City of Dreams, Disappointment, and Optimism:

Rajab

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9 - A

pril 2

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DirasatCity of Dreams, Disappointment, and Optimism:The Case of Nine Communities of Undocumented African Migrants in the City of Jeddah

Fahad L. Alghalib Alsharif

Senior Research Fellow

King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies

City of Dreams, Disappointment, and Optimism:The Case of Nine Communities of Undocumented African Migrants in the City of Jeddah

Fahad L. Alghalib Alsharif

Senior Research Fellow

King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies

4 No. 35 Rajab, 1439 - April 2018Dirasat

© King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 2018

King Fahd National Library Cataloging-In-Publication Data

Alsharif, Fahad L. City of Dreams, Disappointment and Optimism: The Case of Nine Communities of Undocumented African Migrants in the city of Jeddah. / Fahad L . Alsharif. - Riyadh, 2018

60 p ; 16.5 x 23 cm

ISBN: 978-603-8206-65-2

1 - Immigrants - Jeddah 2 - Immigration and

emmigration I - Title

325.1 dc 1439/7148

L.D. no. 1439/7148

ISBN: 978-603-8206-65-2

5

Table of Contents

Abstract 6Introduction 7Saudi Migration Policies 7

Push and Pull Factors 9

Methodology 13

Data Analysis 14The Semi–Focus Group: The Case of African Communities 14The Migration Processes 18

Undocumented Entry 19First Category: Smuggling 20Second Category: Overstaying an Umrah or Hajj Visa 22Third Category: Breaking a Work Contract 22Fourth Category: Undocumented “Migrants” Born in Jeddah 23Characteristics of Irregular Migrants, Such as Age atArrival, Deportation Experiences, and the Value of Migration 26

Familial and Social Ties 30Issues Related to Working Conditions 38Legal Issues Facing Undocumented Laborers in Saudi Arabia 43Plans for the Future 45

Conclusion 50References 54

6 No. 33 Jumada I, 1439 - February 2018Dirasat

Abstract

The goal in this paper is to analyze the lives of the members of nine communities of African migrants to the city of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. Through the testimonies of undocumented migrants living in Jeddah, specifically Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Sudanese, Chadians, Nigerians, Burkinabes, Cameroonians, and Ghanaians, the aim of this article is to study the major social, economic, and security consequences of their presence in Saudi Arabia in general and in the city of Jeddah in particular.

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Introduction

The sudden shift from a traditional commercial economy to an oil-based one in the 1930s changed Jeddah and other cities in Saudi Arabia and transformed their social and economic life. This economic boom led to a dramatic increase in the living standards of the Saudis and, significantly, created new needs for skilled and unskilled foreign workers throughout the country, and particularly in Jeddah. The migrant populations that flocked to the Kingdom can be divided into four main categories: migrants who overstayed their Hajj and Umrah visas; migrants who entered illegally, having been smuggled from Yemen or from one of many other countries on the African continent via Yemen; and labor migrants who stayed after violating their work contract. Naturally, the children born of illegal immigrants must also be accounted for.

Following the oil crisis of 1973, Saudi economy became one of the fastest-growing economies of the world due to the substantial increase in oil prices. The economic prosperity triggered an increase in the number of illegal migrants, which begun to rise dramatically in the following decades. This was due both to various factors in the originating countries, which constituted the push factor, and the lack of necessary national manpower in Saudi Arabia in general and Jeddah in particular, which contributed to the pull factor.1

Through the testimonies of African undocumented migrants living in Jeddah, specifically Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Sudanese, Chadians, Nigerians, Burkinabes, Cameroonians, and Ghanaians, this article aims to study the major social, economic, and security consequences of their presence in Saudi Arabia in general and in the city of Jeddah in particular.

Saudi Migration PoliciesBefore introducing the communities, it is very important to briefly talk

(1) Sudan and Yemen, on the one hand, are countries of emigration, mainly to the Arabian Peninsula, as well as transit and immigration countries for African migrants. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is one of the largest labor importers in the world. Saudi Arabia is a middle-income country, whereas Yemen and Sudan, as well as all the other African countries noted above with the exception of Nigeria, are among the least developed countries, and rely heavily on foreign aid. See Hélène Thiollet, Refugees and Migrants from Eritrea to the Arab World: The Case of Sudan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, 1997–2007 (Cairo, Egypt: American University in Cairo Press, 2007).


about migration policies. First, the Saudi kafala (sponsorship) system has expanded to meet an increasing demand for workers in both the public and the private sectors. These workers include all types of foreign professional expatriates, running the gamut from engineers in construction to doctors and nurses for private hospitals and clinics, not to mention, of course, a vast number of semiskilled and low-skilled workers.

When unemployment rose among Saudi citizens, policy makers adopted “Saudization”2 as a national policy to employ nationals in the private sector, with the aim of reducing the number of foreign migrants in the country. This government policy achieved its goals, though only to a small degree, with the result being the introduction of another policy, the Nitaqat3 system, as an effective tool to enforce Saudization. The word Nitaqat means “areas” or “zones” in Arabic. It is a system to organize and limit the number of non-Saudi employees in the private sector relative to Saudi employees. In other words, it is a set of regulations dictating reward and punishment intended to force the private sector to employ more Saudis. This program was introduced by the Ministry of Labor in June 2011.

The Ministry of Labor teamed up with the Ministry of Interior and employed 1,000 inspectors to enforce the new laws, which established jail terms and fines for Saudi citizens who did not comply and promised to deport any foreign guest worker who violated the new policy. As a consequence of the deportation policy, many undocumented migrants were pressured to go into hiding to avoid being deported. For example, the Saudi Ministry of Interior’s records indicated that 665,960 occurred during 2013 and 605,420 during 2014.4 From 2012 to 2014, more than 1 million expatriates were deported under the two new laws. At the same time, and parallel to the deportation

(2) Al Dosary, Adel S. and Syed M. Rahman. “Saudization (Localization) —A Critical Review,” Human Resource Development Internationa. 8, no. 4 (2005): 495–502.

(3) Françoise De Bel-Air, “The Socio-Political Background and Stakes of ‘Saudizing’ the Workforce in Saudi Arabia: The Nitaqat policy.” European University Institute (EUI) and Gulf Research Center (GRC), 2015.

(4) See Gulf Labour Markets and Migration. “Saudi Arabia: Deportations from Saudi Arabia by Month (March 2011–February 2016).” http://gulfmigration.eu/saudi-arabia-deportations-from-saudi-arabia-by-month-march-2011-february-2016/.

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policy, amnesty policies were adopted to address international human rights concerns regarding the conditions of migrants in Saudi Arabia.

Interestingly, the standard procedure for the amnesty initiative was to provide migrants with a grace period in order to allow them to rectify their legal status, on penalty of a fine, jail time, or outright deportation. Very often, after the deadline passed, Saudi authorities would launch raids and round up thousands of undocumented workers: These raids could last from a few weeks to a few months. Different government agencies carried out raids on all types of local markets, restaurants, convenience stores, shopping centers, and residential areas.5

To clarify the implications of these initiatives, this essay is divided into four parts. The first part deals with the push and pull factors that attract these undocumented migrants to the city of Jeddah from different parts of Africa. In the second part, the methodology used is discussed. In the third part, we present an analysis of the outcomes of the semi–structured questionnaire interviews and focus group conversations conducted with the African communities in Jeddah. In the fourth part, we provide a summary and several concluding remarks.

Push and Pull Factors

It is imperative to analyze the push factors that lie behind migrants coming from these African countries and the pull factors that attract them to migrate to the city of Jeddah. In this regard, over the years, many migrants have fled to Jeddah for economic, social, political, and environmental reasons. Interestingly, it seems that the domestic realities of the various countries of undocumented migrants under examination in this paper are very similar. For example, civil wars, as in the case of Nigeria, or inability to deal with famine and disease stood out as the main concerns. Likewise, Eritrea suffered the worst drought in the late 1990s, causing tens of thousands of people to flee the area. Jeddah became one of their primary destinations, particularly for the poorest sector of society, while the most educated and wealthy Eritreans

(5) Reuters, March 27, 2013.


headed to Europe and North America. Chronic political instability and unsustainable population growth, with the consequent rise of unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, Islamic radicalization, and, in the case of Somalia, piracy, constituted some of the main reasons for the massive migration from Africa to Saudi Arabia and other countries. Furthermore, many of these countries were plagued by repeated environmental disasters such as desertification and floods, which made it difficult to develop a sustainable agricultural system that could have, presumably, helped more of the population to remain in place. All these elements taken together significantly decreased opportunities for the majority of migrants to meet their basic needs to sustain basic living conditions in their native countries. This certainly contributed to the push factors that caused these labor migrants to leave their homeland in search of a better life.

When African countries are compared to other political entities,6 it is, regrettably, evident that many fall at the bottom of the ladder in terms of economic development, with the only exception being Nigeria, whose oil resources generate significant income. In general, African societies boast large family sizes on average, which puts a considerable burden on existing natural resources. Among the push factors, therefore, it is evident that the majority of countries in this study have a high unemployment rate along with very low annual per-capita income. The annual gross national income (GNI) in African countries is among the lowest in the world, and varies from $340 in Eritrea, to $1,250 in Ghana, which is quite low. The Republic of Chad has a mid-range GNI of $710 and belongs to the Republic of Chad7. These GNI statistics are much lower than Saudi Arabia’s GNI, which stood at $18, 750, in 2010.8

(6) Fahad Alsharif, “Calculated Risks, Agonies, and Hopes: A Comparative Case Study of the Undocumented Yemeni and Filipino Migrant Communities in Jeddah,” in Philippe Fargues and Nasra Shah, eds., Skillful Survivals: Irregular Migration to the Gulf (Jeddah, Geneva, and Cambridge: Gulf Research Center, 2017), 161–183. http://gulfmigration.eu/media/pubs/book/GLMM%20-%20IM%20Volume%20-%20Complete.pdf .

(7) World Bank, Africa Development Indicators 2012l13 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013), DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9616-2,. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13504/9780821396162.pdf?sequence=1.

(8) World Bank, “Data: Saudi Arabia,” https://data.worldbank.org/country/saudi-arabia.

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This is why in the past, migrants have perceived Saudi Arabia to be a land of opportunity and continue to do so today.

The geographical proximity of many of these countries to the Kingdom and the economically prosperous Saudi economy contributed as pull factors, as well. Map 1 shows that many African countries within and outside the Horn of Africa are close enough to allow their citizens to venture on the dangerous journey across the Red Sea to Yemen and from there to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia.

Map 1: Geographic Proximity of the Horn of Africa and Other

African Countries to Jeddah and Flows of African Migrants to That City.

Source: Adapted from Google.

Together with Yemen, Sudan has been, for centuries, a key transit country, and it was the main route used by African pilgrims to reach Mecca for Hajj and Umrah. Such religious migration has taken place traditionally from countries such as Chad and Cameroon, and even from West African countries such as Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Senegal. Since 2013, the Saudi campaign against the presence of illegal workers in the Kingdom has been strengthened, both for economic and for security reasons.9 In fact, the construction of 1,118 mile-long iron fence on the border with Yemen is one of the steps taken by the

(9) “Shoura to Tackle Problem of 5 Million Illegals in Kingdom,” Arab News, November 11, 2012, http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/shoura-tackle-problem-5-million-illegals-kingdom.


government to curb the flow of illegal migrants from Yemen and several African countries. In addition, the Saudi government issued a series of amnesties that allowed the resettlement of 5 million irregular workers to their countries of origin, all to better resolve the challenges that these migrant populations posed. In 2018, Riyadh is still pursuing its goal of replacing foreign workers with Saudis, in part because of the global economic crisis, which has made it difficult to implement job creation programs on a large scale. However, as this study demonstrates, despite all of these measures, there has been little success in curbing the flow of illegal immigrants coming to Jeddah or into the country as a whole, especially those using Hajj and Umrah visas, as we will discuss later, and expatriates who violate their work contract.

Furthermore, oil wealth changed the lifestyle of the indigenous populations and encouraged the entry of Saudi women into the labor market starting in the 1980s, which, in turn, led to an increased demand for domestic laborers such as maids and drivers. These requirements served as a strong magnet for foreign labor, along with a large market for low-skilled workers. At the same time, the increase in government revenues led to a huge investment in infrastructure projects, which in turn led to significant growth in the need for foreign labor and created indirect employment opportunities for irregular labor migration into the Kingdom. As a result of a perceived reluctance by some Saudis to engage in manual work and the absence of skilled workers for specific skilled jobs, the Saudi economy has relied, and heavily depends, on expatriate workers from Europe and America in most areas of development.

In this regard, one observer noted that improvement of the country’s infrastructure and services inevitably meant an improvement in Saudis’ everyday life and expectations, changing completely the social panorama of the country. This trend provided a unified platform for the implementation of nation-wide social and economic reforms which strengthened Saudis’ sense of identity.10

(10) Kelly, Michael. “Saudi Arabia: Oil and Saudi Development.” Harvard International Review 8, no. 4 (1986): 34–40.

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Methodology

This study used several qualitative methods, including demographic information, information about the actual migration processes followed, an analysis of familial and social ties, descriptions of any legal and work issues related to migrants’ work in Saudi Arabia, and a glimpse into the plans they harbored for the future. A face-to-face semi-structured anonymous interview questionnaire with closed and open-ended probing questions and a focus group were used as well. Data were gathered from the migrants who were neither under arrest nor under any threat of arrest and were living and working in the city. The interviewees were encouraged to feel comfortable answering questions without fear because the researcher pledged to treat responses about their real-life experiences in the city as undocumented migrants with full confidentiality. Using the snowball sampling technique,11 the researcher interviewed 61 female and male African labor migrants living in Jeddah from nine different African countries and based on one or more of the following criteria: • Entered the country without obtaining an official visa (for example they

were smuggled into Saudi Arabia by land or by sea); • Entered the country legally with Umrah or Hajj visas, but overstayed; • Entered legally with a work permit visa, but left the Saudi employers with

their consent; • Were born in the city to undocumented parents.

The interviewees agreed to talk in detail about their working conditions as illegal migrants. Each interviewee’s confidentiality was protected and careful steps were taken not to violate the standard norms and rules of professional fieldwork ethics. This study relied on informants, or gatekeepers, to secure access to the undocumented migrants. These are individuals who are trusted and respected members of the different communities of undocumented migrants under study. Several were former undocumented migrants themselves

(11) Josselson and Lieblich (2003) contend that “The sample size required to study any particular hidden population, can be defined according to the ‘saturation point’ of data collection: . . . saturation—that is, stopping data collection when the results start to become redundant—is the key determinant of sample size. In practice, this may mean specifying a range between 5 and 30 participants.” Cited in K. Erik Rudestam and Rae Newton, Surviving Your Dissertation: A Comprehensive Guide to Content and Process (Thousand Oak, CA: SAGE Publications, 2007), 108.


and were utilized as advisers and facilitators in order to establish contact with the different communities.

Data Analysis

To better gain insight into conditions confronted by various migrant communities, the researcher first concentrated on the semi-focus group, before turning to the actual processes of migration and the methods used to enter the Kingdom.

The Semi–Focus Group: The Case of African Communities Approaching the African community as a Saudi is not easy, and the

researcher had to rely on the collaboration and support of gatekeepers and community leaders, which allowed him to gain a rare degree of access. Due to the importance of the district of Karantina, the researcher, with the help of several gatekeepers, organized a focus group there. However, during the investigation, the opportunity arose for an unplanned meeting in the house of a Nigerian community leader. Many elderly leaders and young men from different communities were present. The older gatekeeper, who was from the Sudan, introduced the investigator to them as someone who was a social science researcher with no government association and who was interested in studying their attitudes, perceptions, and views on the city of Jeddah, including the difficulties they had faced or continued to face. There were different African nationalities present in that room. Many migrants spoke clear Arabic with distinctive accents; quite a few had only a moderate ability to communicate in Arabic but could discuss their concerns through a friend or a relative present in the chamber. At least five of them remained silent, though one could clearly see the hardships they had endured on their tired faces.

In that unplanned, spontaneous meeting with the African undocumented migrants, the majority seemed relaxed and amused at the fact that a native Saudi was curious about important issues that surrounded their undocumented lives. The researcher avoided asking personal questions concerning names,

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addresses, and legal status, though he was fortunate enough to be able to solicit considerable information about their lives in Jeddah, their plans, and what they expected from the Saudi authorities. All those present at this gathering were anxious to tell their story. They spoke of the fact that many of them loved Jeddah, either because it was close to the holy cities of Mecca and Madina, or because they had been born in Jeddah, spoke the language, and had spent all or most of their life in the city. Others mentioned that they had no chance of survival in their respective countries of origin if deported, and complained about the lack of government support in terms of free public health care and schooling for their children, and the constant threat to their daily survival. In this regard, as undocumented migrants who do not have a residency permit, or iqamah, they faced restricted access to medical care and other services, and several noted that they had to pay more for medical treatment than Saudi citizens. This is because the law restricts access to these services except for people who can show valid identification papers. When the researcher enquired about their young children’s education, they revealed that they had a small unregulated private school in Karantina that taught the Koran to local youngsters.

Most of those present wished to be legal. As holders of valid iqamah they would be able to easily access government services, work, drive through the city with their families, and rent homes without violating city laws. An man from Chad who was in his late 70s, interviewee number 4, ended this unique gathering by saying:

I never thought of returning to Chad. We are devout Muslims. I had left that country for over five decades when I came for Hajj a long time ago. All my three wives, 25 children, and 70 grandchildren were born in Al-Karantina. We just need to be treated fairly. There is a Quran verse in Islam that encourages Muslims to perform Hajj and work. This has been done for centuries, and no one complained about visa or iqamah requirements. This unplanned meeting was important for singling out some of the

different themes that the researcher would later develop in the semi-


structured interviews with individual immigrants, which were conducted with 61 individuals through the interview questionnaire (see table 1 for general demographic data).

Table 1: General Overview of the Demographic Characteristics

Nationality Ethiopia Eritrea Somalia Sudan Chad NigeriaBurkina

FasoGhana Cameroon Total

Gender n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n %

Female 6 9 3 5 2 3 0 0 2 3 4 7 0 0 1 2 0 0 18 30

Male 4 7 6 10 11 18 5 8 3 5 3 5 4 7 4 7 3 5 43 70

Total 10 16 9 15 13 21 5 8 5 8 7 12 4 7 5 9 3 5 61 100

Average Age

36

Average Level of Education 5

Marital Status n %

Married 27 44.3

Single 23 37.7

Divorced 10 16.4

Widows 1 1.6

Total 61 100

Average Number of Children 3

Religion n %

Muslims 58 95

Christians 3 5

Total 61 100

The demographic data collected from interviewees from the nine communities that is shown in table 1 indicate that the undocumented African labor migrants who were interviewed consisted of 18 females and 43 males, representing 30% and 70%, respectively, of the total population of African migrant respondents. The interviewees came from different regions and cities in the African countries under study. Their ages ranged between 18 and 78 years old. The average mean age was 36. The mode (the most often repeated age) was 35 years. Concerning their marital status, there were 27 married men and women, comprising 44.3% of the total. The number of single respondents

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was 23, or about 37.7%. Ten of the 61 interviewees (16.4%) were divorced. There was only 1 widow or widower, representing 1.6% of the sample. About 60% of the migrants’ marriages occurred in their respective countries, and the other 40% took place in Jeddah. It should be noted that few of these marriages were registered in their respective consulates in Jeddah. The great majority of migrants were married in a private setting, which included a Muslim sheikh from within a particular migrant community who had been trained in conducting Islamic marriage contracts and two adult male witnesses. Many women who came with Umrah or Hajj visas or who were smuggled into the country were either single or were married women who were separated or who had requested a divorce from their husbands in their native countries within a certain period of time after their arrival in Jeddah.

Several married men with children (in their native country) from these communities confessed having another wife, or more than one, after spending a few years as bachelors in the city of Jeddah. None of these married individuals could bring their wives via the Umrah or Hajj visa mechanism, nor could they smuggle them into the country because of the hardships such events imposed on those who attempted them. Most of the marriages that occurred in Jeddah among various undocumented African communities happened within the same community. Marriages between individuals hailing from different African communities were less frequent. A few marriages occurred among individuals outside African communities, as it is not unheard of that African women, particularly those born in Jeddah, occasionally married Saudi nationals,12 especially those who were of African origin themselves or else were relatively elderly. Based on years of observation in this field study in Jeddah, the researcher contends that the majority of undocumented African migrants, male as well as female and whether formerly married in their respective countries or still single,

(12) Saudi laws and regulations forbid any citizens to marry a non-Saudi national without official approval. Many Saudis violate this rule due to the difficulty associated with obtaining government permission. In these cases, they proceed to marry the individual of their choice without the authorities’ consent, thus contributing to the identity crises for their children since the they will not have any legal status. As a result, such children grow up subject to arrest, incarceration, and deportation by the Saudi authorities.


planned to marry someone in the future, or to take a second wife in the case of married men. Information gathered from interviewees on this issue reflected a great concern about being a “good” Muslim who sought proper sexual conduct through halal (legitimate) marriage, which they claimed was part of life and the natural thing to do.

Interestingly, the family size of those interviewed varied considerably, from no children to couples with 20 children. Thirty interviewees (49.2%) had no children; 7interviewees (11.4) had 6 children, which constituted the mode,13 and only 1 interviewee (1.6%) had 20 children. The interviewee with 20 children was from Chad and had had most of his children (17) in Jeddah with three wives, all of whom he married in the city. Only 3 of his children were born in Chad, where his original Chadian wife still resided with the rest of the family. Overall, however, the average family size stood at 3.245, or approximately 3 children.

As far as religious affiliation was concerned, 95.1% (58 of the 61) of interviewees were Muslims, and the remaining 4.9% (3 interviewees) were Christians. As far as education was concerned, a great number of the male and female interviewees from these communities not only had to leave school for financial reasons to help their parents support the family (or because of tough economic or political conditions in their country of origin), most were literally forced to migrate and thus had had no opportunity for education. Remarkably, however, the level of education of all interviewees ranged from no formal education to college degrees.14 The average years of education for all individuals interviewed was 4.8, which is equivalent to grade 5.

The Migration Processes Historically, the close geographical proximity of Jeddah to the Horn of

Africa and the relatively cheap cost of the journey have always been a great

(13) The mode in statistics is the most repeated number. In this case, most families have 6 children.(14) For simplicity, the researcher used the American school system levels of education: The

secondary or high school system is divided into 12 grades, and a grade of 0 represents no formal indication, Grade 1 stands for the first year in school for the child at 5–6 years of age. Grade 12 denotes the final year in high school, after which graduates can enter university. The university degree, for our analysis, is grade 16, which represents the 4 years needed to earn a university degree in the United States and most other countries.

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opportunity for labor migrants. We identified four types of undocumented migrants in Jeddah, and this section will discuss them. Table 2 presents characteristics of these migrants.

Table 2: Issues Related to Illegal Migration to Saudi Arabia

Manner of Becoming UndocumentedAfrican Communities

n %Smuggled 21 34Overstay of Umrah and Hajj Visas 23 38Ran Away from Sponsor (Violated Work Contract) 6 10Immigrant Born in the City with No Documents 11 18Total 61 100

Reasons for Migration from Native Country n %Economic 30 49Social: To Join Family or Friends 7 12Religious 0 0Born in the City with No Documents 11 18War and Famine 13 21Total 61 100

Why Migration to Jeddah Rather Than Another Location? n %Friends and Relatives 20 33Easier to Get an Umrah, Hajj, or Work Visa 10 17Making a Better Income in Jeddah 7 12Easy Place to Be Smuggled into 13 21Born in the City 11 18Total 61 100

Value of Migration n %Yes 49 80No 1 2Born in the City with No Documents 11 18Total 61 100

Issues Related to MigrationAverage Cost of Migration through Smuggling $533Average Age at Arrival 25Average Years as Undocumented 14Average Number of Deportations 1

Undocumented Entry

Besides the statistical data, this research aimed at reporting the real experiences of the four different categories of migrants. These included the follwing categories:


First Category: SmugglingOut of the 61 respondents from the African communities who were

interviewed, 21 (34%) were smuggled into Jeddah. The following are a select few testimonies of their journeys.

Interviewee number 11, a woman from Ethiopia, noted that the first time she came to Jeddah was with an Umrah visa when she was 19 years old. She worked in Riyadh for four years without documents. She was arrested by the Jawazat (Saudi Office of Passports and Naturalization) and deported to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, after spending eight months in jail. Despite the deportation, she decided to return, the second time as a “smuggled” migrant. She narrated her experiences in the following terms:

I woke up at noon on a Friday, put on my clothes and took some food like water and biscuits. I went to a meeting place near a mountain where I met 10 men. There were wild animals, and the men had knives for defense. We walked through the mountains until dawn. We slept in the open all morning until sunset, and then we continued walking. We had a leader from Djibouti to guide us. We were tired and at times we had short rides on cars and after four days, we reached Djibouti. We arrived there very early in the morning. I wore men’s clothing, and I entered the mosque with the other men. My brother and cousin and the other men prayed at the mosque and stayed there until the next morning to avoid thieves. We stayed in a small hotel, and after we ran out of money, we asked our parents to send us some. We paid the money to the captain of a big boat. We were about 170 men and women from different nationalities. After 10 hours, we met a huge storm and many drowned, and we stopped on an island. We stayed two days there without food and water. Two days later, another boat arrived on the island. One hundred and eighty of us went on board. We stayed at sea for 32 hours and reached Yemen. Once we reached the shore everyone left the boat except me because I had problems moving my legs because I had been tied to the boat for many hours in order to avoid falling overboard because of the high waves.

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My brother and cousin helped me. I almost drowned. We went into a Yemeni farm that had a tent, and we stayed there two days after paying for food and water. Each of us later paid a Yemeni man $100 to drive us to the Samta near Saudi border. It was night time when we arrived in Samta; we walked and dragged ourselves on our stomachs on the ground for four hours to avoid border guards. After 4 hours, we met a Saudi smuggler who took $160 from each of us to transport us to Jazan. On the road, the Saudi man gave me and the other women abayas [an abaya is a simple, loose overgarment, or robe-like dress, worn by Saudi women] and a niqap [a niqap is a garment that covers the face and is worn by conservative Saudi women] and gloves to hide ourselves from the police. We arrived in our cousin’s flat in Jazan. He is a documented car driver. We stayed there for seven days. We went to a private hospital for medical treatment. My cousin found me a job as a house maid for $267. I stayed in this job for two months. Interviewee number 19 was from Eritrea. He was smuggled from his

country to Yemen via the Red Sea on a fishing boat with 210 other migrants of different nationalities. Forty were women, and 170 were men. They sailed for 36 hours. Once on the Yemeni seashore, all of them went into different directions. He and two other couples tried to reach the Saudi border. He walked for two days without water. He decided to leave the group but lost his way. After two days, he saw two bodies of his former companions, who had died in the desert. He managed to reach the border and walked all the way to Jeddah.

According to many interviewees, the majority of African undocumented migrants were exploited by security officials for huge sums of money once they reached Yemen. Further, they had to pay $100 each to the police officers after reporting to specific police stations. This was on top of the amount each of them had to pay for the Red Sea crossing. A few women were raped, though many female migrants wore men’s clothes to hide their gender. Reportedly, their exploitation did not end there, but rather continued until they reached their destinations in Jeddah. Despite these hardships, and while Saudi border authorities have invested substantial resources in trying to fight undocumented


migration, smugglers resorted to creative ways that represent great challenges to all concerned. It should be noted that the length of the land border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia exceeds the measured internationally recognized distance by five times because it includes all land trails through terrain consisting of mountains and valleys.

Second Category: Overstaying an Umrah or Hajj VisaOut of the 61 individuals from various African communities interviewed

for this study, 23 (38%) overstayed their Hajj or Umrah visas, which was an important category in the migration process. For instance, interviewee number 15 from Eritrea told the following story:

Twenty-nine years ago, my father came with an Umrah visa and later found a kafeel [sponsor] who allowed him to bring his wife [our mother] on an Umrah visa and to bring me when I was 2 years old, together with my older brother and sister. While living in Jeddah, my parents had four more boys and two more girls. My father lost his job and became undocumented. He was arrested and deported 18 years ago. My father lives in Eritrea; he remarried and never tried to come back. My siblings and I were able to attend school in the past because no one asked for documents, but my younger brothers and sisters could not go to school. They all began working at a young age as beggars. When they became older, the males worked in manual jobs and the females, including my mother, worked as housemaids. Interviewee number 39 from Chad said that he came for Hajj when he

was 5 years old. His parents did not need a visa when they arrived, which was over 50 years ago. He traveled with his family using primitive transportation, a combination of walking and lifts on big trucks going from Chad to Sudan, on to Egypt and Jerusalem, and finally on to Jeddah.

Third Category: Breaking a Work ContractOnly six (10%) migrants arrived with a work visa. Interviewee number 22,

an educated undocumented Chadian migrant, said:

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Most uneducated immigrants from Chad work as car washers or are in some other form of manual labor. Smart and educated Chadians do not smuggle themselves into Jeddah; instead they save or borrow enough money to pay for a Hajj visa or, if possible, a work visa in order to reach Jeddah. Once in Jeddah, a job as a car washer is a good way to earn money to pay back debts and save money to travel to Paris or the United States. Interviewee number 37 is another migrant from Sudan. He shared his

experiences about breaking a work contract as follows; I bought a work visa in 1998, worked for two years, and left my employer because he was paying me almost nothing. I stayed as an undocumented for three years and I was deported. I came back in 2000 with my wife and my son with an Umrah visa and overstayed our visa since that time. We also had two additional children in Jeddah.

Fourth Category: Undocumented “Migrants” Born in JeddahOut of the 61 interviewees, 11 (18%) were born in the city with no right

to Saudi citizenship, and lacked the proper documents (iqamah) to stay in the city legally. Importantly, these interviewees were born in Jeddah from undocumented parents of African origin and, in a few cases, as a result of marriage between an African father or mother and an undocumented person of a non-African nationality.

This fourth group of undocumented “immigrants” has to be treated separately. They are the ones who did not physically migrate to the city but rather were born there of undocumented immigrants. Unfortunately, Saudi immigration law does not grant automatic citizenship to the children of undocumented immigrants, which means that their situation is, in some ways, more difficult than for other immigrants because their identities and loyalties are divided between a country of origin totally unknown to them and a birthplace that has not completely adopted them. As it is for any of the migrant communities, the issue of identity is very important, and revealing as well.

Interviewee number 24, a young man from Nigeria named Murad, spoke about this. Murad said he was “stuck” in Jeddah by birth. He is one of 20


brothers and sisters who were born in Jeddah of undocumented parents, and he has two stepmothers. He noted that he feels a “sort” of loyalty to the city where he was born and no attachment to his parents’ native country, Nigeria. He did not mention the importance of living near the holy cities of Makah and Madinah, which a few other Africans noted. As far as his future plans were concerned, it seems he had a limited vision. After a few probing questions about this, he said that he dreamed of migrating to Germany or Lebanon to study because in both places he has relatives who migrated from Sudan.

The dilemma of this young man, in the researcher’s view, is the great confusion of having African roots yet being born in Jeddah with no proper documents. Murad was rejected by Saudi society and became a victim of the established rules and regulations of the city, which are often contradictory and inconsistent. He managed to study in private schools but was not able to continue to college. He planned to marry another undocumented migrant, and when the researcher asked how he could marry an undocumented migrant and raise children, he answered: “Everyone in our community and others has been doing it for years.”

In response to the probing question about the cost of smuggling paid by individual interviewees, it seems that smugglers’ fees varied according to the starting point, but overall, they rose dramatically in recent years. For border crossings such as from Yemen into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Yemeni-Saudi human smugglers charged an individual migrant between $160 and $533. Crossing the Red Sea from the Horn of Africa to Yemen may also cost between $5 and $80. Other African migrants from more distant countries often paid additional fees to reach the Red Sea or simply walked there. For a Sudanese migrant with the need to cross the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia, for example, the cost could, therefore, hover between $235 and $613. Data on the costs of smuggling indicate an increase over time, depending on the number of migrants to be smuggled, the number of smugglers, and the international circumstances, such as famine, wars, and similar calamities, as well as the intensity of Saudi border guard operations. Our interviews allocated an average of around $533 for an entire trip, which was often paid by the individual, his or her family, or

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friends residing in Jeddah. Regarding the issue of border control by the Saudis, one analyst quoted a Saudi border officer, Lt. Qahtani saying: “They [illegal migrants] adapt very quickly to every strategy we have.” In this regard, the migrants wear their shoes backward to confuse tracker or strap sponges to their soles to leave no footprints at all,15 which further highlighted dilemmas faced by migrants as well as government officials. Many interviewees noted that the smugglers were knowledgeable about different routes, so they could generally avoid Saudi border guards, as being caught created fresh hardships.

It was interesting to note that 11 of the interviewees (18%) could not respond to the question about smuggling costs due to the fact that they were born with no documents in Jeddah, from undocumented parents. Thirty interviewees (49%), said that they came for economic reasons caused by the poor policies adopted in their countries of origin. Thirteen interviewees (21%) mentioned civil war and famine as the reasons that “pushed” them to migrate to Jeddah. Only 7 (12%) said that joining a family member was the main reason for their migration. From these testimonies, the experiences of these migrants appear to fit the classic economic model for why people migrate, as most migrated to Jeddah to secure better-paying jobs and, presumably, a higher standard of living. However, only 12% said that the main reason was the presence of relatives in the city, and only a few claimed that a secondary reason for their migration was to live near the holy cities.

It is important to note that such declarations reflect the facts that surrounded migrants’ lives in the city. Over the last few decades, many undocumented residents have been born in the city, married, had children, and even died as “undocumented.” Clearly, there was, and remains, a “generational” dilemma, especially for the young undocumented migrants throughout the Kingdom. Based on the previous facts, and in connection with the data analysis and interpretation in the following section, it is thus possible to suggest that the African community in the city of Jeddah was in search of its identity. In response to the probing question of why these migrants were

(15) Robert F. Worth, “Saudi Border with Yemen Is Still Inviting for Al Qaeda”. New York Times, Oct. 26, 2010. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/27/world/middleeast/27saudi.html


pulled to the city of Jeddah over other cities in the Gulf countries, it was interesting to note that 20 of the interviewees (33%) answered that they had friends and relatives who encouraged them to come to Jeddah by providing financial and other logistical support. Ten (16%) migrants noted that it was easier to get an Umrah, Hajj, or work visa. Seven (12%) interviewees were attracted by the hope of earning higher wages in Jeddah. Thirteen (21%) interviewees noted that the main reason was that it was easy to be smuggled into the city. From these responses, one can suggest that a combination of macroeconomic plus social networking reasons compelled many African migrants to migrate to the city of Jeddah, precisely to ensure better living conditions and to live and work in close proximity to the Muslim holy cities of Makkah and Madinah.

Characteristics of Irregular Migrants, Such as Age at Arrival, Deportation Experiences, and the Value of Migration

Among the more interesting aspects of migration into the Kingdom was the age of the undocumented migrant when he or she arrived in Jeddah, which ranged from 17 to 49 years old, with the mean age estimated at 25.34 or around 25 years. Five interviewees entered Jeddah at age 30, which constituted the mode age. However, if we include those who were born in the city and carried no documents as the result of a marriage between undocumented migrants, the mean drops to around 14 years. Moreover, the periods of time spent in Jeddah as an undocumented migrant varied between a few months and 72 years. One of the oldest interviewees was 72 years old and another was 63, though the average for all the interviewees were an estimated 13.6897, or around 14 years, and the mode was 10 years.

Since it was very difficult to rely on official figures to find an estimate of deportation data, the researcher had to rely on the interviews with migrants to estimate the numbers involved, which varied from no deportation to being deported five times. Forty-two interviewees had never been subject to deportation. Ahmed, interviewee number 30, was in his fifth year as an undocumented migrant from Chad. He came to Jeddah to live and make

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some money to send back home. He worked as a porter near one of the large malls in north Jeddah and had never been deported, but the idea of possible deportation haunts him day and night. “Life has got harder the past few years, we are constantly under the threat of deportation,” he complained. Although he missed his native country, family, and friends, he planned and hoped to stay in Jeddah for at least 10 more years.

Data gathered from interviews revealed that four persons were deported twice, two were deported three times, and one was deported five times. If we take this unofficial data as valid, the mean would stand at 0.5574, or one deportation for each two undocumented migrants. Eleven interviewees were deported just once, and 1 was the mode for the number of times deported. As far as deportation is concerned, Saudi security authorities rounded up thousands of undocumented migrants for deportation over the years, though seldom made a significant dent in the overall figures. A Nigerian, interviewee number 32, from the Al-Musfah district of southern Jeddah described the frequent raids of his district by the Jawazat (Passport Department) officials in these terms:

The Jawazat or Al-Baladiyah [Jeddah municipality] often monitor the district for a period of time before they determine the best minute to raid us in order to arrest as many of us as possible. They arrive almost every week depending on the tips they receive from local Saudi residents or their undercover agents. We noticed that they target just one community of undocumented migrants at a time, for example, targeting only Asian or African undocumented migrants. It should be noted that 10 of the undocumented migrants who were stopped

by the police had never been deported. In this case, they noted that the police confiscated their goods, if they were selling any, or simply let them go without arrest. They said this was due to “the good Saudi heart.”

In the case of migrants being deported and later reentering the country, 43 (70.5%) of interviewees had never been deported; therefore, the question did not apply to most of the individuals in the sample. Seventeen interviewees who had experienced deportation had come back to Jeddah. Ten were smuggled


back by sea and land, and seven came back via an Umrah or Hajj visa. In the past, these migrants had managed to come back to Jeddah by using a different name in a different passport. While one interviewee did not respond to the above question, the great majority of those who had been deported and then smuggled back to the country said they did it for economic reasons. Few did it because they had family in Jeddah.16

This question of the value of migration was raised during the interviews, and it is important because it offered migrants the opportunity to evaluate their presence in Jeddah, as well as analyze the reasons for being there in the first place. Answers varied: Some had family and relatives in the city, while for others, Jeddah constituted a good business opportunity. Others considered the city their home, and it was interesting to note that the testimonies excerpted here reflected the division into the fourth group of migrants introduced previously in the chapter. When interviewees were asked, “Is migrating to Jeddah worth the effort, money, or danger of death through being smuggling into the country?” an overwhelming majority, 49 (80%), responded, yes, it was worth it. Only 1 (2%) said it was not worth it and that she regretted coming to the city. This probing question did not apply to the 11 (18%) interviewees who were born in the city though, in the case of the latter, many contended that they did not think they had an option since they were born in the city.

For example, Interviewee number 33, who was born to Somali parents, said that his father was employed by ARAMCO, the Arabian American Oil Company while his mother was smuggled into Jeddah before she married his father. Although the father in this instance had an iqamah, which is why the interviewee was able to go to school up to grade 9, and later employment with the Islamic Bank of Jeddah turned sour after the father was accused of forgery. The father served a six-year prison sentence, after which he was deported from the country. The family was left behind in Jeddah with no breadwinner, which imposed on the son a heavy burden: Stop schooling

(16) It should be noted that the Saudi government introduced fingerprinting, which, authorities hoped, would limit violations of the residency visas by denying reentry through any Saudi air- or seaport.

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to take care of his family. Interviewee number 33’s mother worked as a housemaid, but he also noted that his father had a third wife after marrying his mother in Jeddah, in addition to a wife in Somalia. From his father’s different marriages, interviewee number 33 had 14 brothers and sisters living either in Jeddah or in Somalia. He currently lives with his mother, two sisters, and four brothers—all undocumented.

Another interviewee, number 35, was particularly interesting, as his case was very similar to many others encountered in the course of this fieldwork. It was conducted in this young man’s parental home in the Musfah district (south of Jeddah) with his father, mother, and two of his brothers present. The interviewee was born in Jeddah from a Sudanese father who was now 64 years old, and a mother from Cameroon, now 58. He had seven brothers and sisters who were all born in Jeddah, all of whom were undocumented. The father had first traveled to Jeddah 34 years earlier with a Saudi kafeel, though he was arrested and deported after 24 years because of an accusation of theft that, he maintained was unjust since he was innocent. In the event, the father returned to the Kingdom with an Umrah visa, using a Chadian passport. His mother, who had entered the country thirty years ago with an Umrah visa, overstayed her travel authorization. She was married in Cameroon and had six children with her first husband, and then remarried, to the interviewee’s father, and had eight children with him. Still, he was deported a few years ago and returned with an Umrah visa too, after changing her passport from Cameron to one from the Chad. The interviewee’s father taught Qur’an in a local mosque, and his mother was in the begging “business,” with all the family members maintaining that if they were ever deported, they would return promptly. The interviewee said that very often the Jawazat raided their neighborhood, but they did not usually arrest everybody, since undercover agents (Mabahith) were stricter due to the nature of their anticrime work.

In its critical to note that terrorist groups attempted to recruit people in the poor districts, but they seldom were successful, since residents focused on their families and simply wished to protect their children instead of taking such extreme risks.


Familial and Social Ties

Table 3 presents data on the migrants’ familial and social ties.Table 3: Social Ties

Family and Social Ties African Communities

Do You Remit? n %

Yes 60 98.3

No 1 9

Total 61 100Average Number of People in the Same Residence 8

Average Number of Contacts with Family per Month 2

Average Number of Relatives in Jeddah 12Average Number of Friends in Jeddah 31

This section offers a measured assessment of the living conditions among migrants in the city, comparing existing lifestyles to what may be the case in their respective countries of origin, to gain better insight into their everyday lives. It also addresses family ties in Jeddah and back in their home countries, and aims at gaining knowledge of how the population under study struggles between the nostalgia of a country they have left forever, and the harsh reality of life in the Saudi city. To better identify fundamental concerns, it will address the following questions: 1) What is your spouse’s type of work? 2) How many people do you live with in Jeddah?3) What about contact with family in your home country, how often does it

occur in a month?4) How many relatives and friends do you have in Jeddah? 5) Was it easy for you to find a job?6) Do you participate in social gatherings or activities with other communities

and Saudis?7) Are you the sole breadwinner?8) Do you remit some of your income home and how? 9) Do you have access to health services?

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While it was not the purpose of this study to offer a detailed analysis of the various social issues facing undocumented, it was nevertheless very important to understand the lives of migrants in general, and those hailing from the African communities in particular.

Due to the displacement suffered by the interviewees, intermarriage among different communities was very common despite various declarations that proved the lack of shared social life. However, interviewee number 43 commented on the topic of intermarriage among the different communities, saying:

There is no real connection between the various communities in the district except by going to the mosque for prayers. There were many statements concerning social activities that resemble the following: Those of us [undocumented migrants] who seek marriage in this city, for example, do it for different reasons. Some marry to “complete” his or her half of religious duties; in this case, marriage is considered a fundamental part of Islam for those who can afford it. Others are those who get married because it is the natural thing to do regardless of your legal status in the city.It was also inevitable that the cultural displacement caused by being

undocumented immigrants, at least in several cases, caused a change in customs and traditions regarding marriage. Interviewee number 44 from Eritrea gave an example of the marriage process in Jeddah as follows:

In Eretria, women pay men the dowry, but in Jeddah a man will pay $267 to $544 as Mahr (dowry).17 A virgin is more expensive. All this is determined by the specific tradition of the tribe. In most of the districts, according to an interviewee, girls and boys, whether

documented or undocumented did not marry someone from the same district, but rather preferred to find a marriage partner from one of the other districts. In this regard, they considered everyone who lived in the same district as a sister

(17) Mahr is undoubtedly a significant subject matter for the Muslim society. It is a sum of money or property on which the wife is entitled to receive from her husband in consideration of their marriage. Cited in Syed, Sahid Ahammad, “A Critical Analysis of Dower (Mahr) in Islam,” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) 21, no. 7, ver. V (July 2016): 86–91, 86, www.iosrjournals.org.


or a brother. It was observed from the interviews conducted in the various districts in South Jeddah that many men said they would prefer marrying a woman with lighter skin, for example, from Pakistan or Indonesia. Some Saudis married young Chadian girls and when they introduced them to their families, they often state that they are virgins. This causes very deep social problems, because when these women have children they are often abandoned as the women are forced to leave them behind.

Keeping in mind all these variables, the answers to the questions about living conditions were very different and the questions elicited complex responses. Six migrants worked as beggars (9.8%). Two washed cars (3.3%). Seventeen were housemaids (27.9%). Two were housewives (3.3%). Other spouses’ jobs included private taxi drivers, recycling and selling used clothing, selling nearly expired goods, engaging in the sex trade, and many other activities that highlighted various dilemmas. Finally, 29 migrants were single (47.5%), which further complicated the analysis on account of difficulties in social settings that excluded those without family ties. All this information unveiled the amount of financial support a spouse provided or could garner for the family. In fact, these statistics did not provide real insights into the problems affecting the entire idea of family in the community, which were taxing to say the least. Due to the instability of marriage relationships, support was not constant, and the whole idea of a stable nuclear family did not apply in this social reality confronted by the undocumented.

Interviewees lived in quite a range of different districts in Jeddah, but the majority seemed to prefer certain districts in the southern part of the city, where they felt more secure. It should be noted that, unlike Yemenis, many members of the undocumented African migrants did not mind living in one of the few well known “under-bridges” settlements in the city if they could not find shelter with a friend or a relative upon their arrivals. Most of the interviewees lived in rented rooms in shabby flats (very low-income houses usually owned by Saudis) with two or more other undocumented African migrants from the same home country sharing the facility. The number of people splitting such accommodations ranged between 1 and 25. Our sample

data suggested that the mean for the number of people living together was 8.393, or 8 people, which was still quite high. Most of them lived with 4 people, which constituted the mode. For all the undocumented communities of migrants under study, it seemed that living with fellow countrymen eased their feelings of estrangement in the city and provided, along with their visits to other members of their communities, an alternative family support network. Interviewee number 46 put it as follows:

Meeting with friends and family members at least once a week helps us to feel comfortable that there is someone who cares about us and assists in resolving some of the personal problems that may arise between some of us . . . very often we discuss important issues such as what we should do towards the amnesty initiatives offered by the Saudi government. When asked about their ties with family while living and working in

Jeddah, all interviewees said that they called their relatives on a weekly basis by mobile phone. The average mean was 2.4, or about twice a month, and most of them called their relatives at least four times a month. Modern technology, and the mobile phone in particular, seemed to play a big part in the interviewees’ lives in terms of communicating with their family members and fellow friends inside and outside the city of Jeddah. Of course, such communication helped them avoid homesickness on the one hand, and the possibility of arrests or deportation on the other.

Table 4: Averages of Undocumented African Friends and Family Members

Type of Relation Average Number Total for All CommunitiesRelatives 12 732Friends 31 1,891Total 2,623

This was important because the number of relatives living and working in the city ranged between no relatives (only three interviewees) to 80 (only one interviewee), which, for obvious reasons, necessitated staying in touch with family members (see table 4). Indeed, the mean average for the number of relatives in Jeddah was 12; the median number was 8, and the mode was 15.

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If we considered only the mean of 12 relatives for each of the 61 interviewees in this study, then we might conclude that there were 732 undocumented relatives in the city. If we considered the median of 8, then the number would fall to 484. However, if we relied on the mode, the number would stand at 915 undocumented relatives in the city, which is, to say the least, an impressive figure for our sample. An analysis of these figures suggest that the presence of African migrants in Jeddah was much higher than official statistics affirmed.

As already discussed, most of the interviewees’ friends and acquaintances were also undocumented migrants and lived in the same areas: Al-Karantina, Al-Hindawiya, Al-Musfah, and other districts in south Jeddah. The number of friends in the city ranged between no friends (only one interviewee) to over 100 friends (only one interviewee), though the average for the number of friends stood at 31. Many interviewees noted that they had around 20 friends, which constituted the mode for the African communities. This totaled 1,891 undocumented friends in the city.

According to the interviewees, very few of their relatives, close friends, and acquaintances possessed valid documents to stay in Saudi Arabia legally. The great majority were undocumented themselves as confirmed by 29 interviewees (47.5%), who noted that they were sure that the great majority of all their friends and relatives were definitely undocumented migrants in the city. The remaining 52.58%, or 32 interviewees, indicated either that they really did not know or that they preferred not to answer this question.

When asked about the “ease” of finding a job in Jeddah, most interviewees replied that it was easy to find a job in Jeddah, not only because there was plenty of work in construction and other types of unskilled jobs, but due to the social network they enjoyed in the community, which facilitated contacts. In this case, 47 interviewees (77.0%) noted that it was easy for their respective relatives and friends to find a job in Jeddah, while only 14 interviewees (23%) said that it was very difficult for their relatives and friend to find a job. This highlighted how the Saudi economy depended on the underground labor market covered by the undocumented immigrants.

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Regarding the intriguing socialization questions, and how one went about it within their own communities, many confessed that they were open to socializing with other communities but admitted that the bulk of their social gatherings or “hanging out” was within their close circle of African friends and relatives. Forty-seven (77.0%) of the interviewees said they only participated in social life within their own particular communities. Thirteen (21.3%) indicated that they participated socially with all other African communities. Only one interviewee (1.6%) noted that he participated with all the communities in Jeddah.

Remarkably, social relationships among members of the same community were exceptionally strong, but I should note that the intensity of these relationships varied from one community to another. Most single migrants called their relatives at least once a month. On the other hand, migrants with wives and children tended to call their family or friends at least four times a month, with several calling more than twice each week. If we were to compare this with similar cases affecting the Asian communities, including Filipinos, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Indonesians, for example, we would notice that family and social ties were much stronger among Asians than in the African communities. Whether the chief reason for such interactions centered around the notion of better organization was difficult to confirm, although an analysis of Filipinos—discussed in depth later in this paper—supported that contention. Members of the Filipino community in Jeddah strongly believed that their stay in the city was temporary and, consequently, saved money to return to home and invest there—which required organization. On the other hand, most of the African migrants did not wish to leave the city because, compared to their home countries, Jeddah provided them with better jobs, more income, and a safer place to live.

A key feature of this assessment was the amount of remittances, as 22 (36.1%) confirmed that they were the only breadwinner for their family in their respective home countries, which necessitated such transfers. The majority of interviewees, 39 (63.9%), noted that other family members assisted in this matter as well, which further strengthened the argument that the family


unit was an extended affair and that, in this context, all members contributed toward its welfare financially. Sometimes this created a burden for the individuals, especially when unemployment was high, although 39 (63.9%) of interviewees acknowledged that they regularly (usually on a monthly basis) remitted part of their income to relatives in their native countries. A further 22 (36.1%) declared that they did not remit any percentage of their income back home. The great majority of the African migrants as other undocumented migrants remitted funds by giving it to someone of their own nationality who had connections where the money was sent. Interviewee number 47 explained how the process functioned:

He calls someone in my town and my parents receive the money at the same time I am paying it here. The person responsible of the transaction charges us reasonable amount money. I give the money to a middleman while he talks to another man in our town. The other man arranges a meeting and at the right time, I use the mobile phone to make sure he gave my family the money. He charges $2.60 for this service.

Table 5: Income Remitted by Undocumented African Migrants

African Migrants % of Income Remitted % of Migrants33 15 54.117 20–30 27.94 36–50 6.66 60 10.01 No answer 1.6

Thirty-three (54%) of the interviewees remitted 15% or less of their income to their home countries, while 17 (28%) allocated between 20% and 30%. Four (7%) dispatched between 36% and 50%. Six interviewees (10%) sent about 60%, and one interviewee refused to respond to the question. Data in table 5 reflected an average mean of around 23.6% of remittance for all migrants. The mode for remittance was 15% (33 interviewees remitted this percentage) of their income, which was probably the most accurate figure.

One cannot help but notice the love and devotion of the majority of those interviewed toward their families and friends, whether living with them in

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Jeddah or in their home countries. It is important to stress the close network of cooperation among members of the undocumented migrants’ communities in Jeddah, and their families in their respective countries. Many interviewees planned not only to help their families financially, but to also assist those who helped them in the past to come to Jeddah, either by providing for them or lending them money to achieve this goal.

Inasmuch as these concerns touched on practical matters, the question about access to health services was even more important, because it illustrated the lack of support and sense of belonging that migrants experienced when they were denied basic social services. In fact, this chief concern caused a very large strain in their lives, coupled with serious social consequences for Saudi society as a whole.

In a 2007 study, Access to Health Care for Undocumented Migrants in Europe, Wayne Farah stated18 that:

The exclusion of vulnerable groups from health care brings along major risks like individual suffering and exploitation, a risk for public health in general, demand for emergency services, which are far more expensive, the creation of backstreets services, ethical dilemmas, problems for the administration and discrimination against the concerned migrants. P.5Undocumented migrants in Saudi Arabia faced similar serious problems in

gaining access to health care services. For them, a worsening of their physical and mental health was likely to occur as a result of poor access to health care services and/or the continual fear of being discovered and deported. Before providing an overview of the situation concerning access to health care for undocumented migrants in Jeddah, it is necessary to first elaborate on international human rights standards on the right to health care, precisely to better identify local dilemmas. The situation of undocumented migrants in Saudi Arabia should be weighed against these international standards rather than those that existed in other Arab Gulf states because the Kingdom is a

(18) Cited in Collantes, Sara “Access to Health Care in Europe” Published by PICUM, Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants. 2007. P. 5. Brussels, Belgium.


leading regional power with clear ambitions. According to UN article 12 (1): “[It is] [t]he right of everyone to enjoy the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health19”

All interviewees (100%) noted that in case of emergency, they had no access to public hospitals in Jeddah, and that their only possible option, if they could afford it, was to go to private hospitals or clinics. The great majority recognized that they would seek and consult with the nearest pharmacist, or see one of the local Attars (traditional medical/herbal practitioners), for medical advice. It should be noted that due to their exclusion from the health services system, undocumented immigrants sometimes borrowed ID cards to access such services. This tendency showed the gravity of the problem, as 19 (31.1%) acknowledged that they used the ID (iqamah) that belonged to another individual, to gain access to medical care in Saudi public or private hospitals. Forty-two interviewees (68.95%) indicated that they never had resorted to such fraudulent schemes because it was dangerous. Interviewee number 48, an Eritrean, said:

We can go to private hospitals, even if we use other special hospitals where there are Egyptian doctors. They understand and do not charge us a lot. We use other Eritreans’ documented papers to go to private hospitals.

Interviewee number 49, a Somalian, confirmed this: We can go to private hospitals, even if we do not use other people’s papers, especially hospitals where there are Egyptian doctors. They understand and do not charge us a lot for medical examination. However, undocumented migrants could not gain access to hospitals,

because doing so was forbidden by law.

Issues Related to Working ConditionsTable 6 presents information about working conditions for the migrants.

(19) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Geneva, Switzerland. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. Twenty-second session Geneva, 25 April-12 May 2000 Agenda item. http://apps.who.int/disasters/repo/13849_files/o/UN_human_rights.htm

Table 6: Issues Related to Working Conditions

Issues Related to Work African Communities

Average Number of Jobs per Year 6

Is It Easy to Find a Job? n %

Yes 12 20

No 47 77

Did Not Respond 2 3

Total 61 100

Average Number of Working hours per Day 11

Average Income per Month in $ $418–$525

Average Rent per Month in $ $27–$53

Standard of Living since Coming to Jeddah n %

Improved 50 82.0

Stayed the Same 0 0.00

Born in the City with No Documents 11 18.00

Total 61 100

Our investigation was also interested in identifying various challenges migrants faced in their everyday working conditions and, toward that end, we asked the following questions: 1) If you worked in your native country, what type of job (or jobs) did you

have?2) Why, if you were employed, did you leave your job to come to Jeddah? 3) Why Jeddah and not a different city in the Gulf? 4) If you currently work, what type of job do you have? 5) Is this the job you were trained to do? 6) How many times per year have you changed jobs and why? 7) How many hours you work a day? 8) And what type of shifts do you do? 9) How much is your monthly income? 10) How do you receive your income? 11) Do you think your standard of living has improved, stayed the same, or

has not improved since you came to Jeddah?

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Responses revealed that 20 (32.8%) of the migrants were unemployed in their home countries, and this question did not apply for 11 (18%) interviewees because they were born in Jeddah. The remaining 30 migrants (49%) in the sample had a diverse employment background that included farmer, carpenter, mechanic, blacksmith, and other manual jobs.

Interestingly, the main reason for the great majority to leave their jobs, if employed, was to seek a better economic life in Jeddah. High unemployment and encouragement by friends or a family member who were already in Jeddah was a major stimulus to migrate. As mentioned earlier, Jeddah’s close geographic proximity to the African continent and the relatively lower cost of being smuggled into the Kingdom, along with the availability of relatives and friends who lived in the city for many years and who were willing to pay for the trip’s cost and the ease of obtaining an Umrah or Hajj visa, made it relatively easy to overstay in the city. These and many other reasons made Jeddah a better choice for the individual migrant compared to other cities in the Gulf area. The answers to this question supported the reason offered at the beginning of this paper in explaining the phenomenon of migration from African countries.

It was a difficult task to list all the types of work that undocumented migrants from the African communities engaged in while living in Jeddah. One of the reasons, perhaps, was their continuous change of jobs. Interviewee number 50 from Ghana reported the following about employment during the Hajj season:

I leave my job as a house maid which pays $400 per month to travel to Makkah where I work as a cook for pilgrims from Africa. This pays around $800 for just 10 days.In general, interviewees were involved in the following activities: 10

females worked as housemaids, 12 of the males were car washers, and 4 females were beggars. Four worked as private taxi drivers. Others worked as carpenters, mechanics, porters, hairdressers, barbers, sex trade workers, and so on. An example of work opportunities available to Chadian undocumented migrants in Jeddah was explained by interviewee number 4, who stated:

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Work in Jeddah for Chadians is limited to washing cars. In the past, we used to work with airport cargo. However, things changed after the airport authorities decided to bring Asian migrants to do the job. We lost ours. We left our lands in Chad when the Christians were ruling the country. And we could not go back. In 1977 King Khalid allowed us the opportunity to obtain [an] iqamah. However, later the government stopped renewing our iqamah. Many of us became undocumented again with the new shift in Saudi policy towards Chadians. The number of times an individual interviewee changed his or her job

varied from no change to 50 times, a very high rate, whereas 11 (18.0%) changed their jobs twice, which was the mode. The average mean for job change stood at 5.8, or changing jobs 6 times per individual migrant. It should be noted that the rate of change was related to the number of years spent in Jeddah. Migrants changed jobs for many reasons but the majority, 55 (90.2%) of the interviewees, indicated that they did so for better pay. Very few women noted sexual harassment or bad treatment as the reasons for changing posts. This was an important observation and will be dealt with in detail in the analysis of the Filipino migrant community later in this paper. Interviewee number 4 added:

It was easy to get jobs with the Saudi government’s economic plans for development in the past, but today we and our children who were born in Jeddah, and regardless of having a lot of Saudi friends, face great difficulties in making a living and are under constant threat of deportation at any time. . . . that is why many of us change jobs frequently. . . . the older people, in my age, socialize only with Chadians in the mosque or have coffees together in one of the small and affordable coffee shops in our district. I plan to go back with my family in five years. Our children are having problems finding jobs and if the authority arrests any of them they could deport the whole family. Was it easy to find a new job when necessary? Forty-seven interviewees

(77.0%) reported that it was difficult to find a new job, whether in the same or a different type of employment. Still, the majority admitted that within a


few weeks they usually did find a job, with 12 (20.0%) stating that they had no problem finding a job. Twenty-six (42.6%) of interviewees noted that it is easier to find jobs in the Southern districts of Jeddah, and eight (13.1%) noted districts in North Jeddah. Two migrants (3.0%) did not answer this question.

To the question of how many hours each migrant worked, answers varied according to an individual’s type of work. For instance, those involved in begging or the sex trade averaged four to five hours per day, while those involved in washing cars, selling nearly expired goods, and as porters worked over 13 hours. The mean was 11 hours, which was considerable.

In terms of income, at the time the interviews were conducted, two individuals were unemployed. The income of the remaining 59 migrants varied from $190 to $4,000 per month depending on the nature or type of job and number of hours worked. In these instances, the total salaries for the 59 African migrants who worked amounted to $31,000 per month combined. This total income of all migrants who worked (including the two women who worked in a brothel and who made $4,000 and $3,200 per month respectively), reflected a $525 mean or average income per month. It should be noted that the two women who worked in a brothel made $7,200 between the two of them. In this case, if we exclude them from the calculation of the average mean of all African migrants in this study, we reach an average mean income of $418 per month. This is close to the calculated mode of $400 per month for this community.

In this connection, the amount allocated for rent ranged from paying none (this applied only to four interviewees, who were living with a friend or parents and, therefore, did not pay for their housing), to $267 per month, with the majority paying between $27 and $53 each month. The southern part of Jeddah is where the poorest districts are located and where accommodations tend to be very poor, sometimes with no running water, electricity, or sewage system. In addition, these accommodations are usually targeted by local authorities, which was the reason why many of the undocumented immigrants changed dwellings so often.

In response to the question regarding the quality of their standard of living compared to their native countries, 50 (82.0%) of the interviewees noted

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that their standard of living had improved since they arrived in Jeddah. This question was not relevant to 11 (18.0%) individuals who were born in the city. The issue of income and salary among undocumented migrants in the city depended on a normal curve of supply and demand. For example, in the case of house cleaners, the supply of female maids from Africa, Indonesia, and the Philippines went down, after raids by the local authority. Consequently, the demand for their services went up and, as a result, their average monthly salaries increased. Another example of wage fluctuations among Africans, Filipino and Indonesian housemaids involved difficulties associated with negotiations by their respective countries with the Saudi Ministry of Labor regarding contract details, namely, salary and living conditions in other countries. During these extended periods of labor negotiations, salaries for available undocumented Filipino and Indonesian maids increased, due to their scarcity. If the exporting countries refused to send their female expatriates to fulfil the demand of the Saudi market for these services, undocumented African females benefited from such opportunities, and many rushed to fill the gap of such shortages, which ensured much higher wages compared to their previous salaries. Decreases in the supply of other female housemaids made it possible for housemaids from the Horn of Africa who lived in Jeddah, not only to find jobs quite easily, but also to demand higher salaries. For example, instead of the usual $214, they could ask up to $533, or even more. Besides, such fluctuations increased the number of undocumented female migrants to smuggle from the Horn of Africa to the city. Ironically, many African female housemaids would leave their employers in Jeddah at the time of Hajj for the opportunity to generate more income by working in Makkah for 10 days, and would earn up to $1,334 during the period. This situation made the sex trade a very remunerative activity too, though data on such activities were scarce and difficult to confirm.

Legal Issues Facing Undocumented Laborers in Saudi Arabia Perhaps as complex as many of the social concerns discussed previously,

several equally important questions, ranging from deportation and freedom


of movement in the country, to dealing with the local authorities, and dealing with the consulates of their countries of origin, raised key legal challenges that also deserved attention.

All undocumented migrants faced legal issues related to their status. As for the other cases, Africans faced arrest and deportation and, like migrants from Asia, the threat of deportation sometimes involved a very difficult journey back if they decided to return to Saudi Arabia. This was in contrast with the situation of Yemeni migrants, for example, where the individuals rely on the ease with which they can cross the long land border dividing the two countries.20 A careful assessment of legal issues raised the following quandaries.

First, 27 (44.3%) interviewees claimed that they had problems moving around the city, while 34 (55.7%)—especially women—indicated they confronted no such difficulties. This was because Saudi authorities, following local traditions, seldom stopped cars transporting women covered in traditional abayas. When asked how they protected themselves from authorities, the typical and consistent answer to this question involved the practice of avoiding, as much as possible, various Saudi authorities, presumably to minimize contact and avoid trouble. For example, trouble might consist of arguments or fights with Saudis and non-Saudis including their own community members in public or private places, and by living in a district where there were many people from the same native country. In the cases of married men with wives in Jeddah who traveled as a family faced risks that were significantly less than for single men moving about in a group. As stated earlier but worth repeating, Saudi authorities usually avoided stopping cars where there were women or children for cultural reasons, as male officers were instructed to avoid contact (ikhtilat) with women who were not related to them.

None of the undocumented migrants in our study considered their respective consulates as a point of reference, as the majority contended that their consulates in Jeddah were not supportive and did not offer assistance

(20) Fahad Alsharif, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Undocumented Labour in Saudi Arabia, the Case of Jeddah,” Unpublished PhD thesis, Exeter University, Department of Politics, Exeter, UK, 2015.

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when needed. In fact, the engagement of various African consulates in issues related to illegal migration was a highly sensitive matter, with 59 of the interviewees affirming that their consulates offered no shelter, while the rest of the interviewees indicated that they either did not know, or simply chose not to answer this question. In short, in addition to persecution by local government authorities, all 61 interviewees indicated that they were mostly concerned with the threat of deportation. It was interesting to note that despite all of these difficulties, the great majority, 51 (83.6%), said that if they were pressured to leave Jeddah, they would definitely try to come back. Five (8.25%) said they would not come back, and another five (8.25%) declared that they did not know if they would return.

Plans for the FutureTable 7: Hopes and Plans for the Future

Future PlansAfrican Communities

n %Are you satisfied with living in Jeddah?

Yes 60 98.3

No 1 1.7

Total 61 100

Does living in Jeddah with no documents bother you?

Yes 48 79

No 13 21

Total 61 100

Are you going to accept the amnesty issued by the Saudi government?

Yes 3 4.9

No 57 93.4

Did not respond 1 1.7

Total 61 100

As documented by the data in Table 7, questions related to future hopes and plans were equally revealing, regardless of the difficulties all of the undocumented migrants in Jeddah faced. An impressive 60 of the 61 migrants (98.3%) affirmed that they preferred their lives in Jeddah, compared to the


ones they had or would have had in their home countries. When interviewees were asked about their state of mind while living and working in Jeddah with no documents, 48 (78.68%) stated that it bothered them living in Jeddah as undocumented workers. Only 13 interviewees (21.31%) noted that having no documents did not bother them. The majority agreed that the city provided them the opportunity to make a living as well as sending money to loved ones back home, but that happiness was not a permanent condition. Again, the majority admitted that harsh work conditions, the long hours they spend every day toiling, and the continuous threat of deportation did not favor a normal life. Many of the Muslim interviewees added that living close to the two holy cities of Makkah and Madinah and the possibilities to have a chance to perform Hajj and Umrah gave them a very pleasant feeling of religious comfort and assisted many to ease their difficulties.

There were other problems and, according to interviewee number 1, from Sudan, these included the impossibility of having a bank account and even traveling for Umrah. Without a valid iqamah, which was necessary to travel, it was impossible for him to journey to Sudan to visit his daughters. He wanted to migrate to Europe and ask for political asylum in order to have the opportunity to oppose the Sudanese government, and hoped to publish a few stories about living in Jeddah as an undocumented migrant, with another book on conditions in Darfur, which was presumably his country of origin.

In terms of attitude toward the government’s amnesty and the possibility of using it, three (4.9%) noted that they would rely on amnesty laws to leave the country, but an overwhelming majority of 57 (93.4%) said no, and only 1 (1.6%) stated that he had not decided yet. Among the justifications offered by interviewees for not using the amnesty initiative to correct their legal status in the city, responses varied. First, they mentioned the economic incentive that allowed them to avoid paying a penalty for violating the iqama law. Second, several were worried about the social factors affecting them. For example, a few were afraid of being separated from their family members and friends. Finally, others spoke about the threat of being detained, imprisoned or deported for violating the laws of the country if they went to the Saudi authorities.

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Interviewee number 53 from Burkina Faso shared his views in the following terms:

I do not know. . . . I am happy about being undocumented and not using the amnesty pardon because I am frightened, that they [the Saudi authorities] will arrest me or after taking my fingerprints, will deport me, and I will not be able to come back. Other interviewees, who thought along the same lines, reached this same

conclusion after heated conversations within their respective communities, including advice received from friends, and other undocumented migrants. In the case of amnesty initiatives, it seemed that from the point of view of most undocumented African housemaids in Jeddah, they were very aware of their undocumented status. According to interviewee number 54, from Cameroon, “Amnesty is not important and it does not affect my life in Jeddah.” This individual, as many others in this study, had been in the city for a long time, with some residing there for over 30 years. Naturally, they recalled earlier government amnesty proposals, which aimed to reduce the number of undocumented. Many were first-hand witnesses to earlier programs that, truth be told, achieved limited successes. Interestingly, one of the Ethiopians interviewed was able to connect the recent vigor for deportation, to issues related to the Arab Spring. It was important to note that, from the interviewees’ statements regarding deportation, a few reported that they could avoid being fingerprinted by paying someone who had connections with the immigration police working at the airport Jawazat office for a price that ranged between $500 and $1,300, depending on the pressure of the authorities, the availability of a few corrupt officers, and the legal situation of the migrants. An individual could thus leave the country without being fingerprinted.

Indeed, deportation posed serious challenges, since most migrants, especially the women, knew that it would be impossible for them to return. When Saudi efforts to deport undocumented migrants through casual raids on particular districts became intense—after the first few weeks immediately following amnesty deadlines—many stopped working and stayed home with their families. Others cautiously spent time with friends or other relatives


in districts witnessing much less intensive inspection campaigns. Interviews with local Umdas (community leaders) and several Saudi nationals, along with personal observations gathered in the course of the fieldwork associated with this investigation, revealed that the beginning of the inspection campaign on undocumented migrants led to a noticeable slowdown in the local businesses sector. Notwithstanding the denials, the economic and social outcomes that arose immediately after the government initiated its arrests and deportation proceedings of many undocumented migrants included the fact that many shops, grocery stores, restaurants, and small businesses either closed down for lack of attainable cheap undocumented labor to run the business or severely reduced their footprints. Saudi nationals, if available, accepted the low-end jobs, though few filled those posts and, clearly, they were not acceptable substitutes for undocumented migrants. It is important to reiterate that the average Saudi nonskilled laborer demanded much higher wages (up to four times more, on average) to do the same job as the foreign laborer, something that business owners were loath to accommodate. The issue gained traction in the auto repair industry, nongovernment hospitals, laundries, slaughterhouses, among farmworkers, and in Saudi homes, to name a few. In the case of the latter, with the need for housemaids were especially pronounced, the impact was devastating for many families. In fact, the average waiting list for a housemaid from the Philippines stood at six months in 2011, with an average cost of $4,000 recruitment office fees, according to importing labor-importing agencies. Saudi women holding professional positions had to quit their jobs to stay home and take care of their young children, including taking the youngsters to school, a job usually performed by housemaids.

There were several other questions that provided varied responses. For example, when asked what they expected their standard of living to be over the course of the next few years if they were still living in Jeddah, 45 (73.8%) of the interviewees believed that it would be higher or would certainly improve. The rest, 16 interviewees, believed it would stay the same. To the question regarding long-range goals and objectives in terms of work and/or living conditions in Jeddah, most among those who were born in Jeddah

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strongly believed that they deserved a better life. Their conditions and circumstances should, they trusted, be considered by Saudi decision makers, and they thought it was reasonable for them to receive a permanent iqamah (residency permit) or even citizenship, if possible. Although they admitted that the possibility of attaining citizenship or even a permanent iqamah was just a dream and impossible to accomplish, several hoped that, at the very least, they would be allowed access to education and public medical facilities. Those who were born in Jeddah constituted a special case, even if they were children born from parents of the same African community, parents from two different African communities, or one parent from the African community and one not from an African community (such as a Yemeni, Bangladeshi, Indian, or Saudis, presumably because of birthright, though Saudi regulations did not recognize such privileges.

The major concern of most of migrants was to save money in order to build a small business in their respective countries if and when they left Jeddah. Still, for most, this vision was directly associated with their had lives in the city, which affected their attachment to their home countries. Our fieldwork research results revealed that out of all the undocumented African communities of migrants, a greater number of the Sudanese were still strongly attached to their homeland, compared to other African nationalities who, in the majority, preferred to stay in Jeddah. As an interviewee from Sudan said, many of the other African communities “feel hopeless about any future in their respective native countries,” with interviewee number 16 from Ethiopia asserting:

I want to save money and go back to see my mother. If my luck is good and I can make a living there, that will be great, otherwise I will buy an airline ticket from Ethiopia to Yemen to avoid the dangerous crossing the Red Sea. Once in Yemen, I will definitely try to be smuggled back to Jeddah. I would love to spend my life here in Jeddah even to die here near Makkah and Madinah. The following is an example of a simple plan of a young undocumented

female migrant from Ethiopia, interviewee number 11:


I plan to stay working and saving money for two more years then go back to my country by surrendering myself to the Jawazat (Passport Department) who will deport me for free, I hope. With my savings, I wish to open a small mini-market in my country and pray that I will find a good man to marry. Interviewee number 54 from Cameroon noted that he had already bought a

small home back in his native country and currently was saving money to buy an iqamah by finding a willing kafeel. On the other hand, an older interviewee from Nigeria, number 48, said that he hoped that the Saudi government would solve the problem of his children’s and grandchildren’s residency statuses. “All were born in Jeddah. . .. We cannot go back to Nigeria,” he confided, and since they never lived in Nigeria, he foresaw eventual difficulties.

Interviewee number 14, a Somali, said: I plan to stay in Jeddah. I have no other place to go to, I have no choice. War and economic problems prevent me from taking my family back to Somalia. I plan to work hard, save money and buy iqamah from a Saudi for myself and family. . . . you should know that there are many Somalis in Jeddah like us. I am not worried about my children in Jeddah. They have food and a place to sleep. If we leave or get deported, it will be a disaster. As normal in every migrant community, the attitude toward their conditions

seemed to always be very ambiguous and problematic, since most were torn between two worlds, with attachments to both.

Conclusion

The great majority of migrants lived in legal limbos, very often for generations, which, by all measures, created specific hardships. For example, in the Al-Karantina district, which was a magnet for most of the newly arrived undocumented migrants, the safe haven for those without official papers proved efficient because government supervision there was rare and many governmental agents were even reluctant to enter the area. Yet most of the residents lived on the margin of city life with no government services and,

51

as interviewee number 53 from Burkina Faso put it, “outside of the law.” According to interviewee number 34 from Sudan, this was the reason why the media depicted them as criminals and a source of disease, and even accused them of providing support to terrorist groups based in the city.

Inasmuch as most African migrants interviewed for this study were Muslims, it was observed that the great majority attended daily prayers at the local mosques, and it seemed that they were devoted regardless of the difficulties they confronted. Remarkably, however, and similar to the Yemeni migrants, most of the African migrants were “resigned” with living in Jeddah without documents, for they had no other options. In the interviews, many demonstrated great awareness of their circumstances and planned accordingly, regardless of their lack of education. It is safe to state that a majority of the undocumented migrants, regardless of their nationalities, were stuck in Jeddah, waiting for something to happen to change their situations and improve their lives. Few wished to go back to their native countries, especially those who came a long time ago or who were born in Jeddah, or who were smuggled into Jeddah. Overall, many shared the feeling that they were stuck in Jeddah because of their birth, or the economic and political circumstances of their respective homelands. Whether they were born in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and had no rights, or came as children with their parents for Hajj or Umrah only to overstay their visas, most suffered and often a great deal. It should be noted that there were many undocumented residents in Jeddah who were the grandchildren of migrants who came even before the Saudi state was reconstituted in 1932, though the exact figures are nearly impossible to retrieve from official sources simply because none are available. Quite a few migrants were not aware of, or did not care to get, the Saudi national identification card (Biṭāqat al-aḥwāl) years ago, and for this reason there were many generations of undocumented migrants. Nevertheless, what stood out in the observations made during the course of this research activity was the instability in the lives of migrants, with many surviving in a state of continuous anxiety and terror from the local authorities and from apparently uncaring Saudis—although admittedly they are few—who treat them appallingly.


Regardless of the psychological and social pressures and threats, migrants have to work hard to offer their families the very basic necessities of life, such as food, clothes, and a place to live. Migration from the various countries under study seemed to be pulled by the prospect of finding a better life in Jeddah despite the risks involved. Those young men and women who risked their lives to reach Jeddah, have vowed to make life meaningful for themselves and their families, and they are likely to do everything in their powers to get into Saudi Arabia (or go elsewhere) to work and make their dreams come true. There was a strong belief among numerous migrants that those who died at sea or in the desert were destined to have their lives end that way. Predestination and the old concept of hijra (migration according to Islam) were therefore cardinal principles of their beliefs as most attempted to get to Saudi Arabia. Very often, the chief reason advanced by authorities who initiate deportation procedures of undocumented laborers focus on the need to create opportunity for more jobs for Saudis. Yet the majority of undocumented migrants in the city of Jeddah were unskilled laborers, domestic workers, construction workers, and in similar jobs, which were generally rejected by Saudi nationals, thus negating the official narrative.

It was clear that for most of the undocumented migrants, life in Jeddah was really very difficult, as they were under the constant threat of deportation while most struggled to make a decent living. At the same time, the possibility of returning to their home countries was even more difficult, because of economic and political situations back home. In addition, one could add that over hundreds of years many African migrants traveled by foot to Makkah to perform pilgrimage (Hajj). Very often they worked in many places and countries during these long trips. Furthermore, some of these families were enslaved by landlords on their way to the Holy cities, and some families even sold their children in order to survive the harsh trips that, in many cases, last over 15 years.

It was important to touch on the iqamah (legal residency) concern in this conclusion as well, as best analyzed by one of the interviewees, who noted that:

Iqamah problems are too many. For instance, the Yemenis do not want to stay for good in the city. Those who were born in the city with no

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documents cannot fix their legal status; then there are those who prefer to stay undocumented, which allows them a degree of freedom from any obligation towards any employer (kafeel). There are also those who do not have the money to pay for their residency renewal, or who have problems with their kafeel. Most of the victims of the above issues are children and families. They have no legal access to free medical care or education. Only Allah knows about the destinies of these people. He ended the interview by remarking that, regardless of these difficulties,

there are many good people who live decently and with honor in these forgotten districts. People still cared about each other and assisted each other in times of need and difficulties. They joined together in happy and sad times and, in support of the previous testimony, a number of interviewees from these communities noted that it was the African community of undocumented migrants that suffered the most due to poverty and lack of safety in most of their respective countries. A few added the Yemeni community to this list, because the military activity of the Houthis on the Saudi-Yemeni borders had triggered an alarm for Saudi security in the city. Deportation efforts initiated by Saudi authorities, according to many interviewees, usually involved raids on only one community of undocumented migrants at a time, depending on the particular internal or external circumstances the country was going through, which created a roulette game in its own right. Many added that their respective consulates in Jeddah never helped their own citizens and concluded that wary foreign officials assumed that their nationals were undocumented migrants who did not deserve help if they were subject to arrest. An important point to note in this respect was that these consulates nonetheless issued passports to members of their own communities if a child was born to an undocumented migrant, a practice that, at least in some cases, illustrated the official dilemmas.

As this research investigation highlighted, it was very difficult to anticipate any immediate solution to the migrants’ situations in Saudi Arabia in general, and in Jeddah in particular. Saudi policies have proved inadequate and oblivious to the realities on the ground.


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About the Author

Dr. Fahad Alsharif joined the KFCRIS as a senior research fellow in 2016. He received his Ph.D. in Political Economy from the University of Exeter, UK. His Dissertation, supervised by Professor Tim Niblock, was titled: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Undocumented Labour in Saudi Arabia: The case of Jeddah. He received his M.Sc. in Administration specializing in Management from the Lindenwood University, USA. He received his B.Sc. in Business Administration from the University of San Francisco, USA. Prior to joining the KFCRIS, he worked as an independent consultant and researcher at various public and private agencies inside and outside of Saudi Arabia in the fields of methodology and the political economy of labor migrants in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. At present, his research interests cover public policies and international migration, the political economy of labor migration of the GCC. He contributed a book chapter on irregular migration to the Gulf titled: “Calculated Risks, Agonies, and Hopes: A Comparative Case Study of the Yemeni and Filipino Undocumented Migrant Communities in Jeddah.” He is currently working on a grant project for KSA Ministry of labor and Harvard university titled: “Skill Development and Job Creation in Saudi Arabia: An Assessment of King Abdullah Scholarship Program in Light of the Saudi National Transformation Program.”

P.O.Box 51049 Riyadh 11543 Kingdom of Saudi ArabiaTel: (+966 11) 4652255 Ext: 6892 Fax: (+966 11) 4659993

E-mail: [email protected]

King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS)

The KFCRIS is an independent non-governmental institution based in Riyadh,

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Center was founded in 1403/1983 by the King

Faisal Foundation (KFF) to preserve the legacy of the late King Faisal and to

continue his mission of transmitting knowledge between the Kingdom and the

world. The Center serves as a platform for research and Islamic Studies, bringing

together researchers and research institutions from the Kingdom and across the

world through conferences, workshops, and lectures, and through the production

and publication of scholarly works, as well as the preservation of Islamic

manuscripts.

The Center’s Research Department is home to a group of established and promising

researchers who endeavor to produce in-depth analyses in various fields, ranging

from Contemporary Political Thought, Political Economy, and Arabic Language

to Saudi Studies, Maghreb Studies, and Asian Studies. The Center also hosts the

Library which preserves invaluable Islamic manuscripts, the Al-Faisal Museum

for Arab Islamic Art, the Al-Faisal Institute for Human Resources Development,

the Darat Al-Faisal, and the Al-Faisal Cultural Press, which issues the Al-Faisal

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visit the Center’s website: www.kfcris.com/en

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