Introduction

According to Grace Skogstad, historically agriculture was a

policy area that was considered to be a ‘special case, a policy

area not subject to the "International trade regime established by

the GATT in 19471. However, under subsequent trade negotiations in

particular the Uruguay Round of negotiations, which lasted from

1986 -1994 there were increased efforts to liberalize the

agricultural sector. Though some progress was made, in large part

the initiative failed to reduce protectionist measures2. However, in

recent trade negotiations in particular, the Doha Round of

multilateral trade negotiations, the question of agriculture was

again brought to the forefront; even though trade negotiations

subsequently broke down. Many developed countries, like Canada,

recognize that it will only be a matter of time before the once

protected agriculture sector is liberalized. It is with this in

mind that, the Canadian federal and provincial governments have

begun to take steps to ensure that the sector can withstand

liberalization. If there was any doubt that the federal government

1 Skogstad,G. (2009)Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture. Universityof Toronto Press

2 Ibid1

was going to endorse and, or continue to fight for measures that

protected Canadian farmers and the larger Canadian agriculture and

agri-food sector these doubts melted away on December 7, 2012 when

the federal Minister of Agriculture, Gerry Ritz unveiled the new

federal programs under Canada's newest agricultural policy

framework -Growing Forward 2 that is directly aimed at improving

the overall competitiveness of the sector3.

This paper will argue that though the federal government

policy is increasingly moving in the direction of liberalizing

agricultural policy and, one would reasonably expect the provinces

to move in much of the same way, this is not the case. Instead, in

both Quebec and Ontario recent agricultural policies have been

diverging rather than converging .The case will be made that this

divergence can be accounted for by a of variety of factors namely;

the differing political cultures and the impact of

institutionalism.

Background

Policy communities and Policy Divergence in Canada, an article written by

Montpetit and Coleman provides important background on the

3 English, J. Harper Government Announces Federal Growing Forward 2 Programs.Media Relations Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada

2

agricultural policy of past decade with regard to the two province

of: Ontario and Quebec. Though the primary focus of the article is

not agricultural policy in general, in which this paper focuses on,

but it is instead on a sub category of agricultural policy that of,

agro environmental policy, nonetheless it is useful in comparing

the two provinces.

Montpetit and Coleman write that most OECD countries had

agricultural policy based on a protected development paradigm and

Canada was no exception. The article points out that as early as

the 1990's long held paradigms in agriculture were beginning to

change. It is with respect to these changes, in paradigms and, in

the international political economy that the authors had expected

the Canadian agro-environmental policy to become increasingly more

receptive to market pressures. However, the authors have found that

instead the international political economy has affected both

provinces disproportionately. The authors point out that

increasingly Ontario and Quebec became more divergent in the area

of agro-environmental policies4. The findings of their study

4 Montpetit, Eric and Coleman, William (1999). Policy communities and policy divergence in Canada: agro-environmental policy development in Quebec and Ontario. Canadian Journal of Political Science.

3

indicated that Quebec's agro -environmental policies were

characterized by an approach that was more comprehensive, coercive

and in general more intrusive in the agricultural production

process5. This is in contrast to policies in Ontario, which though

had similarities in terms of the level of comprehensiveness;

differed in that there was less government intrusion and more of a

reliance on industry and market self-regulation. The evidence of

this divergence comes primarily from a study of the agro-

environmental policies of both provinces. Though both provinces had

similar agro-environmental policy instruments such as: regulation,

cross-compliance and financial incentives policies they were

constructed differently and as such resulted in differing policy

outcomes6. One example highlighted in the article by Montpetit and

Coleman is that of the Environmental Protection Act in both provinces. He

highlights that this Act in both provinces aims ultimately to

prevent, reduce, and or limit the environmental damage resulting

from agricultural practices. However, this act in Quebec called,

Loi sur la qualitede l’environnement, is much more intrusive than the similar 5 Ibid

6 Montpetit, Eric and Coleman, William (1999). Policy communities and policy divergence in Canada: agro-environmental policy development in Quebec and Ontario. Canadian Journal of Political Science

4

Act in Ontario called the, Environmental Protection Act7. The fundamental

difference between the two acts is that, despite having the same

intended goal, the subnational policy communities are organized

differently and thus result in different outcomes.

In Quebec, the sub-government policy community comprise of

more groups: the agriculture ministry, the environmental ministry

and other farm and environmental organization. In this kind of

policy community there is an emphasis on distributive bargaining

thus the main aim is to maintain a balance between both parties.

Thus policy resulting from this community is oriented towards a

balance between business interest and environmental interest8. As a

result legislation and regulations are much more intrusive and

prohibitive while offering farmers richer programs to ensure a

comparative advantage9. As such in Quebec the environmental

protection act prohibits all agricultural and other activities that

result in the release of environmental contaminants. Not only does

it strictly prohibit such activities but also requires any

activities that might produce contaminants namely the ,construction

7 Ibid

8 Ibid

9 Ibid5

of any new farm buildings, to have a permit from the ministered de

l’environnement et de la Faune (MEF)10. Other considerations were

provided for such mandatory rules related sealed manures storage

facilities, rules establishing the required amount of distance from

neighbours during the application of manure and even a moratorium

on hog production. This is in contrast to Ontario which is

comprised of a much smaller policy community, limited to a few

players. The focus of this policy community is on problem solving

and more specifically optimizing wealth and efficiency for

agriculture sector and ensuring that environmental impacts of

farming practices do not undermine the long-term wealth-generating

capacity of the farm economy. As such instead of regulating farm

practices through the Agricultural Code of Practice, Ontario policy makers

chose to make the program voluntary emphasizing that it was simply

to be used "as a guideline for securing certificates of compliance

for buildings and minimum distance separations"11. Montpetit and

Coleman are critical of the act suggesting that it makes provisions

for producers with protection against nuisance law suits from dust 10 Montpetit, Eric and Coleman, William (1999). Policy communities and policy divergence in Canada: agro-environmental policy development in Quebec and Ontario. Canadian Journal of Political Science

11 Ibid6

and odours as long as they adhere to "normal" farm practices.

However, the act never defines what normal farming practices are

and as such the authors view the Ontario Act as, simply a tool of

dispute settlement than an agro- environmental policy12.

One of the major problems with the above article is that it

may not hold true today because it is simply outdated. Secondarily

it focuses on specifically agro- environmental policy, but is it

the case that in other sectors of agricultural policy, that there

is a divergence between the two provinces? How would the authors

account for the persistence of supply management programs at

national and subnational level?

If the ever increasing pressure placed on Canada by the forces

of economic globalization are to be accounted for it would be

expected that increasingly policy would reflect the markets

imprisoning forces and as such agricultural policy would become

increasingly more liberalized. According to Charles Lindblom, a

political theorist, in his 1982 essay entitled, The Market as a Prison,

the very nature of the relationship between markets and states is

12 Ibid7

one in which markets experience paramountcy over states13. Lindblom

theory seems to hold true when examining the recent developments in

the agricultural sector for the province of Ontario, with relation

to the end of the primacy of the pork marketing board.

Dan Schawb in an article entitled, Pork farmers worried about changes

to marketing board, writes that, in October 2010 the Ontario Farm

Products Marketing Commission ( OFPMC) decision to strip the

marketing board of their exclusive role of marketing hogs in the

province has become a contentious issue, as some hog farmers report

that this action has given special leverage to big businesses14 .

The decision has significantly weakened the Pork marketing board,

which has held it exclusive role since 1946. These new changes mean

that, Ontario pork producer now can have direct contact and are

able to directly contract with packers for the purposes of hogs

sales15. The advantages of such a move have long been championed by,

packaging companies and those in favour of the liberalization of

markets. The Montreal Economic Institute notes that, farmers have

13 Lindblom, Charles. (1982). The Market as a Prison. The American Journal ofPolitical Science.

14 Schawb, Dan.(2009) Pork farmers worried about changes to marketing board. Seaforth Huronexpositor.

15 Ibid8

long succeeded in convincing governments to grant them these

monopolistic powers by invoking there weakness in comparison to the

buyers of their product16. However the article goes on to say that,

all monopolistic powers are subject to abuse and farmers have

utilized them in this way, inflicting harm on consumers by way of

higher prices and a reduction in choice. The destruction of the

monopolistic power of marketing board means that, the biggest

barrier processors have long lobbied for has been removed17.

Resulting in packers benefitting from lower transaction cost that

allows for packer to be more competitive and develop specific

products to meet emerging market demands18. From the Ontario example

it seems to be the case that Lindblom assertions holds true and

that, in fact businesses do experience a privileged position.

However in the case of Quebec and its marketing board reforms,

Lindblom theory becomes wholly ineffective.

16Dumais, Mario. (2010) Viewpoint: on the shortcomings of agricultural policies. Montreal Economic Institute.

17 Ibid

18 Ibid9

Jean Gervais writes that, the North American pork sector has

been experiencing one of its worst crises in the past two decades19.

The problems range from: a surge in commodity prices, hikes in

feeds and farm inputs, a recession, to domestic factors like the

appreciation in the Canada currency in relation to the green back20.

However, Quebec emerging from this economic lethargy , rather than

adhering to the paradigm of the political economy that suggests,

that the market is the most efficient mechanism of distribution and

by extension scraping the pork marketing board; Quebec instead

opted to keep them.

Quebec has been no stranger to pressures from big business and

other market forces to liberalizes there agricultural system.

Nonetheless, 90% of foods produced in the province continue to be

sold through marketing boards21. Take for example the issue of the

Pork Marketing board in Quebec both producers and processors have

expressed dissatisfaction with the marketing board system from as

early as the past decade. To resolve these concerns, Quebec, which

19 Gervais, Jean, and Lambert R. (2010). The Simple Economics of Hog MarketingReforms in Quebec. Réseau SPAA Network.

20 Ibid

21 Gervais, J. and Lambert R. (2010).The Simple Economics of Hog Marketing Reforms in Quebec. Réseau SPAA

10

had previously maintained and auctioning system moved to a hybrid

system. This hybrid system comprises of: a percentage of pigs being

auction off while, some pigs were pre attributed to packers based

on their historical market share22. However as the times began to

change in 2007-2008 period the hybrid system began to fall apart

and there was a need to reform. At the forefront of the problem was

that the price levels of pork began to fall well below the US

reference price and producer were dissatisfied while processors

maintained that marketing boards made it difficult to compete. The

mounting acrimony between the two factions: producers and

processors forced the “Quebec Minister of Agriculture to name a

mediator to explore potential reforms of hog marketing institutions

in September 2007”23. It is important to note that as late as March

2008 the mediator reported that no middle ground could be found

between the two parties. Both parties continued to negotiate

throughout 2008 and as a result a tentative agreement was reached

however, the largest packer in the province was unwilling to sign

onto the final document in December 200824.

22 Ibid

23 Ibid

24 Ibid11

Gervais emphasizes that after the long and painful negations

producers and packers finally agreed to significant reforms of the

marketing mechanism and regulations. The result was that the

reforms ensured that both producers and packers concerns were

addressed. The new reform allowed for producers to be satisfied in

that, “packers committed to purchase all Quebec hogs at a price no

lower than the reference price in the US market”25. While

processors, on the other hand, were allowed more direct access to

producers. Nonetheless, the Quebec government did not dismantle the

marketing board since they were still mandatory for both parties;

unlike in Ontario where marketing boards became voluntary and

incurred an additional service fee.

The divergence in the area of agricultural policies for both

provinces is not just limited marketing boards but also evident in

other agricultural policies. To understand the recent developments

and non-developments in the policy area of agriculture for both

provinces a variety sources were employed. For Ontario, The Ontario

Ministry of Agriculture Food and Rural Affairs (OMAFRA) fact sheet

that outlines the specific programs and services offered by the

25 Gervais, J. and Lambert R. (2010).The Simple Economics of Hog Marketing Reforms in Quebec. Réseau SPAA

12

provincial government was used along with ministry sponsored

research through the University of Guelph that outlines research

priorities and themes for the 2008-2014 time period and additional

policy papers. For Quebec similar sources were used such as

Ministre de l'Agriculture, des Pêcheries et de l'Alimentation

(MAPAQ) website and additional policy papers.

The OMAFRA website through it policy document, Discussion Paper

on Intensive Agriculture Operations in Rural Ontario, provides an overview on the

perspective that is has with relation to agricultural policies. The

paper notes that as, “farmers strive to compete in a global

marketplace; they continually look for new efficiencies, whether in

the form of economies of scale, new technology, or vertically-

integrated operations”26. It goes on to say that, this trend has

been occurring since the end of World War II and as such

agriculture has become more industrialized and thus there exist

fewer but much more efficient farms27. This being the perspective of

the ministry the design of the programs tend to follow suite or

what, Wally Seccombe calls the “conventional [line of] thinking”.

26 OMFRA, (2000) .Discussion Paper on Intensive Agriculture Operations in Rural Ontario. OMFRA

27 Ibid13

This line of thinking maintains that, globalization is inevitable

and such if producers “wish to continue farming as a full-time

occupation, they had better expand their operations, achieve

economies of scale, invest heavily in the latest production

methods, and raise outputs in order to maximize gross revenues”28.

It is with this general overview in mind that most of the, Programs

and Service for Ontario Farmers, outlined by Jennifer Stevenson in the OMFRA

fact-sheet tends to be geared toward making farmers more personally

accountable for the losses, pushing farmers to become more

competitive in export markets, as well as encouraging

specialization to capitalize on economies of scale.

Stevenson in, Programs and Service for Ontario Farmers, summarizes the

programs and services currently available to Ontario farmers that

is funded by both levels of government29. However, for the purposes

of this paper there is a focus on programs that are primarily

administered by the provincial government, to specifically

highlight what Ontario officials are currently doing, largely

28 Seccombe, Wally. (2007).A Home-Grown Strategy for Ontario Agriculture: A new deal for farmers, A new relationship with consumers. Toronto Food Policy Council.

29 Stevenson, Jennifer (2012). Programs and Service for Ontario Farmers. OMFRAFactsheet . OMFRA

14

independently, to help the agricultural sector in their province

improve. The programs on the OMFA factsheet are divided into eleven

sections. However three main sections were studied for the purpose

of this paper. The three areas of agricultural programming studied

are; business risk management programs, financial assistance

programs and tax related programs.

One of the major programs sponsored by the Ontario government

in the area of risk management, is administered through the

provincial crown corporation, Agricorp, is the Ontario risk

management program (ORM). The ORM program “helps farmers protect

their farms and manage risks that are beyond their control - like

fluctuating costs and market prices”30. The ORM is available to

farmers in non-supply managed sectors like, “hog, sheep, grain and

edible horticulture”31. The program works in different ways based on

the sector however for the most part it is provincially run

insurance scheme. Farmers and producers pay a premium based on two

factors; commodity type and level of coverage. The Ontario

government is responsible for paying a portion. In the event of

30 Ibid

31 Stevenson, Jennifer (2012). Programs and Service for Ontario Farmers. OMFRAFactsheet . OMFRA

15

catastrophe like a significant decreases in the price below the

support level a producer /farmer qualifies for a payment32.

One of the biggest criticisms of the risk management system

in Ontario is that it is for the most part funded by the

agricultural producers. One blogger, John Schwartz, writes that in

reality the provincial government contributes very little to RMP

programs. He explains that, to qualify for the Ontario risk

management program that producers have to enroll in the two other

federal risk management programs that of: Agri-Stability and,

another production insurance. In effect producers end up paying

into three pools of insurance. Essentially when a farmer receives a

payment from the ORM it is deemed as an advance on Agri-Stability,

a federal program. Thus in this way the program is mostly funded by

the producers and federal government .The blogger cites that,

essentially it is one support program, even though producers pay

for three separate programs, but only really gain the benefit of

one”33.

32 Ibid

33 Seguin, Bob. (2012). Canada’s and Ontario’s Agri-food Risk Management Policy: A Historical Commentary to Prepare for the Future Directions. George Morris Center.

16

This is in stark contrast to Quebec which first of all through

its Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAPAQ), makes note

of its commitment to food security. Though, the policy has not yet

been fully formulated, according to the ministry’s website, it is

preparing to release its policy of on food sovereignty very soon.

This policy is expected to “give new impetus to this key sector of

the economy in Quebec”34. The food security policy is analyzed

because it gives an overview of the ministry’s perspective and the

approach that it will take toward the sector. Quebec’s vision for

the sector is clearly summarized in how the province chooses to

define food sovereignty. Food sovereignty is defined by the

ministry along with major agricultural union in the province, UPA,

to be, “the right of each nation to define its own agricultural and

food policy; to protect and regulate its domestic agricultural

production and trade in order to achieve sustainable development

objectives; to determine its level of food self-sufficiency and

eliminate dumping in its markets”35. Essential what the food

sovereignty policy says about the province attitude towards

agriculture is that, it is committed to helping the sector grow by 34 MAPAQ. (2012)Politique de souveraineté alimentaire.

35 Ibid17

regulation and not necessarily liberalization. As well as the

policy makes clear the province’s commitment to promoting local

production and consumption36. The food sovereignty policy being on

the province’s agenda and featured on its website shows Quebec’s

commitment to the agricultural union, UPA, who also have a similar

commitment to food sovereignty. UPA maintains that regulation is

necessary to ensure food sovereignty and rejects the strict

commercial view citing that, “globalization has not managed to rid

the planet of hunger, nor lift farmers and country people, in both

the South and North, out of the farm income crisis”37.

The food sovereignty policy in mind it is a good segue to

analyzing how the province approaches other agricultural policies

in this instance, risk management programs in the province. In

Quebec, the farm income stabilization program (ASRA) works in a

similar way as does, the Ontario risk management program, the only

difference being that when a producer enrolls in ASRA they commit

to participating in the program for a much longer period of time, a

minimum period of five years. However, the benefits of this program

are much more generous than in Ontario as is explained by John 36 Ibid

37 MAPAQ. (2012)Politique de souveraineté alimentaire.18

Ivison in his article, Free trade agenda runs around in Quebec. Ivison

writes that in Quebec, market distortion run high and these results

from ASRA programs. These programs protect farmers from, “vagaries

of the market and encourages them to produces products that may or

may not be economically viable”38. This program maintains a minimum

price for products, a floor beyond which products cannot fall, and

if priced do fall beyond this guaranteed price floor producers are

compensated. Ivison writes that, the “bulk of this program is

financed through taxpayers and in years like 2008 when prices were

in the slum there were significant amounts of tax revenues just

handed over to producers. The Fraser Alert further states the case

made by Ivison when they make use of the Pronovost Report, which

says that ASRA’s are the “Quebec government’s biggest financial aid

program”39. The provincial government provides 67% of its financing

while 33% comes from farmers. The program is deemed as absurd and

ludicrous according to Alain Dubuc, since currently there exist a

situation where there is an overproduction of pigs in North

38 Ivison, John.(2011). Free trade agenda runs around in Quebec. National Post.

39 Ibid19

America. These subsidies encourage and compensates over

production40. Take for example in 2008, when the market price for an

85.4 kg pig is CA$119.20. The ARSA program guarantees an income of

CA$163.77 and thus because there exist a price drop beyond the

floor the ASRA guarantees a payment would be made out costing the

government millions of dollars. Critics of the program in Quebec

highlight that in 2008, 98 billion dollars were handed over to pig

farmers to be divided among themselves along with other producers

in industries such as blueberry’s maple syrup and the apple

sector41.

One thing that Invison critique highlights is that,

profitability and economic viability is not the main aim of the

provincial government. This is detailed in variety of other

programs like: Programme Prime-Vert and Écoconditionnalité which

emphasize: diversification, development of organic farms and

overall environmental protection42. One thing that the Fraser Alert

indirectly stressed is that, in Quebec there is great emphasis on

40 Minardi, Jean-François. (2009). Fraser Alert: What does the future hold forQuebec agriculture. Fraser Institute.

41 Minardi, Jean-François. (2009). Fraser Alert: What does the future hold forQuebec agriculture. Fraser Institute.

42 MAPAQ. (2012) Mesures d'appui .20

diversity which often goes against market forces and works to

detriment of the economy43. One reason why diversification can be

negative is because it goes against the principles of economies

scales which suggests, that there are cost advantages that result

from mass production44. In Québec instead adhering to economies of

scale the government is much more interested in maintaining stable

incomes across the board. Invison would be much more pleased with

Ontario in which, the government encourages producers to pay

attention to market forces and capitalize on economies of scale

through specialization. One example of the Ontario government

encouraging the cost advantages to be obtained through economies of

scale is in its financial assistance program called the, Ontario

Vineyard Improvement Program (OVIP) 45. OVIP is a program that is

designed to help develop the wine industry in Ontario and, to

improve the grape quality, by transitioning to higher demand grape

varieties, in accordance with the industry's varietal plan. This

43 Minardi, Jean-François. (2009). Fraser Alert: What does the future hold forQuebec agriculture. Fraser Institute.

44? Ivison, John.(2011). Free trade agenda runs around in Quebec. National Post.

45 Stevenson, Jennifer (2012). Programs and Service for Ontario Farmers. OMFRAFactsheet . OMFRA

21

program provides producer with access to funding that cover 35% of

the cost associated with measures to undertake such improvement46.

It is clear from the many different agricultural polices

explored in both provinces that Quebec and Ontario are not moving

in the same direction as it relates to agricultural policies.

Ontario is embracing and preparing for the liberalization of the

sector through policies that focus on improving competiveness

through specialization as well as a reduction in subsidies. Quebec

on the other hand continues to focus its energies on ensuring

stable incomes for producers through subsidies, promoting food

sovereignty and crop diversification. However the crucial question

remains to be answered what accounts for the divergence in

agricultural policy of the provinces?

One of the major theories that accounts for the divergence in

agricultural policy is the theory of institutionalism. Lydia Mijian

writes that theory of intuitionalism says that, “the structural

configurations of the state” dictate the policy outcomes47. More

specifically policies that are enacted are a direct reflection of

46 Ibid

47 Dickinson and Young. (2000) A short History of Quebec. Mc-Gill Queen University press

22

the political institution in the state48. These institutions are

defined not just as organizations but include: customs, practices,

relationships and or behavioral pattern49. In this way the

organization of the Canadian state accounts for the majority of

divergence between the two provinces. Intuitionalism accounts for

the fact that though both provinces, Quebec and Ontario are a part

of Canada they can nonetheless, leverage some level of sovereignty

over their policy making. This is the case because, Canada is a

constitutional federation; by this I mean a country that is not a

unitary state. In this institutional framework there are two levels

of government, both levels of government share power. The

constitution of Canada explicitly states how the federal and

provincial government will share power and by extension decision

making. Agricultural policy is a policy area in which both the

federal and provincial governments share power with, the federal

government having paramountcy. Theoretical speaking the federal

government has paramountcy in this area and it may be easy to

conclude that federal government can simply impose its will on to

the province however, this is not the case. 48 Ibid

49 Ibid23

One additional factor that must be taken into consideration

with regard to Canada and more specifically Quebec is, how

institutions behaved based on historical events. From the 1960’s

during the period known as, the quiet revolution, the province of

Quebec has increasingly thought of itself as a ‘distinct society’

and more importantly as a nation50. This notion of nationhood

fostered other ideas such as: sovereignty and eventually the

separation from the Canadian federal state system. Though

separation efforts failed the distant memory of this time period

still lingers in the mind of bureaucrats and other politicians.

Though, there is no exact evidence that threat of separation has

changed the institutional fabric of Canada; nonetheless it seems as

though Canada is mindful of alienating Quebec and to some extent

has pandered to the province. The federal government has, even

going as far as to recognize, Quebec as a nation within Canada51.

However, going back to the point of Quebec being a nation

this is a very important concept. Nationhood means, “The state or

quality of having status as a separate and independent” and it

50 Dickinson and Young. (2000) A short History of Quebec. Mc-Gill Queen University press

51 CBC. 2006. House passes motion recognizing Québécois as nation24

entails also the idea that the people of a nation, “share common

customs, origins, history, and frequently language”52. This sense of

nation hood and Ottawa being mindful and granting Quebec this

status speaks both to the power of the province threat of

separation and to the political culture of the province. The

political culture of Québec is highlighted in Haddow’s article,

Reforming labour-market policy governance: the Quebec experience, in which he

points out that, Quebec is the only province that has launched a

deliberative assembly53. This assembly is the combination of

business and labour in policy making decision. This deliberative

assembly speaks, to larger corporatist structure of policy making

in the province54. This corporatist structure is as a direct result

of Quebec thinking of itself as a nation and by extension see’s it

role as maintaining this shared culture and identity. This has in

turn contributed to Quebec’s agricultural policies to be more

mindful of the whole, in terms of income distribution, rather than

simply wealth generation. In Ontario this concept of nation hood

52 “ Nation”. (2012) Webster Dictionary.

53 Haddow, Rodney (1998). Reforming labour-market policy governance: the Quebec experience. Canadian Public Administration

54 Ibid25

does not exist and a people who live in Ontario are just

individuals with the province having no role or need to maintain

the individualistic culture of the province. It is in part

institutionalism and corporatist structure that proves to be the

biggest difference between the provinces in the way they make

decisions.

Indirectly the concept of nationhood and shared culture plays

a central role in the development of Quebec’s policies. More

specifically Quebec more corporatist structure encourages

corporation rather than competition. In Ontario there is no real

concept of nation but rather Ontarians see themselves as mere

individuals and this has factored into how the province makes

decision. In Ontario there is greater emphasis on competition and

market forces and as a result agricultural policies tend to embody

these principles. However as westward expansion continues and

increasingly Ontario and Quebec experience more dim agricultural

economies in relation to the more robust ones west, in place like

Alberta , it remains to be seen whether Ontario and Quebec’s

agricultural policies will experience equifinality.

26

.

Work Cited

CBC. (2006) House passes motion recognizing Québécois as nation.

CBC News

Dickinson, John and Young, Brian. (2000) A short History of

Quebec. Mc-Gill Queen University press

Dumais, Mario. (2010) Viewpoint: on the shortcomings of

agricultural policies. Montreal Economic Institute.

English, J. Harper Government Announces Federal Growing Forward 2

Programs. Media Relations Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada

Haddow, Rodney (1998). Reforming labour-market policy

governance: the Quebec experience. Canadian Public Administration

Gervais, Jean, and Lambert Remey. (2010). The Simple Economics of

Hog Marketing Reforms in Quebec. Réseau SPAA Network.

Working paper no. 2010-01.

Ivison, John.(2011). Free trade agenda runs around in Quebec.

National Post.

27

Lindblom, Charles. (1982). The Market as a Prison. The American

Journal of Political Science.

Montpetit, Eric and Coleman, William (1999). Policy communities

and policy divergence in Canada: agro-environmental

policy development in Quebec and Ontario. Canadian Journal of

Political Science.

Miljan, Lydia. (2012). Public Policy in Canada: An Introduction.

Oxford press.

Minardi, Jean-François. (2009). Fraser Alert: What does the

future hold for Quebec agriculture. Fraser Institute.

MAPAQ. (2012) Politique de souveraineté alimentaire. http: // www

.mapaq.gouv.qc.ca /

MAPAQ. (2012). Mesures d'appui. http: // www .mapaq.gouv.qc.ca

/

Schawb, Dan.(2009) Pork farmers worried about changes to

marketing board. Seaforth Huron expositor.

28

Seccombe, Wally. (2007).A Home-Grown Strategy for Ontario

Agriculture: A new deal for farmers, A new relationship with

consumers. Toronto Food Policy Council.

Seguin, Bob. (2012). Canada’s and Ontario’s Agri-food Risk

Management Policy: A Historical Commentary to Prepare for the

Future Directions. George Morris Center.

Stevenson, Jennifer (2012). Programs and Service for Ontario

Farmers. OMFRA Factsheet . OMFRA

Skogstad, Grace. (2009)Internationalization and Canadian

Agriculture: Policy and Governing Paradigms. University of

Toronto Press.

29