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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Land Use Policy

jou rn al h om epa g e: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / landusepol

ompliance and market exclusion in Brazilian agriculture: Analysis andmplications for “soft” governance

hristian Brannstroma,∗, Lisa Rauschb, J. Christopher Brownb,enata Marson Teixeira de Andradec, Andrew Miccolisd

Department of Geography, 810 O&M Building, 3147 TAMU, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USADepartment of Geography, 1475 Jayhawk Blvd, 213 Lindley Hall, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045-7613, USAPrograma de Pós-Graduac ão em Planejamento e Gestão Ambiental, Universidade Católica de Brasília, SGAN 916 sala 222, 70790-160 Brasília, BrazilComSensos Consultoria, CLN 215 Bloco B 213 70874-512 Brasília, Brazil

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history:eceived 22 February 2011eceived in revised form 12 June 2011ccepted 13 July 2011

eywords:

a b s t r a c t

“Soft” or “hybrid” governance holds considerable promise in attempts to reconfigure state-market–society relationships toward improved environmental outcomes. “Soft” governance processes inBrazil’s globally competitive, high-input/output agriculture sector have major implications for landusepolicies. Here we identify and analyze two emergent processes, a compliance regime and bioregion-basedmarket exclusion approach, that stand out amid a background of conflicts between agricultural land uses

griculturenvironmentovernancerazil

and environmental regulation. We address the effectiveness of “soft” governance, using a frameworkthat focuses on interactions among state and non-state actors, use of geographic information, relationsto global processes, and discourse. These policies may play an important role in bridging the dividebetween environmental and agricultural interests, but market and state actors, and the uneven effectsof globalization, will influence effectiveness. Our framework for analyzing governance processes shouldcomplement future work that directly measures environmental outcomes.

© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

ntroduction

Latin America’s dry forests, savannas, and subtropical grasslandsre increasingly vulnerable to conversion to cropland and pastureGrau and Aide, 2008) by “well-capitalized agricultural enterprises”Rudel et al., 2009, p. 1403) and “corporate deforesters” (Butlernd Laurance, 2008, p. 470). These agricultural production systems,hich rely upon large inputs of fossil fuels in the form of fertilizers,esticides, and fuel will be essential to meet the predicted doublingf food demand by 2050 from international trade and increas-ngly urban populations (DeFries et al., 2010; Ewers et al., 2009;ambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; Tilman et al., 2002). Simultaneously,tates and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are exertingncreasing pressure on these agricultural systems to reduce or mini-

Please cite this article in press as: Brannstrom, C., et al., Compliance and m“soft” governance. Land Use Policy (2011), doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.0

ize negative environmental impacts, creating a need for land-useolicies that balance environmental protection with agriculturalutput (Tilman et al., 2002). There is, therefore, a need to iden-

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 97 9845 5923; fax: +1 97 9862 4487.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Brannstrom),

[email protected] (L. Rausch), [email protected] (J.C. Brown),[email protected] (R.M.T. de Andrade), [email protected]. Miccolis).

264-8377/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.oi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.07.006

tify and analyze institutional innovations aimed at balancing thetensions of crop production with environmental demands (Foleyet al., 2005). This is especially important in Brazil, an agricul-tural “superpower” (Abbey et al., 2006; Barros, 2009; Nassar, 2009)that faces numerous social and environmental criticisms (Mueller,2009; Martinelli et al., 2010; Sparovek et al., 2010).

Here we analyze compliance and market exclusion governanceprocesses as examples of “emerging hybrid” and “soft governance”strategies generally called “multi-partner governance” that linkstate, market, and society in attempting to overcome the inabil-ity of a single actor to address the complexities of environmentalproblems (Lemos and Agrawal, 2009, p. 69). However, the effec-tiveness of hybrid governance is unknown. These schemes mightonly encourage “short-term fixes and long-term ineffectiveness”with negative effects on state capacity and may not make posi-tive changes in individual subjectivities (Lemos and Agrawal, 2009,p. 83). These criticisms are synthesized in Bridge and Perreault’s(2009, p. 492) argument that scholars should consider environ-mental governance “as the reflection and projection of economicand political power via decisions about the design, manipulation

arket exclusion in Brazilian agriculture: Analysis and implications for7.006

and control of socio-natural processes.”To advance this discussion, we focus on the first of these crit-

icisms of “soft” governance: that they are short-term, ineffectual,and strategically crafted initiatives calculated to maintain existing

dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.07.006


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ower relations and avoid the underlying causes of environmentalegradation. Several scholars have addressed this question throughmpirical research. Ioris (2010), for example, argued that Brazil’seliberative and participatory water policy reforms (Abers andeck, 2009) have prevented neither conflicts over water nor nega-

ive impacts on water. McCarthy and Zen (2010) have questionedhe ability of hybrid governance schemes to control pollution fromalm oil plantations. Klooster (2010, p. 127) argued that the Foresttewardship Council’s multi-stakeholder certification schemes forree plantations represented trade-offs between “lower standards”nd “increased acceptability.”

In Brazil, scholars have high expectations for “soft” governance.artinelli et al. (2010, p. 437) argued that these processes will

erve as “pioneering” examples for other countries facing immi-ent agricultural expansion. Arguments for ending deforestation inhe Brazilian Amazon by 2020 rely on “market exclusion of defor-sters” and positive incentives for compliance with environmentalaws (Nepstad et al., 2009, p. 1351). Moreover, globalization may beharnessed” into “conservation opportunities” that would encour-ge export-oriented cattle ranches and soy farms in the Brazilianmazon to improve environmental performance (Nepstad et al.,006, pp. 1596, 1599; Butler and Laurence, 2008), although Lambinnd Meyfroidt (2011) emphasize how globalization may accelerateand conversion to crops. However, scholars have indicated signif-cant knowledge gaps regarding outcomes and processes of hybridovernance processes (Rudel et al., 2009, p. 1403). In Brazil scholarsave not yet analyzed these governance processes within a frame-ork that facilitates comparative analysis and deeper reflectionithin the literature.

Our governance framework focuses on policy ends and means,ey actors, territory, global processes, and discursive strategies.ttention to policy ends and means, and the interactions amongtate and non-state actors, derive from an empirical approach toovernance (Jordan et al., 2005, p. 484; Jordan, 2008, pp. 21–24).his approach is based on whether state or non-state actors deter-ine the means and the objectives of policy. Strong governance

esults when non-state actors determine means and objectives,hile strong government is characterized by the state selectingeans and objectives. Hybrid types, in which neither the state nor

ociety determines both means and objectives, are found betweennd points. Lemos and Agrawal (2009, p. 69) use “hybrid” to refero state-market-society relations, but their definition is compatibleith Jordan’s “hybrid” in terms of policy means and objectives. Our

ttention to discursive strategies in governance debates reflects ouroncern for how social constructions of nature affect environmen-al policy debates (Dryzek, 2005; Hajer, 1995; Hajer and Versteeg,005) and how environmental policy debates are about the mean-

ng of nature (Feindt and Oels, 2005).

aterial and methods

We collected qualitative data on three cases studies using


emi-structured interviews with stakeholders, analysis of policyocuments, and participation in public meetings devoted to dis-ussion of the policies in question.1 The three cases we selected

1 For Legal Lucas, the second author relied on six key informants interviews during008 and 2009, in addition to field work during 2011 and analysis of print and Inter-et propaganda about the project. For Sustainable West, the first author conducted1 semi-structured interviews and attended two events focusing on Sustainableest during 2009 and 2010. In 2009, respondents were asked to comment on new

nvironmental policies in the western Bahia region, while in 2010 respondentsere asked to provide opinions regarding the origin and development of Sustain-

ble West. For the Soy Moratorium, the third author interviewed two researchersrom the Brazilian Agro-Pastoral Research Enterprise (EMBRAPA) in 2009. Theseesearchers were in regular contact with soy purchasers and soy farmers in Rondônia

PRESSolicy xxx (2011) xxx– xxx

have attracted considerable attention in Brazil’s popular media andin trade publications. These cases emerged as salient governanceexamples in the midst of conflict between agricultural land uses andenvironmental compliance and regulation (Martinelli et al., 2010).There are very few other known examples of efforts to reconcileagricultural and environmental demands at the levels describedbelow. Other scholars have stressed the need to develop andimplement “new legal and regulatory mechanisms” and “voluntarycommitments” as a major future challenge in Brazilian agriculture(Sparovek et al., 2010, p. 6052). For one prominent Brazilian ecol-ogist, compliance is “a fundamental condition for agribusiness [to]seek a higher level of production quality and certification” (Klink,2009, p. 29). Thus, we respond to a need to analyze prominentexamples of governance relating to environmental critiques of agri-cultural land uses.

We characterize the first case (Legal Lucas and SustainableWest) as municipal-scale compliance in which state and non-stateactors provide incentives for farmers to put their land in com-pliance with Brazil’s federal and state environmental laws. Thecompliance approach is adjusted to Brazilian legislation, situatedat municipal territories, and responsive to the failure of command-control regulatory systems. The second case (Soy Moratorium) ischaracterized as an ecoregion-based “market exclusion” approach(Nepstad and Stickler, 2008, pp. 48–49; Angel et al., 2007) ledby the soy-crush industry aiming to prohibit the purchase of soyproduced on recently cleared land in the Amazon humid forestbiome. The third case, the elimination of sugarcane burning in SãoPaulo state, combines aspects of compliance and market exclu-sion in voluntary initiatives beyond the legal mandate. São Paulo, amajor force behind Brazil’s rise as agricultural “superpower,” wasnoted recently as the “other” Brazil for its national leadership inenvironmental policy reforms (Lucon and Goldemberg, 2010) suchas reforestation policies (Rodrigues et al., 2009), watershed man-agement committees (Abers and Keck, 2009), and state-societyresponses to industrial pollution (Lemos, 1998).

Compliance and market exclusion have strong links to Brazil’sfederal Forest Code (Law 4.771, September 1965), which requireson-farm conservation set-asides of native vegetation (Drummondand Barros-Platiau, 2006). The Forest Code demands that landown-ers maintain a “Legal Reserve” (LR) set-aside ranging from 20 to80% of landholding area. A “Permanent Protection Area” (PPA) isrequired along streambanks and steep slopes, among other areas.In the Legal Amazon region 80% of farmland in the humid forestarea must be set aside as LR (Walker et al., 2009) and 20% of landoutside the Legal Amazon (e.g., the Sustainable West case). Landconsidered savanna or Cerrado inside the Legal Amazon, such asthe case of Legal Lucas, has a 35% LR requirement. Although theForest Code is a durable pillar supporting Brazil’s current environ-mental movement, farmer compliance is unknown (Oliveira andBacha, 2003; Bacha, 2005). One group estimated that “full com-pliance” with Brazil’s forest code “would require radical changes”in farming because of the estimated 36 million hectare LR deficit(Sparovek et al., 2010, p. 6050).


and Mato Grosso states. Meeting minutes, reports, and press releases were availablefrom the website of ABIOVE (Brazil’s vegetable oil industry association), which weused to document the key events and relationships that emerged as part of thesoy moratorium. For the sugarcane burning case, the fourth and fifth authors inter-viewed 15 stakeholders from industry and regulatory agencies in São Paulo State inMay–July 2008 and May–August 2010 using semi-structured interviews and ques-tionnaires and did participant observation in two sugarcane ethanol events. PolicyAnalysis Matrix (Menke and Pearson, 1989) and institutional framework analysiswere used, while triangulation was employed to confirm findings when carryingout policy document analysis.


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Fig. 1. Promotional image of the Legal Lucas project (photo by second author). “Élegal” indicates that “it’s cool” to participate in the project, and that the projectaims toward legalizing farmers. The thumbs-up sign in Brazil has many positivec“

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with the Forest Code. Farmers who had Forest Code transgressions,

onnotations across a wide spectrum of social settings generally meaning “cool” orOK” (Sherzer, 1991).

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ompliance: Legal Lucas and Sustainable West

Two areas in Brazil are sites of a compliance model organizedt the scale of municipal territories. The first originated as theucas do Rio Verde Legal project (henceforth, Legal Lucas), estab-ished in 2006 with the objective of turning Lucas do Rio Verde, aeading-edge agricultural producer in Mato Grosso state, into therst Brazilian municipality with no infractions of federal environ-ental laws in the agricultural sector. “Legal” in Portuguese means

oth legal in a juridical sense and “cool” in the sense of desirabler acceptable – confirmed by the thumbs-up sign (Sherzer, 1991)

indicating that it is “cool” to comply with Brazil’s Forest CodeFig. 1).

Legal Lucas is a partnership led by an environmental NGO (Theature Conservancy), state and municipal governments, and theublic Attorney’s office. In addition, many other entities joinedhe project, including: research groups (Rio Verde Foundation); aarmers’ organization; major agricultural firms, such as the foodrocessor Sadia; and Syngenta, a supplier of agro-chemicals. Withtrong support for the project by the municipality’s farmers, theroject completed its first phase that aimed to produce geo-eferenced land-use and land-cover maps of every property inhe municipality. In 2009, the project entered the second phase:estoring areas that should be maintained as LR or PPA on-farmet-asides, in compliance with Brazil’s Federal Forest Code. Farm-rs are expected to pay for the costs of restoration, but Legal Lucasims to lower the costs incurred by reducing information costs;oreover, project leaders have expressed hope that international

arbon brokers will compensate farmers for their LRs.The events that precipitated the formation of Legal Lucas are

iffuse. Otaviano Pivetta, the former mayor of Lucas, is some-imes credited with laying the groundwork for the project byetting a precedent of competent municipal administration andy promoting growth of businesses, specifically those that pro-uce value-added agricultural commodities. Municipal leadersrioritized carefully planned infrastructure, including power lines,


rainage ditches and paved roads, and investment in education inheir plans for municipal development. This planning led to popularonfidence in local politicians, and the relative wealth generated in

PRESSolicy xxx (2011) xxx– xxx 3

agriculture facilitated the formation of Legal Lucas under the guid-ance of the current mayor of Lucas, Marino Franz. Confidence alsocreated favorable conditions for all of the municipality’s produc-ers to sign on to the project, even though doing so required them totake certain risks, such as admitting to violations of the Forest Codeand voluntarily reducing the amount of their property dedicated toagricultural production. Project leaders and participants alike alsocredit traditions of agricultural-environmental stewardship withcreating the conditions for project success in Lucas.

Legal Lucas did not create requirements for participant–farmersoutside of complying with the law, but gave them technicaland legal advice regarding complying with the existing law andpromises to help them receive visibility for their efforts. Theproject has had no known dissenters. In fact, framing compliancewith the Forest Code as a collective undertaking among farmersin the municipality contributed to a very high participation rateand a sense of ownership among farmers. Criticisms raised byfarmer–participants about the project were limited to the beliefthat leaders could have promoted media coverage of the projectmore strongly, in addition to questions about the interest of indus-trial firms in securing positive publicity (Pinto and Buzanello, 2009).This discursive turn helped construct a history that frames theestablishment of Legal Lucas as a natural step that formalized thealleged environmental ideologies of Lucas’s farmers.

The importance of the project cannot be fully understood out-side of the context of the political and environmental situation atthe state level in Mato Grosso, Brazil’s leading soybean producer. In2005, Greenpeace awarded Blairo Maggi – not only the state gov-ernor but also its largest landowner and soy producer – with the“Golden Chainsaw” prize for his complicity in the soy industry’scontributions to deforestation in the Amazon. In addition, MatoGrosso has received much attention from national and interna-tional environmental activists who have decried the environmentalconsequences of the growth of high-input agriculture and ranchingin the state. Leaders of the Legal Lucas project and the municipal-ity of Lucas have capitalized on setting their municipality apartfrom the environmental and political situation in the rest of thestate. The municipality attracts business and attention by promot-ing the morally and economically palatable notion that high-inputagricultural production can be environmentally friendly.

Legal Lucas promoted the increasingly popular viewpoint thatglobal markets will demand ever-increasing transparency regard-ing the production conditions of agricultural products. The projectoffers tangible benefits to farmer participants because it is able toassist the farmers with the substantial transaction and informationcosts associated with converting, maintaining, and legalizing pre-viously farmed lands in native vegetation cover to meet LR and PPArequirements. This process is based on two key components: thegeneration of a cartographic base for the municipality, and farmerself-declaration of property boundaries, which allows techniciansto generate land-use maps of properties showing where LR and PPAare absent.

The first phase of Legal Lucas created this cartographic base andthe land-cover and land-use maps for each property. The NatureConservancy provided technical support and software to createclassification maps of properties. These maps allowed project offi-cials and farmers to determine where properties failed to complywith federal and state regulations, mainly LR and PPA. The sec-ond phase of the project – restoring natural vegetation in order tobring each property under compliance with the Forest Code – hasbeen nearly completed with the use of these maps, although theremaining cases show the complex and costly nature of complying


but have already remedied them on their own property, have lostincome from compliance; however, they hope that compliance willresult in continued and expanded market access for their products


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Pinto and Buzanello, 2009). Some farmers are trying to avoid theseosses by entering a collective effort to buy LR land in another loca-ion that is still within the same biome, a tactic they say is allowedy possible reforms to a Forest Code. LR purchases have not yetome to fruition because of difficulty finding suitable land.

The maps created from the cartographic base are essentialecause they show LR and PPA violations on each property andllow project officials to monitor properties for further infractions.nce the property is brought into compliance, the maps provide

mportant documentation of compliance for the landowner anday allow the property owner to apply for a simplified environ-ental license for rural properties (LAU, the Licenc a Ambientalnica) from the state (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2005). Farmers value

he LAU because they see it as a government-sanctioned guaran-ee that they will not lose market access for their products dueo concerns about environmental and labor issues. This is a regionhere fraudulent land titles and other documentation are common

ecause of the cost, difficulties, and lack of legal incentives to obtainegitimate titles. The maps certifications provide a chance for farm-rs to get ahead of enforcement of environmental regulations andllow agricultural firms to claim greater environmental and socialesponsibility.

Farmer self-declaration was possible because the project direc-ors promised temporary amnesty to farmers, proclaiming thathey faced no risk in coming forward to participate in the project.ndeed, self-declarations were tantamount to confessions of envi-onmental crimes, as the maps provided evidence that propertiesacked adequate LR and PPA. The amnesty discourse was importantecause total participation was crucial for the project’s success and

egitimacy – all farmers had to participate if Lucas was to becomelegal.” However, the terms of this temporary amnesty are tenuous.nly one state-level agency, the Mato Grosso Environmental Secre-

ariat, and no federal agencies, are officially involved in the project.part from the amnesty claim, Legal Lucas officials also argue thatompliance with environmental and labor regulations will preparearmers and the municipality for more demanding future markets.

oreover, project planners and participants maintain that Legalucas represents a rejection of the notion that intensive agriculturend environmental conservation are necessarily contradictory. Asne farmer put it, “We can grow, but do it rationally. In ten years, weill be glad we did this [participated in programs like Legal Lucas

nd adopted other conservationist strategies]” (second author per-onal interview with farmer, 2009). Legal Lucas also used a symbolicr situational discursive strategy by the fact that it is headquar-ered in the office of the Municipal Secretary of Agriculture and thenvironment.

Leaders in Lucas recognized that consumer demand for envi-onmentally compliant products is growing. In 2008, the Brazilianood producing company, Sadia, opened a large grain processing,

eat processing and biodiesel plant in Lucas, bringing thousandsf jobs to the municipality. Policy makers in Lucas credited the Legalucas project as one of the reasons Sadia selected the municipalitys the site for this plant. Based on the success of this project and ofhe municipality, the state of Mato Grosso is in the planning stagesf creating a scaled-up version of Legal Lucas, to be called Matorosso Legal. The project has also captured the attention of themazon Research Group of the International Finance Corporationf the World Bank in São Paulo (third author personal interviewith World Bank official, June 2009).

It is not yet possible to make claims on the effectiveness of Lucasegal in terms of land cover or land use outcomes. Baseline datare not available, and only limited figures for project performance


ere available from TNC staff. For example, in 2008 Lucas had837 hectares (1.3% of the municipality) classified as “degraded”PA, while approximately 10% of lands that should have been “pre-erved” had been cleared (TNC, 2011). TNC officials report that

project, furthering the idea of a multi-stakeholder commitment to ensuring farmercompliance (photo by first author).

nearly half of farms in Lucas have the LAU, but it is not knownhow much land in PPA and LR has been reforested, nor is it knownhow many properties were out of compliance at the start of LegalLucas.

In late 2008 policymakers aimed to replicate Legal Lucas inwestern Bahia state, another site of rapid expansion of high-input,high-output agriculture (Brannstrom, 2005, 2009). “SustainableWest” aims to achieve environmental compliance of the region’sfarms to LR and PPA set-asides but in western Bahia the LR pro-vision is 20% of farmland. Data on farmer participation, area outof compliance, and area restored were not available to evaluatematerial impacts of Sustainable West. Similar to Legal Lucas, Sus-tainable West aims to have farms comply with state law, whichin the case of Bahia is a requirement for an operational license forfarms that requires prior state approval for clearing Cerrado veg-etation. Unlike in Legal Lucas, Sustainable West did not directlyinvolve agricultural firms, instead focusing exclusively on com-pliance and legalization. Images for the project capitalized on thepositive associations of “sustainable” while highlighting the severalorganizations that support the project (Fig. 2).

Sustainable West resonated among stakeholders in westernBahia. The project appeared as a pragmatic means to achieve policygoals that could not be achieved otherwise. Policymakers promotedthe Sustainable West project on the basis of several points: theproject would help attract agro-industrial firms accountable tointernational markets that demand adherence to environmentalstandards in all phases of production; an amnesty would shelterfarmers from fines, as long as they declared their prior legal vio-lations; farmers would find it easier to obtain financing; and thesale of farms would be facilitated. These arguments were basedon two principles that The Nature Conservancy expressed to farm-ers wary of environmental NGOs: that it respected property rightsand that it favored negotiating with agribusiness actors ratherthan confronting them (first author personal interview, June 2009).However, among the strongest selling points was the argument thatSustainable West was using techniques first used in Legal Lucas.This transfer of experience is known as mimetic isomorphism, theprocess by which organizations and institutions are modeled orimitated as a response to uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983,pp. 150–154).

In Legal Lucas, strong affinity between farmers and the localstate led to a comparatively simple political process leading toimplementation. By contrast, Sustainable West faced major ten-sions between farmers and the state and federal environmentalagencies. The tension between farmers and the state reached a boil-


ing point during a high-profile police campaign, mounted by thefederal Ministry of the Environment in late 2008, to crack down onillegal farm operations. Moreover, it took months of negotiations


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against the policy – farmers – to voice concerns and shape pol-icy. No organizations specifically representing soybean farmers areformally a part of the Soybean Working Group.

2 Consumer, industry, foreign government, academic, and civil society organiza-



efore a leading farmers’ association and various state agenciesgreed to legal terms that would provide cover for compliance.

This agreement immediately attracted criticism from environ-ental NGOs, who opposed amnesty – discursively and materially

for high-input agriculture. Other critics argued that Sustainableest was, ironically, the means to create conditions for a new wave

f Cerrado clearing and to attract foreign investors in agriculture.ustainable West was a “cosmetic intervention” that would “freehe farmers” from legal penalties (first author personal interview,

ay 2009). The project would “put the environmental reservesLRs] on cheap lands” distant from the productive soy and cottonelds, smoothing the way for large foreign investments in soy-roducing lands (first author personal interview, July 2010). Noimilar oppositional group or claims existed in Legal Lucas.

arket exclusion: the Soy Moratorium

The market exclusion governance process is represented byhe Soy Moratorium, a pledge made by two powerful groups,razil’s vegetable oil industry association (ABIOVE) and Brazil’srain exporters (ANEC; Brazilian Grain Exporters Association) andheir member companies, to not trade soy from fields deforestedithin the “Amazon Biome” after 24 July 2006 (ABIOVE, 2009).

t was to last for two years, giving industry, NGOs, and govern-ent agencies the time to establish a governance process setting

he terms of and adherence to principles of sustainable agriculturalroduction in the Amazon.

The Moratorium was a direct outcome of an international cam-aign led by Greenpeace to end reported social and environmentalbuses related to the expansion of soybean production in the Ama-on region. Two Greenpeace actions in the campaign stand out. Therst was the release of a report entitled “Eating up the Amazon” inpril 2006. The document made the case that international cor-orations involved in the purchase, trading, and consumption ofoybeans for animal feed were responsible for deforestation in themazon. Moreover, the report detailed cases of slave labor used in

he clearing of land and it claimed that Cargill’s soybean port in themazon River town of Santarém, Pará, had been established ille-ally (Greenpeace International, 2006). Subsequently, on 19 May006, Greenpeace activists arrived in their ship, “Arctic Sunrise”,t Cargill’s grain port and climbed onto the facility, unfurling aanner reading “Fora! Cargill Out!”. Port operations stopped for

brief time, and with reports of some violent interactions betweenrotestors and personnel from law enforcement and the port, thevent garnered international attention (Howden, 2006).

In one way, the Moratorium was a means to achieve a long-erm objective: to make agricultural production in the Amazon

ore sustainable by helping to bring farmers into compliance withhe existing federal requirements for LR and PPA. In the Amazonumid forest, the LR provision requires 80% of all landholdings toe retained in native vegetation. In another way, the Moratoriumet in motion the need to develop an entirely separate means tochieve its own more narrowly defined and radical objective: tond as quickly as possible the practice of deforestation for plant-ng soybeans. To accomplish this more narrow goal, ABIOVE andNEC assembled stakeholders into the Soybean Working Group

o put the Moratorium into action. Key non-state actors includedn the group’s first meeting in December 2006 were the World

ildlife Fund, The Nature Conservancy, The Institute for Amazo-ian Research, Conservation International, Greenpeace, and themazonia Defense Front. No state actors were present at this meet-

ng (ABIOVE, 2006); in fact, it was not until 6 May 2007 that


he group had its first official meeting with representatives ofrazil’s federal executive branch regarding the Moratorium (Soyoratorium Working Group, 2007). The federal government signed

n as an official participant in the Moratorium on 17 June 2008


(ABIOVE, 2008). Over time, there has been a mix of non-state actorsinvolved as participants in meetings and as signatories.2

The workgroup divided into three subgroups to develop themeans to achieve its goal. One subgroup was to create a strategyto map and monitor agricultural production within the Amazonbiome. Another subgroup developed a farmer education campaignabout the Moratorium and Forest Code, and the third subgroupfocused on developing relations with Brazilian and internationalfirms, NGOs, and the federal government. Similar to Legal Lucasand Sustainable West, high-quality land-use and land-cover datawere critical to planners. To put the Moratorium in force, plannershad to know the spatial extent of the Amazonian humid tropicalforest, in contrast with that of the Cerrado. A map depicting the ter-ritorial extent of these ecoregions (or biomas, as they are known inBrazilian policy circles) was available from Brazil’s Geography andStatistics Institute (IBGE), but only at a scale of 1:1.5 million. Oncedefined, this boundary would also set the policy’s territorial focus.

Knowing which areas had been deforested after 24 July 2006was another piece of key information required for the Morato-rium. For this, the subgroup relied on data provided by INPE’s(Brazil’s National Space Research Institute) Amazonian deforesta-tion monitoring system. Potentially, INPE’s data could define allareas deforested in the Amazon Biome each year of the Morato-rium. Finally, it was necessary to obtain information on whether thedeforested areas within the Amazon biome were planted with soy(ABIOVE, 2006). Ideally, with illegally planted soy areas pinpointed,the soy purchasing companies in the region would determine whowas responsible for the illegal planting and ensure that the soy-beans were not purchased. Farmers learned about the Moratoriumthrough education and outreach efforts by the Soybean WorkingGroup and through soy purchasers. Farmers planting soy againstthe Moratorium directive risked losing access to credit for agri-cultural inputs, which is often provided by the soy purchasers.For example, a regional official from Brazil’s federal agriculturalresearch unit, EMBRAPA, reported that the soy purchasers requiredall farmers to sign statements that their operations were in com-pliance with the Moratorium (third author personal interview withEMBRAPA official, December 2009).

Any opposition to the Moratorium appears to be unorganizedand powerless to effect much change on the goals and means of theMoratorium and the processes it involves. This is understandablegiven the fact that traditionally staunch opponents–internationalenvironmental groups like Greenpeace and large agri-businessfirms–are formal partners in the Moratorium. They have managedto join forces around discourses of corporate social-environmentalresponsibility, sustainable production, forest conservation, andefficient/low-cost food production, forming, in effect, a discoursecoalition as described by Hajer (1995). Carlo Lovatelli, president ofABIOVE and ABAG, even made the argument at the Copenhagen cli-mate talks that the international community should reward farmercompliance with the Moratorium and the Forest Code with pay-ments for ecological services and Reductions in Emissions fromDeforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries(REDD) (ABIOVE, 2010). This discourse and the structure of the Soy-bean Working Group leaft little room for those most likely to argue


tions have included Nutreco, MVO, Fediol, Cadbury Schweppes, Moy Park, Tecnopecand Shell, Ahold, Cadbury, Carrefour, Marks & Spencer, McDonald’s (Europe), Rit-ter Sport, Sainsbury’s, and Waitrose, IFC, German Embassy in Brazil, University ofWageningen, Secretariat of Agriculture of São Paulo, DAP Paraguay, Cargill, Bunge,Imcopa, Greenpeace International, IPAM, Imazon, and Articulac ão Soja Brasil.


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The Moratorium was renewed for the fourth time in July 2010,ased on results of the monitoring program and by INPE researchershowing that deforestation for soybeans diminished to a trivialmount. For example, in 2007 monitoring determined that nonef the harvest was out of compliance and in 2008 a mere 0.88%f the 157,896 hectares monitored by the project was out of com-liance with the Moratorium (GLOBALSAT and ABIOVE, 2009). Inesponse, Minister of the Environment, Carlos Minc, declared thatoy was no longer a factor in Amazon deforestation (Leão, 2009).wo years later, Rudorff et al. (2011, p. 198) argued that the Mora-orium “has certainly exerted an inhibitory effect on the soybeanrontier expansion” in the Amazon. If true, this would be a majorccomplishment of the Moratorium. Direct forest conversion forigh-input agriculture was well documented before the Morato-ium (Brown et al., 2005, 2007; Galford et al., 2008; Jepson et al.,008; Morton et al., 2006). However, several scholars have arguedecently that soy production is causing deforestation indirectly inays that the monitoring program is not considering. These schol-

rs provide evidence that the Moratorium may have caused farmerso expand soy production on pre-existing cattle ranches, in turnausing ranchers to move further into forest areas to clear land forasture (Barona et al., 2010; Lapola et al., 2010; Arima et al., 2011).

n this view, the Moratorium is effective to counter direct deforesta-ion, but powerless to slow indirect processes or “cascade effects”f globalization (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011, p. 3468). Moreover,he Moratorium’s emphasis on measuring soy plantings has over-hadowed other goals, such as compliance of landowners with theederal Forest Code.

The main beneficiaries of the Moratorium appear to be the soy-rush firms that declared it, but soy farmers could also benefit ifhey show high compliance rates that could bolster their claimo be good environmental stewards. Such claims could supportfforts to preserve forests by payments for environmental servicesr REDD (Nepstad et al., 2009). As this governance process evolves,emand may increase for near-real-time geographic informationn land use and land cover, supporting private firms and state orga-izations that produce these data. International NGOs may benefit

rom the Moratorium by showing the rapid response of globalizedgribusiness firms to their campaigns.

rom compliance to market exclusion: sugarcane burninghase-out

Both market exclusion and compliance governance processesharacterize the phasing out of pre-harvest sugarcane burning inão Paulo state, where 60% of Brazil’s sugarcane crop is grownUNICA, 2010). In this case, a combination of state and industry-ed legal mechanisms, in addition to voluntary initiatives, put inlace a standard that is spreading to the new frontiers of sugarcaneultivation in Brazil. This process was marked by market exclusionnd compliance-based governance, spearheaded largely by statectors, but fueled by social movements focusing on environmentalnd health issues, and the sugarcane-ethanol industry.

Since the 1950s, producers burned sugarcane fields to makeanual harvesting more efficient. Burning continued when São

aulo overtook states in northeastern Brazil as the top sugar-ane producer. In the 1970s, a federal ethanol program providedenerous incentives that consolidated the sugarcane and ethanolndustries in São Paulo (Goldemberg et al., 2008; Macedo, 2005). Inhe mid-1980s, criticism grew over air pollution and negative pub-ic health implications from sugarcane burning in municipalities athe center of the sugarcane industry. By the 1990s, environmental


rganizations, along with agriculture and health agencies in sev-ral sugarcane municipalities, made their case against burning byrawing from numerous studies showing the deleterious effectsf burning sugarcane on air quality, local water supplies, workers’


health, soil fertility, and wildlife populations (Alves et al., 2008;EMBRAPA, 1997; Manc o, 1992; Santos et al., 1992). Attempts topass municipal laws aimed at stopping burning failed, however, dueto lack of political support (Manc o, 1992; Marrey, 1993; Scarmato,2005).

Bowing to pressure from public opinion and these advocacygroups, the São Paulo state legislature in 2000 passed the “Burn-ing Law,” which set guidelines, regulations, and procedures foragricultural burning. Meanwhile, evidence mounted for a directcorrelation between burning sugarcane, emissions of carcinogenicsubstances such as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), andan increase in respiratory diseases, especially among children andthe elderly, during the harvest season (Arbex et al., 2004; Canc ado,2003; CETESB, 2008; Santos et al., 2002; Thomaz, 2002).

In 2002, pressured by public opinion, the media, the Pub-lic Attorney’s Office, and environmental and human rightsmovements, state legislators drafted a bill aimed at banningsugarcane-related burning altogether (Andrade and Miccolis, 2010;Thomaz, 2002), forcing producers to use mechanized harvestingof unburned sugarcane. The Organization of Sugarcane Planters ofthe State of São Paulo (ORPLANA) and the National Union of Sugar-cane and Ethanol Industry (UNICA) lobbied intensely for a gradualphase-out of burning (Martinelli and Filoso, 2008; Thomaz, 2002).ORPLANA and UNICA claimed that a ban would create a wave ofunemployment and deal a serious blow to the ethanol-sugarcanesector. The result of this process was legislation that targeted totalelimination of burning by 2021; the halfway point, when 50% of theharvested area could be burned, was placed in 2011.

After passage of the burning phase-out law, a number of fac-tors caused governance dynamics to change. First, between 2003and 2008, bowing to local public opinion, several municipalitiesattempted to pass their own burn-ban laws (Scarmato, 2005).In response, sugar and ethanol groups filed lawsuits against themunicipalities. Courts have struck down these municipal initia-tives, largely on the grounds that it is only the state that holdsthe power to pass laws related to environmental risks that affectseveral municipalities. Second, in 2007, the São Paulo state legis-lature set up a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI) to reassessthe timeline for phasing out burning in sugarcane cultivation.The CPI recommended moving up these dates as well as actionsthat would reduce the negative impacts of mechanized harvest-ing among smallholders and speed the transition of smallholdersto mechanization (CPI, 2008). Third, a growing number of claimsabout human rights abuses, including slave labor, sub-human liv-ing conditions, and strenuous working conditions during sugarcaneharvesting, appeared in the media and in reports by human rightsand environmental NGOs. These prompted changes in the sug-arcane ethanol industry’s labor policies and further encouragedsustainable practices (Andrade and Miccolis, 2010). Fourth, therewere changes in the ethanol market. Demand for ethanol skyrock-eted, with new flex-fuel cars introduced in the Brazilian market.Moreover, in 2007 Brazil and the U.S. signed an agreement on bio-fuels research and development exchange and investment in thirdcountries. Between 2004/2005 and 2008/2009, São Paulo’s ethanoloutput increased by 80% (UNICA, 2010). The EU was also pushingfor tighter environmental and human rights standards in the sugar-cane industry (Ribeiro and Pesquero, 2010). For the industry, then,phasing out burning was an essential measure to enable the con-tinued growth of Brazilian ethanol in international markets, meetlabor standards, and bolster its green credentials, which ultimatelywould enable ethanol to become a flagship of the national climatemitigation policy.


The new governance process differed strongly from the state-led legislative approach that set the phase-out schedule. Atthe forefront was UNICA, which proposed a national certifica-tion of best socio-environmental management practices in the


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ugarcane–ethanol industry through an ambitious voluntary agree-ent known as the Agro-Environmental Protocol (Andrade andiccolis, 2010). Importantly, this industry-state pact moved up the

eadlines for phasing out burning to 2014 (and to 2017 for areashat cannot be mechanized or are smaller than 150 ha), amongther measures (São Paulo and ÚNICA, 2008). Additionally, the6 new ethanol plants planned for the region would only receive

icenses if they committed to harvesting without burning, whichequires mechanization (CPI, 2008; Smeets et al., 2008). In return,he São Paulo’s executive branch committed to providing supportor credit and research and development aimed at enabling small-cale producers, who make up 92% of sugarcane growers but only0% of output, to make the transition to mechanization (São Paulond ÚNICA, 2008).

The gradual replacement of burning and manual harvestingith mechanized harvesting helped abate the public health risks

ssociated with sugarcane cultivation while also improving theeputation of the state’s sugarcane industry in the eyes of foreignarkets such as the EU and US. However, one of the main argu-ents against mechanization, put forth by rural worker’s unions

nd social movements, is the loss of jobs among sugarcane cutters,ince one harvester replaces an estimated 100 workers (Pastoralo Migrante, 2010). So far, this negative impact on jobs has appar-ntly been offset by the rapid expansion of the industry in the statend, to a lesser extent, by efforts aimed at retraining workers. Apartrom migrant workers who might be displaced by mechanization

potentially negative outcome is increasing soil compaction fromarvesters.

To monitor the expansion of sugarcane and compliance with theurning ban in São Paulo, UNICA, the State Environment Agencynd INPE built a satellite-based remote sensing program (Rudorfft al., 2005). According to INPE, from 2003 to 2009 the total areaf sugarcane cultivation jumped from 2.57 million to 4.89 millionectares (Aguiar et al., 2010). Despite this phenomenal growth, 56%f the 2009/2010 harvest was produced without burning, as com-ared to 34% in 2003. By 2008, this reduction in burning avoided900 tons of particulate matter from being released into the atmo-phere (CETESB, 2008). Similar to the isomorphism (DiMaggio andowell, 1983) of the examples described here, the São Paulo models being proposed in other states experiencing rapid increases inhe sugarcane-ethanol industry in Brazil, such as in Goiás State.

iscussion

Are compliance and market exclusion processes short-termxes with low likelihood of long-term effectiveness? We reflect onhe effectiveness debate regarding “hybrid” or “soft” governance ase return to the governance framework focusing on territory, state-

ociety relations, discourses, and global processes. These issues, inurn, lead us to consider possibilities for scaling up environmen-al governance to Brazil and beyond, also to change the mindsetf land users toward a deeper commitment to reducing environ-ental impacts of intensive agriculture. We end with a call for

uture studies of environmental outcomes of hybrid governance toonsider the processes as “outcomes” creating new relationshipsmong previously conflictive actors.

In Legal Lucas and Sustainable West “soft” governance appearsffective at encouraging compliance because the policy goal isarrow and well suited to deepening farmer commitments tonvironmental stewardship. The Moratorium showed strong effec-


iveness in using marketplace power to counter negative publicityor large agro-industrial interests but the benefits appear concen-rated away from individual farmers. In São Paulo the combinationf a state-mandated policy goal and market–society relationships


that formed later show how “soft” governance has gone wellbeyond the state-established goal of policy.

What strengths and weaknesses do territorial scales offer? Thestrength, potentially, of the municipal scale is that many farm-ers will have the possibility of direct engagement with policymeans. This may lead to a deepening of landowner commitmentto environmental initiatives and perhaps lessen the antagonismthat has long persisted among farmers, environmental managers,and activists (Martinelli et al., 2010). In Legal Lucas and Sustain-able West groups linked to farmers played key roles in articulatingand explaining the policy to farmers, negotiating with them whennecessary.

By contrast, market exclusion created little direct engagementwith farmers. Other scholars have criticized roundtable initiativesfor their poor inclusion of producers (Vandergeest, 2007). Yet, mar-ket exclusion has helped inform other governance processes, suchas the way the sugarcane burning phase-out leapt ahead of thecompliance model. The strength of voluntary measures to elimi-nate burning resulted, in part, from the unambiguous goals thatthe state government of São Paulo created for its territory. Munici-palities have weak powers for this sort of policymaking, as the SãoPaulo case showed. In addition, market exclusion may encouragefarmers to participate in municipal compliance policies that are lesscostly to farmers but less ambitious in goals.

Do the governance processes examined here indicate new formsof state-society relations? In all cases, we find strong evidencefor robust actions by agricultural firms and farmer organizationsresponding to global processes and to unambiguous policy goalsset by states. Non-state actors, representing farmer and environ-mental groups, have been crucial to setting the means by whichfarmers may comply with existing environmental laws. The largegap between lack of state capacity and the thousands of farmingand ranching units has inspired organizations to occupy this spaceby brokering deals among antagonistic actors and offering solutionsto environmental conflicts. Market exclusion and compliance existbecause market actors recognize that the state has set policy goalsthat it cannot enforce. Both governance processes aim to resolvethis contradiction by creating the means by which the policy goalsmay be achieved while minimizing contentious political actions. Inthe Moratorium, the state was absent from debates that establishedgoals well beyond those of the federal Forest Code. There is nothingillegal about producing soybeans in the Amazon rainforest, as longfarmers have cleared land following state and federal laws. In thisregard, the market exclusion policy has jumped well ahead of thestate by focusing on one commodity.

By contrast, Legal Lucas and Sustainable West show how compli-ance aims only to meet federal and state requirements. Non-stateactors crafted the means because the state was unable or unwill-ing. In fact, the planned statewide successor (Mato Grosso Legal)to Lucas Legal advocates shifting responsibility of monitoring agri-cultural properties from the sole purview of the state to sharedmunicipality-private system. In São Paulo state, success of the burn-ing phase-out relied partly on the involvement of both state andnon-state actors and on the role of industry in drafting, negotiating,and implementing environmental regulations. This case representsa dual approach that draws elements from both compliance andmarket exclusion. While the state actors spearheaded the earlystages of policy development, the industry has taken on a moreprominent role over the past few years.

Our cases highlight the importance of discursive strategies inwidening the territorial focus of governance and deepening farmercommitment to environmental practices. Legal Lucas capitalized


on the double meaning of “legal” indicating that it is “cool” tocomply with the Forest Code (Fig. 1) and that full compliance willattract agro-industries reliant on soy and maize. In SustainableWest planners used “sustainable” with iconographic references


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Fig. 2) even though the project focuses strictly on providing meansor out-of-compliance farmers to follow the law. Indeed, this over-each inspired criticisms from local environmental NGOs againsthe project. The “amnesty” claim, which was necessary to attractarmers into self-declaration of their illegal environmental acts,lso generated opposition. Nevertheless, Sustainable West is doinguch to overturn a more sinister discursive construction, the

laim that foreign interests support Brazil’s environmental NGOso undermine agricultural competitiveness (Brannstrom, in press).armers participating in Sustainable West see The Nature Conser-ancy working in support of property rights and negotiating witharmers. This may lead to a deepening of policies aimed at reducingnvironmental impacts of high-input agriculture.

In São Paulo, actors shared a common goal of stopping burn-ng but adopted distinct discursive strategies. State agencies raisedoncerns about public health and air quality, while industry groupsanted to improve sugarcane’s environmental credentials and toake the social and economic case for gradually phasing out burn-

ng. When state actors began pushing for tighter deadlines foroing away with burning, the industry was quick to negotiate aiddle-ground voluntary agreement, not only because of increased

ressure from advocacy groups, but also because its interests hadhifted over time. If phasing out burning stood as a threat to somendustries during the early 1990s, it arose as an opportunity in the

id-2000s due to the rising demand for ethanol, greater scrutinynd tighter restrictions in export markets, and the prominent role ofthanol in Brazil’s climate mitigation and renewable energy strat-gy.

Have globalization processes created “conservation opportu-ities” that scholars have predicted (Butler and Laurence, 2008;epstad et al., 2006, 2009; Nepstad and Stickler, 2008)? This global-

zation argument best explains the rise of market exclusion, whichs predicated on the notion that affluent consumers may exert influ-nce on production chains by pressuring large firms. Indeed, theoratorium and São Paulo protocol share broad parallels with the

etter studied “roundtable” initiatives that have developed aroundhrimp and palm oil (Angel et al., 2007; Laurence et al., 2010; dean and Burns, 2006; Vandergeest 2007). The Brazilian cases mark

deepening of this trend in that market exclusion is a far strongerolicy than a discussion of best practices among various stake-olders; moreover, the cases provide strong evidence for the viewhat global processes may generate positive outcomes for managingegative aspects of intensive agriculture.

The influence of global processes on compliance is less strong.egal Lucas originated from competent municipal administrationnd a longstanding policy of the Brazilian government. Globaliza-ion concerns are important at a discursive level in that municipallites used the “legal” argument to attract agro-industrial firms.ustainable West relied on the controversy that the federal govern-ent’s policy action generated, and also on lobbying by a farmers’

rganization to create the terms for the necessary political cover,ven providing physical space for the project to operate. Farm-ng elites are well aware of increasingly strong environmentaltandards enforced by global markets (Brannstrom, in press), butheir main motivation in participating in Sustainable West was toemove the backlog of requests to clear land and remove otheregal obstacles to the business of farming. In Lucas, the main moti-ations for participation of farmers are the attraction of nationalgro-industrial firms and the freedom from legal trouble from envi-onmental compliance. Thus, globalization processes were not themmediate factor in motivating Legal Lucas and Sustainable West.hese projects moved forward because of attention to political


elations in municipal and state territories. Connections to globalrocesses were uneven and contingent, rather than automatic.

What is the evidence that governance processes are short-term,neffectual, and strategically crafted initiatives calculated to main-


tain existing power relations and avoiding the underlying causesof environmental degradation? We reported on processes thatattempt to insulate production systems from environmental criti-cisms by anticipating or incorporating criticisms into a new modeof regulation beyond the state. Lucas Legal, for example, helpedfarmers navigate long-standing but complex federal environmen-tal regulations. Farmer–participants accepted that they will be heldaccountable by the state and market. However, the project includedno mechanism or incentive to reduce, for example, pesticide orfossil-fuel inputs. Narrow policy ends or goals offering tangiblepositive aspects for farmers have resulted in a positive outcome:farmers are participating in a governance process. This is not unlikeKlooster’s (2010, p. 127) characterization of forest governance interms of a trade-off between “lower standards” and “increasedacceptability.” We do not argue that positive environmental out-comes are unlikely or irrelevant. It is beyond the scope of this paperto measure environmental variables, but we recognize that metricsof environmental impacts should be applied to intended and unin-tended outcomes of these governance processes. Our qualitativeanalysis should complement future studies that quantify environ-mental indicators of success or failure.

Finally, our analysis speaks to agriculture-environment conflictsin Brazil and beyond. First, scholars have recognized the need forenvironmental policies that engage agricultural actors in Brazil(Sparovek et al. 2010; Martinelli et al., 2010). The variables andprocesses we report here indicate the importance of consider-ing geographical extent of the policy, information requirements,and the political economic process of stakeholder involvement.If “conservation opportunities” (Nepstad et al., 2006, p. 1599)and “reconciliation” between agribusiness and environmentalists(Martinelli et al., 2010, p. 437) are desired, we need a full under-standing of the governance processes sparked by land-use policies.Our ethnographic approach elucidates the context for understand-ing environmental outcomes and may help define what is meantby “outcomes,” thus complementing quantitative metrics.

Second, Rudel (2007, p. 40) indicates the need for environmentalpolicies to “[influence] the decisions that the heads of enterprisesmake” in tropical rainforests. These high-input production systemswill be essential to meet predicted increases in food demand whilefacing increasing pressure to reduce or minimize negative envi-ronmental impacts. However, Rudel and colleagues have indicatedsignificant knowledge gaps regarding outcomes and processes ofhybrid governance processes in these new settings (Rudel et al.,2009, p. 1403). Qualitative, ethnographic research using a trans-parent framework should play a role in filling this knowledgegap. Narrow definition of policy ends and avoidance of underly-ing causes invite participation of multiple actors in a multi-actorgovernance process. This is an “outcome” unto itself that is likelyto have positive unintended consequences beyond the scope of theinitial policy goal. Our focus on the governance process opens upthe possibility for future work to evaluate these policies beyondnarrow definitions of success.

Conclusion

We addressed the effectiveness of soft or hybrid governanceby employing a framework designed to allow comparisons acrosscases focusing on the geographical extent of the policy, the infor-mation required to enforce, the role of discourse, and the politicaleconomic process involving stakeholders. The particular cases westudied aimed to bridge the large divide between agriculture


and environmental interests. These cases are prominent land-usepolicy initiatives amid conflictive relations between agricultureand environment across Brazil. Compliance and market exclusionoffer different types of implications for long-term effectiveness.


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upported by global processes, market exclusion offers a meanso turn consumer preferences into strong disincentives for defor-station. Compliance aims to resolve a critical gap in state capacityy focusing on one key environmental regulation, and thus mayave strong effectiveness among participating farmers. Soft envi-onmental governance may play an important role in bridging theivide between environmental and agricultural interests, but mar-et and state actors, and the uneven effects of globalization, willnfluence effectiveness. Qualitative analysis should complementuture studies that quantify environmental indicators of successr failure of hybrid governance.

cknowledgements

We thank anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier ver-ions of this paper. Financial support was provided to CB fromhe National Science Foundation (BCS-0647249) and to LR fromhe Fulbright-IIE Student Grant and the Tinker Field Researchrant. RMA and AM thank the NUGOBIO group at the Universidadeatólica de Brasília for the insightful discussions and the Energyiosciences Institute at the University of California at Berkeley for

unding.

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Compliance and market exclusion in Brazilian agriculture: Analysis and implications for “soft”...

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