Chinese Media and Culture: Dancing with Chains

Hongmei Li, Georgia State University

The 18th Party Congress’ Third Plenary Session’s Decision maps out

the country’s plan for cultural and media development. There is

nothing on the surface that suggests a radical departure from the

tight control the Chinese party-state exerts over media and

culture. The Decision is full of paternalistic clichés about the

development of socialist culture under the guidance of Marxism,

media controls, and the unification between social benefits and

economic benefits. But new elements embedded in the Decision

contain potential seeds for at least a partial reordering of the

dynamic tension between impulses demanding control and those

militating for expression in the Chinese cultural and media

realm, with control perhaps gaining ground. These elements also

figure in China’s recent effort to develop culture industries and

rebalance domestic media control and international cultural

expansion and influence.

This essay does not aim to provide a comprehensive

commentary on China’s recent cultural policies as they relate to

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the Decision. Instead, it focuses on the intersection between

cultural and media policies and the push and pull between the

party-state and aggressive market-oriented media producers.

Specifically, the essay will highlight some potential changes in

the following six areas: (1) control mechanisms, (2) the

prescribed nature of a media organization; (3) media censorship,

(4) media consolidation and economies of scale, (5) the entry of

private capital into the Chinese media industries, and (6)

China’s soft power and public diplomacy.

First, the Decision stresses the government’s role as

administrator rather than player in managing cultural agencies.

This is framed as a measure to further cultural reforms that aim

to separate operations of the government from those of the

enterprise. Specifically, the Decision proposes to establish

unified management organizations linking party and state to

administer cultural staff, affairs, capital, and orientation.

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This opens the possibility of changing what has been a dual-track

media control system in China.

Generally speaking, Chinese media have been regulated and

controlled both by a Party and an administrative system. The

Party system is represented by the Central Propaganda Ministry

and its branches at the provincial, district and county levels,

while the administrative system is represented by various

ministries under the State Council and the nationwide branches of

each ministry. For example, TV and radio have been regulated by

the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT);

print media, audio, and video by the General Administration of

Press and Publication (GAPP), and the Internet by the Ministry of

Industry and Technology Information. In 2013, SARFT merged with

GAPP to form a new body called the State Administration of Press,

Publications, Radio, Film, and Television. The new body, whose

name has been widely criticized by netizens for its lack of

creativity, aims to streamline China’s regulation over both print

and broadcast media.

China’s Central Propaganda Department and its branches

monitor media content and can stop problematic programs at any

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time by issuing formal or informal notices or oral directives.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949,

shaping culture has always been a key official mission of the

government and the Party. Except for a few years during the

Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Chinese Communist Party has

maintained tight, centralized control over Chinese media (Zhao,

2008). Various ministries also participate in controlling media

content. For example, China’s State Language Affairs Commission,

which seeks to standardize Chinese language and enforce proper

pronunciation in China, can file official complaints about

problematic content. Given the tradition of the Communist Party’s

pervasive ideological control involving many different government

agencies, a transition away from the current structure is likely

to encounter resistance at various levels.

Second, the Decision emphasizes the dual role of a Chinese

cultural organization as an instrument of social control and a

business, with social benefits prioritized over economic

benefits. While this kind of positioning is not new, the

statement could be viewed as a corrective measure, aiming to

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rectify media practices in China that overemphasize economic

benefits, as discussed below.

In the era of reform, media organizations have been told to

simultaneously serve as an official organ of the state and at the

same time rise or fall based on market forces (Zhao, 1998, 2008).

In the last few decades, the Chinese government has gradually

reduced subsidies and the vast majority of Chinese media now rely

predominantly or solely on advertising as a source of income. The

market now plays a key role in dictating media content, as

evidenced by the importance of the ratings system and the booming

entertainment culture.

The media ratings system was introduced in China in the late

1990s. Now, CCTV-controlled Yangshi Suofurui, with its shortened

English name CSM, is the most important media research firm in

China. Firms that monitor print media, radio, outdoor media, and

the Internet have also been established since the early1990s.

Among them, Hui Cong, established in 1992, is one of the most

important, currently monitoring more than 1,400 print outlets and

more than 7,000 Internet sites. Ratings have become a common

currency of exchange and the most important criterion in

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dictating a TV station’s programming and daily practices. CCTV

even implemented a system called “the last rated program out” in

2002, which means the lowest rated program gets canceled first.

Although the CCTV system was replaced by a more comprehensive

evaluation mechanism in 2011 that stresses four dimensions,

including a program’s leadership power, influence, communicative

power, and professionalism, ratings still take up more than 50%

of the weight in the equation (Chinanews.com, 2011, Aug. 12).

An entertainment culture has boomed since the late 1990s

with the rise of media metrics. Entertainment programming often

is less controlled and more profitable that other types of

content. Many provincial satellite TV channels have launched

entertainment programs to increase their competitiveness in an

economy that depends on eyeballs. Hunan Satellite TV (HSTV) in

particular has become a successful model. Starting with its

flagship program Happy Camp, a variety show that debuted in July

1997, and its subsequent dating program The Promise of Rose (running

from July 16, 1998 to August 25, 2005), HSTV has distinguished

itself by celebrating happiness and youth culture. Other

stations followed suit and attempted to differentiate themselves

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either through TV dramas, marshal arts, localized storytelling or

other types of programming.

Chinese authorities often show an ambivalent attitude toward

media entertainment, fostering the boom on the one hand but

attempting to control it on the other. A number of policies and

regulations have been issued by China’s SARFT to control the

“over-entertaining” trend in Chinese media. Entertainment is

often criticized by the authorities as promoting vulgarization,

infotainment, and celebrity gossip. For example, SARFT issued an

order requiring that no satellite TV channel, starting in July

2011, should air entertainment programs more than three times a

week in prime time from 17:00 to 22:00. This example demonstrates

an inherent contradiction in the dual functions of Chinese media.

Third, the Decision speaks to censorship. It aims to improve

ideological control mechanisms, enhance the management of media

infrastructure and content, establish “a unified mechanism to

prevent and strike online crimes,” and “improve the mechanism to

handle unexpected events over the Internet” so as to “form a

working framework that combines direct guidance and

administration under the law.” It further calls for “the

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institutionalization of news releases, tightening of the

journalist qualifications, management of new media1, and the

regulation of the communicative order.” In a way, the Decision

proposes to tighten ideological controls and online censorship,

probably as a response to the fragmentation of the Chinese media

market and the threat posed by new media, such as social media

and mobile phones.

Indeed, many observers and analysts have pointed out that

since Xi Jinping took power, control over the Internet has been

increased. Most recently, China issued a document called

“Temporary Rules for Managing Instantaneous Communication Tools

and Public Information Service Development,” which aims to manage

and censor information distribution. However, authorities have

always been struggling with the issues of control over media.

There has never been a clear line about what is allowed and what

is not. There is no single media law in China, and scholars have

been discussing the question of whether the state should adopt

one. Chinese media are now regulated by scattered regulations,

1 Many observers believe the party-state’s aim is to converge new and old media so as to maintain the dominance of traditional outlets and thereby maintain ideological control.

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orders and circulars, and the control regime is ambiguous,

combining formal and informal controls. Arguably, the lack of

formal boundaries makes censorship effective. Media workers often

censor themselves to a degree that goes further than the often

unclear official guidelines.

Other controls are being put in place. Chinese people have

long had to obtain state-issued work certificates (shanggang

zheng) to work in a media organization, and regulations are being

tightened. Recently, regulations were implemented to prevent

people on social media from distributing news unless they are

licensed to do so. As the least controlled sector, advertising

traditionally has been under less scrutiny. However, a 2007

decree issued jointly by the Ministry of the Personnel (currently

the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security) and the

State Administration of Industry and Commerce initiated the

practice of certifying ad workers. This decree specifies criteria

used to evaluate and grant the certificates of “assistant

advertising expert, advertising expert,” and “senior advertising

expert” through annual exams overseen by the Chinese Advertising

Association. In 2011, the first qualifying exam was held and the

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subjects tested include advertising laws and regulations,

practices, copywriting, design, and planning. The practice makes

China the only country that grants official certifications to

advertising workers.

Fourth, the Decision continues to stress media consolidation

and economies of scale. It states that “a special shareholding

policy will be applied to state-owned media that are reformed

according to state policies.” It also stipulates that China will

“push consolidation and acquisitions of cultural enterprises

across geography, industry, and different kinds of ownership and

improve the scale, concentration, and professionalism of the

cultural industries.” This is a response to the exponential media

growth in China in the last few decades and to the competition

posed by large foreign media. A staple slogan in Chinese media

industries since the late 1990s calls for enterprises to “become

larger and stronger.” In the last two decades, Chinese media have

been characterized by a rapid expansion as well as a simultaneous

consolidation under the direction of the government as a way to

enhance their competitiveness prior to China’s entry into the

WTO.

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Media consolidation started in 1996 with the formation of

the Guangzhou Daily Newspaper group. By 2003, China had

established 69 media groups, including 38 newspaper groups, 13

broadcasting groups, one magazine group, nine book publishing

groups, five distribution groups, and three film groups

(“Zhongguo chuanmeijituan fazhan baogao,” 2004). In May 2011,

China News and Publishing Group was founded. Not officially

allowed to form cross-media groups, most conglomerates are based

on single medium and related entities, or geography. The Decision

means that in the future cross-media groups can be formed. Media

organizations from different industries and different places can

be consolidated. Consolidation is a means to achieve economies of

scale as well as a way to support government control over

previously fragmented media (Zhao, 1998, 2008).

Fifth, the Decision aims to further promote the development

of private capital in China’s media market. It encourages private

cultural enterprises, lowers the threshold of entry, and allows

private capitalists to be involved in overseas publishing and

online publishing businesses and in holding shares of state-owned

film production, cultural, and arts organizations. It also states

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that China will increase government subsidies, cultural

purchases, and copyright protections. This is evidence of China’s

effort to develop its culture industries domestically and

internationally.

While allowing private capital into media industries is not

entirely new, it can potentially lead to new practices. In the

past, private capital was mainly allowed in the areas of

production and distribution. Since the late 1980s, TV stations

have started to purchase programs on the market, inaugurating a

system that separates the producer from the broadcaster. Since

the 1990s, state authorities have begun to more aggressively

promote the system and allow private capital to enter the TV

market. TV drama is the first area that has witnessed the

penetration of private capital. It is a common practice now for

TV stations to buy programs produced by others. Now, the stages

seems to be set for a broadening of the embrace of private

capital in media.

While Chinese TV producers initially only cloned successful

foreign programs, starting with HSTV’s highly influential show

Super Girl, they have in recent years begun to purchase global

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programming, such as Ugly Betty (debuting in 2008 and licensed from

Televisa), If You Are the One (debuting in 2010 based on the UK

program Take Me Out), China’s Got Talent (deputing in 2010 and licensed

from UK-based FremantleMedia), Daddy, Where Are We Going? (debuting

in October 2013 and licensed from a South Korean producer), Voice

of China (debuting in July 2012 and licensed from the Dutch

program The Voice of Holland), Chinese Dream Show (debuting in April

2011 and licensed from BBC) and so forth.

Fashion magazines have long entered the Chinese market

through licensing or partnership with a local publisher (Fritha &

Yang, 2009). For example, the Hearst Corporation from the U.S.

started to publish a Chinese version of Cosmopolitan in 1993.

Harper’s launched the Chinese version of Harper’s Bazaar in 2001,

and the Chinese version of Vogue was introduced in 2005. Japanese

magazines such as Vivi, With, Style, Oggi and CanCam have also

launched Chinese versions in the 2000s. Given that most of these

magazines are advertising vehicles, content is less controlled

than news programs. In the book publication area, U.S. publisher

Simon & Schuster started to collaborate with Chinese publishers

in the late 1990s in licensing or co-publishing deals.

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Last, the Decision stresses China’s public diplomacy. Since

the turn of the 21st century, China has attempted to increase its

comprehensive power, which includes a higher international

profile and soft power. In addition to increasing China’s

international aid and participation in global affairs, an

important step has been the spread of Chinese culture through

Confucius Institutes. China has founded more than three hundred

Confucius Institutes worldwide. Interestingly, promotion of

Chinese culture overseas emphasizes ideology as well as economic

benefits. Recently, Confucius Institutes in the U.S. has been

under increasing scrutiny.

While there is no doubt that China’s international influence

has increased recently, there is a general consensus that China’s

soft power mainly emanates from its conformity to international

norms rather than its power to shape global policies (Li, 2009).

Li (2009) argues that China’s soft power concerns “the soft use

of power.” China has not yet taken a leading role in

international affairs except in the case of climate change. Also,

there is a deep suspicion toward China in the West. While China

has allocated huge amounts of money for state-owned media such as

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Xinghua News Agency, China Central TV, and Shanghai Media Group

to increase their international influence, gaining credibility is

a major challenge for these media outlets. Competition for

viewers in other countries is always contentious (Price, 2002),

but China faces a unique challenge because of its Communist

ideology, state control, and the West’s anxiety about15 China’s

rise.

In this essay, I discussed potential changes in China’s

media control mechanisms, the dual role of China media,

censorship, media consolidation, the entry of private capital

into the Chinese media industries, and China’s soft power and

public diplomacy. In summary, it seems that the Decision largely

aims to further promote the economic function of culture and

media industries and control their ideological function. It would

not be surprising if we see China implementing tighter controls

over the Internet and social media and simultaneously encouraging

entrepreneurship and creativity. To a large extent, culture and

media industries are dancing with chains. They are only allowed

to become economic entities that only disseminate non-threatening

cultural contents. Chinese media aiming to expand internationally

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will encounter even more challenges. After all, they may continue

to be viewed as the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpieces. Their

dual roles will be constantly tested and contested in the

domestic and international markets. One more note: the Decision

only prescribes the rules for the media and cultural industries,

but the practices may be different.

.

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Fritha, K., & Yang, F. (2009). Transnational cultural flows: An

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Li, H. (2010). Chinese Diaspora, the Internet, and the image of

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