Courting the former colony: Algeria's special position in French Third World policy, 1963

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Courting the former colony:Algeria's special position inFrench Third World policy, 1963Reza Zia-Ebrahimi aa St Antony's College, University of Oxford, UK

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Courting the former colony: Algeria’sspecial position in French Third World

policy, 19631

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi∗

St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, UK

This article analyses the relationship between France and Algeria in the immediate aftermathof Algerian independence. In 1963, Algeria repeatedly breached the Evian Accords, andcontinuously threatened France’s national interests. Yet, French policymakers accommodatedAlgeria’s reassertion and even rewarded it with a generous cooperation package. I will argue thatthis remarkable discrepancy was due to Gaullist France’s belief that association with its formercolony would benefit its image and influence in the Third World. Algeria at the time enjoyedsignificant prestige in Asia and Africa, and this was precisely the arena where France was keen todeploy its leadership in order to enhance its independence from the two superpowers. Thisperception detracted Paris from the cool-blooded pursuit of ‘realist’ state interests.

Keywords: Franco-Algerian relations; decolonisation; third world policy; third-worldism;cooperation; 1952 Evian Accords; French nuclear essays

1. Introduction

L’Algerie est d’abord et surtout « la porte etroite »par laquelle nous penetrons dans le « tiers monde ».

Jean de Broglie, Le Monde, 7 November 1964

The aim of this article is to investigate the position of post-independence Algeria in the early

Fifth Republic’s foreign policy, predicated on grandeur, independence and the reaffirmation

of French leadership in the Third World. I aim to show that from 1963 to 1965, Algeria

enjoyed a privileged relationship with the former metropole, so much so that French officials

went out of their way to accommodate Algiers’ assertive moves, even when these clearly threa-

tened French economic or strategic interests, and although France had both the means and the

justifications to retaliate.

A number of events during the course of 1963 provide a compelling case in favour of

the thesis. On 18 March 1963, a French nuclear test at In-Ekker in the Sahara prompted the

∗Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1362-9387 print/ISSN 1743-9345 online# 2012 Taylor & Francishttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2011.566256http://www.tandfonline.com

The Journal of North African Studies

Vol. 17, No. 1, January 2012, 23–44

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Algerians to demand a revision of the military clauses of the Evian Accords. Concurrently, the

young Algerian government confiscated French properties through a gradual but large-scale

nationalisation programme, threatened French economic interests in the hydrocarbon sector,

speeded up an alarming socialist drive, while at the same time increasing its demands for

French financial aid. Although France continued to use the Saharan sites until 1967, and

despite its overall position of economic and military superiority, it did not retaliate to protect

its own interests, did not attempt to pressure Algiers into any course of action, and yielded to

all its other demands. Substantial cooperation aid continued to flow from Paris to Algiers.

A number of reasons can potentially explain France’s disproportionate restraint: the presence of

French citizens on Algerian soil, important trade between the two countries, the Sahara’s wealth in

hydrocarbons and especially key military privileges conceded to France, which France was unwill-

ing to further endanger. However, relying on recently declassified archival sources as well as pub-

lished material, this article will attempt to demonstrate that the political benefit of publicising a close

relationship with Algeria – seen in the aftermath of the Algerian war as a bridgehead to the Third

World, and therefore to global influence – was the primary incentive to cultivate good relations.

The proposed thesis is significant, because for historians interested in the Gaullist reestablish-

ment of French influence in the Third World, the perceived instrumentality of Algeria in deploy-

ing this influence, and the reasons thereof, will come up for scrutiny. Additionally, the article

proposes to cover the immediate aftermath of Algerian independence, on which studies have

scarcely begun to appear. The little literature on the subject and some elements of controversy

will be reviewed in the next section.

2. Elements of controversy: the broader context of Franco–Algerian relations

Few authors have touched upon this period, and even fewer have researched the events covered

in this article. What analysis there is, rarely exceeds a few paragraphs. David and Marina

Ottaway explore the talks over the revision of the Evian Accords triggered by the In-Ekker

explosion and the large-scale nationalisation of French properties and other moves separately.

They claim that in order to preserve the much-needed cooperation aid, Algeria agreed on

earlier troop withdrawal but backed down on nuclear testing, which continued until 1967. On

the other hand, they claim that Algeria got away with the nationalisations.2 Nicole Grimaud

takes a similar position, claiming that the Algerians had to come to terms with French intransi-

gence on nuclear testing, and Philip C. Naylor asserts that the French response to the nationali-

sations was a looser interpretation of the Evian Accords.3

These authors analyse the negotiations subsequent to, and related to, the In-Ekker explosion and

the issue of nationalisations independently. They do not assess other Algerian violations of the

Evian Accords, Algerias ever-increasing appeals to financial generosity and the French reaction

to all of these within the same analytical frame. Therefore, they fail to see the larger pattern of

French policy towards Algeria. This thesis disputes their conclusions by arguing that the above-

mentioned moves and counter-moves – thereafter the ‘1963 events’ – must be analysed together

as part of one large web of mutually affecting policies. The In-Ekker explosion triggered a larger

and more complex process aimed at revising the Evian Accords and readjusting Franco–Algerian

relations in the new post-independence reality. A combined investigation of all the relevant 1963

events will spell out the magnitude of the damage inflicted to the interests of France. In turn, the

restraint of its reaction will shed light on the pattern of its behaviour that will then come up for

analysis. Failure to see these events within this broader context will inevitably lead to hasty con-

clusions about isolated policies, which will obscure understanding of the larger pattern.

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Three arguments support this approach. First, French interests in Algeria were correlated and

embodied in one document: the Evian Accords. The Accords recognised Algeria’s independence

and laid the foundations of a generous regime of financial, technical and cultural cooperation,

which Algeria desperately needed to keep its bureaucracy, economy and educational system

going during a period of social chaos. In exchange, Paris wanted assurances in regard to its

nationals in Algeria, the continued exploitation of military sites for a limited period of time

(five years for the Sahara and 15 years for Mers-el-Kebir), and a preferential treatment of

French companies in the hydrocarbon sector. The consolidation of these interests in one docu-

ment justifies a common examination of the violations, requests for revision, and demands based

on it within the timeframe of the study. Second, the thesis will aim to demonstrate that the 1963

events were interrelated in more intimate ways. For instance, the nationalisations were conse-

quential to the situation created by the In-Ekker explosion, and the need to react to it (this

will be expanded in Section 3). Third, the discussions that took place between then Algerian

Premier Ben Bella4 and French Ambassador Georges Gorse, reported in the latter’s regular dis-

patches to his superior Jean de Broglie,5 embraced all the above-mentioned Algerian moves,

which were tackled as one broad situation with many sub-components.6

The examination will disregard certain events that were not directly pertinent to the readjust-

ment of relations between Paris and Algiers. Minor violations of the Evian Accords by Algeria,

such as the nationalisation of three French newspapers in September, will be left out because

primary sources hardly ever mention them given their low or nonexistent impact on the course

of the negotiations, or on more fundamental French interests. The intimidation of the harkis or

the disappearance of 3000 pieds-noirs, will also be left out since these exactions either started

before independence in a situation of war, or were carried out by non-state actors, or both. The

rules of exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Sahara, which the two governments renegotiated in

the period 1963–1965, do not bear a direct relationship to the negotiation process at hand

either, since this process would be finalised in a different phase of Franco–Algerian relations,

under the impetus of Houari Boumedienne from 1965 onwards. If anything, all these elements

would in fact strengthen the hypothesis by adding to the list of Algerian moves against French

interests, but they must be left out in a short article with a restricted focus.

3. The 1963 events

The nuclear test at In-Ekker, 18 March 1963

In March 1963, rumours about a possible French nuclear test caused some agitation in Algiers.7

Ambassador Gorse cautiously monitored official reactions since a number of Algerian poli-

ticians had already expressed reservations about the acceptability of the French military pres-

ence in independent Algeria.8 France’s official position was that the Evian Accords entitled it

to use its nuclear-testing sites in the Sahara. On 18 March, one year after the end of the Algerian

war, the French detonated an atomic device in the Sahara at In-Ekker. Although they had taken

precautions to carry out the experiment in secret, a leak to Le Monde revealed it to the public

before it even took place.9 Gorse described Ben Bella’s reaction to the fait accompli as one

of ‘wounded pride’, which augured a period of tension.10

The Algerians’ anxiety was due to both international and domestic considerations. First, a

nuclear test would amount to a symbolic blow to recently acquired sovereignty and be detrimen-

tal to the Front de Liberation Nationale’s (FLN) Third Worldist and anti-imperialist credentials,

endangering its very legitimacy.11 Algerian officials made it clear that in the event of a nuclear

The Journal of North African Studies 25

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explosion, Algeria would have to engage in some sort of face-saving offensive in the Third

World.12 Second, there were internal repercussions. Ben Bella was under pressure from

radical elements in the FLN who saw the military provisions of the Evian Accords as obstacles

to complete Algerian emancipation from France. His leadership was still frail and he inclined

towards avoiding confrontation.

In a speech delivered two days later, before an extraordinary session of the Constituent

Assembly convened for the occasion, Ben Bella attempted to dissipate any impression that he

acquiesced to the In-Ekker explosion, since his fierce advocacy of sovereignty and self-determi-

nation for the Third World could hardly be reconciled with surrendering to French ‘neo-colonial’

military privileges.13 After his speech, the Assembly voted a motion proposing to start immedi-

ate talks aimed at revising the military clauses of the Evian Accords. Since 1962, Ben Bella had

been eager to find an opportunity to request the modification of at least some of the clauses of the

Accords, his opposition to which was well known. Indeed, as early as October 1962, he had

announced on Canadian television that ‘the Evian Accords constituted a compromise in

certain regards incompatible with the socialist perspectives of Algeria’.14 In spite of his official

position in favour of the Evian Accords, he would make several such informal declarations,

usually to the press, emphasising the ‘perfectibility’ or temporary nature of the Evian

Accords, arousing the concern of French policymakers.15 His foreign minister Mohamed

Khemisti would also offer similar hints to the media. In November 1962 he told the newspaper

Le Monde that the Accords were signed in a ‘contexte determine tenant compte des imperatifs

du moment’ and that as such, ‘l’existence de bases militaires etrangeres’ could conflict with

Algeria’s politics of ‘securite et paix’.16

The nationalisations

What came to be known as the ‘March Decrees’17 concerned all settler domains left vacant by their

owners for more than two months and turned them into collective farms self-managed by the

labourers. The Decrees effectively put hundreds of thousands of properties under presidential pro-

tection. The French were furious about such a bold violation of the Evian Accords, and de Broglie –

aware of the populist benefit of such a move – impressed upon the Algerian ambassador in Paris that

‘la presence de 15 a 20% de la colonie francaise anterieure [ne peut pas] constituer une accusation

de neo-colonialisme’ and the nationalisations could worsen Algeria’s economic problems.18 In

October, the whole affair took a turn for the worse when a new decree nationalised – although

the word was never pronounced or printed – the remaining 8000 domains. Ben Bella announced

this latter measure in great ceremony at a ‘grand popular meeting’: ‘A partir de cette seconde,

plus un hectare dans cette terre d’Algerie n’appartiendra a un colon . . . nous vivons une minute his-

torique, la minute de la reparation qui rend au pays son droit essential: la terre’19

A close examination of Ben Bella’s increasingly tense relationship with Paris over the ques-

tion of nuclear experimentation and his position within the FLN highlights two main rationales

behind the nationalisations, one directly related to the In-Ekker explosion – further justifying the

analysis of these issues within the same context – the other indirectly linked, via an inter-party

debate. First, Ben Bella himself linked the In-Ekker explosion to the March Decrees in a

September 1963interview:

S’il y a reprise des explosions nucleaires au Sahara, je serai contre, mais je ne ferai pas la guerrepour ca . . . Ce sera un accelerateur de notre socialisme et nous mettrons la main sur ce qui reste auxFrancais de privileges.20

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Additionally, Ben Bella and Gorse always discussed the issues of the Saharan test sites and the

nationalisations in conjunction. When that was not the case, Ben Bella would immediately impress

upon the ambassador that for him the two could not be divorced, as in their 27 March meeting on

the Decrees, in which he lost his temper and reminded the ambassador that: ‘nous faisons toujours

des gestes . . . sans aucune contrepartie. [L’explosion d’In-Ekker a] porte un coup severe a la

cooperation . . . La France doit comprendre que nous voulons, une fois pour toutes, etre indepen-

dants et maıtres chez nous’.21 In subsequent meetings, Ben Bella did not miss an opportunity to

hint at the In-Ekker explosion and the ‘complications’ it had caused, persistently relating the

grievances deriving from the nuclear experiments to the nationalisations affair.22

Second, his leadership was new and needed regular populist, even theatrical, consolidations in

order to secure domestic support. In early 1963, he was involved in a fierce inter-party conflict

with FLN’s Secretary-General Mohamed Khider who vociferously criticised him for his alleged

weakness vis-a-vis France, particularly over the nuclear question. Gorse, who was a sharp obser-

ver of Ben Bella’s attitudes, had analysed these trends and noted that Ben Bella’s regime rested

on shaky foundations, mainly because of his inability to secure the most elementary material

needs of his people.23 Spectacular announcements could rally the public and radical elements

of the FLN behind his leadership. In the wake of the In-Ekker explosion time was ripe for a dra-

matic offensive and the vacant properties provided him with an opportunity he could not miss.

Domestically, the announcement of such an attention-grabbing populist policy paid off: the

March Decrees put an end to Ben Bella’s rivalry with Khider24 and the October nationalisations

gave the impression that Ben Bella resisted French pressures. Internationally, the French

strongly protested,25 but ultimately they let Algeria get away with it. The French reaction, its

consequences and its rationale, will be analysed in Sections 4 and 5.

Further violations of the Evian Accords

While tensions over the nationalisations and the lack of subsequent compensation reached new

heights in October and November, French authorities found out that the Algerian government

had approached a German company to explore the possibility of building a pipeline linking

Haoud el-Hamra to Arzew. This was a new infringement of the Evian Accords, which provided

for exclusive transport rights in favour of a mostly French consortium. The French Foreign Min-

istry further discovered that Ben Bella himself had initiated the move.26 Interestingly, Paris did

not protest to the main protagonist of the whole affair, i.e. Ben Bella, not even to other Algerian

dignitaries. It obliquely undermined the negotiations by requesting the German government to

undercut the deal. The German pipeline affair was not an isolated case of circumvention of

the Evian Accords in the hydrocarbons sector since a similar step had been taken vis-a-vis an

Italian company. These events too must be examined in conjunction with the In-Ekker explosion

and the nationalisations. Not only do they pertain to violations of the Evian Accords, but the

timing – France and Algeria were still discussing possible compensation of pieds-noirs

whose estates were nationalised in October27 – shows that we are still in the same broad

context of readjustment of Franco–Algerian relations.

Appeals to French generosity

Observing these antagonistic moves, one would gather that Algeria was severing ties with France

and ready to forego the former metropole’s help in order to consolidate its sovereignty. In fact,

Algeria was highly dependent on French aid and it did not hesitate to further increase its


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demands thereon. As Section 7 will reveal in more detail, Algeria was by far the largest recipient of

French financial and technical aid in the period under study. Nevertheless, while continuously

nationalising French enterprises, refusing to compensate the former owners, seeking to

circumvent the Evian Accords and obstinately requesting a revision thereof, the Algerian govern-

ment formulated several demands for further advances or increases in help in 1963. In May, the

government requested an urgent advance from the French treasury to make up for a severe lack

of liquidity.28 This would be followed by two other similar requests. Paris granted an advance

of a quarter of a billion francs on the premise that it was in France’s interest to keep Algeria

afloat. In October, Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika astonished Gorse by asking if France

would be disposed to help his government pay the labourers who were working in nationalised

French farms.29 Not only did Algeria nationalise pied-noir estates and refuse to advance any com-

pensation, but it now wanted Paris to help pay the labourers working on those same nationalised

farms! Bouteflika managed to formulate additional demands, in particular an upgrade of French

military aid by giving away ‘special unit’ material and training the soldiers who would use them.

Only one thing is more remarkable than the crescendo of Algerian demands: France’s acquies-

cence. It officially considered all these demands and although it did not help Algeria with the

payment of the peasants’ salaries, it did grant several advances from its treasury and it gave

way to Algeria’s demand for further military help. None of France’s moves required Algeria

to fulfil any conditions, such as compensating dispossessed French farmers, toning down the

‘anti-imperialist’ rhetoric or respecting the Evian Accords. Farcically, the Algerian government

even refused to pay the debts incurred by the colonial administration, amounting to 6 billion

francs (US$1.2 billion), in spite of the Evian Accords provisions.30

4. French attitude

What France could have done

By 1963, the list of Algerian breaches to the Evian Accords was already long. A note by the Sec-

retariat of State to Algerian Affairs (hereafter: SEAA) listed infringements to organic and jur-

isdictional guarantees, in addition to abductions, assassinations, seizure of Francais d’Algerie

(sevices), eviction of French citizens and harkis, measures of purge in Algerian administration,

detention of Algerians for collaboration with France, etc.31

In this convoluted diplomatic situation, France could have acted with determination to stop or

limit the damage the Algerian government was inflicting to its interests. In particular, France

could readjust the amount of aid to compel the Algerians to change course. In the immediate

post-independence years, the young Algerian state totally depended upon French financial aid

and technical staff. No other country could or would match the amount of French aid: the

Eastern bloc would provide only technical assistance while the United States would not give

more than food aid.32 Although German and Italian firms did negotiate with Algerian authorities

in regards to hydrocarbons, their governments were quick to undermine these negotiations upon

France’s request, indicating a generally low level of interest in aiding Algeria themselves and a

tacit acceptation that it was France’s backyard. Additionally, Algerian infrastructure was

French-built, its bureaucracy and educational system moulded on the French model, and its

elite spoke French. The natural corollary to Algeria’s dependence on France’s assistance was

that Paris could effectively use aid as a weapon to curb Algeria’s assertiveness. Without

giving France total control over Algiers, a threat to review the cooperation regime could

almost certainly deter Algeria from implementing some of its most anti-French policy moves.

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Algerian officials were highly aware of the importance of French aid and eager to keep it

flowing. The Guinean precedent had demonstrated that the discontinuation of aid could be

ruinous and consequently, cooperation was one of the premises of their negotiation in Evian.

Although antagonistic attitude on the Algerian side could seem contradictory in this regard,

those officials involved in talks with the French carefully measured their moves and demands

against French reactions. Gorse described this Algerian caution in concise terms: ‘le gouverne-

ment algerien cherche a pousser autant que possible ses conquetes sans toucher aux secteurs ou

nos reactions seraient les plus vives. [Il me paraıt] plus soucieux que naguere de discerner nos

lignes de resistance’33. As long as they could get away with their policies without losing

cooperation, they would not hesitate to take any measure that was popular within Algeria or

in the broader Third World. In other words, impunity fuelled Algerian resolve.

Besides economic sanctions or a decrease in aid, one other measure that the French government

could have taken was to use the arbitration clause of the Evian Accords.34 This clause provided that

the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was competent to adjudicate disputes between the two

parties. It would have been a mild policy since a judgment by the ICJ according to the Evian

Accords’ terms would have been non-enforceable. Be that as it may, France never took this route.

What France actually did

What action did France take? The short answer is not much for its own sake and a lot for

Algeria’s – at least in appearance. One can distinguish three French reactions:

First, in regard to the revisions of the Evian Accords, France unwaveringly refused to stop its

nuclear experimentation. General de Gaulle was absolutely intractable: ‘Il n’est pas question

[que nous fassions nos essais nucleaires] ailleurs qu’au Sahara’35. The nuclear essays were

of paramount importance to the General and the prime guarantor of France’s international inde-

pendence. As long as the Polynesian sites were not ready to use, nuclear testing had to continue

in the Sahara: there was no other option.36 Nevertheless, in order to make up for this inflexibility,

France was willing to be more accommodating with other military issues. In April, while reiter-

ating France’s ‘hostility in principle’ towards any formal revision of the Evian Accords, the

French left the door open to consider Algerian preoccupations and contemplate ways to

lighten or shorten some aspects of the military programmes conducted on Algerian soil.37 Con-

cretely, France agreed to implement the withdrawal of its remaining 100,000 troops significantly

ahead of schedule, making way for Ben Bella to announce it publicly and reap the political

benefit of such a concession. Paris officially acknowledged the military concession in an

exchange of letters dated 2 May,38 and the remaining French troops left in June 1964, six

months ahead of schedule, possibly with additional cost and logistical complication. In

regards to nuclear tests, France undertook to increase its efforts at keeping them secret and

Algeria did its best to ignore them. The French vacated the Saharan sites in 1967 as planned.

Second, as far as the nationalisations were concerned, many French officials seemed disposed

to use aid to retaliate. However, they were also unusually cautious not to alienate Algiers. De

Broglie, for instance, told a cabinet meeting in April 1963: ‘donner un avertissement par un frei-

nage de l’aide, oui. Mais ne pas mettre en cause Evian . . . notre marge d’action est etroite. Il faut

eviter l’escalade des represailles et des contre-represailles’39 The result of this lack of resolve

was that the French government timidly withheld only one-fifth of the aid for 1964 (amounting

to a mere 200 million francs, i.e. US$40 million), in order to compensate the pieds-noirs who lost

their businesses or agricultural exploitations.40 This measure was insufficient since the amount

was symbolic and represented only a fraction of the damage inflicted by the nationalisations.41


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Indeed, 2.7 million hectares of land and tens of thousands of businesses and residential properties

had been confiscated.42 If this sum was to compensate the loss of land alone, it would represent

merely US$15 per hectare! The measure was equally inadequate since it was not sufficient to

coerce the Algerian government into any course of action. The lack of harsher measures outraged

the pieds-noirs, the anti-Gaullist opposition and those who were suspicious of cooperation

altogether (the cartieristes).43 The Algerian government itself was taken aback. Foreign Minister

Mohamed Khemisti declared to Gorse in April that he appreciated the sang-froid of the French gov-

ernment and that he had expected a sharper and more passionate reaction to the March Decrees.44

Third, France acceded to Algerian demands for advances from the treasury and further aid in

various fields (including education and the military).

When compared to the magnitude of the damage inflicted to France, the moderation and

restraint of its response is startling. In late April, in what almost amounted to an act of self-

abnegation, Gorse declared that ‘Paris ne tient pas rigueur des plus recentes atteintes aux

droits de nos ressortissants’45 His boss would echo, emphasising ‘notre vif desir de cooperer

[avec l’Algerie]’, whichever regime the country chooses, only short of a ‘total ruin’ of

French interests without indemnity.46

5. Rationale of French restraint

Why did France act with such remarkable restraint in the face of such plain violations of the Evian

Accords embodying its national interests in Algeria? Why did France go out of its way to accom-

modate the exponential pattern of Algerian demands for financial support and revision of the mili-

tary clauses of the Evian Accords? A number of elements come to mind. Algeria was still home to

90,000 French citizens as late as 1965. Economic questions in relation to a sizeable bilateral trade

and the Sahara’s wealth in hydrocarbons seem to be equally adequate explanations. Yet, two

elements seem to be more decisive in accounting for the moderation of the French government.

First, Algeria was the only testing ground for the French nuclear force de frappe, which was

‘the paramount symbol of grandeur and independence’,47 and secondly, the French government

believed that the model relationship it had with its former colony was politically beneficial,

allowing France to deploy the influence of its distinctive ‘third way’ in the developing world.

French citizens in Algeria

The pied-noir population amounted to almost a million people in 1962. One of the premises of

the Evian Accords was the provision by the new Algerian government of a number of political,

administrative and judiciary guarantees protecting this population. Regardless of these agree-

ments, and terrified by the prospect of Algerian reprisals, a majority of them (about 60%) left

Algeria in the wake of independence in a large-scale mass departure, often leaving their cars,

houses and other belongings behind.48 Their exodus created inter alia a void in the bureaucratic

and economic structure of the country, leading to social and economic chaos. Departures con-

tinued and there were only 150,000 French citizens remaining in June 196349 and no more

than 90,000 were left in 1965, 40% of whom were not even permanent residents, but cooperants,

i.e. administrative, technical and cultural personnel.50

In November 1963, an SEAA memorandum recognised that the departure of most Europeans

had created a new situation from that in which the Evian Accords were drafted: ‘le lien presque

charnel que constituait entre les deux pays la minorite francaise est brise’.51 Another note from

the SEAA puts it even more boldly: ‘Les evenements de ces quatre mois ont donc fait presque

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entierement disparaıtre l’une des raisons de la cooperation franco-algerienne, c’est-a-dire la

sauvegarde des interets personnels et materiels de nos ressortissants’.52 Therefore, it is not

plausible to account for the restraint of the French government by reference to the presence

of a large French community on Algerian soil, because this latter shrank to less than a tenth

of its pre-independence level in a matter of months. If anything, the declining number of the

pieds-noirs should have freed the hands of the French government – as the preceding memor-

andum seems to suggest. By removing an impediment, this new situation should have allowed

France to adopt a tougher line towards Algiers. The memorandum, while acknowledging the

‘breaking of the link’ represented by the French population in Algeria, gives an inkling of

other ‘more important’ elements: ‘La France reste attachee . . . a la politique de cooperation

et s’il en est ainsi c’est parce que cette politique repose aussi sur d’autres considerations

d’ordre economique et politique qui sont bien connues53’. This mysterious formulation hints

at the other elements put forward for analysis. General de Gaulle’s legendary candidness is

perhaps more revealing: ‘fundamentally, now that almost all the pieds-noirs have left, it’s

only petroleum and the [atomic] tests that count’.54

Economics

The Evian Accords protected French petroleum companies, their concessions, discoveries and

subsequent production. An SEAA memorandum dated 13 November 1963 underscores the impor-

tance of the Saharan wealth of hydrocarbon to France, in view of the impressive growth of French

consumption at the time (8% p.a.). Algeria was, after Iraq, France’s second-largest supplier of oil.

The advantages France enjoyed in the Sahara were outlined as follows: first, privileged access to

Algerian oil allowed France to write off the important investment it had operated in the Sahara (10

billion francs, US$2 billion), and second, it also benefited France in terms of foreign currency

reserves since transactions with Algeria took place within the franc zone.55 This note overlooks

a third advantage of a strategic nature, which is that of allowing France to forego the embarrass-

ment of purchasing energy commodities from the Anglo-American oil cartel.

Although France bought Algerian oil slightly above market price, it was overall a beneficial

situation. De Broglie stressed the importance of maintaining these privileges in a memorandum

dated 26 April:

‘La cooperation entre la France et l’Algerie est fondee sur l’idee d’assurer a la France son appro-visionnement energetique en zone franc. Pour conserver l’exercice de ces droits prevus par lesaccords d’Evian, il s’agit donc pour nous de rendre toute nationalisation impossible.56

Far from being an encouragement to interference and bullying, the events under study and the

policy actually implemented indicate that this strategy was more of a call for caution, motivated

by the need to avoid any forceful move that would feed the nationalist impulses of the Algerians.

Such impulses would bring about the possibility of nationalisation. The precedents of Iran in

1953 and Egypt in 1956 were still fresh and haunted what remained of European overseas

assets. This line of thinking will be vindicated in 1971, when rigidity in France’s position on

Algerian demands for an increased part in the hydrocarbon sector, will ultimately lead to the

much-feared nationalisation of the entire sector.

There was also the trade argument. Algeria had always been France’s largest colonial trading

partner and was completely integrated into the latter’s commercial network. In the period under

study, Algeria was alleged to be the fourth-largest importer of French goods and France imported

almost all of the single most important Algerian production of the time: wine.


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There was therefore an economically beneficial situation deserving some caution. One should,

however, be cautious not to take this argument at face value, as it would constitute an exception

in the history of France. Indeed, studies (notably by Henri Brunschwig) have demonstrated that

France had a consistent record (before and after colonialism) of giving only a secondary role to

economics as opposed to politics.57 When criticised about French aid to Algeria on economic

terms, the General himself retorted in a typical fashion – consistent with French political

culture – that de-emphasised economics in favour of grander designs: ‘the importance of

cooperation [sic] relates less to figures and immediate results than to advantages of a general

nature’.58 Furthermore, studies by a few authors cast doubt on the actual importance of econ-

omics to French Algerian policy. Tony Smith in particular asserts that the magnitude of the bilat-

eral trade is exaggerated and that claims of investment in the Sahara are unsubstantiated.59

As far as hydrocarbons are concerned, Iraq was the most important supplier of oil to France

during those years. Yet, France did not seek to adopt a more assertive foreign policy vis-a-vis

its first supplier aimed at securing the free flow of oil, and it did not display such a pattern of

restraint in its relationship with any other oil-producing country in Africa or the Arab world.

Besides, it seems highly hypothetical to assert that a more aggressive French attitude would

have endangered its privileges in the Sahara. These privileges were legally based on the provisions

of the Evian Accords, which contained arbitration clauses, and their meticulous respect was actu-

ally in France’s interest. Did accepting nationalisation of French properties not amount to allow-

ing a breach in the Evian system, which could endanger hydrocarbon privileges as well?

Therefore, although they disserve attention, economics can only partially account for the

French attitude. On the one hand, they certainly explain the continuation of aid: indeed,

France had a direct interest in keeping Algerian finances afloat and preventing the increasingly

radical Ben Bella regime from sinking into bankruptcy, ceasing to purchase French goods, or

seeking nationalisation of the Saharan hydrocarbon wealth as a result. The previously mentioned

memorandum from de Broglie – in which he devises caution in order to avoid nationalisation –

seems to corroborate this hypothesis. However, the economic argument does not explain the

restraint of the French government vis-a-vis the nationalisations affair or the military conces-

sions. On the contrary, it seems that France would have economically benefited from a stricter

respect for the Evian Accords and it had the means of, at least, trying to safeguard them.

Military privileges

Military privileges were a crucial consideration in the negotiations leading to the Evian

Accords.60 General de Gaulle considered the development of a nuclear force de frappe to be

vitally important to ensure France’s independence from the two blocs.61 Among all France’s pri-

vileges in Algeria, military ones mattered most.62 It was therefore essential to safeguard the con-

tinuation of nuclear testing in the Sahara until the Polynesian sites would be ready to use. In this

respect, then, there was no other choice and France had to be firm. However, it was wary not to

upset the delicate balance of the Franco–Algerian relationship, since the outcome of a new

showdown with Algeria was uncertain and French policymakers, after having ended a bloody

war only a year before, were certainly not curious to find out. This approach is detectable in

the General’s words:

Des atteintes ont ete portees aux accords d’Evian. Mais il ne faut pas les prendre comme pretextespour une remise en cause generale des accords. Ne pas donner aux Algeriens des pretextes derevenir sur les clauses militaires . . . dans l’application, il faut une certaine souplesse. Noussommes d’accord pour faire la part du feu, dans un esprit de cooperation.63

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In sum, the French did not evacuate the Saharan sites, because of the lack of options in 1963 to

carry out experimentations elsewhere and the importance of these tests. However, as France’s

military options were limited, the French willingly displayed more flexibility in the other dos-

siers. In particular, they had to refrain from retaliating against the nationalisations and the

lack of compensation.

In fact, the very 1963 situation was in and of itself, a concession on the part of France. Before

the Evian negotiations started, the official position of the French delegation emphasised separ-

ation between the Sahara and Algeria, and French policymakers discussed various alternatives

aiming to maintain French sovereignty over the Sahara.64 This position will be continually mod-

erated throughout 1961 and 1962 until the Evian Accords were signed. By 1962, the official pos-

ition had become the transfer of Saharan sovereignty to Algeria, but ‘not before the end of 1963’,

and the preservation of France’s prerogative to use the Hammaguir test range until at least

1970.65 In Evian, after yielding on the question of sovereignty, the French insisted on maintain-

ing their entitlement to carry out experimentation for five to ten years, whereas the FLN was

reluctant to allow for more than four years.66 The accords ultimately signed at Evian, allowed

for the sites to be used for five years, therefore representing a significant compromise on the

part of France. Later, as Paris started to realise that the test fire ranges might be needed for a

longer period, they even considered associating the Algerians to their experimentations.67

Furthermore, secret military archival sources uncovered by Jean-Marc Regnault indicate that

the French were not as deaf to Algerian opposition to nuclear tests being carried out on their soil

as some authors claim. According to Regnault, the French government had singled out Polynesia

to be home to the French test sites since 1957, partly because the long-term French plan was to

develop the hydrogen bomb, and this far more powerful weapon could only be tested in a geo-

graphically remote location such as Polynesia.68 The sites in the Sahara were therefore meant to

be temporary, because the French wanted to start experimenting while the Polynesian sites were

being developed and the transportation of material organised. But partly, and most importantly,

some sort of resistance from the Algerians was expected from the outset. As early as 1958,

General Charles Ailleret, commanding general of the special weapons section, prophesied

that ‘we cannot rule out the possibility that external circumstances will in the near future

force us to give up the test firing range in the Sahara’.69 Among the ‘external circumstances’

General Ailleret mentioned was ‘instability in North Africa’. In early 1963, faced with Algerian

pressures, the main military objective had clearly become to switch all experimentation to Poly-

nesia as soon as possible. General Jean Thiry, head of the research commission on underground

sites, stressed ‘the political advantage in having a substitute site, since we are faced with Alger-

ian demands, which tend to force us out of the Sahara’70. Admiral-turned-researcher Marcel

Duval seems to corroborate this point when he asserts that France evacuated the Saharan sites

subsequent to Algerian independence.71

Grimaud, Naylor and the Ottaways not only fail to consider the request for revision of the

military clauses in its broader context, reaching hasty conclusions on Algeria’s alleged submis-

siveness, but neither do they ponder the French military’s anxiety about possible Algerian oppo-

sition. Therefore, when affirming that France was intractable on the nuclear issue, they failed to

see that in a very subtle way, France did in fact devote a lot of energy to developing an alterna-

tive site for nuclear experimentation and vacate the Sahara at the earliest possible date. The

French military certainly had the means to impose its legal experimentation in Algeria for as

long as it would take Polynesian sites to become ready, and France could certainly do

without the financial and logistical complication of speeding up the construction of those

new sites. However, France preferred not to adopt an aggressive stance. The pattern of restraint


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is again discernible in this attitude, although not completely explained by the nuclear argument.

This article’s hypothesis requires one additional element. The missing link can be neither

human, nor economic, nor military. It must therefore be political and it deserves one separate

section.

6. The political benefit of a Franco–Algerian entente

Redeployment of French influence in the Third World

After General de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he initiated a reorientation of French foreign

policy, aimed at reasserting France’s grandeur and influence, and its independence from super-

power hegemony. As Maurice Couve de Murville put it, by being independent itself, France could

‘from then on champion all independences’.72 The Third World, in which France enjoyed a pres-

ence and intense political and economic relations with its former colonies, seemed to be the area

of choice where French leadership could be restored: an independent France could naturally find

its place among the non-aligned nations. Consequently, Paris devised the cooperation policy,

which replaced political, economic and military domination of its former colonies with the

endowment of financial aid and technical assistance to now emancipated nations. For General

de Gaulle, this transformation would over the long run benefit both the Third World and

France. He once said ‘le changement de la colonisation en cooperation [peut etre] accompli

de maniere qu’il apporte a la France, non seulement l’allegement de charges devenues injustifi-

ables, mais encore de fructueuses promesses pour l’avenir’.73 In the words of de Broglie, one of

the architects of cooperation (especially as far as Algeria was concerned), the success of this new

relationship ‘contribuera au prestige de la puissance qui l’a concue’.74 But many critics saw this

policy as the continuation of French domination in subtler forms.

Algeria had a special role to play in the context of this policy. First, the Algerian war had

isolated France from the Third World. Granting independence to Algeria now opened new per-

spectives. According to William B. Cohen, France hoped to regain good fame in the Third

World – where it had been violently taken to task during the Algerian war – by promoting a

model relationship with its former colony.75 This was good thinking, as Algeria held a presti-

gious position in the pantheon of Third Worldism, thanks to its heroic fight against colonial dom-

ination (in which one million Algerians lost their lives76) and its revolutionary nature. De

Broglie was very pleased about ‘l’audience de l’Algerie dans le Tiers-Monde’.77 Once in

power, Ben Bella started a charm offensive to consolidate Algeria’s position in Third World

politics. One of his first actions as head of the new Algerian state was to visit Cuba and

declare that Algeria must be to Africa what Cuba is to Latin America.78 Throughout 1963,

Ben Bella was busy establishing working relationships with such influential members of the

non-aligned movements as China and Yugoslavia.79

French officials – in particular, the promoters of Algerian favouritism within cooperation

such as Jeanneney and de Broglie – thus fervently believed, perhaps with exaggeration, that

Algeria had a special influence in the Third World that could be of benefit to France. De

Broglie intervened at the Assemblee Nationale to ensure that enough funds would be allocated

to cooperation aid for Algeria, and argued that ‘l’Algerie jouit, dans le cadre general du tiers

monde, d’une place, d’un credit, d’un prestige particuliers. Cette constatation egalement mer-

itait de notre part une politique particuliere’. This parliamentary debate also forced de Broglie

to bring Algerian policy into the sphere of public debate. For instance, he declared rather unam-

biguously in an interview published by Le Monde that:

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l’Algerie est d’abord et surtout « la porte etroite » par laquelle nous penetrons dans le « tiersmonde ». Une brouille entre la France et un autre Etat d’Afrique du Nord n’est qu’une simpletension bilaterale. Une brouille avec l’Algerie depasserait les limites des relations franco-alger-iennes et risquerait de ruiner les efforts de notre diplomatie dans le monde entier.80

On another occasion, he stressed that: ‘it is Algeria that opened for us the road to the Middle

East and whose support is useful to us in Latin America’.81 Algeria was seen as a bridgehead to

Africa and the Arab world, and ultimately to global power: ‘des relations [. . .] entre deux

nations telles que la France et l’Algerie, apportent a notre pays un poids utile a son influence

en Asie et en Afrique’.82 A break with Algeria was seen with great apprehension. For Jeanneney,

France could benefit from a close relation with Algeria but a break in these relations could

seriously endanger French policies: ‘L’amitie d’aucun autre pays sous-developpe ne peut

offrir autant de securite a la France que l’Algerie si elle reste liee avec nous, autant de

risque dans le cas contraire’.83

Ben Bella himself was well aware of French perceptions and occasionally used them to justify

his own deeds. In October, during an interview on French television, answering French protests

about the nationalisations, he countered that ‘ce qui compte ce n’est pas les interets prives de tel

ou tel, mais les interets reels, veritables de la France’.84 During a dinner with Jeanneney, he cle-

verly assured this latter that he would do anything to realise the potential of cooperation, which he

considered to be as important to France than to Algeria, especially as far as France’s relation with

the Arab world is concerned.85 Algerian officials regularly implied that it would be beneficial for

France to free itself from suspicions of neo-colonialism by drawing nearer to Algeria.86

A post-colonial white man’s burden?

Not all the political arguments in favour of the entente were as pragmatic – at least in appear-

ance – as those formulated by the General, de Broglie or Jeanneney. Indeed, the intensity of the

remnants of old French colonialist mentality during the development of a new relationship with

the Third World and Algeria is startling. The chimera of Algeria being the key to a French-

controlled ‘Eur-Africa’ and therefore to world influence, so strong during the colonial period,

survived the independence of Algeria. According to Cohen, such fantasies were not only

those of now discredited former colonialists, but pervaded the French political elite and therefore

affected policy.87 Alfred Grosser went even further in asserting that cooperation was fundamen-

tally an institutional, structural continuity.88

One important aspect of this mentality was the emphasis put on French language, technique,

and the expansion thereof. For Cohen, this policy of Frenchification continued the mission civi-

lisatrice mindset, and successive French governments persevered in the illusionary tenets of

francophonie by believing that spreading French language and the French way of thought

was the way to ensure global influence for France.89 A French government memorandum out-

lining the premises of Franco–Algerian entente reads ‘le rayonnement du francais en Algerie

est un fait essentiel et durable; c’est par la communaute de langue que nous maintiendrons le

plus efficacement des relations preferentielles avec l’Algerie’.90 A diplomatic note of 1962

directly linked influence with economic and strategic interests : ‘Notre effort doit donc se

concentrer sur les domaines ou la France peut exercer une influence fructueuse (assistance

culturelle et technique), sur la sauvegarde de nos interets industriels (notamment petroliers)

et de nos points d’appui strategiques’.91 In sum, cooperation somehow perpetuated French colo-

nialism under the guise of a humanitarian and internationalist impulse. It also avoided a brutal

break with a former colony deemed strategically important.


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The General’s prestige

The personal connection between de Gaulle and Ben Bella had its importance too. The General

believed that there was a tacit understanding of each party’s interest. According to Arslan Hum-

baraci, General de Gaulle regarded Ben Bella as ‘another feather in his cap’ as this latter con-

tinuously commended France in Third World circles for cooperating with revolutionary

Algeria, raising the General’s prestige.92 Ben Bella also paid homage to the General’s flexibility

in the 1963 events by declaring that ‘de meme que le general de Gaulle etait le seul Francais

capable de faire la paix en Algerie, c’est sur lui personnellement que nous comptons pour

mener a bien la cooperation franco-algerienne’.93 De Broglie was pleased to observe that ‘le

President Ben Bella celebre regulierement dans ses discours la cordialite des relations avec

la France’.94 Edward Kolodziej summed it all up: ‘de Gaulle could hardly let Algeria go.

Vindication of his personal leadership and France’s global mission significantly depended

upon the success of post-war relations.’95

Cold War politics

Algeria’s slow slide towards socialism and rapprochement with Communist powers were of

concern to some French policymakers.96 This concern did further fuel France’s willingness to

support Algeria financially. In some of the sources at hand, uneasiness is clearly detectable.

Evian was often opposed to Tripoli and the compatibility of the two agendas was constantly

questioned.97 Ben Bella shrewdly played with such fears, when, for instance, he told de

Broglie and Gorse that: ‘depuis l’echec de Cuba, l’Algerie est la seule experience possible

de cooperation entre un pays industrialise d’Occident et un pays sous-developpe. L’echec

de cette experience rejetterait l’Algerie vers le communisme’98 A French governmental memor-

andum outlines one of the premises of a cordial entente with Algeria as a means to curtail Soviet

penetration into the Third World.99 Another memorandum highlights the fact that Algeria was a

stake between East and West and it was not in the interest of France to have ‘at its gates’ a hostile

power which could – in a French version of the domino theory – submerge the whole of North

Africa. Such a development would put an end to the chimera of Eur-Africa and French leader-

ship in the Third World.100

The ‘socialisme a l’algerienne’ was of concern on two other accounts, as Jeanneney openly

confided to Ben Bella himself: there were important French investments in Algeria, especially as

far as the exploitation of the Saharan wealth of hydrocarbons was concerned. Clearly, there were

fears of nationalisation, which the March Decrees did nothing to assuage. But equally and sig-

nificantly, Jeanneney considered a drift towards the Soviet bloc to represent a threat for Franco–

Algerian collaboration. French policymakers were seriously apprehensive of this scenario and

the ideological and practical implications of such a drive. The architects of Algerian policy

seriously pondered the possibility – or lack thereof – of a close collaboration between a socialist

Third World country and an advanced western democracy in 1963.101

7. Figures and comparisons

Facts and figures

Figures illustrating French aid to the Third World bear witness to the favouritism Algeria

enjoyed vis-a-vis other recipients.102 The Rapport Jeanneney on ‘Cooperation Policy with

Developing Nations’, first shows that France gave proportionately more assistance to developing

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countries than any other member of the Committee of Aid for Development of the OECD.103

Indeed, 2.41% of France’s Gross National Product was allocated to development, compared

to the United States’ mere 0.97%. Algeria reaped 52% of all French aid to developing countries

in 1962. The next largest recipient, Morocco, received only a third of the aid allocated to Algeria,

despite its population being a quarter larger.104 In terms of technical and cultural cooperation,

out of a total of 46,121 French technical personnel (including teachers) dispatched to the whole

of the developing world, Algeria received 19,555 (a staggering 42%). The next largest recipients

were Morocco and Tunisia, which together received 11,373. Teachers alone numbered a total of

33,495 in 1964, distributed as follows: Algeria 14,872, Morocco 8916, Black Africa 4385,

Tunisia 2293, Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam 898, Latin America 418, Middle East 271, Asia–

Oceania 152, all other countries 1290.105 By all accounts, the figures suggest that Algeria

received the lion’s share of French cooperation, both in terms of financial aid and technical

assistance.

Some French policy documents of this period even use a terminology that promotes Algeria’s

privileged treatment as opposed to ‘l’etranger traditionnel’ (of which Algeria cannot be a part

of).106 The Rapport Jeanneney itself poses Algerian favouritism as a principle: ‘fatalement,

notre vocation nous donnera une place privilegiee dans l’aide aux nations de langue francaise

de l’ancien empire francais. Parmi celles-ci l’Algerie ne peut pas ne pas occuper une place a

part et de premiere importance’.107

The Tunisian case

A comparative examination easily reveals that when France’s interests were threatened by

another country formerly part of the French empire, the reaction was not remotely as restrained

as with Algeria. To illustrate French firmness vis-a-vis former colonies, most authors emphasise

the case of Guinea. In a 1958 referendum, France gave its colonies a choice between more auton-

omy in a French community or immediate independence. Only Ahmed Sekou Toure’s radical

Guinea chose the latter, and it paid a high price for it. France withdrew all aid, administrative

personnel and capital from Guinea, causing serious economic difficulties to the country.

Guinea acquired its independence without shooting a single bullet at a French citizen or

soldier and France harshly punished it, whereas Algeria fought a fierce war of independence

for eight years, only to be endowed with a generous cooperation regime. The Guinean case,

however, seems remote and quite different from that of Algeria. Tunisia provides a closer and

more plausible comparison. Like Algeria, it implemented several policies that contravened

past treaties with France, demanded the withdrawal of French military presence, and nationa-

lised French lands in a manner very similar to Algeria.

During the Algerian war, Houari Boumedienne’s Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN)

was stationed in Tunisia and enjoyed de facto Tunisian acquiescence to the trans-border

raids it carried out against French outposts. France threatened Tunisia with stopping

cooperation aid and acting through international justice,108 two measures that France consist-

ently refused to take vis-a-vis Algeria. In effect, French aid to Tunisia was conditional upon

Tunisian behaviour, a characteristic noticeably absent in the Franco–Algerian relationship in

1963. In the words of then secretary of state for foreign affairs Maurice Faure: ‘notre aide doit

nous permettre d’obtenir differentes contreparties’.109 In contrast, a description of the

Franco–Algerian relationship in the period under study would have approximated ‘Algeria

will continue to receive aid no matter what’, and Paris never used aid as a means to push

Algeria towards any course of action. French threats to Tunisia were not empty: in the


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absence of Tunisian neutrality in the Algerian war, Paris effectively suspended financial and

military aid to Tunisia in May 1957, despite President Habib Bourguiba’s numerous offers of

compromise. Military aid resumed only after significant Tunisian concessions and diplomatic

bargaining, coupled with Cold War politics. Financial aid had to wait until 1963 to be

resumed.

In 1958, Tunisians requested – just as Algerians did a few years later – the withdrawal of all

French troops from their country. Only after Tunisia accepted many more concessions did the

two countries reach an agreement. Once again, this rather classic diplomatic bargaining

stands in sharp contrast to the Algerian situation, in which a firm resolve in demanding an

end to military privileges was coupled with measures detrimental to French interests, and was

altogether successful. The Algerians did not concede anything – quite the reverse – but obtained

partial satisfaction, nevertheless.

Franco–Tunisian tensions culminated with the crisis over the Bizerte base. The French gov-

ernment had invested more than 100 billion francs in the base and deemed the presence of

French troops there crucial for the security of the Mediterranean and the ‘free world’.110 Paris

politely dismissed several Tunisian requests for the revision of the status of the Bizerte base,

so much so that in 1961 Bourguiba attempted to blockade the base. The French response was

swift: a battle took place in which 670 Tunisians perished. No desire for compromise was dis-

cernable in the harsh words of the General against Bourguiba: ‘il s’est cru autorise a lancer ses

troupes contre Bizerte . . . nous avons ecrabouille son armee . . . il n’avait qu’a ne pas s’y

frotter’!111

In an act reminiscent of the Ben Bella government (and perhaps inspired by it), Bourguiba

decided in May 1964 to nationalise all land owned by foreigners. Paris, in a response quite

unlike its reaction of the previous year in Algeria, immediately suspended all aid to

Tunis.112 Additionally, Paris cancelled all trade conventions – which resulted in a problematic

balance of payments for Tunisia – and drastically reduced technical and cultural aid.

This brief comparison shows that Tunisia received a very different treatment from Algeria. In

very similar situations, such as attempts to consolidate sovereignty by demanding the departure

of French troops or nationalisation of French land, the French response towards Tunisia was

swift, harsh and efficient, although Tunisia was in the process of tightly anchoring itself in

the Western bloc and was far from flaunting the radicalism and the socialist drive of Algiers.

Precisely because of that, Tunisia did not present the same interest for France: it had no

weight in Third World politics. Unfairly, many Third World leaders – headed by Egypt’s

Nasser – criticised Tunisia for its alleged subservience to the former coloniser and the ‘imperi-

alist Western bloc’. Equally important, no nuclear testing was taking place in the Tunisian

Sahara.

8. Conclusion

When faced with the possibility of seeing French cooperation aid to Algeria reduced in the 1965

budget, Jean de Broglie gave a fiery speech before the Senate, equating a decrease in aid with the

end of a fruitful relationship with the former colony, consequences of which could be nothing

short of catastrophic for French foreign policy:

Il n’y a pas, avec un pays comme l’Algerie, de situation intermediaire entre l’amitie et l’inimite ; ilexiste un seuil qui limite la zone des relations positives de celle, immediatement voisine, de la crise etde la rupture. Nous sommes, dans ce budget, tres proches de ce seuil. Qui de vous est pret a le fran-chir ?113

R. Zia-Ebrahimi38

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An elucidation of de Broglie’s perceptions of the importance of Algeria in French diplomacy

requires a detour by the events of 1963.

The In-Ekker nuclear test of March 1963 prompted the Algerian government to request a revi-

sion of the military clauses of the Evian Accords and consequently triggered a process aimed at

readjusting Franco–Algerian relations after one year of Algerian independence. The March

Decrees and subsequent nationalisations, the Algerians’ attempts to circumvent the Evian

Accords and their ever-increasing demands for aid are part of this process and so are the

French reactions to them. All these events bear a relationship to the Evian Accords; they affected

the general trend of the negotiations over revision, and the two parties discussed all of them

jointly within the same framework. It is only when the process of readjustment is considered

in full that the pattern of French behaviour becomes discernible, as opposed to an examination

of isolated moves – for instance, that of France refusing to vacate the Saharan sites – that can

lead to distorted conclusions about Algeria’s alleged submissiveness.

The French were entitled and had the means to protect their interests in Algeria, by decreasing

or terminating cooperation aid: in similar situations, they did not hesitate to suspend all aid to

Tunisia. Algeria desperately needed French aid and a persuasive threat of termination would

have almost certainly restrained it. Paris also could have pursued a milder course with inter-

national arbitration. However, France refused any of these routes. Instead, it continued to

grant Algeria far more financial, technical and cultural aid than any other country, it did not

react to the nationalisations, the sum it withheld to compensate dispossessed pieds-noirs was

only symbolic, it withdrew its troops six months ahead of schedule and it acceded to several

Algerian demands for further aid. However, it could not bring itself to vacate the Saharan test

sites before 1967.

The presence of a dramatically shrinking French population cannot account for such a mod-

erate response from Paris. That would rather have freed France’s hands and paved the way for a

tougher stance. Economically, there was an interest in continuing financial aid and keeping

Algeria afloat, so that it could continue purchasing French goods and not seek to nationalise

its wealth in hydrocarbons. Militarily, the sheer lack of options in 1963 prevented the French

from conducting nuclear testing elsewhere than in the Sahara, and they had to be uncompromis-

ing. However, this prompted them to be more flexible in other fields of contention, by advancing

troops’ withdrawal or letting Algeria get away with the nationalisations. The French also took

into consideration Algeria’s opposition to prospective nuclear testing on its soil, when Paris

decided to speed up construction of the Polynesian test sites. Crucially, however, it was the pol-

itical benefit of boasting a model relationship with a former colony, now a leader of the Third

World, which accounts for the extent of French moderation in 1963. It was believed that a sus-

tained entente with revolutionary Algeria would strengthen France’s influence in the Third

World and re-establish its authority in global affairs. It was therefore a priority to uphold

a good relationship with Algeria in order to avoid, in the words of de Broglie, ruining French

diplomatic efforts in the rest of the world.

The 1963 events were an ensemble of interconnected moves that set in motion the wheels of a

readjustment and gradually brought France and Algeria to a more equitable state-to-state

relationship after the guns had been silenced. Algeria proceeded to consolidate its gains while

France was careful to avoid a break. In retrospect, Algeria won its first post-independence

triumph, as it managed to get rid of the Evian Accords’ rigid liabilities (agreed to in a situation

of weakness) while retaining cooperation. There was ultimately a price to pay as France recipro-

cated Algeria’s repeated violations of the Accords in the following years: in 1964, it established

quotas for Algerian workers in France and wine imports.


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Cooperation was a new model for postcolonial relations, which helped maintain – or so it was

believed – former colonies within the French zone of influence, and symbolised French leader-

ship. It remained on France’s foreign policy agenda in spite of further erosion of France’s interests.

A new Algerian government, headed by Ben Bella’s Minister of Defence Houari Boumedienne,

will proceed from 1966 onwards to remove the most conspicuous aspects of France’s postcolonial

presence in Algeria: the military and hydrocarbon privileges. Yet, cooperation retained its appeal

for French policymakers and was not seriously questioned until – arguably – the 1980s, in spite of

constant fluctuations.114 Starting in 1985, relations will start to be characterised by realpolitik

rather than grand designs, and Franco–Algerian entente will consequently start deteriorating

until the emergence of Islamist militantism brought about new concerns for both countries,115

and the end of the Cold War rendered cooperation obsolete.

In the heydays of Cooperation, Algeria and France were curious bedfellows. France believed

it could indirectly (and paradoxically) benefit from Algeria’s socialist experimentation and

antagonistic moves. Indeed, it was Algeria’s radicalism, revolutionary nature and assertiveness

vis-a-vis the former coloniser, which fuelled its position of leadership in the Third World. In

turn, it was this leadership, which in the mind of French policymakers justified a continued, if

detrimental, support for its former colony, in a vicious spiral of mutually reinforcing antagonistic

moves and ideological constructs. It was a particularly masochistic policy for France to endure

Algeria’s reassertiveness while hoping for positive fallouts. Whether France did actually benefit

from it or not is best left for another study.

Notes

1. When working on this article at the London School of Economics (LSE) in 2007, I benefitted from Pr Robert

Boyce’s supervision, and Pr N. Piers Ludlow’s tutorship. Both must be thanked. Thanks must also go to Pr

Michael Willis of St Antony’s College at Oxford for his useful comments on an earlier draft. I am grateful

to the Geneva-based Ousseimi Foundation for its generous support throughout my time at the LSE, and the

St Antony’s College’s Carr and Stahl travel fund which allowed me to spend time in Paris for research pur-

poses. Finally, I want to thank all my Algerian friends, especially Faycal Tiaıba, whose friendship awakened

my interest in this part of the world.

2. David and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution (Berkeley, 1970), p. 151.

3. Nicole Grimaud, La Politique Exterieure de l’Algerie (1962–1978) (Paris, 1984), p. 55 and Philip C. Naylor,

France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,

2000), pp. 57–59.

4. He would soon achieve the positions of President of Algeria and Secretary-General of the FLN.

5. Signatory of the Evian Accords and secretary of state for Algerian Affairs, 1962–1966, Jean de Broglie was –

after General de Gaulle – the highest authority on matters involving Algeria.

6. See related published sources in Documents Diplomatiques Francais

7. Gorse (ambassador) to de Broglie (secretary of state for Algerian affairs), 14.03.1963, in Documents Diplomat-

iques Francais (DDF), 1963, tome I, pp. 276–278.

8. Ahmed Ben Bella, for instance, had already voiced his opposition to French nuclear tests on Algerian soil in

December 1962. See DDF, 1962, tome II, p. 525.

9. Philippe Herreman, ‘L’explosion souterraine au Hoggar’, Le Monde, 17 March 1963.

10. Gorse to de Broglie, 18.03.1963, in DDF, 1963, tome I, pp. 290–292.

11. This aspect of the subsequent Algerian opposition to the continuation of nuclear experimentation was reported

in a note from the Secretariat d’Etat aux Affaires Algeriennes (SEAA) memorandum. See La politique du gou-

vernement algerien, son orientation actuelle, ses perspectives, 03.06.1963, p. 5, in France, Ministeres des

Affaires Etrangeres, Secretariat d’Etat aux Affaires Algeriennes, c 125.

12. DDF, 1963, tome I, p. 277.

13. Discours du President Ben Bella, vol. II, annee 1963, 1er trimestre 1964, L’experience nucleaire francaise a

Aın-Ekker, 20 mars 1963, pp. 22–27.

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14. Naylor, France and Algeria, p. 55.

15. Attitude du gouvernement algerien a l’egard des accords d’Evian, 19.10.1962, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

16. Andre Pautard, ‘Une declaration au « Monde » de M. Khemisti, ministre algerien des affaires etrangeres’, in Le

Monde, 30.11.1962.

17. ‘Decret no 63–88 du 18 mars 1963 portant reglementation des biens vacants’, in Journal Officiel de la Repub-

lique Algerienne, Democratique et Populaire, 22 March 1963. The Jouranl Officiel can be consulted online on

http://www.joradp.dz.

18. De Broglie to Gorse, 30.03.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 120bis, LD/983.

19. Discours du President Ben Bella, p. 156.

20. Grimaud, La Politique Exterieure de l’Algerie, p. 52.


22. DDF, 1963, tome I, p. 350.

23. Gorse to de Broglie, 23.09.1963, in DDF, 1963, tome II, pp. 304–307.

24. Grimaud, La Politique Exterieure de l’Algerie, p. 52.

25. DDF, 1963, tome I, pp. 333–338.

26. Foreign Ministry to Mr Jacquin de Margerie, Ambassador of France in Bonn, 13.11.1963, in DDF, 1963, tome

II, pp. 499–501.

27. They never received anything. Algeria refused to compensate them, declaring that they would only pay indem-

nities if France agreed to pay war damages for the destruction of 8000 Algerian villages.


29. DDF, 1963, p. 376.

30. Ottaway, Algeria, p. 152.

31. Inventaire des violations des accords d’Evian ou de leur non application imputables aux Algeriens,

30.03.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

32. See BL/150 in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 120. For figures, see Section 7.

33. DDF, 1963, tome II, p. 323.

34. Accords d’Evian du 18 mars 1962, titre IV ‘du reglement des litiges’.

35. Alain Peyrefitte, C’etait de Gaulle 1: La France Redevient la France (Paris, 1995), pp. 419–420.

36. See Jean-Marc Regnault, ‘France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957–1963’, Journal of Military History, 67

(4) (October 2003): 1223–1248.

37. DDF, 1963, tome I, p. 399.

38. Naylor, France and Algeria, p. 59 and Ottaway, Algeria, p. 151.

39. Cabinet meeting of 3 April 1963, reported by Peyrefitte, C’etait de Gaulle, p. 402.

40. Note du Service des Affaires Generales et de la Cooperation Economique et Financiere, in DDF, 1963, tome II,

pp. 479–483.


42. Jean de Broglie, ‘Quarante mois de rapports franco-algeriens’, Revue de defense nationale, 21 (December

1965): 1837.

43. See, for instance, Louis Perillier, Ce qui reste des accords d’Evian, in Le Monde, 06.10.1963.

44. DDF, 1963, tome I, p. 400.


46. De Broglie a Gorse, 24.09.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.


48. Un an apres Evian, March 1963, p.5, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

49. De Broglie, ‘Quarante mois de rapports franco-algeriens’, p. 1857.


51. Cooperation franco-algerienne, 18.11.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

52. Politique de la France a l’egard de l’Algerie, 28.11.1962, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 131.

53. Cooperation franco-algerienne, 18.11.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.


55. Aide financiere a l’Algerie, 13.11.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

56. Orientation de notre action au regard du petrole saharien, 26.04.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

57. Henri Brunschwig, Mythes et realites de l’imperialisme colonial francais, 1871–1914 (Paris, 1960). Naylor

concurs: France and Algeria, p. 54.


59. Tony Smith, ‘The French colonial stake in Algeria’, French Historical Studies, 9 (1) (Spring 1975): 188.


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http://www.joradp.dz

60. The minutes of the negotiations can be found in DDF, 1962, tome I.

61. General Charles de Gaulle, Memoires d’espoir. Le renouveau. 1958–1962, vol. 1 (Geneva, 1981), p. 216.

62. See for instance a hierarchy of the objectives of French policy in Algeria in Les objectifs de la politique fran-

caise a l’egard de l’Algerie, 03.05.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

63. Peyrefitte, C’etait de Gaulle, p. 405.

64. Note du Secretariat d’Etat aux Affaires Algeriennes, 25.05.1961, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 102.

65. Experiences nucleaires et spatiales au Sahara, n. d. (1962?) in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 93.

66. Tableau comparatif des positions respectives sur les questions militaires, n. d. (1962?), in FR, MAE, SEAA,

c 93.

67. BL/51, 07.01.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 120bis.

68. Regnault, ‘Nuclear Test Sites’, p. 1224.

69. Ibid, p. 1228.

70. Ibid, p. 1243.

71. Amiral Marcel Duval, ‘L’Arme Nucleaire Francaise: Passe et Avenir’, in Maurice Vaısse (ed.), La France et

l’Atome (Brussels, 1994), pp. 259–260.

72. Foreign minister in the period under study (1958–1968) and subsequently prime minister for eleven months.

Naylor, France and Algeria, p. 48.

73. De Gaulle, Memoires d’espoir, p. 87.

74. De Broglie, ‘Quarante mois de rapports franco-algeriens’, p. 1857.

75. William B. Cohen, ‘Legacy of Empire: The Algerian Connection’, Journal of Contemporary History, 15 (1)

‘Imperial Hangovers’ (January 1980): 119.

76. Estimations vary from 350,000 (French authorities) to 1.5 million (FLN). Alistair Horne and Raymond Aron

consider the actual death toll to be far higher.

77. Expose de M. de Broglie sur les relations franco-algeriennes apres 3 ans d’independance, 21.04.1965, p. 3, in

FR, MAE, SEAA, c 136.

78. Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, Rapport de fin de mission, 10.01.1963, pp. 13-14, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 136.

79. Chou En-Lai visited Algiers in December 1963 and Ben Bella would be visiting Marshal Tito in March 1964.

DDF, 1964, tome I, p. 235.

80. ‘Une brouille avec l’Algerie risquerait de ruiner les efforts de notre diplomatie dans le monde entier, declare

M. de Broglie’, Le Monde, 7 November 1964.




83. Jean-Marcel Janneney, La politique de cooperation avec les pays sous-developpes, 05.04.1963, p.3, in FR,

MAE, SEAA, c 125.

84. DDF, 1963, tome II, p. 448.

85. Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, Compte rendu du dıner du 15 aout avec M. Ben Bella, 17.08.1963, in FR, MAE,

SEAA, c 122.

86. DDF, 1964, tome I, p. 235.

87. Cohen, ‘Legacy of Empire’, p. 116.



90. DDF, 1963, tome II, p. 505.

91. French embassy in Algiers, note, 20.11.1962, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

92. Arslan Humbaraci, Algeria: A Revolution that Failed. A Political History since 1954 (New York: Praeger,

1966), p. 195.

93. Claude Julien, ‘L’interview du president Ben Bella’, Le Monde, 8 November 1963.




96. ’On ne peut qu’etre frappe par la cordialite du message que M. Ben Bella, “avec un reel plaisir”, a adresse a

M. Khrouchtchev. . .’. See Gorse a MAE, 09.11.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 136.

97. In May 1962, members of the Conseil National de la Revolution Algerienne (CNRA), FLN’s supreme body,

met at Tripoli and developed a programme for the soon-to-be Algerian state. The Tripoli Programme contained

vague but constant allusions about Algeria’s socialist option. For an overview of the Tripoli meeting, see

Ottaway, Algeria, pp. 14–18.

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99. Politique francaise a l’egard de l’Algerie, 11.05.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

100. Aide financiere de la France a l’algerie, 13.11.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

101. Cooperation entre un Etat liberal et un Etat socialiste, colloque SEAA, ambassade de France a Alger, 13 and

14 May 1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

102. All the facts and figures cited in this section are taken from Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, ‘La Politique de

cooperation avec les pays en voie de developpement’ (Rapport Jeanneney), in Documentation Francaise Illu-

stree, no. 201 (1964), mentioned inter alia in Humbaraci, Algeria, pp. 194–200.

103. Humbaraci, Algeria, p. 194. Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, incidentally, was the first French ambassador posted in

Algiers until he was replaced by Georges Gorse.


105. Humbaraci, Algeria, p. 194.

106. Mission culturelle de l’ambassade de France, 11.05.1963, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 125.

107. Jean-Marcel Janneney, La politique de cooperation avec les pays sous-developpes, 05.04.1963, p. 2, in FR,

MAE, SEAA, c 125.

108. See the French Ambassador’s recommendation for using the aid weapon in DDF, 1964, tome I, p. 565.

109. Abdelaziz Chneguir, La Politique Exterieure de la Tunisie 1956–1987 (Paris, 2004), p. 26.

110. Chneguir, Politique Exterieure de la Tunisie, pp. 40, 77.


112. Only aid with an interest for the French industry was maintained. See the summary of measures by ‘la direction

politique’ in DDF, 1964, tome I, p. 577.

113. Jean de Broglie, Intervention de M. Jean de Broglie secretaire d’Etat charge des affaires algeriennes au Senat

(debat budgetaire), 24.11.1964, p. 8, in FR, MAE, SEAA, c 154.

114. Jean-Francois Daguzan, ‘Les Rapports Franco-Algeriens, 1962–1992. Reconciliation ou Conciliation

Permanente?’ Politique Etrangere (1993): pp. 888–890.

115. Ibid., pp. 890–891.

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Courting the former colony: Algeria's special position in French Third World policy, 1963

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Transcript of Courting the former colony: Algeria's special position in French Third World policy, 1963