CANADA AND NEW PARADIGMS OF WAR

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Vol. 9, No. 1 � Canadian Military Journal 105

Introduction

At a recent high-profile public conference onpeacebuilding in Afghanistan, I was struck by

the shared views of three sincere and passionate Canadians:a federal politician, an aid worker, and an academic,all of whom ardently expressed the view that violentextremism and instability in Afghanistan would somehowdisappear if only the Canadian Army and its NATOallies would leave. At this particular symposium, theseindividuals were a decided minority. Nonetheless, theyrepresent a point of view that resonates with a considerablesegment in mainstream Canada and elsewhere in theWestern world. It would seem, viewed from thisparticular school of thought, that war is instigatedand enabled by the very presence of armed forces. Andto give this group its due, in dozens of conflicts across theglobe this has often held true. However, in the case ofthe Afghan war, for those less influenced by dogma, theavailable evidence suggests that the presence of foreignarmed forces is a symptom of more profound societalproblems rather than being an underlying cause. Yet, itwould be wise not to dismiss too lightly popularhazily defined pacifist explanations of the cause and

cures for modern war. Even among those who believeviolent insurgencies must be defeated by temperingforce with development aid, there is no agreed-upon balancebetween the two methods of restoring peace and stability.Differences between modern western pacifists and those whocountenance the use of force are not simply questions ofperception; such differences are almost certainly a reflectionof profoundly different philosophical convictions.

In the main, for those who make their profession thestudy of modern warfare, there would seem to be a highdegree of consistency in their philosophical outlook towardwar. Yet, it is equally true that among those who accept theuse of force as a viable means of creating peace and stability,there are noticeable differences in their perceptions of events,and, as a result, their predictions of the future. In the pastdecade, influential books by such diverse authors as RupertSmith, Max Boot, Martin Van Creveld, Thomas Hammes,Richard Simpkin, Ralph Peters, John Keegan, and evenAlvin and Heidi Toffler amply illustrate that there is nosingle agreed-upon view as to what future wars will belike. This essay will examine several of the new proposedparadigms, and discuss how these interpretations of21st Century warfare might affect Canada.

CANADA AND NEW PARADIGMS OF WARby Michael Goodspeed

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106 Canadian Military Journal � Vol. 9, No. 1

BOOK REV I EW ESSAYThe Utility of Force

In what is arguably the most original and carefullyargued of these books, the British General Sir Rupert

Smith contends in The Utility of Force that the natureof war has changed, and wars no longer result inclear-cut victories with an ensuing peace.1 Instead, warshave become a prolonged, cyclical process, whichleads to an endless form of violent instability. Whetheryou agree with Smith or not, his book raises a number ofimportant issues about modern war and the nature offuture conflict. Smith believes that warfare has evolvedfrom its industrial phase wherein war was waged betweennation-states, to what he terms War Amongst the People.Smith encapsulates these observations in six salient featuresof such a war. “The ends for which we fight are changingfrom the hard objectives that decide a political outcometo those of establishing conditions in which the outcomemay be decided.” In this variant of Clausewitz’s mostfamous dictum, Smith contends that war has become lessa means of forcing a decision and more an ancillary process,which merely shapes and influences the environmentin which conflict will be resolved. “We fight among thepeople, not on the battlefield.” True to his lengthy experiencein counter-insurgency, Smith has modified Mao Tse Tung’smaxim on guerrilla warfare. But Smith takes Mao astep further, declaring that, “War is timeless, evenunending.” And in this, he gives new life to the Orwellianand Leninist views of the future in which war is seen, notas a temporary aberration, but as a constant feature of thehuman condition.

As a corollary of war’s new perpetual nature, Smithobserves that the new form of conflict necessarilyentails a cautiousapproach to violence,wherein, “We fight soas to preserve theforce rather thanrisking all to gainthe objective.” Andin the true adaptivestyle of the guerrilla,tactics, logistics,and organizations arerecycled as new toolsof warfare. “Oneach occasion newuses are found forold weapons andorganizations whichare the products ofindustrial war.”

Lastly, wehave Smith’s finaldistinguishing featureof War Amongst thePeople: “The sides

are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multinationalgrouping against some non-state party or parties.”In this, Smith observes upon the new realitiesthat have characterized low intensity conflict sincethe days of the National Liberation Front (FLN) inAlgeria and virtually every asymmetrical conflict of thelast sixty years.

Smith’s observations undoubtedly are useful, butthere are important areas that he has not explored. Forexample, his paradigm also works for the present, aperiod in which weapons of mass destruction have, fornow, seemingly been contained. However, it is not realisticsimply to assume that the advent of nuclear weaponshas made war between nations too dangerous tocontemplate. Correspondingly, war amongst the peoplewill very likely entail the use of weapons of massdestruction in the future. After all, the 9/11 strikes wereimprovised weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), andit is probable that similarly novel innovations can beused again with the very real and horrific prospect ofretaliation in kind. This raises the real possibility ofescalation, from war amongst the people to a higherand more intensely violent kind of warfare. This almostcertainly would entail escalation to some type of conflictbetween states. Sub-national conflict has, in the past,precipitated global conflict, as the assassination of theAustrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand all too catastrophicallyproved in 1914.

Moreover, Smith assumes that most conflict willbe inherently asymmetrical in nature. This may notbe the case, and it would be wrong to predict the futurebased upon Western experience of the very recent past.


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Other nations and cultures will almost certainly developand become capable of challenging the West; and insuch cases, as in the Cold War, the prospect of interstatewar by proxy becomes a real possibility. Furthermore, anassumption of perpetual asymmetry ignores the possibilityof future coalitions, or, as is entirely possible, anunforeseen weakening in the West. The assumption ofperpetual asymmetry certainly begs the question if thisis not really some form of wishful thinking – ashortcoming that has historically proven to be one ofthe most common and grievous of intelligence failings.

Again, Smith has deliberatelychosen to steer clear of the moraldimension of war, and this is alimitation of his work. For in doingso, he appears to assume that potentialbelligerents view war and its attendantrisks from a similar perspective.Religious beliefs can have an enormousimpact on future war, and enemieswho regard death in battle as a formof martyrdom and a passport to paradisemay well be likely to gamble with the fate ofinnocent and unsuspecting civil populations infurthering their sacred causes. Even the threat of thiskind of war couldtrigger an escalation of violencebeyond War Amongst the People.

Despite these relatively minor criticisms of Smith’swork, his analysis provides a revealing descriptionand highly profitable insight into the kind ofconflict in which the West has increasingly founditself involved.

War Made New

On the other hand, in the book War Made New, MaxBoot surveys the history of technological development

in war, and comes to the somewhat obvious conclusionthat nations may be capable of developing technicaland tactical advantages, but, to be successful, they mustunderstand these developments in light of their armedforces’ strengths and weaknesses, and the larger strategiccontext.2 Boot argues that the limits of force areconstrained by the capabilities and limitations of armedforces – and that understanding those parameters requireswisdom and insight.

According to Boot’s assessment, there have beenfour major revolutions in war: the Gunpowder Revolution,the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, and theInformation Revolution. The bulk of War Made New is awell-written but not particularly original analysis devotedto providing historical proof that technology alone is nota decisive advantage in waging a successful war.

However, what Boot lacks in originality he morethan compensates for with his book’s timeliness, the

breadth of his historical samplings, an engagingwriting style, and his assessment of the InformationRevolution. Boot’s examination of military technologyin the larger sweep of history is valuable, especiallyif one contrasts his analysis with the West’s currentpsychological and cultural vulnerabilities: belief intechnology, impatience, sensitivity to casualties, andpervasive but hazily defined pacifist sentiments. Eachof these vulnerabilities is attitudinal, rather thantechnical or strategic. And if one considers these withinthe context of Boot’s overriding theme that a blinded

outlook can prove a greater and moredangerous shortcoming than any advantageprovided by technological supremacy,they assume a troubling relevance.3

The Transformation of War

Martin Van Creveld was one of themost popular exponents of the view

that the very nature of warfare has altereddramatically – not merely because ofthe changes in the weapons being

used, but more importantly, as a resultof the decline in the importance of the nation-statein prosecuting trans-national Low Intensity Conflict.He articulated these views in several influential articlesand in his highly esteemed and still popular 1991 book,The Transformation of War.4 Van Creveld argued that thefree flow of ideas and the rise of trans-national terrorismand other factors have precipitated a decline in theimportance of the nation-state as a focus for winning thenew wars of the 21st Century. This, in turn, has meantthat the Clausewitzian Universe, in which the nation-statewas a defining concept – and one from which theWest framed its thinking about war – has now becomelargely irrelevant.

War, Van Creveld claimed, will not disappear, butthe nature of conflict will transform into a seriesof prolonged slow-boiling Low Intensity Conflicts. Hefurther maintains that conventional standing armiesshould be replaced by forces more suited for fightingthe Low Intensity Conflicts that will be fought in thefuture. Van Creveld cites the trans-national Jihadistconflict that characterizes the violence in the MiddleEast as an archetype of this new kind of war.

In many respects the six principles Smith proposesin his Utility of Force are extensions and revisionsof Van Creveld’s thinking, which, in turn, was a majorexpansion of the popular view espoused a generationago by John Keegan in his conclusions to The Faceof Battle.5 Keegan argued that war, because of itsincreasingly ruinous potential, was rapidly becomingobsolete. History has already proven Keegan wrong, asmankind has steadfastly refused to renounce violenceas a means of securing its aims. Instead, as this groupof writers affirms, because of modern war’s doomsday

“Keegan arguedthat war, because ofits increasinglyruinous potential,was rapidly

becoming obsolete.”


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potential, changes in the character of inter-state relationsand the lopsided nature of post-modern power andwealth, war has transformed. War is moving downthe scale of violence, and is resurfacing in a newform as a much more prolonged low-intensity struggledesigned to undermine one’s opponent, sap hisresolve, and create the moral and intellectualcircumstances to allow for the triumph of anothercompeting ideology.

Although there is a good deal of truth in this lineof thinking, there are also several problems associatedwith it. Firstly, the contention that the nation-stateis becoming less important as a security, administrative,or cultural focus is almost certainly inaccurate. Undeniably,the role of the nation-state is changing. However, invirtually every corner of the world, nation-states remainas viable and essential institutions that manage theprovision of vital services. They are the crucial organizationsfor defining a population’s laws and for preserving itssecurity and culture. And they continue to act as theguardian of its inhabitants’ values. This remains astrue across the Islamic world as it does in the EuropeanUnion. What Van Creveld, Smith, and even Keegandiscount is that violent trans-national ideologies, be theysecular or religious, ultimately seek to attack and

transform the structure of individual states. And whilewars may be fought by trans-national dissident groupsand insurgents, one of the key aims of war that remainsis changing the nature of a particular state or group ofstates. These are ambitious goals, and to realize themtakes organization, financing, coherent leadership, mass,and secure base areas from which to prosecutecampaigns. Even in a digitized world, a successfulterrorist organization that aspires to grow beyond beingan isolated and violent pressure group needs the supportand backing that only a nation-state can provide. Iftrans-national terror aspires to become anything morethan a deadlier form of international crime, it needsa state sponsor to allow it to grow. In turn, statesthat sponsor terrorism will become the targets of thosewho are attacked by terrorists. In this manner, thepossibility of inter-state war remains as a probableoutcome of 21st Century conflict.

The Future of Inter-State War

Far from disappearing, inter-state war will lingeras a deadly peril that remains closely linked to

Low Intensity Conflicts, as was proven by the Americaninvasion of Afghanistan, where war erupted as a resultof a national government supporting trans-national


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terrorism. In this sense, it is clear that the exposureof covert national support to trans-national terrorismalmost certainly increases the likelihood ofinter-state war. What the world is witnessing isnot a new phenomenon. The environment and themethods for spreading a new threatening ideologyare unquestionably different, but the strategic conditionsfor the propagation of violent subversive ideologiesare, in many respects, similar to the circumstances ofa century ago.

The “withering away of the state” was a 19th CenturyMarxist concept that proved to be as mistaken thenas it is now in its newer incarnation. The implicationof this is that states will remain instrumental inbattling and supporting destabilizing trans-nationalideologies. Destabilizing ideologies will not survivelong, nor prove to be much of a threat outside theincubator of national support. Islamic Jihadism, forexample, is almost certainly in a position similar to thatof communist ideology prior to it finding a Soviethome with the Russian Revolution.6 However, wherethe aforementioned authors are probably correct isin identifying new dimensions of war that take advantageof porous international borders and new physicalvulnerabilities, which, in turn, have developed fromnew communications technologies, freer and moreaccessible international transportation, and modernweaponry.

Clearly, the phenomenon of inter-state war cannotbe relegated to anthropological or military history.Although it is for the time being diminishing infrequency, as a concept, inter-state war remains adynamic and menacing form of conflict. At present,it has shifted to the margins and away from developedstates, many of which possess their own weaponsof mass destruction. As both Van Creveld andSmith point out, the existence of several states possessingWMD has certainly diminished the likelihood of inter-statewar in Europe and elsewhere, but this phenomenonhas also been concurrently driven by widespreadacceptance of democracy, improved mass communications,and the existence of international governing bodies,such as the United Nations (UN) and the EuropeanUnion (EU). WMD, along with these other majortransformations, have conspired to make war betweenthe developed nations less likely. But these constraintsdo not provide any guarantees of preventing inter-statewar between, and with, less developed nations; nor dothey influence the possible spread of instability and waras a result of inter-state wars waged between major andminor powers.

Sadly, neither the scale nor the natureof armed conflict is shrinking. Ideologically motivated,trans-national low-intensity conflict is simply an additionalthreat that extends rather than reduces the possible spectrumof modern violence.

The Sling and the Stone

Of the principal writers on future warfare, certainlyone of the most prescient has been the USMarine Corps’ Colonel Thomas Hammes. In his2004 book, The Sling and the Stone,7 Hammes suggeststhat the nature of current and future conflict hasevolved into a more sophisticated and subtle formof combat. “The fourth generation has arrived. It usesall available networks – political, economic, socialand military – to convince the enemy’s politicaldecision makers that their strategic goals are eitherunachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.”8

Hammes’s views on the fourth generation ofwarfare share much of the same intellectualspace as do Smith and Van Creveld, particularlywith respect to his disdain for what he regards asthe West’s near-compulsive belief in technicalsolutions to military problems. Hammes also sharesthe view with the Smith and Van Creveld schoolsof thought that warfare will, in the main, be lowintensity and prolonged: future wars will be measured indecades, not years, as was the case in mostindustrial-era wars. In comparison to Smith andVan Creveld, Hammes’s approach to this form ofwar is less dogmatic, more imaginative, and lessrestrictive. He also presents a convincing practicalcase for addressing many of the root causes forthe problems generated by the West’s, and, in particular,America’s, belief in technological solutions to militaryproblems.

Hammes’s characterization of the Four Generationsof warfare differs in some important respectsfrom Max Boot’s Four Revolutions. Hammes’s fourgenerations of war are essentially reduced to a linearera, an era based upon firepower, an era based uponmanoeuvre, and an era of multi-dimensional, non-statewarfare. The first three can be roughly equated toBoot’s categories, but the crucial difference lies in Hammes’sFourth Generation Warfare. For Hammes sees, as doSmith and Van Creveld, future war having anenormous similarity to what we have come to regardas conventional insurgency.9 Hammes has identifiedthe most likely kind of future warfare to be insurgencies,enabled by modern technology, and striking at ourpsychological vulnerabilities. While the likelihoodof insurgency being the most probable kind of warwe are going to encounter is not in dispute, MaxBoot’s fourth Information Revolution is nonethelessthe more appropriate categorization, simply becauseBoot’s take on this does not channel thinking to onespecific form of warfare. The concept of anInformation Revolution or Information Age Warimplicitly includes other levels of conflict intensityand the possibility of war between states. Boot’semphasis on the larger societal discontinuity asbeing the overriding factor in warfare also allows histheoretical framework to include the entire spectrum


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of conflict. And, equally as important, it allows for thefull range of possibilities afforded by the Revolution inMilitary Affairs and Network Centric Warfare – both ofwhich were recent buzzwords that now seem embarrassinglyoutdated, but, nonetheless, retain a degree of meaningthat is not contained in Hammes’s newer catchphrase,Fourth Generation Warfare.

Hammes is quite specific as to the actions neededto prosecute fourth generation warfare successfully –and his solutions are not at all dissimilar to themuch scorned opinions of the popular futuristsAlvin and Heidi Toffler. More than a decadebefore Hammes, the Tofflers wrote about the changesThird Wave technological innovations were drivingin warfare.10 The Tofflers, apart from their fixationon developing technologies, further argued thatfuture war would be driven by much flatter commandstructures, less bureaucracy, and more responsiveand direct institutional leadership. Hammes, inturn, is emphatic with respect to the need fordevelopment of clear, flexible thinking amongpolitical and military leaders, and the requirementfor fewer commanders supported by lean, highlyskilled staffs. He is unequivocal in his demandfor reducing and streamlining the industrialage bureaucracies of modern armed forces.

Some Closing Thoughts

From this examination of contemporary viewson the nature of war, it is evident that, in the recent

past, there have been no truly revolutionary discoveriesor startling leaps in thinking. The central ideas thesethinkers propose are almost all variations and gradualdevelopments of broadly shared and evolving concepts.Outside the realm of weapons technology, whichhas witnessed remarkable discontinuities, most currentmilitary thinking would seem to have been largely anincremental progression, a feature that some commentatorshave sneered at because of the derivative nature ofthe process.11 This is not a serious or compellingcriticism; in truth, it is probably a strength. All innovationis ultimately derivative, and the process of understandingsuch a complex and problematical subject rightfullyentails lengthy debate and deliberation.

In Canada, the debate with respect to the natureof future war and how it affects our long-term securityseems to be somewhat muted. What debate there istends to be rigorously tactical or technical in nature,and the subject is infrequently, if ever, raised outsidethe Canadian Forces. At the same time, our armed forcesare undergoing a period of transformation involvingchange at least as dramatic as anything since Paul Hellyer’s


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experiment in enforced unification. Thus, if we agreethat the larger developments in modern war heraldboth a change in emphasis in the kinds of war, and, atthe same time, represent an extension rather than areduction in the spectrum of possible conflict, thenwhat does this mean for Canada and the nature ofthe CF’s transformation?

Should Canada prepare itself fora niche security role solely in thefield of Low Intensity Conflict andpeacekeeping, and with it, accept aniche position on the world stage?Should she arm herself with light, highlymobile, high-technology multi-purposeland, sea, and air forces capable ofoperating across the conflict spectrum, asRichard Simpkin proposed NATOforces should be structured in hisvisionary and influential 1985 bookRace to the Swift?12 Or should we steersome kind of middle course so that we can engageselectively in a range of expeditionary operationswith a larger and more capable ally? These arenot simply Canadian Forces problems of doctrine,acquisition, and organization. They are also issuesthat deserve vigorous national debate, as they areinstrumental in defining who we are as a nation andas a people.

From a Canadian perspective, we should perhapsin addition to these questions be asking ourselvesif the larger debate on the nature of conflict is inaccord with our view of the world. If this review ofsome of the major writers on contemporary warfareis any indication, should we not be asking ourselvesif the current debate with respect to the nature of

conflict is comprehensive enough? Canwar continue to be regarded by armedforces and governments as merely thatstage of international conflict thatinvolves combat? Should Canada andthe Canadian Forces also be lookingat the military’s role in the phasesof conflict preceding and followingcombat?

This is not a far-fetched concept.Military forces around the globe arealready involved in security sectorreform, peacekeeping, and reconstruction

operations, and our own broad experience in Afghanistan andin so many other parts of the world gives us credibilityas one of the world leaders in such operations. Inaddition, Canada has, over many decades, supportedthe notion of providing military expertise, training,and education in support of developing stable andreliable nations in the Third World. If it is correct,as this review of contemporary thinking suggests,

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“Should Canadaand the CanadianForces also be

looking at the military’srole in the phasesof conflict preceding

and followingcombat?”


BOOK REV I EW ESSAYculture that is more patient than does the counter-insurgent.Canada has wisely not chosen this approach tocombating insurgency. Nonetheless there is aninsidious attraction to predominately force-basedapproaches to insurgency. Over the long term, the conductof non-kinetic military operations can createwithin the military an understandable fear that ifarmed forces develop and sustain capabilities foroperations other than combat, they will lose the ‘warrior’spirit and the unique focus needed to triumph in battle.15

This concern is unfounded, for if the new skill setsare deliberately inculcated, the military will enhanceits capabilities and its range of action without gamblingwith its core ethos. Again, Canadian experience inthe decades leading up to Afghanistan is a goodillustration that if armed forces train and focus uponthe most demanding task, winning in battle, they willbe able to accomplish the less strenuous tasks withoutserious difficulty.

Canada’s experience in Afghanistan would seemto bear witness to the Canadian Forces’ understandingof this home truth. It is this question of balancewith which the Canadian population has not yetfully come to grips. To be effective in future wars,we, as a nation, must understand the nature of thesecurity problems we face, and what is going to bedemanded of our troops and our country. The matterof the morality and the efficacy of the use of forcebrings us back to the notion that the employmentof our forces is as much an issue of nationalphilosophical outlook as it is of perception. In thisrespect, the Canadian Forces and the Governmenthave a responsibility to be truthful and forthrightin creating public perceptions of its Armed Forcesand the international environment in which itsmembers may possibly be called upon to serve.However, as a nation, we have, in the decades precedingour Afghan commitment, been guilty of stretchingthe truth. The CF has never been trained, equipped,or organized to be a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepinghas always been a less demanding skill, and theprincipal reason Canadians became renowned aspeacekeepers was because they were, in the firstplace, good soldiers. Yet, while having goodsoldiers, the CF has never been militaristic – andthis distinction has not always been well understoodor promoted. Unfortunately, the false image of theCanadian Forces as being historically and primarilya peacekeeping force has encouraged a bogus sense ofself-righteous hauteur for many of our citizens – and thisis a dangerously unrealistic basis from which tomake effective foreign policy and security decisions.

The majority of Canadians have always instinctivelyknown that peace, stability, and freedom havenever been won or secured by wilting in the faceof brutal aggression or tyranny; but more than asmattering of Canadians believe that force of any

that our view of the conflict spectrum is toolimited, the CF should give these issues moreemphasis in our education and training, and doctrinallyembrace the obligation to prepare for operations inpre-combat and post-combat situations as ashared responsibility with other governmentdepartments.

Developing useful and permanent capabilities inthe pre- and post-combat areas of the conflict spectrumneed not involve large numbers of troops, the creationof large staffs, or the development of new bureaucracies.It will, however, require a change in mindset, acomprehensive re-evaluation of the senior officer’sprofessional development syllabus, and greater cooperationand coordination with other government departments:most notably, Foreign Affairs, the Canadian SecurityIntelligence Service (CSIS), and the Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency (CIDA). This is an attainablegoal, as successive Canadian governments havetheoretically authorized the notion of a much moreproactive national stance in the area of integratedWhole of Government expeditionary operations. Asa consequence, these coordinated endeavours shouldbegin with a tailored inter-agency professionaldevelopment program for the most senior membersof the defence, intelligence, foreign service and aidcommunities. In order to create a functional andpermanent inter-agency educational establishment, itwill likely require direction from the highestpossible level. Our American allies needed theGoldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, an act of Congress,to bring about effective joint and inter-agencyinstitutions.13 It would be presumptuous for Canadiansto believe that, in similar circumstances, wecan prod entrenched and sluggish bureaucracies intothis level of sustained inter-agency cooperationon a voluntary basis.

The three progressive schools of thought espousedby Smith, Van Creveld, and Hammes argue that newforms of warfare require a more constructivelyintegrated approach, and a much more discriminatinguse of force. The solutions for future war – beit War Amongst the People, Low Intensity Conflict,Fourth Generation Warfare, or Information Age Warfare –demand a measured balance between the use of force,mediated conflict resolution efforts, and development.This kind of thinking stands in sharp contrast to thebrutal and ham-fisted solutions to low-intensity war thatwriters, such as the controversial American, Ralph Peters,have espoused.14

This much more aggressive approach to lowintensity conflict is ultimately based upon a strategyof attrition. Historically, in insurgencies, exclusivelyforce-based approaches rarely work, as they tend toisolate the local population, and in a war of attrition,the insurgent, more often than not, comes from a

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the utility and the limitations of force. If we do that,the way we are perceived by the vast majority ofour fellow countrymen will be one in whichthey, in turn, understand and trust their CanadianForces to be judicious and deft in the use of forcewhen such is required of its members.

Lieutenant-Colonel Michael J. Goodspeed, an officer in the

Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), is currently

Senior Staff Officer Lessons Learned at the Canadian Defence

Academy in Kingston.

kind has no legitimate role in international relations.If we are to be successful in dealing with futureconflicts – a goal which also includes preventingsmall conflicts from growing into much larger ones,as well as the ‘right to protect’ – the idea of rejectingthe use of any kind of force will have to change.For democracies, successful international conflictresolution requires a well-informed and realistic population.Accordingly, as we move into a post- industrial worldwith a new set of dangers, our philosophicaloutlook and our doctrine must be such that, as anation, we fully understand and implicitly accept



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1. General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force:The Art of War in the Modern World (London:Allen Lane, 2005).

2. Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare,and the Course of History: 1500 to Today(New York: Gotham, 2006).

3. Apart from these vulnerabilities, if one casts aneye to the future, ‘mass’ could well be added tothis list, as the factionalized West may well findit has difficulties maintaining its currenttechnological lead over cultures whosepopulations are more numerous, and who, as aresult of their demographic advantage, provecapable of devoting correspondingly greaterefforts in the fields of education and scientificresearch. “Mass” in a future military contextcould well take on a new meaning and have moreto do with the scale of scientific and technicaladvantage than the deployment scales of weaponsand troops. The possession of knowledge, anephemeral advantage at the best of times, is nowa Western strength, but it could conceivablymorph into being a critical vulnerability.

4. See also Martin van Creveld, The Rise andDecline of the State (Cambridge, MA: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999), and The Changing Faceof War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne toIraq, (New York: Random House 2007), as wellThrough a Glass Darkly, (Annapolis, MD: NavalWar College Review, Autumn 2003).

NOTES

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic StudiesInstitute of the US Army War College,November 2005).

10. See Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War andAnti-War: Survival at the Dawn ofthe 21st Century (Darby, PA: DianePublishing, 1998).

11. See William Lind, William S. Lind: The Slingand the Stone, at <www.military.com>.

12. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift:Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare(London: Brassey’s Defence, 1985).

13. See Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986,(Legal Information Institute, Cornell LawSchool), at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm>.

14. Ralph Peters, “Progress and Peril,” in ArmedForces Journal (Springfield, VA: Army TimesPublishing Company, February 2007).

15. The notion of cultivating a ‘warrior’ spirithas probably been an unfortunate one toadopt as the concept of ‘soldier’ hasalways included the notions of pride, discipline,devotion to duty, sensible aggression,competence, and thinking skills, withouttrying to conceal or to ‘soft pedal’ theimplications of using force. Equally asimportant, the term ‘soldier’ does not haveany of the restrictive connotations impliedby the term ‘warrior.’

5. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London:Pimlico, 1976).

6. Some might argue that Jihadists have alreadybeen given a haven in that the revolutionaryShiite regime in Iran has provided Jihadistterrorists the support of an established statesponsor. Similar arguments have also beenmade regarding Libya, the Sudan, Yemen,Algeria, Pakistan, and others. The analogywith the Soviet Union and the Cold Warmay also prove to be fitting from the perspectiveof nuclear armed states being able to exportterror and violent revolution with relativeimpunity.

7. Hammes, Col Thomas X, The Sling and theStone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul,MN: Zenith Press, 2004). Reviewed in CMJVol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2006

8. Some have argued that Hammes’s definitionof Fourth Generation Warfare bears a strikingresemblance to Total War, which harnessedevery dimension of the state in the pursuitof its war aims. This may be true, butHammes’s argument goes beyond this conceptand is rooted in the new capabilities affordedby readily available technology.

9. Several prominent writers have taken exceptionwith this. For an articulate and well-reasonedopposing view see Antulio J. Echevarria,Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths

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