actin Plani (wiil WB)

C&ldia lnlUatul Dcvolpmot A¡ency (ClA) oCbbean Basin Management Triiing (CARICOM)oNatural Re.ouCCl Management Dat Bue Prject - OECIBAdaaBV!

oEnvirnmenta Traning prgramme

Gcmw AacDC C~ ionir-a Coon (GTZ) -Pulic Health Educaton - CARICOM cotn.oWor&ton Syiiicm Development - CEll

Japca Poliy aid Hum Ru Devclopme Fw oNaoiu Envirnmenta Actn Plani (N.) ilrou¡h WB - GEC

(pHR)

Uni Sta Aacii Cor lnlclÛii Development oEnvirnmnt aid Coasta R.souce Mana¡emel1t (ENCORE) - GEC

(USAl) oEalCrn CiibbCA Policy Prject - GEC

SOUR.: WOI ~ (1~)

38

Although there would appear to be the potential for economies of scale, questions persistabout how these might be realized through a protocol arrangement and whether a protocol isbetter than some alternative. To date, clearinghouse roles have been developed and implementedby international organizations with international resources, such as UNEP and the World Bank,with apparently little effect on the commitment, practices, or environmental problems ofindividual states. The example of UNEP's CEP, which was established in 1982, serves to makethe point. Brewster (1994) has identified the following four existing constraints to the successfulimplementation of CEP: (1) insufficient political commitment; (2) inadequate financial support;

(3) organizational weaknesses; and (4) inadequate awareness, expertise, and experience at thedomestic leveL. These constraints are of the same nature as those that may well limit theeffectiveness of a regionwide LBMP protocol.

Clearly, there is a role for a clearinghouse on LBMP in the WCR. To a large extent,this role is being performed already by UNEP and the World Bank, as well as by other smallerregional institutions, such as OECS. The fundamental issue is whether additional economies canbe achieved by an "umbrella" institution established through the protocol. Although thisquestion cannot be answered until such an institution is established, it is sensible, at least, toquestion the potential for additional scale economies. We suggest that the best approach is anincremental one.

II A clearinghouse established under the LBMP protocol should take advantage

of existing institutions and expand step-by-step, testing for the existence of scale economies. 12

F. Uniform Standards

The extent to which marine pollution should be controlled depends upon ourunderstanding of both causes and effects, and the extent to which it can be controlled dependsuponour ability to infuence causes so as to reduce adverse effects. Figure 10, adapted fromFisher and Peterson (1973), describes the relationship between emissions (causes) and the

determination of damages (effects). A wide range of pollution control instruments are available,ranging from command-and-control regulations, or standards (Helfand 1991), to market-basedapproaches (OECD 1994; Tietenberg 1985), or to combinations of the two. The best instrumentor combination of instruments may depend upon specific environmental, political, or economicfactors. In the WCR, much of the discussion about pollution control instruments has focusedon the development of "standards" of two types: ambient water quality standards and technology-based controls.

11 Wood-Thomas (pers. coin. 1995) reports that". . . we are pushing a reorientation of CEPPOL to serve

defined management needs and we wil likely pursue a functional linkage of work undertaken through both CEPPOLand IPID," a regional Integrated Planing and Institutional Development Project.

12 The protocol institution may decide to contract, instead of expand, existing institutions in order to achieve

the most effcient level of clearinghouse service.

39

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P, rt ro 0 rt P,Ol o Ol Ii o ro

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Hi VIi0 roOHiC:8 rt Hi 1- Ol

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OlOP,Ol I- 0 ro:: rt Ul OlP, :: rt P,

~

40

In the Caribbean, concentrations of LBM pollutants, of any type, vary by location; theyare "non-uniformly mixed" (Tietenberg 1988). Pollutant levels at each location also may varyover time as a result of environmental events, such as storms; seasonal oceanographic

phenomena, such as freshets; or cumulative effects, such as the build-up of pollutant stocks.Pollutant concentrations, of any type, may be attributed to single or multiple sources, such asindustrial plant emissions, sewer outflows, or runoff from farms. In general, each pollutionsource contributes a different amount to the ambient concentration at each location, because ofrelative proximity, precipitation or mixing, or other reasons. Finally, the distributions of naturalresources and human uses of the marine environment also are nonuniform (Elder and Pernetta1991) .

The nonuniform distributions of both ambient pollution concentrations and resources oruses implies that damages from marine pollution are likely to vary by location. Damages canalso vary because of differences in the tastes and income levels of the users of resources atparticular locations. The differential relative contribution of sources to ambient concentrationsat any location implies that costs of pollution control vary by location as well. Costs ofpollution control for sources can vary also because of differences in technologies, market

conditions, and other factors.

If the causes and effects of marine pollution were uniformly distributed, then uniformregional standards or controls might be appropriate policy instruments. But the existence ofnonuniformities in the Caribbean argues strongly for approaches that are capable of dealingeffectively with the problem of pollution control at each location.13 In other words, regionwideuniform water quality standards and technology-based controls are not necessarily appropriatepolicy instruments, given the environmental and economic characteristics of the Caribbean.

As a precursor to the selection of a pollution control instrument, we require inormationabout the damages associated with pollution at each location in the Caribbean (see the "dollarcosts" box in Figure 10). Ideally, this information would include data on the damages associatedwith different levels of pollution at each location. Moreover, we need information about thecosts of control for sources contributing to pollution at each location. An economically efficientemissions quota or charge could then be set for each location. Preference for either a quota ora charge depends upon the relative levels of knowledge about damages or control costs (Baumoland Oates 1988).14

For many pollutants, a surrogate measure of damages, based upon a scientific

13 One might argue that "on average" standards would be appropriate pollution control instruments. Such an

argument ignores difficulties of political acceptance of standards (Sand 1991) and the natural tendency to weakenthe standards approach through waivers or exceptions (UNEP 1994c).

14 In general, it can be quite expensive to gather information about either damages or control costs.

41

understanding of the potential effect of pollutants on human health, often is employed instead

(see the "effects" box in Figure 10). A water quality standard can be set to ensure that pollutionis kept at some level that has a low probability of health effects (Figure 10). Quotas can be setat levels to ensure that the water quality standard is not exceeded. 15 Water quality standards

are less expensive to administer than the efficient quotas or charges described above, becausethere is no need to measure damages explicitly. 16 But because water quality standards consider

neither damages nor control costs, their uniform application may require excessively costlypollution control in areas where there are very low levels of marine resource use.

Several analysts have suggested that regional water quality standards should be appliedin the Caribbean. In Policy Principles, WWF and ESI (1994: 2) argue for "regionalenvironmental standards and environmental quality commitments." Their argument is basedprimarily on the potential benefits of a level regulatory environment across Caribbean states. 17Kasten (1994: 17) has argued for establishing a technology-based control program in the shortrun and supplementing this program with water quality standards in the long run.

The use of the term "regional" in these studies probably implies water quality standardsthat are "uniform" across the region, but there is no need for this interpretation. For example,in Appropriate Approaches, UNEP (1994c: 27) argues for domestic water quality standardsbased upon regional standards that can be modified though the use of "exceptions" and

"waivers." Exceptions and waivers would be based upon "particular ecological, geographical,and physical characteristics and the level of existing pollution." In this way standards might bemade appropriately nonuniform across WCR states. IS

In order to design technology-based controls that meet established water quality

standards, the relationship between pollutant discharges and effects should be known. Often thisrelationship is not well understood, and pollution controls have been recommended or adoptedin many part of the world without regard to their likely effectiveness in meeting,~water qualitystandards or sometimes even prior to the establishment of water quality standards.

Arguments for the adoption of pollution controls without water quality standards arise,in part, from the supposition that control of LBM pollutants must begin before the lengthyprocesses of establishing water quality standards and understanding cause-and-effect relationships

15 Setting the appropriate quota wil require some knowledge of the relationship between emissions and effects,

i.e., of the assimilative capacity of the environment.

16 Water quality standards can also be applied without regard to the costs of control, although it is often the case

that policy debates wil tend to focus on these costs.

17 This argument is based on the idea of "pollution havens." See below.

is Note, however, that if exceptions become widespread, then water quality "standards" may lose their meaning.

42

are completed. In effect, such an approach is an application of the "precautionary principle,"defined, as follows, in the Rio Declaration of the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED):

(w)here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shallnot be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental

degradation. (emphasis added)'9

Economic theory, in combination with a substantial body of empirical analysis, indicatesthat technology-based standards may be one of the most costly ways in which to control pollution

(Cropper and Oates 1992; Tietenberg 1985). For example, Lyon and Farrow (1995) haveexamined the benefits and costs of clean water programs in the United States. Their findingssuggest that incremental costs of water pollution control, which are based on estimates ofconstructing publicly owned treatment works, exceed incremental benefits.

Notwithstanding their relative costliness, there are several reasons why technology-basedstandards might be promoted as a policy measure. Table 6 presents a comparison of theeconomic incentives and effects of different types of pollution control instruments. First, froman economic standpoint, the presence of theshold effects in the face of uncertainty aboutdamages or control costs is one of the strongest reasons in favor of establishing technology-basedstandards. Such effects may exist in the WCR with respect to harmful, persistent pollutants,such as organohalogens.

Many of the WCR states are Contracting Parties to the London Dumping Convention (seeTable 9 in Section IV), which has organied pollutants into prohibited (black list) and regulated

(grey list) substances. Black list substances tend to be those with theshold effects. One optionfor the Contracting Parties to the Cartgena Convention is to consider treating LBM pollutantsin the same manner ~s London Dumpin Convention pollutants so that, for example, land-baseddischarges of black'list pollutats would be banned and land-based discharges of grey-listpollutants would be regulated by individual states. However, W ood- Thomas (pers. comm.,1995) explain that the negotiations concernng the WCR protocol are leading in a differentdirection:

L¥jL'"

l

We are specifically avoiding a black-list, grey-list approach in the WCR because of lessons leared

in the Baltic, Nort Sea, and Mediterranean. This structure has failed to focus the respectiveparies on those contamnants that are the priority problems within a region. Changes in the Balticand North Sea have reflected a recognition of this problem as they have developed "red-lists."We hope to utilze the negotiation of specific anexes to take this concept to a more pragmatic

19 Adoption of technology-based controls without water quality standards can be considered an application of

an extreme version of the precautionar principle (cf., Broadus 1992), one whose adoption might be questioned onecnomic grounds uness clear threshold effects are suspected. Threshold effects are damages that are severe orirreversible, imposing high levels of social costs if pollution is controlled at too Iowa leveL.

43

Table 6

Pollution C

ontrol Instruents: A Q

ualitative Com

parion

Quali ty/F

eatureT

echnology-based Standard

Pigouvian T

axtr

Tradeable P

ermts

;-:,-

("Optim

al" Em

issions Charge)

(Marketable right to pollute)

Econom

ically "Effcient"

Costly to determ

ne effcient levelsY

es, if knowledge of abatem

entY

es; knowledge of source-

of controlcosts and benefits

contributions to receptorsneeded in non

uniformy-m

ixed

case

Achieves D

esired Em

issionsY

es; only if relationship between

Unlikely, but possible through

Yes

Reduction

TB

S and emissions is know

niterative process

Achieves D

esired Am

bientY

esY

es, after iterations complete;

Yes

Pollutant Levd

possible further reductions asfirm

s innovate

Source of Revenue

No

Yes

Yes, if auctioned initially

Encourages R

&D

inL

ittle incentive, unless standard isY

es (emissions reduced further)

Yes (no further em

issionsPollution C

ontrol"perform

ance-based"reductions)

Monitoring and

Needed and costly

Needed and costly

Needed and costly

Enforcem

ent

Transactions costs

No, but adm

inistrative costs areN

o, but administrative costs are

Yes, if large num

ber of sourceshigh

high(unless brokers em

erge)

~

/ Assum

ng some level of scientific understanding exists of the relationship betw

een pollutant loading from em

issions and ambient

levels of pollutant, considerig the assimlative capacity of the m

arine environment.

level-focusing effort on the principal source categories that are responsible for the more obviousand gross sources of pollution. Various anexes would then be developed over time as the

scientific understanding evolves concerning what pollutants and sources are most important in theRegion. As such we use the protocol structure to help rationalize and focus the attention of theparties on those problems that are most significant in the region. The problems vary and are notshared by all, but with adequate flexibility and definition of the anexes, these should provide auseful vehicle to facilitate limited, but pragmatic actions that expand over time (recognizing thescarcity of resources and that scientific understanding will improve and offer new priorities foraction).

Second, from a political standpoint, some industries may favor standards because theyconstitute barriers to entry, and employees of controlled industries may favor standards becauseof wage-enhancing effects. Table 7, adapted from Dewees (1983), outlines some of thesereasons .

Third, from a strategic standpoint, as happened in the case of the negotiations over anLBMP protocol in the Mediterranean, developed states might argue in favor of technology-basedstandards for at least three reasons: (1) technology-based standards may already be in place; (2)adoption of similar standards removes the incentive, however small, for a developed state'sindustries to relocate; and (3) establishment of technology-based standards in other states

presents market opportnities for existing producers of pollution control technologies.

Technology-based standards are just one of several possible kinds of standards. 20

Moreover, as shown in Table 6, standards are not the only available pollution controlinstrument. Given nonuniformities in the distribution of LBMP causes and effects, it is notobvious, ex ante, that technology-based standards wil be the most appropriate pollution controlintrument in every case. Following the intent of the precautionary principle to encourage theadoption of cost-effective pollution control methods, flexibilty in selecting and implementingmethods of control seems more appropriate. Furter, such flexibilty is likely to increase thepotential for gains from trade in pollution control: and, thereby, to enhance the potential for

protocol effectiveness.

Some analysts have argued for uniform standards to "level the environmental playingfield." This argument, which is one version of the "pollution haven" hypothesis (Cumberland1981), states that the implementation of uniform standards removes incentives for industries torelocate to jurisdictions in which standards are low or nonexistent. The pollution havenhypothesis is currently the focus of a number of research effort in the environmental policy field

(Jaffe et aL. 1995; Cropper and Oates 1992). Early results from this research are not in fullagreement, but basic theory suggests that a policy of "environmental federalism," or the settingof standards at a level which internalizes pollution impacts, is economically efficient (Oates and

20 Helfand (1991) evaluates the economic effects of at least five different kinds of standards.

45

Table 7

Distributional Im

plications of Instruent Choice

~..~

Shareholders of

Workers in

Existing Firm

sE

xisting Firms

Application of controls:

To existing

To new

firms only

To existing

To new

firms only

firms only

firms only

No controls

Inferior to freely

Inferior to

Superior to any typedistributed

standardsof control

marketable perm

its

Uniform

effuent standardsSuperior to either

Superior to noInferior to no

Superior to charges,charges or auctioned

controls or freelycontrols

marketable perm

itsm

arketable permts

distributedm

arketable permits

Tradeable P

ermts

Superior to noInferior to

Inferior to noInferior to standards

(marketable right to

controls; if freelystandards, if freely

controlspollute a specified quantity

distributed, thendistributed

of effuent)superior to standards,charges, or auctionedm

arketable permits

Effuent charges

Inferior to standardsInferior to no

Inferior to standardscontrols

Source: D

ewees (I983)

\0~

Schwab 1988). This result derives its force from the fundamental nonuniformities in cause andeffect, described above.21 This theoretical result reinforces an argument for the setting ofstandards at domestic or subregional levels in the Caribbean, although it should be recognizedthat some states or subregions wil need outside assistance in setting standards.

Other considerations suggest that pollution haven arguments are sometimes exaggerated.For example, unlike marine pollution from ships, land-based capital is not completely mobileand cannot be moved costlessly to avoid stringent environmental regulations. Some types ofland-based sources, including utilities such as power plants, must be sited in almost every

jurisdiction. 22 For those states that focus on tourism as a major industry, the pollution haven

hypothesis would appear to be easily rejected. Also, factors affecting other inputs to anindustrial firm's production processes, such as labor costs, may greatly outweigh the estimatedcosts of environmental regulation in a firm's location decision. For example, Jaffe et al. (1995)find that the costs of industrial compliance with federal pollution control regulations in theUnited States are a small fraction, averaging only two percent, of the total cost of production.

It is likely that great difficulties wil be encountered in attempts to reach agreement onor to implement regionwide uniform water quality standards or technology-based controls,thereby heightening the potential for protocol ineffectiveness. The adoption of regional standardsmay result in an international consensus on the lowest standards acceptable to all parties (cf.,Sand 1991), instead of ones that reflect the size of damages or that adequately protect humanhealth. The nonuniform distribution of causes and effects of LBMP in the WCR strengthens anargument for decisions to be made on water quality standards and pollution control instrumentsat the subregional, bilateral, or domestic levels. Discussion at regional fora on the benefits ofwaivers, exemptions, and timetable extensions indicate that the Contracting Parties are awareof the problems of adopting and applying uniform standards. Thus, a critically importnt rolefor an LBMP protocol is to help states identify the most appropriate pollution controlmechanisms for their individual or shared environmental circumstances.

G. Summary

Many of the arguments made for concluding an international LBMP protocol in the WCRare valid at some scale. Transboundary pollution occurs along the borders of some states but

21 In their study of the benefits and costs of the U.S. clean water program, Lyon and Farrow (1995) recommend

that more attention be given to geographically targeted controls instead of uniform national regulations.

22 If environmental regulations var by jurisdiction, then the kinds of technologies employed by utilities may

var as welL. But utilties wil not be attracted to regions because of nonstringent environmental regulations. In

fact, some types of "point" sources, such as sewage treatment facilties, will be attracted to regions because ofstringent environmental regulations.

47

is not a regionwide phenomenon. Nevertheless, it may be one of the strongest reasons forconcluding an international agreement. Clearinghouse efficiencies, a type of scale economy,may exist for some categories of pollution problems that are common among the WCR states.Clearinghouse programs exist already in the region, and the issue for protocol negotiators is howto take advantage of these programs through judicious consolidation or expansion in some

directions to test for additional scale effects. The nonuniform distribution of causes and effectsof marine pollution in the WCR argues for approaches that deal with problems at each location.We argue for flexibility in the adoption of pollution control instruments, such as tradeablepermits or emission charges where appropriate. Regionwide requirements for technologycontrols wil be unnecessarily costly and inappropriate unless threshold effects are likely.

Increasingly, observers are arguing for an LBMP protocol in the WCR that gives priorityto resolving localized but widely occurring pollution problems. Such an approach is clearlymore compatible with the environmental realities of the region than one that seeks only (orprimarily) to address transboundary pollution problems. However, the logic of concluding aninternational protocol to address primarily domestic pollution problems depends upon certainunproven assumptions about clearinghouse efficiencies and other scale economies, and about thelikelihood that an international program wil be more effective than efforts by individual statesin attracting funding and other forms of assistance from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies.We believe that these assumptions are valid to a point that stops well short of justifying auniform, regionwide approach to LBMP problems and solutions. Rather, recognizing that somecommon LBMP problems in the WCR are more common than others (see Section IV), werecommend a protocol that carefully delineates subregional groupings and approaches on thebasis of common marine environmental problems. We further recommend (in Section VI) thatthe "umbrella" function of a regional LBMP protocol should concentrate on the need to ensureuniform access to all clearinghouse products and on the internal allocation of financial andtechncal assistance to individual states and subregions.

:.ir.o.

In the next two sections, we describe commonalities and differences across WCR statesand begin to identify opportnities for mutual benefits in pollution reduction and control, which,

if properly elucidated, can be used to encourage subregional pollution control efforts.

48

IV. Economic and Institutional Characteristics of the WCR

A. Regional Diversity

The limited evidence of trans boundary pollution effects noted in the preceding section isan importnt respect in which the Wider Caribbean Region (WCR) more closely resembles theMediterranean Sea than either the Baltic or the North Sea. Another striking similarity betweenthe Wider Caribbean and the Mediterranean is the large number of countries bordering theregional sea and the tremendous diversity of cultures, economies, and national priorities thateach region embraces.

Four official languages-English, Spanish, French, and Dutch-and dozens of dialectsare spoken thoughout the Wider Caribbean Region, which encompasses 37 distinct politicalunits: 25 sovereign nations (13 island nations and 12 continental), 5 territories of the UnitedKingdom, 3 overseas departments of France, 2 self-governing units of the Dutch realm(including one island shared by the Netherlands and France), 2 territories of the United States, iand the US-associated commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Table 8). The region's 25 sovereignnations alone range in size from 40,000 persons inhabiting 269 km2 (St. Kitts & Nevis) toroughly 250 milion dispersed over more than 9 milion km2 (United States), with economies

ranging from the world's largest and most diversified (United States) to one of its most abjectlypoor and undeveloped (Haiti) (Figure 11; see also Tables A.l and A.2 in Appendix A).

B. The WCR States and the Cartgena Convention

The large number of countries bordering the Gulf of Mexico/Caribbean Sea is reflectedin a long list of Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection and Development of theMarine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, or Cartgena Convention. Participationby the countries and territories of the WCR in the Cartgena Convention and its two existingprotocols (on cooperation in combating oil spils and on the establishment of specially protectedareas and wildlife) is displayed in Table 9, along with their participation in the Law of the SeaConvention (UNCLOS III) from which the Cartagena Convention takes its definition ofpollution, and in the London Dumping Convention, which govern the dumping of wastes fromships into the marine environment. Not listed in Table 9 are the three European states withisland territories in the region-France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom-that areParties to the Cartgena Convention. All told, 16 of the 25 sovereign states in the region are ...Contracting Parties to the Cartgena Convention, and 10 of the 12 foreign dependencies are

lThroughout the text, we omit the uninhabited US territory of Navassa Island from counts and discussions of

the WCR states. We mention it here only to explain its appearance on the maps in Sections I and V, whereindividual states are identified in terms of their maritime boundaries; in these maps, Navassa appears as a white area(as do two areas of high seas in the Gulf of Mexico) to the southeast of Cuba.

49

Table 8

Political Units of the Wider Caribbean Region

Terri tories/dependenciesSovereign States

Island ContinentalFrance Netherlands United United States

(overseas (self- Kingdomdepartments) governing (terri tories)

units ofDutch realm)

Antigua & Belize French Aruba Anguilla Navassa Is.Barbuda Guiana (uninhabited

terr. )

Bahamas Colombia Guadeloupe Netherlands British Puerto Rico

Antilles Virgin (commonweath)Islands

Barbados Costa Rica Martinique Cayman U.S. VirginIslands Islands

(terrtory)Cuba Guatemala Montserrat

Dominica Guyana Turks &CaicosIslands

Dominican HondurasRepublic

Grenada Mexico

Haiti Nicaragua

Jamaica Panama

S1. Kitts & SurinameNevis

S1. Lucia UnitedStates .... .. ... ..-.

S1. Vincent Venezuela&

Grenadines

Trinidad &Tobago

50

~o"~

e: 80~"-c:.."-i:c:Ui-~ 60c.ac.~oQ.

.E 40~Q.~Q.c.Q.~"-..-9 20::E::u

100

oo 20 40 60 80

Cumulative Percentage of States in Region100

Figure 1 i" Regional diversity as measured by GDP per capita. Greater diversity is shownas a larger deparre from the 45° dashed line, which depicts a perfectly uniformdistrbution of GDP per capita. Among the four regions depicted, the WiderCaribbean and the Mediterranean are the most diverse.

51

Table 9

Participation In Law of the Sea, London DumpIng, and Cartagena Conventions

State Law of the London CartagenaSea Dumping & Protocls

Anauila' .Antiqua & Barbuda . . . .'Aruba" 0 . .. .Bahamas .Barbados . ..Belize .Bntish Viraln Is: . . .'Cavman Is.c . . .'ColombIa 0 0 . ..Costa Rica . . ..Cuba . . .. .Dominica . ..Dominican Reoublic 0 .French Guiana' 0 . .. .Grenada . ..Guadelouoe' 0 . . .'Guatemala 0 . .. .Guvana .Haiti 0 .Honduras . . 00Jamaica . . .. .Martinique' 0 . . .'Mexico . . ...Montserrat .Neth. Antiles" 0 . . ..Nicaraaua 0 00Panama 0 . . .'Puerto Rico' . ..'SI. Kits & Nevis .SI. Lucia . . . .'SI. Vincent & Grenadines - . . .'Sunname 0 .Tnnidad & TobaQo . ..'Turk & Calcoc . . .'United States . . .'US Virain Islands' . . .'Venezuela 0 .. .

. Convention signed and ratified. 0 Convention signed but not ratifed.

. Oil spil protocl signed and ratifed: 0 Oil spil protoc signed but no ratifed:

. SPAW protocl signed (only Colombi has ratifed)

'Not a Contracting Party to the Cartagena Convention, blt participates in the Canbbean~nviroment Programme.By Netherlands.

"By UK.'By France (Cartagena Convention signed "wth reseive.'j'By US.Sources: Branes 1991: IMO 1991: Curtis 1993: Broadus and Vartanov 1994: Mandell 1994:

UNEP 1992a: World Bank 1994: WR11994.

52

bound by its provisions as welL. i (Signatories that have not ratified the convention includeHonduras, Nicaragua, and the European Economic Community).

The Cartagena Convention was negotiated under the auspices of UNEP, and morespecifically of UNEP's Regional Seas Programme, whose charter is to promote "a regionalapproach to the control of marine pollution and management of marine and coastal resources"(Introduction to Cartagena Convention, UNEP 1983). The Wider Caribbean Region became thefourth designated Regional Seas Programme area in 1981 (the Mediterranean was the first, in1978), when an intergovernental meeting at Montego Bay, Jamaica, adopted an Action Plan

for the region. As is customary for the UNEP Regional Seas Programme, the Action Plan setforth required program components in the areas of environmental assessment, environmentalmanagement, environmental legislation, institutional arrangements, and financial arrangements.

The Cartgena Convention, adopted in March 1983 at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia,satisfies the Action Plan's requirement for environmental legislation. It takes the customaryUNEP form of an umbrella convention, elaborated by specific techncal protocols, that servesas a legal framework for cooperative regional and national actions. As expressed in theIntroduction to the Cartagena Convention, "The legal commitment of Governents clearlyexpresses their political wil to manage individually and jointly their common environmentalproblems." Article 7 identifies land-based marine pollution (LBMP) as among the environmentalproblems to be managed.

Joint management of LBMP is likely to be particularly challenging in the case of theWCR, given the large number and broad diversity of the countries involved. As noted in thecomparative study of the Baltic, North Sea, and Mediterranean programs, "one may expectcooperation effort-and particularly the establishment of shared objectives and commonapproaches-to be the most complicated in regions with relatively heterogeneous member

countries" (Broadus et al. 1993). The study goes on to suggest, in the case of the Mediterraneanprogram, that "improvement in managing land-based pollution may be possible by separating andrecombinng the Mediterranean countries into new subregions, based on environmental

considerations. "

In the remainder of this section, we consider the prospects for addressing LBMP on asubregional basis, using as our point of departre the six WCR subregions designated by theCEPPOL program. The CEPPOL point-source pollutant inventories and other reports ofobserved pollutants and associated environmental degradation are reviewed in the context of

various economic and institutional factors that shed light on these observations and on theprospects for controlling land-based marine pollution through collective actions and mechanisms.

i The United Kingdom has ratified the Caragena Convention on behalf of the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman

Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands, but not Anguilla or Montserrat.

53

C. Overview of Demographic and Economic Indicators

Selected indicators of LBMP inputs are presented for the 37 countries and islandterritories of the WCR in Table A.3 (Appendix A). The indicators fall into four general areasof information: on human settlements, agriculture, mining and manufacturing, and deforestation.Information on human settlements includes the estimated concentration of each country'spopulation within the drainage basin and coastal areas of the Wider Caribbean Region (seeAppendix B) and the extent to which the population has access to sewage treatment services.This information sheds light, for example, on the CEPPOL finding that a very high proportionof the Subregion V domestic pollutant load is attributable to Venezuela, even though Venezuela'spopulation, at 19 milion, is only three-fifths the size of Colombia's: Venezuela's coastal

population is approximately 4.5 times greater than Colombia's (Mandelli, pers. comm., 1995;see also Table B.l in Appendix B). Other information reported in Table A.3 includes the extentof pesticide and fertilzer use and the distribution of oil refineries, mines, and factories ofvarious types thoughout the region.

Subsumed under the statistics on agriculture are those for fisheries, which, unlikeagriculture (or mining and manufacturing), derives more benefit from an unpolluted marineenvironment than from the freedom to contribute to LBMP. 3 For this reason-and becauseeconomic data on the region's fisheries are scant and are believed seriously to underestimate thevalue of fishing to many WCR cultures and economies (Mahon 1993)-selected data by weighton fish catch, imports, exports, and domestic consumption are presented separately in Table A.4

(Appendix A). Table 10 provides some limited economic data on those WCR countries that rankamong the top 50 in the world for the value of their annual fish imports and/or export, asreported in U.N. trade statistics (UN, n.d.). Nineteen of the WCR countries and territoriesqualify for inclusion, but only nine of these-the Bahamas, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, FrenchGuiana, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela-are net fish exporters in terms of valueof catch.

Tourism, an economic mainstay for many countries of the region, is an activity that canbe both vulnerable to and a contributor of LBMP. Tourism receipts as a percentage of GDP arereported in Table A.5 (Appendix A), which also includes a narrative summary highlighting themost prominent economic activities and targeted growth areas for the WCR countries. Thecountries are grouped in the table according to the six CEPPOL-designated subregions, makingit comparatively easy to identify those geographical areas where economic activities andpriorities are the most homogeneous (Subregions II and IV), the most vulnerable to LBMP(Subregion IV), or the most likely to create LBMP effects for downstream countries (SubregionV).

3 This statement is paricularly true for the smaller island states, where near-shore arisinal fishing accounts for

most of the employment in fisheries.

54

Table 10

Major Net Importers and Net Exporters of Fish and Fish Products in the WCR

1992 Value ($US 1000)

StateNet Imports Net Export

Bahamas264,033

Barbados 1,499

Colombia 129,123

Costa Rica 26,027

Cuba 345,883

Dominican Republic 16,457

French Guiana38,075

Guadeloupe 14,085

Guyana 1,375

Haiti 3,701

Honduras 41,335

Jamaica 9,889

Martnique 19,492

Mexico 260,087

Netherlands Antiles 1,623

Panama52,656

Triidad and Tobago 1,120

United States 4,530,905

Venezuela 72,511

Source: 1992 International Trade StatistIcs Yearbook; United Nations.

55

D. Comparative Overview of the CEPPOL-nesignated Subregions

Within four of the six WCR subregions, the amount of divergence in standard of livingand the size and composition of economies is nearly as striking at the subregional level as it isthroughout the WCR as a whole. The exceptions to the general pattern of diversity areSubregion II, which is typified by agricultural economies with low per capita GDP and fairlylow population densities, and Subregion iv, which is typified by tourism-dominated economieswith somewhat higher than average Gnp and very high population densities.

Fisheries statistics, although very incomplete and often unaccommodating for purposesof direct comparison, provide sketches of the subregions that have similar implications for theemphasis likely to be placed on the quality of the marine environment. For example, theaverage per capita consumption of fish thoughout the WCR is approximately 20 kg, and itranges from a low of 5.9 kg in Subregion II (with all 7 states well below the WCR average) toa high of 33.7 kg in Subregion iv (with 5 states consuming more than twice the WCR average,and another 3 well above average). These patterns, like the larger economic picture, point tostrikingly different incentives at work in the two subregions with respect to controllngdegradation of marine and coastal resources. Within the other subregions, by contrast, the levelsof fish consumption, like the other economic indicators, are much less consistent.

A number of marine pollution and resource degradation problems plague all of thesubregions, though in varying degrees. The most widespread problems are direct damage toreefs and mangroves from commercial and recreational activities (e.g., dredging, clearing,dumping, fishig, diving, and boating) and pollution of coastal waters by sewage effuent.Among the problems that reach serious proportions in some subregions while occasioning littledistress in others are coastal erosion; deforestation; and pollution from fertilizers and pesticides,bauxite mining, and oil refineries.

1. Economically heterogeneous subregions

Subregion III, the most strikingly heterogeneous subregion (in economic terms), includesthe Greater Antilles, the Bahamas, and the Cayman and Turks and Caicos Islands. Thissubregion is horne to both the highest and the lowest per capita Gnps throughout the WCR (theCayman Islands and Haiti, respectively), as well as to the economies that rank highestthroughout the WCR in terms of the predominance of agriculture (Haiti, at 34 percent of GDP),versus manufacturing (Cuba and Puerto Rico, both at 39 percent), versus tourism (CaymanIslands at 70 percent, about even with Antigua & Barbuda and the US Virgin Islands inSubregion IV; and the Bahamas, where tourism has recently declined from about 75 to about 50percent of GDP). Moreover, among all the economies in the WCR that are heavily orientedtoward tourism, those in Subregion III are the most firmly bolstered by a robust financial

56

services sector.

Jamaica, at the geographic center of Subregion III, has the most balanced mix ofagriculture, manufacturing, tourism, and mining of any country in the WCR (agriculture 5percent, mining 10 percent, manufacturing 20 percent, tourism 21 percent), and in this sensecould perhaps be characterized as the most typical of Caribbean countries, notwithstanding a percapita GDP less than one-third the WCR average.

The Subregion III countries exhibit similar range as well in the extent to which fisheriesprovide a significant export/import and dietary staple. The value of net fish exports by the

Bahamas is the second-highest throughout the entire WCR (after Cuba; Table 10). As can beseen in Figure 12, the Cayman Islands has one of the smallest catches (by weight) and exportsthe largest share of its catch of any WCR country, relying heavily on imports (Table A.4) tosatisfy a roughly average per capita domestic consumption rate among its tiny population of26,000. Haiti, by contrast, exports less than 10 percent of its catch, which ranks in the middlerange (by weight) among all the WCR countries; nonetheless, more than two-thirds of the fishconsumed by Haiti's population of 6.5 millon must be imported, even though its per capitaconsumption rate is the fifth lowest in the entire WCR (Table A.4).

Subregions I and V also exhibit considerable divergence in terms of economic size andemphasis, although in neither case is the mix of leading economic sectors for individual countriesas pronounced as in Subregion III.4

Subregion i. The divergence among Subregion I countries is most striking with respectto per capita GDP (Table A. 1, Appendix A). This is the subregion with the highest average percapita GDP by far (1.75 times the WCR average), yet US per capita GDP is 6 times hìgher thanMexico's and 14 times higher than Cuba's. Similarly, population density is well below theWCR average of 159/km2 in all thee countries, but it nonetheless ranges considerably withinthe subregion, from 27/km2 in the United StatesS to 96/km2 in Cuba. All thee economies areindustrialized and diversified, but Cuba's is the most distinctly geared to .natural resourceexploitation: 20 percent of Cuba's GDP is concentrated in agriculture and mining, as opposedto 11 percent of Mexico's and just 4 percent for the United States-notwithstanding the fact thatthe United States holds more than 1600 outer continental shelf leases in the Gulf of Mexico and,together with Mexico, accounts for thee-quarters of the roughly 100 oil refineries in operationthoughout the WCR (Table A.3).

4This is hardly surprising, given the smaller numbers of countries involved-just 3 in Subregion I and 5 in

Subregion V as opposed to 8 in Subregion II-and the higher proportions of large economies, which tend to bemore diversified and more balanced than smaller ones.

SPopulation density is roughly the same throughout the five Gulf coastal states as for the United States as a

whole.

57

MontserratArba

Cayman IS.

DominicaUSVI

St Lucia _Neth. Antilles _

Brish VI

BelizeSt Kis

Grenada __Antigua & Baruda

MartniqueSuriname

NicaraguaGuatemalaBarbados _Fr. Guiana

St Vincent & GrenadinesBahamas

Hai _ ~Trin & Tob

GuadeloupeJamaica _ _

HondurasDominican Rep

Costa Rica ,.Guyana

Colombia ,-

PanamaCuba

VenezuelaUS GulfMexico

oI

10I

20 :i ~o ~ t! -10 Jo ~ 100

1- Exports as % catch ~ Ann kg per capita

Sources: FAD, 1993a; United Nations, n.d.

Figure 12. WCR fish exports and per capita fish consumption(Note: States appear in order, bottom to top, from largest to smallest catch byweight.)

58

The picture is similar with respect to fish export: Cuba has the fourth-largest catch byweight in the WCR (after Mexico, the US Gulf Coast states, and Venezuela), and the value ofits net fish exports is the highest of any reported for the entire region (Table 10). OnlySubregion VI has less economic reliance on tourism, which constitutes less than 2 percent ofGDP for each of the three Subregion I countries and about 2.6 percent of GDP for the five USGulf coastal states.

Subregion V. As importnt as petroleiim is in the Gulf of Mexico, it is in Subregion Vthat its economic dominance is greatest. Each state in the subregion has at least one refinery,and oil accounts for roughly 30 percent of GDP for Trinidad & Tobago and about 23 percentfor Venezuela. Tourism is targeted for development in Venezuela and especially in Trinidad &Tobago, but in neither country, nor in Colombia, does it yet contribute appreciably to GDP.

The least industrialized state in Subregion V is the Netherlands Antilles, which has thelargest commercial drydock in the Western Hemisphere, on Curacao; tourism is the majoremployer and accounts for more than one-third of GDP, followed in importnce bybanking/finance and fishing. Although tourism figures even more prominently in Aruba (whereit is nearly 50 percent of GDP), Aruba's oil and manufacturing sectors are considerably morerobust than in the Netherlands Antiles.

Colombia's maintays are agriculture and manufacturing (each accounting for 21 percentof GDP), but in no other country of Subregion V does agriculture account for more than 5percent of GDP.

Fish is an importnt dietary staple only in the Dutch dependencies, which must importthee-quarters or more of their needs to meet domestic demand. The largest fish exporter in thesubregion is Colombia (Table 10), which has the sixth largest catch by weight in the WCR,export 40 percent of its catch, and import. one-thrd of its needs to meet the lowest per capitadomestic consumption rate outside of Central America. Venezuela, with a catch thee times thesize of Colombia's, exports very little of its catch (about 10 percent) and import less than 1percent of its needs. Trinidad & Tobago imports just under half of its needs and exports lessthan one-fifth of its catch.

Subregion VI. Fisheries may well be more importnt to Guyana and French Guiana inSubregion VI than to any other countries in the WCR. Both have small and quite narroweconomies and very high per capita rates of fish consumption. Guyana, with a population of800,000, has the distinction of being the only WCR state that is self-sufficient in fish.6 FrenchGuiana is one of the major exporters of fish and shrimp in the region, with shrimp accounting

6According to many sources, including FAO (1993a). UN trade data for 1992, however, list $1,375,000 worth

of fresh and frozen shellfish imports by Guyana.

59

for half of export earnings (and sugar accounting for most of the rest).

Overall, agriculture is the predominant sector in both economies, in terms of share ofGDP. In French Guiana, however, the major employers are forestry and construction, althoughFrance is both the largest source of income (in the form of subsidies) and the most important

source of high-wage and high-skil employment (at the Euro-French space center at Kourou).Guyana, nicknamed the "breadbasket" of the Caribbean, is also known as the world's largestproducer of bauxite and has recently become a producer of gold as welL.

Agriculture and bauxite mining are less prominent, though not insubstantial, in theeconomy of Suriname, where the largest share of GDP (22 percent) is concentrated in financialand real estate services and the largest segment of the workforce (37 percent) is employed inpublic administration and defense. Suriname's is decidedly the most precarious ewnomy withinthe subregion, however, having hovered near the brink of fiscal crisis ever since economic aidfrom the Netherlands and the United Nations was suspended in 1982 in the wake of a post-independence military coup (U. S. State Department 1994).

Probably the most homogenous aspects of the Subregion VI countries are theirremarkably low population density, which averages just 2.6 persons per km2, and the near-totalconcentration of their populations along the coastline. Per capita GDP is also below the WCRaverage for all thee countries, but it ranges from a very low $435 in Guyana to more than tentimes that amount in Suriname.

2. Economically homogeneous subregions

Subregion II. Average per capita GDP is lowest of all in Subregion II, one of two quiteeconomically homogeneous subregions within the WCR. As noted earlier, agriculturaleconomies with low per capita GDP and low population densities are characteristic of SubregionII. So, too, is a greater economic orientation toward the Pacific than the Caribbean coast for

all the Subregion II countries that have two coastlines (i.e., all but Belize). Manufacturing,though generally accounting for a lesser share of GDP than agriculture, is even more ubiquitousthroughout the subregion as an importnt economic sector.

The only two countries that depart appreciably from this description are Mexico (whereagriculture is just 9 percent of GDP) and Panama (where agriculture and manufacturingcombined are just 20 percent of GDP). Mexico, as noted earlier, is quite highly diversified, andits economy completely dwarfs all others in the subregion (although Mexico's per capita GDPis no more than 50 percent higher than any other in the subregion). Panama alone in SubregionII has an economy dominated by services (26 percent of GDP in transportation/communications,with 32 percent of the workforce employed in governent services).

60

Only in Belize does tourism represent a substantial proportion of GDP (23 percent) anda priority area for investment and growth.

After Mexico, Panama leads the subregion in fish catch (by weight). Costa Rica,Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize all export substantially greater proportions of their catch thanPanama, but within the subregion only Mexico's net fish exports surpass Panama's in value.The average rate of domestic fish consumption in Subregion II is the lowest in the WCR, andonly in Mexico and Panama does it surpass 10 kg per capita per year.

Subregion iv. In striking contrast to this picture is Subregion IV, the only othereconomically homogeneous subregion, which is typified by tourism-dominated economies,somewhat higher than average per capita GDPs, and very high population densities. SubregionIV contains seven of the bottom eight WCR countries in terms of proportion of GDP accountedfor by agriculture, mining, and manufacturing combined.

The homogeneity is particularly noteworty for the fact that Subregion IV is the one with

the greatest number of political units (14) and the broadest array of foreign dependencies (twoFrench overseas departents, the smaller islands of the Netherlands Antiles, three Britishterritories, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Clearly the commonalities are the small size of theislands and their considerable limitations with respect to natural resources. Only Dominica,Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines can support agriculture to anysignificant extent (i.e., approaching 20 percent of GDP).

Tourism is tremendously importnt to most of the Subregion IV economies. This is trueeven of heavily (French) subsidized Guadeloupe and Martinque and those few other states thatmay be equally well known for other things besides tourism-such as Barbados for its sugar,rum, and banking services, or the US Virgin Islands for its Hess Oil refinery, the largest in theWestern Hemisphere.

Fisheries employment and fish consumption also contrast distinctly with the SubregionII pattern. Domestic consumption of fish is very high in nearly all the Subregion IV states, andcomparatively little of the fish catch is exported by any state except St. Vincent and theGrenadines.

3. Marine pollution and resource degradation problems within and across subregions

Table 11 displays the observed pollution and resource degradation problems associated

with the economic activities and population concentrations within the WCR states andsubregions. Nearly every state in the region has suffered direct damage to coral reefs andmangroves from a combination of pollutants and economic and recreational activities (as wellas from natural hazards such as hurricanes and coral bleaching). The next most common

61

Tab

le i

i

Obs

erve

d R

esou

rcea

nd P

ollu

tion

Pro

blem

s

Sub

regi

o I

Man

".C

osta

lC

os ta

DI~

! D

ama

10 R

eers

lang

roes

Der

or.

Sol

Unr

eIn

aequ

ate

Cot

sOIt

Polu

tE

rosi

o(o

lh lh

n na

turs

haa

rd)

la li

Ero

slo

utal

euns

s-Invenio/.ssmt 01

Stal

e(C

odi

me,

.es

sed

man

neSe

.01

1F

e1

Min

ing

Sefi

dsl

Nll)

ta !

!co

.tal

reso

urcp

rsag

Pest

olh

WIs

ieac

lilty

Indu

s i

Cu

xx

xsand drein, sperfhlng

Sho

of l

co, f

u, h

osin

g,m

i .pe

re p

ert,

cosu

mgo

.M

exic

xx

xtr

mpl

in, b

ot g

rong

s, li

ne,

xx

xee

ll.sp

erfh

lng

Uni

Sta

le (

Gu

xx

xx

dren

g, a

nc d

ama,

line

,x

Sebo

ta p

o.eo

ll).h

lp tr

1l, w

rks

0' N

Sub

reg

Ion

IIM

anne

'Cos

tal

Cos

taD

iret D

amag

10

Ree

lsla

ngro

esD

elor

.So

lU

nre

lnau

a!e

Com

ents

/Oth

erPo

llut

Ero

sio

(oth

r th

an n

atur

al h

azar

ds)

ta ti

Ero

sloe

ulat

edun

ass-

Inventor/a.sm! 01

Stal

e(C

odl

me

esse

dm

anne

Sew

-O

ilFe

rM

inin

gSo

idi t

rll)

ta li

cost

alre

sour

cpre

ms

age

Pest

olh

WIs

Ieac

lilty

Indu

s I

Bel

ize

x.n

cho

dam

age,

sew

dum

pin

xx

Poah

in o

r. tu

lr, I

osle

r, c

o by

fom

. Sai

iwie

Intr

sio

Infr

eshW

ller

_n..

Seb

opo

ut.

Cos

ta R

icx

xx

lnmplin, litteri, cleari for fuel

xSi

ltati.

& s

hrim

p po

Gua

tela

xx

anch

o da

mag

xx

Wal

er p

ol.ti

. Oil

spill

.

Hor

ra.

xx

xx

trm

plng

, bol

gro

ndin

g, li

tter,

xx

xF

ram

etat

i of c

o.la

l aut

hlls

.!

. pe

arfh

lng

Mex

icx

xx

xX

xO

esel

i.N

lcri

uax

xx

xW. te poli.

P.ne

ma

xx

dregin. oil pipeine & termi""I.

xx

Overl.hing. Coting of turt.

land

ll

"",..

_~:~

:-..;

,:,i.a

j:'~"

'-_'

Tab

le 1

1 (c

ont'd

.)

0\ \.

Sub

regi

on II

Mar

ineC

osta

lC

osla

Dire

ct D

amag

e to

Ree

lslM

angr

oes

Def

ores

-So

liU

nre

Inad

uate

Com

meW

Olh

erPo

luto

n. E

rosi

o(oth thn natura hazards)

ta li

Ero

sloS

eul

aled

unas

s-In

vent

or/a

ssm

t of

Stal

e(C

o.di

men

-es

sed

mar

ine

Se.

011

Fer

Min

ing

Sost

rll)

ta li

cos

tal

reso

urce

sprs

age

Pesl

oth

was

teac

tMty

Indu

sl

Bah

aX

Exp

lslv

espo

sons

use

d lo

r nS

hlng

,X

anc damage, spearflShlng

Cay

man

Is.

Xx

anc damage, Ii

tier,

spe

arls

hlng

Sea

bo ta

r po

lut.

Lak

ofnali resourcs, lotal relianc on

Impo

.

Cub

ex

xx

sand drein, spaarlshlng

Sho

s of

roo

, iv,

hos

ing,

mal

ne s

pare

par

t, co

sum

00 .

Dolrn Repblic

xx

xdi

ver

dam

a, li

tt, ip

erflS

hlng

xCe id IC on nshe Impo.

Lote overshe. III coth

of c

ols,

bir

ds, l

us, T

hpo

.H

ald

xx

man

groe

cle

ri fo

r ru

elx

xO

verx

plta

ll of

nsh

. Inv

erle

and she expo tr.

Jam

aic

xx

xx

dre spols, lnmplln, ancho

xx

xExtr overhlng. High sedimet

dam

a, d

ynam

itng,

spe

rflS

hlng

,Iong fro bauxite mining. El'lo

bot.

groi

ngs

fr sand real. Reel curi

co.

Pu

RI

xx

xan

c da

ma,

shi

p ln

ll,x

Hea

re

on fo

o Im

po.

sper

1hln

g, b

obi,

wrk

sT

hl p

oil.

Tur

& C

alcs

Is.

dren

g, II

t1r

xMinima resourc base.

~:x~

~;¡j

:,i.a

;:;.,'

.-_'

Tab

le 1

1 (c

ont'd

.)

~

Subr

egio

n li

Mar

in&

eost

aleo

ata

Dir

et D

amag

e 10

Ree

lstM

angr

oes

Del

or-

Sol

Unr

eIn

auat

eC

omel

sOlh

rPo

llut

Ero

sio

(othr thn nature hazards)

ta tI

Ero

sloe

ulal

euns

s-In

enlo

/ass

ml o

fSt

ata

(Co

d1m

ees

sed

man

eSe

w-

011

Fer

Min

ing

Solid

slrU

o)te

Uo

cost

elre

sopr

sag

Pet

oth

WIs

ieio

tllty

Inus

t

Ani

nanc damage, spearflShlng

xA

ntlu

a &

Bar

bx

sand remoal, ancho damage,

Lobs

t", o

vere

xplte

d.ex

plos

ives

Bar

bsx

xx

xx

dreng. conslrtion, explosives

Nea

rsho

fish

es o

vere

xplle

;lhl pout; chngng weie

circlati pall & quality.

Brl

Ush

Vir

gin

Is.

xx

man

ge c

lear

i, lit

ter,

dyn

amiti

ngx

Ool

rkx

xx

man

groe

cle

ari f

or f

ux

Shlp

-s ta

pou

t.G

rex

xx

xlin

... s

pear

1shl

ngx

Al f

ishe

s ov

xpl.

Ero

iofr

..nd

min

ing.

Seb

opo

lut.

Gua

elou

pex

xx

xx

dyna

miti

ngx

xx

Mar

tniq

uex

man

groe

cle

arin

gx

xM

onts

eml

xF

ishe

s ov

erxp

fol1

e.N

elh.

Ant

ills

xx

xmangroe clearing, anc & diver

xS

ho o

f frs

h W

Iie. F

ishe

sdamage, sper1hlng

dete orr Saba. Marine heblls

au1em fr lnusb11 and

retil uses.

SL K

Itt &

Nev

sx

xHea relia on fo Impo.

Nears ho fishes expl.

E=

1o fr

san

d re

al.

Inau

ate

po fe

dllS

s.S

L L

ucx

lors

t cle

ri, s

and

min

ing,

anc

xx

~s s

he

blls

sir

s se

d. T

h&

div

er d

amag

, spe

rflS

hlng

po.

SL Vinct &

xde

tert

sx

xS

ebo

tar

pout

. Was

ta fr

Gre

nes

;

yact

s.U

S V

irgin

Is.

xx

xaa

nd m

inin

g, a

nc d

ama,

litte

r,La 01 natura trshwle sous.

lnm

plln

, bot

grn

ding

Thl

pou

t.

Tab

le 1

1 (c

oot'd

.)

Subregion V

Man

n&C

osla

lC

o.ta

Dlrel Damage 10 Reef.lMangl'e.

Del

ore.

-So

lU

nre

Inae

quat

eC

omen

ts/O

thr

Polu

lE

ro.1

o(o

thr

!han

nat

ural

hlz

an:)

ta ll

Ero

oloe

ulat

eUN

I5s"

Inve

to/a

umi o

fSt

ale

(Co-

dlm

eea

sed

man

neSe

w-

011

Fer

Min

ing

Solid

o tnll)

ta ti

co.la

lre

.our

cpm

em.

age

Pe.t

oU-

wa.

teec

lllly

Indu

st

Arb

a.

.ref. cooldre largly dead

Soil poti.

Co

..

""

sand

e.in

tl, fi

llin,

enc

ho.

".

Water poti. Coti of

dam

a, li

ller,

dyn

amlH

ng, w

rk.

en ll speie.. Thrml

po.

Net

h. A

n~lIe

..

""

"mangl'e clearing, anc & diver

.S

ho o

f fr.

h w

ate.

Mar

ine

dam

a,. .

pear

lhln

ghlb/to su1em fr lnu.1r1 and

retll u.e.. n-i pout.

Trin

id &

Tob

..

.an

cho

dam

age,

lille

r, tr

mp6

ngReclllll ml.u.e of

.wam

plnd

.. C

o.ta

l zon

re.

ouco

fik:to

. Ove

r~ng

of b

.and .he..

Ven

ezue

la.

..

.m

angl

'e f

illin

g, .h

lp tr

rf.

.C

o1'd

ng d

end

on c

o. ta

lare.. Seimetati of la.

fr dams. De.tntl of nalura

hlb/

to. O

v.hl

n of

lurt

es a

ndIo

.ter.

0\ VI

Sub

regi

on V

IM

arir

iCo.

tal

Co.

taD

iret D

ama

to R

eefs

lang

l'e.

Def

or.

SOL

Unr

eIn

aequ

ate

Com

eWO

lhPo

luto

nE

ro.1

o(olh thn natura hlzard.)

tade

nE

ro.lo

eu1

tedu

na..-

Inve

ntor

/aum

t of

Stat

e(C

od1

me

8$'0

0m

arin

eSe

won

F ei

Min

ing

Soid

. tnt

l)la ti

co. tal

re.o

urcp

r.ag

Pe.t

oU-

wa.

teec

t!ly

Indu

st

Fre Guna

.G

uyan

a.

X.

Water po.

Suri

na.

.So

rc.:

UN

EPn

UC

N 1

98; E

ld a

nd P

erll,

199

1; R

o.s,

Fen

, and

Gab

le, 1

~ì G

lade

lte a

nd O

gen,

199

.

problem throughout the region is pollution of coastal waters by sewage effuent. Oil pollutionis another widespread problem, although one that tends to originate primarily from sources andactivities that are not based on land.

On average, the states in Subregions I and V do better than those in the other subregionsin providing sewerage services (an average of 73 % of citizens in Subregion I have access toservices, and an average of 64% of Subregion V citizens). Being the most heavily industrializedof the subregions, they share other, less desirable, traits as well. Readily apparent in Table 11

(and in the CEPPOL results), for example, are the pollutants associated with the heavy emphasison oil exploration and refining in both these subregions. Problems of a more localized naturein Subregions I and V include the coastal erosion associated with the high concentration ofpopulation in the coastal zone in Venezuela; soil erosion/sedimentation emanating from Mexico,the US Gulf Coast, and Venezuela; deforestation in Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela; andstress to reefs and mangroves from ship traffic and wrecks off Colombia, the United States, andVenezuela.

The only other area in the WCR where ship traffc and groundings have been cited asa serious problem is the Greater Antilles, especially off Puerto Rico and Jamaica. Far moreimportant and common throughout Subregion III, however, is pollution by oil and grease,minig, and other industrial pollutants, which has left only the Bahamas and the Turks andCaicos Islands relatively untroubled. Jamaica, the most economically broad and balanced statein the subregion, suffers the broadest array of pollution and environmental degradation problemsas well, including stress to mangroves from sand removal and bauxite mining, deforestation, andsoil erosion. Haiti is noteworty for its very high rate of mangrove clearing for fuel to sustain

a tradition of charcoal-based cooking, and for its very low rate of access to sewerage services.Overall, Subregion III ranks in the middle range for provision of such services, which are

available to an average of 62 % of citizens thoughout the subregion. The broadest access isprovided by the Cayman Islands, where 97% of the population have access to sewerage services.

The contrasts between Subregions II and IV, and the relative homogeneity within each,are also evident in the environmental problems noted in Table 11. Deforestation is a problemfor every Subregion II country, whereas coastal erosion, sewage pollution, and overfishing arethe most pervasive natural resource problems in Subregion IV (in addition to the ubiquitousstresses to reefs and mangroves). In both subregions, an average of just 37% of the populationhas access to sewage services.

7 Within Subregion II, the coastal waters of Costa Rica,

7Accrding to the Britannica Book of the Year 1995. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) paints

an even more discouraging picture: P AHO estimates that -c 10 % of sewerage systems in Latin American countrieshave adequate treatment plants, and that only 5-10% of the collected wastewater receives adequate treatment

(PAHO/WHO 1992). For the countries of the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM, including Antigua &Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Doiinica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico,Puerto Rico, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and

66

Honduras, and Mexico contain substantial amounts of industrial pollutants, which is a problemas well for Barbados, Grenada, Guadeloupe, and the US Virgin Islands in Subregion IV.

The very few indications of pollution and natural resource degradation problems notedfor Subregion VI in Table 11 reflects primarily two factors: the relative lack of modernindustrialization in the subregion, and a lack of study of its environmental problems. Only thesewage problems associated with the heavily coastal concentration of the population arerecorded.

4. Extra-regional trade as a unifying force

Having emphasized the economic diversity of the Wider Caribbean Region and thedistinct characteristics of its individual states and subregions as crucial considerations in thedevelopment of an effective protocol on land-based marine pollution, it is equally importnt torecognize the degree to which this region has come to be defined and shaped into something ofa single, coherent entity by virte of its trade relations with the rest of the world. The stateswith importnt agricultural sectors, for example, are bound by their interest in preferential tradeagreements with the United States and the United Kingdom concernng sugar and bananas, andthe manufacturing-oriented economies are bound by a similar interest in agreements with theUnited States concernng garments and other consumer goods.

Currently there is considerable concern that at least some of these sectors are in jeopardyfrom the trend toward trade liberalization embodied in recent NAFTA and GATT/WTOdevelopments and from changes in UK import policies resulting from the integration of theEuropean market. (In addition, Caribbean shipping services have been predicted to lose marketshare in the wake of European integration and resulting effort to strengthen the position ofEuropean shipping services.) The fear of fallng prices and/or loss of market share hasintensified the trend.roward investmentin.tourism "thoughout virtally the entire region-justas banana production was intensified after a dramatic lowering of US sugar quotas in the 1980sled to a decline in the importnce of sugar to many WCR economies.

The increase in banana production has had serious environmental consequences (WorldBank 1993), primarily in the forms of soil depletion and erosion and high concentrations ofnutrients and pesticides in agricultural run-off. The intensification of tourism-related

constrction, sewage, transporttion, and other activities and services, particularly within thewell-established, beach-oriented tourist markets, could eventually prove even moreenvironmentally damaging. As one concerned observer has argued, "Tourism in the Caribbeancould cease within ten years if destruction of the environment continues at the present pace"

Venezuela), a recent PAHO survey concluded that only 2 % to 16% of the population is served by sewage systems(UNEP 1994a).

67

(Goodwin 1992).

One encouraging and potentially competing trend, in which Belize, Dominica, andGuyana have been leading the way, is an emphasis on ecotourism and nature activities, whichare particularly popular with the Europeans who account for most of the recent growth in touristarrivals in the region (Goodwin 1992). Another development, embraced by some governmentsand shunned by others, is the spread of casino gambling, which has proven quite successful inboosting tourism performance in Aruba, for example (Goodwin 1992).

E. Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

In the context of negotiating an international protocol, a particularly important aspect ofregional diversity in the WCR concerns the distinct legal traditions and systems which must beharmonied and upon which a system of effective protocol implementation depends. Themajority of states follow one of two primary legal/cultural systems prevailing in the region. Thefirst of these is the Roman civil law tradition of the Spanish-speaking countries, in which

patterns of resource use are based upon the principles of private ownership and have beencodified over time in a body of civil codes, statutes, and ordinances. The other major traditionin the region is that of Anglo-Saxon common law, which traditionally has emphasized custom,usage, and the decisions and precedents of courts of law, and only comparatively recently has

been codified by legislative action.

Characteristic of nearly all the WCR countries, however, irespective of legal tradition,is an incomplete and somewhat disjointed approach to environmental legislation andmanagement. Two common conclusions noted in studies of the environmental problems of theWider Caribbean Region are that (1) the laws, regulations, statutes, and ordinances with abearing on environmental matters typically are too fragmented to deal. comprehensively and

effectively with the full range of environmental problems in the region; and (2) the legal andloradmiistrative mechanisms for enforcing environmental rules are too often absent,ìhappropriate,andlor readily ignored or circumvented.

A 1991 study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), for example, notes thatmost Bank borrower countries in the WCR8 lack coherent national policies for environmentalprotection, relying instead on so-called sectoral legislation and ministries, which typicallyaddress themselves to thee general categories of fundamentally "dissimilar" subjects:

(i) protection of certain natural resources such as water, soil, wildlife, marine and coastal

ecosystems, nonrenewable natural resources, etc.;

8lADB borrower countries in the region include the Bahamas, Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican

Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname, Trinidad &Tobago, and Venezuela.

68

(ii) management of the urban environment, such as human settlements and industrial sites; and

(iii) protection of human health from environmental impact (Brañes 1991).

The IADB study further notes that this purely administrative approach to environmentallegislation is generally accompanied by an approach to enforcement that revolves around thenotion of policing and the establishment of penalties. The fines associated with environmentalinfractions, moreover, are generally too low to constitute a serious deterrent, and in many casesthey are easily avoided because of the lack of resources to police effectively.

These points are reinforced in a 1994 World Bank study of the 16 member nations ofCARCOM (the Caribbean Common Market).9 The World Bank study rates the severity of 11key environmental issues in each of the 16 countries, using a scale of 1 (least severe) to 5 (mostsevere). Heading the list, in terms of combined score for all 16 countries, is inadequate"monitoring/enforcement" (54 points). Rated fourth most severe among the 11 issues are theadequacy of the "institutional framework" and "coastal zone degradation" (both at 44 points),after solid waste management (51) and sewage disposal (47).

A third and closely related problem with the institutional framework, according to theIADB study, is the tendency of WCR states to centralize legislative and administrative authorityunduly at the national leveL. Very few of the region's countries-only Cuba, Mexico, St. Kitts& Nevis, the United States, and Venezuela-have a federalized form of governent in whichstates or provinces are interposed between the national and municipal levels and given extensiveauthority for establishing or enforcing laws and regulations with environmental relevance. ioOne importnt consequence of this approach has been to limit severely the response capabilityof environmental administrations (Brañes 1991).

As a practical matter, however, the pattern in federalized and non-federalized states alikeis for "general issues of the ownership and use of environmental components, damage to theenvironment, and legal custodianship of the environment" to be governed not by comprehensivelegislation but by a 'patchwork of. sectoraL legislation and civil codes, under criteria that theIADB study criticizes as "totally inappropriate" (Brañes 1991). At the heart of the problem withthe legal and regulatory framework that is characteristic of most WCR countries is legislationthat fails to recognie what the World Bank (1994) has termed "the interlocking nature of theeconomy and the ecology" for most of the Caribbean countries:

9'e CARICOM members are Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, DominicanRepublic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the

Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago.

lOIn Venezuela, however, although state governments generally have powers expressly assigned to them as well

as residual powers not expressly assigned to the national or municipal governents, authority for environmentalmatters is reserved for the national governent. In Mexico, similarly, the national governent has long reservedsuch powers, although recent reform allow for a gradual sharing of environmental powers by state and municipalgovernents (Brañes 1991).

69

This legislation ignores the fact that the behavior it attempts to correct through these sanctions does notnormally involve individual deviations from an imposed legal order, but generalized social behavior whichis deeply rooted in society as a result of the predominant style of development based on production andconsumption patterns that often clash with environmental protection. (Brañes 1991)

Nor does the typical pattern of sectoral legislation and civil codes reflect a modern, scientificunderstanding of the environment as a single, interlocking system.

There are some noteworthy exceptions to this pattern, however, which Brañes argues arecontributing to a trend throughout much of the region toward a more comprehensive approachto environmental legislation and management. The IADB study cites national legislation inColombia, Cuba, Guatemala, and Mexico as instances of "true" environmental legislation-thatis, legislation "based on a concept that views the environment as a whole, organied as asystem." The specific examples include Colombia's National Code on Renewable Natural

Resources and Environmental Protection (1974); Cuba's Act No. 33 on Environmental

Protection and the Rational Use of Natural Resources (1981); Guatemala's Environmental

Protection and Improvement Act (1986); and Mexico's General Act on Ecological Balance andEnvironmental Protection (1988), which combines and supersedes two earlier acts of similarcharacter (the 1971 Federal Act on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution, andthe 1982 Federal Environmental Protection Act). Although not covered by the IADB studies,both Belize and the United States could be included in this group as well-Belize for its 1992Environmental Protection Act, and the United States for its 1969 National Environmental PolicyAct.

Evidence for the argument that other states in the region are beginng to recognie theintegrated nature of the environment and of the causes of its degradation is presented in Table12, which indicates the incidence of cabinet-level ministries, national committees, or othernational bodies whose charter is to provide comprehensive leadership and coordination on

environmental matters. Although comparatively few of the WCR states (Belize, Colombia,Grenada, Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago, and Venezuela) have yet accorded the environment theimportnce of a cabinet-level concern, most have at least established a nationaL:committee orsome other entity that addresses itself more or less exclusively to environmental matters.

National committees typically are housed in the office of the president and include in theirmembership the ministers of relevant sectoral agencies; they may also include representativesof other public or scientific organizations, industr, and NGOs.

Although national committees are generally less infuential than groups accorded cabinet-level status, as permanent bodies they help to ensure that environmental affairs receivecontinuous, comprehensive, high-level attention. Of the 25 sovereign WCR states!! listed inTable 12, only 6 have not established some form of national umbrella organization to providecomprehensive oversight and leadership on environmental matters, and there is no WCR statethat does not fill such a gap by vesting at least some measure of national environmental policy

"With few exceptions, the Dutch, UK, and US dependencies and the French overseas deparments in the regionconform to the laws and regulatory structures and procedures of their respective protector states, which are notconsidered in this discussion.

70

Table 12

Aut

horf

ly fo

r E

nviro

nmen

tal P

olle

y an

d E

nfor

cem

ent I

n th

e W

CR

Sla

tes

-i ..

Stal

eC

opre

oni""

Env

lrom

onio

l Aul

hrlly

SecO

nI A

gand

ea w

ith E

nYlr

ornn

tiil R

eapo

nslb

llltk

nShoro Aulhrt lo Lo Env. Moml

Mln

litt

Nol

l Coi

n..

Oth

erA

or1.

Hea

lthPl

anni

ngN

at R

eala

bor

Sle1

8M

unld

nty

Oth

erAntiue & BOrbda

XX

'X

Bah

amu

XX

,B

o~øo

iX

XB

eliz

eX

XX

XC

Oom

bio

XN

oll.

Pop.

& E

nv, C

oncM

XX

'X

X (

Ore

on C

oncO

l)R

oolo

l Co.

eo le

Ra

XX

XC

ubo

XA

cony

0' S

cien

c.X

Fish

er1e

s, H

ydnt

ulic

Rei

.X

Doi

nic

X'

XX

XvinoOO Condl,

Doinan Ropubl1

XX

XX

Gre

ada

XX

'X

XX

'E

nv. H

ealth

Ois

tnct

sG

uale

mila

XX

XG

uyan

aA

dviio

ry E

nv. C

onci

lX

Hai

tiX

Hon

dun!

sX

XX

XJ8

mal

aiN

ol. R

.i. &

CO

Ol..

1 A

uth_

XX

Mex

icX

XX

XN

icra

gaX

XX

Piin

ama

X

XSI

. KIt

to &

Nov

lX

X'

XX

XSI

. luc

loX

XX

'T

nide

, Ind

. & T

Oui

s.1

XS

I. V

once

l & O

ro.

XX

XSU

Mom

oX

XT

rlnl

do &

TO

boO

OX

XX

UrJ

led

Sta

tei

Env

. Pro

l. A

oone

yX

XX

XX

XSomo reloVconiy

~nd

apon

donl

ogo

ney)

'au

~tie

iV

enei

uel

X

X

See

next

pag

e fo

r no

tes.

Tables 12: Notes

'Ver

y w

eak

Coa

stal

Dev

elop

men

t Aut

horit

y.2J

oinl

Com

mitt

ee o

n E

nviro

nmen

tal A

ffairs

(IN

DE

RE

NA

), M

inis

try

of H

ealth

; rec

ently

IND

ER

EN

A

was

con

vert

ed in

to a

Min

istr

y of

the

Env

ironm

ent.

i-he Division of Forest and Wildlife is recognized throughout

the

Eas

tern

Car

ibbe

an fo

r its

str

ong

lead

ersh

ip r

ole

in d

omes

tic e

nvir

onm

enta

l mat

ters

.'E

nviro

nmen

tal C

onse

rvat

ion

Cou

ncil

esta

blis

hed

1983

, but

in a

ctiv

e si

nce

its fi

rst a

nd o

nly

mee

ting

that year.

5Loc

al g

over

nmen

t bod

ies

wer

e di

ssol

ved

by th

e ce

ntra

l gov

ernm

ent i

n 19

69; s

ince

then

thre

hav

e

been

occ

asio

nal p

ledg

es to

res

tore

them

.&

Min

istr

y of

Nat

ural

Res

ourc

es a

nd E

nviro

nmen

t est

ablis

hed

in 1

984,

but

it la

cks

an a

dmin

istr

ativ

est

ruct

ure

and

does

not

func

tion.

7Cen

tral

Pla

nnin

g U

nit i

s th

e ke

y co

rdin

atin

g m

echa

nism

.

&P

arks

and

Bea

ches

Com

mis

sion

.9P

resi

dent

Clin

ton

has

spok

en o

f mak

ing

the

EP

A a

cab

inet

-leve

l dep

artm

ent,

but n

o fo

imal

act

ion

has

been

take

n.

SO

UR

CE

S: B

rañe

s, 1

991;

Isla

nds

Res

ourc

es F

ound

atio

n, 1

991

a,b,

c,d,

e,f (

Cou

ntry

Pro

files

of A

ntig

ua &

Bar

buda

, Dom

inic

a,G

rena

da, S

l. K

itts

& N

evis

, St.

Luc

ia, S

t. V

ince

nt &

the

Gre

nadi

nes)

; Wor

ldm

ark

Enc

ylco

pead

ia o

f/he

Nat

ions

: Am

eric

as, 1

984;

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

, 199

2.

-i tv

;t5

and authority in one or more sectoral mInistries. Table 12 also shows that, although

intermediate state-level authority for environmental matters is quite rare thoughout the WCR,all but 9 national governments share such authority, at least as a practical matter, withmunicipalities.

Even in those states where a holistic view of the environment has not taken hold, localand national sectoral authorities have in many cases acquired broader responsibility and authorityas knowledge of the interactions between environment and economic activity has increased.Ordinances for controlling beach litter, for example, have been expanded to encompass habitatprotection and beach stabilization; and port/harbor authorities in some small-island nations haveacquired major responsibility for regulation of construction and development activities (UNEP1994c). As noted in UNEP's 1994 document on Appropriate Approaches to the developmentof an LBMP protocol for the Wider Caribbean, "(t)he challenge for governents is to determinehow to establish a national plannng framework that builds on existing power structures andspecialized expertise and complements and reinforces local authorities" (UNEP 1994c; emphasisin original). The same document also recommends the designation of a "national focal point"for land-based marine pollution problems and control, which in many instances may well ensuregreater and better-integrated attention to LBMP issues than could reasonably be expected of anewly established national minstry with a far more comprehensive environmental charter.

F. Measures of Environmental Infrastructure

In addition to the environmental laws and regulations described above, we have surveyedthe literature for measures of environmental infrastructure. Table 13 compares some usefulmeasures across WCR states. Good summaries of the quality of the local marine environmentand the status of intitutional and technological capabilities to deal with LBMP problems can befound in the national reports to the UNCED conference (United Nations 1992). Some of therelevant information is listed in the last column of Table 13.

Other useful measures include the number of major submarine outfalls (Salas 1994), thepercentage of the state's populations with access to closed public sewers or septic tanks, and thepercentage of the population with access to safe drinking water. Submarine outfalls providebenefits in terms of removing sewage from discharge into immediate coastal environments. Onlyin the United States and Puerto Rico are discharges subject to primary or secondary treatment.Many states have minor submarine outfalls; for example, in some island states, coastal hotelsoften discharge in this manner. No statistics have been collected on minor submarine

discharges. Where sewage disposal is available, the populations of most small island anddeveloping nations are using septic tanks. Closed public sewers are limited to a few urbanenvironments and to the developed states and associated territories of the WCR. Safe drinkingwater is readily available to the majority of the region's populations, except in the case of a fewvery underdeveloped states. Many of the island and coastal populations have encounteredproblems associated with the draw-down of groundwater supplies, resulting in saline intrsioninto aquifers and the contamination of groundwater. In some cases, coastal desalination plantscan contribute to excessive salinity levels in wetland or near coastal environments.

".

.~¡,h'1',~ :

73

Table 13

Measures of Environmental

Infr

astr

uctu

re'

-i .t

Subm

arin

eSe

wag

eSa

feO

DF

Stat

eO

utfa

llsD

ispo

sal

Wat

erE

xpen

d.O

ther

(%)

Acc

ess

($U

S m

il)(%

)A

ngui

la

Ant

iQua

& B

arbu

da17

100

Sew

age

trea

tmen

t ser

ves

priv

ate

tour

ist f

acilt

ies

prim

arilv

: Cen

tral

Boa

rd o

f Hea

~h

mon

itors

sew

age

Aru

ba0.

87T

he B

aham

as63

100

Coastal and marlne environmental mon~Orln9 and environmentally sound waste disposal are prriie; Bahamas

Nat

iona

l Tru

st w

orks

to c

onse

rve

coas

tal a

n m

arln

e en

viro

nmen

ts.

Bar

bado

s1

6710

0C

oast

al C

onse

rvat

ion

Pro

ec U

nit c

ondu

cts

coas

tal m

onito

ring;

IAD

B fi

nanc

ing

for

sew

erag

e sy

stem

s In

Bri

dget

ow a

nd o

n w

est a

nd s

outh

coa

sts.

Bel

ize

3575

UN

IDO

spo

nsor

ing

Indu

stri

l Pol

lutio

n C

ontr

ol M

onito

rino

Pro

qram

me

for

Iiou

id w

aste

str

eam

s on

the

New

Riv

er.

Br~

ish

Vir

gin

Is.

1C

IDA

spo

nsor

s a

Coa

stal

Res

ourc

es In

vent

ory;

env

ironm

enta

l wat

er g

ualit

y is

mon

itore

d.C

aj'm

an I

slan

ds97

99C

olom

bia

7093

78.3

Paci

fc c

oast

ecy

stem

s ar

e pr

irity

.Costa Rica

6793

Agr

ohem

ical

mar

lne

pollu

tion

Is a

gro

ing

conc

em.

Cub

a61

98E

nviro

nmen

tal m

ana~

emen

t and

pro

tect

ion

of o

cean

s an

d ba

vs Is

of "

natio

nal i

mpo

rtan

ce."

Dom

inic

a12

771.

07Doinican Republic

5267

3.82

A U

n~ fo

r E

nviro

nmen

tal S

tudi

es h

as b

en e

stab

lishe

d.French Guiana

34G

rena

da23

85G

uade

loup

e25

Gua

tem

ala

2062

7.5

Pro

teci

on a

nd m

anag

emen

t of w

ater

shed

s an

d id

entif

catio

n of

pol

lutio

n so

urce

s ar

e pr

iorit

ies.

Guy

ana

1061

Uni

vers

it of

Guy

ana

Invo

led

In a

Wat

er R

esur

ce M

anag

emen

t pro

ect;

cont

rolln

g co

stal

pol

utan

ts,

espe

ially

fro

m s

UQ

ar P

rouc

tion

and

dist

ileri

es I

s a

prir

ltY..

Ha~

i2

39lOB Involved in san~atlon and drinking water financing; environmental

Infr

astr

uctu

re a

lmos

t non

exis

tent

.H

ondu

ras

1477

35.0

Mar

ine

ecsy

stem

stu

dy u

nder

way

.Ja

mai

ca10

0C

oast

al a

nd m

arin

e en

viro

nmen

tal m

anag

emen

t and

pol

lutio

n co

ntro

l are

prio

ritie

s; p

relim

inar

cos

t est

imat

es to

clea

n up

Kin

gsto

n H

arbu

r ar

e $1

60 m

illon

.M

artin

ique

142

Tab

le 1

3 (c

ontd

.)

.. Ui

Mex

Ico

261

7611

12.0

\A

ctio

n P

lan

on P

reve

ntio

n an

d C

ontr

ol o

f Mar

ine

Pol

lutio

n.

Mon

tser

rat

Net

herl

ands

Ant

iles

41.0

Teb

oln

Rep

Ort

sur

vevs

env

Iron

men

tal p

robl

ems

In h

arbr

s.

Nlc

araa

ua19

548.

9M

anar

ove

rest

orat

ion

pral

ects

.

Pana

ma

4483

Inte

rlnst

itutlo

n C

omm

Ittee

for

Wat

er S

anita

tion

and

the

Env

ironm

ent c

reat

ed In

199

0.

Puer

to R

ic14

96W

aW~

pollu

tlon

cont

rol e

mpl

oyl~

US

pro

cedu

res:

Env

ironm

enta

l Oua

llty

Boa

rd Is

sues

dis

char

ge p

erm

its; w

ater

Quail studIes conducted to eva uate Performance and ensure comrillance.

SI.

Kits

& N

evIs

3210

0P

roar

ams

have

ben

Impl

emen

ted

to c

ontr

ol w

ater

Qua

litv.

SI.

Luci

a36

67A

s In

oth

er O

EC

S s

tate

s. lo

-cos

t tec

hnol

oies

for

sew

arie

trea

tmen

t exI

st.

St.

VIn

cent

& T

he22

752.

66A

s In

oth

er O

EC

S s

tate

s, lo

w-c

ost t

echn

oloi

es fo

r se

wag

e tr

eatm

ent e

xlsl

.G

rena

dine

s

Suri

nam

eG

roun

dwat

er s

alln

atio

n re

conl

zed

as a

pro

blem

but

Is

not a

cle

ar e

nvir

omen

tal p

rltv

.

Trin

Idad

& T

obag

o41

97al

late

ral O

il S

pil C

ontin

genc

y P

lan

wlth

Ven

ezue

la: t

rans

boun

dary

aIr

pol

lutio

n fr

om la

nd-b

ased

sou

rces

see

n as

a co

ncer

n bu

t Is

not a

cer

a en

viro

nmen

tal p

rlorit

v.

Tur

k &

Cal

co I

s.0.

27E

nviro

nmen

tal r

evIe

w c

ondu

cted

In 1

966;

legi

slat

ion

unde

r de

velo

pmen

t: da

mag

e to

mar

ine

ecys

tem

from

laro

e-sc

ale

deve

lopm

ent I

s re

coni

zed.

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

9910

0U

S E

PA

tech

nolo

y st

anda

rds.

dis

char

ge p

erm

it. p

ublic

ly o

wed

trea

tmen

t wor

k: s

ome

cosI

dera

tion

of p

olnt

-no

nQ(in

t sou

rce

trad

ina:

mos

t ext

ensi

ve e

nviro

nmen

tal m

onlto

rlnc

In r

oolo

n.

U.S

. Vlra

ln Is

land

s94

US

mod

el' I

nfra

stru

ctur

e un

know

.

Ven

ezue

la39

8089

Pror

am to

upg

rade

wat

ersh

edSi

~itla

ted

wlh

hel

p of

Int

erna

tiona

l ban

ks a

nd E

uroa

n st

ates

: num

erau

s ou

tfal

ls,

but s

ome

are

old,

sU

aaes

tlna

a h

h de

aree

of

dete

rira

tion.

'Sege dispoalis a measure of the percntage of

the relevant state's polatio wi acc to cloed public seweni or septic tanks. Safe water Is a measure of the petae of the relevant state's

polati wi acc to safe drinking water. Ofal development financing Is estimated fro OECD data for 1990 on private secor and offcIal develoent assistance and on ofial develoent

finan

cing

by

purp

e.

Sourc: BrfannlcB Book ofthe YeBr(1993): United Nations (1992); OECD (1993).

A common plea in the national UNCED report is for foreign aid and other internationalfinancial assistance to help fortify the mostly inadequate capabilties for dealing with LBMPproblems in the region.

G. Scientific Capabiltiesii

Most countries and terrtories in the WCR support some level of marine scientificresearch, the most commonly tageted research areas being fisheries, coastal management, and,more recently, the development and maintenance of marine parks and reserves. Much of thisresearch is carried out at regional unversities or at small marine laboratories that are owned bya regional or a Nort American university, supported by competitively awarded governentfunding. Typically such scientific research programs are seriously constrained by small budgetsand associated limitations in staff siz and facilties. Formal cooperation among a number ofthe region's research intitutions is well established, however, partcularly cooperation towardthe goal of promoting general awareness in the region of mae problems and programs toaddress them. One promient example is the Association of Mare Laboratories of theCarbbean, which was founded in 1957 (as the Association of Island Mare Laboratories of theCarbbean) and in 1994 included 23 member intitutions located in 17 WCR states (see TableA.6, Appendix A).

An importnt component of the basic ecological research conducted in the Caribbea isresearch by US university-affiliated scientists workig in regional marine laboratories withsupport from such US governent agencies as the National Science Foundation, the NationalPark Service, and the Nationa Oceanc and Atmospheric Admistrtion. As orthe late 1980s,

the greater Caribbean accounted for one-fift of all US mare scientific projects requiring vesselclearances from foreign governents (Negroponte 1987). Included in Table A.6 is a list ofmember intitutions of the Southern Association of Mare Laboratories, a US organitionrepresenting governent and academic laboratories from the Virgina coast to the tropicalsoutheatern Nort Atlantic.

In addition to these US reseach activities, a substatial amount of the marine scientificreseach conducted in the region is cared out by scientists from Canda, the United Kigdom,the Netherlands, and other Euopea countres with fuding provided by their governents.

There are also a good many regionally sponsored cooperative projects or programs thatfocus on mare resources, pollution, and environmenta mangement. In the mid-1980s suchprojects numbered about 60 and ranged frm small, bilateral effort to large, long-termmultiateral or regionwide effort (Negroponte 1987) involving UN agencies, environmental non-

governenta organtions (NGOs, discussed separately in the next section), nationalgovernent agencies, and regional scientific organtions. In the last category is CARCOMP(for Carbbean Coastal Mare Productivity), a research and monitorig network of 24 Carbbeamare progra sites (laboratories, parks, and reserves) at which scientists monitor basic

iiUnless otherwise noted, the information in this section is drawn from Gladfelter and Ogden (1994), which was

prepared for use in this study.

76

oceanographic and meteorological variables as well as species type, abundance, and productivityin selected coral reef, seagrass, and mangrove systems. CARICOMP (with member institutionsalso listed in Table A.6) was established in the mid-1980s with funding assistance from

UNESCO and the U.S. National Science Foundation.

Lest the extent of mare scientific activity in the region be overstated, it is importnt tounderscore that national capabilties are in some cases extremely limited, as are the mechansmsand infrastrcture to support regional collaboration. According to a 1983 UNESCO survey, forexample, fewer than one-half of the marine scientists identified as working in the Caribbeanisland nations were at work in one of the much more numerous small island states; and only 63of the 583 scientists workig in Latin America were workig in the small Central Americannations.

H. The Role of NGOs in the WCR13

The extent to which NGOs (and citizens groups) play an importt role in bringingpopular and offcial attention to environmental affairs varies considerably across the WCR states,but overall it is markedly on the rise.

In general, NGOs tend to number in the hundreds and to be very well-established, varied,and inuential in the larger and more industralized countres, such as Colombia, Mexico, theUnited States, and Venezuela. All of these countries afford some legal basis for theestablishment of public bodies empowered to represent the public interest, under which NGOsand/or citizn action groups are assured representation.

Thoughout most of the WCR, the infuence of NGOs is somewhat more limited (thoughnot inbstatial), in par because of the more limited basis for public action, essentially based

on the rights of citizen complaint. Although the numbers and the range of interests of NGOsin many WCR countres are considerably more modest, there is nonetheless an unistaabletrend toward their proliferation. In the Bahamas there are fewer than two dozen NGOs, but theyhave a very long-stading and venerable status dating back to the establishment in 1959, by anact of parliament, of the Bahas National Trust. The Nationa History Society of Jamaica iseven older, but most of Jamica's 15 or so other active NGOs are less th 20 years old, as isgenerally tre of the growin number of NGOs thoughout Central and South America. Eventhe poorest and least developed of the WCR countres had at leat one major environmentalNGO by the early 1990s-the Foundation for a Beautiful Surie, for example, and in Haiti

the Friends of Nature Federation and the Association to Combat Erosion and for Full LandRehabiltation.

An importt element in fosterig the effort of NGOs is the emergence of regional

NGOs, notably the Regional Network of Nongovernental Environmental Organtions for

Sustained Development in Central America (REDES-CA), established in 1987, and theCaribbean Conservation Association (CCA), established in 1967. The first of these includes

13Unless otherwise noted, the informtion in this section is drawn from Brañes (1991).

77

NGOs from Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; the latterincludes in its membership 17 governents, 65 NGOs, and 120 individuals from among theisland and coastal nations of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, including the Bahamasand Guyan. Headquartered in Barbados, the CCA serves as a clearinghouse for informationon the environment and provides techncal assistance, environmental education, assistance forparks and protected areas, and regional and national plang services for sustainabledevelopment and resource management (Island Resources Foundation 1989).

i. Other Regional Organizations

Although the scope of the CCA's membership, interests, and areas of expertise may beunusually broad, the CCA is nonetheless but one of some 100 donor agencies and techncalassistace organitions supporting progras for sustainble resource development and

environmental management in the Eatern Carbbean alone (Island Resources Foundation 1989).Throughout the entire WCR there are hundreds of such agencies and organitions, including

multilateral investment bans, specializd UN agencies, chatable foundations, and NGOs,whose concern rage from disaster preparedess and relief to nutrtion and education.

Many of the UN agencies and other intergovernenta organtions focus in one way

or another on economic and social development (Table A.7, Appendix A), including public andenvironmenta health concern. Two of the most promient agencies active in the region in thslatter area are the Pan-American Health Organtion (pAHO), par of the World HealthOrgantion (WO) network; and the Caribbea Environmenta Health Institute (CEHI), an armof CARCOM (see Figure 13).

The Caribbean Environment Programe (CEP), whose legal fraework is provided forin the Cargena Convention, serves as an umbrella organtion for collaboration among themany social, economic, scientific, and techncal organtions active in the region. The CEPis adminstered by UNEP, though its Regional Coordinating Unit (RCD) in Kigston, Jamaica.Together with the relevant national and regional environmental intitutions (see Table 14), theRCU provides the intitutional capabilties necssar for the implementation of a land-based

mare pollution protocol. In ths . context, two of the CEP's most importt intitutionalnetworks are CEPPOL and a program on Information Systems for the Management of Marineand Coastal Resources (CEPNET), whose role is to ensure that scientific inormation obtainedthough CEPPOL is appropriately collated and dissemite though usefu databases.

Unlike many of the other organitions whose membership or concern are limted toeither the Caribbean island states or the contiental countres of Lati America, the CEPexpressly extends its reach to all the WCR coasta and island states. Moreover, it taes a broad,comprehensive view of environmental affairs and of the special lin between economic andenvironmental concern withn the region. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the precing section,the CEP has had only modest success in this coordinting role. As is tre of so many other

aspects of the Wider Caribbean Region and its environmental agenda, the rationae for acomprehensive approach may be gainng general acceptace, but many of the mechanisms thatallow coherent action are simply not in place.

78

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Table 14

Regional Environmental Insitutions

Rei10na IndludoDl Eivlroamcii Man

Uii N&toll Eiviiit Prgr,. Coinaton of UN. Regiii Sea Prgr foe

Regiona Coing Uni foe lhe Cabbe (UNEIRCU) the Cabe; nipo fex Cabbea EnviiiiPrgramme (CE)

i

Uii N&toll Develpment Prgr (UNDP) . Coinaton of GE NGO Sin Grants Actvity

Univcøit of che Wut Indi:. Depaent 0( Bikigy, Engineeg, Gelogy, and . Coures in envinmnt-rela studies

Zology . Reseach in mae resoe& COllalon and- Mare Ru and Envirnmnta Man~eint ma~ement

Prgr (MAR . Analysis of envirnmnta laws and regulons

- Cabbe Law Iiti (o.l). Traiing, reeach and inocon systems

- Cen~ foe Envinmnt and Development (UWlCED)development in envirnmnt and development

Caribbe Enviriit& He Inti (CEHI. Prvision of 1c and advior services in

envirnmnta maagemnt (e-8., wa.r supply, Liuiand soli waslC ma~ement, pecides contr!);collecton and dimia1on of envirnmenta da

Ocganizon of Earn Cabe Stas (OECS). Coinaton of na re maagement

Nat Resoce ma~eme Uni (NU)progra foe che OEC

Insttu of Mae Afai . Reseach in mae IeCC maagement and

polluton contrl

Tropic Fo Acn Pr¡n (IAP) . Tecni asistace foe iion¥ forstr resouCC.prolCctd iieas, and wilie ma~ement prgr

Cabe Coiiaton ~II (CC) . Advocy, prje ¡xpia1on and imlementaon,intuon buiing, pulic awarne., and educOii

Cabe N~ R.ce.Wt (CANARI . R. tring, and exlCnsli in Ihe fidd ofcoity pacipon and coma~ement of n&reso

Caòbe Agcuwral R. and Develpment Iititi. Covet enviriu im in Ihe course of it

(Cl) re on agncultual acviti

CACOM F"~ R. Aiint and Manemt. Sniies che mae fienes re of U1e region i

Prgr (æR \i

OEC Fisen Unit. Sniies OEC su-rgioii re

\3Ua Re Intu of McG Univeaity. Covea Mae and Co re - monilOnng and

assement

Cabbe Cen~ foe Admútrii Development (CARlCAD). Covet insttuona analysis and development

SOURCE:- WORLD BA 1,99

81

Although the impediments to implementation of the CEP are numerous and variedthoughout the region, four broad problems have been identified (see Section III and Brewster1994), including lack of adequate financial support. This point is borne out to some extent in

Figure 14, panel a, which displays the levels of contributions and deficits (on pledged amounts)for CEP member states during 1982 though 1992 (in current U.S. dollars). Eight of the 34member states are in arrears by amounts greater than their cumulative contributions, and itwould appear that a disproportionate share of the financial burden has been shouldered by Francein particular, and to a lesser extent by Mexico, the UlÙted States, Sweden, and Colombia. Itis useful, however, to examine different representations of the CEP contributions.

14 Figure 14,

panel b, displays each state's CEP contribution (deficit) per coastal inabitant. On this basis,

the British Virgin Islands, France, and the Turks & Caicos Islands make the leadingcontrbutions, and many of the British dependent territories are among some of the leadingcontrbutors. In Figure 14, panel c, each state's contribution (deficit) to CEP is shown as apercentage of its "capacity," or an estimate of its coastal GDP (as explained in Section V). Inths representation, the self-governg unts of the Dutch realm appear to be among the leading

contributors, although Nicaagua and France are the lead contributors. France shows up wellunder any comparison, and, as we wil hypothesiz in Section V, it may be one of the key statesin faciltating WCR trading relationships.

J. Summary

In ths section we have reviewed certin economic, demographic, intitutional, andenvironmental characteristics of the WCR states with the subregional framework establishedby the CEPPOL program. Our review indicates that only Subregions II and IV have a highdegree of homogeneity with respect to economic priorities, and that these priorities, on balance,constitute an incentive for Subregion IV to control LBMP and a disincentive for Subregion IIto do so. The other four subregions are all more economically heterogeneous. Although allthee Subregion I economies are highly diversified, they represent a tremendous range of livingstadards, intitutional capacities, and pollutat load contributions. Subregion V is apparently

the most polaried subregion, with. the notable predominance of ming and manufacturig inthe economies of Venezuela and Tridad & Tobago posing a substantial potential theat to thetourism upon which Arba and the Netherlands Antiles are heavily dependent.

In Section V, we draw upon ths review as the basis for identifying alternativesubgroupings of WCR states to faciltate control of LBMP.

14 In Figue 15, panels b and c, statistics for Guatemaa and Sweden have been left out because of the very smal

number of individuals in the coasta region (or none in the cae of Sweden).

82

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0.15

V. Analysis of the Incentives and Prospects for Collective Action

A. Analytic Approaches

In this section, we explore thee avenues to identifying promising opportnities formutually beneficial collaborations and "gains from trade" in pollution control. First, economiccommonalities thoughout the region are identified, with the states grouped and ranked accordingto their level of participation in relevant economic sectors. This information is useful, forexample, in identifying states engaged in a paricular polluting activity on a relatively smallscale, who could benefit from pollution control approaches and technologies that have alreadybeen adopted by another state engaged in the same activity at a much larger scale. Next weconsider the relative identities of WCR states as polluters and pollutees withn subregionalgroupings. Following the approach developed by Broadus et al. (1993), we estimate the extentto which each state is a source of LBMP, the extent to which it has a stae in controllng theproblem, and its relative economic capacity to underte corrective action. Finally, we developa rating system that attempts to tae into account not only the size but also the direction of astate's economic incentive with respect to controllng LBMP, and not only its economic capacitybut also its intitutional capacity to underte corrective action.

B. Economic Commonalities

As a prologue to an analysis of the incentives and prospects for collective action onLBMP problems in the Caribbean, we have organd the states of the region into "economicgroups." These groups are rankgs of states in terms of siz or value of production, or othermeasures, for specific industries, including hydrocarbon production and refinig, farming,marine fishing, and tourism. The states are also raned in terms of foreign aid receipts andindebtedness.

The purpose of ths subsection is to demonstrte simarities and differences among thestates of the region with regard to major industres tht are known either to affect water qualityadversely (hydrocarbon production and refining, industral chemical production, farming, coastaldevelopment) or to be affected by inerior water quaity (coasta development, tourism,

fisheries). We identify those states in the region that are incumbents in each broadly definedindustral sector. Furer, we identify the major, intermediate, and minor producers in each

industr. We arange states into subgroups as an aid in identifing those states with roughly the

84

same scale of industrial activity in the relevant industr. i

Some observers have hypothesized that, in any particular industr, subgroups of stateswith the same scale of industrial activity may encounter the same kinds of LBMP problems. Ifthis hypothesis is valid, then it is possible that one state's solutions to these problems may betransferable to others at low cost. Alternatively, subgroups might agree to collaborate onresearch or technological development to identify or improve LBMP control mechanisms.

A separate hypothesis is that states exhibiting larger scales of activity in any of theseindustres may have already encountered LBMP problems during their industries' growth andmaturation. In this case, states at an earlier stage of industrial development or with a smallerscale of activity might look to states with a more mature industr or a larger scale for solutionsto LBMP problems.

Of course, there are many assumptions behid these hypotheses. For example, in orderfor transfers to occur, we must assume that solutions to LBMP problems exist and that thosestates that have identified solutions are wiling to convey them to other states.

The economic groups described in ths subsection are, for the most part, self-explanatory;we describe the groups only briefly here. We expect that the identification of economic groupswil be useful as the Contracting Parties to a prospective LBMP protocol begin to considerpossibilties for trading relationships in pollution control. We discuss these possibilities at theend of this subsection.

Table 15, panels a and b, rank the leading oil and natural gas producers in the Caribbeanand the leading oil refiners, respectively. We note that some of the leading hydrocarbonproducing states have attempted to control marine pollution problems, some more successfullyth others. A group of Latin American national oil companies recently has produced a series

of operational practice guidelines for environmental protection (AREL 1994). These guidelinesare likely to be useful for all of the WCR oil producers and refiners.

Table 15, panel c, rank, in terms of gross sales revenues, the leading producers of

industral chemicals in the Caribbean.

Table 16, panels a, b, and c, ran states according to diferent measures of farming

activity. In panel a, the states are ranked in terms of the percentage of land area devote toagriculture. Panels b and c rank the states in sugarcae and bana production. Depending

i We note that this kind of comparison is very general, ignoring ecnomicaly relevant, but diffcult to obtai,

informion about market structure and firm behavior and penormance in these industries. Although industralorgantion data would be helpful to this kind of analysis, we expect that its absence wil not affect the qualitativepoints we make here.

85

Table 15

Led

ing

Oil

and

Nat

ural

Gas

Pro

duce

rs, O

il R

efin

ers,

and

Pro

duce

rs o

f In

dust

rial

Che

mic

als

a. Ledin~ Oil and Natural Gas Producers in the Caribben

(milion barls of oil or milion cubic meters of gas in 1992)

Uni

te S

tate

s26

1753

7542

Mex

ico

100

2549

9V

enez

uela

865

2287

7

Col

ombi

a16

040

78 .

Tri

nida

d &

Tob

ago

5124

000 0\ Cuba

731

Gua

tem

ala

28

Suri

nam

e2

Baa

dos

122

b. Ledine Oil Refiners in the Caribbean

(thousad barels per day in 1993)

Uni

ted

Stat

es15

210

Mex

ico

1524

Ven

ezue

la11

67

U.S. Virgin Islands

545

Net

herla

nds

Ant

illes

470

Cub

a28

0C

olom

bia

264

Tri

nida

d &

Tob

ago

246

Pue

rto

Ric

o12

7Pa

nam

a10

0

Dom

inic

an R

epub

lic48

Jam

aica

32M

arin

ique

16N

icar

agua

16G

uate

mal

a16

Costa Rica

15H

ondu

ras

14B

arba

dos

3

c. L

edin

e Pr

oduc

ers

of I

ndus

tria

l Che

mic

as in

the

Car

bbe

(milions of U.S. dollars in 1993)

Uni

te S

tate

3013

60

Mex

ico

1741

4

Col

ombi

a28

09V

enez

uela

190

Gua

tem

ala

432

Nic

agua

266

Jam

aica

235

Costa Rica

209

Cub

a18

7P

uert

o R

ico

180

Dom

inic

an R

epub

lic14

3

Bah

amas

58Pa

nam

a42

Tri

nida

d &

Tob

ago

36

Hon

dura

18B

eliz

e5

Table 16

Led

ing

Agr

icul

tura

l, Su

garc

ae, a

nd B

aana

Pro

duce

rs

a. Ledin2 A,riculture Producers in the Caribben

b. L

edin

e Su

earc

ae P

rouc

ers

in th

e C

arbb

enc.

Led

in2

Ban

ana

Prod

ucer

s in

the

Car

ibbe

(prct or tota land area in agriculture)

(tho

usad

s or

met

rc to

ns in

199

4)(t

hous

ads

of m

etric

tons

in 1

994)

Mar

niqu

e87

Cub

a44

00C

olom

bia

1950

Gua

delo

upe

84M

exic

o41

652

Mex

ico

1650

Cub

a78

Uni

te S

tate

s29

335

..Costa Rica

1633

Mex

ico

73C

olom

bia

290

Costa Rica

60V

enez

uela

1215

Gua

tem

ala

9788

Pana

ma

1110

Hat

i57

Hon

dura

1086

Jam

ca55

Ven

ezue

la67

00

Dom

inic

a R

epub

licSO

Gua

tem

ala

465

Nic

agua

48H

ondu

ra30

0B

aado

s46

Costa Rica

2840

Cub

a29

5

St. K

itt45

Jam

aica

2661

Mar

niqu

e25

5

00U

nite

Sta

te41

Nic

agua

2400

Hai

ti23

0-.

Hai

ti22

50G

uade

loup

e14

8

Pan

39N

icag

ua13

6

Puert Rico

39Pa

nam

a14

00

Gua

tem

aa38

Tri

nida

d &

Tob

ago

1210

Jam

aica

77

St.

Luci

a38

Bel

ize

1159

St. V

ince

nt &

Gre

nadi

nes

62

St.

Vin

cent

35Su

rina

me

50

Ven

ezue

la34

Baa

dos

533"

Bel

ize

41

Col

ombi

a27

Gua

delo

upe

516

Dom

inic

a40

Guy

ana

26St

. Kitt

s &

Nev

is20

0

Dom

inic

a26

Guy

ana

21

Trinida & Tobago

26M

arni

que

98G

rena

da10

Hon

dura

24Su

rina

me

45

U.S

. Vir

gin

Isla

nds

21

Bel

ize

10..

Our

ow

n es

timat

e.

Ant

igua

& B

abud

a9

Baa

mas

3

upon the irigation and erosion-control practices employed, farming can be a major nonpointsource of marine pollution from sediments, fertilizer nutrients, and pesticides.

Table 17, panel a, rank the states in terms of coastal '-development, as measured by

population density. Note that there may be considerable variation in the concentration ofpopulations within any particular state. This variation may be hidden in the data. Table 17,panels band c, rank the states in terms of marine fish landings and tourism receipts.

Table 18, panel a, ranks Caribbean states in terms of debt service ratio, which is ameasure of each state's abilty to repay loan from foreign sources. The debt service ratio givesa sense of the proportion of anual export receipts that could be used to pay interest andprincipal on international debts. A lower ratio implies that it is relatively easier for a state torepay its foreign debts.

We hypothesize that those states with a history of significant lending or traderelationships may be more likely to cooperate in seekig reductions of LBMP. Table 18, panelb, ranks Caribbean states in terms of the cumulative total of official development assistance from

OECD countres, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands,Canada, and Sweden, during the period 1981 to 1991. This assistance includes grants as wellas concessionalloans that must be repaid. Table 19 describes exporting activity for each of theCaribbean states. For each state, both the leading importing states and the leading exportcommodities are identified. Table 19 helps to characterize existing trade relationships that mayfaciltate mutually beneficial relationships in the control of land-based sources of marinepollution.

The development of mutually beneficial relationships in pollution control is sometimesdescribed, in economic parlance, as a type of gain from trade. The possibilties of gains fromtrde with regard to a pollution problem can be shown clearly using a stylized model, which wedescribe in detail in Appendix C. In ths model, the rights of a state to a clean marieenvironment are clear, and states have the legal competency to enter into agreements to controlpollution. However, states may find other reasons for entering into an agreement to controlpollution. Even states that have a legal right to a clean marine environment may be wiling toaccpt some level of pollution in order to benefit in other ways, such as improved internationalrelations or perceived increased benefits to the state of a trading parer's economicdevelopment. For example, Mäler (1990) cites studies by John Krtila and Alan Kneese whichdemonstrate that:

. . . at least along the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders, agreements on

2 In Appendix C, we examne the effects of propert right distributions, burden of proof, and lack of clarty

in propert rights.

88

00 \0

Table 17

Coa

sta

Dev

elop

men

t and

Led

ing

Fish

Pro

duce

rs a

nd T

ouri

st D

estin

atio

ns

a. P

opul

atio

n D

ensi

ties

as a

Mea

sure

or

Coa

stal

Dev

eloo

men

l

(per

sons

per

squ

are

kilo

met

er)

Bar

bado

s61

2

Pue

rto

Ric

o36

8

Aru

ba32

6Si

. Vin

cenl

& G

rena

dine

s33

2M

artin

ique

321

U.S. Virgin Islands

284

St.

Luci

a25

1B

aham

as25

0

Gre

nada

247

Tri

nida

d &

Tob

ago

242

Hai

ii23

6Ja

mai

ca22

4

Gua

delo

upe

194

Net

herla

nds

Ant

illes

191

Dom

inic

an R

epub

lic14

8

Si. K

iiis

& N

evis

147

Ant

igua

& B

arbu

da14

6

Mon

tser

rat

120

Dom

inic

a11

3

Cay

man

Isl

ands

100

Cub

a96

Gua

lem

ala

85British Virgin Islands

80A

ngui

la75

Costa Rica

60

Hon

dura

s46

Mex

ico

44Pa

nam

a32

Col

ombi

a31

Nic

arag

ua29

Uni

led

Stat

es27

Ven

ezue

la22

Turks & Caicos

21

Bel

ize

8

Guy

ana

4

Suri

nam

e3

French Guiana

i

b. L

edin

e M

arne

Fis

h Pr

oduc

ers

in th

e C

arib

be

(thousands or metric tons in 1991)

Uni

te S

tale

s52

00

Mex

ico

1251

Ven

ezue

la33

2

Pana

ma

147

Cub

a14

4C

olom

bia

84

Guy

ana

40

Hon

dura

21

Costa Rica

16

Dom

inic

a R

epub

lic16

Tri

nida

d &

Tob

ago

10

Baa

mas

9G

uade

loup

e8

Si.

Vin

ceni

8

Jam

aica

7French Guiana

7

Nic

agua

5H

aiti

5G

uale

mal

a4

Mar

niqu

e4

Suri

nam

e4

Baa

dos

3

Pue

rto

Ric

o2

Bel

ize

2A

ntig

ua &

Bau

da2

Gre

nada

2

Neiherlands Antiles

Aru

baD

omin

ica

Si. KiilS

Si. Lucia

U.S

. Vir

gin

Isla

nds

c. L

edin

, Tou

risi

Des

tinat

ions

in th

e C

arbb

e

(milions or U.S. dollars in 1991)

Uni

te S

tale

4955

1

Mex

ico

4355

Baa

mas

1222

Dom

Inic

a R

epub

lic8n

Jam

aica

746

U.S

. Vir

gin

Isla

nds

708

Netherlands Antiles

484

Baa

dos

453

Col

ombi

a41

0A

ruba

401

Ven

ezue

la36

5C

osta

Ric

a33

1A

niig

ua &

Bau

da31

4C

uba

300

Gua

delo

upe

284

Mar

niqu

e25

5G

uate

mal

a21

1Pa

nam

a19

6S

t. Lu

cia

173

Tri

nida

d &

Tob

ago

101

Bel

ize

9551. Kitt5

74

51. V

ince

nt53

Hai

ti46

Gre

na38

Hon

dura

31

Guy

ana

30D

omin

ica

28

Nic

agua

17

Suri

nam

eII

Tab

le i

8D

ebt S

ervi

ce R

atio

s an

d L

edin

g R

ecip

ient

s of

For

eign

Aid

a. D

eb! S

ervi

ce R

atio

s in

the

Car

ibbe

nb.

Lt'.

arlin

l! R

ecip

ient

s of

For

eil!n

Aid

in th

e C

arib

ben

(tot

a de

bt s

ervi

ce (

inte

rest

plu

s pr

inci

pa r

epay

men

ts o

n in

tern

atio

nal d

ebts

)as a percent of export of goos and service in 1991)

(tot

a ne

t dis

burs

emen

ts o

f of

fcia

l dev

elop

men

t ass

ista

ce f

rom

all

OE

CD

Dev

elop

men

t Ass

ista

ce C

omm

ittee

sou

rces

dur

ing

1981

-199

1,ex

pres

se in

mill

ons

of 1

994

U.S

. dol

lars

)

Mex

ico

33

Col

ombi

a32

Hon

dura

s32

Mex

ico

5019

0

Guy

ana

32Pa

nam

a22

886

Nic

agua

25C

aym

an I

slan

ds18

860

Cub

a24

Gua

tem

ala

24C

olom

bia

9759

Pana

ma

22B

aam

as84

58

Jam

aica

20T

rini

dad

& T

obag

o19

Hon

dura

4338

Costa Rica

18Ja

mai

ca41

57

Baa

dos

16N

icag

ua38

03

\0 0A

ntig

ua &

Bau

da14

Cos

ta R

ica

3365

Dom

inic

a13

Gua

tem

ala

3249

Ven

ezue

la11

Dom

inic

a R

epub

lic27

92

Dom

inic

a R

epub

lic11

Net

herl

ands

Ant

iles

2755

Hai

ti22

89

Baa

mas

8

Netherlands Antiles

6G

uyan

a10

75

Bel

ize

6U

.S. V

irgi

n Is

land

s85

4

Gua

delo

upe

6Su

rina

me

644

French Guiana

5D

omin

ica

400

St.

Luci

a4

Aru

ba37

4

St.

Vin

cent

4B

eli z

e36

7

Suri

nam

e3

Baa

dos

336

Gre

nada

3G

rena

da27

3

Hai

ti3

Ant

igua

& B

auda

229

St. Kitts

3S

t. Lu

cia

219

Mar

iniq

ue2

Aru

ba1

SI. V

ince

nt &

Gre

nadi

nes

inT

urks

& C

acos

107

St. K

itts

& N

evis

102

Mon

tsrr

t69

Ang

uila

8

Table 19

Major Export and Primar Importg State

I'RYEXPORTIG IMRTIG I'ODUlSSTAn: STAn: ("1"'1Aauilb .. -An6ua " Øu Unite SCic (41): "" of pc pn

U.iic Kio_ (191;Gey (191

ANb - -II Uiuic Saia (7: ~Pu Ri (17) 4i1bi ru- Uniic lGnido (17): su cb cIUniic Saia (131 copo

Bdiz U.iic Sw (e7); supr oc~ ~Uniic IGdo (2el:Mcxõc (13)

Brsh Yiriin - ..IslCaya iib. .. -Cobi Uiuic Saia (391; !o pruc fi pcns

Gcy (91; prua; cooeV-i (9)c- Ri Uniic Swe (sSI: ba: cooe

Gcy (IICi as (60 su auDonic Uiuic IGdo (e21 ba; co-b _Doinic R.lc Uniic Saia (S); fenickd; su

tI. (niFrc Guya - -Cn Unite SUlC OS): b3; nutm: co t:

Uiuic lGnido (27)

Gulope Fra (781: ,&ritunl pruaMantquc (1-4)(l Un."' Saia OSI: cooe ""El s.vo (lei

eu Uaiic IGnc (33; suar: co: bauxiiUn;ic S.. (31

lWei Uni Sw !71 Ic l'ufacrt

Houru Uniic S.. (s. I: ba: cooe slmp an _Gcy (111J.. Uaik: SU.IC (4)): aluminaUniic lGid (lSI:Ca (10)

Munique Fro (6S): foo prua rd pcnsCu (27)

Mø Uoiic S.. (8 II ..ina dc cioñau pdMo .. ..

tI AIIc - ..

N"icua Uoiic Saia (191: cooe f.. an rl' in _Gcy (Ui.. Uni Sw 001: ba: slmpGcy (27)

Pu Ri Uaiic Sl (1 ciõa an ch i-roo: dc tl

St Ki " tl \J Sl (SSI: nw iu prUni i:do (26)

St Lu Uaic IG (St): ba; cIUaiic Su (211

St V_It Th \J IG (ell: bI _GR Tri " Tob(12) St Lu (10)Sa No o.): aluminaNc (26):Uniic S.. (ni

Tñi " Tob Uniro S.. (e7) mi..-f\ lublS ch anci;a prua

Tut " Ca - ..

Unilc Sc Ca (21; "" .. an po; ba onJap (10); misobn llraMcxõc (9)

u.s. Viriia Isl - -V.. U... Su (S au pc an pc

prua

91

water and water quality have involved "trades" in areas other than the ratherrestricted area defined by the environmental resource. The importnt point hereis that there have been trades, although they may not be directly visible.

Table 20, adapted from Kimball (1994), lists some examples of the kids of trades that mighttae place with respect to LBMP control in the Caribbean. We note tht even when the potentialfor trade exists outside the realm of pollution control, inormation about the gains from tradein pollution control per se wil be valuable to states negotiating broader agreements.

In the next two subsections, we tae a closer look at characteristics of states that mightenable mutually beneficial relationships in pollution control to develop. We offer suggestionson opportnities, but we do not identify any imediate solutions. The reduction and control of

LBMP in the Caribbean wil require much hard work from all of the Contracting Parties to aprospective protocol. As we begin to sketch out some possibilties for mutually beneficialrelationships, we have found it helpful to keep in mid the economic groups that have beenidentifed in ths subsection.

C. Sources and Staes

In ths subsection, we examine the identity of WCR states as polluters or pollutees. Weadopt the approach developed by Broadus et al. (1993) to measure "sources," "stakes," and"capacity." "Source" is a measure of a state's relative contribution of land~based marine

pollution to a region. "Stae" is a measure of a state's economic interest in reducing marine

pollution. "Capacity" is a measure of the economic capabilties that a state has at its disposalto reduce pollution, by cutting its own emissions or by subsidizing the reduction of emissionsin another state.

Implicit in this analysis (particularly in the "source" measure) is an assumption oftranboundar LBMP effects. Although we have note in ealier sections that transboundaryLBMP, where it occurs in the WCR, is generally limted to border areas shared by two states,we believe that ths anlytic approach has value as well in a somewhat broader (i.e., subregiona)

context, primarily because of the potential for larger-scale tranbounda effects to develop orbe deteted in the future. Even if th does not occur, however, and the aim of the protocol

remain one of responding collectively to common but nontranbounda LBMP problems, webelieve tht an understading of each state's relative stading with respect to source, stae, andcapacity should enhance the abilty of negotiatig paries to concentrate on those specific

collaborations and exchanges that are most likely to be successfully implemented.

For our source measure, we would like to have, ideally, data on ambient concentrationsof pollutants at any location in the Caribbea, combined with the abilty to identify costlesslythe exact origin of each pollutat. Such data do not now exist, nor is it likely that they wil ever

92

Tab

le 2

0Opportities for Exchange and Cooperation

\0 w

Cat

eaor

vI

TV

e of

exc

hanC

leE

xam

ple

Economies of Scale

Dat

abas

esIOCIBEI CEPPOL

Clearinghouse systems

CEPPOLI World Banki OECS

Scientific/technical Analyses

IOCIBEI CEPPOL

Technical training

University of the West Indiesi CAARI

Public education/awareness

CEPpOLI OECS

South to North Exchanges

Plan

ning

tech

niqu

esAssessment techniques

Island Resources Foundation

Conflict resolution techniques

Coastal management

Loal co..unity engagement

Costa Rica

Was

te r

euse

and

reC

yclin

Cl

North to South Exchanges

Clean production technologies

Uni

ted

Stat

es, E

urop

ean

co..u

nity

, CU

aForeign aid payments

United States, Canada, France,

United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Sweden,

Ven

ezue

laSU

bsid

ized

loan

sWorld Bank, IADB

Debt-for-nature swaps

Costa Rica (not a marine example)

Shar

ed w

ater

cour

ses

orBilateral or subregional compacts

Venezuela/Trinidad , Tobago (oil pollution)

boun

dari

esFinancial transfers

United states/Mexico

Tradeable emissions quotas

Mex

ico/

Bel

ize

Differentiated standards

Differentiateed timetables

Shar

ed m

arin

e re

sour

ces

Allocation of harvest to distant water

or habitat

natio

nsJoint venture fishing agreements

Barbados and Trinidad , Tobago

Inte

rnat

iona

llyF

orei

gn a

idD

esig

nate

d P

rote

cted

Tec

hnic

al a

ssis

tanc

eA

reas

or

spec

ies

Bilateral or subregional compact

Reciprocal National

National liability laws

Pollu

tion

Lia

bilit

yAccess to national legal systems

ReC

limes

Tra

nsbo

unda

ryRegional agreements

State-OWned oil company guidelines

Environmental Impact

Assessment Reaimes

International trade

Environmental protection rules

NAF'AI CARl

CO

M?

aClr

eem

ents

Bilateral Investment

Environmental protection rules

AC

lree

men

tsprivate Industry

Rec

reat

ion

Red

uctio

n of

gol

f c

ours

e ch

emic

al tr

eatm

ents

Marketing (group pollution control

technolog purchases)

Water conservation and reuse

Catalytic financing from international

dono

rsIADB sewerage system financing in Barbados

Env

ironm

enta

l aud

itsPrivate Tourism

Cruise Ship waste management a~d disposal

GEF Project on Ship-Generated Waste

CO-financing by local governent

Caribbean Tourist organization

Collective Bargaining

Tourist taxes

Barbados Hotel Association Tourism Enhancement

Fund

Don

or A

genc

ies

Replicability of subregional expertise

Donor government citizen benefits

Canada, Sweden, USAID/CEF Eastern Caribbean

Environment and Coastal Resources Management

Pro

j ect

Source: Kimball (1994)

exist. At present, we have incomplete data only on point sources of some pollutants from someof the WCR states and on point and nonpoint sources combined from the U.S. Gulf coast. Eventhese data may be biased, because data tend not to be collected from states with rudimentapollution control intitutions. Because of these limtations, we employ instead estimates of thepopulations within the WCR drainge area as a measure of source. (Appendix B contains adescription of how these estimates were developed.)

For our stake measure, we would like to have, ideally, data on the value of damagesassociated with ambient concentrations of pollutants at any location in the Caribbean. As in thecase of the ideal source measure, such data on impacts do not now exist. The actual impactsof ambient concentrations of pollutants are furter clouded by the issue of "synergistic" effectsraised by Gladfelter and Ogden (1994). We employ intead estimates of the proportion of eachstate's population tht is in the Caribbean coastal zone as a measure of stae (Appendix B).3

For our capacity measure, we nee to know somethg about the distribution of propertrights. If we assume, as in Appendix C, tht states have the right to a clean environment, thenfor source states we would like to have, ideally, an estimate of their abilty to offer payments(or in-kid services) to downstream states as compensation for pollution damages. This estimatewould be an aggregate of each source state's pollutig industries' marginl abatement costschedules (Figure C.1 in Appendix C). These data do not yet exist. As a proxy for an idealcapacity measure, we employ the stae-weighted gross domestic product for each state. (Notethat tls capacity statistic might be interpreted as a measure of the economic value of a state's"stae" in controlling or allowing pollution, depending on the nature of its predomiant

industries. )

Table 21 presents the data on sources, staes, and capacities for each WCR subregion,

as delineated by CEPPOL. A more generalized, geographic depiction of tls inormation ispresented separately for each measure in Figure 15, panels a though d. In Figure 15, we havedelineate the CEP subregions by following the actu or hypothetical maritime boundaies in

the region (panel a). In each of the other panels of Figue 15, states should be compared onlywith each subregion and not across subregions. Each subregion is associated with a specificcolor. There are five possible shades for each color; the lighter shades represent lower valuesof the relevant statistic, and vice versa. The five possible shades represent five possibleincrements (twenty percent each) of the relevant statistic.

We note that an alterntive organtion of the WCR into different subregions wouldresult in different measures of source, stae, and capacity for each state. It wil be importtfor the states involved in framg the term of the protocol to give caeful consideration to the

3 Note that this statistic is an improvement on that used by Broadus et al. (1993) becuse we use only the

proportion of a nation's population that is coastal, not the entire drainage basin population.

94

Table 21

Source, Staes, and Capaities with Subregions'

SlateiSubre~ion Sourc Share Slake Capacity Share"

Sub..ion ICuba 4.0 56.8 2.7

Mexico 24.0 6.0 4.7

United States 720 6.0 92.6

Subreion II

Belize 1.3 64.0 6.6

Cost Rica 10.4 20.8 28.6

Gualemala 36.8 - -Hondura 32.9 22.0 16.1

Mexico 4.1 0.5 34.9

Nicaral! 6.5 2.4 1.0

Panama 8.0 9.5 12.8

Subreion II

Bahama 0.1 100.0 8.3

Cayma i..lnds - 100.0 2.2

Cuba 19.0 16.3 8.9

Dominican Reouhlic 30.0 58.0 13.3

Haiti 27.0 29.2 2.5

Jamaica 10.0 55.4 6.2

Puerto Rico 13.6 80.0 58.5

Turks & Caico - 100.0 0.2

Subreion IV

Anl!ila 0.4 100.0 0.8

Antil! & Barbuda 3.9 100.0 7.4

Barbdos 16.1 47.4 15.0

British Vi..in Islands 0.7 100.0 2.3

Dominica 5.2 100.0 3.1

Gread 5.2 100.0 4.4

Guaelouoe 21.0 44.2 8.5

Martiniaue 20.9 69.0 24.2

Montsrrt 0.7 100.0 1.3

Netherlands Antilles 0.9 8.0 2.0

Si. Kitls & Nevis 2.5 100.0 2.5

5t. Lucia 9.4 100.0 4.4

51. Vincet & Gredines 6.9 100.0 3.0

US Vi..in Islands 6.1 100.0 3.0

Subreion V

Aniba 0.2 100.0 0.2

Colombia 60.4 5.4 8.4

Neterlands Antiles 0.3 92.0 4.8

Trinida & Tob"o 2.5 69.5 12.8

V enezela 36.6 36.9 73.7

Sub..ion VI

Frech Guian 7.6 85.0 27.6

Guyan 61.7 38.1 10.3

Suriname 30.7 41. 62.1

'Se Appedix B for data SOrc and methology us to esimate drainage populations (for calculationof sorc shre) and col zo poulation (for calculation of ste).

95

10°

(0) Subregions

0°

1000W 40°90°

80° 70° 60°

10°

(b) Source

0°

1000W 40°90°

80° 70° 60°

Figure i 5. Comparison of Sources, Stakes and Capacities within CEP Subregions.

96

(c) Stake

10°

0°

1000W90°

80°

(d) Capacity

10°

0°

1000W90°

80°

Figure is (contd).

97

delineation of appropriate subregions on the basis of relevant environmental characteristics. In

particular, care should be taken to delineate subregions such that they encompass only thosestates where sources of pollution originate and effects of that same pollution occur. 4 Ouranalysis should be interpreted as a first-cut using subregions previously designated by CEP.

In Subregion I, the United States is the major source, and Cuba has the major stake. TheUnited States and Mexico have already concluded a bilateral agreement relating to transboundarymarine pollution, the 1983 Mexico-United States Agreement on Cooperation for the Protectionand Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area. Reductions ofLBM pollutants fromU. S. sources through some tightenig of its existing water pollution rules might be one elementof a larger rapprochement between the United States and Cuba should Cuba begin to movetoward democratization and openness. However, given the primary current flows, Cuba isunlikely to be affected much by U.S. LBM pollutants. The nortern Bahamas, in Subregion III,would appear to be more at risk from land-based sources in Subregion I, and therefore shouldbe considered for inclusion in the same subregion as the United States.

In Subregion II, Guatemala and Honduras are the main sources and Belize has the largeststake. Encouraging agreement among these states concernng the Gulf of Honduras wouldappear to be a priority in this subregion. Accentuating Belize's large stae is the fact that it hasthe most extensive coral reef ecosystem in the Western Hemisphere. However, Belize City isa significant source of pollutants, and Belize is located upstream of the other two states, in termsof the predominant coastal countercurrent.

5 As alluded to in Section IV, Honduras may begin

to shift its banana agriculture to other industries, e.g., ecotourism, as U.K. subsidies are phasedout under new European Community rules. This should lower Belize's risks from nutrient andpesticide runoffs. The United States, as a major foreign aid provider to Guatemala and

Honduras, might playa role in facilitating agreement by encouraging Honduras and Guatemalato reduce LBM pollutant loads in return for reductions in sewage and industrial pollutantsemanating from Belize City. Belize and Guatemala currently are engaged in negotiations overa maritime boundary, and these negotiations might usefully include discussion of potentialtransboundary pollution flows.

Costa Rica has a significant stae and capacity share in this subregion, but it is locatedat a substantial geographic distance from the other three major sources and stakeholders. This

4 We note that subregions could overlap. For example, if pollution from state A affects state B, and pollution

from B affects state C, but pollution from A does not afect C, then two overlapping subregions should be

established. Furthermore, subregions could be "nested." For example, if pollution from A affects B and C, butpollution from B affects only C, then Band C form a subregion that is nested inside the subregion formed by A,B, and C.

5 Note that there may be some cycling of pollutants in the Honduras Gulf, suggesting that these three countries

may have a common pool type pollution problem.

98

point furter reiiûorces the critical need for a careful delineation of subregions: is it reasonable

to expect Costa Rica to expend much of its capacity on this problem when it is neither asignificant source of LBMP nor noticeably affected by the LBMP contributions of the majorsource states in the subregion?

In Subregion III, the Domincan Republic and Haiti are the major sources and PuertoRico has the largest stae and the largest capacity. But the priar current movements suggesttht Puerto Rico is upstream of both these states. Transboundary pollution, if it occurs, mightfollow a path from the Domican Republic and Haiti to Cuba and from the south coast of Cubatoward Jamaica. The United States, which is closely associated with Puerto Rico and a majorforeign aid provider to both the Dominican Republic and Haiti, might playa role in encouragingthe latter two states to control LBM pollutants, to reinorce the effects of the existing applicationof US pollution controls in Puerto Rico.

Subregion III includes thee states with economies tht are heavily dependent upon

tounsm: the Bahamas, the Tuks & Caicos Islands, and the Cayman Islands. The southernBahas and Turks & Caicos are relatively protected as upstream states. Reduction of pollutionin the southeastern section of Cuba, another significant source in the subregion, could reducemost of the risk faced by these two states. France, which is a major western source of foreignaid to Cuba, might play a role in encouraging Cuba to reduce pollution in ths region. TheCaymans are protected in a relatively remote area of the Carbbean Sea, but may be at risk,depending upon curent flows, to pollution pulses from upstream states in the .caribbean Sea.This risk is likely to be small.

In Subregion IV, Guadeloupe and Marque are the major sources. Because all of thestates in ths subregion are islands or island groups, they all have large stakes. Many of theisland states in ths subregion have undiversified economies, with tourism the overwhelminglypredominnt sector. Martinque has the largest capacity to deal with any potential pollutionproblems, and the U.S. Virgin Islands and Barbados have substatial capacities as well.Although there are some riks of tranbounda pollution problems among the states of thesubregion, it is likely tht actual tranbounda effects are small, if they exist at alL. Many ofthe Antiles are islands that have some kid of association with a Euopean state (France, theNetherlands, or the Unite Kigdom) tht ca draw upon its experiences in the Nort Sea LBMPprogram (and, in the case of Frace, in the Mediterranean Program as well). It wil be

importt to know whether these Europea states have already concluded other bilateral ormultiateral agreements for control of mare pollution that apply or tht ca be easily adapted

to relations between associated states in the Carbbean. Should tranboundary problems develop,or become apparent, states in ths region might use OECS resources to assist in the identificationof relevant gains from trde (see, e.g., Table 20). Moreover, current OECS member statesmight benefit from an expansion to include all of the Subregion IV states.

99

In Subregion V, Colombia and Venezuela are the primary sources. The island states,again, have major stakes; Aruba and the Netherlands Antiles are comparatively undiversifiedstates, dependent primarily upon their tourism economies. Venezuela and Trindad & Tobagoalready have entered into a bilateral agreement on marine pollution (Goodridge 1994). Althougha coastal countercurrent is thought to move from Colombia toward Venezuela, this is not likelyto add significantly to the pollutants generate along Venezuela's industrialized coast. In thiscontext, it is interesting to note that Colombia has been working to strengthen its environmentallaws, and its efforts have recently drawn praise from Venezuela.

6 Local pollution control

effort in Venezuela, which has significant source, stae, and capacity statistics, wil becomeincreasingly importnt to the domestic population as Venezuela continues to develop

economically.

In Subregion VI, the notions of source and stae are affected strongly by the predomitnortwestern current flow. All thee states are almost certiny affected by Amazon effuents,

which are defined to be outside the Wider Carbbean Region. (Notably, Guyan and Sureare on the Amazon Cooperation Council with BraiL.) Given the direction of current flows,Suriname is the leading source and Guyana has the largest stae. Surine also has the largest

capacity, suggesting that gain from trade, if transboundary effects are present, might derive

from an agreement between Surie and Guyan. The Netherlands, as a major trading parerwith Suriame, might playa critical role in facilitating such a trade.

Table 22 presents an overview of "key" source, staeholder, and faciltator states in eachof the subregions. Key faciltators are those states that provide significant amounts ofdevelopment assistance to key source states and so might be in a position to encourage a tradingrelationship to develop. Where the key source state is not receiving development assistance, amajor trading partner is identified as the key faciltator. (We reiterate the potential sensitivityof the results to the existing delineation of subregions.)

Matchig key faciltator states with key source states may provide clues to importtinternational relationships in the resolution of LBMP problems in the Carbbean. For example,the United States, with assistace from Mexico, might offer the following deal to Beliz: inreturn for the reduction of LBMP emissions in Beliz, the United States wil put pressure onHondur (and possibly Guatemala) to reduce its emissions.

Other interntional trdin relationships might cross subregions. For example, the Unite

States, as Venezuela's largest trdig parer, might encourge Venezuela to reduce itsemissions. The Netherlands would benefit directly from such a move. In retu, the

6 At the 25th anversar of INDERENA, Colombia's environment agency, Araldo Jose Gabaldon, Venezuelan

Environment Minister. praised the conversion ofINDERENA into a Minstr with broader legislative and reguatorypowers.

100

Tab

le 2

2K

ey S

tate

s an

d T

radi

ng R

elat

ions

hips

in th

e W

ider

Car

bbea

Reg

ion

~ o ~

Key

Key

Sou

rce

Stak

ehol

der

Key Facilitator

Stat

e(s)

Sta

te (

s)St

ate

Key Matchups

Sub

regi

on V

ISu

rina

me

Guy

ana

The Netherlands

The

Net

herla

nds

and Venezuela

Subregion V

Ven

ezue

la;

Aru

ba;

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

Uni ted States,

Trinidad &

Net

herl

ands

Venezuela, and The

Tob

ago

Ant

illes

Net

herl

ands

Subr

egio

n iv

Bar

bado

s;U

. S. V

irgi

nFr

ance

united States and

Mar

tiniq

ue;

Isla

nds

Fran

ceG

uade

loup

e

Subregion III

Pue

rto

Ric

o;C

uba

Uni

ted

Stat

esUnited States and

Dom

inic

anC

uba

Rep

ubl i

c ;

Hai

tisu

breg

ion

IIB

eliz

e;B

eliz

eU

ni te

d S

tate

sUnited States and

Hon

dura

sB

eliz

e

Subr

egio

n I

Uni

ted

Sta

tes;

United states and

Mex

ico

Cub

a

Netherlands might encourage Surinae to reduce its emissions, benefitting Guyana and,potentially, Venezuela. To the extent tht the Lesser Antiles are at risk from Venezuelanemissions, France would benefit from Venezuelan cutbacks. In return, France might encourageMarinque and Guadeloupe to control their LBMP emissions, benefitting the U.S. Virgin Islandsand thereby completing the lin. Although ths international negotiation ha many lin, it

involves only four states. In fact, a bargain strck among the United States, Venezuela, andFrance to reduce LBMP emissions in their respective territories and in the territories ofassociated states and states to which they give foreign aid might reduce much of the risksassociated with transboundary LBM pollution in the WCR.

D. An Alterntive Assessment of Capacities and Incentives to Control LBMP

As noted in the previous subsection, the. analytic approach developed by Broadus et aL.

(1993) to estimate sources, staes, and capacities of states proposing to underte collectiveaction on LBMP has as an underlying assumption the generaliz presence of trboundar

LBMP effects. This assumption limts the utiity of the analysis for a region like the Carbbean,where most LBMP effects have so far been demonstrated to be localiz, and where generalrecognition of ths fact has not precluded interest among the Contractig Paries to the CargenaConvention in negotiating a protocol that addresses common but not necessarily tranboundaryLBMP problems. The approach has certin other, more general limtations as well. Theseinclude the failure of the "stake" measure to distinguish between an economic stae incontrolling pollution vs. a stae in continuing to pollute, and the failure of..the "capacity"measure to capture environmental inrastructure as an importt component of a state's abiltyto underte effective action to control LBMP.

In this section we build on our review of economic, intitutional, and environmental

chaacteristics of the WCR states in an attempt to assess the individual and collective prospectsfor undertg sustained and effective action to control land-based marine pollution. This

assessment is based on the assumption that the factors upon which these prospects mainy dependare a combintion of (i) the states' economic and intitutional capacity to tae corrective actionand (ii)the extent to which their economic strengths and priorities represent an incentive tomaintain a healthy coastal environment or, alternatively, to value the suounding marineenvironment priary as a convenient sin for pollutats. Another importt difference hereis tht, unike the application of the Broadus et aL. approach in the preceding section, we do not

begin the assessment by assigng states to subregions, but rather by considerig all the WCRstates together, with a single, unorm context.

Table 23 displays some sumar results of ths assessment effort, expressed in terms ofqualitative ratings for each WCR state in the areas of economic capacity, institutional capacity,and economic incentive. On each of these thee measures, a state was assigned a rating on ascle of 1 (weak capacity or incentive) to 4 (strong), based on an admittedly subjective

102

Table 23

Qulitative Ratigs of Capacity and Incentive to Underte LBMP Control

Slate Ecnomic Insiiiuiional Ecnomic CombinedCapaiiy" Capaciiy' IncetiveC . Scre'

Anguila 0 a . 8

Antigu &. Barbda 0 0 . 9

Aniba . a . 9

Bahama . 0 . 10

Barbados 0 0 . 9

Belize a a 0 5

British Virgin Is. . 0 . 10

Cayma Is. . 0 . 10

Colombia a 0 a 4

Co Rica 0 0 0 5

Cuba a 0 0 7

Dominica a 0 0 6

Dominica Republic a a 0 5

Frech Guian 0 a a 4

Gren 0 0 0 7

Guadeloupe 0 a 0 6

Guatemala a a a 3

Guyana a a 0 4

Haiti a a 0 4

Hondura a a a 3

Jamaica a a . 6

Martinique 0 a 0 7

Mexico 0 0 0 7

Montsmit 0 0 . 9

Neterlands Antilles 0 a . 8

Nicagua a a a 3

Pan 0 a ø 4

Puerto Rico 0 . 0 10

St. Kitls &. Nevis 0 ø . 8

St. Luia 0 ø . 7

St. Vint &. 0 0 . 6Greadines

Suriname ø 0 0 4

Trinidad &. Tobago 0 ø 0 6

Turl &. Caco (S. 0 0 . 9

United Slates . . 0' 9

US Virizin Is. . . . 12

Venezuela ø 0 0 5

o wek (i) 0(2) 0(3) . strong (4)

.Bas on pe capita GDP."Bas on obsrved rercpollution prolem. provision of sewerage and safe drinking water. ancompreensiven of environmeta magemt and enforct.

"Bas on relative importce of marine reurc an reevant ecnomic activities/priorties.'Gulf Coa slates only.

103

assessment of one or more relevant factors for which inormation was available. Specifically:

. economic capacity was rated solely on the basis of per capita GDP;

. institutional capacity was rated on the basis of a state's observed resource/pollution

problems, the extent to which it provides sewage services and safe drining water, andthe comprehensiveness of its environmental mangement and enforcement;

. economic incentive was rated on the basis of the significance of a state's marineresources and the relative importce and direction of pertinent economic activities andpriorities.

The assigned ratings for these thee factors, and the resulting total "score" for each WCR state,are also displayed in Table 23. Figure 16, panels a though d, display the geographic

distributions of the WCR states with respect to economic capacity, intitutional capacity,economic incentive, and total "score."

Admittedly, the thee rating factors constitute a limted and somewhat arbitrary basis forassessing somethg as complicated as a state's capacity-and especially its motivation or lackof motivation-to devote high-level attention, effort, and other resources to marineenvironmental concern. As a practical mattr, however, these factors reflect the limts of therelevant inormation that is available on a more or less uniform and comprehensive basis for allthe WCR states. At least equally importt, they constitute what we believe to be the most

reliable indicators of the WCR states' long-term capabilties, intentions, and priorities (incontrst to, for example, the charer or early statement of objectives of a fledgling environmentalministry) .

Table 24 arrays the WCR states according to their total "scores" for the thee qualitativeratig meaures, which range from 3 to 12. As indicated by the title of the table, we considerthese results to provide a qualitative idea of each state's overall prospect or likelihood of

engaging in sustained and effective action to control LBMP, based on its economic andintitutional capacity and its economic incentive to do so. Another way of describing theinormtion in Table 24 is to consider the states in the far-right colum (i.e., US VirginIslands, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and United States) as those most likely to brigto the effort the strongest mi of know-how, fmaciaI commitment, and political determtion,whereas those listed at the far left (i.e., Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaagua, Colombia, FrenchGuian, Guyana, Haiti, Pana, and Surie) are the states least likely to participate in anymeanigfl way without substantial fmanciaI and technca assistace and other, speciaIinducements.

Clearly, the majority of WCR states fall somewhere between these two extremes (i.e.,

104

10°

(a) Economic Capacity to Control LBMPweak D D D . strong

(1) (2) (3) (4)

0°

1000W90°

40°

80° 70° 60°

10°

(b) Institutional Capacity to Control LBMPweak D D D . strong

(1) (2) (3) (4)

0°

1000W90°

40°

80° 70° 60°

Figure i 6. Relative Capacities and Incentives to Control LBMP Throughout the WCR

105

10°

(c) Economic Incentive to Control LBMPweak D D D . strong

(1) (2) (3) (4)

0°

1 OooW 40°90°

80° 70° 60°

10°

(d) Overall Prospect of Sustained andEffective Action to Control LBMP

(TotalIScore")weak D D D Iä D D D . . . strong

(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

0°

1000W 40°90°

80° 70° 60°

Figure 16 (contd).

106

Tab

le 2

4

Ove

rall

Pro

spec

t of S

usta

ined

and

Effe

ctve

Act

ion

to C

ontr

ol L

BM

P

Wea

kest

Pro

spec

t

Tot

al S

core

:"- 0 ..

34

56

78

910

11

Gua

tem

ala

Col

ombi

aB

eliz

eD

omin

ica

Cub

aA

ngui

laA

ni &

Bar

Bah

amas

Hon

dura

sFr

ench

Gui

ana

Cos

ta R

ica

Gua

delo

upe

Gre

nada

Nel

h A

nli

Aru

ba

BV

I

Nic

arag

uaG

uyan

aD

omin

ican

Rep

Jam

aica

Mar

tiniq

ue51

. Kiii

s &

Nev

isB

arba

dos

Cay

man

Is.

Hai

tiV

enez

uela

Sl.

Vin

cent

&M

exic

oM

onts

erra

lP

uert

o R

ico

Pana

ma

Gre

nS

l. Lu

cia

Tur

ks &

Cal

cos

Suri

nam

eT

rin &

Tob

Uni

ted

Sla

tes

"Bas

ed o

n co

mbi

ned

qual

itativ

e ra

tings

of I

ndiv

idua

l sta

tes'

eco

nom

ic c

apac

ity, i

nsliu

tiona

l cap

acity

, and

eco

nom

ic In

cent

ive

(see

text

).

Strongest Prospect

12 USV

I

in groups with total "scores" ranging from 5 to 9), and the specifics of their circumstaceswarrant closer scrutiny. Fifteen of the WCR states-all of them island nations ordependencies-have very strong economic incentives to control LBMP (see Table 22 and Figure16, panel c). This group includes: Anguila, Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, theBritish Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antiles, St.Kitt & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, the Turks & Caicos Islands, and the

US Virgin Islands.

Of these 15, all but the US Virgin Islands have a substatial to very serious need fortechncal assistance to overcome weak intitutional capacity, and 4 of them (Jamaica, St. Kitts& Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines) have a substantial to very serious needfor fincial assistance as well (Figue 16, panel a). In contrst to ths latter subgroup is another

subgroup of 3 (Arba, the Bahas, and the British Virgin Islands) that is in a comparativelystrong position to pay for the techncal assistace or intitutional strengthenig they would needto control LBMP to a level that is consonat with their economic incentive to do so.

Other than stress to coastal ecosystems, which is a ubiquitous problem thoughout theWCR, pollution from sewage is the most widespread of the serious LBMP problems confrontingths group of 15 states with especially strong economic incentives (affecting 9 of the 15).Sewage is followed by coastal erosion (affecting 7 of the 15 states). Other LBMP and relatedresource degradation problems that affect at least one-thd of ths group are pollution of coastalwaters by oil, ming, and other industrial effuents; deforestation; and overfshi. In addition,

5 of the states in ths group have been cited in various studies for failure to underte anassessment of their marine resources and problems, and an additional 2 (Jamaica and theNetherlands Antiles) have been criticizd for their general failure to regulate development andother activity in the coastal zone (refer again to Table 11 in Section IV).

The most obvious sources of both finacial strengt and techncal assistance with the

WCR are the Unite States and the US Virgin Islands (although the latter has its own diffcultieswith sewage management). Puerto Rico is another comparatively strong prospect for techncalassistace-perhaps paricularly to those neighborig countres that have yet to inventory theircoasta assets and problems or to develop and enforce effective regulations concerng coastalzone activity. Although not in the top tier in terms of overall intitutiona capacity, Cuba rateswell above average for the region, and it should be considered as a potential source of techncalassistace, especially on the use of "clean" technologies to reduce pollution by industral

effluents.

Cuba is one of 9 WCR states whose economic incentives to control LBMP may bedescribed as importnt but not compelling, in that industries such as tourism and fishig aretogether substantially less importnt thn manufacturing and/or agricultue. Cuba is notewortyamong ths group for having developed its quite strong intitutiona capacities despite a very low

108

standard of living,7 whereas something like the reverse is tre of Marinique, whose relativelyhigh standard of living has not tranlated into much progress in the area of environmental

inrastrctue. For the rest of ths group, there tends to be a much closer correspondence

between standard of living and institutional capacity to control LBMP and other environmentalproblems, with the need for both financial and techncal assistance being most serious for Belize,Domica, Haiti, and the Domican Republic.

Other than Belize and perhaps Costa Rica (as discussed furter below), the CentralAmerican countres should not be expected to paricipate in a sustained and meanigful waywithout special inducements.

8 All of these states have little in the way of economic capacity,

intitutional capacity, or economic incentive to paricipate. In Central America, two mainreasons for the low incentive are the predominance of the agriculture and manufacturig sectors,and the far greater orientation of population centers and economic activities toward the Pacificcoast and watershed.

For several of the WCR states, factors other th economic self-interest should not beoverlooked as major motivations to paricipate in a regiona protocol on LBMP. For the UnitedStates, for example, the apparent motive is a sense of responsibilty, as the dominnt economicpower in the region, to share its strong intitutional and techncal expertise with its neighbors(and to imrove the well-being of its own citins and resources in the Mexican border area as

well). Venezuela is likely to be motivated by similar sentiments, including a desire (or perhapsa political necessity) to improve the environmental quality of life for the very nïgh proportionof its population that is concentrated along the Carbbean coast. Perhaps most importt forVenezuela, however-and for Puerto Rico and Trindad & Tobago as well-is an awareness thatthese states account for most of the industral point-source pollution entering the Caribbean

proper (i.e., not including the Gulf of Mexico). Finally, Colombia and Costa Rica have bothtaen various steps which indicate that environmental concern are a much higher priority thantheir actual intitutional capacities would suggest, and it is likely that both these states see thecompletion of a regional protocol on LBMP as improving the chances that greater attntion andresours wil be made available to improve their domestic capabilties in ths area.

E. Concluding: Remarks

The anlytic approaches and examples described in ths section, together with the

7As noted by Broadus (pers. comr., 1994), one explanation that readily comes to mind is the low opportty

cost with a commd ecnomy, paricularly one that until recntly enjoyed tremendous foreign subsidies.

8The same is probably true for the three South Amenca states to the eat of Venezuela, although Guyan and

Sune do paricipate in the Amazn Cooperation Treaty, which may well be more relevant to their environmentaconcern than LBMP in the Carbbea.

109

information compiled in the previous section and in the Appendix A data tables, are intendedto serve as a basis for explicitly recogniing common and complementary self-interests,strengts, and weakesses in the design of protocol mechanisms to facilitate mutually beneficialcollaborations and exchanges.

No attempt has been made to integrate these anlytic approaches into a single "formula"for determinig the "best" organtion of states into subregions. Nonetheless, the present studyhas given attention to concern that were expressed by some reviewers of the earlier,comparative study (i.e., Broadus et aL. 1993) as to the desirabilty of relying on a single

indicator-population-to represent a state's stae in controlling LBMP. Specifically, Broaduset aL. (1993:48) used the percentage of a state's population in the relevant drainage area as aproxy for "political and economic interest in reducing marie pollution" -a measure for whichfew other reliable data are uniformy available.

In ths study, the approach of Broadus et al. has been refined by using an estiate of

coastal population rather than drainge area population to represent a state's "stae" in

controlling LBMP. 9 In addition, an attempt was made to test the validity of the above-mentioned criticism. The coasta population estimate was weighted by our composite indicator

of "economic incentive to control LBMP" (see Section V.D), which represents the significaceof a state's marie resources and the relative importce and direction of pertinent economicactivities and priorities.

Reviewers of the earlier study may be surrised to lear tht ths weighting exercise

resulted in only minor deviations from the results report in Section V.D. For example, CostaRica and Honduras exchanged places but remained fairly close in the middle range of staeswithin Subregion II; and in Subregion il, there was a simar reversal of position for theDominca Republic and Jamaica, with both remainig in the middle range.

Cuous readers can easily perform ths exercise and consider the results for themselves.The resuts are not report here because we remain skeptical about the utiity and validity ofweighting factors that provide only a naow sense of a large and complicated economic pictue

(e.g., agriculture as % of GDP) or caot be reliably quatified for such use (e.g., tageting ofindustries for concerted development effort). 10

9'e preferabilty of coasta population is obvious if one considers that residents of the US states of Montaaand Pennylvania, for example, although par of the WCR drage basin population, are unikely to see themselvesas having an ecnomic stake in the quaity of the Gulf of Mexico or WCR mare environment.

10Simlarly, we have rejected a suggestion that land-use data be used to weight population for a better indicator

of "stae." Lad-use data are quite diffcult to obta, especially for the smal island states. Far more imorttis the fact that, even where available, they are by their nature destied to capture only the relative imprtce ofpolluting and flpollution-neutral fl industries, while failing to capture the importce of industries that are vulnerableto LBMP. such as tourism and fisheries. As such, land-use data, were they more uniformy available, might more

110

A case in point is the evolving economic reality of Cuba, which was singled out by onereviewer as a state for which population alone suggests a far greater stake in controlling LBMPthan its overall economic make-up would suggest (Wood-Thomas, pers. comm., 1995). Whileit is tre that Cuba has an unusually high proportion of GDP accounted for by manufacturing(39%), there are other importnt (but diffcult to quantify) factors that account for Cuba'shaving been assigned a rating of "3" for economic incentive to control LBMP. The mostimportnt of these factors are the following:

Tourism has been targeted as the number one growt area by the governent, andforeign investment in tourism development has been very strong.

Cuba is the largest net exporter of fish in the WCR; the reported value of its net exportexces that of the second-largest net exporter (Bahamas) by more than 30 percent.

Manufacturing is heavily concentrted in paper products and has been tageted by the

governent for strategic diversification. An emerging industr tht could well benefitfrom ths move, and in which Cuba is a leader in the WCR, is the development andapplication of so-called clean technologies.

Such factors, we believe, constitute a sound basis for characterizing Cuba as having a muchstronger economic incentive to control LBMP than its historical emphasis on manufacturing (and,to a lesser extent, agriculture) would indicate. At the same time, however, suchinformation-being diffcult to quantify and not uniformy available or relevant across theregion-does not lend itself to use as a weighting factor.

The development of one or more weighting factors for use in anlyzing states' relativestae in controlling LBMP remain an intriguing area for furter effort, but one in which succsswil depend heavily on substantial improvement in the collection and availabilty of relevantdemographic and socioeconomic data. For the present, we offer the inormation and anlyses

report here as a framework for assessing which states are the most likely to engage insustained and succssful action to control LBMP, and the general categories of assistace orspial inducements tht the other states are likely to nee in order to participate successfully.

appropriately be used as a weighting factor for "source" if one were neeed (which, to our knowledge, has not beensuuggested).

111

Vi. Lesons Lerned i

A review of experience with regional programs to control land-based marine pollutionin the Baltic, Nort Sea, and Mediterranean has revealed a number of factors that can contributeto program effectiveness (Broadus et al. 1993). We compare these factors with expectationsabout a protocol for the Caribbean region, based upon regional characteristics and the currentstate of policy debate over the establishment of an LBMP protocol. 2

We present here and apply a checklist to help sumariz effectiveness factors across thefour regions (Table 25). In general, factors for success can be classified into thee categories.The first is a set of regional background characteristics associated with effective cooperation.The second is a set of program design elements, which are explicitly subject to the control ofprogr planners. The third is a set of indicators of program effectiveness. (Success breedsfurter succss, and evidence that a progr is in fact doing what it set out to do serves toreinorce or provide momentu for furter program effectiveness.)

In the case of the Caribbean, our checklist is necesarily incomplete because there is nopractice under an LBMP protocol to be observed and evaluated. Neverteless, we feel tht ths

checklist provides a useful comparson across the four regional interntional programs.

A. Regional Background Characteristics

1. Delineation of Subregions

The appropriate region must be defined in terms of the actual environmental relationshipbetween states. If pollutants do not circulate widely, then the inclusion of unaffected states ina regional program wil only complicate cooperative effort.

In the Baltic and Nort Sea regions, mare pollution is trly a transboundar problem.The Baltic is shallow and stagnat and thus tends to trap dischaged pollutats, affecting allstates borderig it. The counter-clockwise curents of the Nort Sea provide a bettr flushigmecham for that regiona sea, but a general tranboundar problem remain in tht thedischages of some states are exported to other states.

i Much of this section has been adapted from Broadus et aI. (1993) in order to faciltate the application of

"lessons leaed" from regional international program to control land-based mare pollution in the Mediterrean,Baltic, and Nort Sea regions to the Wider Carbbean. .

2 Ths comparson was intiated though discussions at a workshop conducted as par of this study, which was

held 4-6 Decmber 1994, at the University of the West Indies in Bndgetown, Barbados.

112

Table 25

Checklist: Factors for Regional Program Success

Regional Background Characteriics ror Baltic North Med CaribbeanErrective Cooperation Se

Is me region defined in terms of the pollution Ves Yes Doubiful No. focus should be on delineationproblem? Do the pollutanlS arreci all or the stales or subregionscmtering inlo the agremenl~

Is there coherence among member slates? Are they Largely. Ves No No. bui possibly yes al anal similar levels economic and scientific but some appropriiely delineatedevelopment. and do they have similar resources at dispanry subregional level stake?

Are ile member sialC politically committ 10 the Yes Yes No Doubtl. a1i1ough ise isprogiim? Is the condition of the regional se a regnizpnonty isse. and are high level politica offcialsinvolved in overseeing me program?

Was thre geneiii knowledge of die baseline Ves. fair No, por Some. IOCARBE and CEPPOL haveenyironmnial conditions in the se al th time of the paal made a goo sian; focus should beprogra's ineption? Where ile baic sorc and on pnonty problem aresshres of pollutani inpUlS kllwn?

Elen of Efecve Prgra De

Is die goal of die regional agremenl clearly Stte, Yes Yes Yes Should reive pnontyan are th progiim objecves designe to meel this

goal?

Dos ile agremenl oblige coniiicting panies to Ves Ves Ves Focs on encuraemenis:adopi mesures 10 meei progiim objecves? IInsctions coS! ~uctons

Do mesures spify ~uciion targeis and deadlines Ves Yes Few Enurae flexibility al subregional(or their achievement? leyel

Are progiim mesures designed efflcienUy? Do they No. bul No No Design proiocl instiOJlÏons 10target pollutin sourcs for which ile gretest improving encllge effcieni subregional

reuciions can be achieved al the lowesi marginal gains from Illdecost?

Does ile agremeni provide a mechanism 10 Ves. bul Ves Yes Environmental monitoring anddeienoine whedier or ii coniiicting panies comply not in the enforcmeni are roles for protoolwith adopied mesures? Is there an obligaiion In pal insiilUbonsrepoR on progiim implementaiion?

Does the progiim incorpiiie mechanisms for tiide Limiied No Some Encouiige bilatelli or small group10 increse prognim efficiency? agrements

Adequate finaing feaOJres? Yes Yes Problems Build on CEPPOL foundtin

Is die progiim's declisioiuing pross effectiye? Fair Yes Fair Fos shuld be on proure thiAre mere adOpied so as 10 keep dieir content aim to reuce ttnsactions costmeningful wiiloul alienating reluciani panicipanis' and define nghlS 10 a clean manne

environment

Is th progiim adapiable? Can ii be adjusted 10 Yes Yes Somewhai Design inio prolOlrefleci chaned circmsiaces and imrovedlcwledge?

Dyc Mea or EfecVCIIs thre complia widi th progra' Do Yes. bui , Some or De inlO prolOl usingconictng part imlemeni progia limite minima enyironmnia monilOnng suppon

remmendations'

Is ile goal being achieved? Has the regional Ves Yes Perhps -enyironmeni improved relative to the hypotheiicalsiOJalion thi would have ocrr withoui theregional progiim?

Haye naiiona abatemeni effons ben greter dian Ves Ves Doubtfl Aim shuld be 10 harnss explicidythy would have ben widioui regional copeiiiion? natinal abatemei effons dirogh

die faciltaiion of subregionalammgcments

Adapted from Broadus et al. (1993).

113

The weak currents and small tides of the Mediterranean Sea leave pollutants mostly inthe areas where they are discharged. Although some of the current flows in the Caribbean arestrong, most effects of LBM pollutant emissions are felt locally or subregionally. Pollutionproblems that are local or subregional imply that

subregional effort wil be more effective.

Effective reduction of pollutat discharges at the subregional level can reduce the risks of

regionwide effects.

Broadus et aL. (1993) found that cooperative efforts to control land-based sources ofmarine pollution are most appropriately based in regions defined in terms of the pollutionproblem itself. In regions where measures to control

land-based sources are only one component

of a larger umbrella agreement, it may be useful to focus on environmentally defined subregionswhen addressing land-based sources, rather th unecessarily including unaffected states.

In the WCR, CEPPOL has identifed 6 subregions of contiguous states for purposes ofanalyzing the distribution of pollutat loads (UEP 1994a). This delineation is a useful intialattempt, but we note that the ocurence of localiz LBMP problems does not follow thspattern in most cases. For example, some of the most common and pressing problems and theirdistrbution across WCR states (based on inormation sumarizd in Table 11) are as follows:

Sewage management: Arba, Bahas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands,Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Domincan Republic, Grenada,Guadeloupe, Guyan, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Marinque, Mexico, Netherlands

Antilles, Panaa, Puerto Rico, St. Kitt & Nevis, Surine, Trindad & Tobago, UnitedStates, US Virgin Islands, Venezuela

Indusrial pollutats: Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Colombia, Cuba, Domincan

Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe Jamaica, Marinque, Mexico, Netherlands Antiles, St.Kitt & Nevis, Puerto Rico, Tnndad & Tobago, United States, US Virgin Islands,Venezuela

Need for better resource assesment/coas use reguation: Anguila, Bahamas,

Beliz, Colombia, French Guian, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Jamica,

Honduras, Marinque, Mexico, Montserrt, Nicaragua, Pana, Sure, Tuks &Caicos Islands

Deforestion: Beliz, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domica, Grenada, Guatemaa, Haiti,

Honduras, Jamaica, Marinque, Mexico, Nicaagua, Panaa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent &Grenadines, Venezuela

Coas erosion: Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Dominca, Grenada, Guatemala,

Jamaica, St. Kitt & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Venezuela

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Solid waste management: Colombia, Dominica, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Netherlands

Antiles

Delineation of subregions is one of the most importnt tasks that must be undertenunder the auspices of a protocol. Clearly some of the above problems are more common thanothers, suggesting that a system of overlapping subregions, defined by the presence of tagetedLBMP problems (as arayed in Table 26) might be appropriate. As scientific inormation isdeveloped, revision of existing subregions may be required.

2. Coherence Among Member States

The success of cooperative effort depends upon "coherence:" shared cultural values,public preferences that coincide, simlar stages of economic development, and compatiblepolitical organtions. Regions with states at simlar stages of economic development, such as

the Baltic and Nort Sea states, are able to contribute on a relatively equal basis to a marinepollution control progr, in term of the scientific, techncal, and fincial resources they haveat their disposal. Conversely, regions comprising states at varying stages of economic

development, such as the Mediterranean and Caribbean, may need specializ technology

transfer and financial assistace mechansms if their programs are to function on a fully regionalscale.

In the caes studied, the regions with the best coherence have the most effective regional

cooperation and are leat complicated by a number of tranfer issues. Furtermore, cooperativeeffort are most effective when member states are simarly affected by a degraded maeenvironment and have simar resources at stae. If they are not similarly affected by pollutatdischarges or do not perceive the condition of the mare environment as a priority issue, it ismore difficult to design a program in which participation is beneficial to all members.

The effectiveness of the Baltic and Nort Sea regional programs, relative to theMediterranean and, potentially, to the Carbbea, can be explained by the nature of each region's

member states and the degree of coherence among them. The Nort Sea region consists of asmall number of relatively homogeneous states, sharg simar staes in the condition of theirregiona sea. Most of the Baltic states similarly share a stae in and commtment to theirregiona sea's environment, though some disparty is evident between the traditional democraciesand the formerly communt states. Cooperative effort in these regions have ben able tofunction on a more uniform basis, with a higher level of political commtment and few tranferissues.

The disparty in levels of economic development in the Mediterranea, in paricular, ha

made uniform action virally impossible and has complicated relations by vire of the nee for

transfer mechansms. We expect tht the existence of similar types of disparities among

115

Table 26

Commonalty of Specific LBMP Problems as Basis for Subregional Groupings

Stte(ecnomic caaciiy-innitiona capaciiy-

ecnomic incentive)'

Defor- Solid Coas lnusui Resourc Sewageesction waste erosion pollutats inventory I mgmi

mgmi

..

.. .

. . .. . .

. .

Anila (3- I -4)

Anti & Baruda (3-2-4)

Arba (4-1-4)

Bah (4-2-4)

Barbados (3-2-4)

Beliz (1-1-3)

Bniih Virgin Is (4-2-4)

Cayma Is (4-2-4):::::::::::::::;:.:-.:::;::::::::=:=:::=:=;::':'::=;=:=;:::-:::::::::::.:.:.:.:-:::::;:::.:.......

jJ~almi#.ln~;¡b:mmmJJJ':Jmtti).:¡ --............. .'.....:..

:,'~..........___h__..._d._.~..,.,::."'__..,__,.d'. -:-:':-:-:':':';':':':':';':':':';':-:':':-.':-:-:-:.. '.:,'Jftttittt;Jt .,.,..... . .l

.Cost Rica (I -2-2) .Cuba (1-3.3)

Domica (1-2-3)

Domi Rep (1-1-3)

French Guia (2-1-1)

. .. . .

. .

....... .:'."'.'-

k,- -~ ____:!!t--

h__, _.".-..,-.~t.

Gutema (1-1-1)

Guyan (1-1-2)

Hai (1-1-2)

. . ...

.

..

_':::::;:::;:::;:;:;:;I:;::::;;;;;;;;:'l-:: '.~ . ~..~.:::;il.;:Ii.l~jI:,tI::::::;;:;::I::::¡;::¡':;:;:::::I;:;:::;:¡:::::¡:;:::::"::::;:::;: ::t:;¡t:::;::::iI:¡:::;:;;;;:I:::j:: :;;:::::::.':::::I:::I:::t:¡';::::;;:::: ~Monimit (3-2-4) .Nct. Antiles (3-1-4)

Nica (I-I-I)Pa (1-1-2)

Pul' Rico (3-43)

Sl Kill & Nevis (2-2-4)

St. Lucia (I -2-4)

St Vinnt & Gren (1-1-4)

Sunn (2-1-1)

Tnn & Tobao (2-2-2)

1\ & Cacos (3-2-4)

Unite Slltes (4-1)

US Virin Is (4--4)

. . ...

.

. ...

.

..

.

.

... .

...

. ...._....__u.................. ... .................................. ................. ..--:::::::::::::::::::;:::;:::::::::;:;:;:::::X::::::::;::". .~. ... ..:.;..... .. .. ..............:.=::

Jy'tg#.~:~;ntt:Jmtt::::::t:f:'ttttJdtt :::::;:::;::::::::::¡:i:¡:;::;:¡::¡::;:¡:--

'S Sen V.C. espiay Table 23.Shadin inicate those silIe suffenn frm at leat 4 of the 6 problems listed.

116

Caribbean states implies a high potential for lack of coherence there. A careful delineation ofsubregions would enhance the potential for coherence among states within each subregion.

Building upon the example introduced in the preceing subsection, we note that Table26 presents the qualitative ratings (from Section V) of individual states' economic capacity,

intitutional capacity, and economic incentive to control LBMP. Of the 37 political units in theregion, there are only 7, or fewer than one-fift, for which at least 4 of the 6 selected LBMPproblems are significant: Colombia, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, andVenezuela (the shaded rows in Table 26). Five of these seven have strong to very strongeconomic incentives to participate in an LBMP protocol, but none has an intitutional capacityrating higher than 2, and the average economic capacity rating for the group is just 1.85. Theaddition of the United States (including Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands) and Cuba to thisgroup, however, could make for a kind of "super" subregion that is truly representative of thefull range of problems, incentives, and capacities thoughout the region. Withn a frameworkof overlapping subregions, a "super" subregion constitute on such a basis could be explicitlycharered to playa coordinative role among all the other subregions; to ensure equal accss tothe protocol's clearighouse products; and to promote fairess in the internal allocation offmacial and techncal assistace to all participating states and subregions.

3. High-Level Political Commtment and Oversight

The success of a regional program inevitably depends on the political commitment of itsmember states. Unless members accept the condition of their regional sea as a domestic priorityissue, it wil be difficult to get them to take costly effective action. One indicator of likelypolitical commitment is whether the program grew out of internl or external motivations. Aprogram that develops out of mutual concern for a shared resource is likely to enjoy a greaterlevel of commitment th a program initiated by external players, whose concern andmotivations differ from those of the regional states. The frequency of ministerial-level meetigsmay also indicate continued interest and commtment to a regional program. High-level politicalinvolvement in setting progr objectives and reporting on program implementation also adds

some accountabilty to the program framework.

Both the Baltic and Nort Sea programs were internly motivated, growing out of ashaed perception among regiona states tht the degradation of the marine environment was anissue of great importnce. Minsterial conferences have contributed to the success of theseprogr by producing specific commtments with meanigfu timetables and by encouraging

Contracting Parties to tae actions with greater scope.

Both the Mediterranean and Caribbean programs, on the other hand, have resultedprimarily from external UNEP intiatives. As in the other regions, minsterial-level meetings

117

have contributed to the effectiveness of the Mediterranea program by expediting the adoptionof common measures.

A sense of urgency and concern for the condition of a regional sea, essential to thesuccess of a pollution control program, canot be introduced into regional states by externalorganitions. Many WCR states already consider the risks of transboundary LBMP to be apressing problem, especially because of theats to tourism economies. Even nontransboundarypollution problems may harm other tourist economies, especially those lined by cruise shipbusiness, in that visitors may form a general impression of the Caribbean as polluted on the basisof localized problems. Institutions organd though a Caribbean regional protocol may havean importnt role to play in encouraging subregional agreements to reduce pollution by loweringtransactions costs, channeling foreign assistance effort, and serving as a clearinghouse.

4. Knowledge of Baseline Conditions

All four regions suffer from a lack of adequate baseline data. Without such inormationit is difficult to establish effective program priorities, to gauge program effect, or to adjust effortin response to changing conditions.

Than to the long tradition of environmental monitoring in the Baltic Sea, the natue ofthe region's pollution problem was relatively well understood at the time of the Helsin

Convention's inception. This knowledge of baseline environmental conditions has increased theeffectiveness of cooperative effort in the region.

The baseline conditions of the Nort Sea were not very well understood when cooperative

effort were first undertken. As of 1988, estiates have been developed for the inputs of

nutrients, heavy metals, and halogenated substances, with resultig improvements in

effectiveness.

Baseline pollution sources in the Mediterranean were loosely identified in 1972 by theFAO's General Fishery Council. Therefore, some inormation on the pollutats dischaged intothe Mediterranea and their sources was available in 1975 when the Med Plan was develope.However, the degree of pollutat tranport was overestiated.

CEPPOL has begun to assemble data from each state on its point source contrbutionsto the Carbbea Sea and connected waters. Furer reseach effort are neeed to develop a

better understading of current flows and the associated distrbution of pollutants. A regionamonitoring system would improve the quality of scientific data and deepen our understadingof pollutat dispersal and the potential for damages. Ths task is one of the most importnt tobe undertken by the WCR states. In combintion with IOCARE, the CEP program has taenvaluable first steps in characteriing baseline conditions.

118

Furter improvements could be made by encouraging the scientific community involvedin local monitoring of Caribbean waters to make coarse approximations and estimates of

environmental conditions, suitable for management guidance, rather than waiting for morethorough and exact research results. The World Bank has already taen steps in this direction(Elvis and Colbert 1994). These estimates should be employed in identifying priority bilateralrelationships, delineating subregions, and assisting states in the identification of potential gainfrom trade.

B. Elements of Effective Program Design

1. Clear Goals and Objectives

Effectiveness wil hige on the aptness of program objectives in light of the overall goal.When a regional program is established to improve the quality of the marine environment,objectives should be realistically designed to reduce emission of pollutants into the marineenvironment. A program is ineffective if the successful attinent of objectives does not resutin the achievement of the goal. For example, objectives that call for "confdence-building"exercises do not, in themselves, result in improved marine environmental quality.

All of the cooperative agreements operating in the Nort Sea region clearly state theirgoals. In the case of the Interministerial Nort Sea Conferences (INSC) and the Paris

Convention, objectives have been designed to meet the goal. The Paris Convention calls for theelimination of blacklisted substaces, the strct limitation or elimation of grey listed substances,and the prevention of pollution from radioactive substances in order to attin the goal of

reducing pollution of the Convention area from emissions of land-based sources. TheDeclarations of the INSC call for the development of timetables for the various actions aimingto achieve the goal of protecting the Nort Sea environment.

The goal of the Helsink Convention is clearly stated in the Convention text. Anexesto the Convention identify substaces that Baltic member states should. endeavor to prohibit ormi in order to attin the Convention's goal.

The Barcelona Convention is not very specific in outling its goals and the mea toachieving them. However, the Athens Protocol states its goal as tag "all appropriatemeaures to prevent, abate, combat, and control pollution from land-based sources." Programobjectives are outlined in Aricles 5,6, and 7 and call on Contracting Pares to elimate (Aricle5) or strctly limit (Aricle 6) pollution by substaces liste in Anexes 1 and 2, respectively.Aricle 7, however, limits ths obligation by conditionig the adoption of programs and measuesunder Arcles 5 and 6 on the "capacity to adapt and reconvert existing intallations, theeconomic capacity of the Parties and their need for development. "

119

A clear goal for the reduction and control of LBMP has not yet been articulated by theparies to the Cartgena Convention. In articulating such a goal, states should take advantageof existing intitutions, including bilateral agreements to control pollution, and interntionalorganitions, such as the CEP and the World Ban. We have argued in this report that anexplicitly subregional focus should be incorporated into an LBMP protocol for the WCR. Gainfrom trade are more readily apparent at the subregional, especially bilateral, leveL. Byencouraging states to control the actual incidence of pollution at the subregional level, the risks

of potentially widespread regional pollution can be lowered dramatically. By taking "small"initial steps requiring relatively few but more easily accssible resources, an effective approachto the reduction and control of LBMP in the Caribbean can be built. A careful examintion ofexisting intitutions and programs shows that some small steps in ths direction have already beentaen, providing a firm basis for the subregional approach we recommend.

Clarification of the term "appropriate measures" for LBMP reduction or control, as inthe Barcelona Convention, wil be another importt focus of discussions leading toward aprotocol for the Wider Caribbea Region. It is more likely that effective pollution controlmeasures wil be adopted if states are permitted to choose the most cost-effective approach forany given level of water quality. At the subregional level, WCR states should be given

flexibilty in the adoption of appropriate pollution control measures. Flexibilty wil permitcontrol measures to be one term of negotiation in a trading arangement.

2. Obligation to Adopt Measures: Targets and Deadlines

Effectiveness depends on the degree to which a program's objectives, however aptlydesigned, have been met by its Contractig Parties. Specific targets and timetables for emission

reductions are necessary first steps towards ensring that program objectives result in real action.The practice of including dates and proceures for reporting on implementation in issued

recommendations is also useful in ths regard.

PARCOM issues recommendations to its Contracting Paries and calls upon them toimplement the recommended progr and measures in order to attin adopted objectives. Theeffectiveness of these measures improved with the 1987 and 1990 Nort Sea Conferences, whenan emissions reduction program with speified tagets and time limts was adopted (Wettestad

1992). Prior to the 1987 Conference, the reduction program adopted were vague and reflectedthe position of the most reluctat paricipants.

HELCOM issues recommendations to its Contrcting Paries on the adoption of measuresnecssar to fulfill the program objectives. These meaes usually contain specific tagets anddeadlines for their accomplishment.

Recommended common measures have been adopted in conjunction with the Athens

120

Protocol, addressing 12 of the 28 substances covered in Anexes I and II. However, the contentof the adopted measures is general, with few fixed time limits related to concrete reductiongoals. Only four of these measures include target dates, or periods, for their achievement.Thus the recommendations effectively do not demand that practical action be taen by theContracting Parties. In such a diverse region, however, there may be so many local variablesthat common action becomes virally impossible. In these situations it may be more effectiveto adopt variable standards or differential timetables than to adopt uniform measures that resultin litte or no practical action.

A useful method of accommodating a region's developing states, or states otherwisesubject to drastically different conditions or incentives, is to employ differential timetables forcomplying with objectives, accompanied by mandatory reporting requirements on progress madetoward implementation. In ths way, Contracting Parties are encouraged to tae some sort ofaction toward meeting program objectives, at least in the form of enabling steps, and somerecrd of their progress can be observed.

The differential tietable method can be applied to subregions in the Carbbean. Withguidace from protocol intitutions, subregional groupings of WCR states should be encouraged

to set stadads, identify appropriate pollution control mechanisms, and determine appropriate

timetables for control. Regional institutions, such as the CEP or the W orId Bank, might becalled upon for general advice in selecting these parameters of a program.

3. Efficientlv Designed Progra Measures

Program measures are most effective when they target effuents and locations for whichthe greatest daage reduction can be achieved for the least cost. Reductions across the board,such as those required by uniform standards, tend to be more costly and less efficient than astrategy that bases reductions on the marginal damage done and the marginal cost of abatementfor each substance.

The measures adopted for the protection of the Nort Sea Convention area were notdesigned effciently. Improvements in the mare environment wil be made at a highereconomic cost than necessar (Wettestad 1992). Ths is evident in the apparent preference foruniorm emission reduction stadads over environmenta quality standards, and in the fact thtthe major problems in the region are confmed to several coastal hot spots whie the meauresadopted address the entire Nort Sea area.

Past HELCOM recommendations have not been designed efficiently. As with the 50percent reduction target, past measures have been taen across the board. However, the Balticprogram seems to be moving away from across-the-board reduction strategies. The pre-feasibilty studies of the Baltic Joint Comprehensive Programe focus on the most serious point

121

sources of pollution in an attempt to provide a basis for cost-effective action. Thus, if

HELCOM follows the lead of the Baltic Task Force, measures adopted for the protection of theBaltic Sea should become more effective and efficient.

The measures adopted for the protection of the Mediterranean region are ineffectivelydesigned and often do not result in practical action.

In the WCR case, arguments are now being made for regionwide uniform water qualitystandads and technology-based emission controls. These approaches are infexible and

potentially quite costly. Further, they are warranted only in special cases, where thesholdeffects are strongly suspected or actully evident. As in the case of the Mediterranean, it seemsunlikely that an "effective" protocol wil result from agreement on regionwide standards of these

types. WCR states should be encouraged to focus on relevant margin abatement benefits andcosts. Where water quality stadards are determed to be a more practical approach than thedetermintion of economic damages, states should be encouraged to adopt intrents of control

that allow the stadards to be met in the most cost-effective maner. Although there may be animportt role for technology-based controls on certin discharges or for certin industres, inthe interest of effectiveness, they should not be imposed arbitrarly as the only feasible pollutioncontrol measure.

4. Compliance Mechanisms

Reportg on measures taen toward implementation is a critical element of anysubregiona pollution control agreement. This is particularly tre in a common-poolenvironment, because many states may be reluctant to tae action without the knowledge thatother states are doing the same or at least not subverting their effort. In a unidirectional

pollution case, such as for many Caribbean pollutats, downstream state(s) have a strongincentive to monitor changes in environmental quality to ensure compliance by the upstreamstate(s).

In the absence of physical evidence to determine compliance, paries should be calledupon to report on their level of compliance, in term of legal, regulatory, or other measuestaen toward implementing progr objectives. However, it is essential that reporting be madeconvenient and easy, to ense tht failures to report are not mistaenly interpreted as failuresto comply.

Although there are no physical mechansms to monitor the compliance of ContractigParies in the Nort Sea region, the recommendations issued by the INSC and the Pars

Commssion inc1udea date and procedure for reporting on measures taen. Member statesreport on the implementation of recommendations at the meetigs of the Contracting Paries.

122

HELCOM is becoming increasingly effective at ensuring the compliance of itsContracting Parties. Until recently, reporting on compliance was voluntary. The 1992 HelsinkiConvention has expanded the requirement to report on domestic implementation, as well as theobligation to provide inormation on discharge permits, emissions, and environmental quality.This information is now to be provided upon the request of a Contracting Part or the

Commission, thus improving the Commission's effectiveness in determining compliance.

The Mediterranean regional program is relatively ineffective in monitoring compliance.Although the Barcelona Convention contains an article on "compliance control," it has neverbeen implemented. Thus, there is no effective, binding mechanism to assure the reporting orverification of actions taken.

In the WCR, a regional protocol might contain reporting mechanisms as one way inwhich to reduce the costs to individual parties of gaining information, negotiation, andenforcement ("tranactions costs"). A regional verification authority, deploying environmentamonitoring technologies, could be empowered to determne compliance in the event of a disputeover whether or not a state has made good faith effort to comply.

5. Mechanisms for Trade

Trading mechanisms can faciltate the accomplishment of mutual goals in regions wheremembers' abilties and preferences vary. Where there are substantial differences in levels ofeconomic development, the tranfer of financial resources, technology, and inormation todeveloping states may allow the region to achieve improvements in the mare environment thatwould otherwise be impossible. Such transfers may also serve as inducements for states to adoptgoals and actions more in line with those of their parers. Trading can also improve theefficiency of a regional program, if member states are allowed to exchange pollution reductionresponsibilties. None of the programs studied, however, has utilized mechansms such astradeable emissions quotas to increase program efficiency.

The Baltic regional program has been successful in utilizing the differing expertise of itsmember states. The "lead state" priciple has called upon states with a comparative advantagein deaing with particular substaces, sectors, or processes to be responsible for directing relateprogr intiatives. Ths inovation has provided Baltic states with access to expertise relevant

to the state-of-the-art technologies for paricular industral sectors. The 1992 HelsinConvention reinorces the importce of inormation exchage by expanding the duties of theCommission to include promoting relevant research and reciving, processing, and dissemintingrelevant scientific and techncal inormation.

The Mediterranean program, with its diverse paricipants, presents many opportnitiesfor trade. The Mediterranean program has done the most of the four to transfer financial

123

assistance and encourage capacity building among its members. Most information andtechnology tranfers in the Mediterranean region have focused on environmental monitoring

programs, treatment plant design, and traing for economic policy personnel in the region'sdeveloping states. The potential benefits of trade in the Mediterranean program have not beenfully realized, and other agencies have intervened to encourage and execute transfers.

Trading among member states improves a program's abilty to achieve the mutul goalsof its members. Trading mechanisms become increasingly importnt in regions with diversemember states. A successful program explicitly recognis the differences in the endowmentof its members, and faciltates trading that allows each state to do what it does relatively best.

In ths report, we have developed a styliz model of bilateral trade in pollution controlto clarfy the opportnities for gains in the Caribbean (Appendix C). These opportnities arediminshed to the extent that propert rights in a clean marine environment are obfuscated;

scientific, techncal, and economic inormation useful for characterizing marginal abatementschedules remains undeveloped or is kept proprieta; barrers to negotiation among polluter

and pollutee remain in place; and trading relationships are weakened by indequate enforcement.All of these hindrances to gain from trade are appropriate focuses for LBMP protocol

institutions .

6. Adequate Financing Features

The efforts involved in reaching, maintaing, and evolving regional agreement are costlyin themselves, and the measures required to implement program recommendations are muchmore so. The inclusion of adequate financing mechanisms is therefore indispensable forprogram success.

Financing of program organition and secretariat costs on the basis of equalcontrbutions or on shares pro-rated by economic capabilty (or with supplemental contributions

from host members) is simple and expedient as long as these costs are relatively modest. Thisformula, however, does not take account of the relative staes, responsibilties, and capabiltiesof the members with respect to the specific problem at hand. For example, both the percentageof France's population in the Mediterranean coastal region and its share of economic capacityin that region are less than one-thd of its required share of payments to support the program'soperating costs. Ths can lead to problems if, as in the Mediterranean, secretaiat and

adminstrative costs grow large. These problems may be exacerbate where fmancial tranfersbetween states are involved and when the mechansms for these transfers lack transparency.

¡.

r

Implementation of measures agree to by the program, such as installation of sewagetreatment facilties and introduction of modern industral production or control technologies,is a different problem. These measures wil cost orders of magmtude more thn cuupciative

124

program expenses. Reliance on domestic financial resolve for compliance seems unavoidable,although measures for international fincial assistace wil be needed where intra-regionaleconomic discrepancies are large. We have begun to see already an interest by the World Ban,GEF, IADB, and UNDP in assisting in the financing of marine pollution control facilities in theCaribbean.

The Baltic's Joint Comprehensive Programe (JCP) appears to offer a good example ofboth flexible targeting of regional priorities and realistic consolidation of financial resources toaddress those priorities. How successful it wil be in practice remain to be seen, and ths wildepend significantly on success in mobilizing and managing fmancial resources. The use ofexisting multilateral financial institutions in the region as executig agencies promises smoothand competent fmancial mangement though well-understood mechanisms. Greater tranfers

(from west to east) wil be required in the Baltic, but the regional program can also help guidethe allocation of assistance from outside the region though externl intitutions such as theWorld Ban, GEF, and EIB.

The Mediterranean program also has shown some success in shaping the fudingpriorities of external donor organitions, though to some degree ths has been in reaction tointiatives outside the program arising in part because of dissatisfaction with the program'seffectiveness and lack of fmancial transparency. The Mediterranean Trust Fund mechansm hasnot been notably effective in achieving regional program goals, though it should beacknowledged that it was not intended to finance domestic implementation and capital investmentprojects.

Based upon our analysis of the Baltic, Nort Sea, and Mediterranean cases, it has becomeapparent that a key to effective finncing is to sustain the program's credibilty by keeping itsgoals and recommended measures in line with the tre priorities of its members and by notallowing its recommended measures to outstrip realistic fincial means.

In the Caribbean, program funding might build upon the foundation already establishedthough the CEP . We recommend that small steps be taen, starting with a focus on theregion's existing priority tranboundary marine pollution problems. If waranted, the programand its resources can be expanded as experience in catalyzing subregional agreements is gained.Ths kid of "ramping up" approach is more likely to elucidate relevant protocol "scaleeconomies" and to build confdence among Contracting Paries than a more grandiose effortfrom the outset.

7 . Effective Decisionmaking Process

The means by which measures are adopted is likely to inuence the effectiveness of theprogram. Seeking consensus ensures broad-based support for adopted measures but tends to

125

drive the content down to a level that is palatable to the most reluctant parties (Sand 1991).Although the compromises necessary to reach a consensus may demonstrate a high capacity forpolitical problem solving, they often result in ineffective pollution control measures. Strictinistence on a unanious choice can be an obstacle to progress.

Conversely, measures adopted without consensus tend to be more substative, but may

also discourage a high level of consistent participation. Without consensus, and with nosupranational authority to enforce adopted measures, such an approach is likely to introduceproblems of non-compliance.

The approach adopted by the Paris Convention represents a feasible compromise.Consensus is sought, thus building support for adopted measures. However, if the ContractingParties canot reach a consensus, measures are adopted by a thee-quarters majority vote. Thus,Contracting Parties are not confined to the preferences of the least enthusiastic participants, andan "opt-out" opportnity is available.

In the Caribbean, the trade-off between the level of participation in the program and thelevel of action called for in adopted measures should be explicitly recognied and addressed inlight of a clearly articulated overall goal. Instead of focusing on consensus or majorityagreement over uniform stadards, the Contracting Parties might usefully decide on procedures

for clarifying the legal rights to a clean environment and reducing states' costs of inormationgathering, negotiation, and enforcement. These procedures can then be applied in any particularsubregional case.

8. Adaptabilty Over Time

The abilty to adjust the program to changed circumstances and improved knowledge isvital to its effectiveness over time. The method of keeping the framework convention quitespare and leaving program elaboration to subsequent protocols and recommendations is usefulin ths regard. So, too, is the periodic oversight and intervention of high-level political authority

from among the paries.

All four programs exhibit relatively spare framework conventions, leaving programelaboration to protocols and recommendations. The Baltic program introduces furteradaptabilty by devising specific priority projects and tasks without the need to adopt formalrecommendations. Both the inormal and formal interplay between the INSC and theCommission in the N ort- East Atlantic region help the Nort Sea program adapt to changingcircumstances and knowledge.

To a large extent, adaptabilty is related to decisionmaking rules. Reliance on consensushinders innovation and adaptabilty. Decision mechanisms that permit or specify variable

126

timetables or the ability to opt-out or opt-in on particular measures, as in the Nort Sea region,also enhance adaptabilty. So do mechansms that encourage the formation of subregionalcompacts and projects, again as in the Paris Convention.

The constant public and political pressure assured though high-level political oversightand involvement, as with the INSC and Baltic Ministerial meetings, encourages programadaptabilty. So does pressure from NGOs and public interest groups that is faciltated byprogram transparency and accessibilty.

Both the Baltic and Nort Sea programs have demonstrated adaptabilty with adoption ofrevised 1992 conventions, but even greater adaptabilty would not require so fundamental a

change at the framework leveL. There is some evidence that the adaptabilty of theMediterranean program, and, by implication, tht of the Caribbean program, may be hideredby their being embedded in the United Nations system. In the Med Program, for example, theabilty to generate baseline data was hindered to some extent by the inclusion of all parties inthe study effort, rather than relying on research intitutions that were already functionigeffectively in the region (Broadus et al. 1993; Skjaerseth 1992). There is already someindication that the CEPPOL program is following a similar approach and suffering simarconsequences (see Section II, especially footnote 6). Another intitutional problem encounteredby the Med Plan was a disagreement over funding between UNEP and UNDP, which caused athee-year delay in the implementation of a Priority Action Program (Broadus et al. 1993); inths respect, the negotiating parties would be well advised to learn what they can about theexperience to date of the GEF project on ship-generated waste in the WCR, which is a jointeffort of UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank.

None of the thee earlier programs exhibits adaptive featues that specify uncertintiesor changed conditions whose resolution would lead to specific adaptation in the program. These,too, would be useful features.

C. Dynamic Measures of Effectiveness

1. Level of Compliance

Program effectiveness is in part reflected in the proportion of issued recommendationsthat are actually implemented by the Contracting Parties. If the program merely issuesrecommendations that none of the parties adopts in practice, then the program may be deemedineffective.

Although Nort Sea states report on the measures taken toward program implementationat the meetings of Contracting Parties, no coherent record of their comments is compiled by theINSC or P ARCOM, making it is impossible to monitor the effectiveness of the program in this

127

respect.

Mechanisms to monitor the compliance of Baltic Sea states have been put into place, butit is stil difficult to draw any concrete conclusions on the present degree of compliance. Theavailable information indicates that only 12 of the 47 LBS recommendations issued between 1980and 1991 have been implemented by Contracting Paries, implying that the regional program stilcannot be considered completely effective in this respect.

It is very difficult to determine the degree of compliance with the Mediterraneancooperative program. Despite the obligation to report on measures taen and results achieved,Contracting Parties show a great reluctance to provide such information (Skjaerseth 1992).

Requests for inormation on land-based sources and domestic legislation have received little orno response. Furtermore, there is evidence that most Contracting Paries have failed to adoptdomestic laws and legislation reflecting the provisions of the Athens Protocol and its Anexes

(UNEP 1991b). The available inormation suggests that the level of compliance is quite low.

Weare greatly concerned that if an LBMP protocol for the Caribbean follows along thelines of the development of the Mediterranean program, that compliance wil be predictably low.This lesson provides one of the strongest arguents for a subregional approach in whichdownstream WCR states have imediate incentives to seek pollution reduction from upstreamWCR states and a forum to which they can turn, at low cost, to see that such reductions can beimplemented.

2. Achievement of the Program Goal

A regional program can be considered effective if the regional environment has improvedrelative to the hypothetical situation that would have occurred without the regional program.Knowing the intial environmental conditions that the pollution control program is designed toalleviate is essential in this respect.

Following the agreement by states of the Nort Sea region to reduce pollutant emissionsby 50 to 70 percent by 1995, it appears that the goal of reducing pollution from land-based

sources is progressing toward being achieved. Although the physical evidence to support thsconclusion is scant, there is a general sense among expert that there has been someimprovement in the Nort Sea environment. In fact, the Quality Status Report produced inconjunction with the 1987 Nort Sea Conference noted that "the few sufficiently long time seriesavailable indicate that with a few exceptions, containation has been reduced or at least has notincreased over the last decade" (as reported in Wettestad 1992).

There is some evidence that HELCOM has been effective in achieving its goal andimproving the condition of the Baltic Sea. According to HELCOM experts, the Baltic

128

environment would have been much worse off in the absence of the Commission's activities

(Rodionov 1992). This view is corroborated by the official statement of the Finnsh Delegation,which concluded that "the state of the Baltic Sea today is definitely better than it would havebeen without the many efforts and concrete . . . measures of the Baltic Sea states" (Delegationof Finland 1990).

There are no reliable time series data that would indicate changes in marine

environmental quality resulting from Med Plan activities. The best available inormation isprovided by UNEP's 1989 "State of the Mediterranean Marine Environment" report (UNEP1989b), which gives a fragmented and uncertin account of the condition of the Mediterraneanenvironment. There is some evidence of localized improvements, but how these were inuencedby the Med Plan is unclear. Interviews with regional scientists indicate that they feel that thelevel of pollution has remained roughly constant over the last decade, while coastal populationand industr have grown steadily (Skjaerseth 1992). Thus it appears that the effects of increasesin population and industr may have been offset by the actions taen from 1976 to 1990. Theremay thus be some basis for believing that the Mediterranean marine environment would havebeen worse off without regional cooperation.

Progress has been made on characterizing baseline environmental conditions in theCaribbean. Further research wil be necessary, and ths research should focus on marine areas

that are seen to be priorities in terms of the incidence of actual transboundary pollution effectsor acute localized problems.

3. Increased Domestic Abatement Effort

If a regional program is operating effectively, one would expect member states to engagein greater pollution abatement efforts than they would without regional cooperation.

The pollution abatement efforts of the Nort Sea and Baltic states are probably at ahigher level than would have occurred in the absence of regional cooperation, especially withrespect to the adoption of the 50 percent emissions reduction target for the Nort Sea region.It is reasonable to assume that no single state would adopt so strgent a measure withoutreciprocal action from other discharging states.

Domestic abatement effort in the Mediterranean region are not obviously greater thanthey would have been without the Barcelona Convention and its Protocols. It can be argued thatthe effort of several states (specifically Greece, Albania, and Egypt) were affected by theregional program, because they embarked on vigorous new public adminstrative campaigns tointegrate environmental considerations into traditional coastal zone development and economicplanng. However, many polluting states had established domestic environmental authoritiesand legislation prior to the Med Plan's inception in 1976. Many actions taen during Med Plan

129

years were taen at the domestic level and likely would have been taen anyway. Although theMediterranean would have been worse off without regulation, the Med Plan probably onlyaccounts for a minor part of the achievement witnessed (Skjaerseth 1992).

WCR states already recognie the existence of LBMP problems, and many have begunalready to develop the infrastructure, including the legal institutions and technological controls,to begin to deal with these problems. An effective LBMP protocol would build upon thesenascent efforts, tang small but certin steps to move in the direction of pollution prevention,reduction, and control.

D. Sumary

At ths juncture, it is not yet possible to evaluate the effectiveness of a protocol on LBMPcontrol for the Caribbean. We can, however, say somethg about the general features andelements of a protocol that might be incorporated to improve its potential for effectiveness(Table 25). The WCR resembles the Mediterranean as a regional sea, suggesting that manylessons can be drawn from the Mediterranean experience. Experience with the control of LBMPin other regional seas can provide useful lessons as well, paricularly in the areas of programfinancing (Baltic), political commitment, (Baltic, Nort Sea), statements of goals (Baltic, NortSea), targets and deadlines (Baltic, Nort Sea), and compliance (Nort Sea).

We argue, in this section, for a careful consideration and delineation of subregions, basedon shared LBMP problems of a localized nature, and, where relevant, transboundary pollutioneffects. In the latter case, protocol mechanisms should build upon existing bilateral

arangements, if these are seen to be effective in themselves. A WCR protocol can also utilizeand build upon the resources and capabilties of existing intitutions for scientific research,monitoring, and clearinghouse fuctions. These intitutions should be expanded, or contracted,incrementally to determe their most appropriate and efficient scales of operation.

The rights of a state to a clean marine environment should be clariied with the

protocol, enabling staeholder states to seek beneficial reductions in actual or expected LBMPfrom source states. The Contracting Partes should employ the protocol and its intitutions asa forum with which the agreements to reduce LBMP, based upon transboundary effects orcommon needs, are faciltated, thereby reducing transactions costs (see especially Appendix C).The protocol should encourage states to adopt cost-effective intrments for pollution control,including tradeable pollution permits, emission charges, or technology-based controls, wheretheshold effects are apparent.

130

APPENDIX A

Data Tables

131

Table A. iEcoic and popaton Data for WCR Sta

Gros Domestic Prouct IGDPl' Population.

State T ota11991 Per caplta 1991 Avg. ann. Totl 199' Ann. Denty(SUS millon) ($US) ~rowt rate Gro (pe~

~) 19891 (%) 1m km95'

Anuill 47.4 680 6.5 680 0.6 75

Anaua-Barba" 424 660 1. 64 00 0.3 146

Arba" 85 1360 10.' 63 00 0.2 32

Bahamas" 260 10 20 3.0 24700 11 '8Barbdos" 180 700 14.01 26 00 0.6 612

Belze 420 2165 9.0' 190 00 2.03 8.3

Bñtish Vil'in Is." 133 1060 2.0 1200 1. 80

Cavmn Is." 670 23 00 4.4 26 00 4.f 100

Coombia 41700 126 3.7 32 30 00 1.66 31

Cos Rica 563 1810 3.1 3 04 00 2.41 60

Cuba" 17 00 1 58 120.01" 1061000 0.89 96

Dominica 174 2100 2.1 85 00 1. 113

Dominican ReD. 7148 976 1. 7 170 00 1.98 148

Fr. Guiana" 421' 439' - 98 00 3.4 1.

Greda" 25 300 10.41' 84 00 10.41 247

Guadeloooe" 1100' 3 30 - 34200 0.8 194

Guamala 935 98 1. 9 20 00 2.88 85

Guvna 349 435 7.0' 80 00 0.94 4.1

Haiti 2641 39 io.n 6 490 00 2.03 236

Honuras 300 567 2.7 514000 3.00 46

jamaica 3497 1431 1.6 2 420 00 1.02 224

Martnlau" 200' 6 00' - 34 00 0.9 321

Mexico 286 628 3321 1.2 84 490 00 2.06 44

Monrr 73 580 13.5' 1200 0.3 120

Netlrltnd 1,40 7,60 1.5 183,00 01 191Anlles

Nicaraaua 1736 456 11.91 3 68 00 3.74 29

Panama 554 2248 0.5 2.420 00 1.90 32

Puert Rico" 2280 620 2.t 3 30 00 0.1' 36

SL Kitt & Nevis" 142 350 6.8 40 00 0.3 147

SL Lua" 25 165 2.5 153 00 2.6 251

SL Vincnt f 17 1,50 3.ft 113,00 1.4 332GreneSuñname 1941 4513 12.5) 420 00 1.86 2.6

Tñnlda & Tobo 4939 394 14.41 1 240 00 1.08 242

TUlU & Calco" 68.5 500 - 900 2.3' 21

Unit State 5610802 22 219 2.6 249 98 00 1.03 27

U.5. Viraln Is." 120 1100 - 99 00 10.31 28

Venezula 53441 2705 1.5 1932000 2.12 22

WCR5~3r

Total:~~.:44 45 00

'Src: WR1199 exæpl for contr wh note "b" appie."src: CIA 199 for polali. CIA 1992 for GDP.

'GNP.

'1987.

,. ab micte deit CN 22 inbi island of a io of abo 700 isnd; hoever, polali is heviy cotrled on New Pi, whde ap 700 peliml.

132

Table A.2land Areas, Coastlnes, and EEZ

Land 1-rea WCR Coastline' EEl(km )'

Km As % of YearState nmtotal (~~ cllarenot 100

Anauila 91 61 NO

Antiaua & Barbuda 440 153 200 1982

Aruba 193 68.5 NO

Bahamas 10070 3542 NO

Barbados 430 97 200 -1979

Belize 22 960 386 200 1992

British Viroin Is. 150 80 NO

Cavman Is. 260 160 NO

Colombia 1 038 700 1760 55 200 1978

Costa Rica 50 660 212- 16 200 1975

Cuba 110860 3735 200 1977

Dominica 750 148 200 1981

Dominican Ren. 48 380 1268 200 1977

Fr. Guiana 89 150 378 200 1976

Grenada 340 121 200 1978

Guadelouoe 1760 306 200 1978

Guatemala 108430 8s" 22 200 1976

Guvana 196650 459 200 1977

Haiti 27 560 1771 200 1977

Honduras 111 690 591- 72 200 1980

Jamaica 10630 1022 200 1991

Martinioue 1060 290 200 1976

Mexico 1 923 040 2 070- 21 200 1976

Montserrat 100 40 NO

Netherlands Antiles 960 364 NO

Nicaraoua 129 240 478- 53 NO

Panama 75 990 624- 25 NO

Puerto Rico 6959 501 200 1983

St. Kits & Nevis 269 135 200 1964

St. Lucia 610 158 200 1964

St. Vincent & Grenadines 340 64 200 1983

Suriname 161 470 366 200 1978

Trinidad & Tobaoo 5130 362 200 1963

Turks & Caicos 430 389 NO

United States 9 166600 2 625- 13 200 1963

U.S. Viroin Is. 349 186 200 1963

Venezuela 862.050 2800 200 1978

NO not declared

'Source: CIA, 1994.-Source: Wordmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Americas. 1964.'Source: Fenwick 1992.

133

Tab

le A

.3

Sel

ecte

d In

dica

tors

or

Land

-Bas

ed M

arin

e P

ollu

tion

Inpu

ts

.. w .t

Hurnn SetUemel1

A"r

1ullJ

'"M

lnl~

& M

onuf

oclu

~D

efor

tati'

Contrrr err

Popu

lati

199

." 0

1 po

with

No. ollocloslitallalll

Fors

t%

Ann

. ac

cess

toE

xton

t or

Len

d U

i.A

nnua

A9.

Inpu

ll_s

%or

Ch. In

sew

rae

As%

As%

Iota

lfo

rest

e~1

.m~3

or01

a_a"

,a~r

i~l

'(1

99)

1981

.90

Tot

alU

':,%

In~~

\,U

rbR

ur01

Foo

Sugr

liii

Ch.

Pape

Min

in(x

100

)'W

CR

Tot

al% Cl

F.rt

",nn

.pr

.al

cSo

ft=

nla

ndla

nd(k

g!P.

.LO

mk

(~~,

ha(m

oL

~io

)._

...7

NA

100

100

NA

NA

NA

91N

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

A

Anii &

64'

3110

010

0N

AN

A4

44O

.a'

-N

A5

-4

I-

--

-IG

0B

arb

An

63'

NA

100

100

NA

NA

NA

193

O.a

'N

AN

AI

22

I-

-a'

Aoh

ama

247"

64.3

100

1mN

AN

A9

ioom

""i.'

-N

A27

iN

.N

.N

AN

AN

AN

A32

/1.9

\

Bar

b26

t37

.910

047

.4N

AN

A5

430

0.0'

IG2'

NA

8i

53

4N

AN

AN

Aa'

BaI

ze19

048

.810

064

7G22

2322

80

2.5'

8917

80'

145

21

--

44m

.?\

Brll

lh \J

ln i.

.12

NA

100

100

NA

NA

NA

150

7'N

AN

AN

A5

-7'

NA

Co~

nla.

26'

NA

100

100

NA

NA

NA

26a'

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

23'

NA

Coa

32 3

0G

7.2

925.

464

1817

I 03

8 70

05.

2'10

47

ix29

i51

27

17I

49/O

.G\

Cot

a R

l30

444

.360

.820

.810

093

1850

66

10.4

'21

236

87"

19i

i2

-34

".6\

Cub

a10

6012

.810

073

.110

068

IG11

086

30.3

'15

8N

A43

319

225

75

217

m.9

\

Ool

ri85

'N

A10

010

0N

AN

A21

750

13.0

'N

AN

A7

4i

41'O

.G'

~n7.

170

60.4

100

5895

75is

48.3

829

.9'

603.

297"

191

I-

2-

--

13(2

.5)

Fre Guiana

98'

NA

100

85N

AN

AN

A89

.150

nel,'

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

+N

AN

AN

AN

A82

0

G",

na64

'32

.210

010

0N

AN

A15

3426

.0'

NA

NA

G7

23

95.

0

Gua

pe34

2'48

.410

044

.2N

AN

A10

.11.

760

5.0'

NA

NA

5.3

NA

NA

+N

AN

AN

AN

A40

NA

Gua

lela

9.20

38.4

57""

.72

5226

108.

430

17.4

'71

5.10

015

+N

A+

NA

+N

AN

A40

(1.G

)

Guy

ana

8031

9938

.164

3622

196.

852.

5'30

6522

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

+83

(0.1

)

Hal

~6,

9030

.310

029

.244

1734

27.5

632

.8'

3N

A15

-+

NA

+N

AN

AN

A4

(3.9

)

Hon

5140

41.1

91.3

2289

4223

II I 8

918

.3'

143 .c

192

82

2i

i34

".0\

Table A,3 (contd.)

.. w VI

Human Senlets

Aan

cultu

re1."" & Monulac\Jri

Def

orta

ti i

Con

lrfT

etPopll 19l

% o

r po

p w

tlli

No. or lactoiiilal1l

Fori

l%

Ann

. aceSl 10

Ext

ol o

r la

nd U

i.A

nnua

Ag.

Inpu

ll.1

%or

Ch.

inlo

w.

Ai%

Ai"

Iota

lro

rilo

r~'3

oror

......

fg¡'

fg¡'

(19l

)19

81.9

0

(X;m

),u'

:n'

%in

~;:"

Urb

Ru

OU

Foo

Sugr

lB

_1C

I.Pa

peM

inIn

gW

CR

Tol

al%

Clp

- F.

rtre

nn.

pi.

.icSo

ft

=ß

Iond

land

~P.

ilD

mk

(~i

(mol

~Io

)

Jiilc

2~2O

52.3

100

55.~

1~5

10 lI

2~.9

'94

i ~:i

30i

179

23

I28

15.3

l

M.r

lniq

uo34

80.5

100

69.0

NA

NA

8.1

1,10

08.

0'N

AN

A8.

2I

++

NA

NA

NA

NA

26'

NA

Mex

ic84

~90

71.3

~18.

585

129.

0I 9

23 0

412

.9'

69~5

00"

25~

1812

~28

-24

11.2

1

Mon

ii.m

il12

NA

100

100

NA

NA

NA

100

0.0

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

~N

A

N.lI

nda

183

NA

100

100

NA

NA

I96

0.0'

-2.

0013

22

-3

--

-0'

-A

nalli

Nlc

niu.

368

8125

2.~

32-

3012

0 25

10.7

'29

NA

17N

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

AN

A35

11.7

1

Piin

amø

2~2O

53.7

04.8

9.5

100

68II

75 9l

8.5'

SO5

009

I10

--

210

-54

11.7

1

Puo

Ric

o33

071

.210

080

NA

NA

1.~

9104

1~.3

NA

NA

~1~

72

211.

5

Sl K

lni &

Nev

i.4l

04.9

100

100

NA

NA

826

917

.0'

NA

NA

1~-

52

2-

--

170

Sl lu

c15

304

.~10

010

0N

AN

A1~

610

20.0

'N

AN

A9

..~

I3

1313

.8l

SL V

inen

l &iit

2~.6

100

100

NA

NA

1934

12.0

'N

AN

A9

-10

i3

--

-~1

(2.1

)G

roed

noi

Surn

a~2

O85

.293

.8~1

.564

3610

161,

~70

~.3'

2063

6'13

-II+

NA

NA

NA

NA

+97

(0.1

)

Triidd &

1.2~

69.1

100

69.5

100

922

5.13

023

.~'

672.

303'

392

~5

713

1-

44(1

.9)

Tob

'"

Tui1 & Calcoa

9'N

A10

010

0N

AN

AN

A~3

O0

NA

NA

NA

--

--

--

-0

NA

Unl

lod

Sla

i.a24

998'

"75

.2~.

76

99.~

"2

9166

6620

.599

4 5l

"21

72'

119'

151'

2'2'

2~'

2194

'31

.412

.51

US

Vi"

,ln I

i.99

NA

100

100

NA I NA

NA

352

6N

AN

AN

A1

-I

--

--

8N

A

Ven

zuel

a19

320

8493

36.9

97 I 72

588

2 05

4.4'

116

8 1~

3"39

313

48

8~1

239

11.2

1

NA

= In

form

atio

n no

t ava

ilabl

e+

= k

now

10

exIs

t, bu

t exl

enU

num

ber

not r

epor

ted

- = reported as zero or. non.existent

'So: Worl Re.oun:.. 1994-5 (unlei ollae nolod In lnuol cena).

2pAHO eiamiisa Ihl C 10% ollow IYI_iln laan Amn colrl ti. iile lrltl plenll, and "'I only 5-10% olll colele waitato rel odl. lrlm (PAHOIWO 1992). For li CARICOM colrl (AntiLI & Barb, BalilN.

Bar

b. B

.Uze

, Don

i. D

olrn

R.p

i, G

ri, G

u, H

Iia, J

amlc

, M.x

lc, P

u R

I, S

I. K

itt &

Nlla

, SI.

luc,

SI.

Vln

l & li

Gl'a

, Sur

, Trt

& T

ob. a

nd V

--uo

), a

ral

PA

HO

lury

co

"'I o

nly

2% 1

0 16

%oIlh polall Ii i..od by sa IYlla (UNEP 199).

'So: Encyclood Brilanr 199. (Ag lni nili an foilr.)

'So: UNEP Regio., Owl\w, 199. (Pull clti .. lo.. av, 198-&).

:So: CIA Wor Fac/ 1993.

So: C

IA W

or F

_ 19

90.

Stale Fish Non.Foo Uses Ash Expo Ash Imp Foo suppy fro fishCatc(metrto)

Metr As% Metr As% As%O( Metr As% Per TotlTon 0( Ton 0( Tol Ton O(Tota capi (metr

Catc Catc Foo Foo (kglyr) to)Su Sup!r froFi Fish

Anui NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

Antiua & Barb 233 0 0 201 8.6 5.0 1.90 47.2 62.6 4,04

An 48 0 0 30 6.2 1.4 1,713 79.1 35.5 2,167

Ba 764 18 " 1 4,08 53.4 65.8 2,33 37.5 24.8 6,2Bar 4870 1,33 17.5 105 1.4 1.4 4,151 54.7 29.5 7,582

Bee 1595 0 0 766 48.0 54.5 575 40.9 7.6 1.40

British VlIln Is. 133 0 0 NA NA NA NA NA 86.0 1,33

Caym Is. 613 0 0 574 93.6 72 757 95.0 324 796

Co 95,897 2 " 1 37,591 39.2 42.3 30,56 34.4 2.8 88,871

Cola Ri 20,64 0 0 17.191 83,3 113.3 11,72 77.3 5.1 15,172

Cu 203,85 37.38 18.3 2279 11.2 11.4 56,571 28.3 19.1 20.240

00 667 0 0 0 0 0 8S 56.3 21.1 1,52

Oon Republic 18,26 0 0 1.182 6,5 2.0 41,50 70.8 8.4 58,58

Fre Guiana 6.28 0 0 4.20 67.0 90.0 2,352 50.2 49.3 4,676

Gre 1.832 5 "1 59 3.2 1.9 1,38 44.0 34.8 3.155

Guape 8.373 0 0 42 0.5 "1 8,279 49.8 43.4 16,610

Guatela 4.60 0 0 3,112 67.7 57.0 4,183 76.7 0.6 5.456

Guyna 36.242 0 0 3,471 9.6 10.6 0 0 41.3 32,771

Hait 7.867 0 0 166 2.1 "1 19,148 71.3 4.2 26,84

Honras 17.519 1 "1 13,53 773 26.0 2,03 40.0 1.0 5,123

Jam 10.33 0 0 432 4.2 1.0 34,65 77.8 18.7 44.56

Maniue 3,251 2 "1 20 6.3 1.4 11,96 79.7 42.1 15,00

Mexic 1.414.332 402,813 28,5 141,09 10.0 15.5 19.274 2.1 11.0 911,911

Montsl 115 0 0 NA NA NA NA NA 10.5 115

Nelh Antill 1,20 0 0 29 2.4 "1 3,60 75.5 27.3 4.77

Nicua 4,108 0 0 1,824 44.4 80.0 0 0 0.6 2,28

Pana 157.63 116,631 74 13,93 8.9 38.7 9,157 25.3 15.3 36,167

Pu Ri NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

Sl Ki & Nev 1.700 0 0 221 13.0 11.6 424 22.3 45.1 1,90

Slluc 825 0 0 21 2.5 " 1 1,587 66.4 18.2 2,39

Sl Vinl & 6.302 0 0 5,700 90.4 496.0 54 47.5 10.8 1,149

GrenesSur 3.795 0 0 1,158 30.5 42.2 105 3.8 6.6 2,741

Tri & Tob 7.967 2 "1 1,351 17.0 10.5 6,2 48.6 10.6 12,90

Turs & Calc NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

Unite Slales. 4.269,416 1,072,802 25 88,070 20.7 27.7 1,30,60 41.0 6.8 3,196,614

Gul Cost" 737,582 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

US VlIln Is. 763 0 0 NA NA NA NA NA 7.1 763

Venue 315,69 21,96 7 27,23 8.6 10.2 337 "1 14.1 26,82

Table A.4

Selected Fisheries Data, 1990

So (exlo us data): FAO YeBrl Rsry 51sli 1992 (FAO 1993a),'s: Rsris of th Unied 5/B/85, 1992 (NOAAMFS May 199).

136

Tab

le A

.S

Sele

cted

Eco

nom

ic D

ata

on C

ount

ries

and

Ter

rito

ries

of

WC

R, G

roup

ed b

y C

EPP

OL

-Des

igna

ted

Subr

egio

ns(S

US

199

1 un

les

othe

nvis

e no

ted)

- u: ..

Con

lrfT

erG

OP

Per

Ag

Min

ing

Mfc

lgTou.m repts:

Lal

9tC

ome

Sub

regi

on I

(miii

on.)

'ca

pita

a'as

%of

a. %

ofIn

$ m

ilio.

and

Secl

oG

OP'

% o

f G

OP'

GO

P'G

OP'

8' %

of

GO

P'

Cub

a17

,00

1,58

16""

4-'1

39'"

$30

1.8%

man

ufct

g."

Indu.trl dlverlftl a high prty (no colrled In pape). Touri.m.ee 8. larg.t

(GN

P)(G

NP)

pole

tll g

ro s

eclo

larg

e In

vest

mts

In

cost

rll,

Mai

n ex

po: .

ugr

cane

(w

o.Ial9t expo), nicel (four1 largt sourc), fih' For gros prl.ng $5 mil

In

Inveslmls over sevl yea~ for tori.m and rete sers secto.'

Mex

ic28

6,62

83,

321

92

23$4

,355

1.5%

lre

Lal9t for exchnge earn: peti, bo asse plnts, tom." 61% of

woor In ser.. Indu.Ii.: foo and been., lo, chicls, Ir end slel,

peti,

mIn

in, I

extil

e en

d cl

olhl

ng, l

nnsp

o eq

pl, t

om. M

ii re

ti an

d di

vng

deelng raply.' Uncnty over NAFTA In 1993 "nked to iha de In for

Inveslmls. Go puufng $5 miD ental caig, Inng re of wate and

a- cotr; $23 mni bute for 1993 to Impte sew and. driki wate lo to

elo US bo. estimate $1.6 bln 10 ba ipet on poul cotr eqt as of 199.'

Uni

te S

tate

.5,

610,

802

22,2

19t'

t'19

'S4

9,55

1c1

%m

anul

aclU

r.Ea of lh seclD rese abo 19% of GOP. Most po, i: an ie

Ing

& n

ocall adnc ecy In wo. MaJo In.tr: peti, sli, moto ve, ae

ftna

ncl

spa,

Ie,

chi

cls,

ellc

, foo

prS

iln, c

oum

go,

li, m

ISe

M,'

Sur fo pi fih catc of 4,4 mmio melr Io.

5 U

S G

uK75

2,rx

15,7

10N

AN

AN

A$2

0,00

2.6%

NA

Th

99 U

S G

ul C

o.ta

col

l CO

114

,00

rr e

nd e

re h

o 10

15.

6 m

l pe,

or

S%

Cos

ta s

lale

.of

lh e

ntire

US

pot

i (54

% o

f whi

c re

ids

In c

osta

l cot

ls).

SS

b8

ipet

only

ennll on doesti tr In Albama Fl, iou.lana. Mlsilslp, and Texs. whic Is 18%

of lo

tal U

S en

nu d

o.ti

lrel

exp

etu.

. GuK

of

Mex

fih

cat

c re

17.

7% o

flh entire US ftsh catc by weht end 19% (or $&1 minio) by Y8... In 199, :. 160 ou

cotin

etal

she

lese

s w

e In

pru

cll I

n lh

Gul

l, yi

in r

e 10

lh U

S Fe

dT

resu

r of

ebo

S3

b1lo

..

Table A.S (contd.)

- w 00

Con

lrfT

err

GD

PP

er c

ap!.

Agr

iultr

øM

inin

gM

lclg

Tourism recipts:

Lar

gest

' Com

ents

Sub

regi

on II

(mili

os)'

Is G

DP

'as

as%

olas

%01

In $

mili

ons

and

Sect

o%

of

GD

P'G

DP'

GD

P'as

% o

f GD

P'

Bel

ize

420

2,16

523

113

$95

23%

agri

ultu

reSugar Inustr mot cot-ellecll In English-speking Caribbn. Cltns, bana, ftsh, Umb,

garm

als

o Im

pot e

xpo.

Joi

nt lh

tmp-

farm

lng

vent

u w

ith U

S, I

n re

spo

10ov

hlng

. Tou

m b

oing

and

coi

dbl p

oten

UaI

rei

ns.'

Goa

mt r

eslla

s lo

cot I

nasl

man

t tos

m o

pUe

for

Bee

øns,

enr

as f

or 1

n1llm

t In

larg

prts

.'C

as ia

Ric

5,63

51,

930

16-

19'

$331

6%ltd

eM

ain

inus

trs:

foo

prsi

ng, t

exU

alcl

thln

g, c

ostn

Uo

mai

els,

flllz

er, p

lsti

pruc

ts.'

Mos

t prla

tot l

eto

In C

alrl

Am

, bu

un w

l cos

tre

te fr

Uf c

ete.

' US

co

prng

a w

o ch

ip m

ill fe

re lo

Ihll

se forsts, weUaI. br gros for whle, dophns, may tlh spe.'

Gua

tem

la9.

353

9826

-15

$211

2%ag

riul

ture

Agn

c co

ti 21

of

axpo

",n

gs; m

ain

cr a

re iu

grc,

co,

ban

as,

collae, bens; arna lote ft. Main Inuslrs: sug, telecIlh, fulure,

.ch

ics,

pel

r, m

eta,

ni,

tom

. Tou

rim

lCO

sta

be u

n.' I

MF

gulcng ecic po, wt li unerny opsed.'

Hon

ras

3,00

567

232

17$3

11%

agri

ultu

reA

gnc

prs

21 o

f ex

p, e

ms

62%

of

woo

r H

ea d

e id

ic o

n co

and banai, whic .uter .harp pr flluUos.' Ovshng on of man I' pr

(tlh

cal

i, es

p. .h

t fo

ex u

p 17

0 .in

198

). A

lso

toris

m a

c w

l no

enmelaa.sesme~ fnle cotaauls, tost-lle ae, defortaUo, so

erio

. Les

t de

mln

re

In C

arib

b (g

o, s

ilv, c

o. le

, zl,

nior

, and

mo,

co.

'

Mex

ic28

.628

3,32

19

223

$4.3

51.

5%lr

dela

t for

exc

hng

ea~

: pet

r, b

o ai

iem

bl p

lnts

, io'

81%

of

woor In 18." Indul\1: foo and bes, to, chls, ni an lte,

pelr. mlnl te an cllh, trpo eqpl, tom, Mari reti an div

ci niply.' Uncly fN NAA In 199 Inked lo lha de In fo

Inlmll. Go pli. $5 mi an .mta caig, In ni of wate an

se coln; $2 ml bu fo 1993 10 Im ii an di wate for to

alo

US

bo. E

atlle

S 1

.6 b

Ølo

be

ipet

on

pout

col

n eq

t as

of 1

99.'

Nic

raua

1,73

645

630

116

$17

1%ag

riul

tuE

xpo

01 a

g pr

uc, e

.pe

coee

and

cot

t, co

Uru

to b

e fo

ti of

ec. A

gncl

se

em 4

4% o

f Wlo

r E

xl d

el Is

on

01 h

lghe

l In

wo

on a

pe

ca b

ais.

' Tcu

coy

une

l.'Pa

nam

a5.

542,

248

11-

9$1

963.

5%In

nspo

-Coll ec re iin Nor c:ls (9.3% gi- In 1991, 8% In 199), de

all c

ohigh unl (15%). TrinspollcolcUo acts for roly 26% of GDP

mun

icbul only 6% of woor Go an counit lers Ii largst emplt leto (32l,

tions

o.c

fol byegll, hunll and ftshl (27%) and come, reslaUlts, hole (16%).

Tourim Is Intele with 18f and benkng ornle ecies. Shr marlltu

slgn

ifnl R

eso

pi ln

ud o

verh

lng

and

cotn

of l

us; n

mlle

Info

iial

lbl

on COstall'. Maj dru lnshpmt and moy Ia cete' rile cr

riin

iin

198

No

oule

.'

Table A.S (contd.)

.. W \0

Con

lrfT

err

GO

PP

er c

api-

A9r

iUur

eM

inin

gM

fctg

Tourism repls:

Lar

gest

Com

ets

Subr

egio

n II

(mili

osI'

la G

OP

'as

as%

ofas

%or

In $

mili

os a

ndSe

cto

% o

f G

OP'

GO

P'G

OP'

as %

or

GO

P'

Bah

ama

2,6!

10,2

09

324

$1,2

247

°'"

Iori

sm'

Tourism 50% of woor and 72% or GOP (Note: Varis estimatas of Iorim rang fro

60°'" 10 75% of GOP.). Depite ret slump, rein mot por Caribbn Iorisl desti.

nati.

Hal

d (r

efus

) an

d C

uba

(Ior

it co

ti) p

o ne

chl

lees

. Inc

sing

em

-phasis on shlpp relslr servics. GolntNes assisting slay expansio of expo

fishi

ng In

dusl

r.' S

31.8

mU

lIr lO

B lo

r el

etn

deve

iol

Cay

man

Is.

670'

23,0

0N

AN

AN

AN

AN

Ato

uris

m'

Tourism 70% of GOP, 75% of forign exch eamlngs. Majo ta haernancial celer.

with

cop

any

fees

pril

40%

or

ge r

eenu

e. T

raiti

l tur

t fis

hing

str

Uy

limite

d.Close coti with US on dru ntell.'

Cub

a17

,00

1,58

ur-'

4-.1

39-.

1$3

01.

8°'"

man

utct

g..

Indus.-l dlvenl1ll a high prty (no colrte In pape). Tourism see as largest

(GN

P)(G

NP)

potetil gro seto ia Ineslmls In colnll. Main ex: sugr cane (wo's

largt expo), niel (rou lat sorc), ftti For gro prlsng $5 mill

In

Inveslmts gyM seera years for Iosm an rete servic seto.'

Doi

nin

7,14

897

615

316

$877

12"'

"m

anuf

tgM

anul

ri se

has

he

dosl

l mae

t bi:

half

or m

fc Is

in s

ug r

efin

ing.

Nic

elR

epic

has surpsse sug as main ex aa. Tou deaa, alr main fon ex.

ch ea bei ac for 113 of 128 km codln.i Pl 10 op ne go mi wI

estimaie $6 bill in dell. Ih riin cots of gO pructi fo on mi sli

In 1

993.

'

Hal

d2,

641

3934

-15

$41.

7%ag

riul

ture

Agrl Is pt so of emt fo mo th 70% of Ih ni poti.

Pro

fital

ity ii

ml b

y se

so

arlo

la o

f 1r.

sm

ala

size

s. L

eng

cr:

coffee and sug. Fb haests sma an emll. Mfct acts lo 30 of Iota expo

(wos lat iup of ba: ii iO. ga. el). Most mfct Is lo cI

meill coumll. colr In folis. be. ho go, bulking

mat

es (

I.e.

. cet

).l

Jam

3.49

71,

431

510 _

20$7

4621

%ln

WeI

lf e

cy. 0

n of

wao

r in

se

Inlr

, onr

t in

agri

... f

thes

. fos

\a, W

.i m

fto

MO

fo

priln

, io

and

been

.C

hs, m

etas

. ..U

i.. c

olN

mai

-, W

0A1

Ihl p

luc

of b

auxl

ii.S

ug Is

mot

Impo

t ex

cr. T

h io

prp

etin

g co

ni s

e po

sibi

lity

ofgo

plu

cll.'

Pue

RI

22,8

06,

20i

-39

$1,4

456%

man

ufac

tur.

Mfc

lg a

cnts

for"

50

of e

x. h

a re

sug

sin

WM

i.J Im

pt In

dust

rIn

gIncud phUcli, eltr, pelrls, prse foos,' Seic secto (fina

and ln) Is sec, torism lhlr. Dene In sugr pructi: olh lrltil agriultre

Incuds frt and coffee.' Ashes neligibl, agrlture 0( 3% of GOP: ,. 50 of foo reuir

met

s Im

po.'

Tui

& C

alc

6f5,

00. NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

tour

ism

'O

utst

aing

bes

. col

ref

i. di

v. A

Imin

g 10

be

an Im

pot o

ffsho

fina

ncl c

ete. Ut agrilt. Ash~ Is lrlll. th on pructNe secto; but wate overeplol\e.

Subslanll BriUsh dvpt ald.

J- .t o

.., ~

. "~

Con

irlT

Ol

GO

PPe

r ca

p!.l

Min

inM

fclg

Touri.m nilS:

Lar

glC

ome

Subtvlon IV

(mill

io.)

'lO

GO

I'..

iii %

of81

%of

In $

mH

Ila1

and

See"

"%

or

GO

I'G

OI'

GO

I'..

% o

r G

OI'

An'

"47

"8.

80N

AN

AN

AN

AN

Ato

u.m

'T

ouna

rn I

i mei

o ie

ele

en o

ro a

n!. '

13 o

f G

OP;

rel

l'p6

gr ~

hO

le, o

lh g

ust

acm

olkl

.' L

oIe

an 1

1f a

r ie

elip

o.1

Miiuo &

.424

'6.

804

42

353

1..

74'4

to.m

Hoe "" on lo.m tw Ill: iilllol .ec In i. .nd - I..

B_

lor mony y.... Mon _ll. om... h." .hmod to ii .nd lit mf. ID dllf

ecfc

bel

..J D

r nn

IiH

p . Q

f c:

.&

Bar

biI.

&1'

7.oc

5I

7$4

5323

%\O

.Tou._ it moJO fo .. ._. ..lIlo .t 26 01 GOP. oi.ho ~no

l.rn

.oM. golnln ~! ~ -i. $3 mI._1o 0I1I c:

i-. Sug cr .1

82-i- i-.In'Y In i-hlp.'

Bril

Vkl

n I..

133

10.6

0N

AN

AN

ASI

0982

"1O

omTou.m 25% 01 GOP.. ti.10 lo do po ftnc .. bo i- ..

Impo

l Rl b

ti gn

: .._

801

gr

ro!

Oor

lt7

""-

2.10

021

i8

S28

IS%

ogiu

SIO domo 10 cn: og uo .. lo 30 GOP. 01_ __ 11% 01

pnll on 75% 0I1O up. Rll ge .onc,,1i1o 10 ~ .pe -i

.ec

(1""

.tIlo

io. _

ti'*

& .p

ebl d

M. e

o_ p

l or

un wo lo Inl- ft _ti pi. _I 1\.it._.i tw _! sa

mlnlo In 1993 re lo.. 01 ci..Hp 10.."' tiii...

G-

'J3.

ocis

-6

S315

%iir

iM1

M.1n ii _xp .. "" -. _'. rr. Fre li up. eap. 10

Con

o gr

ool

d U

S S

31n

Jii o

l lo

ne _

II en

tw tI

co... Toum "" Jil-. gr ia. i- de.&¥....V..pe,,1c -

.Iol

lne

(US

S25

mi i

r E

l __

II M

o _

up!

Ni

em Ioll .. 199 10 _ IMF.i ..io pm ro me IO 01

nu _tr. In.. wf _10 10 bol pf. Tou ii -- by

ri.1

n cr

.'

Gup

e1.

100

3,3f

'10

5.3

(co)

S28

26%

lo.

Tro iill lo 17% 01 OOP. Ma pr: .ug .. by (no. mole....).

i.__'. co... co. _ otli Il'* lo _h en oc . tl ~

li .n

d _t

i io

_ cI

po

no e

i. T

oum

10

~I e

nmol ~tI .oc. Heo __ .. .ut_ en ci i-Ie ir F..!

Mor

lnlq

2.oc

'6.

rx8.

16.

2(~)

S213

%AI ir

i..jo ei IN pu _u.r.... _ by ne. ..-- .. _.

Fro

ne II

Ag 10 Hnlle 01 OOP. I' lo up -. ni i-

70 01

lnat

i bhl

n co

-l 1

0.. f

o .u

p. ti

lI 0

1_ ~

Ir

GO

plA

q gr

ea.

_ p

r. In

dty

_la

by II

rn.

"l

...in

on

.ug

,.fi.

Tou

m I

m o

n up

(00

oi.l

o fr

F..)

!M

ontJ

ett

7:t

5.w

:N

AN

AN

.N

AN

Alo

uam

'Tou.m eclS fo 25% 01 GOP .nd Io.-i .il. SmelI-"'Y "" -

_.Ie_ic _II. do.. entr. "..ti bo mf! Ag I... ii 6% 01 GOP;

Ini al1slMl ftshe fo bb... co. f1nftih.'

Net

hndi

t.4O

7.60

I'13

"S4

3.%

loum

'Toun.m ,,plY' mol 01 it pe. Ag Ii mo. Indl1 iM mI: do

MllI

..Ioole by oR reli, _ 10 i- bu no -il FI en -i im (eap.

Cu). Flti In 10 .. Io -i .. J_... "ne bh on Sl

MM,len! Cu ti _I -- dr h Weaie -i.'

Sl K

1tt &

Nev

il14

2"3.

508

-14

ST4

52%

""eI

M.1n ..pe ." .ug & ii: _ ... 10_ co, co 01. _. rr.

ious

mIlnspo oq Ag 10 -* h ~ .. d\. ~ pr! Up 10 70 01

fo __II '" _ 8_ ei. Ge . mo -i (42" In

1967

).' s

a.6

milr

Kul

t __I

Fun

10

_ .._

_ co

S2

m11

rWor B.nk In_ l)l .._1I lo ro .nd ..po _li .

Sl L

u2S

1.66

141

6Sl

T3

69%

""eI

Ag (30 01 ".po oo). tom, and mi .re il_ pl 01"' ec.

lous

m50 of le .re I. cu.lo rn cn ., _'. co. co. co, ii.

Tou

.m ..

peng

dni

ll. e

ape

cn ..

it: o

n 01

~'i

pr y

el1

cal,,. i.i _nd mo.1 __ Intr _In _ ,.lea: do. fI.

..ic

It..io

pr.

.po

go! _

114

.8 m

i del

a co

_ -

10 m

ok"

Sl i

. _ m

a ~

.._1

cal

o S

20 m

i_"

hO-l

ooild

. fw

l by

irnfl

hoa

an r

ntl~

.'

Sl V

11 &

H'-

1.50

iV-

VS5

31%

iir1.

.Ag .ec (60 01_ _)'Io _lo by -l- - (dr

Cln

e.un

plt u

p 10

40)

. tili

ll _

pf l-

_oe

In

01_

__ u

p gr

(22

01

up -

i1n

196)

. oth

o tI

.. I

IIo

loo

.up.

ti S

i _ ..

a "

"i I

lh I

n. T

ou 1

ntr

~ 10

Il'

pi bel aa .... In ~ .._ SIOO .. _la In .. ,. ~

mor

i $3.

3"'1

r K

i- __

Fun

lool

ge.

'U

.S.V

klnl

..i .

2011

.oc'

NA

NA

NA

$T08 59%

1Oam

Toum 10 "' ie 1n'Y en mo.. _.' T.. _II li 01 re.

i-1lnWeaie _pi Otrn- -. -. ii - .

_ ~ o- 1O_1n _ RI'. _lo In "' oirn en

miat 10 US.,f 10 pi en.. .. uM pm lo iilIl

Tab

le A

.S (

cont

'd.)

I- .¡ I-

Con

trfT

enG

DP

Per

cap

l.A

grku

~ure

Min

ing

Mfc

lgTourism repts:

larg

est

Com

ents

Sub

regi

on V

(mlli

asl

ta G

DP

'as

as %

0185

%01

In $

mili

as a

ndSe

cto

% 0

1 G

DP'

GD

P'G

DP'

as %

01

GD

P'

Arb

a85

"13

,60

NA

NA

NA

$41 47%

tori

smT

ouris

t rei

pts

21 0

1 fo

exc

hng

eain

s In

199

; ~i r

efi,

reed

atl

1985

shut

d, a

lso

Impo

l'

Coi

a41

,700

1,26

917

821

$410

1%m

anuf

ctg

F1i

rs r

eflt

dene

In c

alfe

e pr

, ih

lein

exp

o T

ex, g

ats,

chi

cas,

met

alpr

ucts

, ce~

car

drd

pruc

, plti

res

ins,

maj

uac,

bes

. Und

elop

cost

al to

rlm.O

J N

ew 0

/ pru

ctio

n 10

0 m

i. N

E 0

1 B

ogta

Cot

luln

g dn

i and

gue

Da

war

fare

.'

Nel

lnds

1,40

7,60

l13

"$4

35%

tori

m'

Tousm emplyi moit of ih pe. Ag ia margina Indlr cMt minma; do

Ant

illes

lnele by 0/ reftnlng, whic lil' bu not rosl FI and bald Imnt (esp.

Cul. FIhing lnuftlo met

lo d

e on

J8p

ftli

on S

LMeart Cu has largt co dry In Wesle Hemsph.'

Tri

idT

ob4,

939

3,94

230

9$1

012%

min

ing

Con

lr c

olrs

ih o

n ilg

nlln

t 01

an g

ai r

esee

s In

ih C

ari.

oa I

nlr

d0nates (abo 28% of GDP; up lo 21 of ge reenue and ll of ex emlns). wen.

establshe mlctg seto, SO In fo pnilng. Rec em on ex torism,,.th

ipelst holdYI (wfe, dlv, neUe go, lte bands) oten In Tr1. Treitil

expo agriultre In deine, th lug, co. colfee, cis itI main 1nl1. RI In

mln

es a

nd lo

rsts

: fth

ln v

er li

mi w

ith p

ruc

-l be

de'

US

lte

co. 1

1re

Uy

esta

blsh

e ftl

Sl c

omel

z ca

p1n

~ d

eig

101

32,0

0 m

etr

IDr

expolo US. Two Gen ftnn inti In expansio of meth capø, lo make Trinid

and Tob ih wol last expo.'

V_z

ue53

,441

2,70

55

1821

S3-

man

uflu

r.Petr Is ba of ecy (23% of GDP, 70% of cetr go re, 82 01 expo

ineamlns). Ecoic ødjuslmt pr Intr In 198 (i ta, I' 01 pr

colr

, fre

mar

lel e

xchn

g ra

te, m

arle

t-lln

ed I

ntei

t rat

e) th

ec

Into

cof

ulio; reer has be le by no seto. Oth ex: bauxit and alumloom,

Iro

or, a

grilt

ral p

ruct

s, b

asic

man

uure

s. M

ost 0

V I

nlo

ha b

esk

Jtts

h, e

xcel

fO

l maj

o fo

Inl

mll

In S

mul

bllo

LN

G p

r an

d C

anan

Inveslmt In go mining (rel disc 01 largst depl yet

in B

o ita

te).

'

..".."

.,

Table A,S (contd)

I- .¡ N

Con

trfT

err

GO

PP

er c

api-

Agr

iultu

reM

inin

gM

rctg

. Tou

rism

rec

eipt

s:L

arge

. I

Com

ets

Sub

regi

on V

I(m

ilio.

)'la

GO

P'

a.a.

%of

a. ''

¡ of

In $

mill

on. a

ndSe

cto

%of

GO

P"G

OP'

GO

P"a.

% o

f GO

P"

Fre

421.

~4.

3rx~

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

AI fro

Shr

mp

acts

for

50%

or

mo

of e

x ea

rnin

gs. S

ug Ie

th o

nly

sign

ifnt e

xpo

cr.

Gui

naF

ranc

IsForslr and coslrll are majo ocll. Ru pructi: unplle go end baux.

main In-

lte: uneI eclost potell (hll. fishl. ri and jule safaris, Amian

covi

llas)

. Cos

lalo

sm p

rspe

ts iu

fer

fr p

rxlm

lty 1

0 A

mon

(la

of

vibl

be

soor

ran

d cl

ean

wal

e.)

Hom

10

Eur

Man

e sp

a pr

ra, w

h ea

rns

appx

, $70

0~

mll1

_.1

Guy

ana

349

435

2213

9"S3 8,5%

agrt

lure

Nic

me

th "

b ba

sket

of

th C

arib

bn. b

u ag

rItu

, lie

aa

oth

secl

o. I

e un

d.de

elo.

Mai

n cr

are

iugr

& r

i. S

e.su

ft In

fth,

lat e

x In

rei

o of

fish

and

ihrm

p. W

oil I

argl

t bau

xIte

pr

ret e

mph

sla

on g

opru

c. R

ect

resl

rbsn

gclt

reac

ng u

nd IM

F g

unc.

Par

l Clu

b fo

e S

4 m

in b

itel d

ebt

In 1993 and scle ret CHar 23 yr: UK wrte 011 endre of det of $8.5 min,'

Suri

na1,

941

4,51

310

310

$11

-fi

nanc

ial

FInanc and rel eilate Ilnt for 22 of GDP bu empl C 3% of th woor, La.t

seri

c.emplomet aelo (37%) Is public admlnldefenses.' Ova eoy cotii- to

strle sinc enng of Dut delot aid In 1982 (an sup en 811/93). Baiite

mining. alumna pIsslng ere trilll mainstas (15% ofGDP, 75% of

expo

eai

ng.,

..3% of emplymt). Agriltu resents 10% of GDP end 25% of eangs (ri, bane""s.

cltr

s fr

ts, p

alm

011

); f

oo p

Iiin

g ac

fo

60 o

f al

in ii

, T' I

mpo

Lbut va.t lr rain fort Is unpl. Ovt of shr fann Is plnne,' Recnt EC

stuy cos no basIs for cofi In ec poic.'

'Sor

c (u

nle.

oth

se n

ote

In In

divi

dual

cel

l): W

RI 1

99.

.Sorc: CIA Worl Factbok 1993.

'Src

: Enc

clla

Bril

amic

199

. (A

griu

ltre

incl

l.. fi

.hln

g an

d lo

r.tr

.)'Incl.. manufacturing.

.196

.'G

lo s

ocl p

rucl

'Incl.. public udlll.

'198

7.'1

98.

'Sor

c: G

on 1

99'src: Slate Oet Background Noles.

's: Ros, Fen and Gabl 199.

"'rc: U,S. Oel of Co SlatJtJa/ Abstrct oflhe UnH"d Stales 1993.

'Sorc: Brous and Var1no 199.

Scientirc Associations and Member Insitutions in the WCR

Table A.6

Asation or Marine Laboralories or ih~ Caribhen(AMLqBelars Res Insilute or McGill University.BaBeud Biologica StaiionBitt En Field Swion. B V i

Cabisc Maren Biolisc Insiiuul. ÇUr2. NACa1i Ma Re Laboraiory. ilCeie for Ei an Enviromeia Res.

Pu RicoCeir de Invesgacon de Biologia Marina.

Reblica DomicaaCetr de Invesgaon Y de Estudios A vanzados del

lPN-Unida Merda. Mexico

Cetr Univert.re Aniilles-(uyane. Guadeloupe

CCF Baan Field Staiion. FloridaDemel of Mare Science. UPR. Puerto RicoDisver Bay Marne Laboratory. JamaicaEsion de Invesigaciones Marina de Magaria.VeiLaralorio Invesgacion Pesuera. Puero Rico

Fwion Citifica Lo Roques. Venezula

Intule or ~ar Affairs. Trinidad and Tobago

Iiitulo de Invesigacion Marina de PunlO de Beiin.

Colombialnluo Ooniico. VenezuelaMar Sceo Celer. UVI. USVIMOl Mar Laboratory. FloridaPort Royal Marne Laboraiory. Jama icaRosiel Scl of Marine and Atmospheric

Scien. U. Miami. Florida

Smiilian Troica Resrch InSlilute. Panma

Caribben Coatal Marine PrudiYily(CARICOMP)Funion La Salle De Cieoia Natues. VenUniveridad Simo Boliva. VenFoution CARMABI. CuracaoBore Marine ParlUniveida de Pan. PanINVEM Sata Mar ColoUniverly of Co RicaInsituto de Rocrs Natraes (IA). NicaguSmiilia Insitution. Cue Bo Cay. Beize

Hol Oi Marne Rese. BeizCINVESAV. Merda, MexicoUniv. Nac. Auto. de Mexico. Puo Morlos. MexicEPOMEX. Campehe, MexicoInsiiuto de Oclogia. CubaUnivcriiy or ihe Wes Indies. JamcaNaiura Resurc Unii. Cayma IslanUnivcridad Aulonoma de SaIO Domingo. Dominica

RepublicSaba Mare Par, Nciands AniillesBaan Field Slaiion. Sa SavadrBeud Biologica Station. BeCabb Enviromcia Heath lniu. St. LuInsituie of Marine Affiurs. Trinida an TobgoBelairs Resrc Insitute. Ba

Souihe Asation or Marine Laboratores (SAML)

Regular MembeBeict Esrine Resrc Labor-iiory. M DBeud Biological Station for R=rc. Inc.Oie Biological Labonitory. M DColee of ciIeson. SCDaupl Islan Se Lab. ALDue Univerity Marne Labonitory. NC

Flor Demet or Naiuni Resrc. FLFl lniiiuteofTeclogy. FLFl Sla Univeriiy. FLGulf Co Rcs Laboratory. MS

Haoa Univety. VAHar Bra Ocraic Insiiution, FLHon POiDI Envirometa Laboraiory. MDla Univeriiy, TXLo Univerties Marne Cortium. LAMot Mar Labolory. FLOld Dooa Univeriy. V ASava Scale COLLeg GASkway laiiute of Ocraphy. GASrri/ Envirota Re Ceter. MDSoih Calin Wildlife an Marne Resrc

Demei. SCTeu A&M Univeiy-Crp Christi. TXTeu A&M Univenityai Galveson. TXTexas Pari an Wildlife Dcrtmel. TXUniverty of Florida (Manne ubonitory). FLUDiverity of Florida (Witny uboniiory). FLUniveristy of Georgia Marine Insitute. GAUniveity or Miarr (RSMAS). FL

llniversity of Nort Calina-Cpc Hill. NCÜï.iverty of North CArolina-Wilrrngton. NCUniverity of Puo Rico. PRUniversity of South Carolina. SCUniverity of South Florida. FLUniveity of Souther Mississippi. MS

Univerity or Texas (Marine Biomeica Institute). TXUniveity of Texas-Austin (Marine Scien Insituie).

TXUnivCfity or Texas-Pan Amecan (Coal Studies

uboralory).TXVirginia Insiruie of Marine Scien. V A

Ast~ MembersFlorida Institute of Ocogniphy. FLNaiion Marine Fisheries Service (NM FS). Soth

Fisheres Center. Miarr. FLNMFS-Beufort uboratory. NCNMFS-ceson Laboratory. SCNMFS-Galveson. TXNMFS.Miam. FLNMFS-Pan City Laboory. FLNMFS-Pasgola uboniory. MSNor Calina Scale Universiy. NC

US Eavirometal Proeciion Agey-EavirotaResrch uborator. FL ,

,

.-,

143

Table A.7Parcipaon in Globa an Regiona Oranzaons

~ :: ~ ~ ~ ~ii ~ :: :: ::

3 0

.,OJ :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::

:'

0:' :: ~ :: :: :: ~ :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ~ ~ :: :: ~ :: :: :: :: :: :: ~ ::0OJ

a :: :: :: ::~

j OJ :: :: :: ::II Ü~ .,

l2:

::

i:: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::

0

I ..0 :: ~ :: :: :: :: :: ::OJ0

., ::0 :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::;!

~ii ii ,; ii ß

! ,;0 Jl :: :: :: :: ~ :: :: :: .a :: .a :: :: :: :: :: ~ .a

a: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

¡)

Q. :: :: :: Q. :: :: :: :: ::0 :: :: :: :: :: :: ::0(

.. :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::0( :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::0

0~

:: ~ :: ~~

:: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::

0 :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::;;

.~ :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::

1~i

0ii :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::!!0

i i:

i 0( :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: .. :: :: :: :: :: :: Q. :: :: :: :: :: ::

0..z 0 :: :: :: :: :: :: :i :: :: :: :: :::: 0( :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ::

..

~.. ..

l ! ~ ~ ~r! i . i l ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ l ~

~ ; ~ ~ ~h .." 2 2 2 ~ 2

i

, i 1 l ~~

~

ii

J.: oS B. l Iz .. l! ; l

.. f ~ i j 11 i i i..

i.. JI

i-~ ~

l I.D i j

¡ i~

il ~ S l ¡ 'i .. ., l.. ~ ~ l ì

~ II

ii. l R' 11 ! ~ ~ : .I

~ i i l ~ í2 ~

"~ 2

.I ~ ~ .: .: 'C ~ i. ~ 'i ~ l l. ¡;J J l ? ~ ., ~.. .. .. :i :i :: :: ., ., ., .. :: ::

Se next page for key to abreviaons.

144

Tab

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146

APPENDIX B

Estimation of Drainage Basin and Coastal Populations

147

Appendix B: Estimation of Drainage Basin and Coastal Populations

A. Drainage Basin Populations

Estimation of drainage basin populations began with development of a drainage map forthe Wider Caribbean Region by cartographer Tamara Oshychny, based on existing drainagebasin maps for the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean (Oxford Atlas of the World 1992) and the

Orinoco and Amazon Rivers (The Times Atlas of the World 1985). The results were translatedto the UNEP map depicting the six CEPPOL-designated subregions of the Wider CaribbeanRegion (UNEP 1994a) and are included here as Figure B.1.

For countries that lie only partially withn the drainage basin, the drainage map wassuperimposed on country maps showing state/administrative divisions, and appropriateproportions of division-level populations were totaled for each country. For each countr, thesum was then calculated as a proportion of the total population reported for the same year by thesame source, and the proportion was applied to the 1990 population totals used throughout thsreport.

A comparable process was used in the cases of Mexico, Cuba, and the NetherlandsAntiles to determine the distribution \If drainage basin population across the two CEPPOLsubregions in which each is designated as lying. In the case of Cuba, however, which drainsvirtally entirely toward the south, an adjustment was made to capture the heavy concentrationof population in the nortwest Havana area and the related discharge into Gulf of Mexicowaters.

The resulting drainage area estimates are reported in Table B.1.

Data sources: State/adnistatve division mas an populaon daa

Twelve countries and one overseas departent of France lie only partially withn theWider Caribbean drainage basin. These are listed on the next page with the sources that wereconsulted for state/administrative division maps and population counts. Also listed are Cuba andthe Netherlands Antiles, for which drainage basin population counts were assigned to two

separate CEPPOL-designated subregions (as was also done for Mexico).

148

I- .. \0

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Vartanov (1994)

PN oc AN

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;::::;

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Figure B.l

Drainage area of the Wider Caribbean

(Prepared by Tamara Osychny, based on maps in the Oxford Atlas of the World 1992 and The Times Atlas of

of the World 1992).

Table B.l

Estimated Drainage Basin and Coastal Populations of the WCR States'

Subrcgion/$iatc Estimatc: Dr.lin,;i£c n..sin EsiilTlcd Coasl.i Populaiion

Populaiion 1990 199(x 1(0) . (x 100)

Subreeion I 141,836 26,210

Cuba 6,02 5,941

Mexico 34,050 5,069

United Slates 101,760 15,20Subreion (( 14,259 2,62 '

Beize 190 122

Costa Rica 1.488 632

Gualemala 5.244 -Hondura 4.693 1,131

Mexico 591 422

Nicarain 920 88

Panama 1,133 230

Subreion (( 24,246 12.04Bahama 247 247

Cayman Islands 26 26

Cuba 4.584 1,729

Dominican Republic 7.170 4.159

Haiii 6,490 1,895

Jamaica 2,420 1,341

Puerto Rico 3,300 2.640

Turk & Caicos Islands 9 9

Subre¡ion IV 1,629 1,188

An~uilla 7 7

Antil!ua & Barbuda 64 64

Bardos 263 125

British Vir~in Islands 12 12

Donúnica 85 85

Greada 84 &4

Guadeloupe 342 151

Martinique 340 235

Netherlands Aniilles 15 15

St. Kiiis & Nevis 40 40St. Vincet & Grenadines 113 113

US Vir~jn Islands 99 99

Suhreiion V 49,171 9,825Aruba 63 63

Colombia 29.700 1.603

Netherlands Antiles 168 168

Trinidad & Tobal!o 1,240 862Veneniela 18.00 7,129

Subreion VI 1,28 562F re Guian 98 83

Guyana 792 305Suriname 394 174

WCR TOTAL 232,425 52,456

150

Country Administrative map Population data

United States Broadus and Vartnov 1994" Statistical Abstract of the UnitedStates 1993

Britannica Book of the Year

1994Mexico James and Minel 1986b

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

PanaaColombia

James and Minkel 1986

James and Minel 1986

James and Minel 1986

Worldmark Encylcopedia 1984c

U. S. State Dept. 1992d

James and Minkel 1986

James and Minel 1986

James and Minel 1986

James and Minkel 1986

James and Minel 1986

James and Minkel 1986

Britannica 1994

Britannica 1994

Britannica 1994

Britannica 1994

Britannica 1994

Britannica 1994

Britannica 1994

Britannica 1994

Britannica 1994

James and Minkel 1986

Britannica 1994

Venezuela

Guyana

Suriname

French Guiana

Cuba

NetherlandsAntiles Worldmark Encylcopedia 1984 Worldmark Encylcopedia 1984

"The Oceans and Environmental Security: Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives, James M.Broadus and Raphael V. Vartanov, eds. (Washigton, DC: Island Press, 1994). This sourceincludes a map showing U.S. state boundaries and the drainage basin of the Gulf of Mexico.

bLatin America, Preston E. James and C. W. Minel, with Eileen W. James. (New York: John

Wiley & Sons, 5th edition, 1986). This source also includes population distribution maps forindividual countries, which were used as an inormal check on the methodology described above.

cWorldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Americas (New York: Worldmark Press and JohnWiley & Sons, Inc., 1984).

dBackground Notes: Panama (Washigton, DC, U.S. Departent of State, March 1992).

151

B. Coastal Populations

Where necessary, coastal populations were estimated using several methodologies,depending on the form and availability of data.

Populaons entrely within the coasal zone

The populations of the following island countries were deemed to be entirely coastal:Anguila, Antigua & Barbuda, Arba, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands Antiles, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent& the Grenadines, U.S. Virgin Islands.

Counes for which relean coasal populon daa were directly availale

For the United States, 1990 Gulf of Mexico coastal population was directly available (asnumber of persons and as a percentage of U. S. total population) from the Statistical Abstract ofthe United States 1993.

For 17 countries-Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic,

Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela-data were available from the World Resources1992-93 Data Base Diskette. The data used for the coastal population estimation included 1980coastal and total population and projected 2000 coastal and total population. For each country,the proportion of coastal to total population was calculated for 1980 and 2000, the results wereaveraged, and the average proportion (% coastal population) was applied to the 1990 totalpopulation data used throughout this report.

Countries for which Caribbean coasal populaon was calculaed from availale daa ontotal coastal populaon

For countries that also have coastlines outside the Wider Caribbean Region (i.e.,Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama), data on the populations ofmajor cities (from Britannica Book of the Year 1994) were used to approximate the proportion ofa country's total coastal population (as reported in World Resources 1992-93 Data BaseDiskette) that is concentrated on the Caribbean coast. (Here, too, the relevant percentage wasthen applied to 1990 population data for use in the study analyses.) For countries with no majorurban concentrations on the Caribbean coast (e.g., Guatemala, Nicaragua), state/administrativedivision-level population data (also from Britannica 1994) were used instead of urban populationdata.

152

Countries/terrtories not includd in the World Resources Data Base, an countesspaning two CEPPOL-dsignaed subregions

The coastal populations of Puerto Rico and Guyana were estimated from urban populationdata (Britannica 1994) using a methodology comparable to the one described above for countrieswith coastal populations along more than one coast. This methodwas also used to estimate, in the case of Mexico, Cuba, and the Netherlands Antilles, theproportions of the total coastal population residing in each of two CEPPOL subregions spannedby these countries.

Finally, no urban or administrative-level population data could be found for FrenchGuiana. For purposes of this study, 85 % of the population was deemed to be in the coastalzone, based on statements in various sources (e.g., James and Minkel 1986, U.S. State Dept.Background Notes 1989, Worldmark Encyclopedia 1984) indicating that somewhat more thanfour-fifts of the population of French Guiana resides in the coastal lowlands.

The resulting coastal population estimates are reported in Table B.l.

153

154

APPENDIX C

Opportunities for Gains from Trade: A Stylized Model

155

Appendix C: Opportunities for Gains from Trade: A Stylized Model

i. Introduction

The possibilties of gains from trade with regard to a pollution problem can be shownclearly using a stylized model (Mäler 1990; Dasgupta 1982). We wil focus on the problem oftransboundary pollution effects between two states. i In this model, states have the legal

competency to enter into agreements to control pollution, and we assume that subnational agents,such as industries or consumers, are not involved directly in the negotiations.2 Note, however,that a negotiated outcome might involve the paricipation of subnational agents. For example,two states might decide that the best way in which to resolve a transboundary pollution problemis to create a market in pollution rights open to subnational agents from both states.

In order to ilustrate opportnities for gains from trade, we abstract from the real world

in another importnt way . We assume that the two states are strikng a bargain over pollutioncontrol. After all, pollution control is the main focus of the proposed protocol. However, statesmay find other reasons for entering into an agreement to control pollution. Even states that havea legal right to a clean marine environment may be wiling to accept some level of pollution inorder to benefit in other ways, such as improved international relations or perceived increasedbenefits to the state of a trading partner's economic development. For example, Mäler (1990)cites studies by John Krtila and Alan Kneese which demonstrate that:

. . . at least along the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders, agreements on water and waterquality have involved 'trades' in areas other than the rather restricted area defined by theenvironmental resource. The important point here is that there have been trades, although theymay not be directly visible.

We assume as well that, because of the strong directional nature of WCR current flows(Gladfelter and Ogden 1994), there exists an "upstream" polluter and a "downstream" pollutee.We believe that these assumptions characterize many of the potential transboundary pollutionproblems in the WCR. Some localized "commons-type" pollution problems (where each stateis both a polluter and a pollutee) may exist in the Caribbean, particularly in shared rivers,estuaries, or embayments. Gain from trade are possible in the commons context as well,

i This is known as the "producer-producer" externality problem of Coase (1960). Note, however, that where

smal countries are involved, income effects not unike those in a "producer-consumer" externality problem mayarise. See Baumol and Oates (1988) for details.

2 In reality, subnational agents could influence the negotiating position of the relevant states either by exerting

influence on their national governent or by opportnities provided though developing priciples of transnationallaw. Putnam (1988) develops a political model of "two-level games in which a national governent negotiates atboth the international and domestic levels. Sand (1991) advocates "opening local remedies to foreign paries" asone means for de-escalating transboundar environmental disputes.

156

although, for heuristic reasons, we wil not use the commons example here.3

Although we employ an economic model, and we identify an economically "efficient"level of pollution in the context of the model, we wil not be overly concerned with calculating"optimal" levels of pollution here. We are interested in characterizing the conditions underwhich economic incentives exist for states to reallocate their resources in a manner that improvesthe welfare of both states and, by definition, that of the relevant society as well. In ths sense,

"gains from trade" harness the economic self-interest of individual states to achieve a collectiveend (cf., Ridley and Low 1993). We identify the potential roles of WCR states in Section V.

In Figure C. 1, we represent the hypothetical benefits and costs of a problem of pollutioncontrol involving two hypothetical states, X and Y, at any point in time.4 Our analysis is static,although it is possible to interpret the representation in Figure C.1 as the present values of aflow of benefits or costs. State X is emitting a pollutant that has an impact on the waters ofstate Y.5 State Y would benefit from a reduction in X's emissions according to the total benefitscurve displayed in panel a. In a typical case, total benefits of pollution control rise quickly atfirst and then begin to diminsh as more and more emissions are controlled. Reduction ofemissions is costly for state X, and its total costs of reductions increase slowly at first and risemore rapidly with increasing reductions.

6

Panel b displays the slopes (marginal abatement schedules) of the total benefit and costcurves in panel a. According to coasean logic, if we assume either that the legal rights to befree of pollution have been assigned to Y or that rights to pollute have been assigned to X, thenthe two states can realize gain from trade by bargainng to level p*. To see ths- point, considera case where X has the legal right to emit pollutants into the Caribbean Sea from land-based

3 Several analysts have examned the problem of international pollution control in the case of a commons. See

Braden and Bromley (1980) and Hoel (1991) for static analyses. Dockner and Long (1993) show in a theoreticaldynamc model that nations may approach an economically effcient level of environmental quality even when theyhave not committed themselves to control pollution through an international agreement. What is required is thatthe countries communicate before choosing levels of economic output and associated levels of pollution (i.e., theyengage in "cheap talk"). Chander and Tulkens (1992) develop a sharing rule that allows states to divvy up the"ecological surplus" (gains from trade) and to allocate total abatement costs. Dockner and Long (1993) are skepticalabout the likelihood of approaching effcient outcomes where information is incomplete or nations are dissimilar ineconomic characteristics.

4 Note that the information requied to construct these relationships can, in some cases, be diffcult to acquire

(see Section IV).

5 Dasgupta (1982) refers to this example as a "unidirectional externality." Unidirectional externalities are

distinguished from "reciprocal externalities," which could occur when nations pollute each other. We believe thatthe case of transboundar land-based marine pollution in the WCR is best characterized as one in which there existssome risk of unidirectional pollution impacts.

6 Note that this curve also represents the polluter's "demand" for pollution as an input into its production

processes (Baumol and Oates 1988; Seibert 1987). As such, it can be interpreted as a measure of the polluterswilingness to pay compensation to a pollutee under a regime in which the pollutee has the right to a cleanenvironment. We discuss this in more detail below.

157

(a). :J.t

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Figure C.i. A Model of Tranboundary Pollution Control

158

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Figure C.! (continued)

159

sources. We start at point p'. Y would benefit by the amount Q+R from a reduction in

pollution from p' to p*. X would reduce pollution over ths range at a cost R. Y could affordto pay X an amount equal to R7 plus some part of Q, and both states would have gained fromthe bargain. Although there stil exists a measurable level of "pollution" at point p*, there isno economic reason to reduce pollution to a lower leveL.

This stylized scenario requires two furter assumptions. First, transactions costs,including costs associated with each state's gathering inormation about the benefits and costsof pollution control, striking a bargain, and enforcing it, must be zero. The effect of positivetranactions costs would be to shift the marginal abatement schedules for each state in therelevant direction and by an amount proportional to the transactions costs each must bear(Seibert 1987; Bromley 1986). We discuss ths in more detail below. Second, the effects ofcompensation payments on the wealth of the states involved must be negligible.

8 If these so-

called "income effects" are significant, the position of the marginal abatement schedules wil beaffected, perhaps in ambiguous ways, as trading taes place.9

II. Distribution of Propert Rights

Ignore for the moment the effect of transactions costs and income effects, and considerthe possibilty of gains from trade from pollution control in the Caribbean. The first thg onemust know is the nature and distribution of legal rights regarding pollution control. 10 If thereis no clear assigmnent of rights, then we can probably expect continuous disagreement over whois responsible for pollution control.

Rules of customary international law, such as the "no-harm principle," assert thatpolluting states have an obligation not to cause serious or significant harm to other states (HLR1991). Such rules imply that states have a right to be free of marine pollution from others.However, Boyle (1992) believes that such rules are "too general to afford useful guidance toStates in the control of land-based sources of pollution" (see also Churchil and Lowe 1985).

7 Note that, at the intemationallevel, ths payment could take many form: direct cash payments, subsidize

foreign loan, tied foreign aid payments, tranfer of pollution control technology, preferential access to fishing

grounds, among others. See Kimball (1994) for a list of additional suggestions.

8 We might expect that "income effects" are likely to occur. The reason is that if the pollution problem is so

smal that its resolution wil have a negligible effect on the wealth of the paries, then it seems unlikely that theparies wil be motivated to resolve it.

9 For example, the extent to which a country may be wiling to pay for environmental protection may depend

upon its level of development. Moreover, the distribution of propert rights may affect the position of maginalabatement schedules. The latter issue relates to whether or not the relevant par is income constrained. SeeMishan (1982) for an exposition of this issue.

10 The Coase Theorem does not apply unless propert rights are assigned to one of the paries.

160

Another principle, that of "polluter pays," appears, superficially, to say that pollutershave the responsibilty to reduce emissions (or possibly to compensate others for adverse

impacts). In Appropriate Approaches, UNEP (1994c) has recommended that the polluter paysprinciple be "phased-in" for the control of WCR land-based marine pollution, at least at thedomestic leveL. (However, ths principle was not incorporated explicitly into either UNCLOSIII or the Cartgena Convention.

11) In general, the polluter pays principle refers to thedistribution of rights at the domestic level (Hunter, Sommer, and Vaughan 1994). It is not clearthat the principle could be applied between states, although Boyle (1992) suggests that

transnational institutions, such as civil liabilty treaties or international supervisory mechanisms,might permit application of the principle.

Article 194(2) of UNCLOS III obliges states to ". . . tae all measures necessar toensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damageto other states or their environment. . . . "12 Ostensibly, ths duty is clear in its requirement thatpollutee states have the right to a clean marine environment. However, Stevenson and Oxman(1994) explain that provisions found in UNCLOS III with respect to the enforcement ofinterntional standards on LBMP are weaker than many participants had hoped for. The reasonfor ths weakness is a familar one:

One difficulty was that delegates to a conference on the law of the sea had doubts about theircompetence to deal with activities on land that might cause mare pollution. Delegates to the1992 Rio Conference, who suffered from no such disabilty, witnessed the diffculty of gettingstates to agree to binding rules affecting significant activities on land.

We note further that the Law of the Sea Convention has not yet entered into "force for someCaribbean states that are major sources of LBMP, including the United States and Venezuela.

The "Montreal Guidelines" 13 refer to obligations that states have with respect totransboundary pollution flows (Meng 1987). Guideline 3 reads:

States have the duty to ensure that discharges from land-based sources within their territories donot cause pollution to the marine environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits ofnational jurisdiction.

Note that these "obligations" do not have the status or legal force of an interntional agreementor treaty. Even so, ths guideline, in combination with the customary "no-harm" principle andthe language in UNCLOS III, suggests that states have the right to a clean environment.

11 This principle has been incorporated into the 1986 Single European Act, implying that territories governed

by the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom must abide by it.

12 Article 207 contains specific language referring to the obligation of states to prevent, reduce, or control

pollution from land based sources. This obligation extends to the marine environment within national jurisdictions

(Charey, 1994).

13 Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Lad-Based

Sources, UNEPIWG. 120/3 (1985).

161

Here we wil assume that the international distribution of property rights is such that"downstream" states have the right to a clean environment.

14 Under this scenario, the extent

to which gains from trade exist may depend upon the existing level of pollution. Return toFigure C.1, panel b. If the current level of pollution is pO, then state X would be forced bylaw-costlessly under our assumptions, but probably not in reality-to reduce pollution at leastto p*. At any level below p*, X would be wiling to compensate Y to move back up to p*, ifthis is permitted by law. Note that p* is efficient from the standpoint of society (both states inour example). Society gain when X reduces pollution from p" to p*, but the distribution ofbenefits from such a move accrue completely to Y (Y is not required to compensate X). Thusthere is no explicit "trade" or, therefore, "gain from trade" in the legally required move fromp" to p*. However, if the current level of pollution is pI, then gains from trade are possiblewhen X compensates Y to move to p*.

As suggested by the quotation from Stevenson and Oxman above, we may be dealing witha difficult issue concernng the redistribution of assumed pollution rights. States havetraditionally benefited from using the ocean as a sin for the disposal of wastes from land-basedsources. Until relatively recently, this practice has been tolerated for the pragmatic reason thatit may have been much too costly to attempt to enforce nebulous customary rights to a cleanmarine environment. In special cases, such as the Trail Smelter litigation,15 principles ofcustomary international law, such as "no harm," have been invoked to curb serioustransboundary pollution (Churchill and Lowe 1985). More recently, international conventionssuch as UNCLOS III, and soft law, such as the Montreal Guidelines, have strengthened the legalrights of downstream states. In the classic coasean model, when downstream states have clearpropert rights, the scenario involves a move from zero pollution to an efficient leveL. Thesituation is different for what amounts to a switch in the distribution of propert rights frompolluter to pollutee: in ths kid of a situation, the polluter is required to shoulder the burden

of emission cuts to levels below its full emissions.

Another factor hidering the realization of gains from trade in this kind of model is acomplete understanding of state Y's marginl abatement benefits. In the absence of any actualtransboundar impacts, there are no benefits from pollution abatement, and, therefore, noopportnities for gain from trade. On the other hand, risks of pollution effects may be based

upon complicated dose-response relationships or cumulative effects about which little is known.If there is uncertinty about effects, then the marginl benefits of abatement may be moreaccurately represented as a range intead of a line (Figure C.1, panel c). Negotiations over

pollution compensation might stil tae place using expected marginal benefits, but it is likelythat agreement wil be more difficult to reach than in the absence of uncertinty. This suggeststhat there exist benefits to scientific research that help to elucidate the nature of the schedule of

14 We assume as well that we have a full understanding of the movement of pollution flows, the costs of

emission reductions, and the benefits of reduce damges on the downstream nations from such reductions.

15 United States v. Canada, II R.I.A.A. 1911 (16 April 1936).

162

abatement benefits. 16

Also of importnce are the international legal defintions of "pollution" and "pollution

control" . 17 Without a clear defintion of pollution and an understanding of the legal basis forits control, it is likely to be difficult for trading opportnities to arise. Extant definitions ofpollution and its control appear broad enough to incorporate interpretations ranging from

UNCLOS Ill's restrictive defintion (possibly requiring increasingly stringent pollution controlas the "best practical means" at a state's disposal change over time) to the Cartegena

Convention's looser definition (callng merely for "appropriate measures"). Boyle (1992)explain that "(o)ne of the objects of regional treaties is to identify what substances wil betreated as causing 'pollution,' and in what circumstances." One benefit of a protocol would beto give precise definitions to terms such as "pollution," as is commonly done through Anexeslisting "black" and "grey" substances, and to clarify opportnities for trade in pollution rightsas one "appropriate means" for pollution control.

III. Transactions Costs

After clarifying propert rights, the potential for lowering transactions costs is likely tobe one of the most importnt justifications for a protocol on land-based marie pollution in theWCR. In general, it is possible to identify thee broad types of transactions costs. The firsttype is that associated with inormation about the marginal costs and benefits of pollutionabatement. If such information is either highly uncertin or unequally distributed between the

states (or believed to be so by one or both states), then the potential for gains from trade is lessthan otherwise.

18 For example, in a survey of theories of bargaining delays, Kennan and

Wilson (1990) explain that "uncertinty about whether the gain from trade is positive requiressome inefficiency, either as delay or as a breakdown of negotiations." The clearinghouse roleof a protocol in providing scientific and techncal inormation and in channeling assistance todevelop such information can help to reduce the transactions costs associated with inormationabout marginal costs and benefits.

A second type of transactions costs concerns negotiations (or "contracting") betweenstates over pollution abatement. Model agreements, faciltation and arbitration services,

16 Note that Broadus et al. (1993) mae the important point that there exists an optimal level of "ignorance."In other words, there may be decreasing returns to the supply, though scientific research, of information aboutmarginal abatement benefits.

17 Meng (1987) traces the evolution of the definition from the Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of

Marne Pollution (GESAMP) in the late 1960s to the Stockholm Report and from there to UNCLOS II and regionalagreements such as the Caregena Convention. See also Kiball (1995).

18 Baumol and Oates (1988: 10) note that "(i)f both sides to such a negotiation try to outsmar one another by

devious strategies, an optimal outcome is by no mean certai." Maler (1990) explains a result from game theorywhich states that if both states know the parameters of probabilty distributions that describe the position of theirrespective schedules, then neither state has an incentive to outsma the other. This result was developed in aninternational pollution context by Smets (1973).

163

brokerage services, dispute resolution mechanisms, and other means of reducing negotiationcosts can enhance opportnities for gain from trade. These functions are among those that a

protocol might usefully incorporate or develop in order to increase effectiveness.

A third broad type of transactions costs are those associated with enforcement of a

negotiated "trade." These can include costs associated with environmental monitoring,

submitting to adjudication a complaint of a purported inraction, and imposing a penalty on thestate that deviates from an agreement. In their study of international compliance, Chayes andChayes (1993) argue for improvement of dispute resolution procedures, techncal and financialassistance to developing states to enhance their capacities to enter into and comply withagreements, and increased tranparency of domestic policy actions.

The existence of transactions costs, which may be closely associated with the incidenceof "burden of proof, " is an importt consideration. Historically, the burden of proof may haverested with the downstream state. Examine Figure C.L, panel d. Consider the case in whichX has already controlled pollution to some level, perhaps for its own internal reasons. We startat point pU. If the burden of proof rests with y, Y's marginal abatement benefits schedule couldshift downward, reflecting a decreased abilty to offer compensation to Y (Seibert 1987; Bromley1986). The shift may be so large as to cause the "optimal" level of pollution, as perceived byY, to be greater than pU. This kind of scenario might occur in cases where enforcement is

problematic'9 and upstream states have been allowed historically to emit pollutants into themarine environment.

An application of the "precautionary principle" implies that polluters. must shoulderresponsibilty for demonstrating that discharges wil not harm the marine environment (Hunter,Sommer and Vaughan 1994). If the burden of transactions costs fall on X, its marginal cost ofabatement wil shift downward (Bromley 1986). We show this in Figure C.l, panel e. In panele, we show also the effect of the "polluter pays principle" as an upward shift in the marginalabatement benefits schedule for Y (Mishan 1982). Such a shift might occur when Y'swilingness to accept compensation, unconstrained by its wealth or "capacity" (see section V.D.),exceeds its willngness to pay compensation if propert rights had been reversed.

20 The net

effect of these two principles is to shift the optimum from p*, in the absence of uncertinty,transactions costs, and propert assignment effects, to pl. As described above, this may implya movement, which does not involve any trades, from the unenforced outcome of p' to pl. Tothe extent that burden of proof involves transactions costs, the opportnities for gains from tradewil be enhanced through the reduction of these costs.

19 For example, Churchil and Lowe (1985: 248) explain that ti. . . there are no international agreements to

faciltate the bringing of claims for compensation by a national of one State who has suffered damage from pollutionemanating from another State. ti

20 In theory, wilingness to accept compensation should be the same as wilingness to pay compensation.

However, where unique marine resources, such as coral reef ecsystems, are at stake and where substantialuncertainty surrounds the potential damages caused by LBMP discharges, wilingness to accept might well differfrom wilingness to pay. See Freeman (1992) for a general discussion of the issues.

164

The extent to which transactions costs affect the marginal benefit curve wil depend uponthe nature of transactions costs as either fixed or varying with the level of pollution or pollutionabatement (Tietenberg, pers. comm., 1995). If tranactions costs are mostly fixed, e.g., costsassociated with a one-time negotiation, then the position of the relevant marginal schedules wilbe unaffected. If negotiation costs are large enough, however, then they may stil preclude thedesirabilty of pollution control. Furter work is required to examine the nature of transactions

costs in the context of trans boundary pollution in the WCR.

165

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50272.101

REPORT DOCUMENTATION 11. REPORT NO.PAGE WHOI-95-104. Title and Subtitle

2. 3. Recipient's Accession No.

Toward an Effective Protocol on Land-Based Marne Pollution in the Wider CaribbeanRegion

7. Author(s)

Portr Hoagland, Mar E. Schumacher, Arur G. Gaines, Jf.9. Perfonning Organization Name and Address

5. Report DateJuly 1995

6.

8. Perfonning Organization Rept. No.WHO! 93-54

10. ProjectlaskIork Unit No.

The Woods Hole Oceanographic InstitutionWoos Hole, Massachusetts 02543

11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No.

(C) CX821540-0l-0

(G)

12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address 13. Type of Report & Period Covered

Funding was provided by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Offce ofInternational Activities under Co-operative Agreement No. CX821540-0l-0.

Technical Report

14.

15. Supplementary Notes

This report should be cited as: Woods Hole Oceanog. Inst. Tech. Rept., WHOI-95-1O.

16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)

This study was underten to advance the basis for discussions among Contracting Paries to the Cargena Conventionconcerning a protocol on land-based marne pollution (LBMP) in the Wider Caribbean Region (WCR). The study has four principalobjectives: (1) a review and summar of LBMP problems to determine common problems and priority areas; (2) a survey of broadlydefined environmental infrastrcture to help identify national commitments and national capacities to prevent, reduce, or controlLBMP; (3) a survey and analysis of subregional differences in commitment or interest in regional control of LBMP; and (4) acomparson of program approaches from other regions, providing lessons from which an effective program for the Carbbean mightbe designed. The study argues that the environmental, economic, and institutional diversity of the region as a whole suggests (l) anincremental approach to international resolution of LBMP problems, one that builds upon successful arangements among states thathave appropriate incentives for solving real trans boundar pollution problems; and (2) a subregional approach to the control ofloclized but widely occurrng pollution problems, in which the "umbrella" function of a regional protocol would concentrate on the

need to ensure uniform access to all clearinghouse products and on the internal allocation of financial and technical assistace toindividual states and subregions.

17. Doument Analysis a. Descriptors

1. marne pollution2. international protocols

3. UNP Regional Seas Programme

b.ldentifiersOpen.Ended Terms

c. COSATI Field/Group

18. Availabilty Statement

Approved for publication; distrbution unlimited.

19. Security Class (This Report)

UNCLASSIFIED21. No. of Pages

19222. Price20. Security Class (This Page)

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