CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY:A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS*Paul Sabatier, University of California, DavisDaniel Mazmanian, Pomona College

A common complaint several years ago was that scholars inter-ested in public policy had neglected the implementation of legisla-tive statutes and major court decisions in favor of the antecedent—and supposedly more interesting and problematic—process of policyadoption or the more narrow field of administrative and judicialbehavior. But concern over the alleged failure of major legislationin the mid-1960s and early 1970s has led to a rather impressive num-ber of detailed studies of the implementation of specific programs ineducation,^ urban planning,'^ job creation,^ civil rights,4 environ-mental quality,^ and health services.^ There have also been anumber of "thought pieces" and literature reviews which haveattempted to bring together some insights from these and otherstudies. ^

It is now time for a thorough assessment. Further understandingof the policy implementation process requires an integration of thefindings and insights of these disparate studies into a reasonablycomprehensive conceptual framework which can, in turn, serve as aguide to future research. This paper first briefly examines a numberof such efforts noting both their strengths and weaknesses. Thebulk of the paper involves an explication of our own proposed frame-work, which is generally niore comprehensive and specific in itsidentification of variables, particularly with respect to the manner inwhich statutory characteristics affect subsequent events. It alsoattempts to capture the dynamic nature of implementation by focusingon the manner in which changes in socio-economic conditions, publicopinion, and other factors affect the implementation process. Oneof our central theses is that many of the case studies which form thebulk of the implementation literature become so immersed in thedetails of program implementation that they lose sight of themacro-level and political variables which structure the entireprocess.

*This paper is a truncated and revised version of our mono-graph, "The Implementation of Regulatory Policy: A Framework ofAnalysis" (Davis, Ca.: Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1979).We would like to thank Nelson Rosenbaum, Mark Nadel, Paul Culhane,Eugene Bardach, Erwin Hargrove, Judy Rosenener, Robert Johnston,Dale Marshall, Lloyd Musolf, Richard Liroff, Daniel Mandelker,Lettie Wenner, Helen Ingram, Karl Kurtz and Paul Berman for theirhelpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.

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Throughout this paper, we focus primarily on traditional regu-latory policies in which governmental agencies seek to alter the be-havior of private target groups. Nevertheless, we strongly sus-pect that—with a few minor modifications—the framework developedapplies also to the following types of policies:

1) Attempts to change the behavior of field-level bureaucratsthrough legal directives. Examples would include implemen-tation of special-education programs, the Miranda rule, andthe National Environmental Policy Act.

2) Attempts to change the behavior of local (and state) officialsthrough attaching conditions to the disbursement of funds.Examples would include implementation of Title I of theElementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as wellas the court orders and statutes involving schooldesegregation.

3) Attempts to change the behavior of private actors throughattaching conditions to the disbursement of funds. An exam-ple would be the job creation program examined by Pressmanand Wildavsky.

RECENT EFFORTS AT CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION. To datethere have been at least four major efforts to provide some concep-tual integration to the analysis of policy implementation. In one ofthe first attempts, Martin Rein and Francine Rabinovitz suggestedthat the implementation process be examined as the working out ofthree "imperatives:" 1) the respect for legal intent; 2) civil ser-vants' concern for instrumental rationality; and 3) the generalexpectation that concerted action requires consensus both within theimplementing agencies and in their external political system. ^ PaiilBerman focuses on the latter two "imperatives" in his analysis of theimplementation stages of federal social programs. He emphasizesthe adjustments that programs go through as they wind their waythrough federal bureaucracies resistant to change and local servicedelivery organizations which are sensitive to their immediate politicalenvironments and to the desires of "street-level" professionals (e .g. ,classroom teachers).^ Eugene Bardach provides a somewhat differ-ent approach by focusing on potential obstacles to the marshalling ofthe multitude of program elements necessary for the realization ofstatutory objectives. The unifying metaphor permeating his analysisis that the implementation process should be conceived as a seriesof games involving the efforts of numerous semiautonomous actorsto protect their interests and gain, access to program elements notunder their control—all within the face of considerable uncertaintyand the context of general expectations that something will beattempted consistent with the legal mandate.^"^ Whereas Bardach and,to a lesser extent, Rein and Rabinovitz view implementation from thestandpoint of the strategizing behavior of various actors, Donald VanMeter and Carl Van Horn provide a systems model of the implementa-tion process involving the following factors affecting program per-formance: 1) policy standards and resources (basically funds),

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2) support for those policies in the political environment, 3) eco-nomic and social conditions, 4) characteristics of the implementingagencies, 5) communication of policy standards and other decisionswithin and among implementing agencies, 6) incentives to promotecompliance with policy decisions, and 7) the policy dispositions ofimplementing officials.^-^

Collectively, these efforts provide a reasonable overview ofpolicy-making in terms of its complexity and the variety of factorsthat can either assure or impede successful implementation. But wefeel that more is needed. In the first place, more of an effort isneeded in conceptualizing and empirically exploring the linkagebetween individual behavior and the political, economic, and legalcontext in which it occurs. Second, all of the existing frameworksseriously underestimate the ability of a statute to "structure" theimplementation process. While most of them discuss the importanceof clear and consistent policy objectives, adequate financial re-sources , and, to a lesser extent, the incentives provided for com-pliance, they neglect the capacity of a statute to determine the num-ber of veto /clearance points, the formal access of various actors tothe implementation process, and, to some extent, the probable policypredispositions of implementation officials. Third, none of the avail-able frameworks explicitly addresses what might be termed the"tractability" or solvability of the problem(s) addressed by a publicpolicy. For example, why was it easier to achieve the objectives ofthe 1966 Voting Rights Act when the implementation of other civilrights laws and court decisions has been so problematic? Fourth,the frameworks of Berman and of Van Meter and Van Horn—theformer explicitly, the latter implicitly—apply only to programs whichseek to distribute goods and services. This neglects the large numberof programs which seek explicitly to regulate the behavior of privateactors in, for example, consumer and environmental protection,worker safety, and interstate commerce. Finally, the most compre-hensive framework to date—namely, that of Van Meter and Van Horn—suffers from some of the traditional defects of abstract systemsmodels. Many of the factors in their "model," while useful in ori-enting one's thinking, are essentially amorphous categories ratherthan variables that can be easily operationalized.^^ In addition,their framework does not identify which variables are controlled byvarious actors and is, therefore, unlikely to be of much use to policypractitioners.

Despite the limitations of these efforts at conceptualization, eachhas made important first steps to our understanding of policy imple-mentation, bur debt to them will be readily apparent throughout theremainder of this paper. At this point, however, our purpose hasbeen to indicate the directions which "second-generation" frameworksshould move.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS.Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usuallymade in a statute (although also possible through important execu-tive orders or court decisions). Ideally, that decision identifies theproblem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued,and, in a variety of ways, "structures" the implementation process.In the case of a statute regulating private economic behavior, the

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implementation process normally runs through a number of stagesbeginning with passage of the basic statute, followed by the policyoutputs (decisions) of the implementing agencies, the complianceof target groups with those decisions, the actual impacts—bothintended and unintended—of those outputs, the perceived impactsof agency decisions, and, finally, important revisions (or attemptedrevisions) in the basic statute.

In our view, the crucial role of implementation analysis is toidentify the factors which affect the achievement of statutory objec-tives throughout this entire process. These can be divided intothree broad categories: (1) the tractability of the problem(s) beingaddressed by the statute; (2) the ability of the statute to favorablystructure the implementation process; and (3) the net effect of avariety of "political" variables on the balance of support for statu-tory objectives. In the remainder of this section, we shall examineeach of the component variables and their potential effects.

The entire framework is presented in very skeletal form inFigure 1. It distinguishes the three categories of (independent)variables from the stages of implementation, which constitute thedependent variables. It should be noted, however, that each of thestages can affect subsequent ones; for example, the degree of tar-get group compliance with the policy decisions of implementing agen-cies certainly affects the actual impacts of those decisions.

Tractability of the Problem(s) Addressed by a Statute. Totallyapart from the difficulties universally associated with the implemen-tation of governmental programs, some social problems are mucheasier to deal with than others. Preserving neighborhood tranquilityfrom noise disturbances in Davis, California, is inherently a far moremanageable or tractable problem than the saf'e generation of electricalpower from nuclear energy. In the former, unlike the latter, thereis a clear understanding of the behavioral changes necessary to re-solve the problem; the behavior to be regulated is not very varied(primarily fraternity parties) and involves only a small subset of thetown's population; and the amount of behavioral change requiredamong target groups is quite modest. Discussed below are the numberof specific aspects of a social problem which affect the ability ofgovernmental institutions to achieve statutory objectives. While eachis a separate variable, they can be aggregated—at least conceptually—into a summary index of (inherent) tractability.^^

H) Difficulties in measuring changes in the seriousness of theproblem, in relating such changes back to modifications in the behaviorof target groups, and in developing the technology to enable targetgroups to institute such changes. Any regulatory program assumesthat by modifying the behavior of target groups the problem will beameliorated. For example, reducing sulfur emissions from power plantswill reduce the ambient air levels of sulfur dioxide and thereby improvepublic health. But this implies that ambient air levels can be measuredrelatively inexpensively and that a causal model exists which relatesemissions from specific sources to ambient air levels and, in turn, tohealth effects on specific subsets of the population.

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Moreover, many programs are predicated upon the availa-biUty of technologies without which changes in target group behav-ior will not achieve the desired objectives. For example, reductionin sulfur emissions from power plants is contingent upon findinga reliable and relatively inexpensive technology for removing sulfurfrom coal either before or after it is used in power generation—withconsiderable dispute between utilities and the Environmental Protec-tion Agency over whether such a technology is presently available.Other social problems beset by serious technological difficultiesinclude pollution emissions from automobiles, the storage of nuclearwastes, and agricultural pest control.

The absence of a valid causal theory and/or the requisite tech-nology in turn poses a number of difficulties for the successful imple-mentation of statutory objectives. First, any program poses costs totaxpayers (in the form of program administration) and to targetgroups. To the extent that these costs cannot be justified by mea-surable improvements in the problem being addressed, political sup-port for the program will almost surely decline and thus statutoryobjectives will be either ignored or modified. Second, disputes overthe availability of the requisite technology will produce strong pres-sures for delaying deadlines for achieving statutory objectives and/orconsiderable uncertainty over the most effective means of encouragingtechnological innovation—as the very problematic implementation ofthe "technology-forcing" provisions of the 1970 Federal Clean AirAmendments amply demonstrates.

(2) Diversity of behavior being regulated. The more diverse thebehavior being regulated, the more difficult it becomes to frame clearregulations and thus the less likely that statutory objectives will beattained. For example, one of the major obstacles confronting theimplementation of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Amendmentshas been the extreme diversity in the type and seriousness of dis-charges from the nation's estimated 62,000 point sources. Such varia-tion makes the writing of precise overall regulations essentially impos-sible, with the result that regulations for each industry and firm haveto be negotiated on an ad hoc basis with considerable discretion leftto field personnel.

(3) Percentage of population within a political jurisdiction whosebehavior needs to be changed. In general, the smaller and moredefinable (isolatable) the target group whose behavior needs to bechanged, the more likely the mobilization of political support in favorof the program and thus the more probable the achievement of statu-tory objectives. For example, the successful implementation of the1965 Voting Rights Act derived in large part from the fact that itapplied to a fairly specific set of abuses among voting registrars inonly seven southern states. This facilitated the formation of astrong constituency in support of the legislation. In contrast, civilrights have been notably less successful when dealing with country-wide problems such as housing discrimination and de facto schoolsegregation.

(4) Extent of behavioral change required of target groups. Theamount of behavioral modification required to achieve statutory objec-tives is a function of the (absolute) number of people in the ultimate

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target groups and the amount of change required of them. Thebasic hypothesis is, of course, that the greater the amount ofbehavioral change, the more problematic successful implementation.

In short, some problems are far more tractable than others.Programs which address the former are much more likely to be effec-tive in producing the desired changes in the behavior of targetgroups and, in turn, in ameliorating the problem being addressed.This brief review of the variables involved suggests that problemsare most tractable if (1) there is a valid theory connecting behav-ioral change to problem amelioration; the requisite technology exists;and, measurement of change in the seriousness of the problem isinexpensive (2) there is minimal variation in the behavioral practiceswhich cause the problem; (3) the target group constitutes an easilyidentifiable minority of the population within a political jurisdiction;and (4) the amount of behavipral change is modest. For example,the success of the 1965 Voting Rights Act in drastically improvingthe percentage of blacks voting in the South can ultimately be tracedlargely to the first and third reasons, even though the amount of be-havioral change among Southern voting officials was considerable. Incontrast, the implementation of federal occupational health and safetylegislation has been exacerbated by the extreme diversity of thepractices being regulated, the extensive amount of behavioral changerequired (particularly in small manufacturing establishments), and,to a lesser extent, problems in actually measuring health and safetybenefits.

Nevertheless, one should be cautious not to place too muchemphasis on the tractability of the problem being addressed. Afterall, one of the goals of policy analysis is to develop better toolsfor addressing heterogeneous problems which demand substantialbehavioral change. It is also conceivable that more adequate causaltheories, better methods of measurement, and the requisite tech-nologies can be developed. Finally, one of the purposes of ourimplementation framework is to show how even relatively difficultproblems can be ameliorated through a more adequate understandingof the manner in which statutory and political variables affect themobilization of support necessary to bring about rather substantialbehavioral change. It is to an examination of these variables thatwe now turn.

Extent to Which the Statute Coherently Structures the ImplementationProcess. From the perspective of our framework, a statute consti-tutes the fundamental policy decision being implemented in that itindicates the problem(s) being addressed and stipulates the objec-tive(s) to be pursued. It also has the capacity to "structure" theentire implementation process through its selection of the imple-menting institutions; through providing legal and financial resourcesto those institutions; through biasing the probable policy orientationsof agency officials; and through regulating the opportunities for par-ticipation by nonagency actors in the implementation process. Tothe extent that the statute stipulates a set of clear and consistentobjectives, incorporates a sound theory relating behavioral change tothose objectives, and then structures the implementation process ina fashion conducive to obtaining such behavioral change, the possibi-ties for attaining statutory objectives are enhanced—even if theamount of behavioral change sought in target groups is considerable.

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(1) Validity of the causal theory underlying statute. Explic-itly or implicitly, a statute implies an underl3ang causal theory:Given a stipulated objective and the assignment of certain rights andresponsibilities to various implementing institutions, the targetgroups will behave in the prescribed fashion and the objective willbe attained. Within this theory, however, there are two separatecomponents: "technical validity" and "implementation effective-ness."^-^ The former refers to the relationship between targetgroup behavior and the attainment of statutory objectives—in thecase of air pollution control, the relationship between pollutant emis-sions , on the one hand, and the protection of human health and prop-erty on the other.^5 The latter concerns the ability of implementinginstitutions to produce the requisite behavioral changes in the tar-get groups, preferably with a minimum of adverse side effects.Both components must be valid if statutory objectives are to beattained.

The remaining variables in this section all relate to the "imple-mentation effectiveness" component. At this point we would simplylike to underline the point that a sound "technical" component mustnot only be available but also must be incorporated into a statute ifits objectives are to be attained.

(2) Precision and clear ranking of statutory objectives. Statu-tory objectives which are precise and clearly ranked in importanceserve as an indispensable aid in program evaluation, as unambiguousdirectives to implementing officials, and as a resource available tosupporters of those objectives.^6 with respect to the last, for exam-ple, implementing officials confronted with objections to their pro-grams can sympathize with the aggrieved party but neverthelessrespond that they are only following the legislature's instructions.Clear objectives can also serve as a resource to actors within andexternal to the implementing institutions who perceive discrepanciesbetween agency outputs and those objectives (particularly if thestatute also provides them formal access to the implementationprocess, e.g. via citizen suit provisions).

While the desirability of unambiguous policy directives withina given statute is normally understood, it is also important that astatute assigned for implementation to an already existing agencyclearly indicate the relative priority that the new directives are toplay in the totality of the agency's programs. If this is not done,the new directives are likely to undergo considerable delay and beaccorded low priority as they struggle for incorporation into theagency's operating procedures. In short, to the extent that a statuteprovides precise and clearly ranked instructions to implementingofficials and other actors—controlling for required departure fromthe status quo ante—the more likely that the policy outputs of theimplementing agencies and ultimately the behavior of target groupswill be consistent with those directives.

(3) Financial resources available to the implementing agency.Money is obviously necessary to hire the staff and to conduct the tech-nical analyses involved in the development of regulations, the admin-istration of permit programs, and the monitoring of compliance. More-over, we shall subsequently argue that there are tremendous pressures

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for regulatory programs to gradually substitute side-paymentsfor police power decisions over time, e.g., to purchase publiceasements rather than try to force land developers to provide attheir own expense public rights of way to beaches. In general, athreshold level of funding is necessary for there to be any possi-bility of achieving statutory objectives, and the level of fundingabove this threshold is (up to some saturation point) proportional tothe probability of achieving those objectives.^-^

(4) The extent of hierarchical integration within and amongimplementing institutions. Numerous studies of the implementationof regulatory and social service programs have demonstrated thatone of the principal obstacles is the difficulty of obtaining coor-dinated action within any given agency and among the numeroussemi-autonomous agencies involved in most implementation efforts.The problem is particularly acute in federal statutes which rely onstate and local agencies for carrying out the details of programdelivery in a very heterogeneous system. Thus one of the mostimportant attributes of any statute is the extent to which it hierar-chically integrates the implementing agencies. To the extent thatthe system is only loosely integrated, there will be considerablevariation in the degree of behavioral compliance among implementingofficials and target groups—as each responds to the incentive formodification within his/her local setting.

The degree of hierarchical integration among implementingagencies is determined by (a) the number of veto/clearance pointsinvolved in the attainment of statutory objectives and (b) the extentto which supporters of statutory objectives are provided with induce-ments and sanctions sufficient to assure acquiescence among thosewith a potential veto. Veto/clearance points involve those occasionsin which an actor has the capacity (quite apart from the question oflegal authority) to impede the achievement of statutory objectives. ^ Resistance from specific veto points can, however, be overcome ifthe statute provides sufficient sanctions and/or inducements to con-vince the actor (whether implementing officials or target groups) toalter their behavior. In short, if these sanctions and inducementsare great enough, the number of veto points can delay—but prob-ably never ultimately impede—compliance by target groups. Inpractice, however, the compliance incentives are usually sufficientlymodest that the number of veto/clearance points become extremelyimportant, and thus the most direct route to a statutory objective—e.g., a negative income tax to provide a minimum income—is normallypreferable to complex programs administered by numerous semi-autonomous bureaucracies.

(5) Extent to which decision rules of implementing agenciesare supportive of statutory objectives. In addition to providingclear and consistent objectives, few veto points, and adequate incen-tives for compliance, a statute can further bias the implementationprocess by stipulating the formal decision rules of the implementingagencies.-^^ To the extent, for example, that the burden of proofin permit/licensing cases is placed on the applicant and agency offi-cials are required to make findings fully consistent with statutoryobjectives, the decisions of implementing agencies are more likelyto be consistent with statutory objectives. In addition, a statute can

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assign authority to make final decisions within implementing insti-tutions to those officials who are most likely to support statutoryobjectives. Finally, when multi-membered commissions are involved,the statute can stipulate the majority required for specific actions.In the case of regulatory agencies which operate primarily throughthe granting of permits or licenses, decision rules which make thegranting of a permit contingent upon substantial consensus, e.g. a2/3 majority, are obviously conducive to stringent regulation.

(6) Assignment to implementing agencies/officials committed tostatutory objectives. No matter how well a statute structures theformal decision process, the attainment of statutory objectives whichseek to significantly modify target group behavior is unlikely unlessofficials in the implementing agencies are strongly committed to theachievement of those objectives. Any new program requires imple-mentors who are not merely neutral but sufficiently persistent todevelop new regulations and standard operating procedures, and toenforce them in the face of resistance from target groups and frompublic officials reluctant to make the mandated changes.

In principle, there are a number of mechanisms available tostatutory framers to reasonably assure that implementing officialshave the requisite commitment to statutory objectives. First, theresponsibility for implementation can be assigned to agencies whosepolicy orientation is consistent with the statute and which will accordthe new program high priority. 20 This is most likely when a newagency is created specifically to administer the statute, as the pro-gram will necessarily be its highest priority and the creation of newpositions opens the door to a vast infusion of statutory supporters.Alternatively, implementation can be assigned to a prestigiousexisting agency which perceives the new mandate to be compatiblewith its traditional orientation and is looking for new programs.Second, the statute can often stipulate that top implementing offi-cials be selected from social sectors which generally support thelegislation's objectives. For example, several studies of state andregional land use agencies have shown that local elected officials aregenerally more likely to approve developments than appointees ofstate officials. ^^ In fact, it is the generally limited practicability ofstatutes to assign implementation to agency officials committed to itsobjectives which probably lies behind many cases of suboptimalaccomplishment of statutory objectives.

(7) Extent to which opportunities for participation by actorsexternal to the implementing agencies are biased toward supportersof statutory objectives. Just as a statute can bias the implemen-tation process through design characteristics of implementing agen-cies, it can also affect the participation of two groups of actorsexternal to those institutions: a) the potential beneficiaries andtarget groups of the program and b) the legislative, executive, andjudicial sovereigns of the agencies.

In most regulatory programs, for example, the target groups donot have problems with legal standing nor do they generally lack thefinancial incentives to pursue their case in court if displeased withagency decisions. In contrast, the beneficiaries of most consumerand environmental protection legislation individually do not have asufficiently direct and salient interest at stake to obtain legal standing

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and to bear the costs of petitioning adverse agency decisions tojudicial and legislative sovereigns. Thus statutes which provideliberal rules of standing for citizen participation as formal inter-venors in agency proceedings and as petitioners in judicial review(in the form of mandamus actions requiring agency officials tocomply with statutory provisions) are more likely to have theirobjectives attained. ^^

Statutes can also affect the scope and the direction of over-sight by agency sovereigns. On the one hand, requirements forformal evaluation studies and provisions which centralize formallegislative oversight in the hands of the statute's chief sponsorte.g., via a select committee of which he/she is chairman) are prob-ably conducive to the achievement of statutory objectives. On theother hand, provisions for legislative veto of administrative regula-tions are probably inimical to the achievement of those objectivessimply because the target groups are likely to be much better or-ganized and to have more incentives for appeeiling to legislatorsthan are the beneficiaries of regulation.

In sum, a carefully drafted statute can substantially affectthe extent to which its objectives are attained. More precisely,legislation which seeks to significantly change target group behav-ior in order to achieve its objectives is most likely to succeed if1) it incorporates a valid causal theory linking behavioral change todesired impacts; 2) its objectives are precise and clearly ranked;3) it provides adequate funds to the implementing agencies; 4) thenumber of veto points in the implementation process is minimized andsanctions/inducements are provided to overcome resistance; 5) thedecision rules of the implementing agencies are biased toward theachievement of statutory objectives; 6) implementation is assignedto agencies which support the legislation's objectives and will givethe program high priority; and 7) the provisions for outsider par-ticipation are similarly biased through liberalized rules of standingand by centralizing oversight in the hands of statutory supporters.

Non-Statutory Variables Affecting Implementation, While a statuteestablishes the basic legal structure in which the politics of imple-mentation take place, implementation also has an inherent dynamismdriven by at least two important processes; 1) the need for any pro-gram which seeks to change behavior to receive constant and/or peri-odic infusions of political support if it is to overcome the inertia anddelay inherent in seeking cooperation and acquiescence amonp- larp-enumbers of people, many of whom perceive their interests to be ad-versely affected by successful implementation of statutory objectives;and 2) the effect of continuous changes in socio-economic and tech-nological conditions on the reservoir of support for those objectivesamong the general public, interest groups, and sovereigns. Inaddition to these changes over time, there is usually enormous varia-tion in crucial independent variables—e.g. the seriousness of theproblem being addressed, relevant socio-economic conditions, publicopinion—among governmental jurisdictions in which the same statuteis being implemented.

The policy outputs of implementing agencies are essentially afunction of the interaction between legal structure and politicalprocess. Whereas a statute which provides little institutionalized

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bias leaves implementing officials very dependent upon variationsin political support over time and among local settings, a well-drafted statute can provide them with sufficient policy directionand legal resources to withstand short-term changes in publicopinion and considerable capacity to bring about the desired behav-ioral changes in widely different local jurisdictions.

This section will discuss the major non-legal variables affectingthe policy outputs of implementing agencies, target group compliancewith those decisions, and ultimately the achievement of statutory ob-jectives. It will begin with clearly exogenous variables, e.g.,changes in socio-economic conditions; move through essentially inter-vening variables, e.g. attitudes of sovereigns and constituencygroups, and deal finally with the variable most directly affecting thepolicy outputs of implementing agencies, namely the commitment andleadership skill of agency officials.

(1) Variation over time and among governmental jurisdictions insocial, economic, and technological conditions affecting the attain-ability of statutory objectives. There are at least four ways in whichvariation m such conditions over time and among local settings cansubstantially affect the political support for statutory objectivesand, hence, the policy outputs of implementing agencies and even-tually the achievement of statutory objectives.

First, variation in socio-economic conditions can affect percep-tions of the relative importance of the problem addressed by a statute.To the extent that other social problems become relatively more impor-tant over time, political support for allocating scarce resources tothe original statute is likely to diminish.^^ Second, successful imple-mentation is rendered more difficult by local variation in socio-economic conditions and, as indicated previously, in the seriousnessof the problem being addressed. Such variation produces enormouspressures for "flexible" regulations and considerable administrativediscretion to local units. But such discretion increases the probabil-ity of variation in the extent to which the policy outputs of imple-menting agencies are consistent with statutory objectives. On theother hand, the imposition of uniform standards on jurisdictions withwidely different situations almost inevitably increases opposition fromthose who must bear costs which appear unjust. In either case,statutory objectives are less likely to be achieved. Third, supportfor regulation aimed at environmental or consumer protection orworker safety seems to be correlated with the economic viability oftarget groups and their relative importance in the total economy. 24Thus the more diverse an economy and the more prosperous thetarget groups, the more probable the effective implementation of sta-tutes imposing nonproductive costs on them. The lower the diversityand prosperity, the more likely the substitution of subsidies for policepower regulation. Finally, in the case of policies (such as pollution con-trol) which are directly tied to technology, changes or lack of changes inthe technological state of the art over time is obviously crucial.

In short, social, economic and technological conditions are someof the principal exogenous variables affecting the policy outputs ofimplementing agencies and ultimately the attainment of statutoryobjectives. The primary linkage is through changes in interestgroup and public support for statutory objectives and/or through

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the legislative and executive sovereigns of the implementing agen-cies. Alternatively, implementing officials may respond directly(i.e. without any intervening variables) to changes in environmen-tal conditions, particularly if they perceive those changes to besupportive of their programs or preferences.

(2) The amount and continuity of media attention to the problemaddressed by a statute. The mass media are important m the imple-mentation process for at least two reasons. First, they are generallya crucial intervening variable between changes in socio-economicconditions and perceptions of those changes by the general publicand, to a lesser extent, political elites. This is particularly truefor events beyond the local political arena, where most individualshave little direct experience.

Secondly, the tendency for most television stations and news-papers to play an issue to the hilt and then go on to something elseis a real obstacle to the constant infusion of political support fromthe very diffuse beneficiaries of most environmental and consumerprotection programs. 5 This tendency of the media to have a short"issue-attention span" is, in turn, a function of many factors—oneof the most important of which is the tendency of most communica-tions organizations to rely on general assignment reporters ratherthan specialists on specific topics. This suggests that programswhich are monitored by specialist reporters will receive above normalmedia attention over a sustained period of time and—given mediasupport or at least neutrality—are more likely to be effectivelyimplemented. 26

(3) Variations over time and jurisdiction in public support forstatutory objectives. The previous discussion has suggested thatinterest among the general public in a statute or the problem itaddresses tends to be cyclical which, in turn, makes it difficultfor any program to receive sustained political support. Similarly,variation among political jurisdictions in support for a particularprogram is likely to result in pressures for ambiguous regulationand considerable discretion to local officials—both of which prob-ably make behavioral change more difficult to achieve.

The general public can influence the implementation process inat least three ways: 1) Public opinion (and its interaction with themass media) can strongly affect the political agenda, i .e. , theissues to be discussed by legislatures. 2) There is substantial evi-dence that legislators are influenced by their general constituentson issues of salience to those constitutents, particularly whenopinion within the district is relatively homogenous.27 3) Finally,public opinion polls are often employed by administrators and sov-ereigns to support particular policy positions. For example, theEnvironmental Protection Agency sponsored a survey in 1973-74 torefute the conventional wisdom that the Arab oil embargo had sub-stantially undermined public support for pollution control measures;when the poll essentially confirmed the agency's position, it usedthis information extensively in an effort to convince Congress notto emasculate the 1970 Clean Air Amendments. 2^

Changes in the resources and attitudes of constituencygroups toward statutory objectives and the policy outputs of

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implementing institutions. The basic dilemma confronting pro-ponents of any regulatory program seeking a change in the behaviorof one or more target groups is that public support for their positionwill almost invariable decline over time. Normally, such statutes arethe result of very heightened public concern with a general problemsuch as environmental quality or consumer protection. Such concernsoon wanes as the public and the media turn to other issues and asthe costs of such programs on specific segments of the populationdraw away previous supporters and intensify opposition. ^^ The6^ential—and very problematic—task confronting proponents is totranslate the diffuse support which helped pass the initial legisla-tion into viable organizations with sufficient membership, cohesion,and expertise to be accepted as legitimate and necessary partici-pants in important policy decisions by both implementing officialsand their legislative/executive sovereigns.

On the other hand, the opponents of the mandated change gen-erally have the resources and incentives to intervene actively in theimplementation process. Their organizational resources and accessto expertise enable them to make an effective case before administra-tive agencies and, if displeased with their decisions, to initiateappeals to the legislative sovereigns, to the courts, and to publicopinion. Because opponents can generally intervene more activelyover a longer period of time than proponents, it has long been notedthat most regulatory agencies eventually recognize that survival inan unbalanced political environment necessitates some accommodationwith the interests of target groups and thus less departure from thestatus quo than envisaged by the original statutory mandate. '

Constituency groups interact with the other variables in ourframework in a number of ways. 31 First, their membership and finan-cial resources are likely to vary with public support for their positionand with the amount of behavioral change mandated by statutory ob-jectives. Second, constituency groups can intervene directly in thedecisions of the implementing agencies both through commenting onproposed decisions and through supplementing the agency's resources.Finally, such groups have the capacity to affect agency policy indi-rectly through publishing studies critical of the agency's perform-ance, through public opinion campaigns, and through appeals to itslegislative and judicial sovereigns.

(5) Continued support for statutory objectives among sover-eigns of implementing institutions via a) amount and direction of~oversight and b) extent of new (i.e. after original statute) andconflicting legal mandateFi The sovereigns of an implementingagency are those institutions which control its legal and financialresources. They will normally include the legislature (and, morespecifically, the relevant policy and fiscal committees); the chiefexecutive; the courts; and, in intergovernmental programs, hier-archically superior agencies.

One of the major difficulties in the implementation of intergo-vernmental programs is that implementing agencies are responsible todifferent sovereigns who wish to pursue different policies. In suchsituations, we would suggest that, when an intergovernmental subor-dinate is faced with conflicting directives from its intergovernmentalsuperiors and its coordinate sovereigns, it will ultimately lean toward

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the directives of the sovereigns who will most affect its legal andfinancial resources over the longest period of time. For example,when a state agency is faced with conflicting directives from a fed-eral agency and the state legislature, institutional survival requiresthat it give its primary loyalty to the sovereign most likely to affectits vital resources—which, in almost any conceivable case, will bethe state legislature. In relations between a local agency and itsstate superiors, however, the situation is not nearly so predictable,in large part because local governments generally have less consti-tutional autonomy vis-a-vis states than do the states vis-a-vis thefederal government.

These difficulties in intergovernmental programs aside, sov-ereigns can affect the policies pursued by implementing agenciesthrough both informal oversight and formal changes in the agency'slegal and financial resources.

Oversight refers to the continuous interaction between anagency and its legislative (and executive) sovereigns in the form offormal oversight hearings, consultation with staff and legislators onthe key committees, routine requests from legislators concerning con-stituent complaints, etc. On the one hand, there appear to berather strong reasons for legislative policy committees to become in-creasingly sympathetic to target groups over time, in part as a re-flection of changes in the balance of interest group support, in partbecause constituency casework appears to be weighted toward com-plaints . On the other hand, legislative sovereigns supportive of astringent regulatory program can play a crucial role in the success-ful implementation of such statutes if they have the resources andthe desire to do so. Here we come to Eugene Bardach's extremelyinteresting concept of a "fixer," i.e. an important legislator or execu-tive official who controls resources important to crucial actors andwho has the desire and the staff resources to closely monitor theimplementation process and to intervene on an almost continuousbasis.

On a more formal level, sovereigns have the authority toalter and /or undermine the legal and financial resources of imple-menting agencies. There have, for example been statutes which havebeen essentially emasculated by the courts or through the appropria-tions process. ^^ Legislatures also have the authority to substantiallyrevise and even revoke statutes; in fact, the first major effort to doso marks the end of what we have termed the short-term implementa-tion process. But the most frequent effects may well be of a moreindirect nature. As indicated previously, almost any statute isaffected by policies outside its specific domain. Changes in any ofthese can strongly affect support for statutory objectives and/or thenumber of veto points involved in statutory implementation. The roleof an agency and its legislative supporters is to be aware of theseramifications and to make sure that they are explicitly addressed by(subsequent) legislation. In short, the very interrelatedness ofpolicy areas in any complex society enormously increases the moni-toring responsibility of the protectors of any particular statute andthus the probability that the statute will gradually be underminedthrough subsequent tangential legislation.

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(6) Commitment and leadership skill of (supportive) imple-menting officials. We finally come to the variable most directly af-fecting the policy outputs of implementing agencies, namely, thecommitment of agency officials to the realization of statutory objec-tives. This comprises at least two components: First, the directionand ranking of the statutory objectives in officials' preference or-derings, and, second, their skill in realizing those preferencesi.e. their ability to go beyond what could reasonably be expected inusing the available resources. The importance of both attitudes andskill will, of course, vary with the amount of discretion affordedadministrators.

The commitment of agency officials will partially—and, in somecases, largely—be a function of the capacity of the statute toinstitutionalize a bias in the implementing agencies through its selec-tion of institutions and top officials (see p. 547). It will also bea function of professional norms, personal values, and support forstatutory objectives among interest groups and sovereigns in theagencies' political environment. In general, the commitment of agencyofficials to statutory objectives—and the consequent probability oftheir successful implementation—will be highest in a new agency withhigh visibility which was created after an intense political campaign.After the initial period, however, the degree of commitment willprobably decline over time as the most committed people becomeburned out and disillusioned with bureaucratic routine, to be re-placed by officials much more interested in security than in takingrisks to attain policy goals. 33

But commitment to statutory objectives will contribute little totheir attainment unless accompanied by skill in using available re-sources to that end. Usually discussed under the rubric of "leader-ship," this comprises both political and managerial elements. Theformer refers to the ability to develop good working relationshipswith sovereigns in the agency's subsystems, to convince opponentsand target groups that they are being treated fairly, to mobilizesupport among latent supportive constituencies, to adroitly presentthe agency's case through the mass media, etc. Managerial skillinvolves developing adequate controls so that the program is notsubject to charges of fiscal mismanagement, to maintaining highmorale among agency personnel, and to managing internal dissent insuch a way that outright opponents are shunted off to noncrucialpositions.

On the whole, however, leadership skill remains a rather elusiveconcept. While everyone acknowledges its importance, its attributesvary from situation to situation and thus it is extremely difficultto predict whether specific individuals will go beyond what couldreasonably be expected in using the available resources in supportof statutory objectives.

Stages (or Dependent Variables) in the Implementation Process.The discussion thus far has focused on the generic factors affectingthe implementation process as a whole. But that process must beviewed in terms of its several stages: (1) the policy outputs (deci-sions) of the implementing agencies; (2) the compliance of targetgroups with those decisions; (3) the actual impacts of agency deci-sions; (4) the perceived impacts of those decisions; and finally,(5) the political system's evaluation of a statute in terms of major

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revisions (or attempted revisions) in its content. All of thesestages are often lumped together under the rubric of "feedbackloop." But one must distinguish two separate processes: If oneis concerned only with the extent to which actual impacts conformto statutory objectives, then only the first three stages are perti-nent. In our view, however, one should also consider the politicalsystem's summary evaluation of a statute, which necessarilyinvolves the latter two stages as well.

Each of these stages can be thought of as an end point or de-pendent variable. Each is also, however, an input into successivestages. For example, compliance of target groups with the policydecisions of the implementing agencies clearly affects the actualimpacts of those decisions. Likewise, the perceived impacts ofagency decisions are probably the crucial variable affecting(attempted) revisions in the agency's statutory mandate.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK. In order to provide some con-crete examples of the manner in which statutory and political vari-ables interact as the implementation process moves through the stagesof the process, two scenarios of implementation are presented inFigures 2 and 3. Figure 2 represents what is usually consideredthe typical pattern of initial zeal and success followed by a gradualdecline. Figure 3 represents the more positive but less frequent pat-tern of continuing success over time. It is assumed in both scenariosthat the precondition of a valid causal theory underlies the statute.

As we suggest in the scenarios, successful implementation inthe short-run is especially dependent on the strength of the statute,particularly the degree of hierarchical integration, the commitmentof agency officials, the presence of a "fixer," and the resources ofvarious constituency groups. In the long-run, however, it is chang-ing socio-economic conditions and the ability of supportive consti-tuency groups to effectively intervene in the process that areprobably the most important. To summarize, in terms of a minimumlist of crucial conditions, we contend that a statute or other policydecision seeking a substantial departure from the status quo is mostlikely to achieve its desired goals under the following set ofconditions:

1) The enabling legislation or other legal directive mandatespolicy objectives which are clear and consistent (or at leastprovides substantive criteria for resolving goal conflicts).

2) The enabling legislation incorporates a sound theory iden-tifying the principal factors and causal linkages affectingpolicy objectives, as well as the changes in the behavior oftarget groups (the regulated) and other conditions neces-sary to attain the desired goals.

3) The enabling legislation not only gives implementing agen-cies sufficient jurisdiction over the target groups and othercritical areas of intervention but also structures the imple-mentation process so as to maximize the probability thattarget groups will perform as desired.

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Figure 2. Gradual Erosion Scenario

Conformity ofpolicy outputs

withstatutory

objectives

1.0 Initialstart-upproblems

.5

0

Gradual erosion ofconstituency supportand consequent "nibblingaway" at statute--exacerbated by loss of

corrjnitted staff

Death of "fixer"

5 10 15 20Years after passage of ini t ia l statute

The statute clearly mandates significant behavioral change.While the principal implementing agency is given extensive powers,it must work through state and local governments and, moreover, isdependent on private corporations for development of the new tech-nologies necessary to achieve statutory objectives. In short, thereare a rather large number of veto points. The lead agency is staffedinitially by strong supporters of the statute, but their enthusiasmleads them to "cut corners" in proposing regulations, thereby under-mining the agency's credibility. Moreover, the commitment of agencyofficials declines as enthusiastic staff wear out and leave, to bereplaced by more professional-manageri£tl types anxious to reduceconflict with target groups. Meanwhile, the agency's supportiveconstituency declines over time, while opposition is vociferous, well-organized, and exacerbated somewhat by a decline in the generaleconomy. Opponents' efforts to emasculate the statute are, how-ever generally thwarted by a very able "fixer" in the short-run.Eventually he dies, and the statute suffers substantial revision,although not total repeal. The statute results in substantial behav-ioral change, although not as much as required in the formal objec-tives. But conformity of the policy outputs of implementing agencieswith statutory objectives declines over time—particularly after thedeath of the fixer—and, thus, there is some erosion in impacts.

This scenario bears some passing resemblance to the (past andand future) implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act.

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Figure 3. The Successful Regulation Scenario

CDheU COCO O

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00

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Strong staff andconstituency

support

Originalstaff

leave Continued strong publicand constituency suppor

/ ^ P o l i c y outputs of implementing agency/ T a r g e t group compliance

5 10 15 20 25

Years after passage of initial statute

Confronted with a rather limited and well-defined set of prob-lems, the proponents of regulation mobilize sufficient public andlegislative support to pass a strong statute which establishes a newagency with virtually exclusive jurisdiction over the problem area.The agency is staffed intially by officials strongly committed to itsobjectives. Backed by strong public and constituency support,they quickly establish policies consistent with those objectives.Target group compliance is high, in part because non-complianceis very visible and in part because agency staff are assisted bysupportive constituency groups. After a few years, the originalstaff leave to go on to more exciting jobs, but the conformity ofpolicy outputs and target group compliance with statutory objec-tives remains high because of the limited nature of the problem,the continued presence of strong public and constituency ^oupsupport, no substantial decline in the local economy, and con-tinued support from local legislators. Because target group com-pliance is directly related to the achievement of statutory objec-tives, the statute continues to have the desired impacts overtime.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom concerning the inef-fectiveness of governmental regulation, this scenario is notsimply a fair3r tale but instead bears a rather close resemblanceto the experience of the San Francisco Bay Conservation andDevelopment Commission.

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4) The leaders of the implementing agency possess substan-tial managerial and political skill and are committed tostatutory goals.

5) The program is actively supported by organized consti-tuency groups and by a few key legislators (or a chiefexecutive) throughout the implementation process, withthe courts being neutral or supportive.

6) The relative priority of statutory objectives is not under-mined over time by the emergence of conflicting publicpolicies or by changes in relevant socio-economic conditionswhich undermine the statute's causal theory or politicalsupport.

NOTES

• Jerome Murphy, State Education Agencies and DiscretionaryFunds (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974); Milbrey McLaughlin,Evaluation and Reform; ESEA, Title I (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger,1975); Richard Weatherly and Michael Lipsky, "Street Level Bureau-crats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special EducationReform," Harvard Educational Review, 47 (May 1977), 171-197.

^Martha Derthick, New Towns In-Town (Washington, D.C.: UrbanInstitute, 1972); Rufus Browning and Dale Marshall, "Implementationof Model Cities and Revenue Sharing in Ten Bay Area Cities: Designand First Findings," in Public Policy Making in a Federal System,ed. by Charles Jones and Robert Thomas, Vol. Ill of Sage Year-book in Politics and Piiblic Policy (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976) ,191-216.

Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Carl Van Horn,"Implementing CETA: The Federal Role," Policy Analysis, 4(Spring 1978), 159-183.

Harrel Rodgers and Charles Bullock, Coercion to Compliance(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976); Gary Orfield, The Recon-struction of Southern Education: The Schools and the 1964 CivilRights Act (N.Y.: Wiley, 1969).

^Charles Jones, Clean Air (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh UniversityPress, 1975); Bruce Ackerman et al.. The Uncertain Search forEnvironmental Quality (N.Y.: Free Press, 1974); Harvey Lieber,Federalism and Clean Waters (Lexington: Heath, 1974); RichardLiroff, A National Policy for the Environment: NEPA and Its After-math (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

Robert Alford, Health Care Politics (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1975).

'Erwin Hargrove, The Missing Link: The Study of the Implemen-tation of Social Policy (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1975);Harold Luft, "Benefit Cost Analysis and Pxiblic Policy Implementa-tion," Pxjblic Policy, 24 (Fall 1976), 437-462; Martin Rein andFrancine Rabinovitz, Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective,Working Paper No. 43 (Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies,March 1977); Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game (Cambridge:

557

MIT Press, 1977); Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn, "ThePolicy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework," Adminis-tration and Society, 6 (Feb. 1975), 445-488; Paul Berman, "TheStudy of Macro- and Micro-Implementation," Public Policy, 26(Spring 1978) , 157-184; Lawrence Baxam, "Implementation of JudicialDecisions," American Politics Quarterly, 4 (January 1976), 86-114;Giandomenico Majone and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation as Evolu-tion (N.Y.: Russell Sage Discussion Papers, 1977); Walter Williamsand Richard Elmore, ed., Social Program Implementation (N.Y.:Academic Press, 1976), Chapter 2.

and Rabinovitz, Implementation, p. 39.

^Berman, "Macro- and Micro-Implementation," pp. 157-184.

l^Bardach, The Implementation Game, Chaps. 3-6, especiallypp. 51-57.

Meter and Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process."

for example, "political environment." While theamount of support for policy objectives among various actors inthe agency's political environment undoubtedly influences agencydecisions, one needs to distinguish support among the agency's sov-ereigns (who control its financial and legal resources) from thatamong organized interest groups, peer agencies, and the generalpublic because each has different resources and pursues differentstrategies for influencing agency decisions.

"inherent" we mean inherent in the nature of the problemitself, given technical and practical constraints that cannot beremoved through hiiman effort (at least not in the short-term) .Hence our focus on the availability of a valid technical theory,variation in target group behavior, etc. We do not include thepolitical resources of target groups, as these are discussed laterunder "political resources of constituency groups." For an excel-lent discussion of intractable problems, see Richard Nelson,"intellectualizing about the Moon-Ghetto Metaphor," Policy Sciences,5 (Dec. 1974), 376-377.

terms are taken from Berman, " Macro- and Micro-Implementation," p. 163; see also Pressman and Wildavsky,Implementation, preface.

• In their analysis of the implementation of the PublicWorks and Economic Development Act in Oakland, for example. Press-man and Wildavsky argue persuasively that the underlying technicaltheory that minority employment can be improved through s\ibsidizingcapital was simply invalid—or certainly very inefficient—in agenerally healthy economy such as Oakland's. A far more validstrategy would have been a direct labor subsidy to businesseswhich hired minority workers (Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementa-tion, pp. 149-159).

would like to suggest that the clarity and consistencyof statutory objectives be conceptualized along the followingordinal scale:

i) Ambiguous objectives. These include both meaninglessinjunctions to regulate "in the public interest" and man-dates to balance potentially conflicting objectives, e.g.air quality and industrial employment, withoutestablishing priorities among them.

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ii) Definite "tilt." This involves a relatively clear rankingof potentially conflicting rather general objectives,e.g. "improve air quality even if it results in someunemployment."

iii) Qualitative objectives. These involve a rather precisequalitative mandate to, for example, "protect air qualityso as to maintain the public health, including that ofsusceptible populations." Note that this qualitativeobjective is considerably more precise than that \indera "tilt."

iv) Quantitative objectives, e.g. reduce automotive emissionsfrom 1970 levels by 90 percent by December 31, 1975.

Clearly, the last objective constitutes a greater resource toproponents of change than the first.

•^^Determining what constitutes adequate financial resourcesis, however, extremely difficult, except to note that it must berelated to the seriousness of the problem(s) to be addressed (withper capita expenditures often used as a very crude indicator).

calculating the total number of such points, one mustsum those involved in the development of general rules and opera-ting procedures, the disposition of specific cases, and theenforcement of those decisions. One must also consider the pos-sibility that implementing agencies are not given adequate legalauthority to achieve mandated objectives.

the importance of decision rules, see James Buchanan andand Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press, 1962), and Charles Wright, "A Note on the Deci-sion Rules of Pxiblic Regulatory Agencies," Public Choice, 31 (Fall1977), 151-155.

20Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown,

& Co., 1967), Chapter 3. For an example in which choice of theprincipal implementing agency was a major issue, see Zigurd Zile,"A Legislative-Political History of the Coastal Zone ManagementAct of 1972," Coastal Zone Management Journal, 1 (1974), 235-274.

2^Judy Rosener with Sally Russell and Dennis Brehn, Environ-mental vs. Local Control: A Study of the Voting Behavior of SomeCalifornia Coastal Commissions (Irvine: University ofCalifornia, Irvine, 1977).

Q. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in JamesMcKie, ed., Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974), 135-168; Paul Sabatier,"Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies," Policy Sciences,6 (Fall 1975), 301-342; Karen Orren, "Standing to Sue: InterestGroup Conflict in the Federal Courts," American Political ScienceReview, 70 (September 1976), 723-741.

TO

For example, the Arab Oil boycott of 1973-74 underminedsupport for implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Amendments asboth the general public and political elites became more aware ofthe effects of air pollution control measures on, for example,increased consximption of natural gas by utilities and the adverseimpacts of automotive emission control on gasoline mileage.

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the relationship between economic diversity and anability to withstand perturbations (or, in the case of regula-tion, nonproductive costs), see Jane Jacobs, The Economy ofCities (N.Y.: Vintage, 1970).

Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology—The Issue-Attention Cycle," Piiblic Interest (Summer 1972), 38-50.

crucial role of specialist reporters is illustrated bythe role of Morton Mintz of the Washington Post in monitoring theFood and Drug Administration and Casey Buckro of the ChicagoTribune on water pollution in Lake Michigan.

Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influencein Congress," American Political Science Review, 57 (March 1963),45-56; Charles Backstrom, "Congress and the Public," AmericanPolitics Quarterly 4 (Oct. 1977), 411-435.

Viladas Co., The American People and Their Environ-ment, A Report to the Environmental Protection Agency (Springfield,Va.: NTIS, 1973).

29Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," pp. 38-50; Riley Dun-lap and Dan Dillman, "Decline in Public Support for EnvironmentalProtection," Rural Sociology, 41 (Fall 1976), 382-390.

the general argument, see Marver H. Bernstein, RegulatingBusiness by Independent Commission (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress), Chapters 3-8.

• •'-Constituency groups can supplement the agency's resourcesby providing technical data and by helping to monitor compliance.See B. Guy Peters, "Insiders and Outsiders: The Politics ofPressure Group Influence on Bureaucracy," Administration andSociety, 9 (Aug. 1977), 191-218.

Woll, American Bureaucracy (N.Y.: Norton, 1963), pp.39-40. In general, however, courts are reluctant to overturnagency decisions.

discussions of leadership and illustrations of itsimportance, see Frances Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and PublicPolicy, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 94-101.

LEGAL STRUCTURINGOF IMPLEMENTATION

THE INFLUENCE OF LEGISLATURES AND APPELLATE COURTSOVER THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSLawrence BaumThe Ohio State University

One important question in the study of policy implementationis the capacity of agencies which enact policies to influence theprocess by which those policies are implemented.^ It is well under-stood that a legislature or a court which adopts a policy lacks com-plete control over the way in which that policy is carried out. But

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