195

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

Base of text

Psychology & MarketingVol. 17(3):195–233 (March 2000)� 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Top of text

Top of CT

Base of DF

Contributions from MoodResearchHarri T. Luomala and Martti LaaksonenUniversity of Vaasa

ABSTRACT

In this article definitions of mood and the behavioral effects ofnegative moods are reviewed and scrutinized. This is an importanttask for two reasons. First, in prior studies, consumer researchershave treated concepts such as affect, mood, feeling, and emotionvaguely and arbitrarily. This has resulted in confusion regarding thesubstance of mood. In an attempt to dispel a part of this confusion,this article offers a conceptual analysis of mood. Second, a large partof prior consumer behavior- and advertising-related mood researchhas addressed the relation between mood and mental constructs.The relation between mood and actual consumer behaviors is a moreneglected research area. The behavioral effects of negative moodsare an especially interesting phenomenon, because past studies haveproduced mixed and contradictory results. Thus, to offer novelinsights, the key conclusion of the conceptual analysis of mood isharnessed to explain the inconsistent findings regarding thenegative mood–(consumer) behavior relation. Another theoreticalcontribution is the provision of starting points for conceptualizingmood-alleviative consumer behavior. Suggestions for future researchare also briefly outlined in the concluding section of this article.� 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

On the one hand, the concept of mood has been subjected to a history ofcasual and arbitrary use (Gardner, 1985, p. 282; Morris, 1989, p. 1). Onthe other hand, the academic literature contains numerous articles andchapters in books addressing mood where mood definitions are not of-fered at all. There are two possible explanations for this situation. Ei-

196 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

ther mood researchers take it for granted that everybody both knowsand agrees on the substance of mood, or they themselves have difficul-ties in streamlining what are the most defining characteristics of theconcept of mood. Unfortunately, the latter explanation seems moreplausible, as many researchers (e.g., Underwood & Moore, 1973; Solo-mon, 1980; Bower, 1981; Donovan & Rossiter, 1982; Batra & Ray, 1986;Watson, 1988; Dawson, Bloch, & Ridgway, 1990; Hornik, 1993) have notbeen able to find any specific purpose for the term mood, using it inter-changeably with other terms such as affect, emotion, emotional state,and feeling. That is why the basic nature of the concept of mood hasremained unclear and ambiguous.

Regarding past research, another problematic fact is that the largestpart of currently existing consumer behavior- and advertising-relatedempirical mood research has addressed the relation between mood andmental constructs (e.g., recall, perception, evaluation, judgment, deci-sion making, attitudes, intentions) (Luomala, 1998, p. 119). The relationbetween mood and actual (consumer) behaviors has attracted less sci-entific attention, even though this relation is in itself intriguing andimportant. As a consequence, the extant mood reviews (e.g., Gardner,1985; Sedikides, 1992b; Kacen, 1994b) are inclined to handle the influ-ences of mood mainly on memory and thinking activities. That is whya review bringing together prior studies contributing to the understand-ing of the relation between mood and actual (consumer) behaviors isneeded. Especially interesting is the relation between negative moodsand actual (consumer) behaviors, because the results of prior studiestreating the behavioral effects of negative moods are mixed and contra-dictory (Clark & Isen, 1982; Gardner, 1987; Kacen, 1994b). This is thesecond justification for making the review tackling the behavioral ef-fects of negative moods.

Based on the preceding discussion, the following three objectives canbe set for the article: first, to analytically review existing mood defini-tions from different fields; second, to analytically review behavioral ef-fects of negative moods; and third, to present implications for consumerresearch, that is, to specify how consumer research can generally benefitfrom the reviews made. The article intends to contribute to consumerresearch in two ways. First, to suggest explanations for the mixed andcontradictory findings regarding the effects of negative moods on (con-sumer) behaviors. Second, to offer theoretical starting points for con-ceptualizing mood-alleviative consumer behavior.

This article is organized in the following way. The next section of thearticle presents the review of mood definitions. Then the behavioral ef-fects of negative moods are reviewed in the second main section of thearticle. Logically, the last and longest section of the article is devoted todelineating implications for consumer research. The article concludesby putting forth suggestions for future research.

MOOD RESEARCH 197

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

A REVIEW OF MOOD DEFINITIONS

By investigating the different definitions assigned to mood, a deeperunderstanding of the nature of mood can be established. The specifica-tion of the nature of mood is essential for two reasons. First, it is neededin clarifying the core substance of the concept of mood. Second, it hasimplications for the negative mood–(consumer) behavior relation thatis addressed later.

Even though the review of mood definitions offered here is not ex-haustive, it is extensive in that it brings together a large number ofmood definitions from the areas of psychology, social psychology, andconsumer-behavior research. In other words, the major criterion thatguided the selection of mood definitions for the review was the pluralityof the definitions. That is why the set of definitions offered by the reviewis deemed to form a solid and representative basis for investigatingthem and the nature of mood.

The review of mood definitions can be found in Table 1. It consists ofdifferent mood definitions that have appeared in journal articles, bookchapters, and books. In the review, the definitions in quotation marksare formal definitions put forth by the author(s). The mood definitionswithout quotation marks are definitions not formally expressed by theauthor(s), but are statements that have been interpreted to be defini-tional; they are thus included in the review.

The first salient feature of the mood definitions in Table 1 is theirheterogeneity. This heterogeneity can signal at least two things. First,it strengthens the discovery made earlier: There is no consensus on thesubstance of the concept of mood. Second, the heterogeneity of mooddefinitions seems to voice the need for conceptual clarification of thesubstance of mood. This notion is supported by the fact that the defi-nitional discussions of mood are often paralleled with the conceptualcomparisons to emotion, implying that researchers feel the need to dis-tinguish between these two concepts.

It was also noticed that moods have been conceptualized both as re-sponses and states. However, considering individual mood definitions,the fact is that moods are seldom explicitly defined as both responsesand states simultaneously. The implications of this observation aretackled later. Furthermore, in spite of the apparent heterogeneity ofmood definitions, two homogeneous definitional subgroups can be iden-tified. Although all of the mood definitions cannot be incorporated intoeither of the groups, they still subsume the majority of the definitionsof the review.

To the first and larger group belong the mood definitions that em-phasize the structural aspects of mood. For instance, the mood defini-tions by Clark and Isen (1982), Gardner (1985, 1987), Derbaix and Pham(1991), and Kumar (1997) are illuminative in this regard. The structur-

198 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 1. A Review of Mood Definitions

Author(s) Offered Definition

Nowlis & Nowlis (1956) “Mood is an intervening variable or predispositionalfactor that is a source of information or discriminablestimuli to the organism, about the current function-ing characteristics of the organisms. Moods are in-volved in the self-monitoring and self-regulation ofcomplex behavior.”

Jacobsen (1957) “Moods are barometers of ego.”

Ewert (1970) “Moods are background experiences of a diffuse nature.There is no differentiation of experienced self and ex-perienced world. Thus, moods do not refer to persons,things or events. They possess no object reference.”

Pribram (1970) Moods monitor and reflect our appraisal of our life cir-cumstances.

Clark & Isen (1982) Moods are mild general and pervasive feeling states,having no inherent targets. They are relatively tran-sitory, occur frequently, and do not interrupt ongoingbehaviors.

Klinger (1982) Mood means a disposition to react with a certain emo-tion during a period of time greater than a few mo-ments but less than a lifetime. Mood refers to thecentral tendency of emotional states over any giventime period.

Denzin (1984) “Moods are emotional states of mind that transcendspecific situational experiences.”

Isen (1984) “Moods refer to pervasive, global, generalized affectivecomponents or states that influence seemingly non-affect-related events. They occur quite frequently, of-ten in response to seemingly small everyday occur-rences, they are pervasive rather than specific intheir effects, they can be mild, and they often seemmild even when they are not.”

Gardner (1985) Moods are feeling states that are subjectively perceivedby individuals. Moods are mild, transient, general,and pervasive. They rarely interrupt ongoing behav-iors. They may or may not be consciously experi-enced.

Batra & Ray (1986) “Moods are defined as milder, more pervasive, andmore transient than emotions.”

Gardner (1987) Moods are ordinary feeling states. They are affectivestates that are pervasive and transient. They havedirection (analogous to the type of feeling experi-enced) and intensity (analogous to arousal).

Morris & Reilly (1987) “Moods, defined as diffuse or global feeling states, maylead us to take self-regulatory actions.”

MOOD RESEARCH 199

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 1. (Continued)

Author(s) Offered Definition

Russell & Snodgrass (1987) “We shall use the word mood to refer to the core emo-tional feelings of a person’s subjective state at anygiven moment.”

Pieters & van Raaij (1988) Mood is a type of affect with no or a less-specific target.Moods are less intense than emotion in the subjectiveexperience and more diffuse, and often originate inthe glandular system of the person. Mood may be aremainder of a strong emotion. Although mood istransient, it is more an enduring kind of affect thanemotion.

Snodgrass, Russell, &Ward (1988)

“Mood we took as a person’s momentary subjective af-fective feelings describable along the independent di-mensions of pleasure–displeasure and arousal–sleep-iness.”

Morris (1989) “Moods are affective states that are capable of influenc-ing a broad array of potential responses, many ofwhich seem quite unrelated to the mood-precipitatingevent. As compared with emotions, moods are typi-cally less intense affective states and are thought tobe involved in the instigation of self-regulatory pro-cesses.”

Thayer (1989) Mood encompasses a tendency to act in a particularway under certain circumstances.

Alpert & Alpert (1990) Mood is defined as a fleeting temporary feeling state,usually not intense, and not tied to a specifiable be-havior.

Cohen & Areni (1990) “Moods might be viewed as ‘milder’ instances of emo-tions.”

Derbaix & Pham (1991) Moods are target- and stimulus-unspecific affective re-actions. Their intensity is weak or moderate. Theirduration is moderate. Somatic experiences are nor-mally related to moods. Somatic expressions of moodare a function of display rules. Intention to dissimu-late the mood may be strong due to display rules. Fa-cility to deceive the mood expression is rather lowdue to duration and/or intensity. Probability of ele-mentary subjective mood experience is rather low.Moods are moderately mediated by cognition. Subse-quent cognitive processes are often related to mood.

Grunert (1991) “Mood is the label for any relatively short-lived, low in-tensity emotional state.”

Lazarus (1991) Moods are reactions to the way one appraises relation-ships with the environment; they refer to the largerexistential issues of one’s life, that is, to well-being.

200 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 1. (Continued)

Author(s) Offered Definition

Batson, Shaw, & Oleson(1992)

Mood is a specific type of affective state. It has a toneand an intensity. Mood involves a more or less well-formed set of beliefs about whether, in general, weare likely to experience pleasure or pain in the fu-ture. Temporary change in expectation of future plea-sure or pain, combined with the affective state thisexpectation evokes in the present, constitutes themood. Mood functions to inform the organism aboutthe likely pleasure or pain to be obtained from inter-action with the physical and social environment.

Morris (1992) Moods signal the states of the self in terms of the physi-cal, psychological, and social resources available tomeet perceived environmental demands. Moods oper-ate as a cue in a self-regulatory system.

Sedikides (1992a, 1992b) Mood is defined as “a general and pervasive feelingstate that is not directed toward a specific target.”Mood states are frequent, relatively long and perva-sive, but typically milder in intensity than emotions.

Parrott (1993) Moods are better thought of as general frames of mindthat include a complex of cognitive and motivationaltendencies. Moods appear as much more than he-donic states; they are perspectives on one’s situationin the world and on one’s well-being, and they tend toproduce ways of thinking that are adapted to thatperspective.

Swinyard (1993) “Mood has been described as a phenomenological prop-erty of a person’s subjectively perceived affectivestate. It is viewed as a mild, transient, generalized,and pervasive affective state, not an intense emotion,and not directed at specific target objects.”

Kacen (1994b) “Mood can be described as a temporary emotional statethat is ubiquitous in nature.”

Kelley & Hoffman (1997) “The feeling states associated with moods are affectivestates that are general and pervasive and are not di-rected toward anyone or anything in particular. In-stead, these states provide the affective coloring forday-to-day events. In this way, the affective state as-sociated with mood is distinguished from the affectivecomponent of attitude.”

Kumar (1997) “Mood, on the other hand, represents a form of affectthat is not associated with a particular stimulus.Moods are lower-intensity affective states that tendto be more enduring than emotions.”

MOOD RESEARCH 201

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 1. (Continued)

Author(s) Offered Definition

Bagozzi, Gopinath, & Nyer(1999)

The line between an emotion and mood is frequentlydifficult to draw but often by convention involves con-ceiving of a mood as being longer lasting (from a fewhours up to days) and lower in intensity than an emo-tion . . . Still another distinction between emotionsand moods is that former typically intentional (i.e., ithas an object or referent), whereas moods are gener-ally nonintentional or diffused. Also, moods are notas directly coupled with action tendencies as aremany emotions . . . in addition to the things men-tioned earlier, emotions differ from moods in themanner they arise and in their representation inmemory.

Gnoth, Zins, Lengmueller,& Boshoff (1999)

“Moods are complex affective states without a specifictarget, that are pervasive in their effect. In otherwords, moods are both states and responses to previ-ous experiences that affect future behavior and expe-riences.”

Hibbert (1999) Moods that individuals become aware of may instigatestrategic (i.e. non-automatic) mood maintenance ormood repair efforts . . . Mood-management motives,therefore, have the potential to influence goal inten-tions as they increase an individual’s propensity toscrutinize the hedonic consequences of various goalsthat they may choose to pursue and increase a per-son’s commitment to goals that serve mood manage-ment goals . . . Mood is suggested to serve a self-regulatory function because it influences anindividual’s evaluation of whether he or she is likelyto achieve a certain goal.

ally oriented definitions involve the identification of certain dimensions(e.g., stimulus and target specificity, intensity, duration) and assigninga value to these dimensions. Fundamentally, the structurally orientedanalysis attempts to answer the question: “What are moods?” (cf. Bat-son, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992).

The second group, which is clearly smaller than the first, brings to-gether the mood definitions that emphasize the functional aspects ofmood. The functionally oriented analysis seeks an answer to the ques-tion: “Why do moods exist?” (cf. Batson et al., 1992). The definitions ofBatson et al. (1992), Hibbert (1999), Jacobsen (1957), Lazarus (1991),Morris (1989, 1992), Morris and Reilly (1987), Nowlis and Nowlis (1956),Parrott (1993), and Pribram (1970), are examples of the functionallyoriented mood definitions. These definitions more or less explicitly con-vey the message that moods inform people about their general state of

202 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

being. In this capacity, moods are seen as facilitating self-regulation(Morris, 1989, p. 3).

To conclude, the structurally and functionally oriented mood analysesproduce definitions that are different by their nature, because they un-derscore different aspects of mood. As a result, two differing mood con-ceptions emerge. This interpretation is supported by Hibbert (1999).She refers to these different mood conceptions as the associationist per-spective of mood and as the functional perspective of mood. The asso-ciationist perspective of mood resembles the backdrop view of mood in-troduced in this study, and the functional perspective of mood is similarto the motivational view of mood offered in the present article.

The mood substance produced by the structurally oriented analysisis referred to in this article as the backdrop view of mood, whereas themood substance produced by the functionally oriented analysis is re-ferred to as the motivational view of mood. Undoubtedly, the backdropview of mood is more traditional, consensual, and predominant withinthe consumer-behavior–related mood research than the motivationalview of mood.

After the familiarization with mood literature, six characteristics ofmood have been extracted. These are mode of operation, stimulus andtarget specificity, intensity, duration, amount of cognitive mediation,and functionality. First, these mood characteristics are elaborated fromthe backdrop viewpoint, and then from the motivational viewpoint.

The Backdrop View of Mood

Within the backdrop view of mood, the basic premise is that moods areseldom experienced consciously by people. Consequently, when the ef-fects of mood have traditionally been investigated, the explanations thatrelate the automatic mental mechanisms to memory and thinking func-tions have been resorted to. In other words, within this view, mood ispostulated to have the characteristic of a background; it is a formlessbackdrop against which events are experienced. Moods subtly insinuatethemselves into everyday lives, influencing what is remembered of thepast, perceived in the present, and expected from the future. Thus,moods act quite literally as a frame of mind (see Morris, 1989, pp. 8and 9).

The unconscious operating mode of mood is not explicitly discussedby many investigators (see Clark & Isen, 1982, for an exception). How-ever, the arguments that moods do not typically interrupt ongoingthinking activities and behaviors (see, e.g., Isen, 1984; Gardner, 1985;Sedikides, 1992b) imply the conclusion that within the backdrop viewof mood it is inherently assumed that the major mode of operation ofmood is unconscious by its nature. Moods operate at the automatic level,biasing the use of memory, perceptions, judgments, evaluations, andgenerally thinking, by influencing the accessibility of different concepts

MOOD RESEARCH 203

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

in memory. These automatic processes, which make the functioning ofmemory and thinking processes selective and biased, have been studiedunder different labels: unconscious effects of mood, mood effects on ac-cessibility in retrieval, congruence effects of mood, state dependencyeffects of mood, and valence effects of mood (see, e.g., Bower, 1981; Clark& Isen, 1982; Gardner, 1987; Pieters & van Raaij, 1988).

The second characteristic concerning the stimulus and target speci-ficity of mood is more explicitly addressed within the backdrop view ofmood. The apparent trend in the review is the stimulus and target un-specificity of moods. The notion of the stimulus unspecificity (e.g., Der-baix & Pham, 1991; Sedikides, 1992a, 1992b) of moods is consistent withthe unconscious operating mode of mood: the origins of mood areirrelevant (staying unspecified) as far as mood remains in the uncon-scious.

Perhaps the most common comment made on moods is that they arepervasive, diffuse or ubiquitous by their nature. This feature of moodis, in turn, related to the target unspecificity of moods. The target un-specificity of moods has to do with the breadth of influence moods have.Moods are capable of altering affective, cognitive, and behavioral re-sponses to a wide array of objects, persons, and events (Morris, 1989, p.2). Gardner (1985, p. 282) expresses this by stating that mood is thephenomenological property of an individual’s subjectively perceived af-fective state, whose influences are diffuse and not tied to a specifiablebehavior. Also Ewert (1970, p. 233), Isen (1984, p. 186), Batra and Ray(1986, p. 235), Pieters & van Raaij (1988, p. 254), and Alpert and Alpert(1990, p. 110) hold that this characteristic is appropriate for the conceptof mood.

Another area of acceptance within the backdrop view of mood con-cerns the third characteristic, the typical intensity level, of moods. Mostof the researchers in the review see moods as having a relatively lowlevel of intensity in comparison, for example, with emotions. The back-drop view of mood assumes that the intensity of moods is so low thatthe person experiencing moods is often not aware of them and theirinfluences at all. In such cases, moods do not interrupt the ongoing be-haviors or functioning of the person and influence concrete actions onlyindirectly through the person’s thinking activities or other mental pro-cesses.

Consensus surrounds also the fourth characteristic of the duration ofmood within the backdrop view. Most of the authors in the review agreethat moods are typically transient and fleeting (cf. also Dawson et al.,1990). For example, Morris (1989, p. 146) speculates that the mildestmoods may last only a few minutes.

As regards the fifth characteristic of mood, it is generally held withinthe backdrop view that moods are not to a large extent mediated bycognition. However, this is not explicitly discussed by many of the moodinvestigators in the review. In any case, it appears logical to presume

204 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

that the backdrop view of mood regards the amount of cognitive medi-ation to be low or negligible in mood experience. This argument isfounded on the backdrop view belief that moods are usually not con-sciously experienced by people. Cognitive mediation has inevitably norole to play if this belief is to be respected: How can moods be cognitivelymediated if they are not consciously experienced? Is unconscious cog-nitive mediation an answer?

The sixth, the functionality, characteristic of mood is ignored by thebackdrop view of mood. Thus, the only plausible inference appears to bethat the backdrop view of mood does not postulate that moods have anyfunction or purpose at all.

The Motivational View of Mood

The mood substance produced by the motivational view of mood is dif-ferent from that assigned by the backdrop view of mood. To start with,the first characteristic of the operating mode of mood is treated differ-ently within the motivational and the backdrop view. Within the moti-vational view of mood, one fundamental tenet is that individuals areconscious of their mood experiences. This tenet is taken to be valid ontwo grounds. First, even though the idea of unconscious motivation isnot unknown (e.g., in psychoanalytic theories), it is not usually linkedto momentary mood states, but rather to different aspects of personality.Second, the consciousness of the mood experience is strongly supportedby some researchers (e.g., Nowlis & Nowlis, 1956; Morris, 1989; Thayer,1989). According to Morris (1989, p. 9): “. . . a given mood may enterfocal attention, either because it intensifies, or because other demandson attention are relaxed, or because some event causes us to introspect.Upon entering focal attention, mood rapidly acquires the characteristicsof figure or thing. It takes on a specific form, in that we may label thefeeling and thereby partially understand or explain it.” Thayer (1989,p. 147), in turn, holds that one essential feature of mood is consciousawareness: “The first feature is that mood involves conscious aware-ness.”

The stimulus and target specificity, the second mood characteristic,is seen somewhat differently by the backdrop and the motivational moodviews too. Both views hold moods to be target unspecific, whereas onlythe motivational view regards moods as stimulus specific. The notion ofstimulus specificity is consistent with the conscious operating mode ofmood: If people are aware of their moods, they can also identify theirorigins. For example, Isen (1984, p. 186), Ortony and Clore (1989, p.131), and Kacen (1994b, p. 10) make a case for unambiguously stimulus-specific moods. Moreover, even though people might sometimes notknow the real reason for their moods, they are still likely to make at-tributions, or perhaps misattributions, concerning the origins of themood state. This is especially so in the case of negative moods.

MOOD RESEARCH 205

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

The insistence on the stimulus specificity of moods does not, however,mean that moods would not be considered as pervasive (or target un-specific) by the motivational view of mood. The stimulus specificity neednot always imply target specificity. This is so at least for two reasons.First, although the target specificity is usually associated with emo-tions, the relational meaning of stimulation (cf. Frijda, 1986; Lazarus,1991) to a person may be such that it provokes moods rather than emo-tions, because the target toward which the generated affective reactioncould be directed is unspecific or remote. For instance, when a scholarwho has invested time, energy, and attention in making an applicationfor a grant learns that the application is rejected, he or she probablyexperiences irritation (a mood) rather than anger (an emotion), becausethe target of the negative affective reaction is unspecific and remote.Thus, the stimulus-specific and target-unspecific mood accompanieshim/her everywhere he/she goes for a while. Secondly, moods can alsobe induced as a result of the accumulation of multiple minor incidents.In other words, the arousal of mood is not associated with a single in-cident. In either case, due to the nature of mood-instigating stimuli,moods are both stimulus specific and target unspecific.

There is no consensus surrounding the third characteristic, the in-tensity, of mood, between the backdrop and motivational views of mood.Moods are mild affective reactions according to the backdrop view. Inturn, the motivational mood view surmises that moods possess moti-vational force, because their intensity is high. Thus, the intensity ofmoods is seen as at least moderate; it can even reach high levels ofintensity (cf. Isen, 1984; Morris & Reilly, 1987; Morris, 1989, 1992; Ka-cen, 1994b). For instance, Morris (1992, p. 264) argues that moods canbe intensive enough to interrupt ongoing behaviors. The logic behindthis claim is simple: If a certain mood has been able to penetrate intothe focal attention of a person, it is likely that this particular mood ismore intense than mood that has not been able to do so. Naturally, forinstance, cognitive strain may sometimes prevent an individual fromexperiencing moods. However, when the intensity of a particular moodexceeds a certain threshold value, it will inevitably be consciously ex-perienced.

Within the motivational view, moods are not taken to be so transientas they are within the backdrop view of mood. This discussion relates tothe fourth mood characteristic, duration. The motivational view of moodinvolves the belief that when moods are intensive enough they are ableto reside in the individual’s focal attention. This, in turn, makes moodsless transient. This kind of logic is intuitively appealing; for instance,Morris concurs with it. He holds that the intensity and duration of moodare correlated (cf. Morris 1989, pp. 146 and 147). He believes that themildest moods can last only a few minutes, while the strongest moodsmay last a couple of hours; however, certainly not longer than a day.

The amount of cognitive mediation is the fifth characteristic of mood.

206 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 2. A Juxtaposition of Different Mood Substances

Characteristics of Mood

View of Mood

Backdrop Motivational

1. Mode of operation Unconsciousness Consciousness2. Stimulus and target specificity Stimulus unspecific Stimulus specific

Target unspecific Target unspecific3. Intensity Low Moderate4. Duration Transient More enduring5. Amount of cognitive mediation From very small to small Moderate6. Functionality Nonfunctional Self-informational

It is also handled differently by the motivational and backdrop views ofmood. The backdrop view argues that moods are not to a large extentmediated by cognition, whereas the motivational view maintains thatmoods are, at least moderately, mediated by cognition (see, e.g., Derbaix& Pham, 1991, p. 329). This can be seen as the precondition for theassertions that moods are consciously experienced: If people are con-scious of their mood experiences, they will also know their cognitivemediators, either through attributions or misattributions.

The sixth, the functionality, characteristic of mood is not ignored bythe motivational mood view as it was by the backdrop view. In fact, themotivational view postulates that mood has an important self-infor-mational function (cf. Batson et al., 1992; Morris, 1992; Nowlis & Now-lis, 1956; N. Schwarz, 1990). For instance, Nowlis and Nowlis (1956, p.353) state that mood has a cue function in that it supplies informationabout the current functioning of the organism. Batson et al. (1992, p.299) suggest that moods function to inform the organism about thelikely pleasure or pain to be obtained from the interaction with the phys-ical and social environment. Finally, Morris (1992, p. 256) argues thatmood exists for the sake of signaling the states of the self in terms ofthe physical, psychological, and social resources available to meet per-ceived environmental demands.

Negative moods are especially apt to serve a self-informational func-tion. For instance, it has been discovered that the experiences of nega-tive moods lead to heightened self-focus (Pyszczynski & Greenberg,1987; Sedikides, 1992a, 1992b; Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, Stone, & Rach-miel, 1990). This basically happens because negative moods encompassnegative self-evaluation and uncertainty about one’s self-worth. Theseaversive experiences trigger the self-perception process, leading toheightened self-focused attention (Sedikides, 1992b, p. 145).

To conclude the discussion, a juxtaposition of the two mood sub-stances is presented in Table 2. In this table, the mood substances pro-duced by the backdrop and motivational views are compared in termsof the identified six mood characteristics.

To summarize, moods are seen by the backdrop view as operating at

MOOD RESEARCH 207

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

an unconscious level, being both stimulus and target unspecific, havingrelatively low intensity, being transient, being only to a small extentmediated by cognition, and having no special function. In contrast, themotivational view considers moods as operating in consciousness, beingstimulus but not target specific, having moderate intensity, being moreenduring, being at least moderately mediated by cognition, and havinga self-informational function.

Theoretically, there may be clear-cut differences between the back-drop and motivational moods. Nevertheless, this may not be the case inreality. Depending on the circumstances, moods may change their formeven within a short time span. The purpose of this juxtaposition hasbeen conceptually clarifying and heuristic. The heuristic nature of thejuxtaposition is needed when it is used to explain the inconsistent find-ings of past research concerning the behavioral effects of negative moods(to be reported later).

A REVIEW OF THE BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OFNEGATIVE MOODS

Extensive reviews of mood effects on psychological functioning are avail-able (e.g., Clark & Isen, 1982; Cohen & Areni, 1990; Gardner, 1985,1987; Isen, 1984; Kacen, 1994b; Morris, 1989; Pieters & van Raaij, 1988;Sedikides, 1992b). However, the majority of the reviews have a broadperspective on mood effects. That is, the influences of both positive andnegative moods on many aspects of mental functioning (e.g., attention,recall, judgments, expectancies, evaluations, perceptions, impressionformation, decision making, creativity, etc.) and behavior are reviewedjointly. These general reviews usually show a bias toward the moodeffects on mental functioning; less attention is paid to the behavioralmood effects. This bias toward the mood effects on mental functioningis natural, because prior mood research has been mainly interested inthe relation between moods and mental constructs.

Because the relation between mood and actual (consumer) behaviorshas attracted less scientific attention, the focus of the review presentedhere is more concentrated. The studies concerning only the behavioraleffects of negative moods are featured in the review because the resultsof these studies are mixed and contradictory. In other words, studiesdealing with positive moods and/or the effects of moods on memory andthinking processes are not included in the review.

The review presented in Table 3 is founded on both the prior generalreviews of mood effects (Gardner, 1985; Kacen, 1994b; Sedikides, 1992b)and on the individual studies having a bearing on the behavioral effectsof negative moods. It contains a set of studies of different natures: ex-periments, surveys, and qualitative explorations. The mood-manipula-tion method and the relevant findings are reported in the table as well.

208 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 3. A Review of Behavioral Effects of Negative Moods

Study Mood Manipulation Major Finding(s)

Berkowitz & Connor(1966)

Experience of failure Failing subjects expresseddislike for their peers.

Mischel, Coates, &Raskoff (1968)

Bogus negative feedback Failing subjects self-re-warded less than suceed-ing subjects.

Isen (1970) Bogus negative feedback Failing subjects were lesshelpful and charitablethan “succeeding” sub-jects.

Aderman (1972) Velten procedure-induceddepression

Depressed subjects did notperform as well as happysubjects in a helpingtask. Depressed subjectsvolunteered less thanhappy subjects.

Regan, Williams, &Sparling (1972)

Experience of blame Blamed subjects were morelikely than unblamedsubjects to perform anunrelated helping task.

Moore, Underwood, &Rosenhan (1973)

Self-induced sadness Sad subjects contributedthe least to charity in theexperimenter’s absence.

Underwood & Moore(1973)

Self-induced sadness Sad subjects self-rewardedless than happy subjects,but more than controls.

Rosenhan, Underwood,& Moore (1974)

Self-induced sadness Sad subjects self-rewardedmore than controls.

Seeman & Schwarz(1974)

Experience of rejection Rejected subjects did notresist self-reward as longas accepted subjects.

Donnerstein, Donner-stein, & Munger(1975)

Aversive pictures Negative-mood subjects en-hanced their willingnessto help.

Fry (1975) Self-induced unhappiness Unhappy subjects did notresist the temptation aslong as happy subjectsand controls.

Cialdini & Kenrick(1976)

Self-induced sadness Sad and older children sub-jects were more generousthan controls.

Moore, Clyburn, &Underwood (1976)

Self-induced sadness Sad subjects were morelikely to choose a smallimmediate reward than alarge delayed reward.

MOOD RESEARCH 209

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 3. (Continued)

Study Mood Manipulation Major Finding(s)

Rippere (1977) No manipulation (survey) When depressed, respon-dents used most readilyto see a friend, think ofthe reason for depression,go for a walk, rectify thesituation causing it, keepbusy, listen to music,sleep, do something en-joyable, see a film, read,eat, and go shopping.

Schwarz & Pollack(1977)

Guided self-induced sadness Sad subjects made less de-layed reward choicesthan happy subjects andcontrols.

Jones & Thelen (1978) Velten procedure-induceddepression

Depressed subjects self-re-warded less than elatedsubjects.

Depressed subjects self-punished more thanelated subjects.

Weyant (1978) Bogus negative feedback Negative-mood subjects re-duced helping.

Fried & Berkowitz(1979)

Irritating music Irritated subjects were lesshelpful than joyful sub-jects.

Baumann, Cialdini, &Kenrick (1981)

Self-induced sadness Sad subjects self-rewardedmore than controls.

Frost, Goolkasian, Ely,& Blanchard (1982)

Velten procedure-induceddepression

Depressed subjects atemore candy than elatedsubjects and controls.

Parker & Brown (1982) No manipulation (survey) When depressed, respon-dents used most readilyto think or talk throughthe problem, do some-thing to take thoughts offthe problem, listen tomusic, seek warmth, seea friend, pray, watch TV,drink alcohol, spendmoney on themselves,and eat.

Masters, Ford, &Arend (1983)

Experience of nonnurturance Sad boy subjects increasedthe length of time theyexposed themselves to anurturant television pro-gram.

210 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 3. (Continued)

Study Mood Manipulation Major Finding(s)

O’Malley & Andrews(1983)

Self-induced guilt Guilty subjects were morelikely to donate bloodthan controls.

Shaffer & Graziano(1983)

Overhearing a sad conver-sion

Negative moods facilitatedhelping when the taskhad pleasant conse-quences, but tended toinhibit helping when thetask had unpleasant con-sequences.

Folkman & Lazarus(1985)

College examination (sur-vey)

Experiences of stressprompted complex copingactivities. Respondentsused combinations of dif-ferent forms of problem-focused and emotion-fo-cused coping at everystage (anticipatory, wait-ing, outcome) of theexam.

Zillman & Bryant(1985)

Experimental task-inducedboredom and stress

Bored subjects avoided ex-posure to relaxing pro-grams and showed astrong inclination towatch exciting materials.

Stressed subjects elected toexpose themselves asmuch to exciting as to re-laxing fare.

Bogus negative feedback Bad-mood subjects pre-ferred game shows to sit-uation comedies and ac-tion dramas.

Phases of menstrual cycle Premenstrual and men-strual women subjectsshowed a heightened in-clination to choose com-edy.

Folkman, Lazarus,Dunkel-Schetter,DeLongis, & Gruen(1986)

No manipulation (survey) Eight different strategieswere used to cope withthe experience of stress:confrontive coping, dis-tancing, self-controlling,seeking social support,accepting responsibility,escape–avoidance, effort-ful and planful problemsolving, and positive re-appraisal.

MOOD RESEARCH 211

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 3. (Continued)

Study Mood Manipulation Major Finding(s)

Heeler & Berneman(1986)

No manipulation (survey) Shopping was used by re-spondents to compensatefor negative moods.

Cunningham (1988a) Velten procedure-induceddepression

When depressed or sad,subjects used to be alone,listen to music, sit andthink, take a nap, andhave peace and quiet.

Depressed respondentsshowed reduced interestin social, leisure, andstrenuous activities.

Cunningham (1988b) Sad videotapes Sad subjects self-disclosedless and more brieflythan happy subjects.

Gardner & Hill (1988) Unhappy journal article Negative-mood subjectswere more likely to usean informational brand-choice strategy than posi-tive-mood subjects.

Negative-mood subjectswho used an informa-tional brand-choice strat-egy had more positivepostprocessing moodthan those negative-moodsubjects who used an ex-perimental brand-choicestrategy.

Gallup & Castelli(1989)

No manipulation (survey) When depressed, respon-dents used most readilyto spend more time alonewith a hobby, watch TV,read, listen to music,seek out someone to talkwith, eat, pray, meditate,exercise, shop or con-sume, work, sleep, seekhelp from experts, drinkalcohol and take medica-tion.

Helregel & Weaver(1989)

Different phases of preg-nancy

A preference for comedyprograms was apparentwhen dysphoric states at-tributable to physiologi-cal changes prevailed.

212 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 3. (Continued)

Study Mood Manipulation Major Finding(s)

Forgas (1991) Bogus negative feedbackSad film

Sad subjects chose inter-personally rewardingrather than task-compe-tent partners.

Knapp & Clark (1991) Guided imagery-inducedsadness

Sad subjects were less ableto delay gratificationthan happy subjects andcontrols.

Sad subjects delayed grati-fication less than happysubjects and controls.

Kacen (1994a) No manipulation (qualita-tive study)

When in a bad mood, in-formants used to read,watch TV, listen to mu-sic, go shopping, go to themovies, exercise, writeletters, talk with friends,clean up, drive around,play an instrument, andbe alone.

Kacen (1994b) No manipulation (qualita-tive study � survey)

Experiences of negativemood prompted distrac-tive, expressive, revisory,or passive mood-manage-ment strategies.

Negative moods were copedwith by socializing, exer-cising, eating, shopping,pampering, exposing one-self to media entertain-ment, and engaging inhobbies.

Irritated informants choseactivities that resulted inpleasant, nonarousedmood that provided asense of control.

Thayer, Newman, &McClain (1994)

No manipulation (survey) Respondents readily identi-fied a multitude of behav-iors they used to copewith their negativemoods.

Physical exercise appearedto be the most effectivemood-regulating behav-ior.

MOOD RESEARCH 213

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 3. (Continued)

Study Mood Manipulation Major Finding(s)

The best general strategyto change a bad moodwas the combination ofrelaxation, stress man-agement, cognitive andexercise techniques.

Luomala & Laaksonen(1995)

No manipulation (qualita-tive study)

Consumption-related activi-ties were commonly usedto repair or alleviate neg-ative moods. These activ-ities included: buyingsomething special foroneself, going for a beeror two, browsing inshops, and engaging indifferent forms of self-in-dulgence. Things boughton these occasions in-cluded: cosmetics, can-dies, chocolate (or othersweet things), andclothes.

Faber & Christensen(1996)

No manipulation (survey) Compulsive buyers re-ported feeling negativemoods more frequentlyprior to going shoppingthan normal buyers. Thefindings suggested thatcompulsive buyers usebuying behavior to man-age undesirable moodstates.

Spies, Hesse, & Loesch(1997)

Store environment (fieldstudy)

Customers experiencing anegative mood change ina store spent less timeand money on spontane-ous purchases there thancustomers experiencing apositive mood change.

Van Kenhove & Desru-maux (1997)

Store environment (fieldstudy)

In retail environments,shoppers experiencingnegative mood engagedin stronger avoidance be-haviors than shoppers ex-periencing positive mood.

214 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Table 3. (Continued)

Study Mood Manipulation Major Finding(s)

Beatty & Ferrell (1998) No manipulation (survey) Negative affect appeared toreduce an individual’stendency to act on theirpurchasing urges.

Luce (1998) Automobile purchase simu-lation task

When a consumer decisioncreated distress, then anactual choice of an avoid-ant option resulted inless retrospective nega-tive mood and increasedinitial distress resultedin increased choice ofavoidant options (evi-dence for emotion-focusedcoping).

Luomala (1999) Scenarios (survey) The nature of behaviorsaimed at alleviating dis-tinct negative moods wasdifferent.

Most of the findings concerning the behavioral effects of negativemoods lay the foundations for two main observations. First, in the ex-perimental studies, the effects of negative moods on different behaviorswere generally (although not totally) incongruent (cf. Sedikides, 1992b,p. 284). In other words, the findings indicate that when negative moodsare aroused, the likelihood of engaging in behaviors of opposite hedonictone usually increases. For example, negative moods may enhance help-ing and undelayed self-gratification. What these two activities have incommon is their positive, pleasant, and uplifting consequences.

However, in concord with the mixed and contradictory results of pastresearch, the present review also suggests that the effects of negativemood on helping, self-gratification, or other behaviors having a positivehedonic tone are complex. To illustrate, negative moods may increase,decrease, or not affect the likelihood of performance of helping behav-iors. Additionally, negative mood subjects tend to self-gratify more onlyin comparison with controls; positive mood subjects often (yet not al-ways) seem to self-gratify more than negative mood subjects. For in-stance, Morris (1989) is so skeptical of the empirical evidence of thera-peutic self-rewards that he questions the genuine existence of them. Hisskepticism seems somewhat unwarranted in the light of the results in-dicating that negative-mood subjects, nonetheless, engage in undelayed

MOOD RESEARCH 215

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

self-gratification more easily than neutral- (and sometimes positive)mood subjects.

Second, the findings of the surveys and qualitative studies convey themessage that the experiences of negative moods are commonly associ-ated with many different kinds of behavioral activities. In other words,it appears that people typically possess sets of activities in which theyhabitually engage when they are in a negative mood. For instance,Thayer, Newman, and McClain (1994) identified 32 different categoriesof such behaviors. The implications of these two observations aretreated next.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMER RESEARCH

Toward Explaining Contradictory Findingson the Negative Mood–(Consumer)Behavior Relation

In this section the dichotomy of mood developed in this article is utilizedto explain the two main observations produced by the review of behav-ioral effects of negative moods. The first main observation was that inthe experimental studies the effects of negative moods on different be-haviors were found to be generally (although not totally) incongruent.In other words, the documented ambiguity regarding the results of stud-ies addressing the behavioral effects of negative moods was also en-countered here.

The incongruence of the behavioral effects of negative moods was notexpected by the studies utilizing the associative network model of mem-ory as the theoretical framework. According to the predictions of theassociative network model of memory, the behavioral effects of negativemoods should have been congruent. A brief account of the associativenetwork model of memory is provided in Footnote 1. It is based on Bower(1981, p. 135).

What could be an explanation for the mixed and contradictory-

The associative network model of memory supposes that different moods have a specific node orunit in memory that collects together many other aspects of moods that are connected to it byassociative pointers. Collected around this node are its associated autonomic reactions, standardrole and expressive behaviors, and descriptions of standard evocative situations. In addition,each mood node is also linked with propositions describing events in one’s life during which thatmood was aroused. These mood nodes can be activated by many stimuli—by physiological orsymbolic verbal means. When activated above a threshold, the mood node transmits excitationto those nodes that produce the pattern of autonomic arousal and expressive behavior commonlyassigned to that mood. Activation of a mood node also spreads activation throughout the memorystructures to which it is connected, creating subthreshold excitation at those event nodes. Thus,a weak cue that partially describes an event may combine with activation from a mood unit toraise the total activation of the relevant memory above a threshold of consciousness. This re-call constitutes reactivation of a mood-related memory and sends feedback excitation to themood node, which will maintain activation of that mood and thus influence later memories re-trieved.

216 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

results? It may be that negative moods typically produced in a labora-tory setting are backdrop moods. Being mild and operating in uncon-sciousness, their effects on behavior are congruent (e.g., reduction inhelping and self-gratification), as the associative network model of mem-ory predicts. However, it may sometimes be that motivational moodsare produced also in laboratory experiments. Because they are strongerand operating in consciousness, their effects on behavior are incongru-ent (e.g., increase in helping and self-gratification), contradicting thepredictions of the associative network model of memory.

Moreover, why are people eager to help and self-gratify when in anegative mood (as compared with people in a neutral and sometimespositive mood)? Why do negative moods have so many clear behavioralcorrelates, as the second main observation derived from the review sug-gested? In conclusion, one of the most plausible answers to these ques-tions appears to be the notion of self-regulation of negative moods. Now,if moods could not be seen as reactions and states at the same time (apoint raised earlier), this notion would be illogical for two reasons. First,if moods were only reactions and would not endure, their self-regulationwould neither be possible or necessary. Second, if moods were onlystates and would after instigation inevitably wear out through theirown courses, their self-regulation would be impossible, because moodswould not be modified as a response to attempted self-regulatory activi-ties.

On the basis of this reasoning and the review, it is assumed here thatpeople are taking strategic steps to repair or alleviate negative moodsand that is why they engage in behaviors of a positive hedonic tone(incongruence). Even in laboratory settings the motivational tendencies(drive to regulate mood) sometimes override the memory-based mentalprocesses contributing to the inconsistent results. In the case of studieshaving a better ecological validity (survey and qualitative explorations),the role of the motivational tendencies appears to be even more high-lighted.

In other words, in the case of backdrop moods, the explanation putforth by the associative network model of memory is valid, whereas inthe case of motivational moods, the self-regulatory explanation is valid.This is what the review seems to imply. Next, this major implication istackled further by pitting four prior studies with conflicting findingsagainst each other.

Matmur and Chattopadhyay (1991) versus Kuykendall and Keat-ing (1990). In their study, Matmur and Chattopadhyay (1991) (here-after M & C) found empirical evidence for the hypothesis that comparedwith sad program contexts, happy program contexts facilitate process-ing of embedded ads. In contrast, Kuykendall and Keating (1990) (here-after K & K) reported opposite empirical evidence. They state: “Thesefindings suggest that systematic processing is reduced by positive, but

MOOD RESEARCH 217

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Figure 1. Explanation of contradictions between the Matmur and Chattopadhyay andthe Kuykendall and Keating studies.

not by negative moods.” We can dispel this apparent ambiguity by re-sorting to the dichotomy of mood proposed earlier.

Our basic argument is that M & C are in their research dealing withbackdrop moods, while K & K are in their study occupied with motiva-tional moods. In other words, the difference in the nature of mood canaccount for the fact that M & C’s findings are congruent and K & K’sfindings are incongruent (in the case of negative mood). Figure 1 illus-trates this explanation.

The explanation based on the associative network model of memoryfits well with the findings of M & C. According to this explanation, aperson in a positive mood is likely to process positively valenced infor-mation more elaborately. Indeed, positive-mood subjects increased pro-cessing of a happy McDonald’s ad. In turn, a person in a negative moodis likely to process negatively valenced information more elaborately.Interestingly, the processing of a somber insurance company ad by neg-ative-mood subjects was not increased. However, M & C’s analysis sug-gests that processing of negatively valenced information did indeed in-crease, but this increment was due to paying more attention to theprogram used for creating the negative mood than to the ad. If things

218 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

are seen in this light, the explanation put forth by the associative net-work model of memory is credible.

K & K’s findings contradict M & C’s results and cannot be plausiblyaccounted for by the associative network model of memory-based expla-nation. An alternative explanation is based on the notion of self-regu-lation. According to the self-regulatory explanation, people are moti-vated to maintain positive moods and to disrupt negative moods. Thisappears to be an apposite explanation for K & K’s findings. It can besurmised that good-mood subjects did not process persuasive messages,because they wanted to enjoy their good mood and not to ruin it byconcentrating on information processing. In turn, bad-mood subjectspaid attention to (positive) persuasive messages, because this offeredthem a way to turn the initial negative associations into more positivelyvalenced thoughts resulting in the alleviation of negative mood.

This reasoning rests on the assertion that M & C were really inves-tigating the effects of backdrop moods and K & K were really examiningthe influence of motivational moods. Now, we need to prove this asser-tion. This issue comes down to the mood- manipulation methods usedin these two studies. In creating moods, M & C showed subjects 7-min-ute clips from two films. A clip from a Walt Disney classic was purportedto induce a positive mood, whereas a clip from a film “Nuremburg Trials”was meant to generate a negative mood in subjects. The mood-manip-ulation method utilized by K & K was different. In the positive-moodcondition, subjects read an article describing the reuniting of old friends.In the negative-mood condition, subjects read an article describing ba-bies born with AIDS.

The ways in which moods were manipulated in these studies differsignificantly in three respects. First, articles may be more powerfulmood manipulators than film clips, because they require more mentaleffort and subjects can familiarize themselves with the material morefreely. Second, articles were more effective in manipulating moods, be-cause they were based on factual events; they were not fictional like thefilm clips. Third, K & K motivated their subjects to read the articlescarefully, whereas M & C did not make such a statement. These factorstogether make the process of mood manipulation more significant andself-relevant for subjects of the K & K study than for subjects of the M& C study. This is an important point, because closely self-relevant ma-terial has greater capacity to induce moods than distantly self-relevantmaterial (cf. Bock, 1988). In conclusion, we claim that because of thesedifferences in mood manipulation, moods of backdrop status were cre-ated in the M & C study and moods of motivational status were gener-ated in the K & K study. We believe that this main difference in thenature of mood is responsible for the mixed results of these studies.

Helregel and Weaver (1989) versus Gardner and Hill (1988). Weshowed that our basic logic holds at the level of thinking activities (ad

MOOD RESEARCH 219

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Figure 2. Explanation of contradictions between the Helregel and Weaver and theGardner and Hill studies.

processing), but does it work at the level of actual consumer behaviortoo? Proving that it does is a difficult and challenging exercise, becauseit is hard to find two studies that can be compared with each other withrespect to the criteria that are relevant in this research context. In anycase, we try to achieve the goal of demonstrating that our explanationis valid at the behavioral level as well. Our attempt can be seen inFigure 2.

In their article, Gardner and Hill (1988) (hereafter G & H) reportedempirical evidence suggesting that consumers in positive moods may bemore likely to use an experiential strategy (affective operation mode)than those in negative moods, and consumers in negative moods maybe more likely to use an informational strategy (cognitive operationmode) than those in positive moods. These results can be cleanly ac-counted for by the self-regulatory explanation. It can be logically arguedthat consumers chose an experiential strategy in a positive mood, be-cause they wanted to maintain and extend their mood state. In a similar

220 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

vein, it is believable that consumers in a negative mood chose an infor-mational strategy, because it represented a positively toned behaviorthat contributed to getting rid of the negative mood and the negativethoughts induced by it.

In turn, Helregel and Weaver (1989) (hereafter H & W) were inter-ested in analyzing the effects of the different phases of pregnancy onmoods and the selection of certain TV programs. They discovered thata preference for comedy programs was apparent when dysphoric statesattributable to physiological changes prevailed. A preference for actionadventure programs was evident during times of physiologically in-duced heightened positive affect. We claim that when good-mood sub-jects of the H & W study chose an action adventure program, they wereoperating in the cognitive operation mode, because subjects couldquickly catch onto events and become absorbed by them. Naturally, ac-tion adventure programs also include both positive and negative affec-tive elements. On the basis of these two points, we assert in the spiritof the associative network model of memory-based explanation that thepositive mood-related tendency to increase processing of (positive) in-formation was realized through choosing action/adventure programson TV.

Moreover, we think that when bad-mood subjects of the H & W studyselected a situation-comedy program, they were operating in the affec-tive operation mode, because comedy is designed to create laughter,merriment, and euphoria. At first glance, this appears to be in contra-diction with the interpretation of key result in Figure 2, suggesting thatnegative mood-related tendency to sink oneself into negative affectiveexperiences is realized through choosing situation comedy on TV. Thisinterpretation is based on the explanation provided by the associativenetwork model of memory. However, because it has been shown thatthe predominant form of humor in prime-time comedy is hostile humor,which thrives on teasing and put-downs, on belittlement and demeaningtreatment (Zillmann & Bryant, 1985, p. 176), it is tenable to presumethat choosing situation-comedy programs on TV actually produces theeffect suggested above. An interesting question is whether we are readyto accept that (a) choosing action/adventure programs and informa-tional brand choice strategy is a good proxy for positive cognitive oper-ation mode, (b) choosing situation-comedy programs is a good proxy fornegative affective operation mode, and (c) experiential choice strategyis a good proxy for positive affective operation mode. If we are, then wecan state that the associative network model of memory offered a com-pelling explanation for the results of the H & W study and that theopposite findings of the G & H study could be neatly understood in termsof the self-regulatory explanation.

Again, this train of thought is founded on the assumption that H &W were dealing with moods that can be characterized as backdropmoods, whereas G & H created moods that can be described as moti-

MOOD RESEARCH 221

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

vational moods. In order to show that this really is true, we have toconsider the ways in which moods were induced in these two studies.Moods were induced naturally in the H & W study. In other words, theyrelied on the emotional volatility of pregnant women. H & W utilizedthe physiological facts that between the 18th and 24th weeks of preg-nancy women are prone to experience dysphoric affective states due tocertain hormonal changes and that pregnant women experience positiveaffective states between the 25th and the 28th weeks of pregnancy be-cause of the onset of placenta-produced hormones. G & H, in contrast,conducted their research in a laboratory setting and manipulated sub-jects’ moods in the following way. In the positive-mood condition, sub-jects were asked to read a modified article from the Readers’ Digestdescribing the satisfying life of a happy person. In the negative-moodcondition, subjects were asked to read a modified article from theReaders’ Digest describing the unhappy life of a Vietnamese war or-phan.

The most salient difference in the way moods are produced in thesetwo studies is the specificity of the mood influence. In the case of the G& H study, the origin of the mood influence is unambiguous, whereasin the H & W study the origin of the mood influence is ambiguous. Whenthis is coupled with the fact that exposure time to a mood-inducing stim-ulus is much longer in the H & W study than in the G & H study, wecan contend that moods created in the former study are not as easilyregistered in consciousness as moods instigated in the latter study. Sec-ond, G & H used articles based on true stories and they motivated theirsubjects by telling them to let go and try to empathize with the maincharacter. To facilitate this, they even made additional arrangementsto match the sex of the main character of the article with the subject’ssex. This kind of arrangement is bound to increase the self-relevancy ofthe mood manipulation, which is likely to result in a greater mood-in-ducing capacity. We maintain that these differences made the mood-manipulation process of G & H more powerful (motivational moods)than the mood-manipulation process of H & W (backdrop moods). Ul-timately, then, we can explain the inconsistent results of the G & H andH & W studies by applying the analytical mood dichotomy developedearlier in this article.

The Effect of the Quality of Negative Mood on (Consumer) Behav-ior. There is another implication emanating from the review that maycontribute to explaining the mixed and contradictory results of priorexperimental research. The implication pertains to the quality of thenegative mood produced by the mood-manipulation methods. It may bethat not all mood-manipulation methods have induced the same kind ofnegative mood. This may be a partial explanation of the inconsistentfindings of extant research handling the relation between negativemoods and (consumer) behaviors.

222 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

The assertion made above needs explication. It appears to be a factthat all negative moods are not alike (cf. Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991;Shaver, Schwarz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). There are qualitative andphenomenological differences between them. At least, the negativemoods of dejection, irritation, and stress can be separated. Because dif-ferent basic ingredients underlie the experiences of each of these neg-ative moods, their effects on (consumer) behaviors are also likely to bedifferent. This is an important point in shedding light on the mixed andcontradictory results of past studies.

Looking at the mood-manipulation methods of the experimental stud-ies of the review (Table 3) leaves room for speculations. It seems thatmost of the studies have investigated the behavioral effects of dejected(sad, depressed, guilty, rejected, unhappy) moods, finding incongruentbehavioral effects. For example, Donnerstein, Donnerstein, and Munger(1975) induced a negative mood in their subjects by showing them slidesof old people and migrant workers. It was discovered that in comparisonwith positive-mood subjects, negative-mood subjects helped more. Theauthors explained this result in terms of expiation of guilt. Baumann,Cialdini, and Kenrick (1981) demonstrated that for subjects in a badmood (subjects were asked to reminisce about an experience that madethem feel sad), altruistic activity canceled the enhanced tendency to self-gratification. This was taken as empirical evidence indicating that help-ing and self-gratification are equivalent responses to negative mood. Inother words, this study suggests that sad mood facilitates helping be-havior.

However, there is a group of studies (Berkowitz & Connor, 1966; Fried& Berkowitz, 1979; Isen, 1970; Mischel, Coates, & Raskoff, 1968; Regan,Williams, & Sparling, 1972; Weyant, 1978; Zillmann & Bryant, 1985)that utilize mood-manipulation methods that may have generated ir-ritation rather than dejection. In most of these studies the subjects wereled to believe that they had failed in an experimental task. This createsdejection only if the subject makes an internal attribution (blaming him-or herself for the failure). In turn, if the subject makes an external at-tribution (blaming the experimenter, the experimenter’s associates, in-struments, or circumstances for the failure), irritation is the likelyresult (cf. Weiner, 1982). It is interesting to note that nearly all of thestudies (two exceptions) belonging to the second group found congruentbehavioral effects. Regarding helping, for instance, it may be naturalthat the irritated subjects reduced rather than increased (as most of thedejected subjects did) their helping behavior, because the irritated per-son may feel asocial and the cause of irritation often lies in anotherperson or other persons (see Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988).

Also Baumann et al. (1981, p. 1039) state that “Only such negativemoods as temporary sadness or depression are seen to lead to increasedhelping. Unpleasant moods such as frustration and anger . . . are notpredicted to enhance benevolence.” We could find only one experimental

MOOD RESEARCH 223

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

study that explicitly induced an irritated mood in subjects and recordedits effects on helping behavior. This study was done by Fried and Ber-kowitz (1979). In the negative-mood condition, subjects heard a 7-min-ute passage from John Coltrane’s “Meditations.” This passage arousedagitation, annoyance, boredom, and irritation in the subjects. Fried andBerkowitz found that those who heard soothing music (Mendelsohn’s“Song without Words”) were most apt to be helpful immediately after-wards, and that irritating music tended to dampen the participants’willingness to assist the experimenter. So, this study supports our rea-soning.

This is the second alternative explanation for the observed inconsist-ency of the behavioral effects of negative moods. In our opinion, theseillustrations show that the quality of the negative mood really can playa role in determining behavioral effects. Consequently, consumer re-searchers, who are interested in the negative mood– (consumer) behav-ior relation, should pay more attention to the particular quality of thenegative mood they are investigating. This may make a difference asfar as the findings of the study are concerned and contributes to dispel-ling the ambiguities from research addressing the behavioral effects ofnegative moods. Fortunately, researchers have begun to pay attentionto this concern. For instance, Huang (1997) investigated whether neg-ative affect aroused by advertising is general or specific and concludedthat researchers need to consider the specific nature of the differenttypes of negative affect and their directions of persuasiveness. Simi-larly, Bennett (1998) stresses that the apparently subtle distinction be-tween guilt and shame is actually an important point in influencingmessage recipients’ reactions to advertisements. Lastly, Luomala (1999)has tentatively shown that consumers self-regulate irritation, stress,and dejection in different ways.

Toward Conceptualizing Mood-Alleviative Consumer Behavior

When the first steps in conceptualizing mood-alleviative consumer be-havior are taken, many theoretical approaches can serve as a guideline.We have identified at least four such approaches. A theory of affect-dependent stimulus arrangement developed by Zillman and Bryant(1985) is an interesting alternative when the conceptualization of mood-alleviative consumption of electronic media (e.g., watching TV, listeningto the radio, surfing the net) is of major interest. Second, Lazarus’s(1991) general theory of emotion and adaptation offers many theoreticalideas that can potentially be utilized in conceptualizing mood-allevia-tive consumer behavior. Third, a control-theoretic approach to self-reg-ulation of behavior propagated by Carver and Scheier (1990) appears tobe a promising way to build a theory on mood-alleviative consumer be-havior. The fourth theoretical foundation for conceptualizing mood-al-leviative consumer behavior lies in the schema theory (cf. Grunert,

224 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

1991; Luomala & Laaksonen, 1997). Here, we are going to sketch brieflyhow schema theoretical ideas and concepts can be applied to conceptu-alizing mood-alleviative consumer behavior.

Our basic postulate is that consumers have sets of consumption ac-tivities in which they repeatedly engage when they want to self-manip-ulate their negative moods (cf. Table 3). The accumulation of experienceof these activities has led to the generation of mood-alleviative habits,some of which are linked to specific consumer behaviors (e.g., certainself-gift behaviors). In other words, we presume that people possessschematic and scriptal representations, or knowledge structures, intheir minds for mood-alleviative activities in general and for mood-al-leviative consumer behaviors in particular. Prior experience of mood-alleviative consumer behaviors is essential, because it is not logical toassume that consumers would possess schemas and scripts related tothese behaviors without it. In other words, experience determines thenumber and the content of schemas and scripts that have accumulatedas a result of past involvement in mood-alleviative consumption activ-ities. In effect, the acquisition of experience of mood-alleviative con-sumer behaviors implies that consumers have learned to expect thatconsumption of products or shopping environments can serve as mood-alleviative instruments.

In the light of the schema theory, mood-alleviative consumer behav-iors can come about in the following way. First, we assume that peoplehave acquired high-order and abstract mental structures, schemas, formood-alleviation through the processes of learning, socialization, andacculturation. These schemas contain generic and abstract knowledgeabout the concepts (objects, events, persons) and categories of activitiesthat are related to the arousal and self-regulation of negative moods.Schemas are abstract representations of environmental regularities(Crockett, 1988, p. 33; Mandler, 1982, p. 16). Schemas are built up inthe course of interaction with the environment. Thus, they are repre-sentations of experience that guides action, perception, and thought(Mandler, 1982; pp. 3, 18). A schema, then, is a structure for repre-senting the generic concepts stored in the memory (Rumelhart, 1984, p.163).

Whenever negative moods are aroused, it becomes likely that themood-alleviative schemas are instantiated. This instantiation of themood-alleviative schemas is presumed to happen at an unconsciouslevel. The schemas and their instantiation must be conceptually distin-guished. The schemas are the abstract pattern of elements and relationsthat characterizes the concept (e.g., self-regulation of negative moods)(Crockett, 1988, p. 34). In turn, an instantiated schema is a cognitivestructure that results from the interaction of the old information of thegeneric schema and the new information from the episodic input(Brewer & Nakamura, 1984, p. 141). In other words, a schema instan-

MOOD RESEARCH 225

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

tiation occurs when the pattern of elements and relations embedded ina schema is objectified in an object, event, or person that is encountered(cf. Crockett, 1988, p. 34).

Second, we propose that the instantiation of the mood-alleviativeschemas encompasses the triggering of the planning process (cf. Bar-salou & Hutchinson, 1987; Crockett, 1988, p. 38; Miller, Galanter, &Pribram, 1960;). Even though the schema instantiation is presumed tobegin automatically, the planning process it triggers is of a consciousand deliberate nature. The planning process is a mental exercise thatrevolves around the question of what to do in order to self-regulate anegative mood. In other words, planning involves choice. The mood-alleviative schemas are not wholly instantiated until the planning pro-cess is completed. In turn, the planning process is not completed untilthe chosen courses of action are implemented.

Third, the scripts (and their instantiations) are assumed to be in animportant position in the plan implementation due to certain conceptualfeatures of scripts. A script is a subtype of a schema. For example, An-derson (1985, p. 130) refers to scripts as action schemas. For Schankand Abelson (1977, p. 41), “A script is a structure that describes appro-priate sequence of events in a particular context. . . . Thus, a script isa predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation.” This script definition has been adhered to in numer-ous marketing studies (e.g., Leigh & Rethans, 1984; Smith & Houston,1985). Sometimes scripts are defined in relation to goals (cf. Galambos,1986; Leigh & McGraw, 1989; Read, 1987). For example, Read (1987, p.290) defined a script as a more or less stereotyped sequence of actionscarried out to attain a goal in some situation.

In other words, the scripts provide the planner with alternativecourses of goal-directed action in particular circumstances. In the caseof negative mood experience, we propose that the goal of the script-basedaction is related to mood-alleviation. People possess multiple scripts.Some of them are connected with alleviating negative moods. (Somemay be connected with maintaining positive moods.) Some of them arelinked to consumption. We hypothesize that there exist scripts that aresimultaneously related to both; the consumption scripts for alleviatingnegative moods are examples of such scripts. To conclude, scripts areinstrumental in the plan implementation. As the final stage of the pro-cess, both the schema instantiation and planning process are completedby the instantiation of the mood-alleviative consumption scripts. It iseven possible that there are different mood-alleviative consumptionscripts for qualitatively different negative moods. For instance, it maybe that irritation-alleviative consumption scripts are of a different na-ture than dejection-alleviative consumption scripts. Naturally, at a con-crete level, what happens here is that a consumer selects and executesthe consumer behavior(s) specified by the mood-alleviative scripts.

226 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Suggestions for Future Research

On the basis of the reviews, a few future research suggestions can beoutlined. First, the conceptual distinctions between backdrop moods andmotivational moods as proposed by the present article should be testedempirically. Clearly, some of the characteristics of these two moods ofdifferent type can be operationalized, measured, and compared (eventhough not all of the characteristics are unproblematic in this sense).In other words, the interesting question is whether it is possible (e.g.,in a laboratory) to produce backdrop moods and motivational moods ina predictable way.

Second, regarding the mixed and contradictory results of prior re-search on behavioral effects of negative moods, the alternative expla-nations should be systematically tested. Is it so that when a negativemood having backdrop status is instigated, the explanation put forth bythe associative network model of memory holds, but when a negativemood having motivational status is generated, the self-regulatory ex-planation holds?

Third, according to Philippot (1993), differentiated mood states canbe created, at least in the laboratory. Thus, it would be intriguing toproduce different qualities of negative moods (e.g., irritation vs dejec-tion) and see how these moods influence helping behavior and self-grat-ification (which can be regarded as consumer behavior). Will the resultsbe in line with the predictions given in this article? Needless to say, thiskind of investigation would contribute to dispelling the ambiguities fromresearch handling the behavioral effects of negative moods.

Fourth, theoretical elaboration toward conceptualizing and modelingmood-regulatory consumption should seriously begin. A first step in thatdirection includes evaluating the potential of different theoretical ap-proaches to play an instrumental role in this challenging quest. Forexample, the theoretical approaches of Zillmann and Bryant (1985),Lazarus (1991), Carver and Scheier (1990), and Grunert (1991) could besubjected to this kind of screening procedure. Or is it possible to inte-grate different theoretical ideas and concepts to produce a conceptual-ization that is superior to any of these individual approaches alone?

Fifth, we must deepen and enrich our understanding of mood-regu-latory consumption. One way to achieve that is to produce detailed de-scriptions of people’s mood-regulatory consumption schemas andscripts. By comparing, inducing, and analyzing these knowledge struc-tures, we can gain new insights and work toward theoretical under-standing and explanation of this intriguing phenomenon. It seems evi-dent that responding to these calls for further research requires theutilization of methodological triangulation.

Sixth, when considering consumers experiencing motivational moods,it is vital for marketers to know what people typically do and consumein order to self-regulate qualitatively different moods if they wish to

MOOD RESEARCH 227

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

design and implement marketing concepts that are appealing on theseoccasions. For example, a specialty store may base its operation solelyon the idea of mood regulation. However, designing and implementingthis kind of marketing concept is a difficult and challenging managerialtask. The issues that relate to management’s capability to master thesedecisions and to devise creative marketing solutions could be studied byconducting quasi-experiments in the field. The managerial implicationsthis kind of stream of research produces could be notable; they certainlyare desirable. We hope that our article stimulates research addressingthese intriguing issues.

REFERENCES

Aderman, D. (1972). Elation, depression, and helping behavior. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 24, 91–101.

Alpert, J. I., & Alpert, M. I. (1990). Mood influences mood and purchasing in-tentions. Psychology & Marketing, 7, 109–133.

Anderson, J. (1985). Cognitive psychology and its implications. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company.

Bagozzi, R. P., Gopinath, M., & Nyer, P. U. (1999). The role emotions in mar-keting. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 27, 184–204.

Barsalou, L. W., & Hutchinson, J. W. (1987). Schema-based planning in con-sumer contexts. In M. Wallendorf & P. Anderson (Eds.), Advances in con-sumer research (Vol. 14, pp. 114–118). Provo, UT: Association for ConsumerResearch.

Batra, R., & Ray, M. L. (1986). Affective responses mediating acceptance ofadvertising. Journal of Consumer Research, 17, 234–249.

Batson, C. D., Shaw, L. L., & Oleson, K. C. (1992). Differentiating affect, mood,and emotion. Toward functionally based conceptual distinctions. In M. S.Clark (Ed.), Emotion. Review of Personality and Social Psychology (Vol. 13,pp. 294–326). Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Baumann, D. J., Cialdini, R. B, & Kenrick, D. T. (1981). Altruism as hedonism:Helping and self-gratification as equivalent responses. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 40, 1039–1046.

Beatty, S. E., & Ferrell, M. E. (1998). Impulse buying: Modeling its precursors.Journal of Retailing, 74, 169–191.

Bennett, R. (1998). Shame, guilt & responses to non-profit & public sector ads.International Journal of Advertising, 17, 483–499.

Berkowitz, L., & Connor, W. (1966). Success, failure, and social responsibility.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 664–669.

Bock, M. (1988). Emotion, self, and memory. In K. Fiedler & J. Forhas (Eds.),Affect, cognition, and social behavior. New evidence and integrative attempts(pp. 120–137). Gottingen: C. J. Hogrefe.

Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129–148.Brewer, W. F., & Nakamura, G. V. (1984). The nature and functions of schemas.

In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 1, pp.119–160). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

228 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Principles of self-regulation. Action andemotion. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivationand cognition. Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 3–52). New York:The Guilford Press.

Cialdini, R., & Kenrick, D. (1976). Altruism as hedonism: A social developmentperspective on the relationship of negative mood state and helping. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 907–914.

Clark, M. S., & Isen, A. M. (1982). Toward understanding the relationshipbetween feeling states and social behavior. In A. H. Hastorf & A. M. Isen(Eds.), Cognitive social psychology (pp. 73–108). New York: Elsevier.

Cohen, J. B., & Areni, C. S. (1990). Affect and consumer behavior. In T. S.Robertson & H. H. Kassarjian (Eds.), Handbook of consumer behavior (Vol.2, pp. 188–240). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Crockett, W. H. (1988). Schemas, affect, and communication. In L. Donohew,H. E. Sypher, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Communication, social cognition, andaffect (pp. 33–51). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Cunningham, M. R. (1988a). What do you do when you’re happy or sad? Mood,expectancies, and behavior interest. Motivation and Emotion, 12, 309–331.

Cunningham, M. R. (1988b). Does happiness mean friendliness? Induced moodand heterosexual self-disclosure. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,14, 283–297.

Dawson, S., Bloch, P. H., & Ridgway, N. M. (1990). Shopping motives, emo-tional states, and retail outcomes. Journal of Retailing, 66, 108–127.

Denzin, N. K. (1984). On understanding emotion. New York: Jossey-Bass.Derbaix, C., & Pham, M. T. (1991). Affective reaction to consumption situations:

A pilot investigation. Journal of Economic Psychology, 12, 325–355.Donnerstein, E., Donnerstein, M., & Munger, G. (1975). Helping behavior as a

function of pictorially induced moods. Journal of Social Psychology, 97, 221–225.

Donovan, R. J., & Rossiter, J. R. (1982). Store atmosphere: An environmentalpsychology approach. Journal of Retailing, 58, 34–56.

Ewert, O. (1970). The attitudinal character of emotion. In M. B. Arnold (Ed.),Feelings and emotions. The Loyola Symposium (pp. 233–240). New York:Academic.

Faber, R. J., & Christenson, G. A. (1996). In the mood to buy: Differences inthe mood states experienced by compulsive buyers and other consumers. Psy-chology & Marketing, 13, 803–819.

Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1985). If it changes it must be a process: Studyof emotion and coping during three stages of a college examination. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 150–170.

Folkman, S., Lazarus, R. S., Dunkel-Schetter, C., DeLongis, A., & Gruen, R. J.(1986). Dynamics of a stressful encounter: Cognitive appraisal, coping, andencounter outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 992–1003.

Forgas, J. P. (1991). Affective influences on partner choice: Role of mood insocial decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 708–720.

Fried, R., & Berkowitz, L. (1979). Music that charms . . . and can influencehelpfulness. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 9, 199–208.

MOOD RESEARCH 229

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press.Frost, R. O., Goolkasian, G. A., Ely, R. J., & Blanchard, F. A. (1982). Depression,

restraint, and eating behavior. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 20, 113–121.

Fry, P. S. (1975). Affect and resistance to temptation. Developmental Psychol-ogy, 11, 466–472.

Galambos, J. A. (1986). Knowledge structures for common activities. In J. A.Galambos, R. P. Abelson, & J. B. Black (Eds.), Knowledge structures (pp. 21–47). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Gallup, G., & Castelli, J. (1989). The people’s religion. American faith in the90’s. New York: Macmillan.

Gardner, M. P. (1985). Mood states and consumer behavior: A critical review.Journal of Consumer Research, 12, 281–300.

Gardner, M. P. (1987). Effects of mood states on consumer information pro-cessing. In J. N. Sheth & E. C. Hirschman (Eds.), Research in consumerbehavior (pp. 113–135). Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Gardner, M. P., & Hill, R. P. (1988). Consumers’ mood states: Antecedents andconsequences of experiential versus informational strategies for brandchoice. Psychology & Marketing, 5, 169–182.

Gnoth, J., Zins, A. H., Lengmueller, R., & Boshoff, C. (1999). Dimensions ofemotions, mood and motivational orientation with regard to experiential con-sumption. In L. Hildebrandt, D. Annacker, & D. Klapper (Eds.), Proceedingsof the 27th Emac Conference (on CD-disc). Berlin: Humboldt University.

Grunert, S. C. (1991). The cognitive representation of emotions: How schematheory may explain emotional eating behavior (Publications H, No. 59). Aar-hus: The Aarhus School of Business.

Heeler, R. M., & Berneman, C. (1986). Shopper’s mood and purchases. In K.Moller & M. Paltchik (Eds.), Proceedings of the 15th Emac Conference (pp.595–601). Helsinki: Helsinki School of Economics and Business Admistra-tion.

Helregel, B. K., & Weaver, J. B. (1989). Mood-management during pregnancythrough selective exposure to television. Journal of Broadcasting & Elec-tronic Media, 33, 15–33.

Hibbert, S. (1999). The role of mood in shopping motivation. In L. Hildebrandt,D. Annacker, & D. Klapper (Eds.), Proceedings of the 27th Emac Conference(on CD-disc). Berlin: Humboldt University.

Hornik, J. (1993). The role of affect in consumers’ temporal judgments. Psy-chology & Marketing, 10, 239–255.

Huang, M. (1997). Is negative affect in advertising general or specific? A com-parison of three functional forms. Psychology & Marketing, 14, 223–240.

Isen, A. M. (1970). Success, failure, attention, and reaction to others: The warmglow of success. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15, 294–301.

Isen, A. M. (1984). Toward understanding the role of affect in cognition. In R.S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 179–236). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Jacobsen, E. (1957). Normal and pathological moods: Their nature and func-tions. In R. S. Eisler, A. F. Freud, H. Hartman, & E. Kris (Eds.), The psy-choanalytic study of the child (Vol. 12, pp. 73–113). New York: InternationalUniversity Press.

230 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Jones, G. F., & Thelen, M. H. (1978). The effects of induced mood states on self-reinforcement behavior. Journal of Psychology, 98, 249–252.

Kacen, J. J. (1994a). Phenomenological insights in mood and mood-related con-sumer behaviors. In C. T. Allen & D. Roedder John (Eds.), Advances in con-sumer resarch (Vol. 21, pp. 519–525). Provo, UT: Association for ConsumerResearch.

Kacen, J. J. (1994b). Moods and motivations: An investigation of negativemoods, consumer behaviors, and the process of mood management. Unpub-lished doctoral dissertation, The University of Illinois.

Kelley, S. W., & Hoffman, K. D. (1997). An investigation of positive affect,prosocial behaviors and service quality. Journal of Retailing, 73, 407–427.

Klinger, E. (1982). On the self-management of mood, affect, and attention. InP. Karoly & F. H. Kanfer (Eds.), Self-management and behavior change.From theory to practice (pp. 129–164). New York: Pergamon.

Knapp, A., & Clark, M. S. (1991). Some detrimental effects of negative moodon individuals’ ability to solve resource dilemmas. Personality and SocialPsychology Bulletin, 36, 236–246.

Kumar, R. (1997). The role of affect in negotiations: An integrative overview.Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 33, 84–100.

Kuykendall, D., & Keating, J. P. (1990). Mood and persuasion: Evidence for thedifferential influence of positive and negative states. Psychology & Market-ing, 7, 1–9.

Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford UniversityPress.

Leigh, T. W., & McGraw, P. F. (1989). Mapping the procedural knowledge ofindustrial sales personnel: A script-theoretic investigation. Journal of Mar-keting, 53, 16–34.

Leigh, T. W., & Rethans, A. J. (1984). A script-theoretic analysis of industrialpurchasing behavior. Journal of Marketing, 48, 22–32.

Luce, M. F. (1998). Choosing to avoid: Coping with negatively emotion-ladenconsumer decisions. Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 409–433.

Luomala, H. T. (1998). A mood-alleviative perspective on self-gift behaviors:Stimulating consumer behavior theory development. Journal of MarketingManagement, 14, 109–132.

Luomala, H. T. (1999). Irritation-, stress-, and dejection-alleviative consump-tion: Initial tests of working hypotheses. In B. Dubois, T. Lowrey, L. J.Shrum, & M. Vanhuele (Eds.), European advances in consumer research(Vol. 4). Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research.

Luomala, H. T., & Laaksonen, M. (1995). Mood-regulation in the context ofhedonic shopping behavior. In A. Jolibert, R. A. Peterson, & A. Strazzieri(Eds.), Proceedings of the First International Research Seminar on Market-ing Communications and Consumer Behavior (pp. 363–383). Aix-en-Prov-ence: University of Aix-Marseille.

Luomala, H. T., & Laaksonen, M. (1997). Mood-regulatory self-gifts: Develop-ment of a conceptual framework. Journal of Economic Psychology, 18, 407–434.

Mandler, G. (1982). The structure of value: Accounting for taste. In M. S. Clark& S. T. Fiske (Eds.), The Seventeenth Annual Carnegie Symposium on Cog-nition (pp. 3–36). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

MOOD RESEARCH 231

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Masters, J. C., Ford, M. E., & Arend, R. A. (1983). Children’s strategies forcontrolling responses to aversive social experience. Motivation and Emotion,7, 103–116.

Matmu, M., & Chattopadhyay, A. (1991). The impact of moods generated bytelevision programs on responses to advertising. Psychology & Marketing, 8,59–77.

Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. (1960). Plans and the structureof behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Mischel, W., Coates, B., & Raskoff, A. (1968). Effects of success and failure onself-gratification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10, 381–390.

Moore, B., Clyburn, A., & Underwood, B. (1976). The role of affect in delay ofgratification. Child Development, 47, 273–276.

Moore, B., Underwood, B., & Rosenhan, D. L. (1973). Affect and altruism. De-velopmental Psychology, 8, 99–104.

Morris, W. N. (1989). Mood–Frame of mind. New York: Springer.Morris, W. N. (1992). A functional analysis of the role of mood in affective

systems. In M. S. Clark (Ed.), Emotion. Review of Personality and SocialPsychology (Vol. 13, pp. 256–293). Newbury Park: Sage.

Morris, W. N., & Reilly, N. P. (1987). Toward the self-regulation of mood: The-ory and research. Motivation and Emotion, 11, 215–249.

Nowlis, V., & Nowlis, H. H. (1956). The description and analysis of mood. An-nals of the New York Academy of Science, 65, 345–355.

O’Malley, M. N., & Andrews, L. (1983). The effect of mood and incentives onhelping: Are there some things money can’t buy? Motivation and Emotion,7, 179–189.

Ortony, A. L., & Clore, G. L. (1989). Emotions, moods and conscious awareness.Comment on Johnson-Laird and Oatley’s “The language of emotions: Ananalysis of a semantic field.” Cognition and Emotion, 3, 125–137.

Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). The cognitive structure of emo-tions. New Rochelle: Cambridge University Press.

Parker, G. B., & Brown, L. B. (1982). Coping behaviors that mediate betweenlife events and depression. Archives of General Psychiatry, 39, 1386–1391.

Parrott, G. W. (1993). Beyond hedonism: Motives for inhibiting good moods andfor maintaining bad moods. In D. M. Wegner & J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.),Handbook of mental control (pp. 278–305). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.

Philippot, P. (1993). Inducing and assessing differentiated emotion-feelingstates in the laboratory. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 171–193.

Pieters, R. G. M., & van Raaij, F. (1988). Functions and management of affect:Applications to economic behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 9, 251–282.

Pribram, K. H. (1970). Feelings as monitors. In M. B. Arnold (Ed.), Feelingsand emotions. The Loyola Symposium (pp. 41–54). New York: Academic.

Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (1987). Self-regulatory perseveration and thedepressive self-focusing style: A self-awareness theory of reactive depression.Psychological Bulletin, 102, 122–138.

Read, S. J. (1987). Constructing causal scenarios: A knowledge structure ap-proach to causal reasoning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52,288–302.

232 LUOMALA AND LAAKSONEN

MAR WILEJ LEFT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Regan, D., Williams, M., & Sparling, S. (1972). Voluntary expiation of guilt: Afield experiment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 42–45.

Rippere, V. (1977). “What’s the thing to do when you’re feeling depressed?”—A pilot investigation. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 15, 185–191.

Rosenhan, D. L., Underwood, B., & Moore, B. S. (1974). Affect moderates self-gratification and altruism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30,546–552.

Rumelhart, D. E. (1984). Schemata and the cognitive system. In R. S. Wyer &T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 161–188). Hills-dale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Russell, J. A., & Snodgrass, J. (1987). Emotion and the environment. In D.Stokols & I. Altman (Eds.), Handbook of environmental psychology (pp. 245–280). New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding.An inquiry into human knowledge structures. New York: The Guilford Press.

Schwarz, J. C., & Pollack, P. R. (1977). Affect and delay of gratification. Journalof Research in Personality, 11, 147–164.

Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and motivationalfunctions of affective states. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Hand-book of motivation and cognition. Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp.527–561). New York: The Guilford Press.

Sedikides, C. (1992a). Mood as a determinant of attentional focus. Cognitionand Emotion, 6, 129–148.

Sedikides, C. (1992b). Changes in the valence of the self as a function of mood.In M. S. Clark (Ed.), Emotion. Review of Personality and Social Psychology(Vol. 13, pp. 294–326). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Seeman, G., & Schwarz, J. C. (1974). Affective state and preference for imme-diate versus delayed reward. Journal of Research in Personality, 7, 384–394.

Shaffer, D. R., & Graziano, W. G. (1983). Effects of positive and negative moodson helping tasks having pleasant and unpleasant consequences. Motivationand Emotion, 7, 269–278.

Shaver, P., Schwarz, J., Kirson, D., & O’Connor, C. (1987). Emotion knowledge:Further exploration of a prototype approach. Journal of Personality and So-cial Psychology, 52, 1061–1086.

Smith, R. A., & Houston, M. J. (1985). A psychometric assessment of measuresof scripts in consumer memory. Journal of Consumer Research, 12, 214–224.

Snodgrass, J., Russell, J. A., & Ward, L. M. (1988). Planning, mood, and place-liking. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 8, 209–222.

Solomon, R. L. (1980). The opponent process theory of acquired motivation: Thecosts of pleasure and the benefits of pain. American Psychologist, 20, 691–712.

Spies, K., Hesse, F., & Loesch, K. (1997). Store atmosphere, mood and pur-chasing behavior. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 14, 1–17.

Swinyard, W. R. (1993). The effects of mood, involvement, and quality of storeexperience on shopping intentions. Journal of Consumer Research, 20, 271–280.

Thayer, R. E. (1989). The biopsychology of mood and arousal. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

MOOD RESEARCH 233

MAR WILEJ RIGHT INTERACTIVE

shortstandard

Top of textBase of text

Base of RF

Thayer, R. E., Newman, J. R., & McClain, T. M. (1994). Self-regulation of mood:Strategies for changing a bad mood, raising energy, and reducing tension.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 910–925.

Underwood, B., & Moore, B. S. (1973). Affect and self-gratification. Develop-mental Psychology, 8, 209–214.

Van Kenhove, P., & Desrumaux, P. (1997). The relationship between emotionalstates and approach or avoidance responses in a retail environment. TheInternational Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 7,351–368.

Watson, D. (1988). The vicissitudes of mood measurement: Effects of varyingdescriptors, time frames, and response formats on measure of positive andnegative affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 128–141.

Weiner, B. (1982). The emotional consequences and causal attributions. In M.S. Clark & S. Fiske (Eds.), Affect and cognition. The Seventeenth AnnualCarnigie Symposium on Cognition (pp. 185–209). Hillsdale, NJ: LawrenceErlbaum.

Weyant, J. (1978). Effects of mood states, costs, and benefits of helping. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1169–1176.

Wood, J. V., Saltzberg, J. A., Neale, J. M., Stone, A. A., & Rachmiel, T. B. (1990).Self-focused attention, coping responses, and distressed mood in everydaylife. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 1027–1036.

Zillmann, D., & Bryant, J. (1985). Affect, mood, and emotion as determinantsof selective exposure. In D. Zillman & J. Bryant (Eds.), Selective exposure tocommunication (pp. 157–190). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Correspondence regarding this article should be sent to: Harri T. Luomala,Department of Marketing, University of Vaasa, P.O. Box 700, 65101 Vaasa,Finland (harri.luomala@uwasa.fi).