Notification: This paper will be published within the proceedings of the International Scientific Conference: Establishment of the Modern Legal System held by Social Sciences Research Center, University of Burch Sarajevo, Octobar 2014

Collective Identity: The Magic Word for Europe

By Adnan Mahmutovic, PhD

Abstract

This Article concerns questions common to the disciplines of Legal, Political and Social sciences fundamental in identifying how the collective identity could contribute to the European integration process and particularly how it can assist the improvement of democratic inputs i.e. strengthen the democracy in European Union. During my previous research I found out that the political perspective has an important place in the literature on the subject of European Union. That gave me the idea to use it to a greater extent in combination with the normative perspective in order to explain the fundamental achievements related to the European identity as well as to tackle some specific aspects in that area.

The preliminary approach to this matter is based on question whether there is a common set of values within the Union and is it possible for its citizens to identify themselves as Europeans? In that respect, an important part of this research will be to examine whether the origin, history, language and religion constitute an objective criteria upon which collective identity could be established, or are they merely a political tool exploited to reach particular goals. How the origins, history, language and religion are regarded by the people, is usually the result of decisions made by the elite. Therefore, is this a case where the (national) identity policies are construed by political actors and serve to strengthen their power and is that the reason why the politicians avoid supporting collective identity projects?

For the benefit of discussion what could possibly unite numerous citizenships into one collective identity I will briefly consult the previous attempts that have been made to create a European identity through constitutional reforms, formal constitution-making and citizenship rights. The importance of a number of symbols and instruments that were adopted until today, including the recent ones like European Citizen’s Initiative, which came up with the Lisbon Treaty to facilitate the citizens’ progression towards their identification with the Union will also be examined. Some of the questions addressed here will be the basis of this research: what kind of identity will emerge from the process of European integration; what are the new patterns of collective identity formation that affect the process of European integration; what kind of involvement and feeling of belonging will be the essence and the product of the new European social and cultural space and in relation to what symbolic images; what kind of polity and political identification will emerge and settle in?

Key Words: Collective Identity, European Identity, European Citizen’s Initiative, Culture, Religion, History, Language, Political actors.

Problem Description

The shift of sovereignty from the national to the European level is probably the most important reason why a European identification is highly relevant topic.1 It is obvious from the political point of view that the legitimacy of the European project may be at stake. The significant national powers have been transposed to the supranational level and the citizens of the European Union have had little say in major political changes made in their name and that one of the most prominent issues of the EU is that its institutions lack accountability and transparency.2 On the other hand, a development of European identity is regarded as a vital objective in pursuing the establishment of a politically and economically influential united Europe in the world.3

At the same time, the popularity of the European Union among its citizens during the last decades has been rapidly decreased. Nowadays, it is very easy to find empirical evidence for a lack of political participation within the European Union. The turnout rates of the election of the EP reached their lowest level ever and in 2009 we can say that is steadily sank from almost 62% in 1979 to a record-low of 43%. According to the European Commission within the EU, 91% of all citizens feel attached to their own country, while only 53% feel attached to the European Union. Despite the great popularity of the European flag that is known by 95% of all Europeans, only 54% identify with this flag.4 Process of identity formation is also inextricably linked to political participation. According to a constructivist view, both are mutually influencing each other.5

Over the years, the European integration (of primarily economic nature) gradually acquired a recognizable form of political character. That left an impression on the traditional structures of power and introduced some changes to the integration process. In other words, since at the beginning it had a predominant economic aspect, the integration process did not necessarily require a broad popular support. That is not the case with the ongoing political integration and its stabilization because they require adequate democratic citizen involvement in the decision making process. The growing relevance of public opinion becomes dramatically evident with the fact that numerous EU projects have been rejected by popular vote: the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark (1992), the accession of Norway (1972, 1994), the Nice Treaty in Ireland (2001), the introduction of the euro in Sweden (2003), the European Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands (2005) and recently, the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland (2008). Building of collective identity has been perceived as crucial in overcoming problems of EU democratic legitimacy. Nowadays it is more than obvious that Union needs its citizens to be identified with the Union as a foundation of its legitimacy.

1 C. Schumacher, „Konzepte europäischer Identität – Die europäische Union und ihre Bürger, 2002, 33.2 S. Carey, „Undivided loyalties: is national identity an obstacle to European integration?“ European Union politics, 3(4), 2002, 387-414.3 See: http://www.antiessays.com/free-essays/309821.html (27.12.2013.)4 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Directorate-General Communication , 2007, 79-86.5 L.E. Cederman, „Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What It Would Take to Construct a European Demos,“ European University Institute, 2000.

Establishing Collective identity

I understand identity as a process, and not as a fixed structure. More probably, it should be perceived as a dynamic construction of images unlike others, never ending process. Historical retrospective reveals that since the process of European integrations evolved, or, to be exact, when it gained political dimension in addition to the economical, the fathers of the process clearly understood that such a system required a new legitimacy because in the opposite case it would be assessed as fundamentally undemocratic6. More to the point, contemporary analysis in the social and political theory suggests that an identity policy is required for realization and legitimization of EU integrative processes and to assist the construction of a collective, European identity7.

“European identity is necessary for long term preservation of joint decision-making capability (Grimm 1995; Miller 1995). Common European identity would ensure good basis for citizenship, definition of rights and responsibilities of members and form criteria for inclusion and exclusion. That would be the way to draw lines by defining who is European and who is not“8

For that reason, the debate on collective identity of EU is necessarily linked to the rise of European idea and also to the further development of modern nation taking into consideration the contemporary integrative and globalisation trends. Building a collective identity, regardless of its negative effects on national unity is one of the basic factors for creation of EU political community and an important prerequisite for its democratisation. Therefore, the beginning of a more significant democratic construction of EU should be expected at the start of the process of adoption of democratic constitution and the process of greater integration and identification of citizens within unique supranational legal order and creation of conditions and sentiments needed for participation and articulation of a wide spectrum of individual and collective national interests across Europe. On the other hand, the existence or non-existence of collective European identity directly affects the stability and effectiveness of the system and the legitimacy of political order. Although the legitimacy is undoubtedly a multidimensional concept, for EU to be a community with a constitutional character at all, it has to be subjected to those same fundamental principles of constitutionalism that characterise any genuine constitutional and democratic creation. Within the context of the fact that EU is also exercising its authority over individuals, this primarily means that even the EU has to acknowledge a principle whereby any public authority that decides upon rights and duties has to be democratically legitimised by the people as the ultimate source of the entire potential of self-determination.

The ever growing interest of social sciences scholars in ideas, processes and identity of Europenowadays is even stronger due to accelerated development of EU institutions9. First official

6 I. Gačanović, „Problem evropskog identiteta“, Filozofski fakultet u Beogradu, Beograd 2009, 6.7 I. Gačanović , et.al.8 E. O. Eriksen, J. E. Fossum, „Europe in Transformation: How to reconstitute democracy,“ RECON Online Working Paper 2007/1, 16.9 More in Declaration on European Identity, in Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1973, No 12, 118-122; I. J. Manners, „Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?“ Journal of Common Market Studies 40, 2. 2002, 254. D. Sarajlić-Maglić, „EU politika demokratizacije u BiH - Ispravni principi, pogrešne politike “Fond otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina, broj 34. 2007.3.

document that mentioned the question of European identity originated in 1973. Namely, during the EC Summit held on 14th and 15th December 1973, the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted a Document on European identity. This document established democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect of human rights as the fundamental elements of European identity or key norms. It reads that nine EC Member States of the time, by forming up a unique entity in Europe overcame the hostilities of the past. These countries decided that unity represents an elementary European need and that it will secure the surviving of European civilisation. This was the first time that an official EC document introduced term European identity. According to this Declaration, the identity is composed of principles of representative democracy, rule of law, social justice which is also the goal of economical progress, and the principle of respecting the human rights. All these are fundamental principles elements European identity. After that, a big momentum was gained by People’s Europe programme in the 1980's which was a pinnacle of efforts invested in forming up a unique European culture. The program People’s Europe was in 1986 marked by European Commission as the main political goal of EC. The Program made some success in its strivings. Here we firstly have in mind the adoption of the proposal on common symbols; flag and the hymn, which remained to date. Under number 52 in the Declaration, Members States have set the symbols of European Union: Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia and stated that the flag with a circle of twelve stars on blue background, hymn „Ode to Joy“ from the Ludwig van Beethoven's 9th symphony, motto “United in diversity”, Euro as the currency of European Union, 9th May as Europe Day, continue to represent for them the symbols of belonging to the community of citizens of European Union and their bonds to it. Certain proposals of the Program were contained in the Constitution for Europe which was, as is well known, partly because of its very symbolism, unsuccessful at referendums in Netherlands and France in 2005.

However, we have already mentioned that the sentiment of citizens is very important for the strengthening of democratic legitimacy within the institutional structure of EU; the sentiment which says that citizens accept EU institutions as theirs. Therefore, to develop a felling of that kind it is necessary to firstly develop a feeling of common belonging among those citizens or, as Meyer states, the “us-feeling.10 It is in fact a feeling of belonging to European identity. On the other hand, it seems that the very concept of the identity is slightly virtual, partly closed and partly open.11 It is closed because the identity separates us from the other, emphasizing that which makes us different, while at the same time the identity concept is also open, because we need the other to identify ourselves in relation to the other.12 The political function of European or collective identity is represented as one that transforms a group of unrelated individuals and groups to a collective capable of cooperative action.13 However, a European identity that would be based on different histories, national backgrounds, languages, cultures, would not be an easy feat to achieve. The difficult path to European identity is determined, before all, by strong individuality of European nations – individuality that was many times confirmed throughout the history.

10 T. Majer, „Identitet Evrope,“ Službeni glasnik i Albatros, Beograd 2009, 8-9. Citations according to: S. Pavlović, „Politički identitet Evropske unije“, Međunarodna politika br. 1140, 2010, 24-37. 11 D. Čepo, „Od nacionalnog k supranacionalnom: Europski identitet i Europska unija,“ Hrvatski nacionalni identitetu globalizirajućem svijetu, 2010, 69 and further.12 Ibid.13 E. O. Eriksen, J. E. Fossum, 2007, 9.

Identity implies individual awareness of belonging to a certain group, a community with binding norms or awareness of possessing certain common special characteristics.14 In the context of construction and establishment of European identity, this means that someone who has a strong feeling of belonging to a region or nation is in position to recognize self also in relation to the community of supranational character, such as the EU. This is exactly the point which makes us have doubts in the possibility of constructing a European identity, because it appears as too weak when compared to strong sentiments of national belonging or other forms of belonging among citizens of European countries.15 It is also the reason why some authors state that the development of European identity would not be possible without major changes in the national awareness of Europeans.16 One could say that the European identity, like a marriage of convenience, although possibly longevous, without conflicts and useful, may become a true union only if there are true emotions.17 The very presence of emotions or feelings tied to belonging to the European identity can give additional legitimacy to the EU because it implies identification of citizens with EU institutions and the system. Besides the emotion itself, one gets impression that its intensity is very important as well, as it indicates the pride of belonging to European identity. European identity does not mean that the Italians are less Italians or that French are less French because of it; belonging to European identity has to be viewed as an upgrade, an added value.18 European and national identity are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they coexist on the basis of motto: in varieta concordia.19 Europe is by no means singular in respect to the people, language or culture; it is already defined as plurality.20

Therefore, Europe pleads for the unity of diversities not the homogeneous ethnicum.

Due to the values of sensibilities, European identity cannot be imposed over national feelings and therefore the European identity should be contemplated within the terms of open plan, not as an identity looking towards the origin or tortured by obsession of excluding historical contingency.21 Consequently, for European identity will be necessary to initiate communication practices among various national, cultural, and other identities of citizens which invoke collectivism based on respect of others and is represented through affirmation of public factors of Member States on the supranational level. Such affirmation would mean the appreciation of diversity not as a mere supplement but as a higher category compared to its nucleus, national identity, exactly in the same way as the EU represents a higher category compared to its constituent Member States.

“The very communicability may show that there exist permanent common European values, that is, that they are being constructed and that the communication within EU as political community is possible, and that is the very prerequisite for determining collective identities.“22

14 S. Kadelbach, „Union Citizenship,“ Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, 2003, 24.15 See: V. Pavićević, „ Evropski identitet i verske zajednice“, Centar za istraživanja religije, Beograd, 2005.16 J. Such, „Nacionalni identitet naspram europskog identiteta,“ Politička misao, Vol XXXVII, br. 4, 2000, 83–88.17 V. Pavićević, Ibid.18 See: S. Sweeney, „Europe, the state, and globalisation“, Harlow Pearson Longman, 2005.19 See: E. Klaus, „A Theory of Collective Identity Making Sense of the Debate on a European Identity,“ European Journal of Social Theory 2009.20 M. McDonald, „EU policy and destiny: A challenge for anthropology. Anthropology Today 21“, 2005, 4-5 Nav. prema: I. Gačanović, 9.21 S. Vrcan, „ Europski identitet – neke ključne dileme“ ,Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXXVI., No 1-2:2005. 9.22 T. Cipek, „Politike identiteta Europske unije: u potrazi za kolačićima male Madeleine,“ Anali hrvatskog politološkog društva, 2004, 148.

National identity vulnerability problem

However, independently from the Europhile point of view, there are theoretical views that emphasize negative connotations of the idea of European identity based on the idea that an identity category higher than the national can decrease citizens’ support for the EU and vice versa.23 Prime argument is the influence of the collective identity on national culture, religious beliefs, tradition, language, all different between themselves, but citizens express great sensibility for them.24 Similarly, EU citizens’ negative mindset on the collective symbolism was expressed in the rebuttal of the Constitution for Europe. At the time, EU citizens clearly condemned the attempt of collectivisation of symbolic-cultural models based on the models of that kind existing on the national level.

The feeling that national identity is vulnerable may arise from the rapport between European and national law. EU law operates on the principle of subordination which implies the option of non-applicability of an opposite norm of national law and the EU is identified as a new legal order of international law to whose favour Member States limited their sovereign rights in certain areas.25

Negative mood about the fact that EU represents a new legal order is filled with concern that it may disrupt the sovereignty of national states. Sovereignty of a national state implies that there is no authority above the state but the EU and its legal order are higher in a certain way. In fact, this was demonstrated by verdicts reached by the Court of Justice, particularly in cases Factortame26

and Costa v. E.N.E.L.27 where the principle of subordination between a national law and the EU has been established and stressed out that a law originating from the Contract cannot be overpowered by provisions of a domestic law because that would undermine the legal fundaments of the Community.28 This problem is particularly outstanding in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which represents a unique legal arrangement not identifiable in comparable constitutional and legal practice.29 This doctrine comes from Great Britain and implies that Westminster parliament has unconditional authority – meaning that none of itsdocuments may be proclaimed invalid or subjected to judicial examination. Consequently, as (Britain) joined the EU, according to some authors, this doctrine lost much of its importance.30

23 S. Carey, Ibid.24 See in example of relations bewtween religious feelings of dominant Christianity and possible membership of Turkey in EU as a country with Islam as dominant relligion: E. Madeker, „Turkey – a part of Europe? The Construction of European Identity in the German Enlargement Debate, at: http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-istanbul/virtualpaperroom/049.pdf. (08.09.2012.) 25 See: Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1.26 See: Case C-213/89 R V Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No 2) [1990].27 See: Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585.28 For the sake of scientific objectivity, it has to be mentioned that there are arguments which support EU legal order because it provides additional protection of citizens from their national governments, see: Case C-6 and 9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-535729 P. Eleftheriadis, „Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Constitution,“ available at: www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/10006399.pdf (10.10.2012.)30 More in: J. Jowell, O. Dawn, „The changing constitution. 6th ed. Oxford“: Oxford University Press, 2007.

European identity shall originate from national identity

If we analyzed activities conducted in the EU since the Maastricht Treaty we could conclude that the European identity today is developing primarily as a form of an “upgrade” to national identities of European people, not as a substitute to those identities.31 National identities present a nucleus of the future European identity. We shall list some of the arguments. Firstly, cultural policies at the European level are merely cooperation and support policies to national policies or subsidiary policies; they are not policies which would substitute national levels as it happened on the economy plan. Similar is the concept of “European citizen” – a most tangible form of development of European identity, an “upgrade” to national identity. Namely, certain rights which “European citizen” enjoys thanks to the Treaty on European Union are based on the existence of “nationality” in a Member State and cannot exist separately from the citizenship.32

Comparable context can be found in the solutions contained in the Lisbon Treaty Preamble where its initial lines read “cultural religious and humanist inheritance of Europe”. Also, if we consult article 167, paragraph (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of EU, we’ll see that the Union advocates simultaneous respect of national and regional diversity and promotion of common cultural heritage. The Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union specifies the contribution to the common values as one of the Union’s tasks including the respect for the diversity of cultures and traditions of European people and the national identity of Member States.33 This leads to conclusion that “Brussels’ official policy” does not go in the direction of creation of collective identity only on the grounds of the oath of universal rights, universal values represent an upgrade to elementary national values whose futuristic existence is absolutely guaranteed and indisputable.34 Here we see an important characteristic of the European identity which is, as well as the very concept of European integration, a sui generis. Of particular significance is its layered quality, to be exact, the multidimensional quality of identities. This describes the fact that an individual or a group can at the same time belong to various identities without having these identities involved in any major conflict. Evasion of a conflict of identities may be reached through their relationship, that is, by a hierarchical setup without rigid rules. According to that, conceptualisation of European identity goes in the direction of establishing a dual public-legal status of an individual who would simultaneously express affiliation to a Member State and to the EU. However, in that case the individual would probably possess a double political identity and double political loyalty.

On the other hand, we could ask whether the individuality of every nation taken separately from within Member States may represent European Union or the EU can be represented only and exclusively by a product of total relationships? If relations between European states constitute Europe then the collective identity appears as a result of these relations intertwined at the highest level. European identity, if and when it comes to exist, shall represent, as we have already shown, an identity sui generis, as it is the very project by which it is being realized. Nevertheless, its sui generis nature shall not diminish in any way the importance of its national affiliation and self-identification. Therefore, our opinion is that it is not possible to create

31 See: Article 9. UEU.32 M. Radaković, „Međusobna determinisanost evropskog i nacionalnog identiteta“, Međunarodna politika, Institut za međunarodnu privredu i politiku, Beograd 2010, 46.33 I. Gačanović, 100.34 Article 4 paragraph 2 of Lisbon Treaty reads: „The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government...“

European identity entirely independently; on the contrary, the European identity has to have its roots in something. That something is made of national identities of European people. Hereby it has to be pointed out that national identities shall not have equal significance. Such thesis is the result of empirical understandings which encompassed various past roles and the role of certain Member States played during the process of European integrations. Hence, it is possible that the European identity shall be predominantly made of the identities of largest European nations with identities of smaller European nations as the indispensable ingredient and factor.35 Accordingly, the prospective European identity will not be the result of a balanced extraction from legacies of identities of “big and small” European nations; undeniably, it will be based on the identities of all European nations. As a potential example of a model of future European identity often is mentioned the example of U.S.A.36 Namely, the U.S.A. represent a genuine model of creation of a collective on the basis of entirely different national identities – from the Native American population, via the black people with African origins, then Mexicans and all the way to Anglo-Saxons.37 Taking into account the number of similarities between national identities in Europe and comparing it to the American experience it seems that European identity will be attained in an easier manner. However, obstacles on this road are made of very long traditions of European people, a factor missing in the American case and a factor that does not permit a greater dose of optimism.

European Citizen’s Initiative

One of the more significant institutional novelties that have the function of strengthening of democratic legitimacy was made possible by the Treaty of Lisbon – it is the European Citizen’s Initiative. Citizen’s Initiative, mentioned for the first time at the Intergovernmental Conference in 199638, represents a novum and expansion of EU citizens’ rights compared to those previously known from the Treaties. This democratic instrument represents a new approach to the strengthening of Union’s democratic legitimacy via democracy on transnational level that would make possible for EU citizens to directly contribute to the shaping of the future of the European Union. With the Citizen’s Initiative, the notion of democracy is broadened by introduction of elements of direct democracy through trans-border initiatives of European citizens and through strengthening of deliberative processes within the EU institutions. Therefore, besides the representative and participative, according to some authors, a third form of democracy is being introduced – the direct democracy.39 Direct democracy emerges as a need for a stronger

35 M. Radaković, Ibid.36 Ibid.37 Ibid.38 R. Koslowski,” EU citizenship: implications for identity and legitimacy, “ in T. Banchoff / M. Smith (eds), “ Legitimacy and the European Union: the contested polity,” 1999, 159- 169.39D. Grubiša, „Lisabonski ugovor i europsko građanstvo“, 47 Politička misao, 2010, 204.

affirmation of European citizens in European affairs.40 With it, European citizens obtained a specific instrument for political activism and expression of their will.41

Some authors write that the European Citizen’s Initiative provides a tool for transnational participative democracy42 which is perceived as the key to democratic future.43 Here is important to underline that participative democracy traditionally produces its greatest effect on the continuity of inclusion of citizens in the society and state regulation. Therefore, the basic goal of European Citizen’s Initiative could be the need for involvement of EU citizens in the European project, to assist mobilisation of civic society and strengthen pan-European debate on European policies. In other words, this instrument should contribute to giving European citizens a greater influence over EU politics and at the same time, maintain the balance between the Union’s institutions, that is, to reduce the undisputed legislative authority of the European Commission. In that context, the instrument of “citizen’s initiative” can be used by Union’s citizens in one of the two ways: they can report and demand, that is, they can support it or organize it.

Likewise, the details which further clarify the significance of citizen’s initiative as an institute, such as the procedures and criteria for citizen’s initiative, including the minimum required number of Member States from which the citizens have to come from, the minimum number of signatories from a Member State, arrangements for verification of signatures, shall be defined by a directive which, following the regular legislative procedure, shall be adopted by the European Parliament and Council.44 In other words, as we can see, central elements of citizen’s initiative are provided by the cited article 11 (4) of the TEU, regardless of the fact that the procedure and practical implementation opened several legal and administrative issues.45 These pertain to the very determination of the citizen’s initiative (e.g. the minimum number of Member States with at least one million citizens from them), procedures and criteria needed to give proposals for initiative (e.g. the minimum age of the initiator, checks and confirmations of the authenticity of signature), which have to be worked out by the EU legislators. In that sense, it is envisaged that all interested parties take part in the consultations on the issue, and that, in the end, a directive is adopted following a regular legislative procedure.46 European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance to the regular legislative procedure adopted the Directive on 16th February 2011.47

40 Grubiša clarifies that democracy has four levels: „The first one is the representative democracy (parialmentry elections, paraliamentary electoral legitimacy). The second is direct democracy, participation of citizens on the level of subsidiary, therefore, at the lowest level where vital decisions in the interest of citizens are beng made. Third, participative democracy whre citizens, conceerned institutions, civil society institudions and independent experts take part. And, the foruth one is the deliberative democracy where a new model of governig is introduced, a so called governance model, which replaces the old system of authority materialised in the form of government.“ See: „U kakvu Europsku uniju želimo? u potrazi za razlozima demokratskog deficita (EU i RH),“ Međunarodna konferencija zbornik radova i izbor iz diskusije, Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Zagreb, 2006, 70 and on.41 D. Grubiša, Ibid., 205.42 M. Conrad, „The European Citizens’ Initiative.Transnational Democracy in the EU at last?,“ Stjórnmál & Stjórnsýsla 1. tbl.,7. árg. 2011, 5-22.43 D. Held, „Models of Democracy,“ 2000, 286.44 See: article 24. UFEU.45 See: A. Auer, „European Citizens' Initiative,“ European Constitutional Law Review , 2005, 79-86.46 See: Commission on European Communities, Green Paper on European Citizents Initiative,COM (2009) 622 Final, Brussels 11.11.2009.47 See: Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 Of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative.

A critical view on introduction of European Citizen’s Initiative

There is no doubt that Citizens Initiative may produce a definite contribution to the closing up of the gap between the Union and its citizens. Article 11 (4) of the TEU reads:

“Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties”

Analyzing this provision we notice three basic characteristics linked to two different aspects of the anticipated contribution.

Firstly, the Citizen’s Initiative has to be supported by not less than a million citizens of a significant number of Member States. Emphasising that Citizen’s Initiative has to be supported by not less than a million nationals of a significant number of Member States and making of it an important criteria, the Treaty of Lisbon sets up a suitable platform on which to build a common, European interest, such that comes directly from its citizens, not indirectly through their representatives. Therefore, perhaps the greatest benefit of the Citizen’s Initiative is its significant step forward in promoting creation of European spheres of public debates that bring together nationals of various Member States and place them in position to give cooperative support and advocate various issues related to the application of Treaty’s provisions. For that reason, it could be called the first „bottom-up“ processor in the history of EU.48 Citizen’s Initiative, as the expression of principles of direct democracy in the EU, will give it a new democratically legitimised dimension and according to the Commission’s opinion it will “increase the public debate around European politics, helping to build a genuine European public space on the basis of request for more democracy“.49 This situation, in the long term, may result in gradual generation of the profoundly needed feeling of necessity among EU citizens for creation of political control on the supranational level and open doors to greater citizen’s self-identification with the Union. Simply said, the Citizen’s Initiative, as one of the elements of direct democracy, can give a positive contribution for creation of European demos. Many authors wrote that elements of direct democracy in the decision making process of the EU may reduce the existing democratic deficit and create European demos.50 On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that the introduction of Citizen’s Initiative as an instrument may meet its purpose should the civil society recognize this opportunity, that is, if it initiates a broader social debate on a given issue.

Secondly, the purpose of Citizen’s Initiative is to invite the European Commission to submit relevant proposals within its prerogatives in cases where citizens deem that a Union’s legal act is necessary for implementation of the Treaty. That means that the Citizen’s Initiative is legislative,

48 M. Carausan, „The European Citizens’ Initiative-Participatory: Democracy in the European Union,“ EIRP Proceedings, Vol 6. 2011.49 See: COM (2009) 622 Final, Brussels 11.11.2009, 3. 50 H. Abromeit, „Democracy in Europe: Legitimising Politics in a Non-State Polity,“ Berghahn, New York, 1998; T. Christiansen, „Gemeinsinn und Europäische Integration: Strategien zur Optimierung von Demokratie und Integrationsziel,“ in: W. Steffani and U. Thaysen (eds.), Demokratie in Europa: Zur Rolle der Parlamente, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1995, 50 – 64; V. Bogdanor, „Direct elections, representative democracy and European integration, Electoral Studies 8, 1989, 205 – 216; B. S. Frey, „A directly democratic and federal Europe, Constitutional Political Economy 7, 1995, 267– 279.

not constitutional; it cannot change provisions of the Treaty and cannot make fundamental changes to the EU political system.51 Additionally, it also does not have influence on the exclusive right to legislative initiative of the European Commission. From a broader point of view, a people’s initiative (such as the one in Switzerland for example) represents an “appeal of the people to the people”.52 In that sense, the Citizen’s Initiative could be viewed as an appeal of the people to the European Commission to initiate creation of a solution to a certain problem. In that way, the Citizen’s Initiative materializes its direct purpose by contributing to the democratisation of the EU decision making process because it opens up possibilities for the legislative process to be tackled by EU citizens. Therefore, the Citizen’s Initiative Instrument will be purposeful if it succeeds to animate or even to provoke the Commission to make a proposal for initiation of a legislative process on issues where the EU has the legislative authority. Likewise, the Citizen’s Initiative will be successful if it obtains a positive reaction of the Commission in form of implementation of measures for preparation of a legislative proposal. From this position it is difficult to give a precise answer whether the Citizen’s Initiative can actually live up to its purpose by propagating a more active role and involvement of Union’s citizens in the decision making processes, that is, to be like a band-aid on the EU’s democratic wounds, inflicted by, among other things, a low turnout on elections for delegates to the European Parliament and numerous calls for a referendum on ratification of changes and amendments to fundamental treaties. However, it is certain that the front for strengthening of democratic legitimacy of the Union will gain strength with this instrument and its effects will be known in times ahead of us.

Thirdly, the basic task of the citizen’s initiative is to invite the Commission to bring forward a legislative proposal. However, this does not necessarily bind the Committee to do that because the Committee has the discretionary power to decide whether it will and in what form it will submit a particular legislative proposal. Also, the right to make a legal initiative does not mean that the legislative document will be adopted because the initiative has to pass through the legislative decision making procedures of the European Parliament and the Council, and that does not always guarantee a positive outcome. In other words, collecting one million citizen’s signatures from the population of over 500 million, a feat apparently relatively simple, will not result in legal obligation on the Commission’s side to actually come up with a legislative proposal. The Commission has the right to decide whether it will submit the proposal or not. The same situation appears in cases when the European Parliament demands a submission of a proposal on the basis of article 225 of TFEU or the Council on the basis of article 241 of TFEU.53 Hence our earlier referral to Citizen’s Initiative as an instrument of direct democracy becomes flawed.54 To be precise, this is because, as we saw earlier, the Citizen’s Initiative, as an institute of direct democracy, should give EU citizens the right to give a legislative initiative, but in reality it does not. A similar instrument of direct democracy, known as people’s initiative in some Member States, makes possible for proposals of certain laws to be submitted by a preset number of citizens as well, not exclusively and only by delegates, government or the chief of state.55 In that case, the legislative authority is obliged to take the proposal under advisement,

51 M. Conrad, 2011, 11.52 A. Auer, 80. 53 J. C. Piris, „The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analyses,“ Cambridge University Press, 2010, 134. 54 Related to a previously cited source: D. Grubiša, 2010, 204.55 The instrument of citizens initiative exists at the national level of the following EU Member States: Austria, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and The Netherlands. This instrument exists at the regional level in the following countries: Austria, Germany, Spain, Sweden and The

that is, to commence the legislative procedure in the same manner as if the law proposal or proposal for other document came from another authorised entity. Citizen’s Initiative does not secure this option and consequently its relevance as an instrument of direct democracy becomes significantly relativized. Finally, if we would call the Lisbon broadening of the extent of the regular legislative procedure an increase of the role of citizens’ representatives in the process of legislative decision making, then we could conclude that the European Citizen’s Initiative is an attempt to increase the influence of EU citizens because of what they are. Therefore, we can conclude that the European Citizen’s Initiative from the aspect of strengthening the democratic legitimacy has only a relative significance but it still represents a step forward. In fact, we can conclude that the European Citizen’s Initiative is more than a right to petition but less than a referendum or a procedure by which citizens directly set the laws up.56

Ethnic and culturological aspect of identity Continental connection between identities of European people could be an important foundation, but for creation of a supranational identity it is important to overcome ethnic and culturological differences. Talking about the early times of creation of European Community, Jean Monnet, one of the “fathers of Europe”, said that if he would have to start the Euro integration anew, “I would start from the culture” instead from the economy. When he said that, Monnet probably referred to the importance which the feelings of belonging to a culture and the intercultural dependence have on the status of political awareness, processes of international integration and development of a kind of supranational “identity”.57 From our point of view, of course, culture is not a good starting point for a political project, at least not for a project of integration. The evocation of cultural differences helps strengthening antagonisms within or between states but it doesn’t mean that respecting cultural diversity and cultural identity is less important in building common values and democracy. Monnet’s anecdotal statement some authors, linked to, among other things, the concept of building of collective identities such as the one that characterized formation of modern nations in 19th century, where the culture (language, literature, arts, education) was the key bond among citizens of an entity and the basis for construction of their common identity.58

Such points out that the European identity unavoidably includes the cultural identity as the backbone of European Identity.59 Huntington writes that the culture and identity today have to be perceived as a main criteria for distinguishing between political and economical systems and as a basic source of conflicts between them whereby the local politics are reduced to ethnicity politics, and the global politics to civilisation politics, thus the reason why the former rivalry

Netherlands, while this instrument in Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden exists on a local level. Citation from: M. Carausan, „The European Citizens’ Initiative-Participatory: Democracy in the European Union,“ EIRP Proceedings, Vol 6. 2011.56 As in Switzzerland, for example.57 D. Lopandić, „Evropski identitet kao deo nacionalnog identiteta – Identitet kao osnova tranzicije“, Evropski pokret u Srbiji – Fridrih Ebert Štiftung, 2004., also in: B. Nelson, D. Roberts, W. Veit, (ur.), 1992.: The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity, Berg Publishers, New York and Oxford, 1992, 68. 58 D. Čepo, 74.59 J. Such, 85.

between super powers should be viewed today as the “clash of civilisations”.60 Some authors, in the attempt to search for deeper, innermost aspects of the identity of Europe, primarily refer to religious and historical facts.61 However, although this issue is most frequently discussed within the EU contest, one has to bear in mind that very few states have proven themselves capable of successful fusion of cultural diversity and political unity.62 In our study, placed within the framework of ethnic and culturological characters, we shall take a look onto some of the elements of religious, linguistic and historical patterns.

Religion

Religious identity represents a part of culturological and psychological threads and as such it could play a major role within the framework of identity construction. There are many examples in the world showing that religious identity is fundamental to the structure of national identity and has a major function there. On the other hand, it has to be stressed out that in the EU context religious identity is an ambivalent factor.63 For example, if we refer to Ratzinger we see that he tries to explain Europe by emphasizing its Christian characteristics in the East (Orthodox), in the West and North (Protestants) and the South (Catholics).64 Such dispersion and variety, in the first place, implies the problem of how to overcome the differences in religious beliefs in the process of construction of European identity or simply: will the people living on the continent of Europe, in an ambiance where various religious or cultural and psychological patterns exist next to each other, be successful in minimizing the effects of differences generated by feelings of religious affiliation?65 This issue gains on importance with realisation that strong tendencies in conjunction with conflicts of religious character still exist in some areas of Europe – and indicator of religious disintegration.66 The even more precise question is: will the Catholics and Protestants from the West (and when will they) first build mutual tolerance and then accept the Orthodox from the East and South? With the same rationale we ask whether they will, as followers of Christianity, an idea which is a “civilisation idea, political culture and the way of life”67 in Europe, be capable of accepting Muslims, and will they ever and all together, be capable of accepting Hebrews, or, furthermore, how much tolerance is there for the Agnostics and Atheists? “European identity, therefore, is not built only on economy, or through the action of EU institutions; it is also built on much more complex inter-European connections, we would say, in the minds of all Europeans.68 If Europeans succeeded to create such connections among themselves, then European societies would complete a long and challenging journey. 69“

60 S. Hutington, “ The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs. 1993, 22-49.61 J. Ratzinger, „Europe Today and Tomorrow. Addressing the Fundamental Issues. Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2007, 11 and more.62 I. Žanić, „Izlazak iz jezičnog pata: je li veza jezika i kulture supstancijalna ili akcidentalna,“ Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva, Vol.3. No.1. 2007, 209-227.63 J. Such, 86.64 J. Ratzinger, Ibid.65 M. Radaković, 46.66 J. Such, Ibid.67 H. Yilmaz, „Turkish identity on the road to the EU: basic elements of French and German oppositional discourses,“ In Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans. volume 9(3), 2007, 298.68 M. Radaković, Ibid.69 Ibid.

Common language

One of the key elements that identity is based on is by all means the language. Language is often said to be the clearest expression and symbol of nationhood, carrying certain traditional values as creators of the central sense of belongingness.70 The first question here is whether a linguistic standardisation is possible, and if it is, how? We believe that any form of imposition would be counterproductive because it would provoke resistance in the culture of language of European people. Therefore a rational solution should be sought in the broadening of linguistic education, not in standardisation. Our way of thinking is supported by the analysis of past EU politics. The analysis can show that there is no plan in the EU, not even a germ of an idea about the “common European language”. EU is not trying to set a common language; it is engaged in protection of linguistic diversity71 or linguistic rights of Member States72 through official policy that acknowledges more than twenty different languages.73 Besides the official languages in the EU, there are other, “lesser-used”; such are the Mirandese in Portugal, Welsh in Britain, Occitan and Basque in France and Spain and Friulian in Italy.74 Every document of a legislative nature adopted by EU institutions is immediately available to all EU citizens in one of the official languages. This was done for the reason of legal security, i.e. because the EU laws have to be available and understandable to the citizens and their chosen representatives in the European Parliament. Of course, an action like this by Brussels is entirely in the function of democracy because citizens have to have the possibility (the right) to know why a specific legal act was adopted and what is required by it so they could take a position about it through their representatives in the structures of authority. In the context of the situation in the EU a difference between official and working languages must be made. Working languages are languages used by specific institutions; e.g. the working language of the Court of Justice is French, of the European Commission English, French and German etc. However, the said distribution has a more formal than an essential meaning because memos can be addressed to any of Union’s institutions in any of the official languages, regardless of the institution. The answer will be written in the same language used in the original memo. Besides, European Union documents are published in official and working languages.75 Linguistic plurality in the EU requires investment of sizeable financial means to maintain the necessary level of communication and understanding during the work of its institutions.76 However, this is not the only problem arising from this phenomenon. Linguistic plurality poses certain challenges for consolidation of European democratic public opinion, the „demos“.77 Namely, due to the need for maintaining the balance between the respect for national identities of Member States, including the language, and

70 See: http://www.uwcades.org/papers/members/eu_identity.pdf71 See: Article 165. UFEU.72 See: Case C-379/87 Groener vs Minister of Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Educational Committee.73 European Union now has (January 2011) 27 Member States and uses 23 official languages: German, French, Bulgarian, English, Czech, Danish, Dutch, Estonian, Finnish, Swedish, Greek, Irish (Gaelic), Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Slovenian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovakian and Spanish. EU has less official languages than member states. This is because, for example, Greece and Cyprus speak the same language, like Germany and Austria, G. Britain and Ireland, while Luxemburg and Belgium use same languages as their Dutch, French and German neighbours.74 T. D. Zweifel, „Democratic Deficit?“, USA: Lexington Books. 2002, 13.75 See: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/languages-of-europe/eu-languages_en.htm (27.03.2012.)76 Annual translation expenses in EU are more than a billion Euros. See: T. Oppermann, Europarecht, 3. Auflage, Verlag C. H. Beck, München, 2005, 64. Citation according to: B. Košutić, „Višejezičnost – prednost ili usud Evropske unije,“ Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, godina LIV, broj 2. 2006, 80-92.77 Ibid.

maintaining the necessary level of understanding in the functioning of EU institutions, appeared the problem of defining the strategy for the establishment of a collective, European identity. In fact, the linguistic diversity reflects the diversity of democratic culture. There is no common understanding of democracy; there are several competitive national understandings.78 At the European level exists the EBLUL agency, The European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages. The basic task of the Bureau, supported by EU, is to promote regional, minority and non-territorial languages in EU Member States and linguistic rights of their speakers. The Bureau actively participated in the preparation of proposal of European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages, adopted by the Council of Europe on 5th November 1992.79

History

If we accept that common feelings or memory, derived from history are central to identity, for it is what separates individuals from others. In that sense, European identity is an illusion: European history as a whole may be interrelated, yet each nation has its distinctive historical records.80 Therefore, the discourse on European identity based on culturological principles could be viewed as one that explicitly suggests that references to history, heritage and tradition are a method of demarcating Europe, not how to unite it. It can be said that the history of Europe was marked by frequent conflicts. Within such approach the culture does not a have a gratifying role because it appears more as an artefact of the past than as some harmonic interplay in the multiplication of language, religion, economy, art etc. Therefore, if we take into account the very nature of history as a collective memory, the result is very difficult path to a unified, consistent historiographic material. This is because the nations on the European continent were rivals for centuries and each had its own set of values based on facts that were in their favour. However, it is possible, as some authors concluded, to balance the European history by using international conventions.81 Therefore, shared history would be a sum of historical and cultural heritage useful to have as a collective memory. In fact, nobody can prohibit anyone to believe that Greco-Roman classical antiquity is cultural heritage of the entire Europe although it affected only some parts of Europe and often very late and via many intermediary layers. Classical age values were accepted in the entire Europe in 19th and 20th century, during the time of development of general education models.82

Finally, in spite of obvious differences which exist between the nations of Europe today, there are certain traditions and heritage that are common.83 Those are, in the first place, parliamentary institutions, Roman law, political democracy, renaissance, rationalism, empiricism, humanism, romanticism as cultural heritage. Surely not all European nations have made equal contribution to the common cultural heritage; therefore their individual shares in the collective identity cannot be equal.

78 T. D. Zweifel, 14.79 J. E. Fossum, „Identity-politics in the European Union“, ARENA – Center of European Union, University of Oslo, 2001. Citation according to: M. Radaković, 52.80 See: http://www.uwcades.org/papers/members/eu_identity.pdf (25.12.2013.)81 V. Šmale, „Istorija evropske ideje“, CLIO, Beograd 2003, 290–291. Cittation acccording to: M. Radaković, 54.82 M. Radaković, Ibid.83 A.D. Smith, „ National Identity“, University of Nevada Press, 1993, 70-71.

Conclusion

At the end of discussion on European identity we could say that the EU respects freedom of identity of their citizens and actively supports their choice to speak and write in their own languages, but at the same time it is committed to the idea of unification at the European level. In other words, due to different languages and the history of European people the idea of unification and creation of multilayered identity at the moment will not imply the creation of euro-cultural identity. The impossibility of construction of a collective culturological fundament for European identity should be compensated by something else. For now it is very difficult to tell what that would be, that is, what could repair this sizeable shortcoming in the structure of future collective identity in an adequate manner because it makes it look more like a plastic or an artificial sociological construct than an identity generated naturally. Besides, identity in general and more specifically political or civic identity not necessary should be a product of culture anymore.84 For example, an Italian farmer is closer to a French farmer that to an Italian university professor.85 In addition, some postulates of post-national collectiveness based on the rule of law suggest that a legal norm can establish an identity. It is notable that such theses placing post-national(istic) before the ethno-national approach also place the state/constitution above the political people or collective identity. A starting point like that necessarily implies greater penetration of European norms into national laws, that is, more competencies of supranational institution in solving real needs of citizens – competencies that are today dominantly in the hands of national institutions. On this Bruter describes so called civic identity which represents: “the degree to which they feel that they are citizens of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their daily life”.86 Also as Bruter points out, this component of identity quite corresponding to Habermas’s “constitutional patriotism.” Greater regulatory function of European institutions will contribute to larger identification of citizens with the EU and that in itself is sufficient to turn citizens to Brussels in search for solutions for their real life problems.

Besides, European identity gains its supranational recognition with the development of EU. This means that an important role in the further development of European identity will be played by the progress of institutions of European Union. Likewise, the issue of European identity is of significance for the survival and future of the Union. Therefore, it is realistic to expect that the increase of supranational tendencies will be followed by growing feelings of collectivism. However, such hypothesis is justified only if a proper balance is reached with the national interests, that is, a compromise with the key political stakeholders on the national level. Political subjects on national levels still have the power to ignite national feelings and that, because of the widespread lack of understanding of the fundamental concept of European identity, suffocates every attempt among citizens for its better instalment within the social and political discourse in EU Member States. In other words, the calculations of future European identity must not lose the influence of politics and political from sight.

Therefore, the principle of supranationality, strategy and transformation of all attributes of national may lead to creation of European Identity.87 However, it must not be forgotten that EU Member States, especially the national political subjects, hold an important share in the 84 See: http://www.uwcades.org/papers/members/eu_identity.pdf85 Ibid.86 M. Bruter, „Winning hearts and minds for Europe: the impact of news and symbols on civic and cultural European identity,“ Comparative political studies, 36(10), 2003, 1148-1179.87 M. Radaković, 46.

construction of collective identity. They are the ones that are expected to break the existing stereotypes created by the discussion on collective identity with references to the vulnerability and sensibility of national identities. If we take into account the relatively low level of collective European identification among EU citizens, the European identity, as a prerequisite to European demos is probable in the foreseeable future but only as a complementary one, a multi-fold and multilayered, flexible and inclusive collective identity, building up on national identity, not one that seeks to replace it.88 Therefore, European identity should strategically draw less from the inner uniformity and more from the outward diversities. This is because EU citizens are not always sufficiently connected by inward uniformity, but by the outward difference, and this should be quite sufficient for the identity. For that reason:

“A progressive Europe is possible only as a flexible unity in differences that are triumphed over by the perspective of betterment for all and by a new developmental and civilisation paradigm, but also stay in what it makes it a dynamic ensemble and a genuine home of all European nations.89“

Sažetak

Ovaj članak tretira pitanja koja su zajednička za pravne, politološke i sociološke znanosti kao temeljna u identifikaciji kako kolektivni identitet može doprinijeti procesu evropskih integracija, a posebno kako se može pomoći u poboljšanju demokratskih inputa, odnosno jačanjademokratije u Evropskoj uniji. U nekim mojim ranijim istraživanjima našao sam da politološkaperspektiva zauzima važno mjesto u literaturi na temu Evropske unije. To mi je dalo ideju da taj aspekt koristim u većoj mjeri u kombinaciji sa normativnim aspektom kako bi se objasnila temeljna dostignuća vezana za evropski identitet, kao i za doticanje nekih specifičnih aspekata u tom području.

Preliminarni pristup ovom pitanju se temelji na pitanju da li postoji zajednički skup vrijednosti unutar Unije i da li je moguće građane Unije identificirati kao Evropljane? U tom smislu, važan dio ovog istraživanja bit će da ispita da li porijeklo, historija, jezik i religija predstavljaju objektivni kriterij na osnovu kojih bi se mogao uspostaviti kolektivni identitet, ili su oni samo političko sredstvo koje se koristi za određene ciljeve. Kako su porijeklo, historija, jezik i vjera na način kako ih razumije narod obično rezultat odluka elite. Zbog toga je li ovo slučaj u kojem se politika (nacionalnog) identiteta konstruira od strane političkih aktera i služi da ojača njihovusnage i da li je to razlog zašto političari izbjegavaju podržati projekte kolektivnog identiteta?

Zbog koristi za diskusiju o tome šta je to što bi moglo ujediniti brojna državljanstva u jedan kolektivni identitet ukratko ću konsultovati ranije pokušaje stvaranja evropskog identiteta kroz ustavne reforme, formalno stvaranje ustava i prava na državljanstvo. Značaj niza simbola i instrumenata koji su usvojeni do danas, uključujući i Evropsku građansku inicijativu, koji se pojavio sa Ugovorom iz Lisabona kako bi se olakšala identifikacija građana sa Unijom također će biti analizirani. Neka od sljedećih pitanja ovdje biti će osnova ovog istraživanja: Kakav jeidentitet koji će se pojaviti iz procesa evropskih integracija; koji su novi obrasci stvaranja

88 C. Orsmark, „Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union,“ Faculty of Law, University of Lund, Master Thesis, 2004.89Z. Vidojević, „Demokratija na zalasku, Institut društvenih nauka,“ Službeni glasnik, Beograd 2010, 73.

kolektivnog identiteta koji utječu na proces evropskih integracija; koja vrsta uključenosti i osjećaja pripadnosti predstavljaju suštinu i proizvode novi evropski društveni i kulturni prostor u odnosu na koje simbole; kakve politike i političke identifikacije će se pojaviti i nastaniti?

Ključne riječi: kolektivni identitet, evropski identitet, Evropska građanska inicijativa, kultura, religija, historija, jezik, politički akteri.

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Case Law

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