MERRILL-PALMER QUARTERLY, VOL. 5 0 , N o . 3

Conscience in Childhood: Past, Present,and Future

Grazyna Kochanska and Nazan Aksan, University of Iowa

We ask three questions: What are the components of young children's con-science? How are they organized? How does early conscience develop? Wediscuss the changing perspectives on each of those questions. We describe theshift from a focus on a single component of conscience (moral emotions, con-duct, cognition) to o growing emphasis on their integration; from a view of con-science as loosely organized to a view of o coherent system of causally relatedcomponents; from o focus on older children and adolescents to young toddlersand preschoolers; ond from a top-down view of parentol discipline immediatelyfollowing child misbehavior to a focus on mutual processes between the parentand the child that occur in multiple socialization contexts and are shaped by thehistory of the porent<hild relationship and the child's individuality. We concludeby outlining new directions for research on early conscience.

Conscience has a rich conceptual history in human thought. Forcenturies, we have wondered how individuals internalize the values oftheir families and societies and how those values become a reliable innerguiding system for conduct and a vehicle for the intergenerational trans-mission of values (Grusec, 1997). Developmentalists have ponderedwhen and how children come to feel moral emotions, such as guilt asso-ciated with trangressions and empathy toward others; how they becomecapable and willing to behave accordingly to rules and values without aneed for external control; and how they come to appreciate and reasonabout right and wrong (Grusec, 1997; Kagan, 2003).

Research on conscience has focused around several perennial corequestions: What are the components of conscience? How are theyorganized? How does conscience develop—when does it first emerge.

Grazyna Kochanska and Nazan Aksan, Department of Psychology.This research was supported by the NSF grant, SBR-9510863, and two NIMH grants:

an Independent Scientist Award, KO2 MH01446, and ROl MH63096 to the first author.Correspondence should be addressed to Grazyna Kochanska, Department of Psychol-

ogy, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1407. E-mail: grazyna-kochanska@uiowa.edu.Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, July 2004, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 299-310. Copyright © 2004 byWayne State University Press, Detroit, MI 48201.

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what determines individual differences, and what are the implicationsof early conscience for future adjustment and psychopathology?

What are the components of conscience? In the past, the grandtheories have each tended to focus mostly on one element. Psychoana-lysts were concerned mainly with the moral emotion of guilt. Sociallearning researchers focused mostly on moral conduct, although theyconsidered multiple types of moral behavior. The influential Piagetian-Kohlbergian cognitive-developmental approach focused almost entirelyon moral cognition and discounted moral emotions or moral conduct.Contemporary scholars influenced by the cognitive tradition have pro-posed more differentiated views of morality that concern separatedomains of rules and values, such as conventional, moral, personal,and prudential domains (Smetana, 1997; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig,1997).

The psychoanalytic influence, and its focus on moral emotion,reappeared in the 1950s and 1960s in the work of Sears, who revisitedthe questions about the structure of conscience from the neo-Hullianstandpoint. Attempting to integrate the psychoanalytic and learningviews. Sears and colleagues considered both moral emotions andmoral conduct, fmding them only modestly related (Sears, Rau, &Alpert, 1965).

The work over the last two or three decades has been and mostlikely will continue to be influenced by an increasing recognition thatthe multiple components of conscience—emotion, conduct, and cogni-tion—have to be considered together in a comprehensive manner (Bur-ton, 1984; Dienstbier, Hillman, Lehnhoff, Hillman, & Valkenaar, 1975;Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; Grusec & Kuczynski, 1997; Hoffman, 1983;Kagan, 2003; Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1983; Thomp-son, 1998; Turiel, 1998). In his seminal work, Hoffman (1983) proposedan elegant model that brought together moral emotions of guilt andempathy, moral conduct, and the cognitive processing of informationinherent in moral socialization messages. Emotion researchers haveproposed the moral self—a system incorporating the dos and don'ts ofearly socialization—as a core component of conscience (Emde, Birin-gen, Clyman, & Oppenheim, 1991; Emde, Johnson, & Easterbrooks,1987; Kochanska, 2002a).

The question about the components of conscience leads to arelated question regarding their organization. How is conscience orga-nized? Are moral emotions, conduct, and cognition all part of acoherent system, or are they loosely related or even unrelated? Arechildren who feel more remorseful after a transgression also morelikely to comply with rules of conduct and to show more mature

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moral judgment? Are children who are more empathie also morelikely to refrain from cheating?

Because the grand developmental theories have usually focusedpredominantly on one aspect of conscience—emotion, conduct, or cog-nition—they sidestepped the question of whether those componentscohere within an individual child. Hartshome and May (1928-1930)were the first to address this issue, in their pioneering study on thestructure of character. They examined whether different manifestationsof conscience, such as honesty, deceit, self-control, and altruism wereinterrelated in a large sample of elementary and high school students,and they found these manifestations to be only weakly related.

Two subsequent investigations (Burton, 1963; Rushton, Brainerd, &Pressley, 1983) reexamined Hartshorne and May's (1928-1930) originaldata, using newer statistical techniques. They showed that the earlyclaims of the relative lack of coherence of different aspects of characterhad been overstated and that, in similar contexts, individuals did show amodest degree of consistency, or a "latent general moral character fac-tor." In our research, we have also often found that moral emotion, con-duct, and cognition are intercorrelated (Kochanska, Padavich, &Koenig, 1996). Other studies that have addressed the issues of consis-tency among different aspects of conscience yielded variable results,from absent or low consistency to substantial (for reviews, see Eisenberg& Fabes, 1998; Grusec & Lytton, 1988; Radke-Yarrow et al., 1983).

The questions about the organization of conscience remain to beanswered. The future investigations will need to go beyond the issue ofwhether or not moral emotions, conduct, cognition, and self coherewithin an individual child. More important, we will need to address thecausal relations among conscience components. For example, moralemotions of guilt and empathy have been long seen as inhibitors ofantisocial behavior (Blair, Monson, & Frederickson, 2001; Hoffman,1983), but few studies have actually tested whether such models fit theempirical data.

We have begun to address those questions in our research program,and our research has indeed supported causal links among children'sguilt, moral self, and moral conduct. Mediational analyses indicatedthat children's predisposition to experience discomfort after a transgres-sion serves to inhibit behavior that violates rules (Kochanska, Gross,Lin, & Nichols, 2002). We have also shown that the child's early whole-hearted, commiííeí/compliance with the parent results in the child form-ing a view of oneself as a good, moral child—a moral self—whieh, inturn, promotes future rule-compatible behavior (Kochanska, 2002a).This is consistent with the findings of Emde et al. (1991).

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Perhaps the most important set of questions concerns the develop-ment of conscience. How early does it emerge? What determines differ-ences in its outcomes? What are its implications for future adjustment?

The views on how early children show signs of conscience havevaried. The early psychoanalytic theory and the theories infiuenced byit emphasized the preschool age as the time of the emerging superego.The cognitive theories considered young children essentially amoraland selfish (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969).

The 1980s and 1990s ushered in a renewed appreciation of theearly years. The interest in conscience has shifted to the early years,stimulated in part by the work on emotional development duringthe transition from infancy to early childhood. For example, researchon social referencing portrayed it as an effective process whereby par-ents convey to their young children emotional valuations of acts ofbehavior (Emde et al., 1991). Research on early compliance and self-regulation has uncovered an early form of internalization, committedcompliance, a developmental precursor of future, more mature formsof conscience (Kochanska, 2002a). Research on the emerging self ledto the focus on self-conscious emotions (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, &Weiss, 1989). The accumulating empirical evidence revealed youngchildren's capacity to experience guilt and discomfort after transgres-sions, empathy toward others, awareness of right and wrong, sensitiv-ity to rule violations, and the emerging ability to regulate their ownbehavior (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Emde et al., 1991; Stipek, Gralinski,& Kopp, 1990; Kagan, 1981; Kagan & Lamb, 1987; Kochanska, 1994;Kochanska et al., 2002; Kochanska & Thompson, 1997; Radke-Yarrow etal., 1983; Thompson, 1998). The contemporary generation of cognitiveresearchers described young children's abilities to make subtle distinc-tions among types of transgressions (Smetana, 1997; Turiel, 1998).

What determines individual differences in future conscience? Thepsychoanalytic and learning theories emphasized parental socializa-tion. The two major dimensions were warmth and control, particularlythe use of power and punishment. Depending on the theoretical orien-tation, the mechanism of internalization was seen as the child's identifi-cation (Sears et al., 1965) or learning (Parke, 1974). Hoffman (1983)proposed a more differentiated view of parental discipline that encom-passed power, love-withdrawal (two factors that engender varying levelsof arousal in the child), and reasoning, which carries the informationalcontent of moral socialization messages.

Newer approaches to discipline have shifted away from the top-down, parent-to-child perspective to a bidirectional view. The child is

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now seen as an agent in moral socialization who actively processesparental moral messages and exercises a sense of choice and autonomywhile engaging in moral behavior (Hoffman, 1983; Grusec & Good-now, 1994; Maccoby, 1992). The views of the contexts of moral social-ization have expanded to include not only discipline situations sur-rounding the child's immediate misbehavior but also parent-childdiscourse, during which the parent and the child jointly review specificinstances of the child's past conduct (Kochanska, Aksan, & Nichols,2003; Thompson, Laible, & Ontai, 2003). Variations in the parentalstyle of such moral discourse have been associated with differences inthe maturity of children's conscience (Laible & Thompson, 2000;Walker & Taylor, 1991).

The relationship-based approach to socialization continues to gainmomentum (Collins & Laursen, 1999; Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg,Heatherington, & Bomstein, 2000; Kochanska, 2002b; Maccoby, 1992;Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000; Thompson, 1998). In that approach, achild's conscience is seen as emerging in the context of mutually respon-sive orientation between the parent and the child (Kochanska, 2002b).The child's willingness to embrace parental values is seen as flowing outof the shared history of a close, responsive relationship. For example,securely attached children, who likely have experienced more responsivecare, are more eager to internalize parental rules and demands (Lon-derville & Main, 1981; Kochanska & Thompson, 1997).

The quality of the relationship may also moderate the effectivenessof specific discipline techniques. For example, we have shown that ahistory of a warm, mutually responsive relationship enhances theeffectiveness of parental modeling (Kochanska, 2002b). Patterson andhis colleagues have amply demonstrated that negative, adversarial rela-tionships undermine the effectiveness of parental discipline (Patterson,DeBaryshe, & Ramsey, 1989).

Parallel to the growing emphasis on relationships, in the recentdecades we have also witnessed renewed interest in child temperament,which has emerged as a critical set of influences on conscience devel-opment (Kagan, 1998, 2003; Rothbart & Bates, 1998). That researchhas built bridges to the large body of empirical data on adults withseriously impaired consciences. Those individuals have been longknown for their very low level of fear and autonomie hyporeactivity(Fowles, 1998, 1993, 1994; Lykken, 1957; Quay, 1993). Recent researchhas extended the inquiry into the links between temperament and con-science to normative populations of very young children and multipletemperament dimensions.

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Consistent with the findings for adults, growing evidence acrossmultiple studies suggests that fearful children develop more internal-ized consciences (for reviews, see Kagan, 1998,2003; Rothbart & Bates,1998). They are more guilt prone and engage in more rule-compatibleconduct (Kochanska et al., 2002). Temperamental qualities assessed asearly as infancy predicted moral emotions several years later (Roth-bart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994).

Temperament research has also elucidated qualities other than fearas inñuences on conscience. In particular, effortful control—a capacityto suppress the dominant behavior and to perform instead a subdomi-nant behavior, linked to early attentional capacities (Rothbart &Ahadi, 1994; Rothbart & Bates, 1998)—has been strongly associated,concurrently and longitudinally, with conscience development in mul-tiple studies (Kochanska & Knaack, 2003; Kochanska & Thompson,1997).

Future research will almost certainly continue to consider longproposed, and recently demonstrated, interactions between socializa-tion and temperament. Several investigations have shown that thosetwo broad sets of influences may act as moderators for each other.Similar socialization and relationship factors operate differently inchildren with different temperaments, and similar temperamental pre-dispositions have different effects under varying socialization condi-tions (Bates, Pettit, Dodge, & Ridge, 1998; Belsky, Hsieh, & Crnic,1998; Kochanska & Thompson, 1997; Rothbart & Bates, 1998).

What are the developmental implications of early conscience forfuture adjustment? The study of conscience extends beyond normativedevelopment into the purview of developmental psychopathology. Animpaired conscience is a core aspect of conduct disorders, antisocialdevelopment, and psychopathy (Lykken, 1995). Conversely, the capac-ity for remorse and empathy, an appreciation of right and wrong, andengaging in behavior compatible with rules all mark successful adapta-tion. A large body of developmental research shows that early distur-bances in conscience development are important portents of futurerisks and that early moral emotions and self-regulated behavior serveas early protective factors against future antisocial trajectories.

The relations between early conscience and future adjustment arecomplex. For example, Frick and colleagues (Frick et al., 2003; Frick &Elhs, 1999) have shown that early callous-unemotional traits—severelyimpaired guilt and empathy—strongly predict future compromisedconscience and serious conduct problems. On the other hand, Zahn-Waxler and colleagues (Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990) havedemonstrated that early excessive guilt may also lead to detrimental out-

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comes. Euture work will likely focus on such nonlinear developmentalpredictions and on the delicate balance of adaptive and maladaptiveprocesses.

What are some of the promising new directions of research onconscience? One avenue involves contemporary analytic methodolo-gies. Rich longitudinal databases with panel design can now utilizestructural modeling to address both the structure of conscience andcausal links among its components in ways not adequately addressedwith traditional regression and correlational analyses (Bollen, 1989).For example, conflrmatory factor-analytic techniques can directly testthe plausibility of substantively driven models of how various compo-nents of conscience are organized, examine the stability of that organi-zation, and quantify method variance with multitrait multimethodmodels in a less arbitrary fashion than exploratory factor-analytictechniques (Aksan & Kochanska, 2003). Eurther, because structuralmodeling techniques allow researchers to construct a closer representa-tion of causal links among various constructs, they also afford us moredirect ways of thinking about and testing both development withineach construct and relations among constructs than those offered bythe traditional regression-based methods.

More research is needed to understand the links between theparent-child relationship and conscience. Whereas associations withpositive, mutually responsive relationship and children's early con-science have been repeatedly shown (Kochanska, 2002b), the specificmechanisms behind those links are poorly understood. We have pro-posed, and preliminarily supported, a view that a mutually responsiveorientation may promote conscience because it enhances the child'senjoyment of the interactions with the parent, which in turn leaves thechild more open to embrace parental values and rules.

Euture research will also need to consider the network of earlyrelationships in a broader ecology of development. Almost nothing isknown about the differential impact of mothers, fathers, and othercaregivers, such as grandparents or day care providers, on the child'sconscience.

Eurther, growing connections with neuroscience will increasinglyinform research on conscience. According to Damasio and his col-leagues (Damasio, 1994), damage to certain brain areas, particularlythe prefrontal cortex, results in dysfunction of the "somatic markersystem." This, in turn, causes associated deflcits in emotion, responseto punishment and reward, and response inhibition. Those impair-ments are particularly severe in empathy and other moral emotions,moral reasoning, and moral conduct, and they are often referred to as

306 Merrill-Palmer Quarterly

acquired psychopathy (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Dama-sio, 1999; Anderson, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000). Earlierlesions are linked to more severe deficits in moral emotions and con-duct than later lesions, consistent with a view that the early years arecritical for the emerging conscience.

Conscience is an exciting topic, with implications for basic devel-opmental research and society as a whole. Societies could not functionwithout the broad layer of internalized values shared by their mem-bers. Although the core questions regarding conscience developmenthave been asked long ago, the answers remain incomplete and unsatis-factory The upcoming years may bring a new understanding of thiscritical developmental process.

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