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I Introduction

Is Chinese partnership beneficial to African nations? Simple

or definitive answers to this question have eluded scholars,

despite years of earnest research.1 Academic responses have not

been uniform – often the only fact that can be agreed on is that

Chinese-African relations are becoming increasingly important and

prominent. A dominant narrative has arisen that paints China as

an aggressor or even neocolonialist, coming to the continent to

reap its abundant natural resources, empowering antidemocratic

strongmen along the way. This viewpoint is reflected strongly by

a non-academic community of Western policymakers and some

journalists who are deeply concerned about the relative decline

of Western influence and the prospect of Western political values

being replaced by Chinese-style autocracy in Africa. The

responding narrative, pushed by Chinese officials and several

African leaders, argues that Sino-African relations are mutually

1 The field of Sino-African studies took off after the 2006 FOCAC meeting, which garnered press around the globe for China’s lavish promises and high attendance by African leaders.

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beneficial and based on common respect for sovereign rule. Yet

China’s approach to African nations is too complex to adhere

fully to either narrative; on the ground, China’s engagement with

African nations varies widely.

One narrative, most commonly expressed by Western political

leaders, paints China as monolithic, domineering and greedy,

while African leaders are mere respondents to the tides of

history. The Chinese state, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and

even private businesses are a single entity. They tower above

Africans, who seek to appease the hungry dragon with minerals and

oil, receiving substandard infrastructure in return. Chinese

investment disregards local labor and environmental laws,

exacerbating pre-existing issues with poor local governance. The

Chinese also support dictators and protect mass murderers from

impunity.

The competing narrative, espoused by African and Chinese

political elites, argues for “South-South cooperation” and

“mutual development.” This narrative is born largely out of the

Cold War-era Non-Aligned Movement, which sought to disregard the

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US-USSR binary for a third way, based on self-sufficiency and

cooperation. The substantial decline and destabilization that

most African nations experienced in the last three decades of the

20th century is largely blamed on Western meddling. Fortunately,

the Chinese arrived with fair loans and deep trust, creating

economic partnerships that have helped these countries turn

around their fortunes. This narrative suggests that Chinese

investment is long-term and responsible.

Both of these narratives are overly simplistic. The first

narrative negates African independence of thought and action.

Chinese-African relations are guided largely by Chinese business

interests and the search for global investment opportunities.2

And while South-South cooperation is a more accurate model in

terms of trade and the active role of Africans, there is an

imbalance in the distribution of processed Chinese exports and

raw African exports. Chinese engagement differs nation-to-nation

based largely on business opportunities, and is impressively

resistant to unfriendly or controversial political contexts. It

is also complicated by the variety of players. Although state-2 Global Chinese investment is driven largely by their large US currency reserves.

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owned enterprises and the Chinese government are the main drivers

of relations with African states, private companies and

immigrants are often the greatest areas of contention.

This study seeks to offer a third perspective; that the

local context in which China engages produces variable results

for African states. In Oyeranti et al.’s study of Chinese-

Nigerian relations, they note that “[Engagement] with China, just

like any bilateral relationship, has some advantages and

disadvantages and that optimal outcome of the engagement will

depend on the policies and institutions that are put in place to

maximize the complementary effects and to minimize the competing

effects.”3

Thus, partnership with China has largely positive effects

for African economies but a somewhat negative effect on African

governance. Chinese efforts to build infrastructure, concessional

loans and multi-sector investment are indicative of their

position as reliable economic partners, and these efforts are

likely to aid in sustaining growth across the continent. However,

3 Oyeranti, Gboyega A; Babatunde, Musibau A; Ogunkola, E Olawole. “An analysisof China-Nigerian investment relations.” Abstract

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African governments have a long history of weak and corrupt rule,

and the Chinese model of development is likely to encourage

autocratic leaders to continue centralized power and

nondemocratic rule.

Tanzania and Zambia

In order to explore the question of Chinese engagement in

Africa, this study will focus on Tanzania and Zambia. Tanzania

and Zambia have three major strengths as case studies in this

investigation of Sino-African relations. First of all, these two

nations’ economic stability and diversity ensures a clarity that

is lost in Sino-African relations swamped in oil or war.

Secondly, while some African nations are still stagnant and under

a clearly dictatorial yoke, the majority of other nations are

showing strong growth and are moving towards multiparty

democracies with “free and fair” elections, like those in

Tanzania and Zambia. Finally, there are key differences between

them, such as their political and economic structures, which make

them particularly useful to this study.

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The relative peace and stability that Tanzania and Zambia

have experienced since independence simplifies and clarifies the

study of their interactions with China. Other key Chinese

partners, such as Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the

Congo, are afflicted with guerilla conflicts and long-running

sectarian warfare. Instability and warfare often adds a very

difficult layer of complexity to relations with China. This is

especially true when conflict takes place in resource-rich

regions to which the Chinese are interested in gaining access.

Taking such conflict out of the equation greatly simplifies and

clarifies our analysis of Sino-African relations.

Next, this paper posits that the political peace and

economic growth that Tanzania and Zambia are experiencing are

increasingly common across Africa. These trends are supported by

encouraging reports on expanding health and education. A recent

special report by The Economist, for example, notes that “most

Africans no longer fear a violent or premature end and can hope

to see their children do well” and that Africa is currently the

continent with the highest overall GDP growth.4 Furthermore, the

4 August, Oliver. “A hopeful continent,” The Economist. March 2nd, 2013.

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number of ongoing conflicts across the continent is on a downward

trend, and ‘big men’ have been successfully pushed out of office

in a number of African nations, especially in West Africa.5

Though these do not guarantee success, such reports indicate a

break with the stagnant authoritarianism that has been Africa’s

ill for so long, and strengthen the usefulness of Tanzania and

Zambia as case studies.

Tanzania and Zambia’s strengths in this study also lie in

their differences. China’s partnerships with Tanzania and Zambia,

which have expanded greatly since the late 1990s, have taken

divergent paths. In Zambia, adaptation to a fractious party

system and reopening of the copper mines have driven Sino-Zambian

relations. Sino-Zambian relations, on the other hand, are largely

defined by the pre-existing copper industry, a vibrant business

community, and strong civil society organizations,

characteristics present in many other up-and-coming African

nations. In Tanzania, on the other hand, continuous rule by a

dominant party and untapped economic potential have moved

relations with the Chinese forward. The untapped economic

5 This includes Senegal, Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria.

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potential and semi-democratic nature of politics align Tanzania

with China’s other African partners, providing a good test of the

"export of autocracy" model.

Thus, Tanzania and Zambia are excellent case studies to use

in our investigation of the impact of relations with China on

African nations. Tanzania and Zambia are fairly representative of

Sino-African relations because they embody a likely future

Africa, yet have several key differences that helps characterize

the variety inherent across Africa. Concurrently, Tanzania and

Zambia’s peace and stability make studying the impact of Sino-

African relations a much more manageable endeavor. We can now

investigate the factors behind the entrance of the Chinese and

the possible impact of Chinese partnership.

Africa Looks East

The nature of each nations’ natural resources, economic

potential, political-public relations and infrastructure deficits

have led to distinct political and economic ties. These ties with

China then have distinct meanings in each nation, and are

manipulated by various domestic African forces for their own

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ends. Sino-African relations are thus malleable and context-

dependent, rather than being rigid and uniform.

In Tanzania, Chinese engagement has been defined by

Tanzania’s infrastructure deficit, its untapped potential for

being a trade link and provider of natural resources, and by the

ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM; Party of the Revolution).

The Chinese ambassador implicitly supports the CCM government

through his presence at CCM rallies, creating an association

between the CCM and China and implying China’s disapproval of

Tanzania’s opposition parties. China has begun to help address

Tanzania’s infrastructure deficit with large loans covering

fiber-optic cables, railways, roads and ports. This

infrastructure construction also seeks to capitalize on

Tanzania’s position as a coastal link for its five landlocked

neighbors. China has also recently begun to get involved in iron

and coal mine projects in Tanzania.

In the coming years, China’s impact on Tanzania is likely to

include an economic boost in the form of infrastructure and

investment, as well as low-key support for an increasingly

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repressive regime. The special economic zone at Bagamoyo and its

accompanying port and railway will make a major mark on the

Tanzanian economic landscape, drawing traffic away from the

congested Dar es Salaam port and boosting trade and investment

across the nation. The emergence of iron and coal mines could

make labor conditions an important factor in Sino-Tanzanian

relations. Politically, China’s role in the nation’s economy

could become controversial if it’s overt support for CCM is

targeted by opposition figures, or if CCM engages in violent

repression in order to win elections with Chinese tools and/or

weaponry.6

In Zambia, Chinese engagement has been defined by Zambia’s

pre-existing industries, infrastructure deficit, and relatively

strong civil society organizations. The 1970s Tanzania-Zambia

railway initiated Chinese-Zambian relations, but interactions

lapsed in the succeeding decade. Zambia's move to privatize

copper mines in the late 1990s reinitiated engagement. Trade with

6 It is possible, yet quite unlikely, that the CCM could find a serious reformcandidate, surviving the next elections and go on to crack down on corruption and engage in more business reforms, retaining the vote through positive actions rather than fraud or Nyerere’s legacy. Yet there seems to be little will amongst CCM cadres to support such reforms.

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China, which made up less than 1% of Zambia’s total exports in

2001, has risen steadily to 35%, becoming the dominant export

market in 2011.7 Zambia’s infrastructure deficit is being tackled

by numerous Chinese SOEs and private companies, mostly through

bidding for road contracts. Zambia’s unions and NGOs have

provided significant pushback against labor conditions and shifty

deals in the mining industry, strengthening Zambian democracy and

holding their own against China’s aggressive capitalism.

Chinese engagement in Zambia will likely lead to stable and

diverse economic growth but uncertain political progress, a

result of a tug-of-war between President Sata’s political

instincts towards autocratic nepotism and the public’s growing

consensus around clean governance, multiparty democracy and the

role of media. Chinese-built roads are helping to confront the

nation’s poor infrastructure problem. Zambian civil society

groups are playing their part in forging a mutually beneficial

path for Zambian workers and Chinese investors. Yet just like

Tanzania, Zambia’s future lies in the hands of its citizens and 7 “Untangling Zambia’s Currency Controls and Implications for Copper ETFs” Diverging Markets, July 23, 2012. Available at (http://www.divergingmarkets.com/2012/07/23/untangling-zambias-currency-controls-and-implications-for-copper-etfs/)

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it is unclear if Zambian elites will do the necessary work to

ensure that the Chinese presence helps rather than hinders

sustained economic growth.

Conclusion and Implications

Ultimately, China’s impact on the continent will be decided

by Africans. In both Zambia and Tanzania, investment in

infrastructure and extraction industries is giving the economy a

boost, but the government’s recent repressive tactics, now

silently aided partly by the Chinese model, could backfire.

National leaders must tackle corruption seriously and continue

current business reforms to maximize benefits from the Chinese

presence in Africa.

Yet autocratic governance is not the same as poor

governance, and vibrant, multiparty democracy is not a necessary

condition for a government to have a positive impact on the

nation.8 The Chinese model is working for China, insofar as it

has delivered hundreds of millions out of poverty, and it has

been done without a single popular vote. However, Afrobarometer

8 There are also a number of smaller issues that arise from unenforced labor and environmental laws, such as poor safety standards and the presence of Chinese immigrants outcompeting locals in their markets.

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polls indicate rising rates of democratic values in Tanzania,

Zambia and a number of other nations around the continent –

African leaders attempting to create one-party states are facing

increasing resistance from both their own populations.

Though varying depending on local contexts, it is clear that

across Africa China is simultaneously providing a leg up to

underdeveloped economies and an attractive model of autocratic

governance to undemocratic leaders. The conclusions drawn here in

Tanzania and Zambia are reflected in others’ research across

Africa. Oyeranti et al. argue that “The major characteristic of

Chinese investment in Nigeria is its concentration in a few

sectors that are of strategic interest to China.” Such targeted

investment reverberates in other parts of the economy; in Zambia,

investment in the mining sector has aided in the creation of

domestic road contractors. Investment is already diversifying,

helping African economies escape resource dependency.

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Roadmap

This paper begins with a discussion of the recent histories

of Tanzania and Zambia. Political differences between Zambia and

Tanzania became apparent with Tanzanian President Julius

Nyerere’s 1985 resignation, ensuring his party’s political

survival in the coming wave of democratization. Zambia’s

democratic reforms and election of the Movement for Multiparty

Democracy, however, resulted in a fractious multiparty system

that has encouraged ‘big men,’ as well as political visionaries.9

In the second chapter, we will discuss Chinese relations

with the continent, and with Tanzania and Zambia in particular.

Sino-African relations took off in the 1960s as China sought

support for its UN Security Council seat. China, Tanzania and

Zambia formed informal anti-imperialist alliances to combat the

Portuguese and Rhodesian regimes just south of Tanzania and

Zambia. From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, however, Sino-

African relations took a backseat as stagnation set in throughout

Africa and China turned inward to deal with domestic reform. Yet

9 Big men are essentially rulers of neopatrimonial states, whose rules are marked by intolerance of opposition and rely on patronal networks.

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China’s enormous economic expansion soon began touching all parts

of the globe, and relations with Africa took off once again in

the late 1990s. Since then, China has become Africa’s dominant

trading partner, and has helped fund most of the continent’s

largest infrastructure projects.

The next chapter will analyze the quickly expanding economic

relations between China and these two nations, and attempt to

chart a potential path for future engagement. Despite labor

issues and the politicization of the Chinese presence in 2006,

Chinese actors have easily and continuously expanded from

Zambia’s copper industry into most sectors of the copper-

dependent economy, especially infrastructure. In Tanzania,

however, Chinese involvement remained limited until the past

half-decade, when untapped economic potential began receiving

attention from the Chinese. In both Tanzania and Zambia, China

is supplying critical infrastructure loans and business

opportunities, providing economic boosts by taking on the

Africans’ crippling infrastructure deficits. Crucially, the

evidence points to the Chinese being long-term economic partners

for Africa, unlike previous Western investors.

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In the fourth chapter, this paper will turn to the political

relations between China and Tanzania and Zambia. This chapter

will investigate the question of whether African leaders might

learn from or be influenced by Chinese political behaviors and

the Chinese political system. There has been little imperative

for the Chinese to export their political values or become deeply

involved in the domestic politics of Tanzania or Zambia. Rather,

the Chinese are well-renowned for their non-interference policy,

which essentially serves as a diplomatic blanket of silence; only

recognition of Taiwan will draw public ire from the Chinese.

Thus, by replacing requirement-laden Western loans with China’s

silent support, African leaders’ accountability is moving away

from the international community towards increasingly democratic

African audiences. However, the loss of international

accountability for leaders may simultaneously provide an opening

space for autocratic African leaders, exacerbating contention

between the political elite and the largely impoverished public.

To conclude, this study will review the Tanzanian and

Zambian cases and compare them to China’s relations with other

African nations, before extrapolating to possible future

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scenarios. It will be confirmed that China’s expanding engagement

in Africa is founded largely on China’s global economic goals and

Africa’s infrastructure deficit, as defined by the possibilities

of each local context. There is no need to fear Chinese

expansion, but channeling it is necessary to bring maximum local

benefits.

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IIHistorical Landscapes in

Tanzania & ZambiaIn order to examine the implications of Chinese partnership

for African nations, it is critical to understand the histories

of Tanzania and Zambia leading up to the present day. Tanzania’s

postcolonial success as a regional leader has faltered

significantly since the 1970s, partly as a result of continued

rule by independence party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Tanzania’s

de facto one-party state has vastly limited political

participation and innovation, and Tanzania has thus far largely

failed to exploit its own untapped potential for transport and

resource extraction or build the infrastructure needed for

sustainable growth. Zambia, on the other hand, faced similar

issues of stagnation and decay in the 1980s, yet came out of the

next decade with a comparatively vibrant democracy and

reawakening copper sector. Zambia’s ruling party has changed not

once but twice since independence and civil society organizations

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(especially unions) have muscle to flex, yet Zambia still

struggles with inadequate infrastructure and a copper-dependent

economy.

This chapter will review these historical trends in

Tanzania, Zambia and Africa at large by focusing on the role of

political leadership through three historical periods. First of

all, we will examine the period from colonization to the height

of postcolonial anti-imperialist fervor in the 1970s, including

the rise of anti-imperialism and the major political parties in

Tanzania and Zambia. Then, the Lost Decade and the reforms of the

1980s and ‘90s will be discussed, focusing on how political

leaders dealt with the Third Wave of Democratization and Western

pressure to reform economically and politically. Finally, we will

discuss the developments that have taken place since the start of

the new century.

From the Frying Paninto the Fire

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Portuguese trade, exploration, and colonization at the end

of the 15th century marked the beginning of major interactions

between Europeans and sub-Saharan Africans. Early contact was

based primarily on trade or through missionaries. In 1488,

Bartolomeo Dias was the first European to round the Cape of Good

Hope. Subsequent voyages a decade later, led by Vasco de Gama and

others, resulted in landfall in modern-day Mozambique, Tanzania,

Kenya and Somalia. Most interaction remained centered on trade,

with population extraction (slavery) on the eastern coast of

Africa instigated by Portuguese and Arab slavers.10 From the 16th

to the 19th century, overseas territories were used to enslave

local populations and send them to the Americas. In the early

19th century, a dramatic shift began in the colonies,

transforming them from slavery-oriented to resource-reaping

economies. Colonies rebelled against European domination up and

down the Americas, and European governments moved to criminalize

domestic slavery. Europeans began focusing on an exploration- and

10 As many historians enjoy pointing out, forms of slavery existed in many African societies before the arrival of Arab and European slavers. Yet it was a fundamentally different form of slavery, one which settled disputes by adopting a child from another tribe. This child worked for the host family butdid not suffer from cruel or unusual punishment, and could become a full member of his adopted society.

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business-oriented approach to the African continent, and Western

expansion throughout the continent was regulated by agreements

made in European capitals. Informal treaties were signed on the

ground by often illiterate tribal chiefs who were duped into

signing away land and, later on, the loyalty of their own

people.11

The period from the late 19th century through to

decolonization in the mid- to late-20th century can effectively

be seen as the beginning of nation-state governance in Africa, as

governments were formed within geographical boundaries that have

mostly survived intact. World War Two was important to

nationalist African liberation movements. Colonial authorities

liberalized their African policies during the war while

recruiting hundreds of thousands of Africans to fight,

inadvertently opening spaces for anticolonial thought.12 While

11 Gordon, David. “Owners of the Land and Lunda Lords: Colonial Chiefs in the Borderlands of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo.” 2001. P.31712 There were a combination of factors at work here. First of all, most Africans still had not come into close contact with their imperial masters, and the war brought these white men on military campaigns through some regions. Secondly, it led to an upsurge in Africans studying in European universities, where they were exposed to Marxist ideals. Perhaps most importantly, however, WWII shattered the myth of European invincibility, and showed Africans that Europeans could be just as cruel to one another as they were to Africans.

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political opposition to colonialism appeared in different forms,

it was often driven by popular reactions to colonial economic

schemes. These unpopular schemes often employed Africans in very

harsh labor conditions with little pay, often forcing them to

work against their will.

New African nations faced a number of serious obstacles to

growth and stability, chief among them being highly centralized

governments with little to no representation outside of the

capitals. Public officials and soldiers were poorly paid, and

there was no historical foundation for nation-state governance in

areas of high ethno-lengual diversity. A serious lack of well-

educated citizens and unrealistically high expectations on the

part of the newly-liberated populace intensified the pressure on

the first generation of leaders. Within a decade, the majority of

African nations saw regime change through violent means.

Tanzania and Zambia, however, remained relatively stable and

peaceful. Across the continent government bureaucracies expanded

ostensibly to serve the citizenry, but as Therkildsen points out

they “expanded in size but remained, at least in design,

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hierarchical and centralized.”13 Systemic corruption flourished

throughout the postcolonial period across the continent, and

Heilman et al. note “...the major reason being that the legal-

rational bureaucratic model was developed in Europe and

transplanted into an alien environment.”14

Founding fathers Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere were

instrumental in shaping the political environments of Zambia and

Tanzania respectively. Both saw the one-party state as essential

to the stability and the capacity of the nation in carrying out

respective plans for economic growth and increasing the

citizenry’s wellbeing. They formed political ideologies –

Nyerere’s Ujamaa (also called African Socialism) and Kaunda’s

Humanism – in attempts to give meaning to the nation at large.15

While both implemented one-party states within a decade in

office, there were differences in political and electoral

structure. These differences were most pronounced at the end of

13 Therkildsen, 2000. “Public Sector Reform in a Poor, Aid-Dependent Country, Tanzania.”14 Heilman, Bruce; Kamata, Ng’wanza; Ndumbaro, Laurean. “Corruption, Politics and Societal Values in Tanzania.” Journal of Social Philosophy, p.50015 However, Kaunda’s Humanism came later and did not attempt the kind of society-altering program as the sweeping ideological narrative of Ujamaa, which sought to shift the rural countryside towards self-sufficient villages based on traditional nostalgia.

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their times in office, when Nyerere stepped down peacefully while

Kenneth Kaunda refused to pass on the presidency, and civil

society pressure rose to unmanageable levels.

From Tanganyika to Tanzania

Tanzania was originally colonized by the Germans in the late

1880s. Like many colonies of the time, German East Africa never

turned a profit and was continually subsidized by the German

treasury. Though there were a number of uprisings that attacked

local German forces and colonial offices, the best remembered was

Maji Maji, a conflict lasting from 1903-1907. Maji Maji resulted

in half a million deaths by war and an intentional famine

perpetrated by the Germans, killing around an eighth of the

population at the time.16 Though unsuccessful in removing the

German colonial presence, Maji Maji is regularly cited by

contemporary Tanzanian politicians to invoke a legacy of anti-

imperialism and resistance to foreign rule.

The United Kingdom took charge of the territory after the

Treaty of Versailles apportioned Germany’s overseas holdings to 16 Iliffe, John. “The Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion,” p.498. Population statistics found at populstat, by Jan Lahmeyer, available at (http://www.populstat.info/Africa/tanzanic.htm )

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World War One’s winners. Britain applied its colonial methodology

of indirect rule, forcing chiefs or their direct underlings to

work for them as tax-collectors and local administrators.

Education of Africa’s best and brightest at European universities

resulted in their radicalization, and students returned home as

anticolonial activists. Tanganyikan Julius Nyerere was one of

these, and upon return home he founded the ultimately successful

Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) to lead his nation to

independence.17

Julius Nyerere’s ruling style can essentially be described

as that of a philosopher-statesman with poor managerial skills,

which, combined with an undereducated civil service, resulted in

a deeply disconnected leadership. Nyerere’s assumption of power

was rather unorthodox; six weeks after independence, he retired

as Prime Minister and handed power to Rashidi Kawawa, before

returning to power in Tanzania’s first free elections. He spent

the next nine months as a backbencher in parliament, developing

his ideology of Ujamaa.18 His successes abroad and anti-17 TANU became Chama cha Mapinduzi in 1977, in a merger with Zanzibar’s rulingAfro-Shirazi Party.18 Hatch, John Charles. “Two African statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania”, p.179-181

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imperialist rhetoric earned him significant respect from

international leaders. Domestically, however, failing to provide

hands-on management, his vision of a self-dependent Tanzania

never came to fruition; the economy stagnated and dipped from the

early 1970s until the early 1990s. State control of the major

industries led to bloated industries and there was a distinct

crisis of leadership and management.

Harking back to a nostalgic vision of a self-sufficient

precolonial African rural life, Ujamaa attempted to reproduce

this in a modern context by creating self-sufficient villages.

These would be initially supported by the government before

community members (organized through the cell structure) were to

take over the running of farms, schools and other local offices.

The failure of Ujamaa can be chalked up to a number of factors,

yet they all point to poor governance and management: shoddy,

occasionally violent implementation; a lack of local initiative;

a lack of educated public workers; the existence of shortcuts for

local bureaucrats to fulfill their quota; and perhaps most

importantly, Nyerere’s failure to sell Ujamaa ideologically to

subordinates and the population at large. Nyerere decided to

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leave office in 1985 after two and a half decades in office,

thanking the people for forgiving his “many mistakes of

commission”.19

Deconstructing a Copper-Chocked Colony

Zambia was originally colonized by settlers from the south,

forming the northern half of Rhodesia in conjunction with modern-

day Zimbabwe. Zambia was never settled to the same degree as

Zimbabwe, and thus faced less resistance during the post-WWII

independence movement. This struggle organized politically in the

mid-20th century under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda.20 Though

he won Zambia’s first nationwide elections, Kenneth Kaunda faced

an impending economic crisis due to the nation’s economic

dependence on copper exports. Zambia is a landlocked nation and

all transportation links ran through white-controlled Rhodesia

and Mozambique, nations which Kaunda actively opposed. A new

route was needed quickly and he found a willing partner in Julius

Nyerere, whom he had got to know through the independence

movements. Nyerere was searching for a way to energize the 19 Nyerere, Julius. Farewell Speech, November 4th, 1985.20 Harry Nkumbula was in fact the first prominent independence leader in Zambia, but his popularity waned when his position became compromised by negotiations with the British.

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Tanzanian economy and aid nearby liberation groups. The Rhodesian

Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith’s white-

minority government in 1965 put further pressure upon Kaunda to

find an alternative path. The same year, Nyerere forged a

financial alliance with the mainland Chinese government to fund

and construct a railway from the Copperbelt to the Tanzanian

coast.

Zambia’s economy rose and fell from then on, as neighboring

civil wars, poor economic policy and falling commodity prices

took their toll on the economy. At the same time, transition to a

one-party state eliminated official opposition. The early 1970s

saw economic growth rise and fall due to changing copper prices.

With the completion of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) in

1978 and the end of conflict in Zimbabwe in 1979, Zambia gained

some political breathing space. However, economic stagnation led

to popular discontent, as Kaunda began taking major loans from

the World Bank and IMF. These loans came with strings attached:

the removal of subsidies and mass trimming of the bloated

government workforce. In 1986, food riots broke out as a result

of a doubling of the price of mealie meal, presenting the first

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major threat to Kaunda’s regime in decades.21 Ultimately,

however, what doomed Kaunda’s presidency was his unwillingness to

negotiate and make way for a multiparty state. Instead, he

stubbornly watched his statist model come crashing down around

him and he fell from power in 1991, after being forced to open

the electoral field to other parties.

The Lost Decade,Strings, and ReformThe stagnation of the 1980s was a result of factors both

external and internal to Africa. Among these are diminishing

commodity prices as well as institutionalization of patronage

networks and the utter failure of independence leaders (and more

often than not, their illegitimate successors) to prevent or

combat corruption in any meaningful way. For this reason, the

1980s in Africa is known as the Lost Decade. In the late 1980s,

Western donors began rethinking their relations with African

21 “AROUND THE WORLD; Food Riots in Zambia; Borders Are Closed.” The New York Times, December 10, 1986. Available at (http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/10/world/around-the-world-food-riots-in-zambia-borders-are-closed.html)

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nations as global communism collapsed. It became clear that they

could no longer politically afford to prop up nepotistic and

undemocratic regimes. As a result, the World Bank and

International Monetary Fund increasingly took center stage in

loaning money to African nations, using neoliberal tactics

(previously adopted in Eastern Europe and Latin America) in an

attempt to restart the stagnant economies in Tanzania and

Zambia.22

As multiparty reforms swept across Africa’s one-party

states, the political arena was opened slightly for opposition

politicians. The opposition attracted disenfranchised ruling-

party members, business leaders and others with personal

vendettas and deep pockets. Because the ruling parties in

Tanzania and Zambia had been in power since independence,

opposition parties focused on issues of good governance and

economic liberalization. For the electorate, multiparty elections

were approached in a similar manner as previous one-party

elections – referendums on whether or not to retain the ruling

party.22 Shaw, Timothy M. “Africa’s Quest for Developmental States: ‘renaissance’ for whom?” Third World Quarterly, 2012, p.848

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Mwinyi and Mkapa

In Tanzania, Nyerere’s decision not to run in the 1985

election helped ensure the political survival of the CCM. His

successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, was chosen based on a combination

of luck and necessity.23 Mwinyi was chosen to lead Zanzibar by

the CCMs National Executive Committee (NEC), which is two-thirds

Tanganyikan.24 Two months later Edward Sokoine, a favorite of the

President and the people, died in a car crash, leaving the

presidential arena wide open. Mwinyi was nominated as the CCM

candidate in the one-party elections of 1985 and took power in

November of that year, as the Tanzanian economy continued to

plummet. President Mwinyi used his decade in office to break

down barriers between the public and private sectors. Reflecting

this, he was known in office as Mzee Rukhsa (translated as “Mr.

Anything Goes”). He deregulated the economy and opened it to

investment. While his break from the economic statism of Nyerere

was welcomed by many, Schroeder points out that this laissez-

faire attitude “was reflected in the rampant corruption of his

23 Bakari, Chapter 3, Political Succession in East African leadership24 A result of the 1977 merger of TANU and ASP.

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regime.”25 Crucially, the 1991 Zanzibar Declaration removed the

restriction of CCM members from engaging in private economic

affairs, freeing them to earn multiple sources of income,

construct residences to rent, gain directorships and buy

stocks.26

Mwinyi’s official moves towards privatization also aimed to

reform the bloated bureaucracies. On his way out of office he

signed the 1995 Public Leadership Code, which instructed public

servants to “not have private interests, other than those

permitted by the Code” and to resolve conflicts of interest in

favor of public interest, yet removed the key article in the 1967

Arusha Declaration that forbade public servants from having other

sources of income.27 It also did not require public servants to

declare their wealth publically, only to report them to a

Secretariat.28 However, Mwinyi did find success in increasing

25 Schroeder, Richard A. “Africa after Apartheid: South Africa, Race and Nation in Tanzania” p.5526 National Executive Committee. May 1, 1991. THE ZANZIBAR DECLARATION. Retrieved from http://www.tzaffairs.org/1991/05/the-zanzibar-declaration/27 Public Leadership Code, 1995. 6d and 6e. “Multi-Party Elections in Africa”,Tanzania: Elections at the Borderland, p.29528 When the Secretariat revealed in 2011 that just over a half of those required to register their wealth and assets had done so, the number shot up to three-quarters the succeeding year. However, it was not made clear whether the numbers checked out.

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investment confidence, and both GDP per capita and foreign direct

investment began rising again in 1994, after falling for

decades.29

From retirement, Mwalimu Nyerere led the nation toward

multiparty democracy. Opposition parties were legalized, and

twelve official opposition parties were registered in early 1993

and 1994. The 1995 elections were important in that they set up

CCM’s position as the still well-trusted founding party while

ostensibly competing as one of several parties in the first

multiparty presidential elections since 1962. Mwinyi peacefully

left office as CCM faced the first real opposition since

independence. Yet the race was complicated by slow voter

registration, the failure of the opposition to provide a united

front, and Nyerere’s national tour.30 Opposition parties largely

campaigned using anticorruption and anti-ruling party rhetoric,

but lacked a strong vision of what to do in the wake of electoral

success.

29 Both statistics are far from perfect indicators of economic health, and FDIis especially skewed with one-time buyoffs, such as foreign corporations buying up a mining operation. Retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/tanzania/foreign-direct-investment . 30 Richey, Lisa, p.80-82

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Brian Cooksey notes that the Mwinyi administration contained

rampant grand corruption and misuse of foreign aid funds.31

Mwinyi’s reforms are generally regarded as having opened the

country up to foreign investment, but there was little sense this

did much to aid most Tanzanians, who still lived below the

poverty line. “The last five years have been ones of unchecked

corruption in high places” said former MP and newspaper chief

Jenerali Ulimwenu in the run-up to the 1995 election. As a

result, all parties, including CCM, ran on anticorruption

tickets.32

CCM's Benjamin Mkapa benefitted from Nyerere’s unofficial

endorsement, cruising to victory on an anti-corruption campaign,

gaining 62% of the votes.33 Like many African leaders elected in

the 1990s, Mkapa found structural reform to be difficult to

implement and he misdiagnosed a number of issues, much like his

predecessor. He began his time in office with high hopes, pushing

31 Cooksey, Brian. “Trends in Corruption during the Mkapa Era – Who Wants to Know?” p.17932 Orr, David. “Poll rivals promise to clean up Tanzania.” The Independent, October 28, 1995. Available at (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/poll-rivals-promise-to-clean-up-tanzania-1579813.html)33 African Elections Database. Retrieved from (http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html)

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through the 1997 Investment Act in an attempt to further open the

economy to outsiders. Mkapa set up a commission to investigate

the state of corruption in Tanzania, which released the

influential Warioba Report in 1996. It was devastating in its

description of government corruption. The 1998 Transparency

International survey, which was the first to include Tanzania,

tied Tanzania with Nigeria at 81st of 85 nations.34 Mkapa forced

the resignation of three ministers in his first term who had been

suspected or indicted of corruption; later he claimed that he was

pressured into one of these firings as a result of political

intrigue.35

Mkapa’s second term in office saw continued growth, but a

continued tepidness in his pursuit of corrupt politicians. At

Benjamin Mkapa’s reelection in 2000, the Economist noted some of

the changes during his first term: “Inflation plunged from over

30% in 1995 to about 6% this year. Most of the state

manufacturing firms have been sold off; utilities are on the

block. After years of neglect, main roads have been repaired. 34 The Corruption Perceptions Index (1998), by Transparency International. 35 Nyanje, Peter. “Tanzania’s Mkapa: My presidency was tough.” Africa Review, November 20, 2013. Retrieved from (http://www.africareview.com/News/Tanzanias-Mkapa-My-presidency-was-tough/-/979180/2080572/-/582vjqz/-/index.html)

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Foreign investment—mainly in mining, tourism and manufacturing—

has increased nine-fold in five years.”36 In an interview

conducted with the BBC, Mkapa diagnosed the roots of corruption

in Africa to be low wages and poor conditions for the police and

judiciary. In the same interview, he claimed to have no evidence

of grand corruption, but that he would take action were such

evidence to come to him.37 It seems unlikely that evidence of his

ministers’ corrupt behavior was that difficult to find – rather,

he would take action only when it was politically advantageous.

Mkapa continued this balancing act throughout his second

term, pressing for the trials of former cabinet members while

getting frightfully close to being implicated in corruption

himself. The following year, the former Minister of Works under

Mwinyi, alongside four co-defendants, was placed on trial for the

alleged loss of Sh2.7bn over two road contracts in 1992 and

1995.38 After nearly two years in court ex-minister Nalaila Kiula

walked free as the judge claimed there was insufficient evidence

36 “A modest success story”, The Economist, October 19th, 200037 “Tanzania is fighting corruption, says Mkapa.” BBC News, May 25, 2000. Retrieved from (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/764224.stm)38 "The Kiula Case." Tanzanian Affairs, September 1, 2001. Retrieved from (http://www.tzaffairs.org/2001/09/the-kiula-case/)

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for a conviction, though Kiula’s former permanent secretary

received a three-year sentence for concealing financial

information.39 In January 2013, Kiula claimed that he was hounded

as a result of rumors that he would be selected for the 1995

Presidential election.40 No one has corroborated this, but it

would align with the history of corruption trials being used for

political persecution.

39 "Ex-Zambian minister cleared of corruption charges." Panapress, April 17, 2003. Retrieved from (http://www.panapress.com/Ex-Zambian-minister-cleared-of-corruption-charges--13-480722-17-lang2-index.html)40 "I was victim of circumstances – Kiula." IPPMedia, January 20, 2013. Retrieved from (http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=50320)

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Chiluba and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy

In Zambia, on the other hand, public frustration with

economic and political stagnation was made into a potent

political force by the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).

The ZCTU galvanized the copper mining sector to challenge Kenneth

Kaunda, whom refused to pass on the presidency within his own

party. The ZCTU had long served as Kaunda’s unofficial

opposition, becoming increasingly vocal during the Lost Decade,

as UNIP’s reforms brought little respite. As Miles Larmer notes,

“the ZCTU consistently criticised UNIP’s implementation of

structural adjustment and economic liberalisation policies…[they]

attacked the increasing influence of the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) and World Bank over the Zambian economy, and the close

relationship between multinational capital and the management of

state-owned corporations.”41 In late 1989, as Soviet satellite

nations fell and a new wave of democratization began spreading

across the globe, Frederick Chiluba became the first prominent

Zambian to question the continuation of the statist Zambian

political system, remarking “If the owners of socialism have

41 Larmer, p294

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withdrawn from the one-party system, who are Africans to continue

with it?...The one-party system is open to abuse.”42

The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy was founded in 1990

with the express intent of dethroning the UNIP, and the following

year and a half saw the incredible destabilization of a once-

strong state. On June 25, riots broke out in Lusaka and spread to

other towns in response to the doubling the price of the staple

food cornmeal (known locally as mealie meal).43 Students took to

the streets demanding Kaunda’s resignation. Separately, a small

group of officers attempted to forcefully dethrone Kaunda,

leading to their arrest.44 The following month, Kaunda legalized

opposition parties, and the MMD was registered within days of the

announcement. The MMD derived their support from urban areas and

union members, winning the 1992 election with three-quarters of

the vote. Once in office, Frederick Chiluba chose a young lawyer

named Levy Mwanawasa to be Vice-President. Chiluba put off

42 Meredith, p40643 “Thousands of Youths Riot in Zambia Over 100% Rise in Price of Corn Meal.” Los Angeles Times, December 10, 1986. Retrieved from (http://articles.latimes.com/1986-12-10/news/mn-2287_1_price-of-corn-meal)44 “3 Reported Slain After Coup Is Crushed: Zambia: Troops fire on a celebrating crowd in the capital. President Kaunda denounces the plotters.” Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1990. Retrieved from (http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-01/news/mn-919_1_coup-plotters)

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privatization of the state’s 284 parastatals for a few years,

instead launching the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) to

increase government capacity, improve ministerial capabilities,

and make the public service “more efficient and responsive” to

the people.45 This was to be accomplished through restructuring,

improving management, and decentralizing and strengthening local

government.46 Yet a wide variety of constraints and inadequacies

in the PSRP’s implementation limited improvements in service

delivery.47

Vice-President Mwanawasa resigned from office in 1994,

making allegations of corruption against MMD politicians. He

claimed that Minister of Health and future President Michael Sata

directed the Director-General of Medical Stores to employ his

relative, and instructed a junior official to pay Sata’s rent.

When Mwanawasa followed through to prosecute, he was shut down by

Chiluba, leading to Mwanawasa’s resignation.48

45 Bwalya, p24746 Ibid.47 Ibid, p.25848 Malupenga, p59. Mwanawasa recounted this in 2008, two years after a viciouselection campaign that pitted him against Michael Sata and his newly-formed Patriotic Front.

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In 2001, Mwanawasa re-entered the national spotlight,

winning the election with the help of his former rival Frederick

Chiluba. Chiluba eventually embraced his protégé-turned-rival,

and enthusiastically campaigned for him until Mwanawasa felt that

“Mr Chiluba wanted to deliver the presidency for me because he

wanted to make sure that he was the boss.”49 Levy Mwanawasa

cracked down on corrupt ministers and started reforming

government institutions. 50 In a move designed to both distance

himself from Chiluba and prove his anticorruption credentials, he

pressed for the prosecution of his predecessor.51 Unlike his

predecessors, President Mwanawasa’s actions outdid his rhetoric,

bringing in a sweeping range of measures to combat corruption in

the nation. He banned senior officials and cabinet ministers from

bidding for government contracts. 52 In 2006, he passed an

electoral law which prevented persons with records of corruption

from elected office.53 These and other reasons suggest that Levy

Mwanawasa was true to the anticorruption fight.49 Malupenga, p.14050 Statistics available at (http://africanelections.tripod.com/zm.html ) 51 Sichalwe, Noel. “Chiluba Asks Court to Warn Mwanawasa” The Post, October 14, 2003. 52 Unfortunately, it seems this was more of a rhetorical move than legally-binding legislation.53 The Electoral Act, No. 12 of 2006. National Assembly of Zambia.

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The Last Few YearsKikwete’s Kickin’ It

In the two decades of multiparty elections in Tanzania,

opposition parties have been unsuccessful in dethroning the CCM.

It is clear that the CCM has benefitted enormously from their

historic dominance, Nyerere’s legacy, and a lack of serious

public scandals. However, CCM has done little to combat systemic

corruption, and most politicians display erratic behavior on the

issue. Corrupt behavior continues to plague the nation and

electoral irregularities continue to emerge.54 Nevertheless,

Julius Nyerere’s legacy continues to provide the CCM with

election victories even as it faces human rights issues, public

relations scandals, poor governance, and ethnic/religious

troubles.

In comparison to Zambia, Tanzania has a more limited range

of NGOs and civil society organizations working on the

anticorruption crusade, and good governance efforts have largely

54 Mostly on the island of Zanzibar. Chadema also alleged fraud in Dar es Salaam. A Freedom House report notes that “on several occasions in 2010 authorities either banned demonstrations or arrested peaceful protestors.”

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come from the government itself. These crusades are mostly

single-leader in their implementation, and are often in response

to foreign loan commitments or campaign pledges. In January 2013,

the African Peer Review Mechanism released its report on

Tanzania, with praise for Tanzanian nationhood but withering

criticism of current leadership.

The National Plan of Action (NPoA) estimated to cost 7.75

billion dollars, would take ‘more than five years,’ has more

acronyms than teeth, and is an indication of talk without

action.55 Another common form of institutionalized corruption are

per diems, by which government employees are given a daily

allowance, usually for going to workshops, conferences and

training camps even when these are part of their job

responsibilities. Government attempts to curb runaway per diems

and unofficial charges were foiled by the 2010 Public Service Pay

and Incentive Policy, whose authors’ noted the resilience of

corrupt practices.

55 Liviga, Athumani Juma. “The APRM Process in Tanzania; Setting the Governance Agenda”, Open Society Foundations. 2013, p.20-22

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On top of stagnant anticorruption efforts, the Tanzanian

political system has begun destabilizing over the past few years,

with scattered outbursts of violence.56 All signs point to a

ruling party not ready to release their grip on the government,

deploying a loyal police force to discourage a rising political

opposition. Most of the mainland’s recent political violence has

taken place at Chadema (opposition) rallies.57 Previously, the

CCM kept power through sheer lack of political opposition.

Holding fraudulent elections was unnecessary when there was only

the CCM candidate. However, a small but growing Tanzanian middle

class based in Northern Tanzania provides a base for Chadema’s

flourishing support, while the wider Tanzanian populace is

growing to believe that CCM no longer prioritizes their

interests. While it is not clear that Chadema (or any other

opposition party) would necessarily be less corrupt than CCM, the

ruling party has proven themselves unwilling to truly tackle the

scourge of corruption.

56 Nkwame, Marc. “Bombs Rock Chadema Rally, Three Feared Dead.” Tanzania DailyNews, June 16, 2013. 57 Chadema stands for Chama cha Demokrasia na Maedeleo, or Party of Democracy and Development

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Copper, the Cobra and the Chinese

Zambian President Mwanawasa became more outspoken throughout

his presidency, but his death in 2008 led to a snap election and

the rule of his uninspiring Vice-President. Shortly before his

death, Mwanawasa defied the long-standing tradition of defending

Zimbabwean liberation leader-turned-dictator Robert Mugabe,

telling a Zimbabwean delegation that “the [Southern African

Development Community] will not always support [Robert

Mugabe]”.58 Mwanawasa also confronted Thabo Mbeki over the

burgeoning issue of Zimbabwe’s violent and fraudulent elections.

In the wake of Mwanawasa’s death, the nation held an emergency

election, pitting vice-President Rupiah Banda against Patriotic

Front chairman Michael Sata. In a leaked cable, the United States

embassy opined that “Neither Sata nor Banda has the leadership or

inclination to follow in the increasingly principled footsteps of

former president Mwanawasa.”59 Rupiah Banda was elected by a tiny

margin, and though Sata alleged voting fraud, he did not contest

58 Wikileaks, US Embassy Lusaka. “08LUSAKA429, SADC EMERGENCY SUMMIT: MWANAWASA TELLS ALL.” April 15, 2008. Retrieved from (http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08LUSAKA429.html)59 “Post-election Zambia: A World of Uncertainty”, US Embassy Lusaka, October 28th, 2008. Available at (http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08LUSAKA1044)

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the election in court. The campaigns were much cleaner than in

2006, likely due to respect for Levy Mwanawasa and a lack of

time, and Sata dropped some of his more virulent rhetoric, even

claiming he would protect Chinese investments if elected. The

election was generally deemed free and fair by outside

observers.60

President Banda set out a half-hearted national anti-

corruption policy the following year.61 The case against

Frederick Chiluba was dropped and the Task Force on Corruption

was disbanded.62 Vice-President George Kunda claimed the

taskforce had become too expensive to maintain; however, the loss

of Western aid resulting from the downsizing suggests

otherwise.63 When pressed by international colleagues on his lack

of commitment to the anticorruption cause, Banda claimed he had

60 “EU Election Observation Mission, Zambia 2006.” EU Election Observation Mission, p.161 Government of Zambia, National anti-corruption policy, 2009. http://www.zambian-economist.com/2009/08/national-anti-corruption-policy-2nd.html62 Though a separate case in England had settled in favor of the prosecution in 2007, and demanded Chiluba repay $58 million to the Zambian treasury. “Zambia disbands anti-graft task force” Reuters, October 30, 2009. 63 Silwamba, Chibaula. “RB will be haunted for removing abuse of office clause” The Post, September 30, 2010. Available at (http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=14170)

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commitments to his constituencies.64 Various claims of corruption

have risen from the Zambian press, insinuating Banda’s role in

typical family-wide corruption.65

The 2011 election was largely a repeat of the 2008 election,

yet this time Michael Sata’s populist slogan of “lower taxes,

full employment and more money in your pocket” proved

successful.66 The press has played a very active role in Zambian

democracy, and has exposed a number of prominent officials

corrupt behavior. However, the press has also been noted for

taking sides during election time, reporting exclusively on the

misdeeds of one candidate or another. The Zambian Watchdog, a

fiery opposition newspaper, became popular for breaking news on

the misdeeds of the ruling MMD elite.67

Change has gone both ways. The range of manners in which

citizens can report corruption has expanded, including landline

64 Silwamba, Chibaula. “Rupiah explains his corruption stance” The Post, September 7, 2011. Available at (http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=22909)65 Carlucci, Paul. “First Family Problems: Zambia’s Former President on Trial”Think Africa Press, September 10, 2013. Available at (http://thinkafricapress.com/zambia/banda-men-trial-corruption)66 “Know your Leading Political Parties” Foundation for Democratic Progress. Available at (http://fodep.blogspot.com/p/know-your-political-parties.html)67 The Zambian Watchdog, whose executive is in self-imposed exile in South Africa, has been criticized routinely for its usage of sources.

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phone, fax, toll free cell numbers, letters and in person. The

Zambian populace seems to be increasingly in support of a vibrant

multiparty democracy with limited presidential powers. Yet Sata

has overseen several unequal pay rises and proved to have a

rather dictatorial temperament, raising his own salary but

clamping down on striking nurses.

The State of Africa There are two clear yet contradictory trends amongst leaders

in Tanzania and Zambia, whom work in deeply corrupt environments.

The prioritization of anticorruption by civil society,

international donors, and presidents has become common place, yet

corruption continues to touch everyone and everything.68 Although

presidents and prime ministers are the ultimate trendsetters in

political systems, they almost always benefit from corruption,

directly or indirectly. The ruling party thrives on corruption

and all lower-level public servants are indoctrinated in systemic

corruption early.69 It would be hard to argue that a majority of

68 The authoritarian nature of government and local political landscape have allowed for a variety of outcomes across the region.69 In Tanzania and Zambia and neighboring countries, the 1990s saw one of fourtypes of methodologies for dealing with multiparty elections: term limit were

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political leaders meant ill for the country; instead, upper-level

public service jobs are seen as requiring stylish suits,

expensive cars and security, both physical and financial. Moving

from economic liberalization and multiparty elections to clean,

accountable governance requires both effective legal bodies and

historical precedents.

Thus, the major differences between systemic corruption in

Tanzania and Zambia are related to the system of governance.

Specifically, Zambia has changed ruling party twice, while one-

party rule has continued in Tanzania under CCM.70 Both nations

have had their share of major corruption scandals and failed

anticorruption programs. However, Zambia is probably in a better

position to formalize the public bureaucracy and create a new

norm of professionalism and anti-graft behaviors. Three political

perspective surveys conducted by Afrobarometer in 2004, 2008 and

2013 show that while popular support for leaders’ waxes and

wanes, there are clear trends supporting increasingly democratic

extended in Zimbabwe, Uganda and Namibia, while dubious elections with handpicked successors emerged in Mozambique70 Understanding the differences between systemic corruption in Tanzania and Zambia is quite tough and is best done so using local news sources and countryexperts.

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attitudes in both nations. This includes support for clean,

multiparty elections, press freedoms, term limits and the

existence of an opposition party.71 Yet how these aspirations are

to be met remains to be seen.

71 Q34 on Round 5 (2013) Zambia – 89% agree well-run elections are more important than an unfavorable outcome, 67% very strongly. Up from Round 4 in 2008 (when 76% agreed, 54% very strongly)

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IIIChina’s Interactions with

AfricaChina’s return to Africa has been arguably the most

important development for the continent since the end of the Cold

War. Between 2000 and 2013 China-Africa trade increased more than

sixteen-fold, showing little sign of letting up as annual trade

passes $200 billion.72 China is not only a comparatively unknown

actor in Africa, but is quite distinct from the European powers

that have dominated Africa for the past several centuries. Where

Western powers have tended to intervene on behalf of economic

interests and political ideals, the Chinese have sought

pragmatic, noninterventionist trade deals with significantly

softer terms. The Chinese have tended to use their historic role

in the anti-imperialist conflicts of the Cold War as a basis for

an alliance modeled on South-South cooperation, (a.k.a. Third

World Solidarity). However, their image in Africa has been

complicated by a comparatively harsh work ethic and accusations

72 “The Chinese are coming…to Africa” The Economist, April 22, 2011.

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of neocolonialism, leading to a wide range of opinions by

Africans on the Chinese role in Africa.

Thus, in pursuit of the implications of Sino-African

partnerships, we will assess China’s global rise and domestic

governance, China’s relations with Africa, and contemporary

African perspectives on their role in Tanzania and Zambia.

Historically, Chinese involvement in Africa began with

revolutionary fervor in the 1960s and 1970s. On the part of the

Chinese, this was a combination of the Cold War and a drive to

gain the necessary votes to take the UN Security Council seat

from Taiwan. The Chinese then retreated from the continent for

the next two decades, as Deng Xiaoping’s reforms turned China’s

gaze inward and Africa’s explicitly anti-imperialist conflicts

drew to a close. As the new millennium began, China burst back

onto the scene with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the

Go Out policy, seeking uncritical global partners for their

extraction and construction industries. Through focusing on four

key sectors of society in Tanzania and Zambia, we will then see

that African perspectives on the Chinese contain a wide range of

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views, but are largely optimistic. We will then conclude with a

few notes on Sino-African dynamism and Western criticism.

The Dragon AwakesSino-African relations have come to fruition considerably

more conspicuously on the African continent than in China. Yet it

is important to understand the movement of Chinese money and

people from the Chinese perspective.73 There are three major

phases in modern Chinese history: Maoist governance (1949-1976);

turmoil and reform (1977-1992); stabilization and global

expansion (1993-today).

Post-revolution consolidation saw the Maoist regime

stabilize the nation under the totalitarian rule of the Chinese

Communist Party. Land reform began with the change of ownership

of large tracts from landlords to the peasant majority. Mao

cracked down on capitalists and those deemed to be antithetical

to the Communist cause, instilling a climate of fear throughout

the elite. By the early 1960s, China had begun to fund global

73 Of course, it goes both ways. Today, there is a quickly growing population of African students in China.

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Marxist groups in colonial Africa. The Cultural Revolution,

running officially from 1965-1968, caused a massive disruption in

rural life, party governance and Chinese industry, as well as

resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. Only with Mao’s death

in 1976 did China begin to move away from Maoist philosophy.

The period of reform, roughly lasting from 1977-1992, was

dominated by Deng Xiaoping and the idea of “socialism with

Chinese characteristics.” Deng pushed through a wide array of

reforms including dismantling of the commune system (that had

largely destroyed agricultural production), liberalizing the

economy and pushing for the ‘four modernizations’. This included

modernization of the economy, of agriculture, of scientific

development and of national defense. While these reforms

unleashed economic growth and a huge expansion in manufacturing,

notably absent was the ‘missing modernization’ – democracy. This

culminated with the Tiananmen Square uprising, when the

government responded to a popular protest group, which included

student activists’ calls for democracy, with a military

crackdown.74 By the time of Deng’s resignation in 1992, China

74 Binyan, Liu. “Deng’s Pyrrhic Victory,” October 2, 1989. P.34

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had moved from isolated, underdeveloped status to that of a

nation on the cusp of breaking into world markets.

Jiang Zemin, whom took over from Deng in 1992, largely

continued Deng’s economic reforms. Jiang did not relinquish the

centralist control of the CPC, but let others within the party

take over economic policy. He also lobbied for entry into the

World Trade Organization, in order to gain wider access to global

trade. The same year, the “Go Out” policy began implementation,

encouraging Chinese companies and entrepreneurs to trade and

invest abroad.75 By the time Jiang handed over power to Hu Jintao

in 2002, China had joined the WTO and begun to accrue foreign

reserves, mostly in the form of US bonds.

Under Hu, Chinese economic growth continued unabated and

reform shifted to the local level as urbanization began putting

enormous pressure on Chinese society. Official opposition

remained stifled, but civic participation evolved into an online

cat-and-mouse game on Weibo (China’s microblogging service),

whereby the state spying services censure certain words and

bloggers come up with clever stand-ins. The 2008 Beijing Olympics75 Ye, Min. “China Invests Overseas: Regulation and Representation” p.176

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brought global respect, but neither that nor economic growth have

stifled the West’s claims of human rights abuses. The Chinese

government, and the Communist Party of China in particular are no

more tolerant of dissent than in the 1980s. Hu pressed for global

initiatives, continuing the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

(FOCAC) begun under Jiang and calling for a ‘peaceful rise,’ that

would ostensibly avoid threatening neighboring nations. Xi

Jinping, whom took over in 2013, has made anti-corruption a

priority in a campaign to refresh the party’s image and make the

‘Chinese Dream’ a distinct possibility for hundreds of millions.

However, he has similarly avoided any real loosening of the one-

party system, signaling national reform is to remain primarily

economic for the time being.

Corruption in Modern China

The central concept behind modern corruption in China is

that of ‘guanxi’, meaning interpersonal networks of influence.

This is essentially a form of social capital, and applies outside

of China’s borders as well as within China.76 Guanxi translates

76 The so-called ‘bamboo network’ is used to describe guanxi relations in the Chinese diaspora.

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into corruption when the requested favor is a corrupt one.

Corruption in China has been declared a major priority of the Xi

administration, and he has announced a wide bundle of minor

reforms to tackle it, including bans on luxury funerals and the

improper use of public vehicles.77 However, the fight against

corruption is, like many things in China, centralized and

unwelcoming of civil advocates. Guanxi is seen as a methodology

for corrupt conduct, rather than a necessary form of social

interaction.78 Thus, it is not that corruption is culturally

inherent to China through guanxi, but rather that corruption is a

product of contemporary Chinese society, and that guanxi is a

popular and well-understood method of corruption.

In Karklins’ typology of corruption in post-communist

regimes, judicial corruption is noted as key to the overall

anticorruption fight, as “the rule of law is at the heart of

democracy, and undermining it severely limits accountability in

all sectors of the state and public life.”79 Yet China is not a

77 “Xi Jinping’s Anticorruption Paradox,” Bloomberg Businessweek, Jan 15, 2014.78 Li, Ling. “Performing Bribery in China: guanxi-practice, corruption with a human face.” P.279 Karklins, Rasma. “Typology of Post-Communist Corruption,” p.24

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democratic nation, and does not currently seek to be so.

Corruption in China is instead characterized by autocratic

selectivity, guanxi networks and the pressures of newly-formed

capitalism. The CPC views most corruption as a scourge that

threatens a functioning bureaucracy, but also understands its

importance in retaining the one-party state. As Deborah Brautigam

points out, “Corruption is widespread in China…yet it has not

derailed economic development.”80 The Chinese government makes a

distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ corruption in their quest to

model development in a one-party state. That which prevents

development or unnecessarily toughens individual or corporate

economic prospects is to be eliminated, while select judicial

corruption which aids the CPC in running the country smoothly is

to be left alone. As this is the current government model of the

PRC, it is also the one most likely to be exported to Africa and

elsewhere.

80 Brautigam, “The Dragon’s Gift.” p.296

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They Arrived From theEast

Sino-African relations are best understood as founded on

global economics and the history of the Non-Aligned and Third

World solidarity movements. The newly-formed People’s Republic of

China was born during a heyday of Cold War hysteria. Staunchly

‘communist’, Mao Zedong forged a new path for his nation through

his interpretation of Marxism; Maoism. Chinese foreign policy

thus placed themselves as a Third World nation, meaning they

sided with neither the United States nor the USSR. However, their

spot on the UN Security Council was taken by the Republic of

China (Taiwan), as recognized by the US and the West. Thus, a

major goal of China’s from the get-go was to drum up support to

take their rightful place on the council, through an election in

the General Assembly.

The 1955 Asian-African conference held in Bandung, Indonesia

was a key moment in the history of Sino-African relations and the

formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Bandung

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Conference advocated a wide range of international policies,

including but not limited to noninterventionism, anti-

imperialism, economic independence and global solidarity. The

Bandung Conference was, in its day and age, a revolutionary

conference, one staffed with leaders whom had often risen through

the anticolonial movement and were determined to see it through.

Sino-African scholar George Yu identified three components

to China’s role in Africa in 1970: the Chinese model; the

superpower struggle; and China’s Third World policy.81 The

Chinese model refers to their historical experiences with both

revolution and development – notably, during Zhou Enlai’s 1964

tour of Africa, he pronounced the continent “ripe for

revolution.”82 The struggle between the United States and the

USSR for military and ideological supremacy was resented hotly by

many developing nations.83 Thus, the reactive force against this

was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), led and staffed by the ‘Third

World.’ These were postcolonial nations, including almost all of

81 Yu, George. China’s Role in Africa. p.9782 This understandably disturbed a number of African leaders, whom considered themselves products of the revolution.83 As an African proverb (heard across multiple cultures) succinctly puts, ‘when the elephants fight, the grass is trampled.’

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Africa and Southern Asia. China sought to become a central

influence in the NAM, but was never granted full membership. Yu’s

three components can thus be understood together as placing China

solidly on the side of independent African nations resisting

American and Soviet interventionism.

Yet the results of these policies were often messy: the

Chinese often supported self-declared Marxists, underdogs that

weren’t already funded by the Soviets, and failed to side with

many ‘winning’ revolutionaries.84 Chinese rhetoric in the early

1960s was fiery and polarizing, likely losing them a number of

potential allies. In 1970, Yu hypothesized that “China can expect

to retain its presence in Africa if it responds to Africa's

changing situation.”85

TAZARA, the Anti-Colonial Railway

The defining piece of Chinese diplomacy in Africa of this

period was their funding and construction of the Tanzania-Zambia

Railway, built to help land-locked Zambia export copper without

84 Especially in wars in Angola and Mozambique, the Chinese struggled to find a group not being supported already by the US or USSR. They then either fundeda small group with no real chance of domination or ‘betrayed the cause’ and sided with an American-supported group.85 Yu, George. “China and Tanzania: a study in cooperative interaction.” 1970.

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benefitting the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and

Mozambique. Kenneth Kaunda pursued Western funding until multiple

reports made it clear that no Western nations had interest in

backing TAZARA, deeming it inefficient and politically motivated.

He thus joined Nyerere in negotiations with the Chinese in early

1965.

In mid-1965, the Chinese government agreed to carry out a

survey on the railway over the next two years. Once completed,

the Chinese then agreed to fund and construct the project in

1967, issuing a concessionary loan that granted Tanzania and

Zambia 15 years to begin paying it back. Between 1970 and 1976,

it is estimated 10,000 Chinese and 40,000 Tanzanians and Zambians

worked on the railway.

After the project was completed, Chinese interactions waned

as domestic reform issues gained momentum. Deng Xiaoping

deprioritized the Third World struggles, and began converting aid

programs into investment. TAZARA was handed over to Tanzanian and

Zambian authorities in the early 1980s, although Chinese advisors

stayed on. The railway’s heyday was shortly after inception, and

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reshaped agricultural development in Southern Tanzania, yet it

failed to live up to its load-bearing capabilities for the

Zambian copper industry. It was periodically injected with

capital and engines were donated by the US and West Germany,

although services continued to decline throughout the 1990s and

2000s. Today, TAZARA’s major issues include long delays,

bureaucratic mismanagement, under-funding and track maintenance.

TAZARA remains most potent as a political symbol rather than an

economic accomplishment, and serves as an incentive for other

African nations to engage with the Chinese on large

infrastructure projects.

From Tiananmen to Today

Tiananmen Square was a transforming moment in Chinese

international relations: the quick condemnation by Western

leaders contrasted sharply with the words of support from African

dictators that had faced similar disdain from the West.86 Many of

these same dictators lost power in the coming elections, yet

their support reminded the Chinese that there was a continent of

similarly-disdained leaders with huge, untapped markets. China

86 Taylor, Ian. “China’s Foreign Policy Towards Africa in the 1990s,” p.443

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began investing in nations whose economies had been ripped open

by structural adjustment packages, and set up the first Forum on

China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 to coordinate expanding

ties.

In 2006, Beijing hosted the third triannual FOCAC meeting

with the highest-ever attendance by African leaders – thirty-five

heads of states, and officials from thirteen more (of 52 total

nations at the time).87 A wide variety of aid was rolled out at

this event, including $5 billion in interest-free loans. Perhaps

the most distinctive result of this conference, however, was not

the economic impact of newly-announced projects, but the global

reaction. This conference sparked a huge wave of Western media

reports and literature, most of it initially intensely negative,

calling out China for supporting Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, who was

terrorizing the Darfur region of Sudan through the notorious

Janjaweed militia. Though many media reports continue to follow

the narrative of a neocolonial China bent on reaping Africa’s

natural resources, the academic literature quickly evolved beyond

this. 87 “FOCAC Beijing Summit” People’s Daily Online. Retrieved from (http://english.people.com.cn/zhuanti/Zhuanti_492.html)

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Chinese policy has also evolved considerably, and the

government has honed a pragmatic approach to political

instability and ambiguity. In Holslag’s analysis of China’s

reaction to five coups across the continent between 2003 and

2010, he notes that China’s response to the coups was guided by

“the strategy of adapting to political realities, rather than

trying to shape them.”88 China considers nonintervention a

central principle in a continent marked by political instability

– a strategy shared by Westerners when they similarly have

significant investments in a nation.

China tends to distribute aid and help through their own

governmental programs and state institutions, rather than

multilateral organizations such as the World Bank. Unfortunately

for contemporary scholars, the Chinese government has been far

from transparent; their definition of aid includes ‘free’

services by Chinese parastatals and large corporations, most

often doing construction work on large infrastructure projects.

Chinese aid entails strict control of funds from start to finish.

Chinese money usually pays for a Chinese company to hire Chinese 88 Holslag, Jonathan. “China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa” p.367

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managers and begin building, bypassing often corrupt and

inefficient African state-owned enterprises. Brautigam breaks

down the two types of ‘aid’ offered by China and the Export-

Import Bank of China (Eximbank) into preferential export buyer’s

credit and concessional loans. The first of these are offered in

foreign currency, mostly to be used to purchase Chinese goods and

services.89 Concessional loans, on the other hand, are issued in

Renminbi with at least 50% of each loan spent on Chinese goods

and services.

Most projects that are funded by the Chinese hire Chinese

firms through competitive bidding, and the resultant employment

is usually managed by Chinese nationals and staffed by African

laborers. Pushback against the Chinese manager/African laborer

system has resulted in negotiation and new frameworks in a number

of countries, with varying degrees of success. In Zambia, the

Chinese have often sought long-term site-specific development,

which requires acquiescence to employee demands.90 Chinese labor

relations in Africa are dependent upon several key factors,

89 Brautigam, p.17390 Lee, Ching Kwan. “Raw Encounters; Chinese Managers, African Workers and thePolitics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves.” P.665

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including long-term vs. short-term investment, profit margins,

and location flexibility. While labor relations between Chinese

managers and African laborers cannot be easily generalized, it is

generally true that projects are majority staffed by African

laborers, whom are paid and treated similarly in non-Chinese

projects.

The Chinese largely focus on large-scale infrastructure

projects are sources of national pride, public confidence, and

economic growth. Economic network projects tend to include road

networks, railways, electrical networks, production facilities,

and various processing plants. This largely began with the TAZARA

railway. Economic network projects provide an economic tool that,

if wielded successfully by governments and businesses, can

further unlock the nations’ economic potential. However, if the

projects are badly mismanaged, they can turn out to be

burdensome. Nationalist symbols at their worst are known as

‘white elephants’ – pits for corrupt politicians to pull cash

from, or projects that are ultimately of little use. In Tanzania,

the Beijing Construction Engineering Company Ltd. is constructing

the Benjamin Mkapa National Stadium, while the Chinese government

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finances around 60% of it.91 Apart from stadiums, the Chinese

have also funded a number of presidential palaces across

Africa.92 These have tended to bring criticism from both

international governments and domestic opposition groups, and

China has not worked on an African presidential palace since

2009.

A quick note should also be made of trade between Africa and

China. While overall export/import is fairly balanced, Africa is

a continent, not a country; thus, oil-producing nations like

Angola export far more than they import from China, while nations

such as Tanzania continue to import in excess of exports to

China. Sino-African trade is imbalanced insofar that China sends

much more value-added products, demanding more skilled Chinese

workers, while mining Africa’s surface for various commodities.93

Perhaps the most badly-hit industry has been textiles; cheap

Chinese imports caused such an uproar in South Africa, a quota

91 “National Stadium handed over” Daily News, July 4, 2013.92 China aided in the funding or construction of presidential palaces in Cote D’Ivoire (2002), Namibia and Togo (2003), Comoros (2005), Guinea (2006), Sudan(2007), Burundi (2008), Guinea Bissau (2009).93 Konings, Piet. China and Africa: Building a Strategic Partnership. p357

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was installed.94 One of the first and still most common

criticisms of the Chinese in Africa is that they are

neocolonialists, coming to reap the abundant natural resources of

the continent; nearly 90% of Chinese imports from the continent

are raw materials, and the Chinese are currently on a global

chase for commodities.

As well, China’s moves in Africa are not just profit-seeking

businesses. Cultural cooperation between China and Africa

consists not only of travelling troupes of entertainers but also

academic cooperation, namely through the China-Africa Think Tanks

Forum and the China-Africa joint research and exchange program.

Most of these programs exist almost entirely as part of the tri-

annual meetings, and accomplish little outside of them. Chinese

medicine has become popular across the continent, and traditional

Chinese medicine clinics can be found in both Zambia and

Tanzania. According to Elizabeth Hsu’s study of Chinese clinics

in Tanzania, they are profit-oriented – i.e. they are businesses.

Popular respect for dawa ya Kichina (Chinese medicine) likely stems

from the clinics that set up during construction of TAZARA in the94 Naude, W., & Rossouw, R. (2008). South African quotas on textile imports from China: A policy error? Journal of Policy Modeling, p.743

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1970s.95 These clinics tend to combine traditional Chinese

medicine and modern medicine; such as traditional herbs in

capsule form. In Zambia, these clinics can be found in Lusaka and

in the Copperbelt, and are patronized by both Zambians and

Chinese immigrants.96

It is also useful to discuss the growing number of Africans

studying at Chinese universities. The Chinese began recruiting

Africans in the 1950s, but as the first account of this suggests,

everything from the academic environment to treatment by the

Chinese public was problematic.97 In 2009 it was estimated there

were over 12,000 African students in China, and 20,000 in 2011.98

The Chinese support scholarships for these students for a number

of reasons, top amongst them being to improve their image in

Africa and to increase the number of Chinese-speaking Africans.

However, some students report being disappointed by the quality

of study China has to offer.99 95 Hsu, Elizabeth. “The medicine from China has rapid effects”: Chinese medicine patients in Tanzania, p29596 Gadzala, Aleksandra W. “From formal- to informal-sector employment: examining the Chinese presence in Zambia.” P.4697 Hevi, Emmanuel John. ”An African Student in China.” 196398 “Statistics of International Students in China in 2011” Study In China, February 29, 2012. Retrieved from (http://www.csc.edu.cn/laihua/newsdetailen.aspx?cid=122&id=1399)99 Haugen, “China’s Recruitment of African University Students” p.314

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Thus, it can be understood that the majority of programs

intending to build socio-cultural links between China and Africa

are designed as public relations distractions by the Chinese

government.100 Currently, Sino-African ties are also aided by the

appearance of Confucius Institutions, which teach Chinese in

various African universities. Thirst by the Chinese nouveau riche

for art resulted in a successful exposition of Tanzanian Tinga

Tinga art in September, 2012.101 Export of Chinese culture has

been much less successful, although Chinese radio and TV channels

are increasingly available throughout Africa.

The Chinese are well renowned for their lack of criticism

towards modern-day partners – not since the 1970s has the Chinese

government openly condemned a new African regime. They make it

abundantly clear there is only one requirement of their

friendship: the One-China policy, i.e. the recognition of the PRC

and not Taiwan. Since 1995, ten African nations have switched

allegiance to the PRC, leaving autocratic Swaziland the sole

100 There is no reason, however, to believe more grassroots movements won’t arrive in the coming years.101 “Tanzanian Artist Proves Success in China” Tanzania Daily News. Available at (http://dailynews.co.tz/index.php/features/popular-features/15633-tanzanian-artist-proves-success-in-china)

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friend of Taiwan on the continent.102 China's changing political

relations has two major goals in Africa: to enhance economic

relations and to legitimize the Chinese role on the world stage.

The Chinese government is well known for the lavish

attention it pays to guests and hosts. Chinese officials attend

inaugurations, congratulate leaders on their elections and/or

offer small donations of aid to those looking to keep new regimes

afloat.103 While China’s African policies during the Cold War were

generally stringent, fiery and non-negotiating, they have changed

considerably. China’s role in Africa has become notably more

flexible since Deng’s reforms and the Go Out policy came into

effect.

The re-emergence of China as a world power is likely the

most significant trend since the end of the Cold War. The 2000

Beijing Declaration states that “the universality of human rights

and fundamental freedoms should be respected…” yet “[each]

country has the right to choose, in its course of development,

its own social system, development model and way of life in light

102 “Taiwan has some sketchy friends” GlobalPost, July 10, 2012.103 Holslag, 371-374. The Chinese offered Rajoelina’s Madagascar $30m in cyclone relief, and an unknown sum to the Nigerien coup leaders of 2010.

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of its national conditions.” This accurately summarizes the

simultaneous deference to the global value of human rights and

state-by-state interpretation of such values. At this time,

Tanzania had opened up its political system without changing

parties, while the opposition had gained power in Zambia. These

changes, not necessarily irreversible, have led the political

systems of Africa and China down divergent paths.

The discussion of human rights should also be considered in

terms of contrasting cultural values: Western individualism

versus Chinese notions of social duties. Ian Taylor breaks this

down further, explaining that the difference lies in the West’s

focus on political rights, compared to China’s focus on socio-

economic rights.104 This, then, betrays a difference in

priorities; Western democracy or Chinese development? The

Chinese have not made it an official goal to sway African nations

away from democratic practices; a large part of their

attractiveness to Africans lies in their silence on domestic

issues. This silence is a welcoming respite from the unwelcome

advice of Western diplomats and NGOs. Chinese silence is not

104 Taylor, Ian. “Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights”

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limited to electoral issues but all governance. A number of

African leaders have specifically chosen Chinese aid deals over

Western ones in order to avoid the political requirements

attached to Western loans.

China regularly supports an array of African leaders in

international global organizations, including the UN and the

African Union (AU). In 2012, Hu Jintao and Ethiopian President

Meles Zenawi opened the new Chinese-built African Union

headquarters in Addis Ababa. Chinese support in international

institutions is largely based on rhetoric of South-South

cooperation.105 However, the Chinese have a tendency to bypass

regional and international organizations in pursuit of bilateral

relations, which provide a much more direct route to cooperation.

African Eyes on ChinaChinese presence in Africa is often competitive and

contentious; for the majority of Africans, the Chinese exist

through imported products and various headlines. However, more

105 This is essentially identical to Third World Solidarity in terms of participating nations, but more focused on trade

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and more Africans are working one-on-one with Chinese, be they

building roads, haggling in the markets or mining minerals. It is

impossible to generalize African sentiments towards the Chinese,

but it is possible to note developments between the Chinese and a

few sectors of African societies. In order to analyze the

interaction between the Chinese and the socio-political

landscapes in Tanzania and Zambia, it is useful to examine four

major sectors of African societies: political elites, business

elites, civil society and the public.106 Public sentiment towards

the Chinese, according to a Pew survey, is overall quite positive

across the continent: over 90% of the populations in Ivory Coast,

Mali and Kenya in 2007 found China’s growing economy to be a good

thing for their nations.107 This may be because Africans view

Western economic domination as having had overall deeply negative

effects on their nations. However, opinions have cooled slightly

on the Chinese across Africa, positive impressions down 3-5% in

African nations polled in 2013 compared with the same countries

in 2007.108 In Zambia, the public’s view of the Chinese has 106 For purposes of this analysis, the public refers to the civil population that does not consist of elites or civil society leaders.107 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, How the World Sees China. Available at(http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/12/11/how-the-world-sees-china/)108 Pew Global Attitudes Project surveys.

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fluctuated considerably since their entry in the late 1990s,

especially since Sata’s opportunistic usage of the Chinese as a

political punching bag in the 2006 election. While anti-Chinese

sentiment rose to an all-time high in the wake of the election,

it has since settled as rhetoric cooled and new negotiations saw

better conditions for Zambians working under Chinese.109

Civil society in Africa includes groups most concerned about

Chinese partnership – many civil society organizations have

financial or ideological connections to the West, and oppose

China on account of their human rights record. Religious

organizations are the most powerful players in civil society in

most African nations, but they have largely kept out of the

debate over the Chinese (exceptions include Desmond Tutu, a

strong critic of the Chinese government).110 Trade unions have

been the most deeply involved in dealing with the new Chinese

presence on the continent, but success in negotiating with the

Chinese has varied. In most cases, trade unions have found the

109 Larmer, Miles; Fraser, Alistair. “Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia’s 2006 Election” 2007. p.629110 Tutu, Desmond; Guangcheng, Chen. “A Year for Human Rights in China” Huffington Post, June 3, 2013.

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Chinese to be manageable partners and flexible negotiators, and

welcome Chinese investment.111

Most simply and obviously, African political leaders view

China as a cooperative and generous economic partner, as well as

a welcome respite from demanding Western donors. The lack of

conditionality is enticing, especially those with undemocratic

processes. The 2006 Zambian election had notable anti-Chinese

rhetoric, though most politicians view the Chinese as an economic

necessity. African business leaders mostly seem to view the

Chinese positively, as they bring enormous deals to the continent

– however, some view the Chinese as dangerous competition. Cheap

Chinese exports, often counterfeit, have had detrimental effects

on a few African industries.112 In both Tanzania and Zambia,

cheap, mostly small-scale Chinese companies have competed with

and often undermined local traders.113

Watching From the Swahili Coast

111 Kragelund, Peter. “Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure? Chinese Investments in the Zambian Mining and Construction Sectors” 2009, p.646112 Wei, Huang. “Free to Choose” November 2, 2006. p.2113 Interview with author, Zambian shopkeeper, Lusaka, July 22nd, 2013.

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The Chinese presence in Tanzania is much less controversial

than in Zambia. With a numerically small presence, the Chinese

migrants in Tanzania have remained located either in project site

camps or in coastal Dar es Salaam. The only available poll on the

popularity of the Chinese in Tanzania is one from 2007, which

noted that 70% of Tanzanians had a favorable view of China, while

78% viewed Chinese influence positively.114

In Dar es Salaam, Chinese entrepreneurs have become a

noticeable presence in Kariakoo, a market district where they

have formed a Kariakoo Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Most of the

Chinese nationals running small businesses are engaging in it

illegally, as they are unable to fulfill the 1997 requirement of

$100,000 minimum capital investment.115 Resentment towards these

small shop-owners by Tanzanians grew sufficiently, so that in

January 2011 the Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and Marketing

gave Chinese businesses a 30-day ultimatum to leave Kariakoo.116

However, nothing came of this. Three years later, the newly-

114 Pew Survey, How the World Sees China. (http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/12/11/how-the-world-sees-china/)115 “Traders in Tanzania seek rescue from illegal Chinese vendors,” by African Topics. August 21, 2013116 “Govt plans making Kariakoo re-export centre – Nyalandu” by IPP Media. January 7, 2011.

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formed Kariakoo Chinese Chamber of Commerce (KCCC) had all two

hundred members pledge to adhere to Tanzanian product quality and

tax laws. The KCCC stated they would “pay all taxes in accordance

with the law” and treat workers well.117 Thus, resentment from

local traders in Tanzania has not been taken up seriously by the

Tanzanian government, and Chinese traders are instead taking the

initiative to bridge the gap.

Civil society in Tanzania consists of religious groups,

various NGOs and a few weakened unions. Religious groups have

kept out of the discussion over the Chinese. There are also those

that are deeply irritated by Chinese involvement in illegal

smuggling, especially ivory. Though the Chinese government

condemns it, there are still Chinese citizens that find it to be

a lucrative business – in November 2013, 1.8 tons of ivory was

discovered at the home of a Chinese national in Dar, and three

Chinese nationals were arrested.118

117 “Chamber pledges to ensure high quality products” by The Citizen. January 23, 2014.118 Heath, Kevin. “1.8 tonnes of ivory found in Chinese home in Tanzania.” Wildlife News, November 3, 2013. Available at (http://www.spaceforgiants.org/?q=ele-news/18-tonnes-of-ivory-found-in-chinese-home-in-tanzania)

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Politicians from the ruling CCM party largely seem to

appreciate the role the Chinese have played in the revitalization

of the Tanzanian economy. Relations between the CCM and Communist

Party of China (CPC) go back half a century, and they regularly

visit each other’s nations.119 They have a number of common

interests: economic growth through South-South trade; the success

of alternative development models; and the most troublesome –

their respective political parties being synonymous with the

state. In September, 2013, the Chinese ambassador Lu Youqing

attended a CCM political rally in Shinyanga region. At the rally,

he announced a plan for cotton investment in the area, including

cotton processing, livestock processing and an agricultural

college.120 The issue caused a small outrage in the private press,

and opposition party Chadema announced they would write letters

to the Tanzanian and Chinese governments to register their

complaint, saying Lu intentionally violated the Vienna Convention

on Diplomatic Relations.121 It seems the Chinese view governance

in Tanzania as essentially a one-party state like their own.

119 Including a Chinese delegation in Tanzania in 2011 and vice versa in 2013120 Machira, P., & Nyanje, P. (2013, September 17). China envoy at CCM rally irks Chadema121 Ibid.

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To Chadema, the Chinese present a legitimate business

opportunity, but one that has largely benefitted CCM at the

expense of the nation (and it’s democracy). However, unlike the

Patriotic Front under Michael Sata, they have avoided using

xenophobic or Sinophobic rhetoric in their quest to gain power.

Instead, Chadema’s critique of the ruling party focuses on CCM’s

corrupt and ineffective leadership.

Possibly the biggest issue in private business relations

between Tanzania and China has been quality control and the

‘flooding’ of Chinese goods into the Tanzanian marketplace. There

is resentment on the part of small-scale Tanzanian entrepreneurs

that are forced to compete with cheap Chinese goods in local

markets.122 The Chinese have long recognized their ‘quality

problem.’ During the 2008 infant formula powder scare in China,

when Tanzania banned these imports, the same product was smuggled

through the ban into the black market, potentially affecting

thousands of young Tanzanians.123 What unites businessmen and

122 Most notably, when the deputy industry minister threatened to kick Chinese vendors out of the Kariakoo market in Dar es Salaam, in January 2011. No action was taken.123 McGregor, Sarah. “Tanzania Seizes Chinese Milk-Powder Imports After Imposing Ban.” Bloomberg News, September 23, 2008. Schoder, Dagmar. “Melamine Milk Powder and Infant Formula Sold in East Africa” Journal of Food Protection, 2010.

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entrepreneurs in Tanzania in support of the Chinese is their work

in infrastructure. In 2011, Sichuan Hongda got on board with a

$3bn deal that will involve the construction of a coal mine, an

iron ore mine and a thermal power station.124 All told, Chinese

companies are involved in building or supporting every major form

of national infrastructure, and this is likely to only win them

more friends and fans in the Tanzanian business sector.

Zambian Stares

Public opinion of the Chinese in Zambia has fluctuated

intensely over the past 15 years – Michael Sata’s rhetoric in the

2006 election elevated the issue of the Chinese presence to one

bordering on violent xenophobia, before abandoning this tactic in

favor of economic partnership with the Chinese. Since then, the

Zambian public’s view of the Chinese has been dominated by their

perceived labor relations and their role in the Zambian economy.

Disputes over minimum wage and labor conditions in the mining

sector have turned violent on multiple occasions. Thus, while

initial reaction to the Chinese could be described as trepidation

p.1710124 Anthony, Ross. “Infrastructure and Influence: China’s presence on the coastof East Africa.” 2013, p.135

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growing into outright hostility, Zambians have since become

accustomed to their presence in the shops and mines, and now tend

to view them largely as economic partners.125

There are a wide range of civil society actors in Zambia, in

comparison to Tanzania’s more modest offerings. The most

influential actors in Zambia’s civil society are the Church, the

unions and various NGOs. The unions’ strength comes from their

role in the Copperbelt, powering Zambia’s major industry. The

Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) is the oldest, continues to

represent a majority of miners, and was instrumental in the

electoral success of the MMD in 1991. Transparency International

Zambia has also been vocal, but has largely kept from criticizing

or endorsing the Chinese.

Chinese interactions with the MUZ, Zambia’s largest and most

relevant union, have been rocky as Chinese engagement in the

Copperbelt deepens. Carmody et al., consider Chinese actors to be

provoking violence in Zambia, through their labor policies and

political behavior.126 Leading the debate has been questions over

125 Kopinski et al. p.190126 Carmody, Padraig; Taylor, Ian. “Flexigemony and Force in China’s Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Sudan and Zambia Compared” 2010.

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labor relations and a number of violent incidents that have

disproportionately raised the international profile of Chinese-

owned mines. These incidents began in 2005 with an accident at an

explosives plant that killed 49 Zambian workers, highlighting

conditions faced by workers in the Copperbelt. The following

year, a wage dispute escalated into a shooting; both police and

Chinese managers seem to have shot at strikers.127 Over the next

several years, acts of violence continued to occur at strikes,

and the Zambian government continued to half-heartedly intervene.

In 2011, NFCA Mining fired around two thousand workers striking

over wages – they were shortly reinstated after pressure was put

on the Chinese by the Zambian government.128 It seems likely that

while the unions are engaged in bitter disputes with the Chinese,

they realize the necessity of negotiation, and do not view a

Chinese exodus as a viable option.

Zambian political elites are largely in line with their

neighbors views of China; the Asian nation is seen as an

enormous, largely unquestioning business opportunity. However, as

127 “Workers shot during Zambia mine riots” by Mail & Guardian, 26 July, 2006.128 “NFCA Mining in Chambishi re-instates the fired workers.” By Lusaka Times, October 21, 2011.

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Sino-Zambian relations moved quickly over the past decade,

Michael Sata led the pack in revolutionizing usage of the Chinese

for political gain. At first, he called the Chinese out for being

“infesters, not investors” during the 2006 campaign, essentially

turning the election into a referendum on the Chinese.129 When

this tactic failed to gain him the presidency, Sata instead

turned towards a more generally populist stance, positioning

himself as a defender of the working man. Sata’s penchant for

public spectacles continues, and he has used his position as

president to personally lambast various Chinese contractors for

less than satisfactory progress.

Around three-quarters of Chinese investment in Zambia has

been in the mining sector, but Chinese companies, especially

private ones, have continually diversified since the 1990s.130

Chinese investment pledges through the Zambian Development Agency

have reached $300m in the manufacturing sector alone.131 The

Chinese are involved in building and upgrading roads, railways,

129 To see a full discussion of the 2006 election and the xenophobic rhetoric employed by Michael Sata, read “Of Cabbages and King Cobra” by Larmer and Fraser.130 Kragelund, p.484131 Ibid.

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hydropower stations, stadiums, transmitters and more.132

Currently, various Chinese contractors are hard at work

fulfilling the Link Zambia project, which will see the

construction or paving of 8000 kilometers of road. Broken up into

a number of smaller projects, Chinese companies bid against

others from Zambia and South Africa to win government

contracts.133

Zambian business elites perspectives on the Chinese vary by

industry between mining, construction, agriculture and

manufacturing. Mining companies view them as one of several large

investors in the mines (despite all appearances, the Swiss are

the largest investors in the Copperbelt), yet more volatile in

terms of local reactions. Chinese companies win around three-

quarters of infrastructure project contracts, and are thus viewed

as fierce competition. 134 In response, local companies are

pairing up with South African and British companies in bidding

132 For a complete list of Chinese projects in Zambia, visit china.aiddata.org133 Named companies include Reubex, Copperfields Mining Services and Nyatsi Zambian Ltd. Mwapa, Isaac. Interview with author at the Road Development Agency, July 22nd, 2013.134 Hairong, Yan; Sautman, Barry, “Small Chinese Activities in Zambia: More than Just Mining” p.6

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wars for Link Zambia 8000 projects, which are vastly expanding

Zambia’s road network.135

ConclusionChinese relations with African nations began under highly

ideological conditions during the Cold War, and have evolved

considerably since then towards a pragmatic, non-intervening

trade-based foreign policy. Sino-African relations are dynamic,

and though they are largely government-led, they include many

outside the state and a wide range of investments and actors.

Chinese rhetoric of South-South cooperation is legitimized

somewhat by their dealings on the continent. However, Chinese

migrants continue to cut themselves off from Africans, and could

benefit both personally and economically from improved relations

in this region. Chinese cultural exports continue to underperform

abroad.

Western media reports can skew the image, in subtle and

less-subtle manners. The Economist, for example, published three

separate articles between 2010 and 2012 entitled “The Chinese are

135 Interview with author, RDA official, July 2013.

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coming…” on the expansions of Chinese tourism, Sino-African trade

and media.136. If one followed only Western news, one would likely

be under the impression that China dominates the Zambian copper

sector and is widely despised for their horrid working

conditions. This is exacerbated by human rights NGOs which tend

to view the Chinese as inherently dictatorial and dismissive of

labor and human rights, while ignoring similar violations by

Western firms. In order to gain a more accurate view of the

Chinese presence in Africa, it is important to focus on very

recent research (since 2008) and African media sources, as well

as seek out both governmental and nongovernmental reports.

Thus, Sino-African history is based largely on the political

conflicts of the Cold War and the African economic renaissance of

today. Though buffeted much by the harsh winds of imperialism,

Africans continue to exercise their agency in choosing leaders

and allies, limited options though they may be. China and

Africa’s success in overcoming their histories of global

oppression and underdevelopment is yet to be played out, but an

136 The Economist. “Chinese tourism in Britain: The Chinese are coming.” December 29, 2010. “Banyan: The Chinese are coming,” March 4th, 2010. “Chinesein Africa: The Chinese are coming…to Africa” April 22nd, 2011.

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economic partnership without their former colonial masters is a

step in the right direction.

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IVBuilding the Chinese DreamThe economic partnership between Africa and China has been

the driving force behind the renaissance of Sino-African

relations, above and beyond any political considerations. China

has proven its interest in a long-term business partnership, and

has engaged in sincere South-South cooperation in both Tanzania

and Zambia – although some serious issues have surfaced. After

staunch growth for the past three decades, the Chinese economy is

resource-hungry, and unprecedented levels of foreign reserves are

forcing the Chinese to invest wherever they can.137 African

nations, on the other hand, are coming out of two decades of

Western-led economic and political reforms that have led to

unprecedented economic openness, which the Chinese have taken

advantage of. Thus, while Chinese investment is by and large a

very positive development for the continent, there is often

137 “China to Use Forex Reserves to Finance Overseas Investment Deals,” Bloomberg News, January 14, 2013. Retrieved from (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-14/china-to-use-forex-reserves-to-finance-overseas-investment-deals.html)

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inadequate enforcement of labor, safety, and environmental

regulations by African governments.

This chapter will analyze these burgeoning economic ties.

First, the state of Sino-Tanzanian and Sino-Zambian economic

relations will be broken down into extraction, construction,

investment and immigrant activities. Then a wide variety of

issues with Chinese business will be reviewed, ranging from

Chinese immigrants involved in poaching ivory to an unintentional

destabilization of the East African Community (EAC). Finally,

this chapter will sum up the impact of Sino-Africa’s multifaceted

business relations, concluding that China’s most beneficial role

in Tanzania and Zambia has been support for their infrastructure

projects and investment diversification.

What is China Looking for in Africa?

Chinese-African trade is, in fact, only one part of a global

strategy that is directing Chinese businesses to invest, extract,

and expand at unprecedented levels.138 In terms of resources, oil

138 Brautigam, p.279. Also, in Joshua Eisenman’s breakdown of China-Africa trade, he concludes that five causal factors drive the trade: Africa’s plentiful national resources; China’s comparative advantage in manufacturing; rapid Chinese growth; China’s emphasis on, and Africa’s needs of, infrastructure-building; and China’s formation of massive shipping and light

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makes up an estimated two-thirds of Chinese-African trade,

dominating relations with oil exporters yet not affecting oil-

less Tanzania and Zambia.139 Metals are next; the Chinese are

engaged in large operations extracting cobalt from the DRC,

copper from Zambia and uranium from Niger. On the other hand,

China’s foreign reserve surplus has been behind rapidly expanding

investment in African infrastructure, manufacturing, and banking.

What do African Nations Want from China?

African nations want reliable and fair trading partners that

invest in diverse industries and infrastructure projects. There

are several major obstacles to economic development in Africa,

including but not limited to poor governance, inadequate

infrastructure and resource dependence. Of these, infrastructure

development has been the major beneficiary of Chinese investment.

Chinese export-import businesses have begun by focusing on the

continent’s resources, but are expanding to other industries.

Infrastructure is key to development in Africa, and is the

largest area of investment for Chinese companies in Tanzania. A

manufacturing industries.139 Kelley, Jeremy. “China in Africa: Curing the Resource Curse with Infrastructure and Modernization” p.38

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2013 World Bank report estimated adequate infrastructure could

bring productivity levels up 40% across the continent.140

Businesses need a reliable supply of electricity and transport

networks to manufacture and ship goods. Private citizens also

benefit directly from paved roads, electricity and clean water

supplies.

Tanzania’s most pressing development issues lie in its poor

infrastructure, educational system, and poor local governance.

Tanzania’s dismal education system can only be aided by the

Chinese with the construction of schools and educational advice;

the real reform must be enacted by the Tanzanian political

elite.141 The Chinese will not directly act to improve Tanzanian

local governance or to reduce local corruption as part of their

economic engagement.142 China’s most useful role in Tanzania has

been in the form of infrastructure development, including working

140 This includes telecom networks, electricity networks, railways, ports and roads. “The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013,” p.69141 The Tanzanian public educational system is linguistically fractured; primary schools are in Swahili, while secondary and onwards are in English. The transition between primary and secondary schools is handled poorly, and many Tanzanians fail to make much of secondary education, as their English-language courses are insufficient.142 The Chinese could certainly have a policy of ‘do no harm’ and come down strongly on Chinese that engage in local corruption.

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with the port system, road construction and other general

infrastructure.

Zambia needs roads and economic diversification; since its

creation as a nation-state, Zambia’s economy has been dominated

by the copper industry, leaving it vulnerable to commodity price

fluctuations. Additionally, Zambia’s position as a landlocked

state makes transportation links incredibly important. China has

thus played a similar role in taking on Zambia’s infrastructure

deficit, and has additionally aided in investment

diversification.

The Role of Diasporas

Though Sino-African trade is still dominated by government

loans and state-owned enterprises, immigrants are playing an

increasingly important role in developing trade links between the

subcontinents. Away from the five-star hotel meetings and Sinopec

board meetings, thousands of Chinese are moving to Tanzania and

Zambia as economic migrants. They come largely to escape the rat

race, and to make a few quick bucks before going home to start or

rejoin a family with new savings.143 Though their English and 143 Interview, Bank of China, Lusaka.

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Swahili language skills are often sorely lacking, they learn to

get the message across in mines and markets, and shop employees

learn to understand their pidgin English.144 The size of China’s

immigrant population is poorly documented – a reasonable estimate

puts it at 60,000 in Zambia – but it is clear the diaspora in

Zambia is larger than Tanzania and continuing to increase.

Estimates for Tanzania range from mere hundreds to tens of

thousands.

Tens of thousands of African university students and

immigrants in China have been central to the creation of trade

links between the continent and the country.145 The Chinese

government offers scholarships to African students, and many from

the new middle classes see China as a cheaper alternative to a

Western degree.146 In a 2011 study, Heidi Haugen found that

“Africans may arrive in China as students and leave the country

as traders in Chinese goods as they compensate for

dissatisfaction with the academic experience by entering into

144 Authors’ observations, Lusaka, Zambia.145 David Leblang’s article “Familiarity Breeds Investment” found diaspora networks have a significantly positive effect on cross-border trade.146 As well, Chinese universities are well-advertised in Africa. Haugen, “China’s Recruitment of African University Students” p.315

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business.”147 In 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Education put the

total number of African students in China at 27,052.148

147 Haugen, p.332148 To compare, there were just over thirty thousand in the US a year before. Retrieved from (http://www.campusexplorer.com/college-advice-tips/E311AB9D/African-International-Students/)

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Resources for Infrastructure?

It is common for Western observers to sum up Chinese-African

trade relationships as African resources being traded for Chinese

infrastructure (or investment). In Chan-Fishel et al.’s study of

Chinese deals in four African nations, the authors support a

model of resources for investment (referred to as R4I). While

noting “Beijing is not the only country on the Continent offering

aid and investment in exchange for natural resources,” they

caution African leaders looking to play Chinese and Western

companies off each other in search of a better deal.149 It should

also be noted that this report is nearly seven years out of date.

Chinese extraction efforts and infrastructure building are

large themes in Sino-African relations, yet a resources-for-

infrastructure model tends to cloud over other important aspects

of their relations. The Chinese government has sent tens of

thousands of health workers and engineers to the continent, and

thousands of private citizens are migrating annually for business

reasons. The rhetoric and actions of Chinese officials paint a

149 Chan-Fishel, Michelle; Lawson, Roxanne. “Quid Pro Quo? China’s Investment-for-Resource Swaps in Africa” 2007 p.

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government genuinely interested in South-South cooperation and

mutual development.

The lynchpin of the claim that the Chinese are

neocolonialists is the idea that China is exploiting Africa in

its quest for resources. At face value, a comparison of European

colonialism and Chinese expansion is deeply misleading. The

Chinese pay for resources and do not have the Wests’ historical

baggage of centuries of unequal and deeply exploitative dealings

with Africa. The Chinese policy of noninterventionism is the

antithesis of historic Western policy. When journalist Wu Yi

responded to Jane Goodall’s accusation that “China is merely

doing what the colonialists did,” he pointed out that the Chinese

feared similar Western exploitation when their economy was opened

in the 1980s. Instead, “China took the opportunity of dealing

with developed economies, and became what it is now.”150 While

this view clearly emphasizes the Chinese approach (a solid work

ethic laced with pragmatism), it also highlights Chinese optimism

for Africa, an attitude rarely shared by Western authorities.

This is not to say that Chinese racism doesn’t exist; it is a 150 “Goodall wiser on chimps than ‘colonialism’” Global Times, February 23, 2014.

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disturbingly common trait amongst Chinese peoples, both at home

and abroad.151 But this does not necessarily constitute

exploitation.

All Roads Lead ToLusaka

Chinese business in Zambia is a mixed bag. China’s

involvement in the Zambian economy is still focused in the

Copperbelt Province on copper extraction and smelting, but is

diversifying into manufacturing and construction. Chinese

economic involvement in Zambia is led by Chinese SOEs and large

private companies, as well as the Chinese government’s offer of

loans. However, the growing Chinese diaspora has vastly

complicated and diversified Sino-Zambian business ties.

What Business?

Extraction

151 “Michael”, a Chinese trader the author interviewed in Kasama, Zambia, called Zambians “lazy” and “unhygienic” after attempting to relate to the author’s skin tone. The only local friends any immigrant had was their colleagues.

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Chinese-Zambian relations took off largely on the back of

several investments in Zambia’s previously-dormant copper mines

made in the late 1990s and early 2000s. High global commodity

prices have made for profitable business, and the Chinese have

expanded from extraction into processing and smelting in Zambia.

Most Chinese investment in Zambian extraction industries is

through the China Non-ferrous Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC),

but there are also a few scattered private organizations. Chinese

mining has been amongst the most controversial of their

operations in the country, and miners’ wage disputes have given

rise to violence.

Chinese state-owned investments in the Zambian copper

industry consist of two mines, a smelting plant, a processing

plant, and processing facilities. CNMC began by buying the

Chambishi mine in 1998, during Chiluba’s privatization drive.

Purchased for $25 million, CNMC invested $125 million in its

renewal, reopening it in 2003 to fanfare.152 CNMC opened Sino

Metals three years later, providing “lower-level processing into

152 Human Rights Watch; “You’ll Be Fired if You Refuse”; Labor Abuses in Zambia’s Chinese state-owned Copper Mines, 2011.

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exportable copper cathode” for Chambishi’s copper.153 In 2009, the

unproductive Luanshya mine was sold off by its majority-Indian

owners to the Chinese, whom promptly returned the mine to

activity.154 The same year, CNMC opened the Chambishi Copper

Smelter.

Collum Coal Mine, which operated from 2000-2013, was a

private Chinese venture that was plagued by labor conflict and

environmental irresponsibility. It was eventually taken over by

the Zambian government. Collum was initially funded and operated

privately by three brothers from Jianxi province that began work

with encouragement from the local government. From the beginning

Collum ran into environmental problems, and was accused of

contaminating local water supplies. In its later years, Collum

was beset by pay disputes, riots and a shooting. The government

took over in February 2013, citing a wide range of issues

including riots, pay disputes, and safety and environmental

concerns.155 The Zambian parastatal currently in charge of Collum

153 Ibid.154 “Kambwili Accused of Illegally Occupying Golf Course Land” Zambia Reports, May 6, 2013.155 “Zambia revokes Chinese mine licenses on poor safety” Reuters, February 20,2013.

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Coal Mine is waiting for a private company to buy it back. If a

Chinese parastatal takes over, it would indicate the government’s

willingness to bail out failed ventures by private Chinese

citizens.

Construction

Not long after assuming office, Sata announced the Link

Zambia 8000 (LZ8K) project, which seeks to build or revamp over

8000 kilometers of road over a five-year period.156 The goal of

LZ8K is, according to the Road Development Agency, “to construct

an efficient road network and international highways linking

Zambia [to all its neighbors].”157 Split into three phases and

countless segments, Chinese parastatals and private companies

handily outcompete rival firms from Britain, South Africa and

Zambia.158

Chinese businesses have aided in construction across many

other sectors of the Zambian economy, including power

infrastructure and communications. Chinese investors have been

156 “Sata launches phase one of the Link Zambia 8000 Project” The Post, September 20, 2012.157 Zambia Development Agency. 2013. “Infrastructure Sector Profile.” P.5158 RDA official, interview with author, July 22nd, 2013.

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behind construction of dams, stadiums and fiber-optic lines in

Zambia. Most notably, the Chinese funded the Levy Mwanawasa

Stadium, home to the Zambian national football team. Chinese

telecommunications have remained limited to Huawei, who budgeted

two million dollars for marketing alone in 2013.159

In 2006, Hu Jintao announced that China would be building

its first African Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Copperbelt

Province. Built in Chambishi, this SEZ focuses on mineral

processing and, according to Yejoo, has “led to increased output

and job creation.”160 A second, subzone SEZ was announced the same

year, but construction did not begin until 2010. This second SEZ

is located just outside of Lusaka, and focuses on manufacturing,

including “garments, food, appliances, tobacco, [and]

electronics.”161

Chinese Immigrants

In Lusaka and Copperbelt Province, Chinese immigrants

unaffiliated with SOEs are setting up shops and small companies.

Some of these migrants work in the mines as managers, but most

159 “Huawei budgets $2mn for marketing in Zambia.” ItWebAfrica, July 9, 2013.160 Yejoo, Kim. “Chinese-led SEZs in Africa” p.7161 Brautigam et al., “African Shenzhen” p.32

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work in shops that are directly or indirectly connected to the

copper industry. This has led to resentment by local traders,

whom are easily outcompeted by cheap Chinese products. Chinese

entrepreneurs have dealt with this growing resentment by having

their Zambian employees deal with shoppers and keeping a low

profile.162 This is aided by their conglomeration of several shops

– interviews with Zambian employees in Lusaka revealed that

Chinese bosses visited between once a day and once a month, to

restock and take count.

Blue, Gold, Black andGreenbacks

After the TAZARA project, an active attempt to energize the

Tanzanian economy, Chinese economic involvement in Tanzania

remained limited to select aid projects, medical workers and the

occasional refinancing loan for the partially-defunct TAZARA

railway. Chinese involvement remained relatively low-key until

multibillion dollar projects signed over the past four years.

Between 2011 and 2012 alone, Chinese direct investment in the 162 Interviews with the author, Lusaka, Zambia, July 2013.

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Tanzanian economy tripled from $700 million to $2.1 billion.163

Recent large investments by China in Tanzania have focused on

building much-needed infrastructure, as well as showcase

projects, such as the Benjamin Mkapa Stadium in Dar es Salaam.

Extraction

In Tanzania, the main extractive sectors are natural gas,

coal, gold and other precious stones and metals, with major

recent Chinese gains in access to coal, gas and iron. In 2012,

China National Gold Group Corporation began talks with Canadian-

owned African Barrick Gold to take over their largest mining

operation in Tanzania. Talks fell through in early 2013, however,

as the companies were unable to agree upon a price, and China

remains outside of Tanzania’s gold industry.164 Though Chinese

companies have not entered the Tanzanite extraction sector

either, a private Chinese jewelry company signed a deal in late

2013 to import finished stones.165

163 “China’s investment in Tanzania surges” The Citizen, February 15, 2014.164 “African Gold Miner in Limbo” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2013.165 “Tanzanite supplier to meet Chinese demand” Mining Weekly, October 11, 2013.

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In 2011, the Chinese company Sichuan Hongda signed a $2.5

billion deal with the Tanzanian government to gain access to iron

and coal deposits.166 This consists of three major construction

projects: the Mchuchuma coal mine; the Liganga iron mine; and a

600MW thermal power station. The projects will be under joint

ownership, with 20% owned by the Tanzanian National Development

Corporation (NDC). The NDC will be able to increase its shares to

49% once Sichuan Hongda has recouped their investment costs.

These projects were completed in 2012, and are coming online.

Tanzania has also recently discovered large reserves of

natural gas off the coast, which the Chinese are poised to get

involved in. South from Dar es Salaam, where the gas fields were

discovered, the Chinese loaned Tanzania $1bn in October 2011 for

the construction of an Mtwara-Dar es Salaam gas pipeline. At the

time, the energy ministry had estimated only around ten trillion

cubic feet of natural gas, but that number had tripled by mid-

2012.167 The Ministry of Energy and Minerals announced it expected

the reserves to increase fivefold more in the next two years, to

166 AidData.org, project #1928167 “Tanzania’s Natural Gas Reserves Almost Triple on New Finds” Bloomberg News, June 20, 2012.

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200 trillion cubic feet, which would place Tanzania’s reserves in

the top ten worldwide.168 It seems unlikely the subsidiaries of

China Natural Gas, Inc. will remain uninvolved in the Tanzanian

gas fields over the coming years.

Construction

The Bagamoyo deal signed in early 2013 sets up financing of

around $10 billion to go towards building a ‘mega-port’, a

special economic zone (SEZ) and a railway network. This is a

combination of Tanzanian requests for a better port and adoption

of the successful Chinese model of SEZs in other nations.

Tanzania’s role as a gateway to the sea for its landlocked

neighbors (Zambia, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, eastern DRC)

has been an underused source of revenue for the usual reasons;

clogged ports, poor road and rail infrastructure, and

dysfunctional bureaucracies. The new port in Bagamoyo will be

capable of moving 40 times more containers than the Dar es Salaam

port, which currently handles goods worth 60% of Tanzania’s

GDP.169 The special economic zone, costing between $300 and $500 168 “Energy industry sees much promise in Tanzania” Financial Times, September 30, 2013. 169 The Dar es Salaam port has a widespread reputation for being backlogged, asnoted by several traders interviewed in southern Tanzania and in Zambia.

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million, will consist of a wide range of industrial parks.170 The

SEZ is also expected to benefit from its close proximity to Dar

es Salaam and pre-existing power infrastructure.171

Chinese contractors have also been deeply involved in

building roads, internet infrastructure and airports in Tanzania.

Over a thousand kilometers of road have already been built by

various Chinese contractors under bids from the Tanzanian

government, but several may be banned from future work for

“collusive practices” that took place in the Philippines. After

the African Development Bank (AfDB) announced a $112m loan to

build a highway from Arusha, Tanzania to Tengeru, Kenya in April,

2013, reports emerged that the contract had already been given to

China Geo Engineering.172 China’s Eximbank has also extended a

loan to build a national fiber-optic network.173 As well, in 2007,

170 This includes, according to a report by the Tanzanian consulate in Dubai, export processing zones, industrial parks, a tourism park, a free trade zone, free port facilities, science and technological parks, an international business center and industrial sheds.171 “Bagamoyo Special Economic Zones”, Tanzanian Consulate Dubai.172 There was then an initial error in the construction, resulting in a sectionprone to heavy flooding, China Geo immediately agreed to rebuild the portion between January-April 2014. In2EastAfrica. (2013, November 18). African Development Bank. (2013). Project Appraisal Report; Arusha-Holili/Taveta-Voi Road Project. Abidjan: OITC Department173 “China, Tanzania sign loan agreements on ICT, air transport infrastructure.” People’s Daily, April 17, 2010

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the Sonangol group signed up to revamp the Dar es Salaam airport,

but this seems to have largely fallen flat.174

Chinese Immigrants

Though Chinese business in Tanzania mostly consists of

large-scale projects carried out by Chinese parastatals, a

growing number of Chinese immigrants have begun small businesses

in Dar es Salaam’s Kariakoo district. After outcompeting their

Tanzanian compatriots for a few years with cheap (directly

imported) Chinese products, they have formed the Kariakoo Chinese

Chamber of Commerce (KCCC). In its opening act, the KCCC got over

200 Chinese signatures for a statement on ethical standards to be

upheld. According to KCCC’s spokesperson, this includes paying

all the relevant taxes (a rarity for small-scale traders), good

conditions for Tanzanian employees, cooperation with Tanzanian

traders, and supplying “quality Chinese products in the local

174 Yin, B. (2012, March 2). Chinese investment in Tanzania bears bitter fruit | Beibei Yin | Global development | theguardian.co.uk. Retreived from (http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/mar/02/chinese-investment-tanzania-airport-eviction)

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market.”175 The Minister of State replied by urging Tanzanians to

“continue cooperating with them in every way.”176

Issues from the EastPoaching

A major issue for the Tanzanian government in dealing with

Chinese immigrants is their involvement in the illegal ivory

trade.177 Poaching of endangered animals and violations of the

international ban on ivory trade have increased over the past few

years. Chinese traders find the ivory trade to be lucrative, and

the biggest markets for ivory are in East Asia. Some Chinese

immigrants to Tanzania have taken advantage of rising Chinese-

Tanzanian trade ties, Tanzania’s loose National Park boundaries,

and underpaid rangers to participate in the slaughter of around

850 elephants every month.178 In early November 2013, three

Chinese nationals were discovered with over seven hundred tusks

175 “Kariakoo Traders Urged to Work Together” Tanzania Daily News, January 27, 2014.176 Ibid.177 This is a much smaller, but still significant issue in Zambia and South Africa.178 “Kagasheki unveils Chinese ivory haul in Dar es Salaam” IPPMedia, November 3, 2013.

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at their home in Dar es Salaam, worth nearly $5 million.179 They

have not yet been convicted, and President Kikwete has agreed to

burn, rather than sell the ivory in order to keep the ivory out

of the global marketplace entirely.180 On the 3rd of January, 2014,

a shipping container full of tusks was seized at the Dar es

Salaam port.181 In Zambia, there has been less evidence linking

the Chinese to a rise in poaching, yet an Oxpeckers report

revealed the involvement of Chinese middlemen in moving ivory out

of Zambia through neighboring nations.182

‘Stealing’ Resources

There has been little indication Chinese parastatals are

signing particularly unfair trade deals in Tanzania and Zambia’s

extraction industries. However, private Chinese companies are

likelier to flout local tax laws or otherwise defraud the

government. Upon Sata’s election in 2011, he fulfilled a campaign179 “Case on illegal possession of tusks facing Chinese nationals adjourned” IPPMedia, December 31, 2013.180 Operation Tokomeza, a military-driven anti-poaching campaign, faced a fair amount of controversy for its usage of torture against villagers whom may or may not have been complicit in poaching. Kikwete halted, and then re-launched Tokomeza in early 2014, in order to up the ante in the anti-poaching fight. “Putting ‘Operation Tokomeza’ in its perspective” Daily News, December 22, 2013.181 It was not clear whether there was Chinese involvement. “Container full of elephant tusks seized in Dar” IPPMedia, January 3, 2014.182 “Zambezi’s ivory poaching exposed” Lusaka Voice, March 27, 2014.

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pledge to double mine royalties, aiming to support a government

budget focused on poverty reduction.183 In Tanzania, Chinese

involvement in the extraction industry has not expanded

sufficiently, nor are the deals transparent enough, to understand

the current state of Chinese business dealings. Historically,

many African nations have struggled to make good on the promise

of their natural resources, and there are few signs this has

changed significantly. However, leaders have been negotiating

increasingly beneficial deals. This has probably been helped by

the diversification of business partners; with China in the mix,

African unions and governments have greater leverage. Corporate

responsibility has also been helped by the flourishing of

initiatives such as the Extractive Industry Transparency

Initiative, a mechanism for self-reporting that is increasingly

used in both Tanzania and Zambia.184

Quality Control

Chinese construction quality has improved drastically over

the past few decades, yet shoddy construction remains a common

183 “Zambia to double mine royalties” Financial Times, November 11, 2011.184 More information available at www.eiti.org

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complaint against Chinese contractors. In Tanzania, a World Bank

ban on several Chinese construction companies indicted for

corrupt practices in the Philippines may be extended to their

non-World Bank work in Tanzania. The debarred companies include

several of China’s largest constructions SOEs.185

Unfair Competition

There have been recurring concerns that cheap Chinese

imports undermine local manufacturing industries, as well as

complaints by African traders that Chinese immigrants are unfair

competitors. Most notably outside of Tanzania and Zambia, textile

industries have been closed in both Southern and West Africa. In

Zambia, Chinese immigrants and private businessmen have been

competing with Zambians in a number of sectors for more than a

decade now, and a combination of government and civil society

actors have worked to change the landscape for Zambian traders.186

Zambian employees replaced their Chinese bosses as the faces of

many of the businesses, partly due to negative publicity as well

as increased conglomeration of stores.187 In Tanzania, on the 185 “Dar road works at risk as WB bans 3 firms,” The East African, January 23, 2009.186 This includes the 2008 subcontracting law.187 Interviews with author, June 22-23, Lusaka, Zambia.

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other hand, Chinese traders in the Kariakoo market have sought to

deflect local resentment through self-organization.

Equitable Growth?

As Mohan and Lampert point out, “the African actors that

appear to benefit most are often political and business elites

and this might reinforce unaccountable modes of political and

economic governance as well as highly uneven distributions of

wealth and power.”188 It’s widely accepted in development circles

that inequality rises before it falls, as business elites make

millions before the new middle classes become a majority. With

the increasing complexity of global investments, it is difficult

to hold Chinese investment solely responsible for the increasing

inequity seen in most of Africa. The question remains, however,

if investment, by the Chinese or others, is limiting the ability

of African nations to ensure current economic growth does its

part to lift people out of poverty.

Labor Conditions

188 Giles, Mohan; Lampert, Ben. “Negotiating China: Reinserting African agency into China-Africa relations” 2012, p.110

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The flashpoint of Chinese relations in Zambia has been

around labor conditions. A tragic accident at an explosives plant

in 2005, followed shortly by a shooting at a miner’s strike,

catalyzed global concern for Zambians working in Chinese-owned

operations. These incidents and the wider state of Chinese mining

in Zambia have been highly controversial in the West, and have

dominated much of the debate over the Chinese presence in Zambia.

The highly influential organization Human Rights Watch

recently published a report on labor abuses at Chinese state-

owned copper mines, claiming that Chinese mines “fall short of

practices among the copper mining industry elsewhere in

Zambia.”189 Several supporters of the HRW report are discredited

by their usage of a wide range of factual inaccuracies.190 Barry

Sautman and Yan Hairong, however, tackle HRW’s report in an

article entitled “Barking up the wrong tree,” claiming that the

report “reinforces erroneous notions promoted by Western media 189 “’You’ll be Fired if you Refuse’ Labor Abuses in Zambia’s Chinese State-owned Copper Mines.” Human Rights Watch, 2011.190 For example, the widespread claim that Sata won on an anti-Chinese ticket –he ran on that in 2006, but dropped it from his rhetoric in 2008 and 2011. This claim is also made in a Time article by Jennifer Cheng, available at (http://world.time.com/2013/07/16/six-chinese-megaprojects-across-the-globe/slide/collum-coal-mine-in-zambia/), and a New Yorker article by Alexis Okeowo,available at (http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/10/china-zambia-and-a-clash-in-a-copper-mine.html).

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and politicians.” Specifically, they accuse the report of

“[playing] into the racial hierarchy in Zambia” by demonizing

non-white mine owners. Sautman and Hairong ask if it is “a

coincidence that HRW studies of abuses in the mining industry in

Africa have been confined to one about a Chinese SOE and two

others that implicate the Zimbabwean government, a target of

Western sanctions?”191 The Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) has

also repeatedly defended Chinese miners.

However, the HRW report isn’t to be entirely dismissed. The

report’s discussion of low Chinese wages was not strongly refuted

by Sautman et al., and has been backed up by other observers. The

privately-owned Collum Coal Mine, which was not part of the HRW

report, had a long string of trouble with employees and

government regulations before being shut down in early 2013. It

may be that Chinese state-owned corporations’ shareholders (that

is, the Chinese government) keep them from the most egregious

violations of Zambian regulations. There are fewer Tanzanians

working on Chinese managed projects, but the numbers are steadily

191 Sautman, Barry; Hairong, Yan. “Barking up the wrong tree” Pambazuka News, 2011.

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rising with the recent Bagamoyo deal and associated construction

deals.

Comparing the success of Tanzanian and Zambian laborers

resisting employment casualization (the transformation of

permanent positions to less-stable short-term contracts) by

Chinese managers, Ching Kwan Lee notes the divergent state

methods of negotiation as being central to employees’ success.192

Chinese decision-making was similar at the two worksites in their

pursuit of profits, but in Zambia, the Chinese sought long-term

site-specific development, which required acquiescence to

employee demands.193 Chinese labor relations in Africa are thus

dependent upon several key factors, including long-term vs.

short-term investment, profit margins, and location flexibility.

The ratio of Chinese to African laborers also varies widely

across the continent, from Zambia’s one-to-fifteen to Angola’s

one-to-one.194 This disparity is due to the type of project and

availability of skilled labor – road-builders are plentiful in

192 Employment casualization is the process by which long-term contract workersare moved onto shorter-term contracts, often with less benefits. This makes iteasier for employees to hire and fire, but destabilizes workers.193 Lee, Ching Kwan. “Raw Encounters; Chinese Managers, African Workers and thePolitics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves.” P.665194 Moyo, Dambisa. “Winner Take All.” P.159

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peaceful Zambia, while oil engineers are in short supply in war-

torn Angola. There have also been complaints that the Chinese

import semi-skilled labor that could be found locally, such as

drivers and cooks. Thus, labor relations between Chinese managers

and African laborers cannot be easily generalized, but there is

insufficient evidence to endorse the idea that African staff get

a worse deal under Chinese managers.

Private Chinese Entrepreneurs

Chinese businessmen working on their own volition in African

nations have often engaged in the most risky and law-defying

operations. Zambia’s privately-owned Collum Coal Mine, for

example, was lacking any emergency medical facilities when it was

taken over by the Zambian government in early 2013.195 In 2007,

the private businessman Sam Po, representing a consortium of

companies including China Sonangol, signed a deal to upgrade the

Dar es Salaam airport and revive the national airline Air

Tanzania. In return, China Sonangol was granted licenses to

explore oilfields in southwest Tanzania. Though the eviction of

195 “Zambia revokes Chinese mine licenses on poor safety” Reuters, February 20,2013.

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1300 local residents was carried out, construction has not made

any progress in the past few years, and the oil deal was

revoked.196 This lack of constraint on the part of private Chinese

actors likely stems from lowered concerns around image – they are

less likely to worry about the general image of China in Africa

compared to state-owned enterprises.

Environmental Issues

China’s record on environmental issues is mixed; many

Chinese entrepreneurs have little regard for the environment, yet

also invest heavily in green industries such as solar power. The

prioritization of development in the world’s most populous nation

has created domestic environmental disasters, and China’s sprint

for resources and businesses abroad has similarly taken advantage

of weak enforcement of environmental laws in Africa. Zambia’s

Collum Coal Mine is an example of the dangers of weak local

political structures on environmental issues; local governance

encouraged private Chinese investment, yet failed to hold the

company to account when local water sources were contaminated.

196 “Chinese investment in Tanzania bears bitter fruit” The Guardian, March 2, 2012.

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Upon the mine’s closure, the Minister of Mines Yamfwa Mukanga

said that the mines issues largely derived from unqualified

employees.197

Lack of agricultural trade

Agriculture makes up a quarter of the Tanzanian economy and

a fifth of the Zambian economy by GDP, and constitutes around

three-quarters of the labor forces in each country.198 Yet

agriculture, Africa’s historically dominant sector, has generally

failed to benefit from China’s economic engagement with the

continent.199 According to a 2009 study by Nelson Villoria,

agriculture’s mediocre gains are due to Chinese price

inflation.200 This has negated any gains in Sub-Saharan African

food exports to China over the past decade, even though China

grew enormously as an overall food importer during the same

period.201

197 “Zambia revokes Chinese mine licenses on poor safety” Reuters, February 20,2013.198 CIA World Factbook199 China’s main agricultural imports from Africa are soybeans, palm oil and wheat.200 Villoria, Nelson. “China’s Growth and the Agricultural Exports of Sub-Saharan Southern Africa.”201 Villoria, p.534

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Unintentional Effects on the East African Community

China’s recent deals in Tanzania have caused ripple effects

through the East African Community, causing Tanzania to be

effectively isolated by its neighbors Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda

(dubbed the ‘coalition of the willing’ by local media).202 Shortly

after the Bagamoyo deal was signed, leaders from Kenya, Uganda

and Rwanda met and formulated plans for the expansion of the port

at Mombasa, Kenya and a regional rail network. They also began

organizing closer regional cooperation, including a regional

passport, without Tanzania or Burundi. Tanzania has historically

been a less successful economy than these three (in ratio to

population size), yet its stability is a source of envy in the

region. This chapter in EAC relations seems likely to be a

Kenyan-led response to the Bagamoyo expansion, and is

characterized as such in the local press.203 The exclusion of

Burundi, however, means the coalition of the willing are not only

responding to Chinese business in Tanzania, but have a genuine

internal cohesion.202 The EAC, revived in 2000, was originally just Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2009. Burundi has also been left out of the ‘coalition of the willing.’203 Wekesa, Bob. “China Connection in East Africa’s Infrastructure Wars, State Rivalries,” Business Daily, October 22, 2013.

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Additionally, the coalition between Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda

does not seem to have an anti-China agenda. China pledged $5bn in

grants and concessional loans to the port and rail Kenyan

project.204 The recent inclusion of South Sudan into the mix has

also strengthened the Kenyan plan, as the new nation is currently

applying for EAC membership and attended the opening of the

Mombasa port.

ConclusionThough the picture of economic engagement between China and

Africa is muddied by a lack of transparency by their respective

governments, it seems clear that infrastructure construction is

booming while private Chinese investment remains quite limited.

However, the foreign and domestic obstacles that historically

held back African growth have not been entirely vanquished, and

Western companies that previously made up the bulk of investment

in Africa remain cautious investors. Though the general economic

engagement trends are similar in Tanzania and Zambia, Zambia is

likely to achieve greater benefits from Chinese business than 204 “Presidents welcome Mombasa port expansion” Business Day Live, August 30, 2013.

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Tanzania in the short term, primarily due to Zambia’s strong

unions, competing investors, and economic diversification into

manufacturing and agriculture. Though government pressure is

minimal in Tanzania, Chinese actors have recently recognized

their image problems and are tackling them. In both nations,

however, private Chinese businessmen have proved themselves

lower-quality economic partners than their state-owned

counterparts.205

205 However, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which requires compliant nations to report payments by oil, gas and mining companies, has reported slow, yet uneven improvements over the past few years in levels of taxation and fraud. Nonetheless, only 5 of 30 compliant Tanzaniancompanies reported paying corporate income taxes. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Zambia Reconciliation Report for the Year 2011. EITI,Tanzania Reconciliation Report, 2011.

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VIs China Sinifying Africa?A defining feature of the debate over China’s impact on

African nations is the concern that the Chinese will ‘export’

their human rights record and governance style to Africa, thus

reinforcing local human rights and corruption problems. Yet this

analysis is flawed both in its assumption that the Chinese aim to

export their style of governance and in its ignorance of China’s

nonintervention policy. Rather, China has little interest in

preaching Chinese values, and China’s commitment to uncritical

support (noninterventionism) supplies the freedom to make

domestic political decisions without foreign interference to all

their partnering African leaders. Of course, these African

leaders’ decisions may be to the detriment of their

populations.206

To take on the issue of the political impact of the Chinese

on Tanzania and Zambia, this chapter is split into two major

206 In Tanzania, for example, Western pressure on an increasingly repressive regime is being lifted by lessening dependence upon Western economic aid through a shift to Chinese funding.

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sections. The first section takes on the issue of whether China

is exporting its political values to Africa. This will be

assessed using the paradigms of soft power and diplomacies,

breaking down the most important Chinese political values and

analyzing whether they are being pushed in Tanzania and Zambia.

Once it is made clear that the Chinese have little interest in

exporting their political values, the discussion will move onto

an assessment of China’s noninterventionist policy. It will then

be noted that noninterventionism is a hallmark of Chinese

involvement in Africa, and that it simultaneously creates

political breathing space for African leaders while enabling

dictatorial tendencies.

What are Global Values?

Global values are a wide range of values that cover the

political, economic and social realms, and represent the ideal

systems leaders wish to see realized. These values overlap

between the realms; for example, the social value of

individualism commonly held in Western societies is reflected in

their push for individual political rights – democracy. This

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study is concerned specifically with political values, and will

thus focus on the values that are supported and represented by

politicians, government officials and government institutions.

This includes concepts such as the union of state and party,

freedom of political expression, and accountability. Political

values are the specific concepts within political culture that

can be exhibited or promoted by the nation’s politicians and

government officials.

What is Soft Power?

Soft power is generally recognized as the brainchild of

Joseph Nye, whom first defined soft power in 1994 as “getting

others to want the outcomes that you want.” Soft power works as

it “co-opts people rather than coerces them.”207 This definition

has been expanded by the Chinese, whom tend to view “everything

except traditional military coercive measures” as soft power.208

Chinese academics and politicians are pushing for an expanded

definition of soft power to include economics and it is likely

that the definition of soft power will continue to evolve. Thus,

207 Nye, Joseph. “Soft Power” 2004. 208 Li, Xin; Worm, Vernon. “Building China’s Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise.” P.225

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the definition of soft power in play here is non-coercive power;

the vehicle in which Chinese political values could be shipped to

Africa.

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Chinese Soft Power

Historically, the Chinese have struggled against a narrative

that paints them as regional aggressors, proselytizing

Maoists/communists, and most recently, shoddy manufacturers. The

Hu Jintao administration made increasing soft power a primary

directive, spending billions of dollars on expanding foreign news

services and government cultural institutions. As part of his

address to the 17th National Congress of the CPC, former

President Hu Jintao spoke of China’s need for increased soft

power resources;

We must keep to the orientation of advanced socialist culture, bring about a newupsurge in socialist cultural development, stimulate the cultural creativity of thewhole nation, and enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to betterguarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests, enrich the cultural life inChinese society and inspire the enthusiasm of the people for progress.209

In 2012, the world’s leading soft power index ranked China

22nd globally, as well a 5th and 6th in the sub-indices of

education and culture.210 As the report notes, “China’s curbs on

individual freedom, heavy-handed management of the press, and an 209 Hu Jintao. “Hu Jintao’s Report at the 17th Party Congress” October 15, 2007.210 McClory, Jonathon. “The new persuaders III” 2012. As defined by The New Persuaders III, the five quantitative sub-indices are business/innovation, culture, diplomacy, government and education. The subjective measures include cultural output, cuisine, soft power icons, national airline/airport, global leadership, design/architecture and commercial brands. These subjective measures are decided upon by a panel at the Monocle and Institute.

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aversion to political criticism, undermine its efforts to

generate soft power.”211 Fijalkowski additionally points out that

only half of soft power is how well the Chinese sell it; the

other half is whether Africans are willing to buy it.212

At best, China’s ‘soft power’ instrument in Africa is the appeal of its ‘model’ ofdevelopment, and the idea of a new type of strategic partnership with Africa basedon political equality and mutual trust – the scripted ‘win-win’ cooperation mantra.But different agents are involved in Chinese African policy, and the government’sability to ensure that these diverse agents will act according to the general policygoals is highly limited.213

China’s intention to allay Western fears over aggressive

expansion while attracting under-developed partners is neatly

summed up in the well-touted concept of ‘peaceful development.’

In 2003, Hu Jintao coined the term ‘peaceful rise’ to describe

the Chinese assumption of world power and assuage those that

worry China is a threat to global security.214 It was changed to

‘peaceful development’ in 2004, as the term ‘rise’ was considered

too aggressive.215 For Westerners concerned about their own

relative decline, peaceful development is an obvious attempt to

convince them that China has no ill intentions on the world

211 McClory, p.13212 Fijalkowski, Lukasz. “China’s ‘soft power’ in Africa” 2011, p.231213 Fijalkowski, p.231214 Li and Worm. 215 Xiaoxiong, Yi. “Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Understanding China’s‘Peaceful Transition’” 2005.

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stage. For nations in the global South, peaceful development

represents the possibility of stable and sustainable growth.

What is Chinese Soft Power Made Of?

For the intents and purposes of this paper, Chinese soft

power will be understood by the definition laid down in Li and

Worm’s article on the topic, “Building China’s Soft Power for a

Peaceful Rise.” They identify six pillars of soft power and three

channels for wielding soft power.216 These pillars are cultural

attractiveness, political values, development model,

international institutions, international image, and economic

temptation, and the three channels are economic, formal and

cultural diplomacies. Efforts to expand Chinese soft power

generally focus on promoting a better global understanding of

Chinese culture and history. Chinese soft power, however, faces

at least one major stumbling block; the contradiction between a

centralized autocracy and the individual free-for-all that

culture production thrives on. Worst of all for the Chinese

government, some of China’s best-known celebrities passively or

216 Li, Xin; Worm, Vernon. “Building China’s Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise.”

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actively oppose the government on the grounds of human rights and

democracy.217

Chinese Political Values

Chinese global values have been almost entirely defined by

the Communist Party of China as a result of its six-decade

domination of Chinese politics. The face of China on the world

stage is essentially that which the CPC presents. Having ruled

mainland China for more than six decades, a fair amount of

fluctuation in values has occurred under the CPC. The largest

national shift in Chinese political values has been the influx of

market-economy ideologies under Deng Xiaoping.218 Today, the most

relevant political values for this study are the one-party state,

pragmatism, non-interference, the developmental state, and South-

South cooperation.

The most conspicuous political value that the Chinese

exhibit is the one-party state. The Communist Party of China has 217 Internationally renowned artist Ai Weiwei, for example, has been jailed andbeaten for his criticism of the government.218 This disruption of ‘your grandfathers’ socialism’ has led to massive socialupheaval, a quickening of urbanization and economic growth, and increases in inequality and global Chinese networks. Younger Chinese are more urban and connected, and have thus been slowly departing from the traditional family structure, which has placed large burdens on them through the one-child policy.

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been the only legal political party since 1949, and there are few

signs the CPC is loosening its grip on power. Apart from the

obvious reasons of self-interest, the CPC view the one-party

state as instrumental in ensuring political stability and

continued economic growth. Chinese leaders argue strongly against

the imposition of democracy in foreign countries, citing the

instability and ineffectiveness inherent to democratic regimes.

Modernization or economic development remains the priority

of the Chinese state under Xi Jinping. The corresponding

political value can be understood as government-led economic

development, better known as the developmental state. The

Japanese government has been a model for the developmental state,

having developed it in the postwar period.219 Brautigam et al.

note the Chinese developmental state as being “especially

difficult to disentangle [abroad],” owing to the continued

dominance of state-owned enterprises in international business.220

Nonetheless, it is an attractive value for the scores of nations

with millions still mired in poverty.

219 Brautigam, Deborah; Xiaoyang, Tang. “Economic statecraft in China’s new overseas special economic zones: soft power, business or resource security?”220 Ibid.

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A commonly-cited Chinese value is pragmatism, and an ability

to adapt to difficult situations. Though some scholars and

journalists use outdated and racist stereotypes of the ‘huddled

masses’ to justify the necessity of pragmatism, others have found

evidence for such an attitude in interviews and social

research.221 Sociologist Tom Doctoroff examined twelve

“quintessential Chinese behavioral characteristics” and declared

two of them to be “pragmatic elasticity” and “incremental

pragmatism.”222 He notes this elasticity to be a result of the

regimented nature of Chinese society, which gives extra clout to

those that display “clever resourcefulness.”223 However, this also

leads to moral relativism and the usage of bribery as a tool to

get by in tough situations. Incremental pragmatism, on the other

hand, explains how resourcefulness fits into a strictly-

structured society; there is a common trajectory of progress for

Chinese men, and individual progress is inevitably slow.224

221 See “Asia’s Mired Huddled Masses” by Sheila Tefft, 1995.222 Doctoroff, Tom. “The China Code: A Continuum of Twelve Quintessential Chinese Behavioral Characteristics.” P.123223 Doctoroff, P.127224 This Confucian saying describes it well; “At fifteen my heart was set on learning; at thirty I stood firm; at forty I had no more doubts; at fifty I knew the mandate of heaven; at sixty my ear was obedient; at seventy I could follow my heart's desire without transgressing the norm.” Quoted in “Billions:Selling to the New Chinese Consumer” by Tom Doctoroff, p.91

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Pragmatism as a political value for this study holds

relevance in work ethics and the habit of gift-giving. Gift-

giving is a widespread practice in China, used by citizens,

employees and officials to smooth the path ahead and gain

promotions, favors or simply better service; it is essentially

corruption.225 The Chinese state under Xi Jinping has made active

efforts to crack down on such behavior, such as outlawing the

usage of public funds to buy mooncakes, one of the most common

gifts.226 Another widespread form of gift-giving in China is the

usage of public funds for cigarettes, which have become a heavy

habit in China.227

Perhaps the most important Chinese political value is

noninterventionism, though it is clearly self-defeating to

suggest that the Chinese would export it. Noninterventionism, or

silence, states that governments should not intervene in

another’s politics, especially against the wishes of the ruling

government. Noninterventionism is actively promoted across global

225 “China trying to pull back on gift-giving” by Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2013.226 Ibid.227 See “Tobacco as a Social Currency: Cigarette Gifting and Sharing in China” by Rich, Zachary C; Xiao, Shuiyuan

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forums, and is responsible for some of the most glaring breaks

with Western politicians, whom often view intervention as a

necessary tool in civil conflicts and a useful one in economic

conflicts.228 Chinese noninterventionism includes governance

styles; Chinese officials claim China does not export or push its

values on other nations. The Chinese claim of noninterventionism

is a complex concept, and it is not always clear when private

suggestions become arm-twisting.

Finally, South-South cooperation is a strong rhetorical

tactic the Chinese have undertaken to explain their connections

to Africa and other parts of the global South. Justified by

China’s historical support of the Non-Aligned Movement and

African independence movements, China positions itself as a non-

exploitive partner that seeks ‘mutual development’ alongside

African nations. Officials highlight similar colonial histories,

and the ongoing plight of an unfair global economic power

structure is emphasized. South-South cooperation thus states

China and Africa are natural allies, and that China is in Africa

228 Most notably, Western nations intervened economically in Africa in the late1980s and 1990s by forcing borrowing nations to carry out certain reforms through structural adjustment packages.

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for the mutual good of Africans and Chinese. South-South

cooperation is likely the Chinese political value most explicitly

exported by the Chinese, as it advocates that Africans should

look east for beneficial economic partnerships.

Exporting ChineseValues

There is an important distinction to make when discussing

the export and import of political values – unlike physical

trading, the imported value will not be the exact same as the

exported value, as it changes to exist in the new context of the

importing nation. This is true whether Western values or Chinese

values are being addressed. While the Chinese seemingly have

little interest in exporting their political values, there is a

general tendency to promote a more statist approach to the

economy and governance. Ultimately, the exchange of political

values between China and Africa has much more to do with what

African leaders view as attractive and adaptable to their

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context, rather than any attempted export of Chinese values. Yet

it is important to give an overview from the Chinese side first.

Economic Diplomacy

Chinese use of economic diplomacy has not been explicitly in

support of Chinese political values. In describing the

developmental state abroad, Brautigam and Xiaoyang point out that

the Japanese model used “official aid, export credits and

investment support” in order to expand overseas, and that the

Chinese have by and large followed this model.229 However, this is

not necessarily aimed at exporting economic or political models,

but instead an active effort to expand economic links for the

benefit of the Chinese state. Economic diplomacy is thus likely

implicitly promoting the Chinese model of the developmental

state.

Formal Diplomacy

Chinese ambassadors and officials are the most important

spokespeople for the Chinese government, and have made a number

of comments pushing back against the imposition of Western values229 Brautigam, Deborah; Xiaoyang, Tang. “Economic statecraft in China’s new overseas special economic zones: soft power, business or resource security?” p.802

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on Africa. However, they have avoided promoting their own

political values, instead leaving Africans to choose their own.

Thus, what is useful to analyze is which Western political values

the Chinese have pushed back against most consistently.

The Chinese may no longer make fiery anti-capitalist

speeches, but Western democracy still draws ire, leading to the

implicit promotion of the one-party state by Chinese officials.

As Ian Taylor notes, “Liberal democracy has in fact been held up

by the Chinese as a source of much of Africa’s woes (going

directly against the Western mainstream view that it is a lack of

democracy that helps account for Africa’s maldevelopment).”230 In

2005, a prominent Chinese official stated “For a starving man,

which should he choose, bread or ballot, if he is supposed to

choose only one? The ballot is of course important. But he must

feed himself with the bread before he can cast a ballot.”231 This

statement signals a deep-rooted pragmatism in Chinese political

culture, combining China’s developmental state and one-party

state to push for rapid, centralized economic growth.232 Thus, 230 Taylor, Ian. “Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights”, p.69231 “Human rights can be manifested differently” Xinhua, December 12, 2005.232 This pragmatism can be considered partly responsible for the emphasis of development over democracy.

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formal diplomacy implicitly supports both the one-party state and

the developmental state.

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Cultural Diplomacy

Chinese cultural diplomacy has focused on promoting Chinese

culture and history, thereby implicitly supporting the

aforementioned five global values. One of the most successful

initiatives of the Chinese government in this area has been the

Confucius Institutes. Founded in 2004, there are now over 320

throughout the world lodging at various academic institutions.233

Their stated goal is to teach and promote Chinese language and

culture, as well as encourage trade ties; by all accounts

considerable success has been achieved. There are now three

Confucius Institutes in Tanzania (two in Dar es Salaam, one in

Dodoma) and one in Zambia.234 The Chinese have also engaged in

various bilateral cultural exchanges – the first Spring Festival

(known by many as the Lunar New Year) celebrations in Zambia were

held in late January, 2014. These same celebrations have been

held in Tanzania since 2010, similarly funded by the Confucius

Institutes. In Tanzania, the opening of the China Library in

233 Nearly 40 of these are located in Africa, according to Confucius Institute Online. This is much less than the nearly 500 in North America, but is at least partly related to the comparative lack of universities and colleges available to host them.234 “Worldwide Confucius Institutes,” available at (http://www.chinesecio.com/m/cio_wci)

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September 2012 was attended by the Tanzanian Minister of

Education.235 A travelling photography exhibit on “Henan in the

Eyes of World Photographers” in Tanzania in 2011 had an extended

section titled “Rediscover China”.236 Thus, much like economic and

formal diplomacies, cultural diplomacy avoids explicitly

promoting Chinese political values.

Importing ChineseValues

There is a rising body of journalists and policy-makers in

Africa who advise Africans to learn from but not copy the

Chinese. The Gabonese ambassador to China stated that “The rise

of China calls for every African, including me, to take pause and

think. Africa cannot imitate the Chinese model, but we can learn

from [their] experience.”237 As African democracies solidify and

economies grow, the success story of the Chinese economy stands

out amongst non-Western nations. However, the (mostly Western)

235 “China opens library in Tanzania to boost exchange,” CCTV English, September 27, 2012236 “Speech by H. E. Ambassador Liu Xinsheng at the Opening Ceremony of the Photo Exhibition.” June 13, 2011237 Allo, Emmanual M. Interviewed by Weijuan, Yan; Zhijian, Li. October 2011.

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international outcry against China in Africa that arose in the

wake of the 2006 FOCAC meeting has given some African leaders

pause. Thus, despite China’s immense diplomatic and economic

gains across the continent, there are still very few Africans

that actively or explicitly seek out Chinese culture and

governance style.

While African leaders largely embrace Chinese investments

wholeheartedly, the more democratic and better unionized nations

are savvier in negotiations that benefit the population. Zambia,

for example, has had notably better results than Tanzania in

bargaining for improved conditions and wages. Reasons for this

revolve around their respective governments and civil societies.

Zambian unions are much better organized and more powerful than

their Tanzanian counterparts, and political power has changed

hands in Zambia (which likely leads to better political

accountability). Most Zambian jobs are also neither transportable

nor as impermanent.238

One-Party State

238 Lee, Ching Kwan. “Raw Encounters; Chinese Managers, African Workers and thePolitics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves.” P.665

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The one-party state is a very attractive model to African

nations still resisting multiparty democracy, as well as to those

that gained power through elections but now don’t want to lose

it. Tanzania, fitting in the first category, has grown

increasingly repressive over the past few years in a bid to stem

growing opposition parties. In Zambia, on the other hand, Michael

Sata’s PF came to power through opposition parties, and the

spirit of anti-authoritarianism that Sata channeled is now

returning to challenge his rule.239 This is also reflected in Mo

Ibrahim Foundation’s Index of African Governance, which shows

that civic participation and human rights have gone in two

different directions in Tanzania and Zambia since 2000. While

Tanzania’s score has declined slightly as a result of an overall

decline in participation and gender equality, Zambia has improved

enormously in participation and rights.

The Party of the Revolution at the Ballot Box

Over the past few years, electoral fraud, corruption and

political repression have ramped up under CCM’s rule – an organic

239 Sata’s PF is largely centered around his charisma. He has jumped ship from the ruling party twice, from Kaunda’s UNIP to Chiluba’s MMD in the mid-1980s, and then left MMD in the mid-1990s.

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response to a growing opposition. It is thus difficult to claim

that Tanzania is ‘importing’ the one-party state; rather, CCM’s

nostalgia is reinforced by their increasingly important alliance

with China’s powerful one-party state. In the early 1990s CCM saw

one-party states crashing around them, giving way to multiparty

elections. CCM thus saw the transition as inevitable and thus the

only option, and democratized despite the wishes of a

conservative electorate. CCM held onto power as economic growth

resumed, but incompetence in tackling corruption and heavy

handling of the opposition has recently increased support for the

opposition.

As Tanzania comes closer to kicking CCM out of power, CCM

increasingly views elections as dangerous distractions, and views

the CPC’s lack of opposition with some envy. The question is thus

whether CCM views the one-party state as a viable option to which

to return, or if the tools of repression of electoral fraud

should be utilized in order to retain power in a multiparty

environment. The appearance of a Chinese official at CCM events

is not new, yet its consistent reoccurrence can be considered a

breach of China’s noninterventionism and a display of ignorance

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by the Chinese government. CCM leaders have struggled immensely

with bringing Tanzania into modernity, and China’s repressive

response to similar opposition movements thus probably seems like

an attractive option.

State repression can also been seen as a stopgap measure for

elections, keeping a lid on opposition support to ensure the

ruling party’s electoral victory. For the CCM, China is a

generous economic partner whose projects can energize the

Tanzanian economy and redeem the CCM as a key developmental

partner, thus winning the CCM further elections. In a thorough

breakdown on Jamii Forums, Tanzania’s main online political

forum, a journalist and self-described CCM supporter noted

Tanzania’s incredible fortune in avoiding political conflict

despite many factors correlated with it being present.240 He goes

on to claim that CCM’s support comes not from wise policy

decisions but from “cautious Tanzanians who see a vote for CCM as

a vote for the peaceful political culture.”241 Clearly, Tanzanians

240 This includes high unemployment, a large youth population, a very ethnically and religiously heterogeneous society, chronic foreign aid dependency, and neighboring military insecurity.241 Mchambuzi, “CCM, Chadema and the Theory of Conflict and Violence.” 2011.

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are becoming increasingly incautious as CCM grows ever more

skittish. This is a dangerous combination.

Zambian Democracy

In Zambia, a fractious political system has hardened

presidents, whose personal governing styles have defined the

benefits they see in Chinese partnership. Thus, while Levy

Mwanawasa used increasing Chinese investment to advance his

anticorruption agenda, his successor President Banda used the

same economic growth to devalue the anticorruption agenda. Today,

the question of the one-party state lies in the hands of the

fiery populist President Michael Sata.

Michael Sata has been successful in jumping parties as a

means to gain power, and he displays some clear anti-democratic

tendencies. Sata’s interest in building a security state similar

to China’s has been demonstrated in several cases. In August

2013, the Zambian government awarded a $210m contract to ZTE to

build a network of security cameras, claiming it was to catch

speeding drivers and to curb criminal activity.242 It was revealed

242 “Zambian government defends controversial CCTV contract” by Lusaka Voice, August 27, 2013.

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that ZTE had won the contract without bidding, despite interest

shown by other companies.243 The government thus abandoned the

plans and instructed the Anti-Corruption Commission to

investigate.244 A month later, at a meeting with Chief Jumbe,

President Sata revealed he had been spying on him, stating that

“Every 24 hours I know what happens everywhere you go, in your

bedroom all the 24 hours of the day…Why did you criticize my

introducing Paramount Chief Mpezeni?”245 There are also reports

that a bug was planted at the desk of King Lubosi Imwiko, leader

of the nonviolent secessionist Barotseland movement.246

There have also been less believable reports on China’s

involvement with Sata’s administration. Most interestingly, there

is a report that the Chinese government has aided the Zambian

state intelligence services in spying on their own people. This

claim arose from the Zambian Watchdog, that Huawei’s $48m fiber-

optic cable network in Zambia is a front for installation of

243 “Corruption Concerns over ZTE’s No-Bid Contract in Lusaka” by Zambia Reports, August 24, 2013.244 “Government terminates the CCTV $210 million contracts, instructs ACC to investigate” by Lusaka Times, September 5, 2013.245 Chao, Rebecca. “Zambian President Admits to Spying on Fellow Officials,” published on TechPresident, October 16, 2013.246 “Spying device found on Litunga’s chair, as suspect flees to State House,” by Barotsepost, July 8, 2013.

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hacking devices on all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the

country. Huawei immediately issued a denial, and no evidence has

surfaced to support the claim.247

These cases indicate that Michael Sata sees the Chinese one-

party state as a favorable model. However, intense press scrutiny

has taught him that the destruction of Zambia’s vibrant

multiparty democracy would be very difficult and would come with

harsh repercussions. Instead, he has gone a middle way, offering

muddled by-election seasons as opposition politicians defect to

the PF.248 Though his autocratic tendencies may be shared by the

Chinese, the Chinese do not see much value in aiding Sata in his

quest for power. Chinese companies that are involved in building

Sata’s security state are doing so out of self-interest, not by

instruction of the Chinese of government; contracts are to be

had. The Zambian people, however, increasingly view multiparty

247 “Huawei distances itself from Zambian Watchdog accusations,” by HumanIPO, September 5, 2013.248 At least 1600 MMD members, led by six constituency officials and an ex-provincial chairman, defected to the PF in 2013. For more information see “Political Defections” by the Zambian Economist, April 8, 2013. Available at (http://www.zambian-economist.com/2013/04/political-defections.html). For information on by-elections, see Motsamai, Dimpho. “By-elections galore in Zambia: Is parliamentary democracy under threat?” July 5, 2013.

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competition as the defining feature of democracy.249 Thus, Sata’s

autocratic tendencies, which may be reinforced by his view of the

Chinese one-party state, face fierce resistance from both the

public and the media.

Noninterventionism

The question of exporting Chinese noninterventionism to

Tanzania and Zambia might be considered a non-issue. Neither

Tanzania nor Zambia are involved in intervening in other

countries, and have not taken part in direct (non-peacekeeping)

conflicts since the 1979 Tanzania-Uganda war. Mentions of

noninterventionism by African leaders is largely related to

Chinese noninterventionism towards them, or rejection of

interventionist Westerners. However, noninterventionism may be

becoming rhetorically popular; in defending Chinese investments

in Tanzania, President Kikwete said “Our investment conditions

don't include democracy standards or values of the investors'

country of origin.”250

249 31% of Zambians in 2013 view fair multiparty elections as the “most essential characteristic of democracy” up from 21% in 2005. Compiled from Afrobarometer.250 “JK defends Chinese investors” IPP Media, October 6, 2012.

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Pragmatic Gift-Giving

Gift-giving as a form of bribery already exists in African

nations, most obviously in cases of buying votes and securing

favors from low-level officials (teachers, policemen etc.).

However, it is fundamentally different from Chinese gift-giving:

African gift-giving is not nearly as widespread if one does not

count the palming of small bills. Chinese gift-giving is

ubiquitous and some might contend that it is not always corrupt

behavior per se. The issue of giving gifts directly to African

heads of state, such as by building presidential residences, is

possibly the example of Chinese gift-giving that causes the most

concern for those worried about Chinese reinforcement of corrupt

African practices. It has the ability to reinforce the notions of

the political elite’s ‘right’ to luxurious living, which can

trickle down from the presidents’ office to other regional

political leaders keen on a luxurious lifestyle. Best known in

Kenya as the wabenzi, the luxuries that governments’ afford their

parliamentarians and other officials is attracting a wide range

of criticism.251 This criticism is not just from domestic lower

251 Wabenzi literally means owners of Mercedes-Benzes, named after the propensity of the ruling elite for the German model.

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classes and the West, but is increasingly coming from political

elites looking to burnish their name in the anti-corruption

fight.

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South-South Cooperation

After decades of Western interventionism in the form of

political turmoil and economic dependence, the Chinese concept of

South-South cooperation might be considered incredibly

refreshing. Though Sino-African relations contain a wealth of

concepts, South-South cooperation represents at least three major

changes for African leaders. First, it is an assertion that

African leaders need not go to the Western international

financial institutions for loans or aid, gaining them some

breathing room. Secondly, it tells them to look East for new

partnerships. Finally, it provides leaders with a more evenly

balanced relationship that does not make automatically make

Africa the ‘dependent’ or ‘recipient’ in said relationship

(though the reality may play out quite differently). South-South

cooperation is thus quite popular throughout Africa. South-South

cooperation can only be tenuously linked to poor governance

through its rejection of Western political values. Yet even these

neither explicitly nor necessarily implicitly lead to corrupt

behavior – only if the rejected Western norms include rational-

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logical bureaucracies, transparency or accountability. It would

thus be difficult to argue that South-South cooperation is in

fact a means to directly entrench poor governance; only that it

may be defending those who practice it.

The Developmental State

The issue of the developmental state is quite complex and

ill-defined, but can be largely understood as a question of the

state vs. the free market’s role in national economic growth.

After independence, most African states chose to go the way of

state-led development, nationalizing industries and resources and

developing statist economic policies. However, mismanagement,

entrenched corruption, poor educational systems, and an often

hostile global economic environment led to decay within state-

owned enterprises. The privatization of the 1990s is unlikely to

be reversed, but the state can lead development in other ways. A

production-oriented private sector, for example, is something

that the government can influence but not directly mold.

The Tanzanian State

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From the perspective of government leadership, Tanzania is

especially lacking. President Kikwete has made development a

national priority, yet according to development expert Joseph

Ayee, he does not have “the vision…a developmentalist ideology

and the commitment” required for development-oriented

leadership.252 Kikwete may not be an example of especially poor

governance, insofar that he has not massacred his own people or

destroyed economic growth, but he is certainly an example of a

mediocre and uninspiring president. National development planning

in Tanzania is aspirational rather than problem based. The

government has stated it aims to bring Tanzania to middle income

status by 2025, yet this would require high levels of sustained

growth as seen in only a few other countries.253 Rather, the

Tanzanian leadership seems to muddle through development, taking

a backseat in the growth of the Tanzanian economy to global

commodity prices and ambitious Chinese infrastructure projects.

252 Ayee, p.266253 Moyo, Mujobu; Simson, Rebecca; Jacob, Arun; de Mevius, Francois-Xavier. “Attaining Middle Income Status - Tanzania: Growth and Structural Transformation Required to Reach Middle IncomeStatus by 2025.”

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In terms of larger government and private-sector roles, the

record of a Tanzanian developmental state is similarly dim. In a

government report on sustainable development in Tanzania, the

state house admitted that “insufficient institutional framework

for coordination” and “insufficient involvement of local

authorities and communities” remain major challenges to

Tanzania’s progress.254 It would be hard to argue that state

autonomy, as defined by Ayee, is rife in the Tanzanian state; it

is better known for a weak and corrupt bureaucracy. Public

service is improving, yet many of these functions are being taken

over by private initiatives that bypass the government and do not

extend to the poorer and more rural sections of society. The

expansion of human capacity is aided by international

initiatives, yet the Tanzanian state itself fails to adequately

address the issue. Lastly, the question of whether Tanzania

harbors a production-oriented private sector is rather muddled –

there are few indications the private sector is up-and-coming in

any way, and cooperation with the government is somewhat limited.

254 “National Report for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20” 2012. P.40

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Overall, it does not seem that Tanzania is a developmental state,

or is seriously moving towards one.

The Zambian State

As one of the first proponents in Africa of privatization

and deregulation in the 1980s, the Zambian government has done

little to encourage the creation of a development state.

Neoliberal economics have only come under fire in Zambia when

they have directly threatened the status of mineworkers, and even

then remarkably rarely. In a 2012 op-ed in the Zambian Post,

Mbita Chitala argued that the “current international financial

crisis points to the collapse of laissez faire economics and

discredits market fundamentalism,” and that a “developmental

state” was necessary for Zambia to seriously tackle rampant

poverty.255 Yet apart from Sata’s efforts to revamp national

infrastructure, little effort has been made to create such an

active role for the government in Zambia’s economic growth –

Zambia is not tending towards a development state.

255 Chitala, Mbita. “Why Zambia is Poor,” the Post. April 30, 2012.

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Sinification? Not InThis Nation.

It is clear that the Chinese government’s efforts to expand

their soft power resources have not resulted in widespread

adoption of either political or social values in Tanzania or

Zambia. This should not surprise observers, given how much values

are molded by history. Rather, any ‘import’ of Chinese political

values is merely opportunistic reinforcement on the part of

African leaders. Indeed, Chinese noninterventionism itself is a

defining feature of their likability on the continent. But what

does this entail for Africans?

How About We Try Not Intervening

Theoretically, nonintervention means that China does not

intervene in the affairs of a nation.256 Though noninterventionism

is partly a reaction to Western military interventions, it also

has political and economic dimensions. Politically, the Chinese

government perceives its rule within China (which, from its 256 Outside of Africa, this has resulted in controversial positions being takenby the People’s Republic of China at the UN Security Council, such as opposition to intervention in Syria.

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perspective, also includes Taiwan) as sacrosanct. Any country

which criticizes its handling of Tibetan demonstrations or who

supports Taiwan's purchase of defensive weapons is viewed as

meddling in the affairs of state. Logically then, China tells

developing nations, and the world at large, that it will not get

involved in their domestic affairs. Chinese support for this

policy is simple; within the Chinese political elite today,

according to Wenran Jiang, “there is a strong belief that

conflict resolution is primarily realized through domestic

dynamics, and that foreign interventions are less decisive, do

not really work, and are often counterproductive.”257 Chinese

officials argue that sovereignty is the basis of a peaceful world

order, and that development is difficult, if not impossible, when

the developing nation faces constant interference from foreign

powers. When the Chinese criticize democracy and Western notions

of human rights, they do so from an angle that sees these as

impositions, unwelcome foreign interventions that do more harm

than good.

Noninterventionism in Africa

257 Jiang, Wenran. P.56

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Pang argues that “China has long observed and defended the

principle of ‘non-interference’ or ‘non-intervention’”; yet

China’s observance of non-intervention in Africa only extends

back to the late 1970s.258 Before this, China was actively

involved in supporting various militant groups across the

continent, such as Mozambique’s FRELIMO and Angola’s UNITA.

Noninterventionism has since taken center stage in Sino-African

relations, especially in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident.

The incident earned China harsh criticism from the West, but

several African leaders defended the Chinese on the basis of

sovereignty.259 Emphasis of noninterventionism became a method to

ally China with African nations, whom faced similar histories of

colonization and economic oppression. China’s non-interventionist

role on the continent is most visible in situations such as

Sudan, where the PRC repeatedly vetoed related UN Security

Council resolutions from 2005-2007.260

Chinese non-interventionism divides opinions, as African

political freedoms clash with Western insistence on good 258 Pang, Zhongying. “China’s Non-Interventionist Question,” Global Responsibility to Protect, 2009.259 Taylor, p.443260 Hu Jintao later privately convinced Sudan to accept a peacekeeping force.

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governance. Thus, the Chinese government does not advise others

on how to govern or run their economies, and is quite uncritical

in its dealings with African leaders. To Westerners with moral

superiority complexes, this can be aggravating; the Chinese are

missing opportunities to ‘teach’ Africans how to govern. For the

African political elite, however, Chinese silence means the

replacement of requirement-ridden IMF loans with simple, soft

Chinese loans, creating breathing space for politicians.

Western Criticism

Chinese noninterventionism is criticized by the West for its

passive support of dictators and violators of human rights. In

states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, Chinese partnership has at

best been as a passive bystander. At worst, China actively aids

and abets repressive regimes in their domestic campaigns of

violence. There is also an implicit criticism that the Chinese

have ‘stolen the spotlight’ from the Western-supported economic

and political reforms that have rolled out in Africa over the

past three decades. Multilateral engagements do not draw as much

attention, but Chinese intentions are questioned: are

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peacekeeping missions “an unobjectional way for China to fly its

flag.”?261

Western powers have consistently criticized the Chinese for

leaving good governance off of the agenda, yet Western history

undermines their own rhetoric in Africa. Former US Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton called Chinese engagement in Africa “new

colonialism.” In 2012, she told a crowd in Senegal that “America

will stand up for democracy and universal human rights even when

it might be easier to look the other way and keep the resources

flowing.”262 The argument that the Chinese are leading Africans

away from a path of democratization and modernization encounters

several obstacles. First, it assumes democracy and modernity are

necessary for African nations. Secondly, this argument assumes

that these are issues that can only be promoted by Westerners,

and makes them indistinguishable from Western political culture.

These criticisms also fail to take into account a comparative

analysis, which would point out American and French friendships

261 Richardson, Anna. “Beijing’s Blue Berets: UN Peacekeeping and the Evolutionof Chinese Diplomacy.” 2013262 Ghosh, Jayati. “Hillary Clinton’s morally superior speech in Africa was deluded.” Available at (http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/aug/07/hillary-clinton-speech-africa-deluded)

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with a number of what would otherwise be pariah states. 263 Most

critically, Western critiques are flawed by their continual

ignorance of African agency, painting African leaders as merely

followers of foreign trends rather than active shapers in their

own destinies.

African Freedom, Chinese Consistency

What Chinese noninterventionism means for the African

political elite is increased freedom for political elites.

Specifically, this freedom comes from a stark contrast with the

history of Euro-African relations, and the slow erosion or

transformation of European domination on the African continent.

Much of this comes from the change in financial donor – IMF

requirements pertaining to economic reform and good governance

are glaringly nonexistent in Chinese loan agreements.264

Though the 2005 Gleneagles Summit saw the cancellation of

over 95% of Tanzanian and Zambian debt respectively, these

governments continue to need external support to back the annual

263 Hecht, Gabrielle. “An elemental force: Uranium production in Africa, and what it means to be nuclear.” 2012264 It also comes in the form of uncritical rhetoric – Africans do not need to worry about damning criticism from their biggest partners.

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budget. This historic summit saw the G8 agree on the Multilateral

Debt Relief Initiative, which, combined with the Enhanced Highly

Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, cancelled nearly all

of Tanzania and Zambia (and 17 other nations’) public debt.265

This gave nations a clean slate, but new funding was conditional.

In particular, these countries needed to reform and improve their

taxation. Many countries had either no system to collect taxes or

the systems were too weak to provide the state with the resources

to provide necessary educational or health services. Thus,

countries could borrow more from the West, if they chose to do

so, but had to sign up to a slate of new government requirements.

From the Western perspective, improving taxation and trimming

bloated bureaucracies was intended to limit such new debt to

manageable levels. From Africa, it looks like a continuation of

manipulative Western policy.

A major question, then, is whether non-intervention can be

interpreted as silent support for fiscal irresponsibility or poor

governance. A leader with a history of poor governance and

repression may continue this path because his domestic

265 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative Fact Sheet, by the World Bank.

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imperatives outweigh the effects of international criticism. From

the perspective of African leaders, non-interventionism is a

policy of consistency; the Chinese will invest in their nation

before and after their gaffes. Thus, if the Chinese become

economically involved in a nation, taking over from hesitant

Western lenders, will countries end up more indebted and worse

governed?

Noninterventionism is a negative policy; one can

economically intervene by promoting policies within a

multilateral institution as requirements for loan-receiving

nations. The most obvious example of this is the Western (largely

US) economic interventions in Africa from the late 1980s onward,

when structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were implemented as

requirements of necessary IMF loans.266 While there have been

negative consequences of SAPs, it is unclear if these negative

consequences are because of how the SAPs were implemented,

because there was inadequate accountability, or because the

programs themselves were not economically sound.

266 For more on neo-liberal reforms in Africa, see “Organised Labour and Neo-Liberal Economic and Political Reforms in West and Central Africa” by Piet Konings.

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An implicit criticism of the uncritical Chinese alliance

with African nations is the idea that Africans are missing out on

the reforms and requirements of IMF and World Bank loans. These

reforms most commonly came in the form of SAPs and Poverty

Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).267 Yet effective and

sustainable reform will only come through legislation with

widespread political support. As Meles Zenawi pointed out,;

Good governance can only come from inside; it cannot be imposed from outside.That was always an illusion. What China has done is explode that illusion. It does notin any way endanger the reforms of good governance and democracy in Africabecause only those that were home-grown ever had a chance of success.268

Economic (Non)intervention

China’s economic presence in Africa is similarly

noninterventionist. To economically intervene is to use specific

economic activities or tools (not just sanctions but also subtler

ones like price-fixing) to affect outcomes in a foreign state, or

to attempt to change the economic structure of another state.269

Economic noninterventionism, then, is to engage economically

267 Generally speaking, SAPs push for privatization, deregulation, and the reduction of trade barriers.268 Meles Zenawi, quoted in The Dragon’s Gift, by Deborah Brautigam. P.287-288269 Thus, to be economically noninterventionist is to avoid tangling economic links with goals for foreign change. It also includes offering negative policies, reducing the need to make painful but important changes in economic practices.

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without a) using economic or political tools to manipulate a

foreign economy or b) target foreign industries. Because economic

interventionism does not include global trade, economic

noninterventionism that accompanies existing relations is

essentially a form of passive, or non-targeted interventionism.

Military (Non)intervention

According to a comparative study on Chinese vs American arms

transfers from 1989-2006, the Chinese sent more arms to

democratic nations rather than autocratic ones, relative to

American arms transfers.270 China also sent much less arms to

nations suffering from civil wars.271 However, the conflicts in

Sudan and Zimbabwe have brought China considerable negative

press. Zimbabwe’s burgeoning relationship with China was revealed

in embarrassing ways when a shipload of Chinese arms headed to

Zimbabwe was caught in South African legal limbo during Mugabe’s

wave of electoral violence.272

270 De Soysa, Indra; Midford, Paul. “Enter the Dragon! An Empirical Analysis ofChinese versus US Arms Transfers to Autocrats and Violators of Human Rights, 1989-2006.”271 Ibid.272 Though the weapons were ordered before the election, their arrival would have coincided with the worst stage of violence. South African dockworkers refused to unload it, and after being similarly rejected by Mozambique and Angola, it’s fate became foggy ; some journalists claimed the shipment went through Congo-Brazzaville, others that it was rerouted back to China. In the

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In a study of Chinese diplomacy in the wake of coups in five

African nations between 2003 and 2010, Holslag notes that China

continued “to practice conservative restraint, has avoided being

entangled in international sanctions, and has not moved an inch

from its sovereigntist principles.”273 Chinese pragmatism plays

out well in the wake of military coups; rather than immediately

condemning an illegitimate takeover, they monitor the situation,

stay low, protect their investments, and re-engage with the new

administration.274 This might have a destabilizing effect;

potential coup leaders may anticipate Chinese silence and rapid

re-engagement to sustain them in the turbulent post-coup period.

Nonintervention in Tanzania

Chinese noninterventionism in Tanzania largely revolves

around the same theme of an uncritical alliance. CCM and the

Communist Party of China are both rooted in their nations’

independence and Chinese diplomatic officials in Tanzania tend to

meantime, Sino-Zimbabwean relations settled significantly, and no above-groundmilitary deals have been made since. Spiegel, Samuel J; le Billon, Philippe. “China’s weapons trade: from ships of shame to the ethics of global resistance.” 2009.273 Holslag, Jonathan. “China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa,” p.386274 Holslag, p.385

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point to their historic connections as a means to explain their

current relations and future prospects. This has proved to be a

successful tactic in solidifying their unofficial alliance.

In Tanzania, Chinese military intervention has taken the

form of limited military aid and connections. According to the

Aid Data project, the Chinese have invested in the Tanzanian

military through funding an Army uniform factory and a defense

college, in 2001 and 2011 respectively. Also in 2011, Chinese and

Tanzanian military leaders agreed “to further promote the

relations between the two countries’ armed forces,” according to

Xinhua.275 However, no concrete proposal or deal came out of this

meeting.276

The style of Chinese support for the Tanzanian political

elite is revealed in an odd case surrounding a coal mine. At the

end of President Mkapa’s second term, Tan Power Resources,

jointly owned by Mkapa’s family and the family of his Energy and

Minerals Minister, bought the defunct Kiwira Coal Mine for a 275 “Chinese, Tanzanian armed forces to further ties.” Xinhua, June 15, 2011.276 Considering the usual flurry of paperwork and concessionary loans, it seemslikely then that Tanzanian requests for military aid from the Chinese are quietly shelved, or satisfied through more indirect manners (such as building a defense college.) The Chinese do not seem particularly interested in gettinginvolved with the Tanzanian military.

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tenth of its valued price.277 The issue became increasingly

controversial, and Tan Power Resources stakes were redistributed

by the government. A few private companies bought stakes, and the

Minister of Energy and Minerals announced China’s intention to

issue $400 million soft loan in 2011 to aid in the reform of the

mine.278 However, it is not clear whether this loan ever came

through, and Kiwira shut down once again in mid-2012, citing

unmanageable debt loads. Instead, a $3 billion deal was signed

with the Chinese in 2011, part of which was the opening of a

separate coal mine. This case seems to reveal a willingness by

the Chinese to engage in projects that would save face for the

CCM government, balanced by a drive for profitable business.279

The most hypocritical case of nonintervention in Tanzania

is to do with party-state relations; Chinese officials have

repeatedly shown up at CCM rallies, lending their support through

277 “Kiwira coal mine saga stalemate: It’s JK to decide who gets paid, why, andwho doesn’t” This Day, December 14, 2009.278 “Tanzania shuts operations at Kiwira coal mine,” Platts, July 4, 2012.279 This also indicates as a hesitancy over the financial status of such projects. It is safe to assume that the Chinese suggested such a loan to the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, whom consequently announced it as a means forthe Tanzanian government to save face over the Kiwira scandal. The Chinese then recognized the dire straits of the Kiwira coal mine and looked to invest elsewhere; namely, the $3 billion iron and coal project announced in 2011.

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party solidarity.280 The presence of the Chinese ambassador at CCM

rallies has been quite common. After the most recent appearance,

in September 2013, Chadema cried foul, and the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation responded by

stating it would “like to remind all envoys that it is against

the Vienna convention…to participate in any political rally.”281

Ambassadorial participation in these rallies suggests that the

Chinese do not hold Tanzanian multiparty democracy in high

regard, and raises questions about China’s response to a future

CCM loss of power.

The last four years have seen a drastic increase in

political repression and violence in mainland Tanzania, with

Chadema at the center of the CCM’s efforts to delegitimize the

opposition. Trouble began largely in the wake of the 2010

election, which despite being “a considerable improvement over

280 Gift-giving has also been a central tactic of the CPC in showing support for the CCM. A donation of forty-four motorcycles in December 2013, from the Chinese ambassador to the Tanzanian Prime Minister, saw the motorcycles split between secondary schools and CCM ward leaders. When flooding happened in Morogoro, January 2014, the Chinese Civil Engineering Construction Corporationrushed in to rebuild a vital bridge, and ambassador Lu arrived with a $20,000 donation and a message to believe in the “strong leadership of president Kikwete.” “Remarks by He Amb. Lu Youqing At the Donation Ceremony for MorogoroRegion Disaster Area,” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, February 1, 2014.281 “Ministry Cautions Envoy On Politics,” Tanzania Daily News, September 18, 2013.

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previous elections” was contested by Chadema leaders and

supporters like never before.282 There have been bombings,

arrests, and even the mob murder of a CCM official. This upheaval

is virtually unheard of in the otherwise peaceful mainland.283

The violence began when a Chadema meeting turned into a

protest march on the local police station, where Chadema members

were known to be held. The police opened fire on the protest,

killing two.284 In early May 2012, the Usa River township Chadema

chairman Msafiri Mbwambo was brutally murdered, shortly after he

orchestrated a by-election win for Chadema. An ‘intensive

investigation’ was launched, and at the time the regional police

commander stated he didn’t believe the death “had anything to do

with politics.”285 In September of the same year, journalist Daudi282 “Tanzania: Freedom in the World 2013” Freedom House.283 As Ilana Kessler noted in her 2006 Honors project at Georgetown University,“The belief that Tanzania has low levels of violent conflict relative to its neighbors is so commonly accepted that authors frequently make this claim while offering no evidence of its veracity.”284 “Tanzania police kill two in Arusha at Chadema protest.” BBC News.co.uk, January 6, 2011285 Within a few days, three perpetrators were arrested – sub-village leaders whom the police suspect disliked Mbwambo’s “diligent and strict” stance on various corruption matters. When fellow Chadema officials received death threats, and the Assistant Commissioner lashed out, saying “CHADEMA officials who claim to be threatened are simply sending themselves those messages to boast their popularity and seek public sympathy which, if you ask me, is rather childish.” “Police Dismiss Meru Death Threats As Unfounded” Tanzania Daily News, May 9, 2012. “Grisly Murder of Chadema Usa River Chairman” The Arusha Times, May 5, 2012.

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Mwangosi was murdered by policemen at a Chadema protest, which

was in defiance of a ban on political demonstrations. His

assailants, though identified, have not been convicted. A few

months later, a policeman with a machete came knocking at the

door of journalist Shaaban Matutu. Matutu survived the incident

with a gunshot wound to the shoulder.286 In June 2013, a bombing

at a Chadema rally killed three and wounded more than twenty

others. It was an attempted political assassination aimed at

Freeman Mbowe, the Chadema National Chairman, who escaped

unharmed.287

While the American embassy issued a press release calling

for “the arrest, prosecution and conviction of those responsible”

for the June 2013 bombing, the Chinese embassy remained silent.288

Though it is unclear whether CCM sees Chinese silence as support

for their repressive tactics specifically, the Chinese are

helping legitimize CCM rule while doing nothing about the

political violence in the nation. This close alignment of the

286 “Journalist survives police gunshot” IPP Media, December 6, 2012.287 “Bombs Rock Chadema Rally, Three Feared Dead” Tanzania Daily News, June 16,2013288 US Embassy Dar es Salaam, Press Release, available at (http://tanzania.usembassy.gov/pr_06172013.html)

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ruling parties, however, has not led to Sinophobic rhetoric on

the part of Tanzania’s opposition parties.

Nonintervention in Zambia

Though Zambia has been at peace since the end of the

Rhodesian Bush War in 1980, the Chinese military has made low-key

moves to, in the words of the Chinese government news outlet

Xinhua, “strengthen military cooperation.”289 Chinese military aid

to Zambia included a small direct donation in 2001 of nearly two

million dollars, and two planes in 2006.290 Most recently, the

donation of eight K8P planes from the China National Aero-

Technology Import and Export Corporation to Zambia more than

doubled the Zambian Air Force’s K8P squad.291 They have also

helped restore the Maina Soko Military Hospital, providing

specialist assistance in medical equipment and human resource.292

289 In terms of military cooperation, there is more rhetoric than action. In April 2011 Zambian Army Commander Wisdom Lopa travelled to Beijing and met with the Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie. At the accompanying press conference, no grand deals were signed; Minister Liang thanked Zambia for its support on domestic issues and Lope welcomed China’s role in Zambian infrastructure creation. “China, Zambia pledge to expand military ties.” People’s Daily Online, April 3, 2011.290 All on AidData.org291 “CATIC Hands over Eight K8P Trainers to Zambian Air Force” China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation, March 21, 2012.292 Nyirenda, Catherine. “Govt Pledges to Improve Military Health Care” the Times of Zambia, November 15, 2012.

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Chinese noninterventionism was breached most notably in the

2006 election, when the Chinese ambassador threatened to cut

diplomatic relations with Zambia. This was in response to

presidential nominee Michael Sata’s description of Taiwan as a

‘sovereign state’, and a promise to recognize Taiwan if

elected.293 Ambassador Li Baodong reportedly stated that “Chinese

investors in mining, construction and tourism have put on hold

further investments in Zambia until the uncertainty surrounding

our bilateral relations with Zambia is cleared.”294 Though Sata’s

promise was only stated once and did not ever come into effect,

later reports indicated that Sata borrowed around $30 million

from the Taiwanese Green Party to fund his 2006 and 2008

elections.295

The 2006 election was seen as a referendum on the Chinese by

Western observers due to Sata’s fiery rhetoric and the Chinese

ambassador’s threat to leave, and it was won by Mwanawasa. By

early 2007, Mwanawasa was actively promoting Chinese investment.

A week before Hu Jintao signed on for $800m in investments,

293 Reed, John. “China intervenes in Zambia elections” September 5, 2006.294 Ibid.295 “’$30m debt shows Sata’s thirst for power’” Lusaka Times, March 14, 2011.

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Mwanawasa called on Zambians to improve their opinions of the

Chinese. He defended China’s role in the Zambian economy, asking

“The Chinese government has brought a lot of development to this

country and these are the people you are demonstrating

against?”296 After Mwanawasa’s death, Rupiah Banda largely

followed his footsteps in inviting Chinese investment. Sata

likely steered away from his earlier comments as he recognized

the vital role the Chinese now play in the Zambian economy, and

the heavy cost of ‘switching Chinas.’

As President, Sata has had to balance his previous rhetoric

and campaign promises against China’s golden deals. When he took

power, his first official appointment was with the Chinese

ambassador, and Sata took the opportunity to remind him that

Chinese investors are liable to Zambian laws.297 Since then, his

fiery rhetoric has translated to erratic and sometimes worrisome

action, revealing an opportunist populist at the core. Sata has

held constant by-elections, which his opponents claim are aimed

296 “Embrace Chinese firms, urges Mwanawasa” The Lusaka Times, January 26, 2007. 297 Brautigam, Deborah. “Michael Sata and China in Zambia,” October 3, 2011. Retrieved from (http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2011/10/michael-sata-and-china-in-zambia.html)

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to confuse the political process and help his PF cronies.298 He

has also begun using the previously forgotten colonial-era Public

Order Act, which requires organizers of public gatherings to

notify the police seven days in advance. The government under

Sata has also arrested a number of opposition leaders, holding

them on various charges.299 There has been little word from either

Chinese or Western embassies on these developments.

ConclusionChinese noninterventionism has been a very popular policy in

Africa, and has been critical in gaining access to African

economies. Chinese silence has been a fresh breeze for African

leaders, and effectively negates most exportation of Chinese

values to Africa. Noninterventionism has also been key to Chinese

success in riding out illegitimate changes in political

leadership.300 For Africans, Chinese noninterventionism has

298 Tembo, Lee E. “Zambia’s Wasteful By-Elections in Perspective” Zambia Reports, May 6, 2013.299 In January 2014, Sata’s ex-ally Frank Bwalya was arrested for calling Sata a potato on the radio. As well, UPND leader Hakainde Hichilema was arrested three times within the first year-and-a-half of Sata’s presidency. “Inside Sata’s country” New African, April 1, 2013. “Zambia’s Frank Bwalya charged over Michael Sata potato jibe” BBC News, January 7, 2014.300 As well, coups do less damage to nations’ economies when international partners stick around afterwards.

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provided political breathing space and considerably friendlier

terms on loans and grants. However, it has also reduced

governmental pressure to do more in respecting political rights,

leading to an increased usage of political repression.

In Tanzania, Chinese political presence has taken the form

of low-key political support for the ruling party, Chama Cha

Mapinduzi. This interference is unlikely to challenge China’s

role in the Tanzanian economy. Political violence on the mainland

has risen considerably in the past few years, with bombings,

arrests and murders of Chadema politicians. However, there is no

evidence to suggest there is a connection to the silence

emanating from the Chinese embassy.

In Zambia, Chinese presence has inadvertently aided Michael

Sata’s rise through his instrumentalization of public discontent

towards Chinese workplace policies. The reduction of Western-

style democratic reforms is being imperfectly replaced by the

Zambian populace’s rising democratic opinions and expectations.

These are increasingly conflicting with Michael Sata’s autocratic

tendencies. Zambian leadership is increasingly challenged by

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popular opinion, yet parties themselves remain largely vessels

for leaders to fill up with their followings.

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VI The Yellow Peril inthe Dark Continent

By and large, it seems that Chinese business in Africa is an

enormous help in the efforts to realize African economic

potential. However, as Chinese-African trade continues to grow,

the bulk of it remains tied to African resources and Chinese

infrastructure projects, which raises three important questions.

Are the Chinese ‘manipulating’ Africans to get hold of their

resources? How will the relationship change as the Chinese

economy slows its growth rate? And how will increasing

independence affect African leaders’ decision-making?

In op-eds published across the continent, African leaders

and columnists call for a policy of “learn from, but don’t copy”

the Chinese, indicating a clear recognition of the impossibility

of simply transferring Chinese values. But as African leaders

attempt to adapt successful policies for their nations, values

come into contradiction. For example, the developmental state

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does not necessarily happily coexist alongside an easy

pragmatism, an issue the Chinese themselves are taking more

seriously. There is some hope in President Xi’s anti-corruption

campaign; it signals a recognition that corruption is not merely

a cultural norm but a political behavior that weakens

productivity and economics. So while there are no current anti-

corruption initiatives going on between China and African states,

it could become an implicit part of cooperation. This could

happen when Chinese companies and African states make it clear

corrupt behavior will not be tolerated. Unfortunately, high-level

judicial corruption, which is a key part of the connection

between the party and state, is unlikely to be tackled anytime

soon in China.

Rocks for Roads and Neocolonial China

The resource-for-infrastructure framework could work in two

ways. Chinese political and business leaders could approach

African nations expressing their interest in extracting African

resources, offering funding and cheap labor for infrastructure in

return. It seems much more likely, however, that Chinese business

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interests could seek out infrastructure bids, which combined with

diplomatic initiatives, sufficiently endears the Chinese to

Africans as to gain them favorable positions in bids for mining

and other resource-plundering initiatives. Kenyan academic Samuel

Nyadema argues the Chinese dangled project financing “as bait, to

secure routes to scarce natural resources.”301 However, the

concept of resources-for-infrastructure has been questioned by

scholars such as Deborah Brautigam and Ian Taylor, whom assert

that Sino-African relations are far too complex to be boiled down

to R4I. This author agrees, but notes that R4I still makes up the

bulk of Sino-African trade.

Yet there are still a few issues related to China’s conduct

in Tanzania and Zambia. In both nations, private Chinese citizens

have demonstrated a disregard for the rule of law, and a clear

prioritization of profits over environmental and labor laws.

Considering the weakness of Tanzania’s unions and taxation, it is

also likely that Tanzanians will struggle to benefit from

Chinese-owned mines. Tanzanian officials will need to do a much

better job than they are currently doing if they want to assure 301 Nyadema, Samuel, quoted in “China moves to secure prime position in mineral-rich Tanzania,” The Citizen, October 30, 2013.

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equitable benefits. In Zambia, negotiations between the Chinese,

the Zambian government and Zambian unions need to continue apace

to ensure a mutually beneficial partnership.

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China Can’t Grow Forever

Next, how might the slowing of the Chinese economy affect

the economic dynamics between China and Africa change? It seems

plausible that the Chinese will continue to encourage

manufacturing in Africa, as the Chinese economy slowly shifts

towards being service-dominated. Thus, much like the exportation

of manufacturing jobs to China from the West, Chinese

manufacturing jobs might shift to booming African nations such as

Nigeria and Ethiopia. The Chinese are likely to continue to

dominate commodities for as long as prices remain high, which

Zambian economist Moyo suggests will last a few decades.302 And if

African economies and political systems continue to strengthen,

this will translate to increased benefits from dealing with

Chinese companies.

African Agency, Adjusted

Are African nations losing out opportunities to reform their

economies by not engaging more with the IMF and other

international lenders? Despite the initial economic losses due to

302 Moyo, Dambisa. “Winner Take All,” p.5-7

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retrenchment of the bloated bureaucracy, politicians and

academics have argued that the privatization and deregulation of

the 1990s has led to a better business environment in Africa.

Similarly, the uneven nature of the reforms may have limited

their effectiveness. Given that the Chinese government generally

try to avoid any political stance that will embarrass them on the

world stage, they are likely to remain steadfastly

noninterventionist for the foreseeable future, avoiding pressing

any similar reforms in Africa.

Economic engagement between China and Africa means fewer IMF

loans, and the stringent safeguards that are required by such

agreements. The question over whether this leads to worse

governance is complex; accountability may become equally

important for both China and Africa within these trade deals.

Chinese loans and grants, rather than being provided to national

governments, where politicians can skim off the top, go directly

towards paying for infrastructure projects.303 That being said, if

trade arrangements remain minimally transparent there remain

considerable opportunities for high-level corruption to persist

303 Brautigam

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throughout Africa. This is where Tanzania and Zambia can once

again shed light on the complicated results of Chinese silence,

and possible routes for Chinese-supported African nations.

In Tanzania, the CCM is likely to continue its sporadic

usage of few repressive tools in order to make up for its fleeing

voting base. Decades of CCM rule have ensured a high rate of

loyalty within government ranks (especially the police).304 Thus,

CCM could in fact be caught in between necessary civil service

reform and losing a loyal fanbase. If CCM stays in power through

the 2015 elections, they will have another five-year to prove

themselves to an increasingly wary public. If CCM loses the

elections outright, it is possible that CCM would resort to

violent tactics to remain in power.305 It seems unlikely, however,

that the Chinese would outright support the Tanzanian government

if it were to violently crack down on opposition.306 For CCM

304 In June 2013, Chadema officials claimed that police had beaten cadres of the party in 2011, leading to a false admission of guilt over electoral violence. CCM and the police denied the claims, and several police officials refused to comment. Noted in “CCM, police under fire over ‘blackmail’” by The Citizen, June 24, 2013.305 Such tactics have already been used in Zanzibar, yet the CCM entered into apower-sharing deal with the Civic United Front in order to save ground and face.306 Chinese silence does not seem to be encouraging the Tanzanian government tooppress the opposition. However, the presence of Chinese officials at CCM rallies has the potential to encourage the CCM to ignore or run roughshod on

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elites to give up power, it must be shown that it is in their

best interests to hold legitimate elections and abide by an

electoral loss to the opposition. It remains to be seen how far

the CCM will go in these stopgap measures, and whether they will

willingly give up power if they are unable to reenergize their

voting base.

In Zambia, on the other hand, Sata’s opposition has been

simultaneously weakened by mass defections and strengthened by a

highly critical press and civil society. Sata’s emphasis on

development over democracy faces fierce resistance by civilians,

yet politicians have largely failed to capitalize on this or

coalesce national parties around ideologies rather than leaders.

The Chinese presence is unlikely to lead to any seismic shifts in

the Zambian political system, yet their economic role may be

revived as a political tool for opportunistic politicians.

Ultimately, this analysis of the import of Chinese political

values by Tanzanians and Zambians makes it abundantly clear that

values need to be generated and fostered from within rather than

the political rights of the opposition. Overall, Chinese military involvement in Tanzania is cautiously responsive to Tanzanian requests for aid, while avoiding any serious entanglement.

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copied from outside. The long political tradition of allying with

or against involved foreign powers in order to gain local

political dominance has often thwarted the development of both

the domestic economy and political values. It could be suggested

that the main role the Chinese seem to play is to balance Western

influence in Africa. China’s role on the continent, for now, is

that of a badly-needed trading partner, whose motions towards

mutual respect and noninterference are a drastic improvement over

the past half-century.

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