Construction of Nationalism in the Republic of Kosovo

Bujar Aruqaj

The Politics of Deeply Divided Societies – Fall 2013

Contents

Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 3

Context Analysis: The Republic of Kosovo............................................................................. 4

1.Historical Evolution of the Kosovar national question: The Road to Statehood .. 6

1.1.Peaceful Struggle and War ................................................................................................. 6

1.2.International Protectorate (1999-2008) ............................................................................. 8

1.3.Process of Status Talks: “The Ahtisaari Plan” ................................................................. 8

1.4.Declaration of Independence .............................................................................................. 9

1.5.Brussels Talks .................................................................................................................... 10

2.Identity Construction in the Republic of Kosovo ....................................................... 10

2.1.A Constructed Identity ..................................................................................................... 10

2.2.A Multi-Layered Identity ................................................................................................. 10

2.3.An Invented identity ......................................................................................................... 13

2.4.Symbolic Elements of Identity Construction .................................................................. 15

Conclusion and Recommendations ................................................................................... 17

Bibliography........................................................................................................................... 19

To all citizens of Kosovo

Let this be our flag of peace. May no one have to fight or shed blood for

this flag.

Abstract

This paper will address the question of the construction of Kosovar national identity. With the

declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo‘s institutions have sought to promote a common

civic identity within the citizens of the new Republic.

Kosovo was the site of a famous battle between Serbs and Turks in 1389 and is often described

as the birthplace of Serb identity. Ethnic Albanians say they are the descendants of the ancient

Illyrians, Kosovo's first inhabitants. When Kosovo's parliament first declared its independence,

in 1990, Albania was the only country to recognize it. The new official Kosovar discourse,

sought to eliminate this long contest by promoting a new state, that would belong to all its

citizen, Albanian and Serb alike.

The use of national symbolism was particularly important in this process. The new flag with six

stars, representing the distinct ethnic communities in Kosovo, presented in 2008, and the later

adapted lyric-fewer anthem are key examples of how national symbolism is used in constructing

a common identity. Furthermore, this process is described here as an ―Invention of tradition‖.

The paper is divided into two main parts. Part one will analyze the historical background and

context, in which the question of Kosovar nationhood has evolved, and will present an overview

of Kosovo‘s road to statehood. Part two, will look at national identity construction in Kosovo

and how this process was done deliberately as part of local and international state/nation building

effort.The theoretical framework used to explain construction of national identity in Kosovo will

be that of ‗imagined communities‘; ‗nested identities‘ and the ‗invention of tradition‘ and their

relevancy in one of the newest countries. The paper will end with final remarks and conclusion.

Context Analysis: The Republic of Kosovo

Kosovo became a nation when its parliament declared independence from Serbia on February 17,

2008. The United States and many European countries have recognized Kosovo's independence,

while Serbia and some of its allies1, most notably Russia,have denounced the declaration as

illegal.

In the 1990s poor economic policies, international sanctions, limited access to trade and finance,

and ethnic conflict severely damaged Kosovo's economy, and it now has one of the poorest

economies in Europe. The violation of basic human rights of Kosovar-Albanians under

Milosevic‘s establishment led to an apartheid-like regime that lasted for more than a decade.

Kosovo, which was part of the former Yugoslavia, had been administered by the United Nations

and NATO since 1999, when Serbian forces were ousted after a U.S.-led NATO air war was

launched to end Serbia's crackdown on ethnic Albanians. About 12,000 people were killed and

nearly one million others were driven from their homes during the conflict.

About 90 percent of Kosovo's estimated two million people are ethnic Albanians, most of whom

are Muslim. The remaining 10 percent are mainly Orthodox Christian Serbs living in northern

Kosovo, near the border with Serbia, and other ethnic communities.

The government of the Republic of Kosovo is defined under the 2008 Constitution of Kosovo as

a multi-party parliamentary representative democratic republic. Legislative power is vested in

both the Assembly of Kosovo and the ministers within their competencies. The President of

Kosovo is the head of state and represents the "unity of the people". The Executive of

Kosovo exercises the executive power and is composed of the Prime Minister of Kosovo as

the head of government, the deputy prime ministers, and the ministers of the various ministries.2

Kosovo institutions have control over most of the territory of Kosovo, while North Kosovo, the

largest Serb-majority enclave, is largely outside their control. So far, the biggest problem in

Kosovo, in terms of ethnic divide remains Albanian-Serb relations.

1 "PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WATCH." Public International Law & Policy Group. N.p., 14 Feb. 2005. Web. 15 Nov. 2013.

<http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Vol.-4-Issue-5-Feb.-14-2005.pdf>. 2Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.Prishtina: [Constitutional Commission], 2008. Print.

1. Historical Evolution of the Kosovar national question: The Road to

Statehood

1.1. Peaceful Struggle and War

There have been many detailed accounts of the war in Kosovo, but not so many of the events that

anticipated the break out of violence. This paper does not seek to reiterate all historical events.

However, presenting a short chronological overview is necessary in order to understand the

historical evolution of the concept of Kosovar nationhood.

Many scholars have neglected the fact that Kosovar-Albanians led a peaceful struggle for more

than a decade, before violent conflict broke out in 1998. Howard Clark presents a detailed

account of this period in his book, ―Civil Resistance in Kosovo‖ (2000). This period is crucial in

understanding the origins of war not only in Kosovo, but more broadly in former Yugoslavia.

Clark divides ‗the apartheid like period‘ this into four main phases:

Phase One: the period 1986 to 1990, coinciding with the rise to power of Milošević and the

beginnings of the post-Tito disintegration.

Milošević during this period was banging the drum over Kosovo which has a special mythic

importance for Serbs. In 1989, the six- hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosova, the bones

-supposedly - of King Lazar, who died in the battle, were paraded around the province and

ceremonially reburied to show that Kosovo had always been Serbian. Leading up to that,

Milošević used the persistent Serbian emigration from Kosovo and the grievances of those who

left, to create a nationalist authoritarian politics capable of taking over from the previous

communist authoritarianism.3

Phase Two: The Loss of Autonomy and the Establishment of Parallel Institutions.

The final annulment of the province‟s autonomous status in 1989 was followed by massive

sackings - figures range from 120,000 to 140,000 Albanian workers sacked, representing 70-80

per cent of the Albanian workforce. The sackings provoked huge public protests among Kosovo-

Albanians, and fierce repression. The army was brought in - the first time the Yugoslav People‟s

Army had been used against the civilian population - and tanks were used to close down the

parliament. The last mass protest, on the issue of education, took place in October 1992 when it

is claimed that around half-a-million people protested, roughly a quarter of the entire population

of the province. After that the leadership decided that mass protests involved too many risks.4

3 Clark, Howard. Civil resistance in Kosovo. London: Pluto Press, 2000. Print. 4 Ibid

Phase Three: The ‗quiet‘ or passive phase.

During this phase the Albanians relied essentially on the parallel institutions to underpin

wholesale non-cooperation, and on small businesses started by sacked people which enabled

some kind of economic life to get under way. The energy of the leadership was put into trying to

get international support for Kosovo while the parallel institutions did their best to meet people‟s

needs. There was a widespread fear at this period that war would come to Kosovo as it already

had done to Croatia and Bosnia.5

Start of a New Phase of Activism:

Kosovo was emerging from this quiet period in two ways. The previous year saw the first

political assassinations and bomb attacks, allegedly by Albanians though the identity of the

„Kosovo Liberation Army‟ (KLA), which claimed responsibility for them, was far from clear.

This body had not issued a single political statement, but simply claimed responsibility for

actions which in fact played into the hands of Milošević.

The war that proceeded after these events, led to the mass migration of approximately 1 million

Kosovo-Albanians (Over half of the population). Plunder and destruction became routine. The

Serbian Army indiscriminately attacked Kosovo Albanian villages. Police and military forces

partially or completely had destroyed thousands of Albanian villages in Kosovo by burning or

shelling them. According to a UNHCR survey, nearly 40% of all residential houses in Kosovo

were heavily damaged or completely destroyed by the end of the war. Out of a total of 237,842

houses, 45,768 were heavily damaged and 46,414 were destroyed.6 After the liberation of

Kosovo from NATO forces and the withdraw of Serbian military and paramilitary forces from

Kosovo, reconstruction, peace building and primary aid became the major priorities of the

international agencies involved in Kosovo, such as the UN, NATO, and the European Union.

It is important to acknowledge how Steward Kaufman‘s theory of the ―symbolic of ethnic war‖

(2001) can help us understand the causes of ethnic war in Kosovo.

The idea of ethnic symbolism is useful, because it combines the logic of the ancient hatreds,

manipulative elites, and economic rivalry stories. Ethnic symbols are tools used by manipulative

elites, but theyonly work when there is some real or perceived conflict of interest at work and

mythically based feelings of hostility that can be tapped using ethnic symbols. All three elements

are needed to make mobilization happen: Without perceived conflicts of interest, people have no

5 Ibid 6"UNHCR - UNHCR Global Report 1999 - Kosovo Emergency."UNHCR News.N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2013.

<http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d4d5f7.html>.

reason to mobilize. Without emotional commitment based on hostile feelings, they lack sufficient

impetus to do so. And without leadership, they typically lack the organization to act.7

Having this in mind, we can add that economic ethnocentrism in Yugoslavia and unequal wealth

distribution were among the major reasons, which caused the marginalized Albanian of Kosovo

to rebel.Economic ethnocentrism is tied more closely to the perception that other groups can be

seen as economic competitors, therefore should be limited in their capacity as economic actors.

It can express itself in discriminatory measures on the labor market, and in boycotts or other

actions.8

1.2. International Protectorate (1999-2008)

Kosovo became a United Nations protectorate through Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)9.

The United Nation Interim Administration Mission, UNMIK, govern Kosovo until it declared

independence in 2008. According to UNresolution-1244, UNMIK was to: perform basic civilian

administrative functions; promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-

government in Kosovo; facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status;

coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies; support the

reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights; and

assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in

Kosovo.10

Until today, UNMIK sustains a small office in Kosovo, although its role has

significantly changed and it is not a major decision makes anymore.

1.3. Process of Status Talks: “The Ahtisaari Plan”

In April 2007, UN Special Envoy MarttiAhtisaari submitted to the UN Security Council his

Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (the "Ahtisaari Plan"). The Ahtisaari

Plan is primarily focused on protecting the rights, identity and culture of Kosovo's non-Albanian

communities, including establishing a framework for their active participation in public life.

7 Kaufman, Stuart J..Modern hatreds: the symbolic politics of ethnic war. New York: Cornell University Press, 2001. Print. 8Hooghe, Marc. ―Economic Ethnocentrism.International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.‖ Philadelphia: MacMillan. 2008:12 9United Nations. 1999. Security Council Resolution 1244.

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement 10Reka, Blerim. UNMIK as an international governance in post-war Kosova: NATO's intervention, UN administration and

Kosovar aspirations. Shkup: Logos-A, 2003:5

Special Envoy Ahtisaari also proposed that Kosovo become independent and subject to a period

of international supervision, which ended in 2012.11

On February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Assembly declared the independence of Kosovo in line with

the Ahtisaari recommendations. In its declaration of independence, Kosovo made a binding

commitment to implement fully the Ahtisaari Plan and welcomed a period of international

supervision. Kosovo has already begun to approve new legislation as envisioned in the Ahtisaari

Plan, develop a Constitution that enshrines the Ahtisaari principles, and take other measures to

implement fully the Ahtisaari Plan's provisions.12

Some of the key elements mentioned in the

plan and then later adapted in the Constitution, include: multi-ethnic democracy; minority rights

and participation; decentralization of local governance; and the creation of the Kosovo Security

Force.

1.4. Declaration of Independence

The declaration of independence in 2008 led to partial international recognition (So far 104

countries). Kosovo‘s Independence remains contested both by a significant share of the Serb

community in Kosovo, as well as internationally. At first, state building in both Bosnia and

Kosovo was primarily driven by the US. Gradually, the EU has taken over in both countries.13

As

for now, the main problem for the Kosovo governance is the lack of legitimacy in the north of

Kosovo, mainly populated with ethnic Serbs who do not recognize the new political reality in

Kosovo.

In 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), made its decision regarding question of Kosovo.

The ruling14

held that the Kosovo declaration of independence was not in violation of

international law. It drew praise from some quarters and negative reactions from other quarters

led by Serbia and other states which said their position would not change.

11Perritt, Henry H. The road to independence for Kosovo: a chronicle of the Ahtisaari plan. New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2010: 14 12Unites States Agency for International Development. September 2011. ―Kosovo Public Pulse Report 2.‖ USAID Office in

Kosovo.<http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/Public-Pulse-web-eng.pdf> 13Bieber, Florian. Building Impossible States?: State-building Strategies and EU Membership in the Western Balkans. London

[etc.: Routledge, 2012:49 14Hilpold, Peter. Kosovo and international law: the ICJ advisory opinion of 22 July 2010. Leiden: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2012.

Print.

1.5. Brussels Talks

In 2011, the European Union launched a new negotiation process aimed at solving technical

issues in order to improve everyday life for ordinary people. Surprisingly in 2012, Serbia‘s Prime

Minister, IvicaDacic, sat down at the same table with his Kosovo counterpart, HashimThaci, in

Belgium. The joint meeting came as surprise, as Serbia bitterly opposes Kosovo's independence,

and has since boycotted any events where Kosovo officials represented themselves as an

independent country. "We agreed to continue the dialogue on normalization of relations between

the two sides and both are committed to working together," the EU statement reads.15

Other

meetings have followed since then. Serbia and Kosovo have agreed to start implementing some

key agreements that are essential for both counties to progress towards EU membership.

2. Identity Construction in the Republic of Kosovo

2.1. A Constructed Identity

The theoretical framework used to explain Kosovar identity here, is based on the most influential

arguments on collective identity formation, namely sociological/constructivist reasoning. From

this perspective, collective identities are constructed on the basis of normative beliefs of

belonging to a community that shares the same culture, language and history. They include

emotional, affective, and evaluative components.

2.2. A Multi-Layered Identity

The debate on whether and what a Kosovar identity may be, is a delicate subject overloaded with

political nuances. In order to start this analysis with a common approach, we need to consider the

whole complexity of the ‗Kosovar Nation‘. By elaborating on the concept of ‗nested identities‘16

we can propose a model of how one can conceptualize this nation.Nested identities are ‗lower-

and higher-order identities such that the latter encompass the former.‘17

The importance and the

popularity of ‗Kosovar identity‘ have been a crucial issue not only before but mostly after

Kosovo declared its independence.

15"Kosovo, Serbia Reach Deal on Regional Representation." :: Balkan Insight, n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2013.

<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-serbia-reach-deal-on-regional-representation>. 16Herb, GuntramHenrik, and David H. Kaplan. Nested identities: nationalism, territory, and scale. Lanham, Md.: Rowman&

Littlefield Publishers, 1999: 3 17 ibid

In the light of the latest

developments, with the

challenges for a full

international recognition of

Kosovo as an independent

and sovereign state, the

issue of identity has become

an issue of great concern.

The identity issue is so

delicate that even Kosovar

political leaders, publicly

asserted before the declaration of independence that ―Kosovo identity does not exist yet, but the

taboo is beginning to crack.‖18

In an academic journal, published in the Journal of European and International Affairs, Dr.

DoriaJano claims that the Kosovar identity is a multi-layered identity. The argument builds on

today‘s post-modernist world in which collective identities have the tendency to be multi-

layered, moving from the first order concept of national (cultural) identity towards including

other-order concepts of post national identity such as state or supra-state identity.19

The concept of multi-layered identity or nested identities sees national identities a first-order

concept where collectivities identify themselves belonging to a certain national identity based on

narratives of shared language, tradition and history; state identities a second-order concept where

collectivities identify themselves belonging to a certain political identity based on a ―common

economy and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members‖20

; and

adds a third layer, the supra-state (European) identity, that can be seen as a third-order concept

where collectivities identify themselves belonging to a wider political space than the state, as it

18 Reference to Bilefsky, Dan (2007) ―Kosovo Struggles to Forge an Identity‖, New York Times, December 17. 19Jano, Dorian. "Kosovar multi-layered identity: what is the same, different and in common with Albanian identity." Journal of

European and International Affairs , Iss.1• 1 January.27-40 (2013): 32. 20 Smith, Anthony D (1991) National Identity.London: Penguin

Kosovar Multi-Layered identity

Source: Dorian Jano

isthe case of the European Union based on additionaleconomic, political and social interests or

values for all communities and consequently all members.21

As the case of Europe shows, nations do not always overlap with states. In 1912, when Albania

gained its independence, many Albanians and their territories remained outside of the new

Albanian state. Today, although Albanians from all the areas share the same national identity,

they have developed different polity identities depending on the state in which they live. For

example Albanians of Kosovo, although they share the same national identity with Albanians of

Albania, belong to different states with different civic and political identities. They also belong

to a different polity, the state of Kosovo.22

The state here should be seen as a political unit which

offer a common economy and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all

members included in its political unit.

For Anthony D.Smith “the state is a legal and institutional concept. It refers to autonomous

public institutions which are differentiated from other social institutions by their exercise of a

monopoly and extraction within a given territory. The idea of the nation, by contrast, is

fundamentally cultural and social.”23

Conceptualizing Kosovo as a multi-layered society does

not conflict with Smith‘s argument. Rather it enforces it, by implying the Kosovar citizens‘ core

political identity depends upon an institutional framework (the state) which they need to share.

The polity identity does not require a prior shared cultural (national) identity. A polity, more

especially those composed of communities with very different national identities, which intend

to be found on nationalistic backgrounds, is doomed to fail. This was the caseof the

disintegration of Yugoslavia. The idea of a very nationalistic polity is incompatible with the

liberal democratic ideas promoted in the ‗90s and ―unable to function according to demands of

modern political institutions: as communities of free and equal citizens‖.24

21Jano, Dorian . "KOSOVAR MULTI-LAYER IDENTITY: WHAT IS THE SAME, DIFFERENT AND IN COMMON WITH

ALBANIAN IDENTITY." Journal of European and International Affairs 1.1 (2013): 23. Print. 22 Ibid 23Smith, Anthony D .National Identity.London: Penguin.(1991):61 24Vlaisavljevic, Ugo (2003) ―Yugoslav Communism and After: The Continuity of Ethnopo-litics‖, Identities:Journal for Politics,

Gender and Culture2(2): 6-26.

2.3. An Invented identity

The new ‗imagined community‘25

in Kosovo is held together by the construction of a symbolic

level interwoven by narratives. A symbolic level whose role, in Kosovo‘s official discourse, is to

present the democratic values of the ‗West‘.In Benedict Anderson‘s view:

Nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in viewof that word's multiple significations, nation-

ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular kind. To understand them

properlyweneed to considercarefullyhowthey havecomeinto historicalbeing,in whatwaystheir

meaningshave changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional

legitimacy. The creation of these artifacts towards the endofthe eighteenth century was the

spontaneous distillation ofacomplex 'crossing' ofdiscretehistorical forces; but that, once created,

they became'modular', capable ofbeingtransplanted, with varying degreesofself-consciousness,

to agreatvarietyofsocialterrains, to merge and bemergedwitha correspondingly widevariety of

political and ideological constellations.26

Not by chance, in Europe and elsewhere, do most of the claims by minorities and peripheral

groups still lean on national or ethnic arguments; and these groups in most cases tend toinvent or

‗construct‘ new national histories and symbols to justify their requests.27

As a matter of fact, the task of defining a Kosovar identity went along with the steps towards

independence. Few months before this statement, Thaçi said –as reported by NY Times on 9

December 200728

, that ‗Kosovo identity does not exist, but the taboo is beginning to crack‘. The

taboo he was talking about was the possibility of Kosovo to gain independence by self-

determination of the Albanian majority without –which is the trickery –pretending a reunion with

fellow Albanians from Albania.29

As Thaçi said on Independence Day, ‗as of today, Kosovo will be a democratic, multi-ethnic

state moving rapidly toward EU and Euro-Atlantic integration‘. To gain the right, and the

support necessary for declaring independence, the ‗official‘ identity of Kosovo could be in no

25Anderson, Benedict R. O. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Rev. and extended ed.

London: Verso, 1991. Print. 26Albertini ,Matteo . "Kosovo: An Identity between Local and Global." <i>Ethnopolitics Papers</i> No.15 (2012): 1-34: 12 27Ibid 28D. Bilefsky (2007) ‗A difficult question for Kosovars: who are we?‘, New York Times, 9 December 2007.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/world/europe/09iht-kosovo.4.8660025.html?pagewanted=all> 29Matteo ,2012:23

way ‗Albanian‘: it would exist only when every single nationality living on this territory would

will accept the contemporaneous presence, in Kosovo, of each other: Albanians, Serbs, Romas,

Bosnjaks and so on.30

The primary solution to guarantee a better cohabitation between Serbs and Albanians was

‗reloading‘history from 1999, that is to say,after the beginning of international administration.

From this perspective, the creation of the new official Kosovo identity depended mainly on the

deletion of the historical dimension, and the ‗Kosovo reconstruction‘ –outlined in the last years –

was not only devoted to the restoration of public buildings and private homes destroyed by the

Serbian Army, but also to neutralize ethnic tensions forging a brand new identity.31

That is to say that the entire epic of the military victory of KLA against the Serbian army, which

is the main source of Kosovo government‘s legitimization, could no longer be the leading

narration in defining the identity of this ‗nation‘, because it stirred up the resentments of the

Albanian part against the remnants of the former rulers. It was necessary to create a completely

different background, in which the presence of Serbian and other minorities would be coherent

and at most defended –by law and official institutions.

In 1992, Hobsbawm concluded his major work Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, stating that

the end of the twentieth century would see the decline of nationalism in conditioning public

policies –with new ‗supranational‘structures taking center stage –and would lead to the birth of

new entities unclassifiable as ‗nations‘in the classical sense.32

The EU which is currently experiencing one of the harder periods of its history, due to economic

crisis, members‘growing debt, lack of executive power; but at the same time it appears the only

viable way to resolve the lingering tensions between former Yugoslav people and nations –a

crucial task, whose accomplishment will show the reliability of a future Union enlarged to

include the Balkan countries, as a common home for any European citizen.33

It is possible to agree with Hobsbawm: if nations have not disappeared, they have indeed

changed their nature, to adapt to a world in which human groups are more and more connected

30Ibid, 22 31Ibid, 34 32Hobsbawm, E. J.. Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University

Press, 1990. Print. 33Matteo, 2012: 31

by new technologies and interrelated by global fluxes of people and goods.However, the eventsin

Kosovo demonstrate once more the crisis in which nations, to be conceived as homogeneous

imagined communities, have been thrown in the last 15 years by global economic fluxes,

beginning with the Yugoslav wars of 1991–9. Nevertheless, both ethnic Serb and Albanian

groups, whose relations are still strained, indicate a future access to the EU as the primary goal to

obtain a better future for them and their families.34

2.4. Symbolic Elements of Identity Construction

The Constitution

The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was almost entirely based on the ―Ahtisaari Plan‖.35

The Republic of Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs.

The constitutional order of the Republic of Kosovo is based on the principles of freedom,

peace, democracy, equality, respect for human rights and freedoms and the rule of law,

non-discrimination, and the right to property, the protection of environment, social

justice, pluralism, separation of state powers, and a market economy.

The Republic of Kosovo ensures gender equality as a fundamental value for the

democratic development of the society, providing equal opportunities for both female and

male participation in the political, economic, social, cultural and other areas of societal

life.

A market economy with free competition is the basis of the economic order of the

Republic of Kosovo.

The Republic of Kosovo is a state of its citizens.

While flag and name define the aseptic background of the new state, the currency (the Euro-€)

and the national anthem serve as pivots of a different narrative. It is possible to call it a

34"Serbia and Kosovo A breakthrough at last."The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 20 June 2013. Web. 21 Nov. 2013.

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/04/serbia-and-kosovo-0> 35Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.Prishtina: [Constitutional Commission], 2008.

‗redemptionnarrative‘, which defines the new place in which the new ‗Kosovar identity‘ could be

significant: the European one, as far as possible from those chaotic and warlike Balkans.36

The flag

The only common symbol between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, the two-headed eagle,

has obviously not been chosen as a symbol of the new Kosovo State: What color would

the eagle be? Should it be black as in the Albanian flag or white as in the Serbian one?37

When the contest to design the soon to benew state‘s flag was announced to the public in the

summer of 2007, its organizers—the Kosovo Unity Team—made clear that proposals should

reflect Kosovo‘s multi-ethnic population38

and refrain from using symbols from Albania or

Serbia.

The Anthem

The national anthem of Kosovo, which is

particularly interesting: it is a lyric-less hymn

titled ―Europa‖ because it has not been possible

to find enough common words for every

nationality living in Kosovo.

Official Languages

The official languages in the Republic of Kosovo

are Albanian and Serbian and most interestingly

English as well. Turkish, Bosnian and Roma

languages have the status of official languages at

the municipal level and will be in official use at

all levels as provided by law.

36Matteo, 2012:39 37Matteo, 2012: 23 38 Ibid: ―The Roma group is often divided into ‗Ashkali‘ and ‗Egyptian‘ groups. The latter represents an interesting process of

invention of tradition: members of this group are actually Roma, which chose to refuse this affiliation (and the ‗demonization‘

they frequently suffer). This invention bases on narrations about a pretended deportation of Egyptians accomplished, 2000 years

ago, by Alexander the Great during his Egyptian campaign. It has nothing to do, therefore, with the national group usually called

‗Egyptians‘, citizens of Egyptian Republic.‖

Kosovo Flag: In the center, the yellow

silhouette of the new state, surmounted by

six white stars representing the official

ethnic groups living in Kosovo: Albanians,

Serbs, Roma, Bosnjaks and Gorans (an

Islamized Slavic group).

Newborn Monument

"Newborn" was chosen as a single English word

for the power to describe the birth of a new

country, its positive connotations, ease of

understanding by non-native English-speakers,

and potential to present Kosovo as a new,

contemporary, trendy country. The yellow color

was chosen in combination with blue banners and the supporting slogans to represent both

Kosovo's new flag colors as well as EU colors. According to New Kosova Report, the supporting

slogans used during the unveiling were "NEW life is BORN", "NEW hope is BORN", "NEW

future is BORN" and "NEW country is BORN", all presented in blue and yellow colors. 39

Conclusion and Recommendations

As Julia Resnik notes, ―nations, like persons, acquire their identities from hearing their

biographies‖.40

As new generations of individuals are born in an independent Kosovo, learn the

Kosovo Republican national anthem, engage with maps where Kosovo is outline by bold lines

rather than thin dashes, learn about the country‘s unique recent history, and earn certificates

anddegrees that bear the name and emblem of the new state that a sense of Kosovar nationhood

will emerge.41

That is to say that even though nationality in Kosovo is society constructed and an ―imagined

community‖, created by means of an ―invention of tradition‖, it does not mean that this

community is a fictional one. The success of the Republic of Kosovo depends greatly by how the

citizens of Kosovo affiliate with being ―Kosovar‖. The many critics of Kosovar nationhood,

should know that this holds the key to fostering social cohesion in Kosovo.

39"New Kosova Report."NEWBORN, the symbol of Kosovo Independence.N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2013.

<http://newkosovareport.com/200807041018/Society/NEWBORN-the-symbol-of-Kosovo-Independence.html>. 40Resnik, Julia. 2003. ―‗Sites of Memory‘ of the Holocaust: Shaping National Memory in the Education System in Israel.‖

Nations and Nationalism 9 (2): 297–317. 41Pezeshk, Ardeshir . "A KOSOVAR NATION: HEROES, EDUCATION, DIASPORA, AND THE (RE) IMAGINING OF

KOSOVAR NATIONHOOD." A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of San Diego State University. (2012).

In the dispute over who "owns" Kosovo, Serbian and Albanian nationalists brandish arguments

from history going back to antiquity or the Middle Ages. Yet nations are a recent creation, barely

two centuries old.The old narratives that empathized ‗the glory of the past‘ are replaced in the

new ‗Kosovar narrative‘ with ideas of tolerance, human rights and democracy. Even though

these concepts have been greatly ‗western‘ oriented, they can nevertheless facilitate peace

building, by providing a base for inclusion of all members of Kosovar society. And since

narratives have been adapted in the past; mythicized and passed on, this new narrative is just

another very recent example to show how new identities can emerge. Therefore, Kosovo should

belong to nobody but its legitimate owners, namely all citizen of Kosovo, the Kosovars.

Considering decades of economic neglect, ethnic discrimination and war, experienced in the past

by the majority of the people Kosovo. I should be no surprise to anyone that this small place was

longing to govern itself, as an independent country. To justify this existence, the country had to

‗invent‘ an identity capable of including all communities. Only in this way would the new

country be successful in gaining international support on one hand, and providing the foundation

base for democracy internally.

The outcomes have been modest so far, as the country faces economic difficulties and remains an

ethnically and politically divided society. But better than anyone had anticipated: A civil notion

of nationalism, so different from the nationalist Balkan identities of the past that have often

sought to ‗own the state‘. Strengthening ‗Kosovarness‘ will be a hard task for ordinary citizens

and policymakers alike. It will take a long time, as identities naturally, do not appear overnight.

Nevertheless, especially the younger generations have adapted this new feeling very deliberately.

The ‗Young Europeans‘ as a nation branding campaign by the government suggest.42

Drawing

upon the theme that Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe. This generation is

responsible off taking a different path from the previous one. One example from this generation

is MajlindaKelmendi, who recently became judo champion43

, bringing the first internationally

acclaimed title to the Republic of Kosovo. She was proudly waiting to see the Kosovo flag

42

Wahlisch, Martin, and Behar Xharra. Public diplomacy of Kosovo: status quo, challenges and options. Los Angeles, Calif:

Figueroa Press, 2011. Print. 43 "World Judo Championships: MajlindaKelmendi makes history for Kosovo." ..N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2013.

<http://zeenews.india.com/sports/others/world-judo-championships-majlinda-kelmendi-makes-history-for-

kosovo_767755.html>.

raised and hear the nationalher anthem being played. In regard to the contemporary Kosovar

discourse, she could be seen as a new ‗national hero‘.

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