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Transcript of Continents divided
Continents Divided: Understanding Differences on GM Acceptance between Europe and North America David Zilberman Robinson Chair and Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics University of California, Berkeley Scott Kaplan Research Assistant Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics University of California, Berkeley Eunice Kim Research Assistant Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics University of California, Berkeley Gal Hochman Associate Professor of Agriculture, Food, and Resource Economics Department of Agriculture, Food, and Resource Economics Rutgers University Gregory Graff Associate Professor, Economics of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics College of Agricultural Sciences Colorado State University
Continents Divided: Understanding Differences on GM Acceptance between Europe and North America
Key words: GM Crops, Biotechnology, Economics, Policy, Europe, United States, Regulation, Interest Group, Political Economy Abbreviations:
1. GM: genetically modified 2. GHG: greenhouse gas 3. Agbiotech: agricultural biotechnology
Abstract
The differences between GM policies in the US and Europe have several causes. GM technology holds a home court advantage in the US and European chemical companies did not support its introduction. The technology did not seem to provide benefits to consumers, and the crops it applied to were not significant in Europe. Green parties and politicians in Europe have held significant power in coalitions government, and have used their leverage to influence policies that aim to block GM technology. There is also much less trust in the government’s capacity to handle food safety regulations in Europe than there is in the US. The technology was introduced during a time when the political influence of green parties in Europe was especially significant, and European trust of government capacity to enter food security issues was at its lowest.
Introduction
The discovery of DNA in 1953 by an American and a European (albeit British) scientist1 ushered in an era of modern biotechnology. As medical biotechnology flourished and was adopted enthusiastically around the world, the genetically modified [GM] organism, a major form of agricultural biotechnology, was introduced in 19422 in the form of the Flavr Savr tomato. Sold on both sides of the Atlantic, this product was discontinued later on for commercial reasons, and the next wave of GM crops were introduced in the form of insecticide resistant (Bt) and herbicide resistant varieties which were quickly adopted in North America and the Western hemisphere for corn, soybean, cotton, and rapeseed, but have been practically banned in the European Union [EU] since 1999. This paper uses a political economic lens to explain the differences in acceptance of GM in America and in Europe.
The political economic perspective introduces political science and legal considerations to economic decision-‐making frameworks.3 This framework suggests that policies are outcomes of political processes that reflect the gains and losses of various groups in society (e.g. consumers, farmers, chemical manufacturers, etc.). However, the power of different groups varies, which affects final policy outcomes. The same types of groups in different countries may have different perspectives and/or interests, one example being the difference in perspective on GM taken by the agrichemical industry in the US and Europe. As a result of the commercialization of GM technology by Monsanto (a US company), European agrichemical suppliers have seen significant decreases in sales. Differences in the perspectives of different groups, their political weights, and perceptions evolve over time, which may lead to either the cementing, or reform of regulations.
We find that the main differences between US and European GM policies represent differing perspectives of the same groups in their respective regions. In the US, the biotechnology industry and their academic and agricultural allies were able to overcome the objections of environmentalists and convince consumers and legislators that the introduction of GM was worthwhile, while in Europe opposition to GM was stronger and able to dominate the debate and determine policy. To better understand these outcomes, we separate the players into five groups and assess their perspectives on GM and how they have evolved over time. GM technology and input suppliers
Modern biotechnology is essentially a product of the educational-‐industrial complex that reached its height in the United States. University scientists frequently develop innovations and may sell the rights to develop these innovations to multinationals or startups, and at times may lead these scientists to become investors in these startups.4 These patterns of innovation were dominant in medical biotechnology where companies such as Genetech, Chiron, and Amgen built on initial university innovations to develop numerous medical advancements. Agricultural biotechnology was also based on university innovation, however two American companies, Monsanto and Dupont, were the first to follow this path. At the
same, European companies were the dominant players in the supply of chemical pest control for agriculture, and while Monsanto had its own successes, it realized that to become a major player it had to transform itself. Monsanto, as opposed to other major agrichemical companies, invested heavily in agricultural biotechnologies, and some of its fundamental patents were obtained from university scientists at a time when other companies were skeptical of these patents’ potentials.5 Once Monsanto and Dupont obtained patents for major GM enabling technologies, other input suppliers felt threatened, realizing that it would take time and money to catch up and were thus reluctant to support their introduction into the market. In 2001, most of the sales and patents in agbiotech ended up with American companies (75%), while the resulting reduction in sales of agrichemical pest control products took place primarily in European companies.6 As time went on, the range of companies investing in GM were mostly American; thus for European pest control companies, chemical pesticides remained a dominant part of their business while for Monsanto, and later on, Syngenta and Pioneer Hi-‐Bred, GM became their major source of income. Thus American GM companies would later on become the main contributors to political campaigns and other efforts supporting GM7 and these companies are likely to be more effective on their home turf. Furthermore, the relatively larger number of American scientists that work on GM have contributed intellectual support in debates that aim to restrict the use of GM.8 Thus, the dominance of American GM companies from the beginning, and the resulting losses inflicted on European chemical companies have played a major role in the differences between GM policies in America and Europe.9,10 Farmers
Farmers are heterogeneous and include many groups: some may win while others may lose from agricultural biotechnology. We will distinguish between 3 types of farmers: (1) growers of crops (2) livestock operators and (3) organic growers. Crop growers tend to have mixed perspectives about innovations. They appreciate innovations that reduce costs while maintaining constant supply. Farmers may be less enthusiastic when a particular technology increases supply and thus reduces prices. GM technology was introduced in cotton, corn, and soybean, which are major crops in the US but much less significant in Europe. In the case of corn and soybean, while concerns about lower prices might have been a factor, farmers expected growth in demand resulting from rapid economic growth in China and other countries and the resulting increase in consumption for meat, which relies heavily on corn and soybean feed.11 Thus, corn and soybean farmers in the US were much more interested in technologies that would increase yields to meet growing demand. GM was not introduced in North America for wheat primarily due to growers’ concerns about their ability to sell their product to Europe and because of the resulting price effect (decreased prices because of increased supply).12 The realization that demand for rice was not likely to increase dramatically was one factor that delayed the introduction of GM rice to China.13 Cotton production has increased significantly because of the introduction of Bt cotton. GM has been estimated to increase the supply of cotton by ~40% resulting in a ~33% decrease in its price.14 Note that some cotton producers who saw significant gains in yield
because of Bt cotton are gaining from the GM adoption while others who used GM to replace pesticides (and did not gain much in yield) may have lost because of lower prices. Thus, within GM adopters there may be varying intensity of support for GM.
As of now, GM has mostly been introduced in field crops, yet there is one example where GM was introduced to a specialty crop, papaya, which has been adopted by growers in Hawaii where it has helped prevent disease. Farmers who recognize that GM technologies may provide an effective solution to some diseases both in the present and into the future, and are likely to adopt this technology if it can solve a severe disease problem. Their support depends largely on their ability to sell their product to consumers, so while farmers support research on the use of GM to control against Pierce’s disease in California, they would be reluctant to adopt the technology if it meant a reduction in market size. The same logic that applies to US markets applies to Europe. Farmers will support pro-‐GM legislation especially in cases where they can overcome severe disease problems without much loss in market.
Livestock operators are likely to support GM, as it increases supply and reduces the price of feed. This does not apply to small groups of organic livestock producers, and enthusiasm for GM crops will decline if it reduces access to the market. GMs has already significantly benefited livestock producers. While GM was adopted on only 25% of corn globally, it increased the global corn supply 3-‐19%. GM also contributed to the doubling of the acreage of soybean over the last 20 years, much of it by allowing double cropping of soybean with other crops, and its contribution to increased soybean output ranges between 12-‐42%. Furthermore, GM increased the supply of cotton between 25-‐55%. These increases in supply have resulted in an estimated decline of 13% in the price of corn, 33% in the price of cotton, and 38% in the price of soybean.15 Livestock producers as well as processors of cotton are major supporters of GM in this case.
Organic farmers may have benefited from GM, as it differentiates their products from mainstream products, and there is actually a strong case for incorporating GM into organic farming.16 However, organic farmers have been a major opponent of GM, both for ideological and market reasons. For example, they elected to exclude GM from organic certification in the US and have been strong supporters of GM labeling regulations.17 The organic movement in Europe has also led to strong opposition of GM. Consumers
There is a large literature on consumer nutritional choices showing that the same primary factors affect consumer behavior each year, and the differences between years are quantitative.18 Consumers are more likely to buy a product if its price decreases. On average, they tend to identify similar quality attributes, and consumers with lower incomes are more likely to purchase low quality products because of the price differential.19 Yet, there is a significant heterogeneity among consumers in terms of their product choice.20 This heterogeneity is apparent when it comes to decisions regarding products with environmental attributes, like pesticide free products, where a substantial minority may have significant
willingness to pay for these specific attributes while a significant number of consumers are not willing to pay any premium for pesticide free products.21
Consumers in both the US and Europe tend to have a negative prior towards GM food, and therefore may state that they will pay a premium to label GM food and to avoid it. Alternatively, they will take price discounts to buy GM food. However, this willingness to pay for non-‐GM is greater in Europe than in the US.22 Both the US and Europe are heterogeneous, and there are significant differences in willingness to pay to avoid GM across regions of the US. Stated willingness to pay to avoid GM is likely to be much larger than actual willingness to pay, and stated willingness to pay may vary over time as new information becomes available.23 The difference in attitudes towards GM between the US and Europe, for example in the late 1990s when GM was introduced, was expanded because of food safety concerns due to the BSE (Bovine Spongiform encephalopathy) crisis.24
A major reason for avoiding GM food is the presumed risk, and indeed willingness to pay to avoid GM food is related to the level of risk aversion of the individual.25 Lower willingness to pay for GM products is more prevalent in the UK because of higher perceived risk.26 The differences in perceived risk between the US and UK may represent big difference in trust in food safety authorities, as well as media coverage in each country.27 Consumer concern about food safety is also increasing with the discovery of food safety problems, like the emergence of mad cow disease.28 Even without significant evidence of any negative environmental or health effects from GM food, consumers may still be willing to pay a premium to avoid them. Behavioral economics suggests that consumers tend to overweigh small, perceived probabilities as long as they are unconvinced that the products are risk free.29
Attitudes towards GM are also affected by socio-‐economic variables such as education, religious beliefs, and gender. Furthermore, attitudes and judgments are affected by framing of different alternatives and by the introduction of new knowledge. Negative attitudes towards GM can be amplified by exposure to negative information and may be somewhat reversed with positive information.30Actually, there is also evidence that consumers are willing to pay positive premiums for GM products that have beneficial health traits.31 This suggests that with the continuous supply of negative information, the negative attitude towards GM in Europe has hardened.32 But this attitude may be reversed if and when evidence of benefits from the use of GMOs is presented. There is early literature that indicates that the gain from the adoption of GM is contained mostly by product developers but is shared between farmers, product sellers (markets, etc.), and consumers (in the form of lower food commodity prices).33 There is more recent evidence on the significant reduction in commodity prices due to GM34, but this new information is not widely available and price reductions in food commodities are much more significant for consumers in developing countries, as the cost share of raw commodities in consumer food prices is high.
Political choices (for example, voting for a proposition to ban GM products) are not always linked to willingness to pay to avoid a certain trait, even though there is a high correlation between willingness to vote and willingness to pay to avoid
chemicals in food, for example. Some individuals may not vote against GM, but at the same time will pay a high premium for non-‐GM food. Others, sometimes poor, may not be willing to pay much to avoid GM but may support banning it.36 Thus, consumer attitude towards GM technology should reflect both a concern about the human health effect (in this case, consumers will be willing to pay a lot for GM free food) and the environmental effect of GM, and if the latter is the main concern, consumers may vote to ban GM products but will not be willing to pay much extra if these products are available.35
Another factor that may contribute to different attitudes towards GM in the US and EU is the “ invisible flag”. There is evidence that consumers hold preferences for local products and ideals, denoted as the “home bias”.36 In many people’s minds, GM was associated with Monsanto, which is an American company, so some of the negative attitude towards GM is due to the perception that it is a technology has been imposed upon Europe by a US company. Much of the debate on GM in Europe was conducted during the Bush administration when the United States was portrayed as environmentally irresponsible because of its refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol, which contributed to the negative attitude towards GM in the EU as well. Environmentalists
There is ample evidence that the introduction of GM in agriculture has had positive environmental effects. It reduces exposure to toxic chemicals and even saves lives by increasing productivity. It has reduced the footprint of agriculture and the pressure on land resources, it reduces greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by facilitating low and no-‐tillage agriculture, and it reduces chemical contamination of groundwater by reducing runoff. Several studies by major national academies of science have suggested that it is no worse for the environment than traditional forms of agriculture. There is also evidence that GM has contributed to food security and the wellbeing of the poor.37 However, the assessments of technologies by environmental groups are not necessarily based on measured impact on the environment. Environmentalists have been suspicious of GM from the beginning, and over time it has become an accepted norm that GM is undesirable.38
There are several objections to GM. The first is that it is a new technology representing the human desire to tinker with nature and a key element of the environmental movement has been focused on conserving nature rather than altering it. A related objection is that GM is typically associated with monoculture and commercialization of agriculture while environmental groups usually advocate for small scale, diversified farming systems. A third objection is that agricultural biotechnology has been associated with large, multinational companies and modifies the traditional ways that agricultural genetic material is produced and distributed. There were also concerns about “gene flow”, build up of resistance to Bt and other pest controlling agents, and damage to non-‐target species.39
When the first version of GM (ice minus, a trait aimed to allow strawberries to survive frost) encountered legal challenges by activists, field tests were delayed four years.40 Over the years, the US, as well as the rest of the world, established biosafety procedures and regulations that incorporated many environmental
objections. One of the implications of these biosafety procedures has been that compliance has become very costly, strengthening the capacity of major corporations who had the financial muscle and ability to develop these technologies, and delay the introduction of technologies such as golden rice that enhance the nutritional well-‐being of the poor.41 In 1998, activists attempted to restrict GM technologies using evidence from studies that were later discredited both in the US and EU, and despite the proven lack of credibility, they were eventually successful in the EU.42 Furthermore, activists have attempted to place global restrictions on GM via labeling regulations and strict purity requirements, resulting in the Cartagena Protocol that was signed by most of Europe but not the United States.43
Activist organizations have gained credibility and impact through the use of the media in both Europe and the US.44 The symbiotic relationship between anti-‐GM activists and the media stems from the fact that media revenues are often enhanced by emphasizing bad news and controversies over good news.45
In addition to use of the political arena, the media, and the courts to slow the introduction of GM, environmental groups realized that consumers buy food through retailers and other middlemen, and one way to affect availability or access to GM is by affecting the supply chain and placing pressure on major companies to avoid GM products. 46 One success story from the activist perspective was their ability to pressure McDonalds to stop using GM potatoes, leading to the halt of commercialization of this GM product. 47 While the regulatory pressure in Europe resulted in a practical ban of GM, pressure by activists in the US contributed to the restriction of GM to only a few crops and resulted in a status quo where GM is used for feed and fiber is rarely used in food for human consumption.
Finally, the debate about GM continues. Some environmental groups state that they do not oppose it in principle, but that so far its implementation has not benefited the poor. However, this issue is not a problem inherent in the technology itself, rather a direct effect of the regulatory environment that has to a large extent been shaped by the environmental groups. The heavy regulatory burden makes it very costly to introduce a new technology, and is likely to minimize the introduction of GM innovation that is targeted to markets with small earning capacity. For example, markets that serve specialty crops as well as ones that enhance the wellbeing of the poor.48 Policymakers and Policy Systems
The political economic literature recognizes different systems of governance, translating the desires of various players into different outcomes. Anthony Downs argued that the median voter affects the outcome of direct elections on a proposition and that various interest groups allocate resources to capture the swing vote.49 In a regulatory environment, there are situations where the regulator is ‘captured’ by those being regulated, or where the regulatory outcome reflects the efforts and power of the affected parties.50 In an electoral system, politicians are directed by the pursuit of both voters and campaign contributions. Under the proportional electoral systems where people vote for parties (some continental countries in Europe), there are likely to be more parties and coalition governments than under majoritarian electoral rule where regions select an individual
representative (i.e. in the US). Coalition governments are more likely to turn to higher spending to accommodate coalition members.51 While the European commission has frequently taken a pro GM position, the current strict regulation in Europe was a result of political choices at the country level.52 Environmental groups have taken advantage of the proportional electoral system in European countries, where the green parties and green movements play a key role in the balance of power. During the period where GM was introduced to Europe (1996-‐2000), the continent went through political change as power shifted to the left. Tony Blair replaced Thatcher in England, Lionel Jospin’s government in France included members of the green party, and Gerhard Schroder established a “red green” coalition in Germany. The power of the greens in Europe at the time, combined with the loss of trust to governments’ handling of food safety issues because of the BSE problem and the lack of trust in Monsanto and American agribusiness led to strict regulation that resulted in a de facto moratorium on GM in Europe.53 Domestic agribusiness in the US shaped a relatively favorable environment for GM, including the use of the notion of “substantial equivalent” to analogous traditional products to determine whether to raise new regulatory concerns about GM products. The industry received support from the US government in accusing the EU for violating the WTO provision. The lack of news grabbing biotechnology incidents in the US has not allowed NGOs to utilize the legal system and the media to redefine biotechnology policies.54 The attempts by environmental activists to use the direct voting legislation system to control GM technologies have not been very successful. A prominent example is the recent failure of a 2012 proposition to require mandatory labeling of GM food in California. While early polls suggested that the majority supported the proposition, campaigning by the opposition emphasized that these propositions for labeling of GM in food would be costly to the consumer, leading to its eventual defeat. An earlier proposition to ban pesticide use in California underwent a similar fate. California is perhaps the state that has the closest preference to the EU; it passed its own carbon-‐trading scheme. Anti-‐GM regulation was first introduced in California, partially because of this perception. This suggests that there may be broad support for GM regulation in principle, as long as it is not costly to the consumer, as their willingness to pay is low.55 But support for restricting GM will decline as the realized cost of banning GM increases. Conclusion The differences between GM policies in the US and Europe are not merely the result of differences in consumer attitudes56,57, but because of the interaction between different factors that has led to different outcomes. First, GM technology has held a home court advantage in the US. The companies that develop the technologies were much more skilled and influential in the US political economic systems than in the EU, while the European consumers and voters saw it as an invasion by US corporations. Moreover, the European chemical companies were standing to lose from the introduction of GM, and thus they did not support its introduction and may have implicitly helped to oppose it.
Second, the nature of the technology was such that it did not seem to provide benefits to consumers, and the crops it applied to were not significant in Europe. At the same time, corn, soybean, and cotton are major crops in the US, and the demand, especially for corn and soybean, was on the rise and thus the industry was behind the technology. In Europe, industry might have implicitly accepted a policy against the technology because it was able to provide justification for product differentiation and higher prices. Third, in some European countries’ governments, green parties and politicians have held significant power in coalitions government, and have used their leverage to influence policies that aim to block GM technology. Fourth, there is much less trust in the government’s capacity to handle food safety regulations in Europe than there is in the US, and relatively more trust in NGOs, thus their objections to GM carried more weight in the EU. Fifth, environmental activists have realized that retailers and large food corporations are the soft link in the supply chain and most vulnerable to pressure, and have taken advantage of this to prevent introduction of GM crops both in the US and in Europe. Finally, the technology was introduced during a time when the political influence of green parties in Europe was especially significant, and European trust of government capacity to enter food security issues was at its lowest. There is a growing realization of the importance of path dependency. The specific constellation that led to the practical ban of GM in Europe in the late 1990s established a path that has continued ever since. Some of the negative attitudes towards GM have hardened with time. However, there is ample evidence in the US reflecting that attitudes towards GM technology can change; some anti-‐GM activists have recanted realizing the benefits that GM crops can provide in a world with increasing food prices and further threatened by climate change.58 There is also evidence that consumers’ attitudes can change once they realize the economic and health gains that can be obtained from GM varieties. Acceptance of GM is more likely if traits that provide immediate benefit to consumers, for example improvement in nutrition, obvious environmental benefits (drought tolerance), and significant reduction in price are introduced. Introduction of such innovations will trigger further acceptance of GM because it will be a mechanism to save face for its opponents. However, the strict regulatory environment has reduced the incentive to pursue and invest in new GM technology59, which has reduced the likelihood of the introduction of breakthrough innovations in the near future. The literature on political economy suggests that policy reform is triggered by crises where parties realize the losses from the status quo.60 GM technology is likely to be accepted in Europe as concern over food prices and food availability increase, and especially in cases where it can provide solutions to plant diseases that cannot be addressed through other means. It will also be adopted heavily elsewhere, say China, in a way that will threaten the economic well being of Europe. Continuous success of the performance of GM technology in places it has been adopted and better reporting of the benefits of GMOs and the implications can also push for regulatory changes in Europe.
Acknowledgements Research leading to this program was supported by Cotton Inc., BARD, the Giannini Foundation, and the Energy Biosciences Institute.
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