Introduction: Historical Context and Research Question

This paper deals with a particular case of a much broader problem common to many governments in early modern Eu-rope: the question of how to establish control and integrate semi-autonomous populations settled in frontier zones. In the 17th century, such zones could be found at the fringes of Europe, for example in the Scottish Highlands or at the Crimea, but also in the heart of Europe, by following the Habsburg-Ottoman borderline, from the mountains of Mo-rocco through the Mediterranean Sea, all the way down to the Great Hungarian Plain. The particular case this paper is concerned with is the Republic of Venice during the war for the island of Crete (1645–1669), and its frontier with the Ot-toman Empire in Dalmatia.

The War of Candia was the longest war Venice ever fought with the Ottoman Empire. It lasted for almost 25 years, and in spite of tenacious Venetian defense, losses of tens of thou-sands of lives, expenditures of millions of ducats, and the ac-cumulation of an enormous public debt, the war ended with the Ottoman victory, and the Republic was forced to surren-der the last major piece of its Eastern dominion, the island of Crete. On the other hand, in the Adriatic theatre of opera-tions the fortunes were reversed. Here, for the first time af-ter a series of defeats in the previous wars (1537–1539, and 1570–1573) the Republic could claim a local victory and ex-pand its territory with the acquisition of several important strategic locations. However, of much more importance and long lasting consequences than the minor territorial gains of this war where the effects of another historical event: a massive migration of the Ottoman subjects of Christian faith settled along the Dalmatian-Bosnian border, known in the Venetian sources as the Morlacchi (Morlachi, Muralchi), on the territory under Venetian control.1

Encouraged by the successes of the Venetian forces in Dalmatia in the first years of war, large numbers of Morlac-chi decided to leave their homes in the Ottoman Empire and to throw in their lot with the Most Serene Republic. Accord-ing to the report of the governor-general (Provveditore Generale di Dalmazia et Albania) Lorenzo Dolfin – head of the Venetian provincial administration in Dalmatia – from 1655, between 28.000 and 30.000 Morlacchi defected to the Venetian side in the first years of the war.2 The massive movement of the Morlacchi from Ottoman lands into the territory under con-trol of the Venetian Republic was one of the most important events of this war. The effects of this migration for the Vene-tian military effort were twofold: it not only provided the Re-public with a new pool of manpower, increasing significantly its decreasing military presence in Dalmatia, and at the same time it deprived the Ottomans of this same resource. These »noble savages«, disobedient beyond any measure but brave and fierce warriors, who in »search for liberty« and to escape the oppression of »the Ottoman yoke«, fled over to the Vene-tian side – as Morlacchi were usually described in contem-porary sources – managed to capture imagination of those who came in contact with them. For example, Pierre Michel De La Haye, in his work on the Venetian Republic from 1669, described the Morlacchi as »Iroques of these parts«.3 How-ever, the most interested in the Morlacchi were the Vene-tian governor-generals in Dalmatia. For them the Morlacchi were, above all, a valuable military resource which enabled the Venetian administration in Dalmatia to at least partially compensate for the Republic’s dwindling military presence in Dalmatia, caused by financial strains of prolonged war-fare, and pressing needs of other battlefields, mainly Crete and the Aegean.

The integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian defen-sive system in Dalmatia was done along the lines of the mo-del of the so-called »Military Frontier«, a model at that time already successfully organised on both sides of the Habs-

Domagoj Madunić

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian

Defensive System in Dalmatia and the Formation of the Morlacchi Elite (1645–1669)

burg-Ottoman border to the north.4 One of the key features of such defensive systems was that instead of an exclusive re-liance on (expensive) units of the regular professional army, it also employed a large number of irregular troops, who in exchange for land and small subsidies in grain and money performed various military services, ranging from guard du-ties to raids deep inside the enemy territory. In such defen-sive systems only the major key-fortifications were garriso-ned with the contingents of the regular army, while the rest of the borderlands was entrusted to these irregular troops. In Dalmatia, this role was fulfilled by the Morlacchi, who con-stituted the heart and body of this new institution. Although the Venetian Military Frontier in Dalmatia will be properly organised and given full institutional coverage only during the 18th century, the Venetian attempts to integrate the Mor-lacchi in this war served as an embryo from which that later institution evolved.

»Everywhere there are Morlacchi, although their concen-tration is the largest in the countryside of Zadar where they have a great deal of lands. They are fierce and in-domitable beyond belief and, with the sole object of freedom and easing of burdens, they left the Empire – to which they were previously subjected – and willingly sub-ordinated themselves to Your Serenity. They live of agri-culture and warfare, plundering the enemy and exposing themselves willingly to any hardship on any occasion. As much as they are meritorious for the maintaining of the countryside, which otherwise would be completely unin-habited and the Turks would incontestably loot it down to the walls of every city, that much they are rash and in-solent, they do as they please, and give to the landowners as much as they feel it’s proper: they have their own Ser-dars, and from them more then from the public officials they receive regulations and laws.«(Relazion dell’ Eccellentissimo signor Catherino Corner, Provveditor Generale in Dalmatia, 14. Dicembre 1667).5

This is how, in 1667, the Venetian nobleman Catherino Corner, upon his return from the service of the governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania, in his report to the Vene-tian Senate, began his description of the lands and people entrusted to him. By the days of Catherino Corner’s service, the Morlacchi constituted the first line of defense of the Dal-matian towns. Serving as the irregular militia, settled in the deserted areas of no-man’s-land, they provided the Venetian defensive system with several valuable services. Not only that they shielded the Venetian controlled lands from any smaller Ottoman raid and provided the Venetian forces with the sys-

tem of early warnings through the line of guard outposts. Even more important, after 1654, in the aftermath of the defeat of Venetian forces at Knin (Ital. Tenin), the initiative passed to the Ottoman side, and Venice limited its activities in Dalmatia strictly to the defensive, the Morlacchi remained the only offensive weapon of the Republic in Dalmatia.6

Under Venetian rule, the Morlacchi enjoyed a large measure of autonomy. They were governed and led in action by their own leaders who styled themselves with a mixture of Ottoman-Venetian titles (serdar, harambassa, capitano, capo principale, direttore, governatore), and who by the end of the war practically managed to turn their positions into hereditary ones. In the following pages two mutually connected pro-cesses will be examined in detail: first, the integration of the Morlacchi into the Venetian defensive system, and second, the formation of the Morlacchi elite, the so-called »Capi di Morlacchi« which assumed charge and leadership over va-rious Morlacchi groups and functioned as the intermediaries between the representatives of the Venetian government and the Morlacchi population. Furthermore, as this paper will argue, these two processes were in reciprocal relationship: the more successful the integration of the Morlacchi was, the less need existed for their separate command structure, and thereby the position of this elite weakened.

The development of the Venetian-Morlacchi relationship can be traced through three distinctive stages. The first one, in which the foundations for the Venetian-Morlacchi con-nections were set up, lasted from the beginning of the war, 1645, roughly until the end of 1648. The second, lasting up to 1660, was a period characterized by a high level of Mor-lacchi autonomy, embodied in the newly founded position of the serdar, who functioned as their supreme leader and re-presentative, freely elected by the Morlacchi and from their own ranks. Finally, the third stage, lasting from 1660 until 1671/72, was a period in which the Venetian state managed to restrain Morlacchi autonomy and establish control over the Morlacchi by transforming the members of their social elite, mainly Morlacchi serdars, from community leaders into state officials who, appointed by the state, were obliged to execute state policies.

Morlacchi Migration 1646–1648: »venir a l la devotione«

The appearance of the Morlacchi, or Vlachs along the Vene-tian-Ottoman border in Dalmatia was one of the conse-

Domagoj Madunić30

quences of the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans in the 15th and 16th century. Vlachs were employed by the Ottomans as auxiliary military units who, after the conquest, were en-gaged to colonize the depopulated areas along the newly es-tablished Ottoman border. In the period from the 15th to 18th century, the legal status of the Vlachs went through several changes. While in the first phases of the conquest Vlachs en-joyed some sort of a privileged position within the Empire, and were more or less treated as the military order, with the stabilization of the western border of the Empire their status began to change, and by the 1620’s, more and more resem-bled that of ordinary raya (non-Muslim subjects of the Ot-toman Empire), and their military service was turned from privilege into kuluk (a force labour in service of a landlord).7 Thus, when the new war between the Republic and the Ot-toman Empire broke out in 1645, and the Ottoman Empire began to show signs of weakness, the idea to abandon their masters and to search for a better life elsewhere appealed to many Morlacchi. The migration of the Morlacchi to Vene-tian Dalmatia was the most influential event of this war. It spanned over the entire duration of the war, and consisted of the two major migration waves, interspersed with con-tinuous flows of small groups, families or individuals who crossed to the territory under Venetian control, either of their own free will in their search for a better life, or forced by the war events.

Already at the beginning of the war, in March 1646, gover-nor-general Leonardo (Lunardo) Foscolo reported to the Se-nate that he had been contacted by the representatives of the various Morlacchi communities who expressed their readi-ness to cross to the Venetian side.8 And indeed, from March until June, the first Morlacchi groups on their own initiative began to cross to the Venetian side.9 This deflection of the first Morlacchi groups almost caught the Venetian govern-ment by surprise. No attempt to initiate and organize further massive migrations of the Morlacchi were undertaken, and these refugees were mainly used as settlers to repopulate the nearby islands, and adult males served as recruitment pool for the various units of the Venetian army. Soon, the Ottoman supremacy in the region, and the start of the new military campaign in June stopped these movements, and the single largest group of Morlacchi that crossed to the Venetian ter-ritory in 1646 was the one accompanying the army of the pa-sha of Bosnia on its summer campaign. In fact, the Morlac-chi migration started only in the following year (1647), when in early spring the strategic initiative shifted to the Venetian side.

In March 1647, while the snow still kept the mountain passes from Bosnia to Dalmatia closed, the Venetian army went on the offensive. In the short campaign, lasting until the end of May, one by one, Ottoman strongholds in Dalma-tia fell into Venetian hands. With these conquests, Venetian forces became the rulers of the virtually entire area between the Dalmatian towns of Zadar (Ital. Zara) and Šibenik (Ital. Sebenico).10 Moreover, with the capture of sancakbeyi of Lika in the town of Zemunik (Ital. Zemonico), and many other »capi principali dei Confini« in other strongholds, practi-cally the entire Ottoman command structure in these parts was wiped out, and the Ottomans were thrown in the state of confusion and disorder, which prevented them to react prop-erly to Venetian actions.11 Under these profoundly changed circumstances began the first wave of the Morlacchi migra-tion. Contacts between Venetian officials and various border Morlacchi communities intensified after the recapture of the Novigrad fortress (Ital. Cittanova) by the Venetians at the end of March. The mastery of the battlefield and the temporary impotence of the Ottomans gave the governor-general Lu-nardo Foscolo upper hand in these negotiations. With the skillful application of the »carrot and stick« strategy – with promises of enrollment into the Venetian army, subsidies of grain, and lands for settlement in Istria to those willing to cross to Venetian lands, and at the same time with publicly proclaiming that all those who remain will be treated as en-emies – Foscolo managed to initiate the migration of the first large groups of Morlacchi to the Venetian side, or as it is usu-ally recorded in the sources, to convince them to »venir alla devotione«.12

From mid-April 1647, the first groups of Morlacchi, from the Velebit slopes and nearby regions, arrived in the area of the Novigrad channel.13 The Venetian command of the coun-tryside and the availability of sea transport made the channel of Novigrad the most suitable gateway to the territories of the Most Serene Republic. Over the next two months, thou-sands of Morlacchi along with their numerous families and large herds of animals descended to the two small Venetian outposts: Posedarje (Ital. Possedaria) and Novigrad and were transported from here by ship to the security of the nearby islands. When, in June, the final account of this operation was made, the governor-general informed the Senate that, all in all, 1000 adult males fit for arms, accompanied by thou-sands of women, children and old people, and almost 80,000 animals crossed to the Venetian territory through that side.14 Similar events, but on a smaller scale, were taking place along the entire Venetian-Ottoman border in Dalmatia. Al-most every thrust of the Venetian army into the Ottoman

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia 31

territory was followed by the migration of some Morlacchi group. Wherever the Venetian army appeared, its presence motivated the Morlacchi to declare themselves ready to »ve-nir alla devotione« and, escorted by the Venetian troops, the Morlacchi left their homes and headed for the coast.15 How-ever, the arrival of the Bosnian pasha at Knin rallied the local spahis, and the soon built-up of the military presence of the Ottomans in the countryside rendered central land routs to-ward Venetian towns closed.16 During the spring of 1647, the Ottoman army began to assemble for its next campaign in Dalmatia, and over time its growing presence made any fur-ther movements of Morlacchi impossible. In July, the Mor-lacchi migration to the Venetian territory all but stopped, and this migration wave ended.

In August 1647 a massive army of the Bosnian pasha, 30,000 to 40,000 men strong, according to the Venetian sources, finally went on the move, and on the 21st of August the Ottomans arrived at the town of Šibenik and began the siege. One month later, the remains of this large army, deci-mated by epidemics and high losses caused by numerous re-pulsed assaults on the town fortifications, retreated from the battlefield.17 The Ottoman failure to capture Šibenik and to shift the initiative to their side had significant consequences for further Morlacchi migrations. Every year, the coming of fall signalized the start of the regular seasonal migration of the Morlacchi and their herds from the mountains to the coastal marines on the Venetian controlled territory. In the pre-war years the Morlacchi could count on the Ottoman protection, but now, with the Ottomans in Dalmatia shaken and with the disbandment of Bosnian spahis at the end of the campaign, the Morlacchi were at the mercy of Venetian forces. Already on the 16th of September 1647, governor-gen-eral Foscolo asked the Senate for instructions how to deal with the numerous expected petitions of these Morlacchi to be allowed to »venir alla devotione«, who now »mentre non protetti da Turchi viveranno sempre con dubio, et timori di esser depredati, et fatti schiavi dai nostri.«18

With the retreat of the Bosnian army, the Morlacchi in Venetian service started a campaign of raids on the Ottoman lands, which resulted in even more petitions of various Mor-lacchi communities still left on the Ottoman side to be al-lowed to migrate to the Venetian territories.19 Through the entire fall and early winter of 1647/8, events similar to those of the previous spring took place. Again, the channel of Novigrad served as the main entry point for the Morlacchi to the territories under Venetian control. Units of the Venetian army or Morlacchi groups were dispatched in the country-side, either to escort incoming Morlacchi groups, or to, by

burning their houses and property, convince irresolute Mor-lacchi to commence their move. Again, thousands of Morlac-chi, bringing their animals and property, swarmed the port of Posedarje.20 Although the presence of the Bosnian pasha at Sinj (Ital. Signo) prevented any major deflections of the Mor-lacchi in those parts, their representatives nevertheless held secret negotiations with Venetian officials in Šibenik. When in February 1648 the Venetian forces launched their offensive to capture two major Ottoman logistical centers on the fron-tier Drniš (Ital. Dernis) and Knin21 the terms of crossing sti-pulated in these negotiations were triggered, and Morlacchi in hundreds begun heading towards Šibenik.22 Finally, with the capture of the famous fortress of Klis (Ital. Clissa) on the 31st of March, Venetian forces became uncontested masters of the countryside, and for more than two months move-ments of Morlacchi toward the coast went unchallenged. Al-though, small Morlacchi groups continued deflecting to the Venetian side for the entire duration of the war, such massive movement of the people as in the period of these two years would never again be repeated during this war.23

Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System

The original plan and the motives of the Venetian Senate behind the decision to authorize governor-general Lunardo Foscolo to engage in an attempt to draw to the Venetian side as many Morlacchi as possible were very simple. The main goal of this operation was to depopulate the lands on the Ot-toman side of the frontier, and use these Ottoman subjects for a recolonization of Istria and the Dalmatian islands.24 In accordance with these directives, Foscolo had already at the end of June shipped first groups of Morlacchi to Istria and to the Island of Krk (Ital. Veglia), and by the end of July, these were followed by further 1500 persons who were trans-ferred to Istria. However, the full execution of this plan met strong opposition from the Morlacchi, who resisted Vene-tian attempts to reallocate them to Istria, mainly because of its climate, and eco-conditions to which they were comple-tely unaccustomed. In the first few years, Morlacchi settlers in Istria were practically decimated by epidemics of malaria and similar indigenous diseases. Due to this, Istria acquired a notorious reputation among the Morlacchi, to the extent that some named it »sepulcher of the living« (sepolcro di vi-venti). In the end, in spite of all the efforts of the governor-general to convince Morlacchi to concede to this transfer,

Domagoj Madunić32

their stubborn refusal to leave Dalmatia rendered the execu-tion of this plan impossible.25

The acquisition of thousands of these new subjects, who stayed in Dalmatia [mainly in the districts of Zadar, Šibenik, and Split (Ital. Spalato)], presented the Venetian government with several practical problems: first, how to organize the Morlacchi and achieve maximum utilization of their military potential, and second, how to secure their loyalty. Although, without any doubt, the large part of the Morlacchi crossed to the Venetian side of their own free will, this was not the case in general.26 The policy proclaimed by the governor-general Foscolo in April 1647 that all those who remained on the Ot-toman side would be treated as enemies, were not just empty words, these were threats backed up by the military force.27 More than anything else, migration took place under the sign of the threat of Venetian arms. Therefore, the Morlacchi re-presented a significant security risk, and it was quite clear to the Venetian officials that their loyalty to the Republic is very doubtful.

In order to address this issues and to prevent the Morlac-chi from returning to the Ottomans, Venetian administration in Dalmatia adopted several policies, which over time became a standard practice in dealing with the Morlacchi crossing to the Venetian side. In the first place, in order to diminish the possibility for Morlacchi to change their minds and re-turn to their old homes on the Ottoman territory, the practice of burning abandoned Morlacchi villages was introduced.28 Second, whenever possible, Morlacchi were separated from their families, which were transferred to the nearby islands or in Istria under the pretext of protection from Ottoman in-cursions, but in reality to function as hostages. Finally, what proved to be the most effective, and longest lasting policy used to secure the loyalty of Morlacchi and to prevent their return to the Ottomans was the policy of »insanguinarli con Turchi«, the goal of which was very simple: to create such a bloody feud between the Morlacchi and the their previous lords which would render their pardon impossible. As soon as the new Morlacchi settled on the Venetian territories, the governor-general started dispatching Morlacchi parties on raids of the Ottoman territories. Since, after the migration, the Morlacchi simply had no way to support themselves, no significant effort was needed to incite them for these actions. The prospect of plunder and war booty, combined with the assurances of protection by Venetian forces in case of emer-gency and the supply of munitions and necessary war materi-als, was all the motivation that was needed.29

Over the years, the Morlacchi-Ottoman warfare, the same as any other guerrilla warfare targeting civilian infrastructure

of the enemy, developed into a bloody conflict full of acts of savage atrocities.30 Customary norms of the 17th century warfare, usually respected in the European-Ottoman con-flicts – such as giving of the quarter and respect for ranks and titles – were in this conflict more an exception than the norm.31 In the end, all of this resulted in the close circle of unending personal vendettas, which rendered any reconci-liation between the Morlacchi and the Ottomans almost im-possible.

On the other hand, as far as the Morlacchi were concer-ned the most efficient way for securing their loyalty was the enrollment in the salaried units of the Venetian army. The re-quest to be enrolled, constituted an integral part of almost every Morlacchi-Venetian negotiations in the spring of 1647, and was considered by the Morlacchi as the most preferable and safest means to secure material support for their fami-lies. However, since this would result in a significant in-crease of the monthly spending, the Venetian government was reluctant to accede to their wishes. Such attitude of the Venetian Senate is easily understood comprehensible when taking the circumstances of the state finances at the time of the Morlacchi migration into account. By May 1647, the Ve-netian logistical system in Dalmatia was on the verge of col-lapse. Monthly salaries to the companies of Italian and trans-alpine infantry (so called compagnie Oltramontane), were on the average four months in arrears, while the situation with the companies of Croatian and Albanian infantry serving as the marine infantry on armed vessels (barche armate) was even worse, with units who not received their salaries for periods of 10 to 14 months. The total debt toward the units of Vene-tian army in Dalmatia amounted to 231,841 ducats, and was steadily increasing with every month. The Republic simply could not provide 50,000 ducats every month needed to cover wages for its forces in Dalmatia.32

Under these circumstances, units of the Venetian army were threatening with open rebellion, and consequently the enrollment of thousands of Morlacchi was considered as a very undesirable step. Nevertheless, in June 1647, governor-general Foscolo informed the Senate that he had no other choice but to enlist 200 Morlacchi under four of their cap-tains, in accordance with the promises made to the Morlac-chi during the negotiations, and asked the Senate for autho-rization to enlist further 500.33 In order to encourage further deflection of the Morlacchi to the Venetian side, the Senate authorized this additional enrollments, and by the end of the December 1647, the number of Morlacchi enlisted in 20 salaried companies was increased to 600.34 However, a continuous flow of the Morlacchi to the Venetian territories

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia 33

through the entire winter and spring of 1648 made the pro-secution of this policy impossible, and a new one had to be found.

For an entire fall-winter 1647/8, the Senate and governor-general Foscolo debated the further course of actions to be taken with the Morlacchi. Should they all be enrolled and organized as the paid units of the Venetian army or should just the partial enrollment be carried out, should they be granted full wages of 4 ducats or just half wages, were they to be allowed to settle in the depopulated lands of the Zadar district, or should the policy of their transfer to Istria be re-lentlessly pursed by all cost?35 In the meantime, the number of Morlacchi newcomers constantly grew, and their sheer number rendered a continuation of this debate pointless. In the letter of 25th December 1647, when the migration of the Morlacchi di Bucovizza, one of the largest group of deflectors, counting almost 2,000 men fit for arms, came to an end, Fo-scolo wrote to the Senate that the most secure way to ensure Morlacchi loyalty would be to enlist them all as soldiers, but since the lack of money did not allow this course to be taken, he proposed that the Morlacchi and their families should be consoled solely with bread, and that a monthly stipend of 4 ducats should be given only to the Capi delle Ville. In this way, wrote Foscolo, with the yearly spending of only 2,000–3,000 ducats, a sum »si può dir insensibile, et che con le morti s’an-darebbe diminuendo, ricavar se ne potrebbe inesplicabil vantaggio.«36 On the 2nd of January 1648, the Senate heeded Foscolo’s advice and gave him broad instructions, allowing the settlement of the Morlacchi on the deserted lands of the Zadar district and authorizing him to keep the leaders of the Morlacchi satisfied and loyal with grants of monthly sti-pends. Additionally, the Senate also authorized Foscolo to, in the course of time, if the circumstances allowed it, grant soldier wages and enlist all the Morlacchi fit for arms. How-ever, when in the spring of 1648, in the aftermath of the new victories of the Venetian arms, additional thousands of Mor-lacchi deserted to the Venetian side, it became obvious that a full enrollment of the 3,000–4,000 of Morlacchi during the wartime was impossible.37

In order to at least partially ease the burden of the gover-nor-general in Dalmatia, another policy was devised, similar to the planned transfer of Morlacchi to Istria. In December 1647, amidst the Morlacchi migration, the Senate instructed the governor-general Foscolo to attempt to organize several companies of Morlacchi for service on Italian possessions of the Republic.38 This policy turned out to be quite success-ful. In February 1648, the first two companies of the Mor-lacchi, counting 210 men, arrived in Venice,39 in April, the

Senate ordered the formation of new companies, and in the October of the same year, further six companies were sent to Venice.40 This operation, continued for the next year, when, in April 1649, three new companies of Morlacchi arrived in Venice destined for service on »terra ferma«.41 In this way, by significantly diminishing their number in Dalmatia, at least some of the burden of maintaining an ever growing number of Morlacchi was taken from the governor-generals in Dal-matia. Even more, since many of the Morlacchi that went to Italy left their families in Dalmatia, they also served as hos-tages and additional assurance of fidelity of the Morlacchi to the Most Serene Republic.

The problem of how to provide the Morlacchi with the means to support themselves was actually never properly solved. The Morlacchi, even those who were enrolled, were in fact left to live of plunder and their stock. They were con-soled and paid on irregular basis, less in money (and then only in form of small advances on their salaries) and more in grain and hardtack (biscotto), and, although they frequently demanded the clearance of their accounts, this was never fully realized. Instead, based on the authority granted to him by the Senate decrees of 28th of January 1648, and 16th of May 1647, to assign some sign of recognition to the de-serving »capi, harambasse de Morlacchi«, governor general Foscolo began to grant monthly stipends of four ducats to the Morlacchi leaders, so-called harambassas (Ottoman Turk. harambaše).42 In practice, the policy adopted by the Most Se-rene Republic in dealing with the Morlacchi was the one proposed by governor-general Foscolo already in Decem-ber 1647, who recommended: »sempre più irritarli contro Turchi, insanguinarli, et allettarli con bottini, ma procurar anco di guadagnar gl’ animi almeno di Principali, per haverli pronti nell’ occorrenze, che rappresentarsi potessero.«43

In the long run, the problem with this arrangement was that the Morlacchi were too successful in raiding nearby Ot-toman lands, and by 1651, those became almost completely desolated and empty, forcing the Morlacchi to search for their booty farther and farther in the distant and more dangerous »hunting grounds«. As a consequence, over the time, the Morlacchi became more and more discontent with the rule of the most Serene Republic, and when in 1651 Foscolo was re-placed by the new governor-general Girolamo Foscarini, the situation he found was anything but rosy. Upon his arrival in Dalmatia, Foscarini reported to the Senate that not only had some groups of Morlacchi returned to the Ottomans, but those who had stayed were almost beyond control, conduc-ting raids not only on the Ottoman lands but also in the area of Poljica (Ital. Poglizze) which subordinated itself to the

Domagoj Madunić34

Venetian Republic, and even on some Dalmatian islands.44 Furthermore, Foscarini reported that the number of the Mor-lacchi had declined significantly, and that they now counted only 2591 adult males fit for service, partially enrolled in 22 companies (18 from Zadar and further 4 from Šibenik), and 6,620 women, children and old. In his long report Foscarini gave serious criticism of the Venetian policies concerning the treatment of the Morlacchi so far. Arguing that arbitrary and irregular distribution of material help in form of money, hardtack and grain resulted only in substantial spending. Ac-cording to the balance sheet made by Foscarini’s administra-tion, from 1647 until the 1st March of 1651, the Republic had spent on Morlacchi almost 166,000 ducats in various forms of subsidies, but with none or limited results, since Morlac-chi in general remained untaken care of and dissatisfied.45

To prevent their complete alienation and return to the Ottomans, Foscarini advised the Senate to authorize him to undertake a reform, the essence of which was transferring the Morlacchi into the units of the regular army. Foscarini proposed that all the male Morlacchi should be enrolled for a regular monthly salary, although much smaller then the one granted to the ordinary soldiers of barche armate, with the ex-ceptions of harambassas, who should continue to receive full salaries. Finally, Foscarini suggested that one of the local Dalmatian subjects should be appointed over the Morlacchi as their »principal capo«.46 Due to the constant financial pro- blems Foscarini’s plan was never approved nor put into exe-cution. On the contrary, during Foscarini’s service in Dal-matia (1651–1653) the monthly pay of the enrolled Morlac-chi were transformed into irregular distributions of grain, granted to them for rendered services (»à mesura delle loro meritevoli operationi«). In order to appease the captains of the Morlacchi companies, because of this change of their sta-tus, they were over time equalled with the grants of monthly stipends of four ducats with the other harambassas who were consoled in this way, with the exceptions of few prominent captains to whom higher stipends were awarded.47

As it has been shown, the Venetian attempts in the orga-nization and utilization of the Morlacchi during their migra-tion went through several phases and significant changes. While the Morlacchi who went over to the Venetian side in the first years of the war (1645–1646), simply served as a re-cruiting ground for filling the ranks of the Venetian regular army, the majority of the Morlacchi of the first wave (in the spring of 1647) were conscripted as salaried soldiers under their own captains. However, war events, specifically the suc-cessful Venetian defense of Šibenik, and the spring campaign of 1648, which initiated the new wave of Morlacchi migra-

tion, rendered the continuation of this practice impossible. Due to the chronic shortage of money, such large numbers could not be accommodated in the ranks of salaried units. Instead, the Morlacchi were left to organize themselves as auxiliary forces under their own leaders, and regular monthly payment was limited only to the most prominent of the Mor-lacchi leaders, while the rest served for a share in the booty and a limited quantity of grain or hardtack.

Although in this way the financial aspect of integration of the Morlacchi into the Venetian defensive system was more or less solved, still the heterogeneous Morlacchi groups had somehow to be organized in order to act in accordance with the overall war strategy. The core of the problem lay in the question of how to organize the higher levels of command structure for the Morlacchi, or, simply put: who were to be the leaders in charge of the Morlacchi raids. Concerning this issue, Venetian administration in Dalmatia took a very practical stand. It was ready to recognize as a legitimate can-didate for this job anyone who could exercise some level of influence and control over the Morlacchi, and was able to organize them and lead them into combat when ordered to do so. At first, it was attempted to put some local Dalmatian nobles in charge of the Morlacchi raids.48 However, soon it became obvious that the Morlacchi were most effective when led by their own leaders, and although two Dalmatian nobles were appointed by the governor-general Foscolo as »sopraintendenti di Morlacchi« – Gregorio Civallelli for the Morlacchi in the district of Zadar, and Zorzi Papali for that of Šibenik – they functioned more as liaison officers, and not as the combat leaders.49 Similarly, activities of the Count of Pos-edarje (Conte di Possedaria), the Dalmatian noble with the most experience in dealing with the Morlacchi, were limited to the military operations of joint combat groups, consist-ing of the Morlacchi and the units of territorial militia and/or companies of barche armate,50 while the leadership of the Morlacchi raiding parties was left to the Morlacchi.

»Capi di Morlacchi« and the Problem of Command Hierarchy

»… mentre è questa gente tumultuosa che non così facilmente soggetta si rende all’ obedienza tanto meno quanto molti pretendono commandare«(Lunardo Foscolo, governor-general in Dalmatia and Al-bania)51

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia 35

The Morlacchi communities that had crossed over to the Venetian side brought with themselves their own social or-ganization. Their leaders styled themselves as conte (Croat. knez), or more often as harambassa. The first term was used to denote a village elder, or in some cases an elder in charge of several villages, while the title of harambassa was primarily a military one. It was held by elected or self appointed mili-tary leaders in charge of small combat units, raging in size from 10 to 200 men, who otherwise held no power or juris-diction over their men. Other persons of prestige amongst the Morlacchi were their parish priests or monks. It is from these two groups, clerics and small combat groups military leaders, that emerged the first set of contestants for the po-sition of the mediator between the Venetian administration and the Morlacchi.

When the Morlacchi began crossing to the Venetian side, their priests not only followed the flock, even more, many of them were actively engaged in the process of negotiations with the Venetian officials, and acted as representatives of the communities; a few even functioned as initiators and organizers of such enterprises.52 Undoubtedly, the most fa-mous one engaged in winning over the hearts of the Morlac-chi for the Venetian cause was Don Stipan Sorić. Priest Sorić was one of the most picturesque characters of this war. Epic folk poetry depicts him as a real warrior priest, and in all honesty, it does not fall far from the truth. He was not only actively participating in operations to bring the Morlacchi to the Venetian side, sometimes even resorting to the use of force, but was also actively engaged in fighting the Ottomans by leading Morlacchi raiding parties. Although his initial of-fers of service to the Venetian administration were met with suspicion,53 his success in bringing over villages under his jurisdiction – his parish Gorica (Ital. Goritza) was located in the Ottoman territory – quickly brought him to the attention of governor-general Lunardo Foscolo, who began to regard him as a person of confidence, spy and liaison officer for contacts with various other Morlacchi groups, all of which in turn, further augmented his esteem among the Morlacchi, who began to perceive him as a representative of the Vene-tian side. In his endeavors, Sorić was helped not as much by his status as the shepherd of the flock, but more by the fact that he could count on support of his numerous Morlacchi kinsmen – also members of his parish – who decided to sup-port his actions as a part of the »family effort«. Thus, Sorić began to build his power base very quickly, and by August 1647 his influence among the Morlacchi was such that Fo-scolo entrusted to him to lead Morlacchi companies as re-inforcements to the besieged town of Šibenik, where Sorić

ultimately confirmed his bravery and qualities as a combat leader, which finally earned him the favor and confidence of governor-general Lunardo Foscolo.54

Parallel to these developments, other Morlacchi lea-ders were also making »names« for themselves on the fron-tier and were competing to earn attention and thrust of the Venetian officials. All such contestants followed the similar career paths. First, by display of personal valor and courage on the battlefield, the harambassa in question would distin-guish himself and earn respect among the Morlacchi and Venetians alike. Then, due to the combination of organiza-tional abilities and the display of a certain level of influence over other Morlacchi, Venetian officials started to perceive the harambassa in question as the suitable representative of a Morlacchi group. Finally, finding the Venetian recognition was also accompanied by some appointment or material gain that would only further fortify that leader’s position among the Morlacchi. The rewards given by the Venetian adminis-tration ranged from monthly rations of grain, hardtack or bread, monthly stipends of 4 ducats (or more in cases of a distinguished harambassa), to gold rings, medals, necklaces and Ottoman slaves. No matter how small they seem, these rewards were of enormous importance. In the first years af-ter their deflection to the Venetian side, the Morlacchi lived in absolute misery and were completely dependent on the Venetian help for their survival. In such circumstances, as the cases discussed in the following paragraphs will show, the ability of a particular Morlacchi leader to tap these scarce ma-terial sources distributed by Venetian government would give him a quick rise through the Morlacchi social hierarchy.

As a result of this process, by the middle of 1648, beside Don Stipan Sorić two other Morlacchi leaders rose to promi-nence. These were harambassa Petar Smiljanić (Ital. Pietro Smiglianich) from the Morlacchi settled in the district of Zadar, and harambassa Vuk Mandušić (Ital. Vucen Mandus-sich) from those around Šibenik. The career path of Petar Smiljanić, followed closely the role model described above. Smiljanić, accompanied by his family, crossed to the Venetian side during the winter of 1647, and immediately enrolled in the ranks of the Venetian army as cavalry soldier. During the Venetian spring campaign of 1647, Smiljanić distinguished himself by acts of personal valor on several occasions, and when from April 1647 Morlacchi groups began to cross to the Venetian side, Smiljaniće took over the role of harambassa and began to organize and lead Morlacchi raids into the Ottoman territory. The first major successful Morlacchi raid, the attack on the town of Gračac (Ital. Gratzaz) in Lika in August 1647, was lead jointly by Smiljanić and Sorić.55

Domagoj Madunić36

A similar career was also made by the other famous Mor-lacchi leader, Vuk Mandušić.56 Although Mandušić crossed to the Venetian side in the last migration wave, some time during the late winter of 1648, he very quickly earned the es-teem of both the Morlacchi of Šibenik, and of the Venetian officials, who styled him as »capo direttore de Morlacchi del territorio di Sebenico.«57 Vuk Mandušić managed to acquire one of the most valuable positions in 1648 the Venetian ad-ministration could grant to any Morlacchi leader: captain-ship, or command over one of the companies of enrolled Morlacchi. This appointment did not only bring a good salary, but more importantly, due to the fact that it was the captain who accepted and dismissed soldiers from his com-pany, several dozens salaried positions were at disposal of its holder which he could give to persons of his trust. As such, captainship was an exceptional tool for establishing a power base for any Morlacchi leader in possession of it. Moreover, it seems that Mandušić also made a very good personal im-pression on governor-general Foscolo, who in his report to the Senate described him with the following words: »Il Capi-tan Mandusich di Morlacchi, esperimentato nell’occorrenze tutte, certo molto valoroso, ma che merita anco il nome di prudente, prerogativa non ordinaria in gente di questa na-tura«.58

It was mainly on these three Morlacchi leaders, priest Sorić, harambassa Smiljanić and captain Mandušić that Vene-tian administration relied to organize and lead Morlacchi parties in action. However, as spectacular as was their rise to prominence, equally spectacular was their end. By Au-gust 1648, within a period of two weeks, all three of them were dead. Smiljanić and Sorić died together, on their return from the Ottoman territory, when their raiding party was am-bushed,59 while Mandušić died two weeks later, during the ambush he laid to an Ottoman raiding party.60

Out of these three, it was Vuk Mandušić whom epic folk songs loved the most, Don Stipan Sorić whom the Venetian government and propaganda favored the most,61 and Petar Smiljanić whose dynastic achievements lasted the longest. Petar was the founder of the most influential Morlacchi clan: the Smiljanićs who played a major role in the Venetian-Mor-lacchi relationship for almost 150 years. Unlike Mandušić, Petar Smiljanić was never given the position of a captain. Rather more important, in May 1648, he was confirmed by the governor-general Foscolo as the »capo di Morlacchi di Buccoviza«, an area in the vicinity of Zadar, which at that time counted 18 villages with a population of around 5,000 peo-ple and represented probably the most numerous Morlacchi community. The most important aspect of this appointment

was that with it Smiljanić was granted legal powers to pre-side over the disputes among the Morlacchi of Bukovica. In this way, Smiljanić became more than just a military leader, and his influence among the Morlacchi increased signifi-cantly.62 When in the early winter of 1647 Petar Smiljanić led his family to the Venetian side, he had been accompanied by his four sons. By the end of the year, two were already dead,63 and now, after Petar’s death, it was time for his two remain-ing sons, Ilija and Filip, to step forward.

The deaths of Sorić and Smiljanić at Ribnik left the Vene-tian administration without suitable partners among the Morlacchi of Zadar. Therefore, governor-general Leonardo Foscolo invited all of the harambassas and asked them to elect new leaders among themselves who he would confirm. The Morlacchi of the Gorica, whose capo was Stipan Sorić, elected Matija Sorić, brother of the late Don Sorić, and those of Bu-kovica elected Ilija Smiljanić, son of Petar.64 A few days later, after the death of Vuk Mandušić, the Morlacchi of Šibenik followed the same pattern and elected as a successor of Vuk Mandušić his only living relative, Tadija Vučević, his nephew. The governor-general confirmed their election and also ac-cepted their request that Tadija was given the captainship of the company commanded by late Mandušić.65 With these two events, three important precedents were set concerning the procedure of the succession of the Morlacchi leaders. The first one concerns the choice of a successor; as we have seen, all the persons elected by the Morlacchi were members of the families of the deceased. In the following years, this heredi-tary principle was to become almost standard practice. Se-condly, a more important precedent concerns the role of the governor-general in the process. The fact that although the governor-general did not take an active part in the process of election, in the end it was him who was in the position to confirm the choices of the Morlacchi which had far reaching consequences. In this way, the participation of a state repre-sentative was ensured in the process of succession, and more importantly, he was given the position of arbiter. Finally, the third precedent concerns the position of the captain that Vuk Mandušić held. By granting this service to Mandušić’s successor, a precedent for the inheritance of state services granted to particular Morlacchi leaders was set.

The deaths of the three Morlacchi leaders created a sort of a power vacuum among the Morlacchi, and many other harambassas aspired to fill that space and follow in their foot-steps. The three set an example, and showed how a personal promotion can be achieved in the service of the Most Serene Republic, based on the merit and personal actions. In the following years among the Morlacchi of Zadar several lea-

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia 37

ders took control over various Morlacchi groups.66 However, the most successful among the contestants, was previously mentioned Ilija Smiljanić, son of late Petar Smiljanić. In the period from his father’s death in August 1648 until 165067

Ilija managed to establish himself as the leader of all of the Zadar Morlacchi, and styled himself with the title of serdar (or sardar).68 As the serdar, Ilija was among the Morlacchi of Za-dar acknowledged as their supreme military commander and judge, he was in charge of the war parties, decided on the selection of targets and routes, and most importantly on the distribution of the booty. Moreover, this title also earned him the respect of the other Morlacchi groups, and it was always him who was in charge when joint war parties were assem-bled.69

The years of Ilija Smiljanić’s »serdarship« and those of both his immediate successors represented the high peak of the Morlacchi autonomy. The Morlacchi of Zadar in the person of young serdar Ilija Smiljanić, as their single repre-sentative, found an excellent negotiating instrument. It was through him that Morlacchi presented their common griev-ances and applications to the Venetian government. For ex-ample, in 1653, when there was a serious chance that peace would be concluded with the Ottoman Empire, the Morlacchi leaders accredited Smiljanić to go to Venice and petition the doge that in the case of peace the Morlacchi were given land and sanctuary in the region of Kotari around Zadar.70 More- over, in the middle of the war, when the Republic heavily relied on Morlacchi services for the defense of its Adriatic posses-sion, the negotiating position of the serdar was quite strong. What firm position the Morlacchi could take in relation to the Venetian officials, can best be illustrated with the events of July 1653, when a large Ottoman raid, 10,000–12,000 men strong, invaded the district of Zadar with the goal of plunder-ing the Morlacchi settlement. On the news of the appearance of the Ottoman forces Ilija Smiljanić as the representative of the Morlacchi, went to the Provveditore Generale di Cavalleria71 and demanded that the Venetian forces under his command provided support to the Morlacchi in defense of their homes. He threatened openly that otherwise they (Morlacchi haram-bassas) were renouncing all of their titles, stipends, and as-signments of any sort, and that they would go to seek greener pastures.72

On the other hand, Venetian administration also very quickly realized the benefits of having at their disposal se- veral »capi principali di Morlacchi«, as Janković, Smiljanić, and Županović were most commonly referred to in the Vene-tian sources. They represented not only suitable partners, who could be counted upon to organize and lead the Morlac-

chi in combat, and in this way greatly increased the utiliza-tion of the Morlacchi as a military asset, but they also could be used as relatively inexpensive instruments of control over the various Morlacchi groups. By granting them special hon-ors, in form of necklaces, medals, rings and other similar gifts, the Venetian administration increased their esteem among the Morlacchi, and also at the same time bound them more closely to its cause, hoping that it could count on them for execution of its policies concerning the Morlacchi.

As long as Ilija Smiljanić was able to exert control over the Morlacchi unite and lead them against the Ottomans when ordered to do so, the governor-generals were content to tolerate the introduction of this novelty, in form of »serd-arship«. In this regard, Ilija Smiljanić without doubt fulfilled the hopes of the Venetian administration. His military record surpassed by far that of his father or Mandušić and Sorić.73 Therefore, it is not surprising that, as the influence of the family among the Morlacchi grew, in order to bind them as closely as possible to its cause, the Venetian administration continuously imposed gifts and granted favors on them.74 At the beginning of his carrier, in July 1648, Ilija Smiljanić was in the usual manner, like any other prominent harambassa, given a monthly stipend of four ducats.75 However, when in June 1651 the young serdar got married in the church of St. Si-mon in Zadar and his wife – who was born as Muslim – was baptized, the governor-general personally attended both cer-emonies, both as best man and godfather, and awarded the couple with sapphire rings and twelve brazza of velvet, and contributed large quantities of hardtack and several bar-rels of wines to the celebration.76 In March 1651, the Senate awarded Ilija Smiljanić with a golden necklace for his ser-vices, although he had to wait for more than one year, until July 1652, for it to arrive in Dalmatia.77 The year after, in 1653, Ilija was given a house in Zadar,78 and the power base of the family was even further enhanced with the appointment of his younger brother Filip to the position of the captain of the company of the regular cavalry in May 1653.79 Furthermore, in reflection to his new status, sometime along the way his monthly stipend was also increased, to the handsome sum of 50 ducats per month. However, like his father, Ilija Smiljanić did not enjoy his fame very long, in September 1654 he was killed leading a Morlacchi raid in the territory of Lika.80 The same month, his younger brother Filip, at that time 24 years old, was unanimously elected by the Morlacchi as the new ser-dar, and a few days after the request of Morlacchi harambassas, his election was confirmed by the governor-general Lorenzo Dolfin.81

Domagoj Madunić38

Filip Smiljanić finally managed to break with the family tradition of dying in the fight with the Ottomans. Instead, he died less then two years later, in February 1656, in a brawl with the Venetian soldiers in Šibenik. In order to appease the Morlacchi because of this incident, he was given state funeral and was ceremonially buried in the Zadar Cathedral.82 The Venetian administration was at that time already alarmed by the power concentrated in the office of the serdar. However, since it proved such an efficient instrument in the manage-ment of the Morlacchi, they did nothing to prevent the elec-tion of the next serdar. Nevertheless, this time several signifi-cant changes occurred. At first, the newly elected serdar was not a member of the Smiljanić family – the choice of the Mor-lacchi was harambassa Janko Mitrović. Secondly, this time the Venetian government took more active participation in the process of transition. Although the Morlacchi informed the governor-general Antonio Zen of their choice immediately after the death of Filip Smiljanić, on the 5th of February 1656, the appointment of Janko Mitrović as the new serdar by the governor-general took place more than a month later on the 25th of March 1656, only after receiving the confirmations from the Senate to do so. Third and most important, un-der the pretext of convenience – since the power base of the Mitrović was located further to the north of the Zadar district around the town of Posedarje (confinium superior) and his du-ties would require his presence there – the governor-general appointed harambassa Ilija Milković (Ital. Ellia Milcovich) as his tenente and in charge of the Morlacchi around the city of Zadar (confinium inferior).83

Several factors made this possible. First, there were no more direct descendants of Petar Smiljanić, and it seems that his closest living relative, nephew Smoljan, had not yet acquired enough reputation and esteem among the Mor-lacchi. Second and more important was, that at this time a small inner circle was formed among the Morlacchi chiefs. This so to say oligarchy consisted of no more than a dozen chiefs who managed to build their own power bases and ac-quire the most lucrative positions and benefits granted by the Venetian government, and who in the end were probably as concerned with the rise of the Smiljanić family as was the Venetian administration. By the arrival of governor-general Antonio Zen in Dalmatia, in January 1655, the number of Morlacchi harambassas in the district of Zadar that enjoyed state stipends amounted to 68 persons.84 However, when in 1653 Ilija Smiljanić, went to Venice to plea for the Morlacchi cause, his credentials were signed only by 22 most respected Morlacchi leaders who can be taken to roughly represent this inner circle. Not surprisingly, at the top of that list one can

find the names of Janko Mitrović and Ilija Milković, the newly appointed serdar and his aide.85

At the time of his election as serdar, Janko Mitrović had already been a well-known and influential harambassa; he had received several tokens of recognition from the Vene-tian administration, and his monthly salary at the time of his election was not the customary 4 ducats, but rather 20.86 Moreover, it also seems that even before the death of Filip Smiljanić, the Morlacchi inclinations shifted in his direc-tion.87 Although, over the time Milković also assumed the title of serdar,88 Mitrović remained the supreme leader of the Morlacchi, and the level of power and influence he ac-cumulated among the Morlacchi of Zadar were without precedent. It seems that in his pretensions Mitrović did not limit itself only to Morlacchi communities, but also at-tempted to extend his authority over the old habitants of the Zadar district. All of this seriously alarmed Venetian admin-istration and especially the governor-general Antonio Ber-nardo who accused Mitrović’s of usurping »una potesta as-soluta«.89

What probably troubled the governor-general the most, was that through the person of the powerful serdar the Mor-lacchi were able to effectively oppose plans for their further integration in the Venetian defensive system. In 1656, the idea of governor-general Foscarini from 1651 that Morlacchi should be put under the command of one Dalmatian noble, was revived, and the Dalmatian nobleman governatore Fran-cesco di Possedaria, with the support of the governor-general, began a campaign to be appointed as collonelo de Morlacchi which would give him military command over the Morlacchi. This project seriously alarmed the Morlacchi, and through their serdar Mitrović they informed the governor-general that they would never accept as their commander anyone who is not a Venetian noble.90 Met with strong opposition on the part of Morlacchi, the Venetian administration was forced to temporarily abort this project. It is not surprising that, when in February 1659 both serdars died in combat,91 the governor general refused to appoint a new serdar, and in his final re-port submitted to the Senate (in 1660) even suggested that the title serdar should never again be given to anyone else, but rather that the harambassas should be overseen in their ma-nagement of the Morlacchi by the public officials, and mili-tary command over the Morlacchi should be given to single public representatives.92

Although for almost a year after the death of Mitrović in March 1659 no new serdar was appointed, and the Morlacchi were managed through several of their chiefs who enjoyed the trust of the governor-general, but without any official ap-

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia 39

pointment and or extra salary, this turned out to be only a tem-porary solution. With the arrival of the new governor-general Andrea Corner in March 1660, the Venetian administration again turned to the office of a serdar as the most preferable tool for »managing« the Morlacchi, however, with one signi-ficant change. This time, already at the beginning two serdars were appointed, both of equal rank, and none subordinated to the other, with the division of their jurisdictions along the lines introduced in 1656. Furthermore, this time the Vene-tian administration was aware of the dangers of hereditary practice, and although the serdar in charge of the area around Zadar came from the Milković family, the one in charge of the area previously overseen by the powerful Janko Mitrović was not his son Stojan Mitrović, but harambassa Petar Grgu-rica (Ital. Pietro Grgurizza).93 In this manner, the position of the serdar was seriously weakened, and with the extension of participation in this lucrative position to the new clan, their support to the Venetian cause was further secured.

Soon the Venetian administration came to realize that they had finally found the correct policy. When in July 1663 both of the serdars died in fighting the Ottomans, the Morlac-chi informed the new governor-general Girolamo Contarini that they would like to have as their single capo harambassa Mattio Mircovich.94 However, it seems that the memory of the days of the powerful serdars (Smiljanić and Mitrović) was still alive, and Venetian administration had no wish to revive them again. Instead, the new governor-general followed the same practice as his predecessor: again two serdars where ap-pointed and none of them from any of the clans that previ-ously had supplied serdars, such as Smiljanić, Mitrović or Milković, but rather from two other prominent families – the above mentioned Mirković and the Čačić family.95

In the meantime, one last step in integrating the Morlac-chi in the hierarchy of the Venetian administrative structure in Dalmatia took place. In December 1663 the noble of Zadar, Donato Civalleli, who since 1654 held the office of the soprain-tendente di Morlacchi, died, and the governor-general replaced him by another Dalmatian noble, the powerful and influen-tial colonello Francesco di Possedaria.96 This appointment had serious consequences for the Morlacchi-Venetian relations, since with it a nominal supervision of the sopraintedente was turned into reality. While in the days of Donato Civalleli, the Morlacchi usually bypassed him and presented their grie-vances and petitions directly to the governor-general through their serdars, now they started to do it through the person of Francesco di Possedaria,97 who also began to attend the Morlacchi assemblies as the representative of the governor-general.98 In addition, orders of the governor-generals con-

cerning Morlacchi affairs were from that time usually ad-dressed to colonello Possedaria, serdars and other capi.

The role the Venetian administration envisaged for Francesco di Possedaria to play in Venetian-Morlacchi rela-tions soon became completely clear. In October 1664, since the two existing serdars where already of age and required as-sistance to perform their duties, a third office of the serdar was created. With this act, not only the prestige of the title of serdar was further diminished, but also the position of Francesco di Possedaria within the hierarchy was given of-ficial confirmation. In the decree of the appointment it was clearly stated that the new serdar same as the two old ones, Mirković and Čačić, were subordinated to the »colonello Francesco di Possedaria loro capo e direttore«. In this way, what could not be done in 1651 or 1656, in the days of strong Morlacchi serdars, was finally successfully established in 1664, and serdars were subordinated to an appointed state official. Most probably in order to appease the Morlacchi, the gov-ernor-general for this honor appointed a »capitano et hara-mbassa Smoglian Smiglianich« (Croat. Smoljan Smiljanić),99 a head of the famous and widely respected Smiljanić family. With these events, a long lasting process of creating a frame-work for the integration of the Morlacchi came to an end, and until the end of the war no new changes in Morlacchi-Venetian relationship were introduced. In the end, although serdars remained freely elected by the Morlacchi, they were confirmed by the governor-general (and with this act also granted state salaries), and in their work (at least in theory) supervised by Venetian officials.

Conclusion

The integration of tens of thousands of Morlacchi immi-grants and their transformation from the Ottoman raya into obedient subjects of the Venetian Republic would represent a serious problem for the Venetian government even in peace-time. In war time the task was nearly impossible. As this ar-ticle argued, the final result, an integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia as units of ter-ritorial irregular militia, with their separate command struc-ture, was a not intended product of a single long term policy defined by the central organs of the Venetian government. Instead, it rather represents an outcome of the combination of skilful improvisations on the part of various governor- generals in Dalmatia: their responses to the challenges of the daily needs and particular situations, material constraints

Domagoj Madunić40

within which they had to operate, and general instructions formulated by the central organs of the state.

Already at the beginning of the migration, general-go-vernor Leonardo Foscolo realized that the minimum require-ment for establishing some level of control over the Morlac-chi immigrants was to win over their chiefs for the Venetian cause. And indeed, of all the policies devised by the Venetian government to ensure the loyalty of its new subjects, in the end the one that proved to be most effective was the state sponsored stratification of the Morlacchi society as a con-sequence of which a new elite was formed among the Mor-lacchi. The elite, elevated to its privileged position through the acquirement of state stipends and other benefits granted by the Venetian government, thus its existence was closely bound to the Republic.

Another important process that occurred during this war was the adoption of the office of serdar – originally introdu-ced by the Morlacchi of Zadar on their own – in the Venetian administrative structure. The existence of serdars was to be one of the specificities of the Venetian military border in the 18th century. The appearance of the serdars among the Mor-lacchi was a product of several factors: 1) the war necessities which demanded the existence of a supreme combat leader who could better organize the Morlacchi military activities, 2) the need of the Morlacchi communities of a judiciary au-thority that could preside over their disputes, 3) the need of a medium through which the Morlacchi could represent their grievances to the Venetians and further their cause, and fi-nally 4) the dynastic efforts of the Smiljanić family. After few initial years, Venetian administration became aware of both the utility and the dangers of this novelty introduced by the Morlacchi, and acted accordingly. As it has been shown, in less than a decade the position of the serdars was subjugated and incorporated into the hierarchy of the state administra-tion. In these efforts, the Venetian administration was helped by two factors: first, the high death rate among the serdars, (successors of Ilija Smiljanić lasted between 2–4 years) and secondly by the rivalry among the Morlacchi clans. With each new election of a serdar, the involvement of the state in the process was becoming higher and higher. Additionally, with the creation of several offices of the serdar, the participation in the state services and benefits were extended to the wider circle of influential Morlacchi families, and in such way wider support for the Most Serene Republic among the Morlacchi chiefs was ensured.

When the war ended in 1669, it was to the serdars and other »Capi di Morlacchi« that Venetian administration turned to for maintaining law and order on the border, and the most

important: the prevention of further Morlacchi raids. For the small inner circle of the »Capi di Morlacchi«, the loss of autonomy and their transformation from community lea- ders into state officials were a small price to pay compared to the attained personal gains. In addition to the titles and sti-pends, after the war, the »Capi di Morlacchi« were rewarded with the grants of lands for their faithful services.100 Over the decades, various titles and offices were practically turned into hereditary ones. Probably the most striking in this re-gard is the case of the Smiljanić family. For more than 130 years, from the appointment of Smoljan Smiljanić in 1664 till the fall of the Republic in 1797, the title of the serdar was con-stantly held by some member of the family.101 Battlefield pro-motions were not unknown in the 16th and 17th centuries, but war rarely acted as such a rapid catalyst for the creation of an entire elite. As a symbolic culmination of this process, the events of the year 1670 can be taken, when the widely re-spected and famous young harambassa Stojan Janković (son of the serdar Janko Mitrović) was granted the knighthood of the Order of St. Mark by the Senate on 13th March 1670 as a recognition for his services and those of his father, and a few months later, just like all other »Capi di Morlacchi«, was given large areas of state land.102 In just a span of one genera-tion, the Janković-Mitrović family crossed the gap from the Ottoman harambassa to the Cavaliere di San Marco.103

In this regard, seen from the perspective of the Morlacchi chiefs, the Republic of St. Mark offered far better opportu-nities for personal advancement through merit than the Ot-toman Empire. Furthermore, a high death rate was not only characteristic among the holders of the title of serdar. »Capi di Morlacchi« were in the first place combat leaders, and the death toll these families paid during the war was staggering. Applications of various Morlacchi submitted to the Venetian Senate, with petitions for some form of recognition for the services rendered to the Republic, by them or members of their family, are full of records of family tragedies, of lost brothers, fathers and cousins.104 For the descendants of the Morlacchi families that rose to prominence during this war, Smiljanić, Mitrović, Milković, Mirković, and others, military service to the Most Serene Republic and »heroic deeds« of their ancestors captured in the epic folk poetry, became an integral part of the family tradition and closely tied to their own sense of identity. What seriously hampered Venetian ef-forts in the integration of the Morlacchi at the beginning of the war was the fact that apart from the common religion, these two groups lacked any sharable traditions, either le-gal, political or cultural ones, that could serve as a bridge be-tween the state and its new subjects. In the end what served

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia 41

as a link to cross this gap was the Morlacchi elite born during the War of Crete.

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E n d n o t E s

1 the problem of the collective identity of the Morlacchi – or Vlachs, as

they are more commonly referred to – is a complex and controversial one,

and has already been the subject of many historiographical debates. the

questions such as whether the Morlacchi / Vlachs formed a separate ethnic

group, whether they belonged to the serbian or Croatian ethnic bodies, or

whether they should be approached not as an ethnic, but rather as a distinc-

tive social group defined by its privileged position, are all beyond the inter-

est of this paper. For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to say that

the Venetians used the name Morlacchi for almost all of the ottoman rural

subjects, of both orthodox and Catholic denomination, who lived in the

area along the border of Bosnia and dalmatia. For the Venetians and for the

majority of contemporary dalmatians, these people were simply the nazione

Morlaccha. the existing literature on the problem of the Vlachs is vast and

extensive, so here I will only mention the most recent work by Zef Mirdita

(MIRdItA 2004) dealing with the problem of Vlachs in historiography. the

study provides an overview of the treatment of the Vlach question in all of

the major regional historiographies (Albanian, Croatian, Greek, Romanian,

serbian). Furthermore, for a good analysis of the usages of the name of

Morlacchi by contemporary Venetians see noVAK 1971. In this paper I have

decided to adopt the Venetian view of this population and use the Italian

version of their name: Morlacchi. For more on this migration in its broader

historical context and its consequences on the development of dalmatian

society see: MAYHEW 2008, 185–226.

2 noVAK 1972, 116. Rather comprehensive overview of the organs and

institutions of Venetian administration in dalmatia, and especially the role

of the governor-general offers: MAYHEW 2008, 141–162.

3 dE LA HAYE 1669, 103.

4 For an introduction in English of this unique institution which managed

to survive well into the late half of the 19th century see the classical work of

Gunther Rothenberg (RotHEnBERG 1963). the literature on the Croatian-

slavonian Military Frontier is vast and extensive, and at this place I only

mention the relatively recent work by Karl Kaser which contains good cover-

age of the historiography of this topic, for more see KAsER 1997, 21–29. on

the dalmatian Military Frontier and historiography of this topic see PERIČIĆ

1989. – GRGIĆ 1962 and sFRECoLA 1998. As for the ottoman side of the

frontier, the Bosnian historian Hamdija Kreševljaković, in his work on the

development of Bosnian »kapetanije« (military districts), was among the first

to point out that similar developments as those that led to the formation of

the Croatian-slavonian frontier also took place on the ottoman side of the

border (KREŠEVLJAKoVIĆ 1980). In addition on the Bosnian Military Frontier

see the studies by: sPAHo 1989 and sUĆEsKA 1989. However, the first

approach the research of the phenomenon of this frontier in its full scope,

covering not only political and/or military aspects of the problem and insist-

ing on the unity of the frontier as a single space, a unity that manifested

in similar patterns of life, shared mentality, cultural traditions, economy

etc., along the entire Habsburg-ottoman-Venetian border marked drago

Roksandić with his notion of Triplex Confinium. For the full list of studies on

this topic see the list of project publications in RoKsAndIĆ 2003, 241–242.

For the ethymological development of the terms: confinium, frontier, border,

»krajina« and other similar slavic variants, see: RoKsAndIĆ 2003, 25–50.

Additionally, for the comparative survey of the triplex Confinium historiogra-

phy see BRACEWELL 2006.

5 translation by the author. noVAK 1972, 259.

6 stAnoVEVIĆ 1958, 125–146. – PRAGA 1993, 191. – MAYHEW 2008,

44–48.

7 MoAČAnIn 1998, 133–134.

8 dEsnICA 1950, 11.

9 the first recorded group that crossed to the Venetian side was 20

families from the village of Miragnie (Croat. Miranje), led by their priest

and other village elders, one month later they were followed by another

group of families from the Velebit region. However, when in June 1646

the army of the Bosnian pasha took the field, all such movements

stopped. dEsnICA 1950, 11–12. – JAČoV 1991, 28–29. – stAnoJEVIĆ 1959,

107–108.

10 In his letter, dated 26th of April 1647, Foscolo informed the senate that

to the ottomans »in quelle parti più non resta ne anco un palmo di terreno,

tutto guadagnato dall’ armi di Vostra serenità.« AsVe, PtM, b. 464, n. 238

(di Galea, Pontadura 26. Aprile 1647). For more on Foscolo’s campaigns of

1647/48 see: sAssI 1937. – stAnoJEVIĆ 1959, 109–113 and 118–122. – JAČoV

1992, 29–43 and 52–80.

11 AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. 231 (Zara, 13. Aprile 1647); n. 235 (Zara, 20. Aprile

1647).

12 the oldest preserved contract between the Morlacchi and Venetian

officials is that of the village of Vojnić and governor-general Foscolo which

contains all of the above elements. the Morlacchi were granted lands and

pastures in Istria (village of Costagnizza and mountains tribglienizza and

dobridol), and according to the terms of the contract they were promised

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia 43

200 positions in the four companies of the marine infantry (compagnie di

Barc’ armate) under their own captains, with the standard salary and ration

of hardtack (con la paga e biscotto giusta il solito). dEsnICA 1950, 12–13; AsVe,

PtM, b. 464. n. 232 (Zara, 14. Aprile 1647).

13 Venetian reports provide excellent illustrations of how the Morlacchi

migration looked like in practice, and what sort of logistical challenge it

represented for the Venetian administration. the first major group that

arrived at the novigrad channel were the Morlacchi from the villages of

Jasenica (Ital. Gessenizze), this group counted 500 persons in total, of which

90 were fit for military service, but they also brought with themselves 20,000

animals, of which 2,000 large ones. due to such large quantity of animals,

the operation of their transfer to the nearby island of Pag (Ital. Pago) lasted

for two whole days. AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. (236. Galera in Canal di novegradi,

23. Aprile 1647).

14 AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. 256 (Zara, 13. Giugno 1647).

15 For, example, when in late April the suburb of the town of Vrana and

surrounding villages were burned by the Venetian forces, 60 Morlacchi with

their families, accompanied by 3,000 animals, escorted by the Venetian

army, crossed to Venetian territory and were settled on the island of Murter.

AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. 236 (Galea in Canal di novegradi, 23. Aprile 1647).

16 In mid May, governor-general Foscolo informed the senate, that

because of the increased ottoman presence in the countryside he was forced

to temporary put on hold further negotiations with the Morlacchi, and that

in the expectation of the imminent ottoman offensive emphasis should be

solely on the organization of defense, and not to hazard any more troops

in the sorties in countryside, in order to provide protection for deflecting

Morlacchi groups. AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. 246 (di Galea sebenico, 18. Maggio

1647).

17 stAnoJEVIĆ 1958, 11–112.

18 AsVe, PtM, b. 465. n. 316 (di Galea sebenico, 16. settembre 1647).

19 For example, already in the october 1647, after a successful raid on fort

(castel) Radutz in Lika, many Morlacchi from this region asked to be allowed

to migrate to Venetian territories. AsVe, PtM, b. 465. n. 330 (Zara, 16. ot-

tobre 1647).

20 the largest group of Morlacchi that crossed to the Venetian side in this

phase were those of the area of Bukovica (Ital. Buccovizza), counting almost

2000 men fit for arms and thousands more of women, children and old. their

transport to the dalmatian islands lasted for more than a month and was

finished only by the end of december 1647. AsVe, PtM, b. 465. n. 343 (Zara,

20. novembre 1647); n. 355 (Zara, 25. decembre 1647).

21 For details on the Venetian spring campaign of 1648 see: stAnoJEVIĆ

1958, 118–122.

22 stAnoJEVIĆ 1958, 122. – KosoR 1995, 124–130; For the terms of agree-

ment between the Venetian magistrate (Conte) in Šibenik and representatives

of the Morlacchi from the Petrovo polje (Ital. Campo di Pietro) region, which

could be taken to represent the final step in the evolution of the Venetian

policies concerning the crossing of the Morlacchi groups to their side see:

dEsnICA 1950, 26–28.

23 As late as 1667, one Morlacchi group of 30 families from the region of

Lika asked the permission to cross to the Venetian side, and to be granted

lands and usual salaries of 4 ducats for the harambassas. AsVe, PtM, b. 497. n.

10 (Zara, 6. novembre 1667).

24 AsVe, senato Rettori, R-17, f. 76v–77r; R. 18. f. 93r–v; AsVe, PtM, b. 464.

n. 268 (Zara, 5. Luglio 1647).

25 stAnoJEVIĆ 1958, 116. – sAssI 1937/II, 73–74. – AsVe, PtM, b. 465.

n. 349 (Zara, 9. decembre 1647).

26 Concerning the motivation of the Morlacchi crossing to the Venetian

side, in May 1647, Foscolo wrote to the senate that: »alcuni per sottrarsi

dal giogo ottomano, altri per non restar soccombenti nelle scorrerie da me

ordinate«. AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. 246 (di Galea, sebenico, 18. Maggio 1647).

27 on several occasions, the governor-general had ordered to burn down

villages and property of irresolute Morlacchi communities, in order to force

them on the move. Moreover, during the operations against Vrana, obrovac

(Ital. obrovazzo) and other ottoman stronghold, Venetian forces, in the

manner of any 17th century mercenary army, was indiscriminately looting vil-

lages in their surrounding without any difference whether their inhabitants

were Muslims or Christians. dEsnICA 1950, 14. – AsVe, PtM, b. 465. n. 352

(Zara, 15. decembre 1647).

28 For example in May 1647 governor-general Foscolo commissioned the

Conte di Possedaria to burn abandoned houses of the Morlacchi in order to

»levarli l’allettamento del ritorno«. dEsnICA 1950, 14.

29 the basis of these policies were outlined already at the beginning of the

migration, in the letters from June 1647, in which governor-general Foscolo

informed the senate concerning his planned conduct with the newly arrived

Morlacchi. AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. 256 (Zara, 13. Giugno 1647). the senate’s

instruction dated 3rd July 1647 authorized all actions by Foscolo and encour-

aged him to continue with the project of creating a bloody feud between the

Morlacchi and their former lords. AsVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, f. 144v–145v.;

see also: AsV. senato, dispacci, PtM. b. 464. n. 265. (Zara, 30. Giugno

1647).

30 the Venetian sources are full of records of acts of gruesome violence

that gave this war its notorious frontier character, such as: killing of prison-

ers, head-taking and collecting of noses or ears of killed ottomans, to be

presented as proofs of their deeds to the Venetian authorities, who then in

turn awarded bearers of such items with stipends of grain or money. For

example, in october 1653, Gregorio Galatovich who presented to the

governor-general the head of an ottoman agha, named Assan Cuna, was

awarded with one portion of hardtack per month for the duration of the war.

dEsnICA 1950, 69.

31 For example, during the raid in February 1659, both Morlacchi serdars:

Mitrović and Milković, were killed, and in revenge for their deaths the Mor-

lacchi killed all of the ottoman prisoners, including the Alaibegh, a person

of great fame and influence on the frontier. dEsnICA 1950, 101f.

32 AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. 246 (di Galea sebenico, 18. Maggio 1647).

attachment no.1 Avanzo delle Militie Italiane, oltramontane, Corse, Crvate,

et Albanese, che paga la Cassa del Generalato et Camera di Zara per tutto

Domagoj Madunić44

il mese di Maggio corrente; see also: AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. 261. (Zara, 22.

Giugno 1647). – sAssI 1937/II, 61.

33 AsVe, PtM, b. 464. n. 256 (Zara, 13. Giugno 1647). By allowing four

Morlacchi captains to organize their companies, although completely in

accordance with the agreed terms concerning their crossing to the Venetian

side, governor-general Lunardo Foscolo overstepped his authority. Issuing

licenses to captains to form new companies was strictly in the domain of

the senate, governor-generals could only submit the petitions of the ap-

plicants, not grant them. For more on the organization and administration

of the Venetian army see: PRELLI 1993, 5–12; and for the competences of the

governor-general MAYHEW 2008, 150–156.

34 AsVe, PtM, b. 465. n. 349 (Zara, 9. decembre 1647).

35 AsVe, PtM, b. 465. n. 316 (di Galea sebenico, 16. settembre 1647); n.

326 (Zara, 8. ottobre 1647); AsVe, senato Rettori, R-19, f. 92v–94r, 126v–

127v, 140v–141v, 154v, 162r.

36 AsVe, PtM, b. 465. n. 338. (Zara, 4. novembre 1647); n. 355 (Zara, 25.

decembre 1647).

37 In May 1648, Foscolo informed the senate of the inability of carrying out

full scale enrollment of the Morlacchi due to the chronic lack of cash and

that he was thus forced to suspend execution of this order. AsVe, PtM, b.

466. no. 408 (Zara, 4. Maggio 1648).

38 AsVe, PtM, b.465. no. 351 (Zara, 14. decembre 1647).

39 AsVe, Senato Mar, registro 106, f. 60v; AsVe, PtM, b. 465. n. 374 (Zara, 8.

Febbraio 1647. m.v.).

40 AsVe, PtM, b. 466. n. 408 (Zara, 4. Maggio 1648); n. 415 (Zara, 25.

Maggio 1648); AsVe, senato Mar, Registro 107, f. 80r.

41 AsVe, Senato Mar, registro 108, f. 108v, 133r.

42 AsVe, senato Rettori, R-19, f. 166v–168v. For example of such decrees

by Lunardo Foscolo of the years 1648–1649 see: dEsInCA 1950, 32–33, and

52–55.

43 AsVe, PtM, b. 465. n. 355 (Zara, 25. decembre 1647).

44 In April 1651, one raiding party attacked the dalmatian islands of Brač

(Ital. Brazza) and Hvar (Ital. Lessina). AsVe, PtM, b. 471. n. 12 (trau, 24.

Marzo 1651).

45 AsVe, PtM, b. 471. n. 22 (spalato, 14. Aprile 1651).

46 AsVe, PtM, b. 471. n. 22 (spalato, 14. Aprile 1651).

47 AsVe, PtM, b. 473. n. 158 (dai scogli di Zara, 9. Gennaro 1652. m.v.);

out of the 15 Morlacchi captains, affected by this reform, for whom Foscarini

asked the senate for a confirmation of this arrangement, the governor-

general also recommended that to the four most distinguished of them: the

captains Boxe Zuppanovich (Croat. Bože Županović), nicolo and Francesco

sorich (Croat. nikola and Fran sorić) and Mattio Mircovich (Croat. Matija

Mirković) should be granted stipends of six instead of usual four ducats.

48 For example, when in June 1647, one of the first Morlacchi raiding

parties formed of the newly arrived Morlacchi was dispatched against the

ottomans, it was led by the two brothers, Gregorio and donato Civallelli,

dalmatian nobles from Zadar. AseV, PtM, b. 464. n. 269 (Zara, 9. Luglio

1647).

49 the participation of these two nobles in the military actions is recorded

only in the case of major military operations in which Morlacchi participated

as auxiliary units of the Venetian army. For example in February 1652, dur-

ing the attack on fortress of Zadvarje (Ital. duare), Morlacchi of Zadar and

Šibenik were led by these two dalmatian nobles to the zone of operation.

AsVe. PtM, b. 472. n. 90 (Almissa [Croat. omiš], 20. Febbraio 1651. m.v.); n.

91 (Almissa, 24. Febbraio 1651. m.v.).

50 on the activities of the Count of Posedarje see: AsVe, PtM, b. 464.

n. 293 (Zara, 17. Agosto 1647); b. 465. n. 330 (Zara, 16. ottobre 1647). –

dEsnICA 1950, 37–39.

51 AsVe, PtM, b. 466. n. 426 (Zara, 21. Giugno 1648).

52 In the preserved records of Morlacchi-Venetian negotiations one can

frequently find as Morlacchi representatives persons of clerical background.

such was for example the case of the village of Miranje and its neighboring

villages, where negotiations were headed by parocho Pietro Popovich, or with

don simon nisich who was sent by Venetians to bring to their side Morlac-

chi from the Velebit region, or with the 13 villages of »Petrovo polje« were

among the names of Morlacchi representatives who signed the treaty with

the Venetians one can find also three Franciscan friars including such high

ranking official as nicolo Rusich »diffinitore della provincia di Bosnia«. see:

dEsnICA 1950, 11f.,17, and 26–28.

53 dEsnICA 1950, 17. – JAĆoV 1992, Vol. 1, 146–148.

54 For more on the life of don stipan sorić see: PERIČIĆ 1997.

55 For a full cursus honorum of Petar smiljanić see his letter of recommen-

dation issued by governor-general Lunardo Foscolo on 28 decembre 1647,

listing all his activities in Venetian service, either as the regular soldier or as

Morlacchi harambassa. dEsnICA 1950, 30. Furthermore, for a full biography

see: JELIĆ 1982/1983 and HRABAK 1953, 7–22.

56 For more on Vuk Mandušić see: MIJAtoVIĆ 1995, 83–94 and dEsnICA

2008, 118–124.

57 dEsnICA 1950, 51.

58 AsVe, PtM, b. 466. n. 419 (Zara, 3. Giugno 1648).

59 dEsnICA 1950, 41–45.

60 dEsnICA 1950, 46–52.

61 For example in the contemporary historiography of the war of Crete,

the migration of the Morlacchi to the Venetian side in spring of 1647 is

represented as the almost exclusive work by the priest stipan sorić. He is

depicted as their supreme leader »Capitano, Condottiere e difensore« of all

the Morlacchi. BRUsonI 1673, 126–128.

62 dEsnICA 1950, 36.

63 Both died during the spring campaign of 1647, Ivan during the charge

at the fortresses of nadin, and Mate during the capture of Vrana. JELIĆ

1982/1983, 118.

64 dEsnICA 1950, 45–46.

65 AsVe, PtM, b. 467. n. 446 (Zara, 1. Agosto 1648). – dEsnICA 1950,

50–52.

66 In the northern parts, around the Posedarje, harambassa Janko Mitrović

(Ital. Gianco Mitrovich), founder of the well known Mitrović-Janković clan,

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia 45

assumed charge over the Morlacchi settled in that area. Among the Morlac-

chi of Gorica, the first large group that went to the Venetian side, led by

late priest stipan sorić, the leadership passed from sorić’s brother to the

governatore Boxe Zuppanovich, who proved to be a more successful military

leader and organizer. dEsnICA 1950, 46. such division of power among the

Zadar Morlacchi was noted by Foscarini in his letter: AsVe, senato, dispacci,

PtM. b. 472. n. 95. (spalato, 11. Marzo 1652).

67 the first recorded mention of Ilija smiljanić as a serdar is from February

1650, when Morlacchi petitioned the governor-general to allow passage of

their serdar to Venice, so he could personally present their case to the doge.

stAnoJEVIĆ 1958, 172. – AsV, PtM, b. 469. n. 680 (Zara 18. Febraro 1650,

attachment: Lettera scritta da Morlacchi).

68 the title of the serdar or sardar represents the ottoman legacy among the

Morlacchi, and denotes the supreme military leader or field marshall. For

more see: BosWoRtH 1997, 50.

69 For example such was the case with the joint operations of the Morlac-

chi of Zadar and Šibenik in november 1649 and in december of 1653.

stAnoJEVIĆ 1958, 127 and 134.

70 dEsnICA 1950, 65.

71 during the War for Crete the Provveditore Generale di Cavalleria repre-

sented the second most important office in the Venetian administrative

structure in dalmatia. He was not only in charge of all of the cavalry forces,

but was with the senate decree from 14th of June 1647 given precedence over

any other Capo di Guerra serving in the province. this in practice meant that

any execution of the military operations was almost always entrusted to the

Provveditore Generale di Cavalleria, if one was available. MAYHEW 2008, 145

and sAssI 1937/II, 64.

72 »…altrimenti protestava à nome di tutti gl’altri Karambasse, et Morlac-

chi, che rinontiavano Condotte, stipendij, et assegnamenti d’ogni scorse, et

che sarebbero andati à cercar loro fortuna in altra parte.« AsVe, PtM, b. 474.

n. 62 (di Zara, 14. Luglio 1653).

73 For a more detailed overview of the military activities of Ilija smiljanić in

the period 1648–1654 see stAnoJEVIĆ 1958, 125–134.

74 It is also interesting to note that the Venetian Republic was not without

competitors. the fame of the young serdar Ilija smiljanić also draw the atten-

tion of the famous and powerful Croatian magnate Conte Pietro di Srin (Croat.

Petar Zrinski / Hung. Zrínyi Péter) who attempted to draw smiljanić and his

companions to cross to his territories and enter his service. AsVe, PtM, b.

471. n. 43 (spalato, 12. Luglio 1651); n. 49 (Zara, 15. Agosto 1651).

75 dEsnICA 1950, 40–41.

76 AsVe, PtM, b. 471. n. 37 (Zara, 19. Giugno 1651).

77 AsVe, PtM, b. 473. n. 115 (Zara, 12. Luglio 1652).

78 dEsnICA 1950, 66.

79 dEsnICA 1950, 66–67.

80 dEsnICA 1950, 75–77. – AsVe, PtM, b. 476. n. 158 (Zara, 9. settembre

1654).

81 AsV, PtM. b. 476. n. 160. (Zara, 16. settembre 1654). It is also interesting

to note that on the same occasion Katarina, widow of the late Ilija smiljanić,

with the support of all the Morlacchi harambassas, petitioned the governor-

general to be granted some monthly stipend as a sign of recognition for the

services of her late husband. In accordance with its usual practice of conced-

ing to similar requests from the widows or children of its deserving subjects

who gave their lives in service, and to appease the Morlacchi, the senate

instructed the governor-general to grant this request, and Lorenzo dolfin

entitled her with the stipend of 12 ducats per month for life. dEsnICA 1950,

79. For more on the wife of Ilija smiljanić, the so-called »Kate turkinja« also

see: MAYHEW 2006, 90–93.

82 AsVe, PtM, b. 478. n. 89 (Zara, 5. Febbraio 1655. m.v.).

83 AsVe, PtM, b. 478. n. 89 (Zara, 5. Febbraio 1655. m.v.). dEsnICA 1950,

89.

84 AsVe, PtM, b. 477. n. 12 (Zara, 11. Febbraio 1654. attachment to the let-

ter).

85 dEsnICA 1950, 65–66.

86 dEsnICA 1950, 70. Moreover, in recognition of his services Mitrović

succeeded in securing the monthly stipend of 6 ducats also for his underaged

son stojan. dEsnICA 1950, 67.

87 While in the days of Ilija smiljanić it was almost always him who pre-

sented the Morlacchi applications to the governor-general, in the days of the

»serdarship« of his brother Filip this was more and more done by harambassa

Janko Mitrović. For example the repeated requests of Morlacchi chiefs for

the payments of the money indebted to them, on account of their monthly

stipends, were submitted to the governor-general by Janko Mitrović. AsVe,

PtM, b.477. n. 12 (Zara 11. Febbraio 1654. m.v.); b. 478. n. 79 (Zara, 1. de-

cembre 1655).

88 dEsnICA 1950, 103.

89 noVAK 1972, 145.

90 dEsnICA 1950, 90–92.

91 dEsnICA 1950, 101–103. – stAnoJEVIĆ 1958, 139.

92 noVAK 1972, 145.

93 First, in May 1660, the captain of Zadar appointed two new serdars,

proposed by the Morlacchi, and later, in March 1661, the governor-general

confirmed this appointment of his subordinated officers, and established

their monthly stipends at 10 ducats. dEsnICA 1950, 105–106.

94 AsVe, PtM, b. 490. n. 83 (spalato, 7. Luglio 1663).

95 dEsnICA 1950, 117–118.

96 At the time of his appointment, Francesco di Possedaria had already ac-

cumulated several important offices, by his birth he was count of Posedarje,

and as such also held the title of a governatore, or the civil administrator of

the area, he was also the colonello in charge of the territorial militia of the

town of nona (Croat. nin), and now he was appointed as the head of the

Morlacchi of the district of Zadar. AsVe, PtM. b. 491. n. 116 (spalato, 10.

decembre 1663).

97 For example in May 1664, it was through Francesco di Possedaria that

Morlacchi petitioned the governor-general for a supply of munitions and

bread to be used while performing the guard duties. AsVe, PtM, b. 492. n.

147 (Zara, 17. Maggio 1664).

Domagoj Madunić46

98 It seems that over the years the diligence of the Morlacchi to guard the

passes to the Zadar district fell down, furthermore, the flight of the three

families back to the ottoman side seriously alarmed both the senate and

the governor-general. In order to address these issues, the governor-general

Contarini ordered the Morlacchi to hold their general assembly (Congresso

generale in Campagna) and appointed also colonello Francesco di Posedaria to

assist Morlacchi during the assembly. AsVe, PtM, b. 492. n. 151 (Zara, 31.

Maggio 1664).

99 dEsnICA 1950, 119.

100 For more concerning the land distribution at the end of this and two

subsequent ottoman-Venetian wars and the economic integration of the

Morlacchi in the dalmatian society see: MAYHEW 2008, 227–249.

101 JELIĆ 1982/1983, 115–131.

102 For more on life of stojan-Janković and his role in Morean War (1684–

1699) see: RoKsAndIĆ 2002, 117–171. – For the decrees of appointments

see: dEsnICA 1950, 143–145.

103 the order of the Knights of san Marco was the only knightly order in the

history of the Venetian Republic. the Cavaliere di San Marco title was awarded

usually to the middle ranking military officers, diplomats, and various public

officials for their services to the Republic. For more see: BARAttI 1989.

104 For example, when in February 1655, Governatore Bože Županović, peti-

tioned the senate to be awarded some form of recognition for his service. In

his application Županović stated that of four brothers and three cousins that

crossed to Venetian territory with him at the beginning of the war, now eight

years later he has lost four of them all in the service of the Republic. AsVe,

Senato Mar, filze, 1655 (Marzo–Aprile). Even more extreme is the application

of Šimun Milković from 1668, from which can be seen that of the twelve male

members of the family only two of them were alive at the end of the war.

dEsnICA 1950, 133f.

»Capi di Morlacchi«: The Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia 47