China's Growing Influence in the South Atlantic [CIDOB Journal d'Afers Internacionals, 2013]

Working Paper

Chinarsquos Growing Influence

in the South Atlantic

October 2013

BRICS Policy Center

BRICS POLICY CENTER ndash WORKING PAPER

Chinarsquos Growing Influence in the South Atlantic

1

Authors Adriana Erthal Abdenur (PUC-Rio BRICS Policy Center)

Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto (University of Cambrige)


in the South Atlantic1

Introduction

After nearly half a century as a strategic backwater the South Atlantic has been gaining new

importance due to new or renewed interests from both within and outside the region Key

players along the African and Latin American sides of the South Atlantic have been rethinking

the relevance of the maritime space as new discoveries of natural resources (including oil and

gas) are made as new poles of economic growth emerge and as direct ties across the South

Atlantic multiply Brazil has reformulated its national security strategy promoting the concept of

the Blue Amazon to enhance control over its maritime territory At the same time Argentina

has reaffirmed its claim over the MalvinasFalklands even as the UK (backed by the US and

other NATO allies) maintains control of a string of islands strategically located across the

Atlantic On the African side both Nigeria and South Africa seek to play a role of regional

leadership and gateway to the continent while Angola has become a key player due to its

abundant oil On both sides of the Atlantic natural resources especially those near the coast

attract a growing number of stakeholders both state and non-state from within and outside the

immediate region even as certain areas remain susceptible to political and social instability

There is an already substantial literature examining Chinas regional interests in respectively

Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (Ellis 2009 Brautigam 2009) as well as a growing

number of studies on China in Antarctica However so far there has been no attempt to study

1 This article was originally published in Spanish as Abdenur Adriana Erthal and Souza Neto Danilo

Marcondes (2013) ldquoLa cresciente influencia da China en el Atlaacutentico Surrdquo Revista CIDOB dafers internacionals

102-103 pp 169-197 Available online at

httpwwwcidoborgespublicacionesarticulosrevista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals102_103la_crecien

te_influencia_de_china_en_el_atlantico_sur



2

the relevance of China to the South Atlantic as a distinct geopolitical space Within this rapidly

changing panorama China remains one of the least studied actors despite a clear upsurge in

its interests and presence across the South Atlanticmdashboth its along its continental margins and

within the oceanic space This article thus sets out to analyze how the role of China-- here

conceived not as a unitary coherent actor but rather as a set of social actors connected by

their historic cultural and political affiliations with the Peoples Republic of China--has changed

across the South Atlantic focusing on the past ten years During this decade not only has

China significantly reoriented its regional policies for Africa Latin America and Antarctica there

has also been a rapid proliferation of Chinese state and non-state actors across the South

Atlantic

Rather than treating the South Atlantic as an interstitial or negative space or as a mere

backyard to global or regional powers here we focus on the South Atlantic as a key strategic

site that is being redefined by a growing web of overlapping intercontinental links as well as by

maritime interests that deserve an analytical treatment separate from the more traditional

continental approach (China in Africa China in Latin America etc) In terms of Chinarsquos rise and

its implications for the global order Chinarsquos growing capillary reach within the South Atlantic

reflects its ability to rise within the rules and institutions-based order promoted by the United

States even as it erodes American influence in the Western hemisphere (Ikenberry 2009 Roett

and Paz 2008) Finally this analysis also has concrete policy implications given that

stakeholders all along the South Atlantic perimeter increasingly turn to the seas as they

pursue their economic political and security interests

Broadly put we find that not only has the Chinese presence in the South Atlantic increased

dramatically over the past ten yearsndash as reflected by rapidly expanding trade the proliferation of

companies and investments and the growth of Chinese diaspora communities along the African

and Latin American shores ndash it has also undergone significant qualitative changes First there

has been a substantial diversification of Chinese interests and actors ndash not only in the economic

arena but also in terms of politics and security These interests however are not uniformly

distributed the Chinese presence along the African shores of the Atlantic is significantly deeper

and more complex than along the Latin American side Moreover in both continents there is a

marked variation in how China deals with local actors Far from adopting a cookie cutter

approach which would suggest a lack of institutional learning Chinas has become more

sophisticated with time and varies according to local resources institutions and the effects of



3

its own accumulated presence Second over the past decade Chinarsquos presence across the

South Atlantic has been marked by new forms and levels of social organization This

phenomenon is both top-down and bottom-up at the same time that the Chinese government

engages local states and facilitates the entrance of non-state actors including the private sector

new transnational communities link up the diaspora communities along the South Atlantic Third

China has stepped up its presence in Antarctica renewing the strategic relevance of Antarctica

to the South Atlantic

Even though the Chinese state does not yet have a South Atlantic policy this expanded role

entails a growing power asymmetry applicable (though not uniformly) to both the African and

Latin American sides of the South Atlantic Moreover Chinas growing presence increasingly

challenges the longstanding influence of the United States and Western powers in the South

Atlantic Even if China does not have the intention to dominate the South Atlantic it has already

helped to redefine the region as a geostrategic space becoming a force that should be factored

into the calculations of other South Atlantic actors

Background

Although Chinas presence in the South Atlantic during the past decade has grown dramatically

it did not appear out of the blue China has a long (if scattered) history in the region and an

analysis of recent trends must take into account this history so as to understand the basis for

certain phenomena and avoid overestimating the novelty of certain dynamics

Before the 19th century when the South Atlantic was still a central arena in Western slave trade

and empire-formation Chinarsquos presence in the South Atlantic was limited to the arrival of

Chinese silk and artisanal products in Africa and Latin America In the case of Latin America

between twenty to sixty ships sailed the route (sometimes nicknamed Silk Road on the Sea)

between China and Latin America from the late 16th century to the early 19th century bearing

silk textiles crafts jewelry gunpowder and some edible products In exchange Latin American

colonies exported shoes hats wine olive oil and soap to China (Ding et al 1986) There was

also a small amount of ancient trade between China and Africa though it concentrated on the

Eastern coast Yet exchanges between China and the South Atlantic remained limited in part

by extreme geographic distances coupled with the lack of convenient maritime passages



4

Before the Panama Canal opened in 1914 ships sailing from China to Latin America had to

either cross the perilous Strait of Magellan or circumnavigate Cape Horn From the African side

before the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 maritime navigation from China to the South

Atlantic required circumnavigating the Cape of Good Hope

The Chinese presence in the South Atlantic only acquired a demographic dimension with the

establishment of early diaspora communities on both continents especially in the 18th and 19th

centuries These migratory flows resulted from state-led initiatives meant to either complement

African slave labor on plantations farms and heavy infrastructure projects or to supplement

European immigration under racial policies for colonies or newly independent states On the

Latin American shores of the Atlantic sizeable communities (both coastal and inland) emerged

in Mexico Panama Cuba Jamaica Venezuela and Surinam with smaller groups in Brazil and

Argentina On the African side the earliest Chinese communities were established in South

Africa by the Dutch East India Company and later expanded under British rule (Yap and Man

1996)

Many of these communities grew with the arrival of subsequent waves of Chinese laborers

especially during turbulent periods in post-imperial China such as the Civil War or the Great

Leap Forward However until the late 20th century these early Chinese communities along the

Atlantic remained highly fragmented largely isolated from one another as well as from China

and subject to periodic forced repatriation drives (Romero 2010 Yap and Man 1996) In Latin

America partly due to the overwhelmingly male composition of Chinese immigration there was

widespread integration of the population through marriage (formal or common law) with locals

While this integration helped to make Chinese culture part of the local social fabric (Chinese

workers brought Buddhism to Cuba pioneered tea cultivation in Brazil and set up a Chinese-

language school in Jamaica) it occasionally weakened community cohesiveness and solidarity

Moreover those communities were often subjected to oppressive racial classifications and

barred from public goods and business opportunities (for instance they were forbidden from

mining contracts in South Africa) In some places systematic discrimination led to out-migration

which also weakened local communities (Lai 2005 Westad 2012) In some places diaspora

communities formed hometown associations benevolent societies and secret societies

including the Hongmenhui fraternal association but links to the migrants and their descendants

places of origin in China remained tenuous Save for a few exceptions-- some Chinese-



5

descending South Africans have become members of Parliament or the National Congress and

Arthur Chung born to immigrant Chinese parents in 1970 was appointed Guyanarsquos first

president-- these communities political influence remained relatively weak

During this period the Chinese state whether as dynasty or republic had little interest or

capacity to maintain an organized long term presence in the South Atlantic Despite the

establishment of diplomatic relations with countries in the region the Chinese diaspora

communities were largely left to their own devices Even after the Peoplersquos Republic of China

was founded Chinese foreign policy focused on the great powers the Communist Party

leadership paid little attention to the South Atlantic considered as a peripheral region during the

Cold War It was only in 1956-7 when Premier Zhou Enlai toured eight African countries that

China developed a significant interest in countries along the South Atlantic (Li 2007) The trip--

part of a bid to forge a more autonomous foreign policy and win the support of African countries

for the PRCs bid to replace Taiwan within the UN-- included three countries along the South

Atlantic Morocco Ghana and Guinea Shortly afterwards China began supporting the

independence movement in Angola by providing major liberation movements including UNITA

and MPLA with arms and financial backing

As for the major local South Atlantic players Chinarsquos ties remained weak and things did not

always go smoothly China established formal ties with Nigeria in 1971 but there were limited

exchanges during the following twenty years China and Apartheid-era South Africa did not

recognize one another and the two regimes were highly antagonistic with diplomatic relations

being established only in 1998 On the Latin American side Argentina recognized the Republic

of China until 1972 when it switched allegiances to Beijing Brazil had signed a Friendship

Trade and Navigation Agreement with China as far back as 1881--one of the many Unequal

Treaties with the Qing (Altemani 2004) but relations were interrupted by the fall of the dynastic

system There was a short period of relations between 1961 and 1964 when an anti-

Communist military regime was installed in Brazil The two countries cut off relations until 1974

Chinas interest in the South Atlantic began to change after Deng Xiaopings economic reforms

launched in 1978 marked a new openness in Chinese foreign policy Although this trend

underwent a reversal after the Tiananmen crackdown China redoubled its efforts and in 1999

launched its Go Out policy to encourage Chinese firms to invest overseas By the turn of the

millennium Chinarsquos double-digit growth and increasing demand for natural resources led it to



6

devote more attention to Africa and Latin America Not only did China develop regional policies

for both continents -- White Papers for Africa and Latin America were issued in 2006 and 2008

respectively2-- it also strengthened relations with key players around the South Atlantic In Latin

America alone China opened commercial offices and signed trade agreements with dozens of

countries (Dreyer 2006) For many South Atlantic states China represented a promising

alternative to the Northern powersmdashincluding the United States and the UKndash that had long been

not only dominant trade partners but also active military players in the South Atlantic In Latin

America the rise of several leftist regimes including in Venezuela Brazil and Argentina

enhanced certain political affinities and facilitated some of the strategic partnerships and

dialogues pursued in the region (Shambaugh 2008)

Since then three interrelated factors have contributed to the South Atlanticrsquos geostrategic

importance to China oceanic natural resources the MalvinasFalklands and Antarctica Oil and

gas exploration in the South Atlantic expanded significantly in the 1980s and additional

reserves have been discovered off the coasts of Africa and Latin America At the same time the

MalvinasFalklands debacle became more important to China Although China maintained an

ambiguous position during the 1982 war more recently Beijing began expressing open support

for Argentinarsquos claims over the islands as Chinese military analysts saw in the dispute a parallel

to its territorial claims in the Pacific region including Taiwan (Goldstein 2008) Finally

Antarctica became vastly more important to China which set an explicit goal of assuming a

leadership role in Antarctic affairs These factors became all the more pressing after the turn of

the millennium as the Chinese role across the South Atlantic not only intensified but also

diversified along three key dimensions economic political and security

Chinas Changing Presence in the South Atlantic

Economic Role

Economically Chinarsquos foremost concern across the South Atlantic remains gaining and securing

access to natural resources needed to maintain the countrys dramatic growth rates At the

2 Chinas African Policy January 2006 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (2006) and Chinas Policy

Paper on Latin America and the Caribbeanrdquo [online] httpwwwgovcnenglishofficial2008-

1105content_1140347htm



7

same time Chinarsquos continuing demand for African and Latin American resources has helped to

boost the GDP of many countries in the area after a prolonged period of stagnation or low

growth along both sides of the South Atlantic Oil is a particularly important concern because of

the rapid expansion of demand in 1993 China became a net importer of oil and shortly

thereafter became the worlds second-largest consumer of oil By 2020 China is expected to

become the worlds largest net oil importer (IEA 2011) Thus even though China still relies

primarily on coal for its energy needs oil imports have become vital to its energy security and

are expected to become even more important within the coming decade

As a result China has sought to diversify its oil sources abroad Although it imports heavily from

Saudi Arabia and its neighbors uncertainty of access in the conflict-ridden Middle East has led

to China to invest in oil fields elsewhere including the South Atlantic which is rich in oil along

both African and Latin American shores as well as in pre- and post-salt layers Recent

discoveries of reserves in these areas heighten the strategic importance of the South Atlantic as

an energy supplier even though some of the areas also suffer from political instability Piracy

has spread to the Gulf of Guinea social instability is common in Nigeria and political

uncertainty has been increasing in both Venezuela and Argentina Nevertheless South Atlantic

reserves have helped China to diversify its oil imports so as to enhance its overall energy

security In 2006 for example Angola replaced Saudi Arabia as Chinarsquos largest provider of oil

(Alden 2008)

On the African side four out of Chinarsquos five top oil suppliers are located along the South

Atlantic Nigeria Angola the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea (Sudan is also on the

list) (Taylor 2010) In addition China has been investing in smaller oil producers such as

Gabon Ghana and Liberia and prospecting for oil in promising suppliers like Sierra Leone and

Benin where Chinese cooperation packages help those countries build up their nascent sectors

while securing preferential access to their resources In Latin America Chinarsquos key oil suppliers

are also located around the South Atlantic Venezuela receives more Chinese investment than

any other Latin American country much of it connected to expanding oil production In Brazil

China is both financing the exploration and buying up shares of companies that are already

prospecting pre-salt reserves In Argentina Chinese oil companies are competing with Western

counterparts through mergers and acquisitions for instance buying Occidental Petroleumrsquos



8

operations there for $245 billion in 2012 3 These investments make Latin America an

increasingly important part of Chinas energy diversification strategy although it is not yet a

priority region (Palacios 2008)

These efforts show that China invests not only to maximize its current oil imports but also to

guarantee long-term supplies This long-term vision is reflected in Chinas growing role in deep-

sea oil and gas exploration Interest in deepwater pre-salt oil is fueled by significant discoveries

of high-quality crude in rocks below salt layers (pre-salt) off Brazils shoreline Across the

Atlantic Chinese companies have begun helping Western African countries to explore their

frontier exploration zones especially in the Gulf of Guinea and to map the seabed in search

for deepwater resources (competing with Brazil whose defense cooperation agreements also

include seabed mapping) This growing interest though not exclusive to China is helping to

foment new technologies for deepwater oil and gas production that stand to boost production on

either side of the South Atlantic4 In October 2013 two Chinese state oil companies (CNOOC

and CNPC) participated (with a 10 stake) in the consortium led by Petrobras and including

Dutch Shell and Francersquos Total that won an auction for the right to develop during a 35-year

concession the pre-salt oil in Brazilrsquos Libra Field

Chinas energy diversification approach often entails accepting risks (due to political economic

and political uncertainties) above traditional levels One of the ways that China mitigates some

of these risks is through a concerted collaboration between three key categories of actors the

Chinese state which uses diplomacy to establish agreements and open up doors the large

state owned companies (notably PetroChina Co Ltd and China Petroleum and Chemical Corp

known as Sinopec) that carry out most of the deals and the private companies and joint

ventures that carry out some of the related investments and ship the oil across the South

Atlantic and along the coasts of Africa and Latin America While the interests of these actors

often converge it would be a mistake to treat the Chinese presence in this area as in others as

a monolithic coherent unit The growing numbers of small-scale traders in Africa for instance

do not necessarily adhere to official rules Yet nor is the role of China entirely fragmented the

government works to actively direct and foment trade and other bonds according to its foreign

3 China taps into Argentinas oil prospects by Leslie Hook and Jude Webber December 12 2010 in The

Financial Times 4 Repsol-Sinopec makes huge oil discovery off-shore Brazil Mercopress Monday February 27th 2012 4httpenmercopresscom20120227repsol-sinopec-makes-huge-oil-discovery-off-shore-brazil-250m-

boe



9

policy priorities while ensuring Chinas oil supplies within a global climate of deep uncertainties

(Lee and Shalmon 2008)

Although oil is arguably Chinarsquos top economic concern in the South Atlantic especially on the

African side it is far from Chinas only economic interest Chinese manufacturing-- not only for

export but also for domestic consumption-- requires vast amounts of minerals wood cotton

fish and agricultural inputs from both sides of the South Atlantic In order to transport these raw

materials back to China China has invested heavily to improve infrastructure and transportation

integration at several South Atlantic nodes not only expanding port capacity but strengthening

logistics integration so as to expedite the flow of goods from inland areas For instance China

is helping Angola to refurbish the Benguela railway heavily damaged during the civil war to

transport ore from Zambiarsquos copper belt to the Angolan port of Lobito (Liu 2012) As in other

African countries along the Atlantic Chinese construction companies have also been expanding

Angolas airport infrastructure which should greatly increase capacity for the growing number of

transatlantic flights especially to Brazil5

All along the Atlantic coast of Africa Chinarsquos cooperation agencies have offered ldquoinfrastructure

packagesrdquo to local governments In addition to logistics and transportation these loans and

grants typically cover hospitals schools stadiums and government buildings-- sometimes

explicitly linked to natural resource deals Through these packages China is also able to

secure leverage for future exploration and drilling rights Thus Chinese investment in African

ports usually correlates to key economic opportunities-- even in the case of South Africa which

despite not being a significant source of oil in many ways serves as a gateway for China to

much of Sub-Saharan Africa In Nigeria not only has China invested in ports and transport it

has also been setting up two Special Economic Zones the Ogun-Guangdong and Lekki Free

Trade Zones (Brautigam amp Tang 2010) and Chinese companies are looking to invest in the

Angolan SEZ underway in LuandaBengui China may also contribute to regional integration by

building a 2000-km West African Highway slated to cross nine states along the South Atlantic

as part of a 2012 agreement with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)6

5 Luandas new airport in Anola aims to rival Johannesburg airport Macauhub October 24 2011

httpwwwmacauhubcommoen20111024luandarsquos-new-airport-in-angola-aims-to-rival-

johannesburg-airport 6 ECOWAS Chief Ouedraogo Discusses Regional Peace with Liberias President Johnson-Sirleaf ECOWAS

Press Release N 3602012 19 December 2012



10

On the Latin American side the Chinese presence is not yet felt quite as strongly but it is just

as varied even where infrastructure and logistics are concerned Although most China-driven

port refurbishing is along the Pacific China is also helping to expand Puerto Cabello

Venezuelarsquos largest Caribbean port by dredging and building new berths for large ships 7

Chinese companies are interested in investing in new ports along the South Atlantic including

Uruguayrsquos new deepwater port in Rocha and Brazilrsquos Accedilu ldquosuperportrdquo although parts of the plan

have been dropped due to reported inefficiencies on the Brazilian side8 The Accedilu Port under

construction in Rio de Janeiro State near Brazils major oil fields will also serve as a hub for

export commodities (primarily soy and iron ore much of it shipped out to China) produced in

Brazilrsquos landlocked states

Given the severe infrastructure and logistics deficits across the South Atlantic these Chinese

investments appear attractive to many countries in the region-- not only due to the speedy

access to low-cost financing but also because of the broadening of options as outside actors

compete for access and influence In Angola financing by China Exim Bank helped to trigger a

variety of aid and credit offers from Northern donors and multilateral organizations granting the

government a wider variety of alternatives (Corkin 2011) However in many places Chinese

companies also face setbacks due to political instability bureaucracy and corruption all of

which slow down investments At the same time shoddy construction environmental harm and

predatory practices by Chinese actors breed resentment and resistance among local

populations and political elites-- as does the growing perception of power asymmetries South

African President Jacob Zuma recently characterized Africarsquos growing trade imbalance with

China as ldquounsustainablerdquo9

Although oil and gas have dominated debates about Chinas quest for South Atlantic resources

the areas rich fisheries have also generated interest After nearly depleting its fisheries in the

1970s and 80s the Chinese government encouraged fishing companies to go outside of

7 Venezuela y China firman acuerdo para construir nuevo embarcadero de Puerto Cabello Correo del

Orinoco Caracas 21 january 2013

8 Chineses suspendem sideruacutergica no porto do Accedilu de Eike por falta de infraestrutura November 11 2012

httpwww1folhauolcombrmercado1183997-chineses-suspendem-siderurgica-no-porto-do-acu-de-

eike-por-falta-de-infraestruturashtml

9 Zuma warns on Africas ties ot China Leslie Hook Financial Times July 19 2012

httpwwwftcomintlcmss033686fc4-d171-11e1-bbbc-00144feabdc0htmlaxzz2I9foEF5Y



11

Chinarsquos EEZ including beyond Asia Since then China has become the worlds top consumer of

fish generating incentives for fishing in distant waters From 2000 to 2011 Chinese vessels

operated (legally or otherwise) along most of the South Atlantic perimeter on both African and

South American coasts (Blomeyer et al 2012) Although China has fishing agreements with

several African countries (including South Africa Guinea Bissau Guinea Senegal and Sierra

Leone and Mauritania) as well as with Argentina the rapidly growing demand has generated

some friction According to a 2009 report 65 of the vessels involved in illegal fishing off the

coast of West Africa were from China10 China is also accused of nearly depleting the South

African coast of abalone a highly prized delicacy and object of extensive illegal smuggling

routes to Hong Kong (Alden 2007) In 2005 Xinhua reported that Chinese fishing vessels that

could not afford to purchase an official permit walked a fine line entering Argentinas exclusive

economic zone illegally to fish squid and ended up being chased out by Argentina warships

firing warning shots11 In December 2012 Argentinarsquos coast guard detained two Chinese fishing

vessels caught with large stocks of squid within Argentinarsquos EZZ12

Some South Atlantic countries are also promising markets for Chinese exports particularly

those experiencing economic growth and middle class expansion China already exports

manufactured products to nearly the entire region To Africa China mostly ships cheap

manufactures and overproduced goods including electronics and textiles Compared to Africa

Latin America possesses a reasonably established manufacturing base in some sectors

producers fear the impact of cheap Chinese goods (legitimate or contraband) either at home or

in third markets (Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010) In sub-Saharan Africa China has also found

a growing market for arms from 2001 to 2010 China surpassed Russia to become the top

supplier of major arms to sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria is a major buyer but Benin Republic of

Congo Gabon Ghana Namibia and Sierra Leone also purchase from China In addition China

is a growing source of small weapons and equipment for weapons manufacturing (Wezeman

Wezeman and Beacuteraud-Sudreau 2011) In contrast Chinese arms sales to Latin America have

generally concentrated on logistical equipment rather than combat weapons (Marcella 2013) In

10 The Role of China in World Fisheries European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies Study

2012 httpwwweuroparleuropaeumeetdocs2009_2014documentspechdvchichinapdf 11 嘆嚔ɽ頣)闙し譚 existpound0黛鷉 - 赱ensp譖e29 援ŉ銧援庙逆恌 Ļ ュ晧χ

httpnewsxinhuanetcomoverseas2005-0930content_3564536htm 12 httpenmercopresscom20121227argentine-coast-guard-arrests-two-chinese-jiggers-off-puerto-

madryn



12

both regions China becomes an alternative to traditional providers of military equipment

equipment including leading NATO member states

Overall growing trade flows between China and the South Atlantic have strengthened the role

of the Chinese diaspora communities of the South Atlantic In both Africa and Latin America

these communities have played a crucial sometimes pioneering role in establishing trade and

investment ties (Jiang 2011) These occur either through the entrepreneurship of individuals

and groups or through broader associations that bring together diaspora-run businesses from

both shores for instance the BRICS Business Forum or the IBSA Business Council This

ldquobridgingrdquo function played by diaspora communities along both sides of the South Atlantic may

benefit from the capital made available to small and medium enterprises by Chinese banks

(Dube 2008)

Political Role

Politically Chinarsquos oldest concerns in the South Atlantic relate to displacing Taiwan and

expanding Beijings support within multilateral settings This approach proved highly successful

in the 1960s and 1970s when China managed to supplant Taiwan in the United Nations but it

has found far more success in Africa than in Latin America While only four African states

recognize Taiwan (two of them on the South Atlantic coast Gambia and Satildeo Tomeacute and

Principe) eleven Latin American and Caribbean states have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan

Beijing continues to press Central American and Caribbean countries to break ties with Taipei

Not only do the substantial cooperation packages offered by China create incentives for

breaking ties with Taipei China has also resorted to more direct diplomatic moves After Mexico

supported Chinarsquos request for observer status in the OAS China backed Mexicos bid for a non-

permanent seat in the UN Security Council In 2005 Mexico convened a meeting between

Central American states and a Chinese government representative to discuss the recognition

issue (Ellis 2009) In addition some analysts argue that Chinarsquos peacekeeping efforts are

related to its One China policy claiming that Beijing may reap political benefits from sending

troops to countries that have ties with Taiwan In 2004 China contributed to a peacekeeping

mission for the first time deploying the first 300 of its peacekeeping police officers to the UN

Stabilization Mission in Haiti (the last Chinese peacekeepers there left in the end of 201213)

13 As of October 2012 there were only 16 Chinese police officers in Haiti and by November 2012 the UN listing

no longer included China as a contributor to MINUSTAH See



13

More broadly this quid pro quo has been important for China in several key moments in its

foreign relations Within the UN Commission on Human Rights the support of African countries

helped to block proposals critical of China (He 2007) South Atlantic countries also helped to

break Chinarsquos isolation after the Tiananmen crackdown when Beijing came under heavy

criticism and was subjected to an arms embargo by Europe and the United States Argentine

President Carlos Menem was the first head of state to visit China in November 1990 (Malena

2011) Cuba was one of just a few countries that openly supported Chinarsquos response to the

protests and Namibian President Sam Nujoma praised Chinarsquos reaction to the

ldquocounterrevolutionary rebellionrdquo (Shinn and Eisenman 2012) Additional waves of support for

China also boosted its bid to host the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 World Expo Fair In turn

China backed South Atlantic states in key moments In 1994 during a visit to Buenos Aires

Peoplersquos Congress President Qiao Shi expressed open support for Argentinas claim to the

MalvinasFalklands since then China has repeatedly backed Argentinarsquos position

Over the past decade Chinas political role in the South Atlantic has also grown as a result of

key changes in Chinese foreign policy After the turn of the millennium Chinese foreign policy

makers began promoting the concept of ldquopeaceful developmentrdquo stressing Chinas role as a

responsible leader the primacy of domestic concerns and the principles of mutual benefit and

non-interference With respect to Chinas regional approaches for Africa and Latin America its

diplomatic discourse stresses a common identity historically as part of the Third World and

more recently as a fellow developing country Occasionally China uses this identity rhetoric to

openly contrast itself with Northern powers for example in a 2012 question-and-answer

session at Davos Premier Wen Jiabao stated that The United States is the biggest developed

country and China the biggest developing country in the world14 This discourse reflects Chinas

concerted effort to build up political affinities meant not only to open up economic doors along

the South Atlantic but also to pursue broader long-term goals such as pressing for global

governance reform and offsetting the influence of Northern powers

httpwwwunorgenpeacekeepingcontributors2012October12_5pdf and

httpwwwunorgenpeacekeepingcontributors2012Nov12_5pdf 14 Premier Wen Jiabao Answers Questions at the Opening Ceremony of the 6th Summer Davos Forum and

Meeting with Business Representaties Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC September 11 2012

httpwwwfmprcgovcnengzxxxt968650htm



14

Bilaterally China has diversified its links on both sides In addition to expanding the number of

formal relationships (reflected in the rapid growth of Chinese embassies in both Africa and Latin

America) China has accumulated strategic partnerships with major regional players Brazil

(1993) Argentina (2004) Angola (2010) and South Africa (2010) such a partnership is also in

the works with Nigeria (Egbula and Qi 2011) Brazil Nigeria and South Africa have expressed

interest in becoming permanent members of the UN Security Council and therefore have given

considerable attention to relations with China a permanent member already In the meantime

China has obtained recognition as a market economy from many countries within the region

including Argentina Brazil Uruguay Sierra Leone Niger and Gabon This status implies that

more countries in the region are willing to lower protective barriers against Chinese firms in

order to deepen their commercial relations with China From Chinarsquos perspective it allows for a

quantitative expansion of friendly ties generating not only economic opportunities but also

political benefits

Even though China has traditionally prioritized bilateral diplomacy over the past ten years it has

also invested heavily in multilateral initiatives relevant to the South Atlantic In addition to

launching the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 China is also a non-

regional member of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) and the African Development

Bank (ADB) To boost its high-level relationship with the African Union China has built the

organizations new headquarters in Addis-Ababa a futuristic $200 million USD project that

serves as a tangible reminder of the importance that China attaches to Africa

In the Latin American side of the Atlantic China became an observer state within the

Organization of American States (2004) and has also gained observer status within the Latin

American Parliament the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and the UN

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) as well as non-borrowing

member status in the Caribbean Development Bank In 2008 after lobbying by Inter-American

Development Bank President Luis Alberto Moreno and support from the US China became a

contributing member of IADB ending Japans position as the only Asian member (Ellis 2009)

Chinas initial contributions included $125 million to the Fund for Special Operations which

provides soft loans to countries (including three South Atlantic states that maintain ties with

Taipei Haiti Honduras and Nicaragua) In addition since the 1990s China has participated in

consultations with the Rio Group and with Mercosur during his 2012 visit to Argentina Premier



15

Wen Jiabao expressed interest in signing a Free Trade Agreement with Mercosur15 though

political fragmentation and prioritization of Mercosur-EU ties have weakened the prospects for

such an agreement at least for now

Nonetheless China continues to express interest in vastly expanding its links to Latin America

proposing a cooperation forum as well as $10 billion to kickstart infrastructure cooperation

projects and 5000 scholarships for study in China16 Finally China is also involved in a number

of initiatives connecting the two sides of the Atlantic These include the Forum for Economic and

Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Macau Forum) which

links China with Brazil and Portuguese-speaking countries on the African side of the Atlantic

including Angola Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau

In both its bilateral and multilateral strategies along the South Atlantic China relies on soft

power to deepen ties In addition to opening dozens of Confucius Institutes in Latin America and

Africa it has also set up academic exchanges and sponsored cultural events Occasionally its

soft power drives are linked to military initiatives In September 2011 China sent its naval

hospital ship the Peace Ark on a ldquogoodwill visitrdquo tour of the Caribbean docking at ports in Cuba

Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago and Costa Rica where staff provided free medical treatment

and collaborated with local medical personnel17 Frequent delegation trips and hosting of

government leaders from the region allows for intermingling of Chinese and local political elites

(Eisenman 2008) These charm offensive initiatives enable China to engage not only with the

regions governments but also to connect more directly with the broader population including

overseas Chinese In 2010 then-Vice President Xi Jinping urged over 6000 overseas Chinese

youth from 51 countries participating in a Root-Seeking Tour to act as civilian ambassadors

between China and their places of residence18

15 China propuso un acuerdo de libre comercio con el Mercosur Natasha Niebieskikwiat Clariacuten June 26

2012 httpwwwiecoclarincomeconomiaChina-propuso-acuerdo-comercio-

Mercosur_0_725927454html 16 Wen urges closer Sino-Latin American Cooperation Xinhua June 27 2012

httpwwwchinaorgcnworld2012-0627content_25746816htm 17 httpwwwgovcnjrzg2011-1022content_1975818htm 嘆嚔⑼洄ビットŉ Ẽ狡 4 嚔 ldquo藁烋跏ひrdquo陵倣

ｰ90

18 Overseas Chinese youths urged to serve as communicators between cultures Xinhua June 26 2010

httpnewsxinhuanetcomenglish2010china2010-0726c_13414708htm

18



16

Not only have diaspora communities across the South Atlantic grown with successive waves of

migration (especially as Chinese firms tend to bring over their own labor) the emerging

transnational communities link up growing Chinatowns to one another as well as to China

(both the mainland and Taiwan) Chinese migrants or their descendants have also become

more politically active In 2005 19 Chinese associations in Argentina issued a comuniqueacute

supporting Chinarsquos One-Country Policy they were joined by Venezuelan and Colombian

counterparts19 The Chinese Communist Party whose outreach program builds on the historical

support that China provided to national liberation movements in Africa and left-wing movements

in Latin America actively nurtures ties with counterparts both regions The Senegalese

Democratic Party (SDP) has frequent exchanges with the CPC as does the Permanent

Assembly of Political Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean (COPPPAL)20

These strategies come across as part of a broader effort by China to counter Western

dominance and promote multipolarity by siding with developing countries and assuming an

increasingly active posture within formal organizations as well as looser coalitions striving for

global governance reform The BRICS grouping brings China together with two major players on

either side of the Atlantic with some concrete results directly relevant to South Atlantic

integration The Bank of China has offered to finance 60 of the submarine BRICS Cable

which will connect the two sides of the South Atlantic as part of a broader project interlinking all

of the BRICS21 Not only can the cable render communications among participants faster and

more effective it would allow data to bypass Northern hubs a growing strategic concern for

China Other coalitions include the G-20 which also brings China together with South Africa as

well as Brazil Mexico and Argentina

On the other hand some important regional initiatives exclude China Cooperation between

actors on both have been growing dramatically partly due to a drive by Brazil to strengthen its

cooperation ties with Africa (Saraiva 2011) Among the key multilateral efforts is the South

Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation (ZOPACAS) which makes most of the South Atlantic a

nuclear weapons-free zone seeks to protect the regions marine resources and more broadly

19 Overseas Chinese in Latin America back Chinas Anti-Secession Law Peoples Daily March 15 2005

httpenglishpeopledailycomcn20050315eng20050315_176978html 20 La COPPPAL propuso en China profundizar los lazos entre ambas regiones COPPPAL 2012

httpwwwcopppalorgaractividadesla-copppal-propuso-en-china-profundizar-los-lazos-entre-ambas-

regiones 21 Arica Undersea Cable for Greater Connectivity Marcel Trout AllAfrica June 7 2012

httpallafricacomstories201206071268html



17

aims to enhance the control that regional states have over the South Atlantic22 Despite the

growing importance of China in the area there are still some geopolitical spaces along the

South Atlantic in which China does not play a direct role

Security Role

Chinarsquos security interests in the South Atlantic are closely associated with trade and investment

but they also reach beyond the economic dimension Unlike Western powers China has no

permanent base or military presence in the South Atlantic region Although China has been

expanding and modernizing its armed forces-- including plans for a nuclear-powered submarine

fleet an aircraft carrier program and an expanded surveillance satellite system-- it lacks the

capacity to project military power far from its immediate vicinity (Holslag 2009) Moreover

although its security concerns in the South Atlantic region have grown and diversified they still

do not justify (economically or politically) a permanent presence in the area especially one that

might overextend Chinas reach Finally despite occasional political tensions China has

amassed a certain degree of goodwill among regional partners and for now these links seem to

suffice for tackling Chinarsquos security concerns around the South Atlantic

Nevertheless there has been a certain amount of speculation about Chinas intentions

especially by NATO allies In June 2012 Premier Wen made a stopover in the Azores after a

four-country visit to South America23 His four-hour tour of Terceira island home to the Lajes Air

Base raised some alarm and rumors within US conservative circles that China was interested in

using the space once the US a current tenant withdraws in 201424) Although the Chinese

embassy in Portugal refuted such reports as ldquounfoundedrdquo25 there may be precedents for such

Chinese interest in an overseas presence elsewhere China has been considering using ports in

the Seychelles for Navy vessel refueling in the Indian Ocean26

22 Montevideo Declaration VII Ministerial Meetind of ZOPACAS14-16 January 2013 Montevideo 23 Primeiro-Ministro da China esteve hoje na Terceira June 2012 Governo dos

AccediloreshttpwwwazoresgovptPortalptentidadessrrndestaquesPrimeiro+Ministro+da+China+esteve

+hoje+na+TerceirahtmWBCMODE=tzggfdkepqdamplang=ptamparea=ct 24 Red Flag Over the AtlanticGordon C Chang National review November 5 2012

httpwwwnationalreviewcomarticles332454red-flag-over-atlantic-gordon-g-chang and Team Lajes

gets briefed about future of the installation Lajes Field US Air Force December 19 2012

httpwwwlajesafmilnewsstoryaspid=123330492 25China pode estar interessada na base das Lajes defende investigador Carlos Diogo Santos ionline

November 27 2012 httpwwwionlineptportugalchina-pode-estar-interessada-na-base-das-lajes-

defende-investigador 26 China to consider Seychelles port offer denies naval base plan Los Angeles Times December 13 2011

httplatimesblogslatimescomworld_now201112seychelles-china-port-naval-basehtml



18

For now however Chinas only direct military presence in the South Atlantic has been through

military diplomacy and UN peacekeeping missions In addition to the ldquoPeace Arkrdquo naval hospital

that toured Caribbean ports in 2011 in 2013 a Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet

composed of one frigate one destroyer and one support ship (The Luzhou the Liuzhou and the

Poyanghu respectively) with a combined staff of 600 visited ports in Chile Brazil and

Argentina deepening ties to local navies and carrying out bilateral exercises27 In terms of

peacekeeping China has contributed peacekeepers to several UN missions in the region This

participation includes past and present missions in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) Liberia

(UNMIL) Ivory Coast (UNOCI) Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and Namibia

(UNTAG) In addition China has signed a large number of defense cooperation agreements

with South Atlantic countries covering training equipment provision arms sales and logistics

China has become an important alternative supplier of military equipment and weapons to

countries in the region including some facing embargos For example in 2012 Venezuela

ordered eight Z-9CD helicopters meant for anti-submarine warfare and search-and-rescue

missions from Chinarsquos Harbin Manufacturing Corporation 28 China also has a cooperation

agreement for training of aircraft carrier personnel with Brazil whose carrier Satildeo Paulo is

capable of launching and recovering fixed-wing aircraft (Thaler 2010)

The South Atlantic has also assumed new relevance for Chinas new security concerns China

is interested in securing the shipping routes used to transport African exports to China

especially given the instability in certain areas and Chinas growing concern with food and

energy security Container services between China and South America transit via the Cape of

Good Hope though indirect shipments from the Amazon move northwards through the

Caribbean and the Panama Canal or through European ports such as Hamburg The more

goods transit through these routes the more important their security becomes to China

Although piracy has been a concern predominantly around the Horn of Africa the combination

of growing riches and recurring instability have have fuelled piracy in the Gulf of Guinea29

27 Visit to the Liuzhou Warship on October 24 2013 at Pier Mauaacute Rio de Janeiro Also seePLAN visita o Rio

de Janeirordquo Defesanet October 23 2013 httpwwwdefesaaereanavalcombrp=30968 28 La Armada de Venezuela adquiriraacute helicoacutepteros chinos para la dotacioacuten de los patrulleros de

NavantiaCarlos E Hernaacutendez Infodefensacom August 2 2012 httpwwwinfodefensacomnoticia=la-

armada-de-venezuela-adquirira-helicopteros-chinos-para-la-dotacion-de-los-patrulleros-de-navantia 29 ECOWAS to Provide Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Food Crisis Rebel Attacks ECOWAS Press

Release Ndeg 0222012 16 February 2012 Abuja - Nigeria



19

Chinese nationals have also become targets of kidnappings and violent attacks including by

Islamist extremist groups such as Boko Haram Some of these attacks intersect with the piracy

problem in March 2010 gunmen kidnapped seven Chinese workers on fishing boats in

Cameroonrsquos Bakassi peninsula 30 In Latin America there have also been a few cases In

November 2012 rebels from Colombiarsquos Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

freed four Chinese Sinochem workers who had been held for 17 months in jungle camps31 To

help prevent these attacks China has entered agreements to boost the protection of Chinese

nationals including with with South Africa against local armed gangs (Holslag 2009)

The other side of this coin is that some Chinese nationals have also been involved in illicit

activities Criminal groups on both sides of the South Atlantic have benefited from an increase in

international connections linking up with China-based gangs that carry out drug trafficking

human trafficking smuggling and money-laundering African and Latin American police forces

have experienced difficulties in fighting these networks because of language barriers and scarce

resources but there are incipient cooperation initiatives Chinese police collaborated with

Angolan law-enforcement agents32 in the deportation of Chinese gangs that lured Chinese

women into prostitution in Angola33

China is also increasingly concerned with the drug trade spanning the South Atlantic which may

bring together Chinese and non-Chinese gangs Africarsquos West Coast once a secondary route

for drug smugglers has become a key depot for South American drugs bound for Europe and

beyond as traffickers take advantage of the lack of radar control over the South Atlantic In 2012

the Guyanese government seized $10 millions worth of cocaine hidden in fish food bags bound

for China just two weeks after seizing a similar shipment bound for Nigeria 34 In 2012

authorities in Belize intercepted a shipment of chemicals sent in from China that was bound for

30 Released Chinese nationals arrive in Cameroons port city Limbe all in good condition Government of the

PRC March 18 2010 httpwwwgovcnmisc2010-0318content_1558283htm 31 Colombia FARC bebels free four Chinese captives held since 2011 Helen Murphy and Luis Jaime Acosta

Reuters November 22 2012 httpwwwreuterscomarticle20121122us-colombia-rebels-chinese-

idUSBRE8AL0Q020121122 32 China promete melhor proteccedilatildeo dos cidadatildeos chineses no exterior Embaixada da Repuacuteblica Popular da

China no Brasil August 29 2012 httpbrchina-embassyorgporszxwt964481htm 33 Chinese gangstersrepatriated rom Angola Tom Philips The Telegraph August 26 2012

httpwwwtelegraphcouknewsworldnewsasiachina9500517Chinese-gangsters-repatriated-from-

Angolahtml 34 Authorities Seixe Cocaine in Fish Food Bound for China The Gleaner December 13 2012 httpjamaica-

gleanercomextraarticlephpid=1918



20

the methamphetamine labs of the Zetas cartel in Mexico35 As elsewhere smugglers exploit

transnational networks creating new security concerns common to China and local states as

well new areas for security cooperation

The Antarctica Factor

The geostrategic importance of the South Atlantic region has also been changing due to

renewed interest in Antarctica Several key South Atlantic players-- among them Chile

Argentina and UK-- have territorial claims that in accordance to the Antarctic Treaty they

agree not to exercise After being excluded from the original treaty in 1959 due to political

reasons China became a signatory in the mid-1980s Almost immediately it established a

presence on the continent by building two bases including the Great Wall Station located less

than 1000 km from Cape Horn

Since 2005 China has sought more of a leadership role in Antarctic affairs (Brady 2010) In

addition to modernizing its first two bases it also built a third camp the Kunlun Base located at

high altitude on Dome A right in the middle of the territory to which Australia lays claim Not

only does Kunlun overlook all the other research stations in the area it is also ideally located to

receive send and intercept satellite signals (Bateman 2012) Beijing also established an

Antarctic studies institute in Shanghai and refitted the Xue Long (Ice Dragon) ice breaker

whose research expeditions have been the subject of a concerted propaganda effort to illustrate

Chinas global reach Xue Longs journeys are publicized with great fanfare to the Chinese

public with official reports typically stressing the economic and social benefits of the

research36

But there are also other interests at play Although the Antarctic treaty system forbids

prospecting and mining on the continent in January 2010 Chinarsquos Minister for Land and

Resources joined a delegation visiting Australiarsquos Casey Station soon after the director of

Chinas Arctic and Antarctic Administration admitted that China was interested in the ldquopotential

35 Los Zetas Draws new Smuggling Routes Through Belize Iris Amador Diaacutelogo Americas August 11 2011

httpwwwdialogo-americascomen_GBarticlesrmisafeaturesregional_news20111107aa-belize-

los-zetas 36 達な椑憘)194669ま71誻阷牂21 饅陵陋倣遊隶 httpwwwgovcnjrzg2012-




21

of the natural resourcesrdquo in Antarctica37 Although China is not the first country to develop such

an interest-- at the 2011 Buenos Aires consultative meeting of the Antarctic Treaty Russia

revealed its intention to prospect for minerals oil and gas-- Chinas expanding permanent

presence on the continent hints at a desire to follow suit38

In addition to increasing its presence in Antarctica in December 2010 China launched its 22nd

and largest global ocean expedition 218 Chinese experts crossed the Indian Atlantic and

Pacific oceans during 369 days they collected rock and fish samples and discovered 16

hydrothermal deposits five of them in the South Atlantic39 This scientific interest in the South

Atlantic along with Chinarsquos expanding presence in Antarctica signals a growing awareness of

the South Atlantics geostrategic potential By investing heavily in ensuring its long-term

presence in Antarctica China has not only attained recognition there as a growing player it has

also begun to generate some unease Any plans for natural resources extraction would bring

serious implications for an area of growing importance to regional actors Moreover given that

the South Atlantic is one of the key entry points to Antarctica any shifts in the Antarctic Treaty

System could have environmental and strategic implications for the broader region

Conclusion

Chinas presence and interests across the South Atlantic have grown and diversified immensely

during the past ten years Over the next decade this capillary reach--driven not only by the

Chinese state and its regional interlocutors but also by a variety of non-state actors-- looks

likely to continue growing enhancing Chinarsquos influence within the Western Hemisphere

Economically the ongoing discoveries of non-renewable energy resources including oil gas as

well as fish stocks will continue to attract China in the coming years especially given their

abundance and stability (relative to other regions) and Chinas growing concerns with energy

and food security For certain South Atlantic states however this asymmetrical

interdependence will also generate vulnerability to Chinas economic oscillations even if a hard

landing does take place

37China flags polar resource goals Jo Chandler The Age January 7 2010

httpwwwtheagecomaunationalchina-flags-polar-resource-goals-20100106-luc2html 38 Pawns in play on Antarctic ice-cap Steacutephane Foucart Guardian Weekly November 10 2011

httpwwwguardiancoukglobal2011nov08antarctic-prospecting-treaty 39 ldquo Chinarsquos largest global ocean expedition to date discovers 16 hydrothermal depositsrdquo China Today v 61 n

2 February 2012



22

Politically Chinas ties with state and non-state actors in both Latin America and Africa have

already led to instances of mutual support especially within multilateral fora such as the UN the

Bretton Woods Institutions and more informal arrangements such as the BRICS and the G20

These links may prove vital to overarching goals such as reform of global governance

institutions Regionally however Chinas preference for bilateral diplomacy and cooperation

may undermine multilateral institutions that have already been weakened by political

fragmentation or conflict

In terms of security any statement about Chinas intentions for the South Atlantic must be

qualified Despite the recent expansion of Chinarsquos military power its domestic priorities and its

ongoing disputes in the South Pacific mean that distant regions including the South Atlantic will

remain secondary to Asia within Chinas security interests In addition China does not have an

explicit South Atlantic policy While it is clearly more aware than ever of the South Atlantics

potential for now Chinese foreign policy focuses on continental (African Latin American and

Antarctic) dimensions rather than on the South Atlantic as a geostrategic space

Nevertheless Chinas growing interests across the region will continue to generate not only new

opportunities for cooperation and benefits for local societies but also new dynamics of

competition that are relevant for the entire South Atlantic Chinarsquos presence has already eroded

to a small but visible extent the Westrsquos historic influence in the region particularly American

hegemony as exercised through the Monroe Doctrine China is increasingly a direct competitor

for American and European economic political military and even cultural power within the

broader South Atlantic sometimes appearing as an attractive alternative due to economic or

even ideological reasons In many places Chinese cooperation falling outside the norms

established by OECD has already dislodged Northern donors as a source of development

assistance and presented a new model for development that is attractive to local states for a

variety of economic and political reasons And all this is happening precisely at a time when the

global economic crisis has limited the Western powers capacity to engage with and influence

South Atlantic actors many of which have become disappointed at or hostile towards the

Norths engagement with developing countries

But Chinas growing presence also has repercussions for key regional players who have

become more assertive in their foreign policies and are rethinking their own national strategies



23

and multilateral efforts Brazil has launched its Blue Amazon initiative and is planning a fleet of

nuclear-powered submarines for enhancing surveillance of the South Atlantic and attempting to

expand its maritime borders while vehemently opposing the presence of NATO forces in or near

the South Atlantic NATO has expanded its role in Africa for example through recent

intervention in Libya and through cooperation with the African Union although NATO has stated

that it will not intervene directly in Mali its leadership has supported Francersquos role and has

characterized the growing instability in the area as a ldquohole in European defense capabilitiesrdquo

The NATO issue also comes up in reference to the MalvinasFalklands where natural resource

discoveries have spiked up interest by Argentina On the African side Angola is becoming a

more relevant actor and Nigeria jockeys with South Africa for regional leader status These

growing national ambitions will have to take the South Atlantics more complex ecology into

account including Chinas growing presence

More broadly growing power asymmetries in relations with China pose new challenges For

regional actors Chinas new engagement with the South Atlantic presents opportunities for

trade investment (including in the regions long-neglected infrastructure) and alternative political

alignments with a country that presents itself as a fellow developing country While these ties

often generate tangible benefits for South Atlantic societies they have also led to charges of

neocolonialism and concerns about a new Beijing-centric dependency Framing links with

China as a re-edition of Northern ties with all their specific historic baggage is a vast

oversimplification but South Atlantic actors must innovate both domestically and internationally

in order redress growing imbalances At the same time Chinarsquos greater responsibility in

providing public goods within this regionmdashfighting drug trafficking cooperating to minimize

piracy and contributing to peacekeepingmdashshows a growing awareness by Chinese foreign

policy makers that its influence in the South Atlantic requires a greater participation in

contributing to inter-regional solutions

Domestically these states must enhance and upgrade their economic structures according to

their own resources and capacities and without neglecting the regions historical problems with

poverty alleviation and social inequality In particular states in whose territories new reserves oil

and gas reserves are being found must find ways to secure and manage their windfall

effectively In terms of foreign policy not only do countries across the South Atlantic need to

implement diversification strategies of their own they would be wise to boost cooperation

initiatives across the region including trans(South)Atlantic cooperation Strengthening



24

multilateral organizations such as ZOPACAS and the South America-Africa Summit (ASA) may

help local players to pool their leverage economically and politically Finally protecting the

Antarctic Treaty will help ensure the security and environmental vitality of the South Atlantic For

all involved rethinking the South Atlantic as a geopolitical space rather than a mere interstice

between continents will help ensure the regions long-term development and guarantee local

players interests

Sources

Alden Chris China in Africa London Zed Books 2008

Altemani de Oliveira Henrique Brasil-China trinta anos de uma parceria estrategica Revista Brasileira de Poliacutetica Internacional vol 47 no 1 (2004) P 7-30

Bateman Sam Strategic Competition and Emerging Security Risks Will Antarctica Remain Demilitarised in

Alan D Hemmings Donald R Rothwell Karen N Scott (Eds) Antarctic Security in the Twenty-First Century

Legal and Policy Perspectives New York Routledge 2012

Blomeyer Roland Goulding Ian Pauly Daniel Sanz Antonio Stobberup Kim The Role of China in World

Fisheries European Parliament Committee on Fisheries Vol 11 (July 2012)

Brady Anne-Marie Chinas Rise in Antarctica Asian Survey vol 50 no 4 (JulyAugust 2010) P 759-785

Brautigam Deborah Tang Xiaoyang Chinas Investment in African Industrial Zones Washington DC World

Bank January 6 2010

Corkin Lucy Uneasy allies Chinas evolving relations with AngolaJournal of Contemporary African Studies

London Taylor amp Francis 2011

Ding Sha Zhongguo he lading meizhou guanxi jianshi (A Brief History of Sino-Latin American Relations)

Henan Renmin Chubanshe 1986

Dube Memory ldquoTowards a New Partnership China in the SADC Banking Sectorrdquo Trade amp Industrial Policy

Strategies (December 2008)

Egbula Margaret and Qi Zheng China and Nigeria A Powerful South-South Alliance OECD Sahel and West Africa West African Challenges No 05 (November 2011)

Eisenman Joshua Chinas Political Outreach to Africa in Robert I Rotberg (Ed) China in Africa Trade Aid and Influence Washington DC BrookingsWPF 2008

Ellis R Evan China in Latin America The Whats and Wherefores Boulder Lynne Rienner 2009



25

Finlay Robert How Not to (Re)Write World History Gavin Menzies and the Chinese Discovery of America

Journal of World History vol 15 no 2 (2004)

Gallagher Kevin and Roberto Porzecansk The Dragon in the Room China and the Future of Latin American

Industrialization Palo Alto Stanford University Press 2010

Goldstein Lyle Chinas Falklands Lessons Survival Global Politics and Strategy vol 50 no3 (2008) P 65-

82

He Wenping The Balancing Act of Chinarsquos Africa Policy China Security vol 3 no 3 (Summer 2007) P 23-

40

Ikenberry John (2009) ldquoThe Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive

ldquoForeign Affairs (JanuaryFebruary 2008)

International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 2011

Jiang Shixue ldquoTen Key Questionsrdquo in Adrian H Hearn and Joseacute Luis Leoacuten-Manriacutequez (Eds) China Engages Latin America Tracing the Trajectory pp 51-65 Boulder Lynne Rienner 2011 P 51-66

Holslag Jonathan ldquoChinarsquos New Security Strategy for Africardquo Parameters vol 39 vo 2 (summer 2009)

Lai Walton Look Images of the Chinese in West Indian History in Anderson Wanni Wibulswasdi Lee

Robert G (Eds) Displacements and diasporas Asians in the Americas New Brunswick Rutgers University

Press 2005 P 54ndash77

Lee Henry and Dan Shalmon Searching for Oil Chinas Oil Strategies in Africa in Robert I Rotberg (Ed)

China in Africa Trade Aid and Influence Washington DC BrookingsWPF 2008 P 109-136

Li Anshan China and Africa policy and challenges China Security Vol 3 No 3 (2007) P 69-93

Liu Haifeng The Untold Story of Chinese Perceptions of Angola in Marcus Power Ana Cristina Alves (Eds)

China and Angola A Marriage of Convenience Pambazuka Press Cape Town 2012 P 162-178

Malena Jorge Eduardo ldquoChina and Argentina Beyond the Quest for Natural Resourcesrdquo in Adrian H Hearn

and Joseacute Luis Leoacuten-Manriacutequez (Eds) China Engages Latin America Tracing the Trajectory Boulder Lynne Rienner 2011 P 257-278

Marcella Gabriel What is the Chinese Military Doing in Latin America Americas Quarterly Chinas Global Rise Implications for the Americas Vol 6 no 1 (Winter 2012) P 67-69

Palacios Luisa Latin America as Chinas Energy Supplier pp 170-189 in Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz

(Eds) Chinas Expansion in the Western Hemisphere Implications for Latin America and the United States

Washington DC Brookings Institution 2008

Roett Riordan and Guadalupe Paz (Eds) Chinas Expansion in the Western Hemisphere Implications for Latin

America and the United States Washington DC Brookings Institution 2008



26

Romero Robert Chao The Chinese in Mexico 1882-1940 Tucson University of Arizona Press 2010

Saraiva Joseacute Flaacutevio Sombra Aacutefrica Parceira do Brasil Atlacircntico Brasiacutelia Universidade de Brasiacutelia 2011

Shambaugh David Chinas New Foray into Latin America Yale Global Online 17 November 2008

Shinn David H and Joshua Eisenman China and Africa A Century of Engagement Philadelphia University of

Pennsylvania Press 2012

Taylor Ian Chinas New Role in Africa Boulder Lynne Rienner 2010

Thaler Kai Using BRIC to Build at Sea The Brazil-China Aircraft Carrier Agreement and Shifting Naval

Power IPRIS Viewpoints (January 2010)

Westad Odd Aren Restless Empire China and the World Since 1750 New York Basic Books 2012

Wezeman Pieter D Siemon T Wezeman and Lucie Beacuteraud-Sudreau Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa

SIPRI Policy Paper 30 (December 2011)

Yap Melanie Dianne Leong Man Colour Confusion and ConcessionsThe History of the Chinese in South Africa

Hong Kong Hong Kong University Press 1996



1

Authors Adriana Erthal Abdenur (PUC-Rio BRICS Policy Center)

Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto (University of Cambrige)


in the South Atlantic1

Introduction

After nearly half a century as a strategic backwater the South Atlantic has been gaining new

importance due to new or renewed interests from both within and outside the region Key

players along the African and Latin American sides of the South Atlantic have been rethinking

the relevance of the maritime space as new discoveries of natural resources (including oil and

gas) are made as new poles of economic growth emerge and as direct ties across the South

Atlantic multiply Brazil has reformulated its national security strategy promoting the concept of

the Blue Amazon to enhance control over its maritime territory At the same time Argentina

has reaffirmed its claim over the MalvinasFalklands even as the UK (backed by the US and

other NATO allies) maintains control of a string of islands strategically located across the

Atlantic On the African side both Nigeria and South Africa seek to play a role of regional

leadership and gateway to the continent while Angola has become a key player due to its

abundant oil On both sides of the Atlantic natural resources especially those near the coast

attract a growing number of stakeholders both state and non-state from within and outside the

immediate region even as certain areas remain susceptible to political and social instability

There is an already substantial literature examining Chinas regional interests in respectively

Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (Ellis 2009 Brautigam 2009) as well as a growing

number of studies on China in Antarctica However so far there has been no attempt to study

1 This article was originally published in Spanish as Abdenur Adriana Erthal and Souza Neto Danilo

Marcondes (2013) ldquoLa cresciente influencia da China en el Atlaacutentico Surrdquo Revista CIDOB dafers internacionals

102-103 pp 169-197 Available online at

httpwwwcidoborgespublicacionesarticulosrevista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals102_103la_crecien

te_influencia_de_china_en_el_atlantico_sur



2










Atlantic

























3















Background

















4














1996)




















5


































6
























Economic Role








7



















(Alden 2008)














8































boe



9


































10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















2










Atlantic

























3















Background

















4














1996)




















5


































6
























Economic Role








7



















(Alden 2008)














8































boe



9


































10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















3















Background

















4














1996)




















5


































6
























Economic Role








7



















(Alden 2008)














8































boe



9


































10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















4














1996)




















5


































6
























Economic Role








7



















(Alden 2008)














8































boe



9


































10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















5


































6
























Economic Role








7



















(Alden 2008)














8































boe



9


































10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















6
























Economic Role








7



















(Alden 2008)














8































boe



9


































10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















7



















(Alden 2008)














8































boe



9


































10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















8































boe



9


































10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















9


































10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















10



































11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















11































madryn



12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















12











(Dube 2008)

Political Role






















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















13

































14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















14













political benefits





















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















15




























ｰ90



18



16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















16



































17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















17




Security Role































18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















18


































19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















19


































20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















20





















research36











21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















21
















Conclusion














2 February 2012



22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















22

































23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















23



































24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















24






players interests

Sources










Bank January 6 2010












25






82


40
























26
















25






82


40
























26
















26














China's Growing Influence in the South Atlantic [CIDOB Journal d'Afers Internacionals, 2013]

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Transcript of China's Growing Influence in the South Atlantic [CIDOB Journal d'Afers Internacionals, 2013]