Can Rights-Based Approaches Enhance Levels of Legitimacy and Cooperation in Conservation? A...

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Can Rights-Based Approaches EnhanceLevels of Legitimacy and Cooperation in Conservation?A Relational Account

Sébastien Jodoin

Published online: 22 February 2014# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract Rights-based approaches (RBAs) are increasingly gaining favour amongpractitioners in the field of natural resource conservation and management. RBAs area non-binding operational framework through which conservation actors can integratehuman rights standards and principles into the design, planning, implementation,monitoring, and evaluation of projects and programmes. In addition to promoting thehuman rights of local populations, it is also argued that RBAs may hold benefits forconservation initiatives. This article draws on existing research on the social psychol-ogy of procedural fairness to develop a relational account of how and whether RBAsmay enhance levels of legitimacy and cooperation in conservation. This relationalaccount stresses the importance of fair experiences for generating positive feelings oflegitimacy and associated cooperative behaviour among individuals interacting withorganisations or authorities. On the whole, this article suggests that if RBAs can ensurerespect for the human rights of local populations, they have the potential to engenderfair experiences and related positive institutional effects, thereby significantly strength-ening the overall effectiveness of conservation initiatives.

Keywords Human rights . Rights-based approaches . Environmental governance .Conservation . Procedural justice . Legitimacy

Introduction

Over the last three decades, many conservation scholars and practitioners have come torecognise the importance of developing approaches, policies, and programming that areresponsive to the institutions, needs, and rights of local communities. For one thing,increased awareness of the ways in which exclusionary conservation initiatives haveclashed with local priorities, resulted in negative social impacts, and engenderedtensions with local populations has prompted a search for alternative approaches and

Hum Rights Rev (2014) 15:283–303DOI 10.1007/s12142-014-0312-8

S. Jodoin (*)Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, 195 Prospect St, New Haven, CT 06511, USAe-mail: [email protected]

Author's personal copy

methodologies (Lele et al. 2010), such as community-based approaches (CBA)(Agrawal and Gibson 1999), integrated conservation and development (ICD) (Wellset al. 2004), and payment-for-ecosystem services (PES) (Pirard 2012). For another,Indigenous Peoples and resource-dependent communities have achieved significantsuccesses in seeking recognition and protection of their rights, autonomy, and dignity atthe domestic, regional, and international levels (Siegele et al. 2009), and this hascontributed to greater understanding of how conservation efforts have often hadnegative impacts on their rights, entailing, for instance, economic or physical displace-ment, destruction of means of subsistence, disruption of cultural practices, arbitraryarrests and detention, and excessive use of force (Sharma Paudel et al. 2007).

The emergence of rights-based approaches (RBAs) in the work of major interna-tional conservation actors represents a recent and potentially transformative develop-ment in this broader turn towards participation and respect for rights (WorldConservation Congress 2008, para. 1(a)). As summed up by Campese, the adoptionof RBAs in conservation seeks the integration of “rights, norms, standards, andprinciples in policy, planning, implementation, and evaluation to help ensure thatconservation practice respects rights in all cases, and supports their further realisationwhere possible” (2009, p. 1). Although RBAs share many of the assumptions of otheralternative approaches regarding the value of local participation for equitable andeffective resource governance, RBAs are seen as providing a distinctive focus on thelegal obligations owed to local communities by virtue of their rights under internation-al, regional, constitutional, and customary law (ibid, p. 13). In addition to their potentialto protect and promote the human rights of local populations, the proponents of RBAsalso argue that they possess numerous advantages for achieving conservation objectives(Shelton 2009, pp. 5–6; Campese 2009, pp. 13 and 22; Campese et al. 2009b, p. 292).

While a range of practitioners and experts have begun to develop some of the keyconcepts and principles that lie behind RBAs to conservation (Shelton 2009, pp. 13 and22), this work is still in its very early stages and a number of critical research questionsremain (Campese 2009, pp. 29–30). Among other gaps, the literature on RBAs stilllacks convincing theory-driven accounts of whether and how RBAs may affect con-servation practices, processes, and outcomes. To be sure, the burgeoning policyliterature on RBAs includes numerous illustrative case studies of their multiple benefitsin different conservation contexts and projects (Campese et al. 2009a; Greiber 2009).Even so, there is no equivalent scholarly literature subjecting these claims to systematictheoretical and empirical scrutiny. Further academic research is therefore needed totheorise and study the ways in which RBAs may actually deliver on their promise totransform the field of conservation by generating positive results for local populationsas well as the environment.

This article seeks to provide an initial theoretical foray into the nature and implica-tions of RBAs for the practice of conservation. While a number of important questionsremain about the various processes through which legal empowerment approaches suchas RBAs may ensure genuine respect for the rights of local communities (Jodoin andStephenson 2013), my concern in this article lies with understanding the role of RBAsin enhancing the overall effectiveness of conservation initiatives. Given that RBAsmight imply trade-offs or costs that do not directly or immediately support theachievement of conservation initiatives, I am particularly interested in examining theoft-repeated claim that RBAs have the potential to provide conservation initiatives with

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greater levels of legitimacy among local populations, thereby gaining their support for,and collaboration with, conservation activities (Shelton 2009, pp. 6 and 14). I examinehow and to what effect RBAs may enhance the legitimacy of conservation initiativesamong local populations by adopting a social–psychological approach that treatslegitimacy as an interpersonal and subjective phenomenon. In particular, I draw onTyler’s relational model of procedural justice positing that feelings of proceduralfairness and legitimacy can lead individuals to comply and cooperate with theorganisational authorities with which they interact (Tyler 2006, 2011).

I proceed as follows. In “The Relational Model of Procedural Justice and ItsImplications for Understanding Legitimacy and Cooperation in Conservation”, I pro-vide an overview of Tyler’s relational model of procedural justice and explain itsrelevance for understanding legitimacy and cooperation in conservation. In “Rights-Based Approaches and Their Potential Influence on Levels of Legitimacy andCooperation in Conservation”, I describe the core components of RBAs, review aparticular framework for their operationalization, and assess their potential for enhanc-ing levels of legitimacy and cooperation in line with the expectations of Tyler’s work.In “Conclusion”, I consider the significance of this research for understanding thebroader relationship between human rights and conservation.

The Relational Model of Procedural Justice and Its Implicationsfor Understanding Legitimacy and Cooperation in Conservation

The Relational Model of Procedural Justice

Over several decades of research, Tyler has developed a relational model of proceduraljustice that explains the antecedents and effects of individual assessments of the fairnessof their interactions with organisational authorities such as the police or courts,supervisors in a work setting, and decision-makers in government (Tyler 1997a, b,2006, 2011). Tyler has identified four factors that individuals use to assess theprocedural fairness provided by authorities: their neutrality, their trustworthiness, thelevel of interpersonal respect that they offer, and the level of participation/voice thatthey accord. Neutrality “includes assessments of honesty, impartiality, and the use offact, not personal opinions, in decision-making” (Tyler 1997a, p. 337). Trustworthinessrefers to an individual’s judgement “about whether or not the third party is motivated totreat them in a fair way, to be concerned about their needs, and to consider theirarguments” (ibid, p. 336). Interpersonal respect refers to whether individuals are “beingtreated politely, with dignity and respect, and having respect shown for one’s rights andstatus with society” (ibid, p. 337). Finally, with respect to participation/voice, individ-uals have reported feelings of fair treatment “if they are allowed to participate inshaping decisions which affect the resolution of their problems or conflicts” (Tyler1997b, p. 232). The recurring finding of Tyler’s work is that individuals are more likelyto develop feelings of legitimacy vis-à-vis authorities when they perceive their inter-actions with them as procedurally fair, independently of their satisfaction with out-comes in particular cases (Tyler 1997a, p. 326).

Tyler’s research evinces that experiences of procedural fairness play a critical role inshaping an individual’s feelings of legitimacy and that this has significant implications

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for their behaviour, particularly on rule adherence and cooperation. Tyler finds thatthere are strong associations between an individual’s feelings of legitimacy towards thelaw and legal authorities and their overall levels of compliance with the law (2006, pp.161–169). One study that is particularly relevant for the purposes of this article reportsthat the perceived legitimacy of the decision-making processes used to establish rulesfor water conservation has a greater influence on the willingness of an individual torestrain their water use than the perceived favourability of these rules on that individ-ual’s water use (Tyler and Degoey 1995). Tyler also finds that the use of fair proceduresmay also influence an individual’s level of cooperation in an organisation, which hedefines as “a decision about how to actively to involve oneself in a group, organization,or community through taking actions that will help the group to be effective andsuccessful” (2011, p. 22). This echoes similar research in organisational psychologyas to the role played by procedural fairness in the emergence of trust, collaboration, andreciprocation among actors (Konovsky and Pugh 1994).

By emphasising the role that judgements about procedural fairness play in an indi-vidual’s behaviour, the relational model supports the adoption of a social, rather thaninstrumental, approach to human motivation (Tyler 2011, pp. 27–47). A social approachemphasises intrinsic motivations for human behaviour such as attitudes, values, identity,procedural justice, and motive-based trust. In general, social approaches to motivationprovide a more stable and cost-effective basis for fostering cooperation than a system thatdepends on the use of material resources and sanctions to enforce rules or encouragecooperation. When institutions are endowed with legitimacy, rule adherence or cooper-ative behaviour needs not be encouraged through extrinsic rewards or enforced throughcoercion on a regular basis (Tyler 2006, pp. 22–25; Tyler 2011, pp. 150–151).

By contrast, instrumental approaches are based on a rational choice conceptions ofhumans that views their behaviour as being driven by the availability of rewards andsanctions. An inherent weakness of such approaches lies in their susceptibility to thechanging patterns of sanctions or rewards provided by external authorities. Moreover,such instrumental approaches may elicit deleterious consequences, including the feel-ings of distrust, anger, and unfairness that develop as a result of practices of enforce-ment and monitoring (ibid). One final reason to shun instrumental approaches is thatthey may undermine the intrinsic motivations that individuals may have to comply withrules and cooperate with institutions. Indeed, because instrumental approaches are notself-sustaining, “it becomes more and more important to have such external constraintsin place, for whatever intrinsic motivation people originally had is ‘gradually crowdedout’ by external concerns” (ibid, p. 153).

Naturally, Tyler does not advocate doing away with instrumental approaches alto-gether. Rather, Tyler suggests that social approaches to motivation should be givenpriority in institutional design, with instrumental approaches filling the gaps, whennecessary. This could contribute to the long-term development of organisational envi-ronments and cultures that seek to motivate individuals on the basis of their intrinsicdesires to respond to feelings of fairness, trust, and legitimacy. On the other hand, wheninstrumental approaches serve as the default option, “everybody in the group isapproached in this way, and led to highlight in their ownminds the incentive and sanctionelements in their relationship with the group” (ibid, p. 157). This can instead contribute tothe emergence of a culture of distrust and self-interest, with negative implications for thesocial relationships that are so important to a functioning organisation or society.

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Although the finding that procedural fairness matters more to feelings of legitimacythan outcome favourability is a cornerstone of 40 years of research in social andorganisational psychology (Konovsky 2000), it nonetheless has three important bound-ary conditions. First, many scholars argue that the distinction drawn between proceduresand outcomes in individual assessments of legitimacy is overstated and thus fails torecognise the importance of interacting effects between these two dimensions of justice(ibid, pp. 502–504). For instance, existing studies show that assessments of the fairness ofprocedures may fail to overcome concerns about the favourability of outcomes in caseswhere individuals have clear and deeply held moral beliefs about the latter (Skitka 2002;Mayer et al 2009). Second, other scholars have argued that individuals develop feelingsof legitimacy (or illegitimacy) in the context of collective experiences and not simply onthe basis of their personal interactions with authorities (van den Bos and Lind 2001).Third, as Tyler himself acknowledges, if an organisation’s history has been characterisedby low levels of trust and fairness, this may temper its capacity to engender positivefeelings on the basis of new fair experiences, at least in the short term (Tyler 1997b, p.224). These boundary conditions suggest that procedural justice, while important, is farfrom a panacea that can endow organisations with legitimacy in all circumstances.

Understanding Legitimacy and Cooperation in Conservation

Legitimacy has recently become an important object of study in conservation research(Viteri and Chavez 2007; Keulartz and Leistra 2008; Rantala 2012; Borgström 2012)due to increased awareness of the negative implications of the coercive approaches thathave dominated conservation practice (Pierce Colfer 2011) as well as the broaderdiscursive turn in environmental governance more generally (Steffek 2009; Bernstein2005). By and large, this existing literature shares Tyler’s assessment of the importanceof legitimacy for motivating individuals and accordingly maintains that conservationinterventions that can acquire and maintain high levels of legitimacy are likely tobenefit from increased stability and effectiveness than more instrumental approaches.

The value-added of Tyler’s work to this body of research relates to the relationalantecedents of legitimacy, rather than its effects. On the whole, most accounts oflegitimacy in conservation and environmental governance are based on macro-social ordiscursive perspectives. For instance, Rantala conceives of legitimacy as resting onfoundational normative principles that “are socially constructed” and that relate topreferences for ideologies, regime types, and decision-making processes (2012, p.167). Similarly, Bernstein and Cashore’s conception of legitimacy is based on the notion“that already institutionalized norms define appropriate and inappropriate courses ofaction, legitimate institutional forms, and create a context in which cost–benefit analysisoccurs, even making certain actions unthinkable” (2007, p. 351). One final example isSteffek’s work arguing that perceptions of legitimacy are shaped by processes of“communicative justification” grounded in social norms and values (2009, pp. 314–316).

These macro-social perspectives on legitimacy have three important implications forstudying the influence of an intervention like an RBA on levels of legitimacy andcooperation in conservation. First, they are founded on the notion that the legitimacy ofinstitutions is primarily based on norms that emerge and evolve over time throughlearning or communicative action. These accounts thus suggest that institutions operatein already socialised environments and the acquisition of legitimacy, at least initially, is



dependent on an appeal to, or fit with, existing norms.1 This means that RBAs will havevarying effects in different parts of the world, based on their congruence with localsocial or cultural norms, thus limiting their potential for legitimation to populations thathave already internalised common understandings of human rights standards andprinciples (or similar norms).

Second, the broader social structures that mediate the interactions between theproponents of conservation activities and local communities may serve as an obstacleto the sort of equitable engagement and mutual understanding that is required for RBAsto operate effectively. Indeed, one of the obstacles to the full and effective implemen-tation of CBAs has been that conservationists frequently continue to hold prejudicialviews about the knowledge or capabilities of local communities (Fischer 2010).Moreover, local communities themselves may hold beliefs and adopt defensive strat-egies that make it more difficult for outsiders to understand their views and concernsand collaborate with them: “When they interact with broader scale and still morepowerful actors and encounter differing systems and norms, [marginalized communi-ties] may misrepresent their own activities, beliefs, and knowledge to outsiders; defendtheir views and behavior based on the logic of their own symbolic systems or frombroader scale legislation or narratives; resort to trickery in their own defense; jointogether to rise up against oppressors; or form ties with powerful outsiders like NGOsor universities” (Pierce Colfer 2011, p. 2160). These challenges associated withcrossing from one social system to another may likewise undermine the effectivenessof RBAs, when they are implemented by external actors in a cultural or socialenvironment with which they are not familiar.

Third, while macro-social perspectives recognise that institutions and relationshipsmay eventually change and thus generate new norms, this takes place through relativelygradual and lengthy social processes of socialisation and translation. For Bernstein andCashore, this means that institutional interventions should first seek to appeal to thepragmatic motivations of actors while creating the conditions for the emergence oflearning and shared understandings over time (2007, pp. 362–363). Steffek goes furtherstill and advises that the spontaneity and capriciousness of social mechanisms requirethat we “be a bit sceptical towards attempts at artificially and authoritatively creatingdiscursive settings through a process of institutional engineering” (2009, p. 317). As aresult, a macro-social perspective on legitimacy suggests that institutional interventionslike RBAs are unlikely to enhance levels of legitimacy in the relatively short time framein which conservation projects and programmes are first initiated and implemented(unless it coheres with pre-existing social norms and practices).2 Of course, the longview adopted by RBAs may in fact be in a strength and reflect instead the inherentweaknesses of the short time frames of conservation projects and the sources of fundingupon which they depend.

By contrast with these macro-social perspectives, Tyler’s approach to the study oflegitimacy derives its explanatory value not in pre-existing social norms but in a socialpsychological understanding of the importance of interpersonal treatment for socialidentity (Ellemers et al. 2002). Indeed, the relational model stresses the role thatinteractions with authorities play in an individual’s self-assessment of their status within

1 This is a view that is commonly adopted in the literature on international norms (see Cortell and Davis 2005).2 For an application of these theories to RBAs, see “Limitations and Alternative Explanations” below.

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society. This makes it possible to study how an institutional intervention like a RBAmaygenerate individual experiences of procedural fairness and thereby affect, depending onthe pace of implementation, levels of legitimacy in a relatively short time-frame (Tyler2011, p. 103). This analytical focus on relationships between authorities and communi-ties also provides another way of assessing the role and effects of significant gaps inunderstanding and representation (Pierce Colfer 2011) that may structure the interac-tions between the proponents of RBAs and the individuals to which they are addressed.Moreover, Tyler’s relational model claims a robust level of cross-cultural validity since itrests on what is generally understood as a basic human need to seek recognition andrespect from others.3 Finally, assessments of interpersonal treatment have been found tobe most important “to those who believe themselves to be socially excluded, peripheral,or marginalized” (Tyler 2006, p. 138). This undoubtedly increases its salience in thefield of resource conservation and management in which local communities have beenand continue to be dispossessed, excluded, and marginalised (Peluso 1993; Brockingtonand Igoe 2006; Cernea 2006), even in the context of reforms aimed at the recognition oftheir authority and rights (Pulhin and Dressler 2009; Hajjar et al. 2012).

Not surprisingly, a few recent studies in conservation have begun to draw on workby Tyler and other social psychologists to conduct empirical assessments of the originsand implications of legitimacy in specific conservation projects (Stern 2008b; Boumaand Ansink 2011). Reporting the results of his interviews with individuals living inproximity to four parks in the USA and Ecuador, Stern concludes that “[t]he criticalelements leading toward greater compliance with [protected area] regulations” include“meaningful and respectful communications between PA entities and local residents,receptiveness to local input, consistent and honest performance, benefits for localpeople associated with PA presence and equitable treatment of different groups”(2008a, b, p. 209). Likewise, Bouma and Ansink describe the outcomes of a collectiveresource game conducted with the residents of two villages near a protected area inCosta Rica and suggest “that communities are more likely to collaborate voluntarily inrestricted resource use when they perceive park management as legitimate” (2011, p.15). These findings demonstrate the utility of using the relational account of proceduralfairness for assessing as well as verifying the potential of RBAs to transform the way inwhich conservation is practiced in different parts of the world.

Rights-Based Approaches and Their Potential Influence on Levels of Legitimacyand Cooperation in Conservation

The Concept of RBAs to Conservation

RBAs have become an increasingly important normative and operational framework forfields that serve or engage marginalised or disadvantaged groups, such as development

3 Tyler recognises that the meaning of fairness and justice and its effect on status may differ from one culturalgroup to another (Tyler 2006, pp. 156–157). At the same time, reporting on the analysis of a survey examiningthe antecedents of political behaviour in Africa, he nonetheless finds that “people are more likely to participatein the political process […] when they have favourable social motivations—that is favourable attitudes,supportive values, a positive identity, a view that the procedures of government are fait, and a trust in politicalauthorities” (ibid, p. 85).



(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2012) andhealthcare (Gruskin et al. 2010). RBAs have emerged in the field of conservation as ameans of maximising the benefits of conservation for local communities and their rights(including by securing access to land, ecosystem services, and natural resources that arecritical for such rights as the rights to health, an adequate standard of living, food, andwater) while also resolving the conflicts that often arise between these two fields inpractice (Campese 2009, 7; Svadlenak-Gomez 2007). While RBAs have mostly beendeveloped and discussed in the context of conservation initiatives undertaken in devel-oping countries, they can also be applied in developed countries (IUCN 2013).

Although RBAs vary widely in their formulation and implementation, they tend todefine problems in terms of the human rights of right-holders, emphasise the obligationof duty-bearers to abide by the corresponding legal obligations owed to them, andfoster solutions that emphasise agency, empowerment, and social change (CARE andOxfam America 2007). Rights-holders in the conservation context most notably includeindividuals, local communities, and Indigenous Peoples that live on, near, or dependupon a resource to be conserved.4 Duty-bearers within most RBAs are states first andforemost, as they bear the primary responsibility for the implementation of humanrights obligations in both national and international law. For government actors oper-ating in the conservation context, RBAs may represent a means of assessing andrespecting human rights obligations and standards prescribed by applicable law andpolicy. At the same time, international organisations, transnational corporations, andnon-governmental organisations have made commitments to improve their humanrights performance (Reinisch 2005). In this context, RBAs provide a methodologyfor voluntarily committing to, and implementing, relevant human rights standards.Finally, it is also worth recognising that communities themselves may initiate and leadresource conservation initiatives and could apply an RBA in that context, in which casethey would be doing so in light of their understanding of their rights and the obligationsowed to them (Campese et al. 2009a).

RBAs entail the use of human rights standards and principles to understand andassess the context, process, and outcomes of conservation initiatives. RBAs primarilyderive their substantive content from international human rights law, including civil andpolitical rights (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976),5 economic,social, and cultural rights (International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights 1976),6 and the human rights of specific groups such as minorities, women,children, and Indigenous Peoples (International Convention on the Elimination of AllForms of Racial Discrimination 1969; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination against Women 1981; Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990; UNDeclaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2006). Yet, the application of RBAscan also include consideration of relevant human rights instruments at the regional andnational levels as well as customary rights and statutory rights that implement and

4 UNDRIP, art. 18: “Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters whichwould affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their ownprocedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions”.5 Civil and political rights include such rights as the rights to life, security of person, liberty and freedom ofmovement, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of association.6 Economic, social, and cultural rights include such as rights as the rights to work, an adequate standard ofliving, health, education, and culture.

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supplement applicable international human rights law (Shelton 2009, pp. 7–9; Campese2009, fn. 1–3). Although the specific scope of relevant human rights standards andprinciples in the implementation of RBAs varies on the basis of the applicable law andthe context to which they are applied, there are a number of elements that are held to becommon to all RBAs, including “basic principles of non-discrimination, concern forthe most vulnerable and marginalized groups, participation and empowerment, andaccountability” (Shelton 2009, p. 24).

In essence, RBAs are a methodology that can be used to guide the design, planning,implementation, monitoring, and assessment of conservation decision-making and man-agement processes, including the provision of accountability and remedies to provideaccess to justice to rights-holders (Campese 2009, p. 10; Campese et al. 2009b, p. 304).Campese points out that there is therefore no set blueprint for implementing RBAs toconservation as they “can be carried out at multiple scales and contexts and throughvarious legal instruments, policies, programming approaches, methods and tools”(Campese 2009, p. 10). In this regard, it is worth highlighting that RBAs are frequentlyassociated with participatory approaches to conservation, most notably CBAs (Labanet al. 2009; Crane et al. 2009). To be sure, RBAs share many of the underlyingassumptions of CBAs,most notably their rejection of top-down, centralised, and coerciveconservation practices developed in opposition to the rights and interests of localcommunities and their embrace of the value of participation for effective and equitableenvironmental governance (Peluso 1993; Menzies 2007). Moreover, RBAs also provideopportunities to actively involve communities and individuals in conservation gover-nance (Jonas et al 2010) and monitoring (Danielsen et al 2009).

Nonetheless, RBAs posses a distinctive focus on human rights as standards forinstitutional analysis and design that entail a number of important differences withCBAs and other participatory approaches. To begin with, this normative focus onhuman rights and human dignity provides a different basis for seeking the involvementof local communities than the instrumental claim that community-based managementpractices may yield better environmental outcomes (Wollenberg et al. 2007). Indeed,enhanced conservation effectiveness may not be an inevitable outcome of an RBA, andimplementing an RBA requires respecting rights even in those cases. This normative,rather than instrumental, focus on human rights is seen as a critical strength of RBAs interms of their capacity to deliver benefits for local communities. As Campese (2009, p.13) explains,

[…] where collaborative approaches have proven too costly or difficult, conser-vation organisations have sometimes moved back towards more overtly protec-tionist and exclusionary models. Finally, approaches that exclude local people cansometimes be effective in achieving conservation outcomes. For all of thesereasons, instrumental approaches alone may be insufficient to guarantee thatpeople’s wellbeing is secured. By addressing human wellbeing as a matter ofobligation, and addressing the rights not only of communities, but also ofindividuals and vulnerable groups within communities, RBAs can, in principle,better ensure that basic human rights are respected.

Further, RBAs can apply to a broad variety of contexts and structures as they are notwed to a particular community unit or level of analysis (Campese 2009, p. 21). They do



not necessarily involve decentralisation or devolution of power or authority to thecommunity level, although models of shared or community governance may indeed bea “way to bring rights holders and duty bearers together in transparent processes inwhich they can understand the claims and duties at stake, and negotiate fair outcomes”(Campese 2009, p. 12). Most importantly, unlike community-based managementpractices, RBAs focus on individuals as well as communities and do not thereforeignore differences and inequalities within communities (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, pp.634–635). As such, RBAs may provide an important tool for ensuring that reforms thataim to devolve authority to local communities operate with greater accountability andare responsive to the rights of the most marginalised members of a community (Ribot2003).

Finally, the focus of RBAs on relations of obligation between rights-holders andduty-holders entails that they target power dynamics and asymmetries beyond thosepresent at the community level, thereby addressing a particular weakness of CBAs(Agrawal and Gibson 1999, pp. 640–641; Johnson and Forsyth 2002; Campese 2009,p. 13). Indeed, through its emphasis on human rights, participation, and accountability,RBAs can form the basis for improving decision-making processes and addressingfailings in the quality of governance and rule of law structures at the regional andnational levels. Accordingly, as Campese concludes, “the substantive and proceduralaspects of inclusive RBAs can be far more comprehensive than a more general‘participatory’ or ‘pro-poor’ approach” (Campese 2009, p. 13)

As a result of the normative commitment to rights that they require of projectproponents and their focus on inequalities within communities and across levels ofgovernance, the proponents of RBAs view their potential to endow conservationinitiatives with enhanced levels of legitimacy as one of their most important advantagesover other participatory approaches. All the same, it is also worth highlighting that dueto their ambitious and comprehensive nature and the challenges that their full andeffective implementation may pose to existing administrative systems and dominantparadigms, the obstacles that stand in the way of achieving transformative social andenvironmental justice outcomes on a broad scale through RBAs may be considerable(Schuijers 2011).

A Relational Account of RBAs and Their Potential to Generate Legitimacyand Cooperation in Conservation

In what follows below, I develop a relational account of whether and how RBAs mayenhance levels of legitimacy and cooperation in the context of specific conservationinitiatives, with a particular focus on the step-wise framework for implementing RBAsdeveloped by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)Environmental Law Centre (ELC).

As can be gleaned from Table 1 below, the IUCN’s step-wise framework for RBAsclarifies and operationalises the role, responsibility, and burdens of duty-holders torespect the procedural and substantive rights of local communities—from situationanalysis to enforcement. It is meant to be incorporated into laws, policies, and codes ofconduct guiding the decision-making of a wide range of conservation actors, includinggovernments, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations, to im-plement RBAs in their programmes and projects (Shelton 2009, pp. 23–24). On the

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whole, the IUCN’s RBA framework aims to ensure that conservation initiatives assessand address important human rights issues; ensure the participation of members of localpopulations in a manner that respects the latter’s human rights and dignity; takereasoned and transparent decisions and resolve conflicts on the basis of establishedhuman rights standards and principles; and provide access to participation and justice tolocal populations.

Table 1 IUCN step-wise framework for implementing an RBA to conservation

1. Undertake a situation analysis

1.1 Identification of actions, stakeholders, and respective roles

1.2 Identification of applicable legal rights, claims, and duties

1.3 Identification of potential impacts of the proposed activity or project

1.4 Identification of potential conflict resolution mechanism

2. Provide information

2.1 Compile, publish, and otherwise disseminate information in an understandable and easily accessible way

2.2 Disseminate general information regarding the action

2.3 Disseminate specific information regarding legal rights, claims, and duties of potentially affected persons

3. Ensure participation

3.1 Undertake consultations

3.2 Seek and promote free and prior informed consent

3.3 Provide and use conflict resolution mechanisms to secure rights

4. Take reasoned decisions

4.1 Check for compatibility with rights and obligations at the international, national, and local levels

4.2 Check that the decision-making has taken place with proper information and participation

4.3 Include reasons for the decision

4.4 Disseminate the decision to all relevant stakeholders

5. Monitor and evaluate application of the RBA

5.1 Evaluate the application of the RBA through monitoring procedures

5.2 Use indicators to assess the impacts of steps taken

5.3 Compare impacts against pre-determined benchmarks

5.4 Analyse whether actions are contributing to (positive or negative) unintended consequences

5.5 Evaluate whether and how outcomes contribute to pre-defined objectives and where objectives are notbeing met, make efforts to understand why

5.6 Take account of new conditions that may affect conservation or rights

5.7 Document the process and identify “lessons learned”

5.8 Ensure that monitoring is transparent, consistent, and participatory

5.9 Draw on the whole evaluation and lessons learned to develop, collaboratively negotiate, and implementany further change to the policy, project, or activity

5.10 Transparently report the experiences and draw on lessons learned to seek ways of expanding andstrengthening the overall foundation of an RBA

6. Enforce rights

6.1 Provide access to effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including access to redressand remedies. Remedies could include restoration, compensation, and criminal prosecution

The elements in the table are drawn from Shelton (2009) pp. 25–35



Some observers have suggested that this framework may be biased towards the workof external actors and may risk sidelining interventions aimed at empowering commu-nities as conservation actors (Jonas et al 2010). While it is true that the framework iswell-suited for the activities of governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs),and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), the framework itself is entirely compatiblewith, and adds value to, a community-led approach. Indeed, whether or not an RBA isimplemented by an external actor or leaders within a community, it mandates a numberof steps that are aimed at identifying and enforcing not only the collective rights ofcommunities but also the rights of individuals within these communities. As a result,RBAs may provide a methodology for avoiding the challenges of elite capture that hasbeen associated with the implementation of participatory approaches to conservation(Ribot 2003). Yet, perhaps the most important contribution that RBAs can make toconservation governance is by providing a methodology for resolving competing rightsmade by communities with overlapping claims to scarce resources (Campese 2009, p.22; Oviedo and Puschkarsky 2012, p. 292).

I hypothesise that the full and effective application of an RBA in the context of aspecific conservation initiative will generate interactions between this initiative’s lead-ership (whether a government, an NGO, an IGO, or community institutions) andindividuals in a local population that are likely to be experienced by the latter asprocedurally fair. As shown in Table 2, through its emphasis on transparent decision-making and conflict resolution processes that respect the rights and dignity of commu-nities and individuals (Shelton 2009), the IUCN’s step-wise approach to RBAs is well-positioned to fulfil the expectations of individuals with respect to the four factors that aregenerally assumed by Tyler as critical to individual assessments of procedural fairness.

Moreover, as a result of their experiences of fairness with conservation initiativesimplemented through an RBA, individuals would be expected to form positive assess-ments of the legitimacy of this initiative, whether it is established by external actors or thecommunities to which they belong. In turn, these generalised assessments of legitimacywould motivate these individuals to adhere to relevant conservation rules as well asvolunteer their time, energy, and knowledge to provide overall support to conservationefforts in this region. This is critical because whether or not these initiatives are led bylocal communities, they will normally impose particular rules and burdens upon individ-uals to collaborate in the sustainable management of natural resources. This is all themoreimportant whenmultiple communities have competing claims to a common resource, andfair and transparent decision-making processes are required to establish rules and resolveconflicts across multiple communities (Oviedo and Puschkarsky 2012, p. 292)

Finally, it is important to stress that this relational account posits that experiences ofprocedural fairness would generate feelings of legitimacy among members of localcommunities and motivate cooperative behaviour accordingly, even in the absence ofmore favourable material outcomes at an individual level (such as increased benefitsgenerated by the exploitation of natural resources). As long as the processes andinteractions facilitated by an RBA provide individuals with high levels of interpersonalrespect, participation, and other cues reinforcing their social identities, they would beexpected to provide new or existing conservation arrangements with higher levels oflegitimacy, rule adherence, and cooperation.

Of course, the significant assumption made here is that it is possible to fully andeffectively apply an RBA in the context of a specific conservation initiative. This

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Table 2 The IUCN step-wise framework for implementing an RBA to conservation and the factors critical toindividual assessments of procedural fairness

Criteria of proceduralfairness

Corresponding elements of the IUCN step-wise framework for RBAs

Neutrality 1.1 Identification of actions, stakeholders and respective roles1.2 Identification of applicable legal rights, claims, and duties1.3 Identification of potential impacts of the proposed activity or project2.1 Compile, publish, and otherwise disseminate information in an understandable

and easily accessible way2.2 Disseminate general information regarding the action2.3 Disseminate specific information regarding legal rights, claims, and duties of

potentially affected persons4.1 Check for compatibility with rights and obligations at the international, national,

and local levels4.2 Check that the decision-making has taken place with proper information and

participation4.3 Include reasons for the decision4.4 Disseminate the decision to all relevant stakeholders5.1 Evaluate the application of the RBA through monitoring procedures5.2 Use indicators to assess the impacts of steps taken5.3 Compare impacts against pre-determined benchmarks5.4 Analyse whether actions are contributing to (positive or negative) unintended

consequences5.5 Evaluate whether and how outcomes contribute to pre-defined objectives and

where objectives are not being met, make efforts to understand why5.6 Take account of new conditions that may affect conservation or rights5.7 Document the process and identify “lessons learned”5.8 Ensure that monitoring is transparent, consistent, and participatory5.9 Draw on the whole evaluation and lessons learned to develop, collaboratively

negotiate, and implement any further change to the policy, project, or activity5.10 Transparently report the experiences and draw on lessons learned to seek ways

of expanding and strengthening the overall foundation of an RBA

Trustworthiness 1.1 Identification of actions, stakeholders, and respective roles1.2 Identification of applicable legal rights, claims, and duties1.3 Identification of potential impacts of the proposed activity or project2.3 Disseminate specific information regarding legal rights, claims, and duties of

potentially affected persons3.1 Undertake consultations3.2 Seek and promote free and prior informed consent4.2 Check that the decision-making has taken place with proper information and

participation4.3 Include reasons for the decision4.4 Disseminate the decision to all relevant stakeholders5.1 Evaluate the application of the RBA through monitoring procedures5.2 Use indicators to assess the impacts of steps taken5.3 Compare impacts against pre-determined benchmarks5.4 Analyse whether actions are contributing to (positive or negative) unintended

consequences5.5 Evaluate whether and how outcomes contribute to pre-defined objectives and

where objectives are not being met, make efforts to understand why5.6 Take account of new conditions that may affect conservation or rights5.7 Document the process and identify “lessons learned”5.8 Ensure that monitoring is transparent, consistent, and participatory5.9 Draw on the whole evaluation and lessons learned to develop, collaboratively

negotiate, and implement any further change to the policy, project, or activity



postulation is belied by the work of political ecologists evincing that powerful local andinternational elites often have limited interest or ability in actually providing the poor,marginalised and excluded with resource and environmental rights and their relatedbenefits (Ribot and Larson 2011). Only time will tell whether the first generation ofRBA pilot projects succeed in generating fair processes for individuals and fosteringrelations of trust and cooperation between individuals and conservation authorities.

Limitations and Alternative Explanations

Although the relational account of RBAs developed above shows significant promise,any empirical research on RBAs should explore the factors that may limit or explain itseffects on legitimacy and cooperation in particular contexts. First, the deterioration of

Table 2 (continued)

Criteria of proceduralfairness

Corresponding elements of the IUCN step-wise framework for RBAs

6.1 Provide access to effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings,including access to redress and remedies

Level of interpersonalrespect

1.1 Identification of actions, stakeholders, and respective roles1.2 Identification of applicable legal rights, claims, and duties1.3 Identification of potential impacts of the proposed activity or project1.4 Identification of potential conflict resolution mechanism3.1 Undertake consultations3.2 Seek and promote free and prior informed consent3.3 Provide and use conflict resolution mechanisms to secure rights4.1 Check for compatibility with rights and obligations at the international, national,

and local levels4.2 Check that the decision-making has taken place with proper information and

participation5.6 Take account of new conditions that may affect conservation or rights5.8 Ensure that monitoring is transparent, consistent, and participatory6.1 Provide access to effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings,

including access to redress and remedies

Participation/voice 2.2 Disseminate general information regarding the action2.3 Disseminate specific information regarding legal rights, claims, and duties of

potentially affected persons3.1 Undertake consultations3.2 Seek and promote free and prior informed consent4.2 Check that the decision-making has taken place with proper information and

participation4.4 Disseminate the decision to all relevant stakeholders5.8 Ensure that monitoring is transparent, consistent, and participatory5.10 Transparently report the experiences and draw on lessons learned to seek ways

of expanding and strengthening the overall foundation of an RBA

Neutrality refers to evaluations about “honesty, impartiality, and the use of fact, not personal opinions, indecision-making” (Tyler 1997a, p. 337). Trustworthiness refers to evaluations about “whether or not the thirdparty is motivated to treat them in a fair way, to be concerned about their needs, and to consider theirarguments” (ibid, p. 336). Level of interpersonal respect refers to evaluations about “being treated politely,with dignity and respect, and having respect shown for one’s rights and status with society” (ibid, p. 337).Participation/voice refers to evaluations about whether individuals “are allowed to participate in shapingdecisions which affect the resolution of their problems or conflicts” (Tyler 1997b, p. 232).

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levels of trust and legitimacy between local communities and conservation authoritiesprior to the introduction of an RBA may pose an obstacle to the formation of newfeelings of legitimacy based on experiences of procedural fairness. The broaderstructural context in which many conservation initiatives in the developing world havebeen pursued over the last half century, including neo-colonial dynamics of power andcontrol (Ribot and Peluso 2003; Peluso and Lund 2012) and more recently neo-liberalconceptions of nature and conservation activities (Igoe and Brockington 2007), remaina serious obstacle to the emergence of trust and social exchange. Likewise, as discussedearlier, the ability for conservationists and local communities to effectively communi-cate with one another remains an enduring challenge (Pierce Colfer 2011).

Second, the expected behaviour of rule adherence and cooperation must not in ofitself entail a serious violation of the moral beliefs of local communities. For instance,an RBA implemented in the context of a market-oriented mechanism such as REDD+or PES might not lend this initiative high levels of legitimacy among local communitieswho view participation in such mechanisms as contrary to their identity and deeply heldmoral opposition to the commodification of nature (Cabello and Gilbertson 2012; Reed2011).

Moreover, as Tyler’s own work shows, there is much to be gained in studyingprocedural justice alongside other factors that may shape perceptions and behaviour inconservation. Follow-up empirical research efforts on RBAs should be undertaken in amanner that examines or controls for the influence of a range of alternative factors onlevels of legitimacy and cooperation in conservation. An alternative sociologicalperspective would posit that the potential of RBAs to legitimate conservation initiativesdepends not on their ability to respond to the social identity of individuals but onwhether they conform to existing shared norms and understandings held by theseindividuals regarding what counts as fair and just (Tyler 2006, pp. 156–157). Asociological perspective would posit that local communities would primarily be moti-vated to cooperate with conservation efforts if they judged these efforts as fair in lightof relevant social norms defining fairness and requiring cooperation as a result. In thisregard, the potential for RBAs to incorporate regional, national, and customary normsin the design of conservation initiatives can be expected to go a long way to ensure thatthey are perceived as legitimate in accordance with the expectations of a macro-socialperspective (Cortell and Davis 2005).

On the other hand, an alternative instrumental account would insist that individualsevaluate the legitimacy of authorities on the basis of the favourability of materialoutcomes (ibid, pp. 20–22 and 71–72) and make decisions about compliance andcooperation on the basis of whether such decisions are utility-maximising (Ferraroand Simpson 2002). Returning to a hypothetical RBA project, this would signify thatindividuals within local communities would only consider conservation efforts to belegitimate and cooperate with them as a result if they viewed its material outcomes asfavourable on individual terms, whether in terms of increased use of resources orpayments made for the protection of ecosystem services.

Of course, there is no reason to think that all three perspectives may not hold someexplanatory value in any given conservation initiative. It would be surprising if socialnorms and material outcomes did not also drive behaviour, alongside proceduralfairness, among a local population affected by or participating in a conservationinitiative. It is quite reasonable to expect that an RBA may not only generate



experiences of procedural fairness but may also correspond to social norms of fairnessand deliver improved material outcomes. The hardest case for testing the effect of anRBAwould be one where fair interactions are generated in the absence of correspond-ing social norms and a context in which individuals are requested to make significanteconomic sacrifices for conservation objectives. The real question in either scenario iswhich of these factors will exert the most influence on behaviour and how they mightreinforce or weaken one another’s effects. Additional empirical research should there-fore not only seek to assess whether RBAs can actually contribute to the success ofconservation efforts but also identify how feelings of procedural fairness interact withother factors.

Conclusion

A critical insight in the field of conservation research and practice over the last 20 yearshas been the realisation that the success of conservation initiatives frequently dependson the knowledge, support, and initiative of local populations (Stern 2008a, b). A newgeneration of scholars and practitioners has therefore sought to develop alternativeways of fostering and gaining the support of individuals and communities for conser-vation projects and programmes.7

One strand of thinking argues in favour of providing material incentives to localpopulations through ICDP (Wells et al. 2004) or PES (Wunder 2005; Pirard 2012). Bycontrast, another set of scholars and practitioners support the adoption of institutionaland governance solutions that emphasise strategies of community engagement, co-management, and increased public participation in decision-making (Pimbert 2004;Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Carlsson and Berkes 2005); Murphree 2009). In manyways, this cleavage mirrors the distinction that Tyler draws between instrumental andsocial approaches for motivating human behaviour.8

In this article, I present RBAs as an emerging and promising social approach forgoverning conservation projects and programmes. Building on the relational model ofprocedural justice, I provide a plausible explanation of how and whether an RBA mayenhance the legitimacy of a conservation initiative and thereby motivate individuals inlocal populations to comply with its rules and demands and contribute to its overallsuccess. This relational account shows significant explanatory potential for understand-ing how human rights may be used to develop institutional interventions that canstrengthen the effectiveness of conservation initiatives, whether they are implementedby governments, NGOs, IGOs, or community themselves. Beyond its theoreticalcontributions, a relational approach provides an important opportunity to draw on therange of empirical and experimental research methods developed by social psycholo-gists to study the effects of RBAs to conservation.

What is more, this relational account shows that RBAs have a number of potentialadvantages over other instrumental approaches that have generated enthusiasm among

7 Of course, this search for new conservation methodologies should not obscure the fact that many traditionalcommunities have long served as effective stewards of the natural resources within their control (Fearnside2003).8 Another helpful way of distinguishing between these two approaches is March and Olsen’s distinctionbetween logics of consequences and appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989).

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conservationists. RBAs could provide an effective approach for encouraging localpopulations to act in ways that can directly improve conservation outcomes, withoutthe negative side effects and social impacts of instrumental approaches such as PES(Corbera et al. 2007). In particular, the ability of RBAs to generate experiences ofprocedural fairness addresses three principal challenges that instrumental approaches toconservations have encountered. To begin with, RBAs provide a way of ensuring thatthe trade-offs required by conservation do not lead to diminished levels of commitment,compliance, or cooperation on the part of local populations. This is especially the casesince whether or not a conservation initiative is understood by an individual as havingfavourable implications for local populations at an aggregate level (such as increasedprotection for communal forests), it may still be the case that an individual’s decision tocomply or cooperate may have unfavourable implications for that individual at aparticular time (through restrictions on their ability to extract resources from that forestbeyond what is sustainable). The ability of an RBA to provide experiences of fairnessguards against the possibility that an individual may decide to act on the basis of whatis in their best material interests at any given time.

In addition, RBAs are also well-suited to the on-going nature of conservationinitiatives. It may be the case that an initial conservation arrangement includesfavourable outcomes for population as a whole as well as particular individuals.However, disagreements about these arrangements may occur and particular individ-uals will come into constant contact with organisational authorities throughout the lifeof an initiative. By ensuring that on-going interactions between local populations andauthorities are based on interpersonal respect and fairness, RBAs can ensure aninitiative retains a high level of legitimacy and support among a local population, evenas perceptions shift with respect to the favourability of outcomes.

Finally, the effectiveness of RBAs does not depend upon the on-going delivery ofmaterial benefits and is therefore not susceptible to the vagaries of markets forecosystem services and the priorities of donors (Wells et al. 2004). Instead, RBAsdepend on the generation of fair experiences on an-going basis and are thus lesssusceptible to collapse, when external funds dry up or become rare.

Strictly speaking, from a human rights perspective, the potential of RBAs to deliverthese sorts of positive conservation outcomes is only relevant to the extent that suchoutcomes may also improve the realisation of human rights. As such, part of myinterest in developing a convincing account of the value-added of RBAs to conserva-tion programming lies in my assumption that this may play a decisive role in theiradoption on a wider scale, particularly among those actors who may not be especiallycommitted to human rights in the first place. The IUCN’s research programme onRBAs has similar ambitions, and its leading publication on the topic seeks to enhance“awareness that respect for such rights can lead to better conservation” (Shelton 2009,p. 5).

To be sure, emphasising the benefits of RBAs for conservation (as opposed tohuman rights) may in of itself have perverse consequences. There is always a dangerthat the application of RBAs for instrumental rather than principled reasons may notlead to improved conditions for local populations. According to its proponents, the verystrength of an RBA is that it is founded on a particular set of normative commitments tothe human rights and dignity of local populations (Campese 2009, p. 13). Conversely,the growing enthusiasm for RBAs among conservation actors may ultimately lead



RBAs to become a purely rhetorical tool that does not lead to any improvements in therights of local populations (Ribot and Larson 2011, pp. 67–68). As Sokhi-Bulle hasargued in a different context, an emphasis on the instrumental and governing role ofRBAs may run the risk of transforming rights into yet another form of governmentalityand social control (Sokhi-Bulle 2010). And this would not be the first time thatconservation initiatives while paying lip service to the rights and autonomy of localcommunities nonetheless maintained asymmetric power arrangements that restrictedthe ability of communities to benefit from their rights (Ribot and Peluso 2003).

Nonetheless, the strength of using the relational model of procedural justice to builda case for RBAs to conservation is that its posited positive effects are predicated onactual changes in the quality of decision-making and treatment in a conservationinitiative. In other words, for conservationists to reap the advantages of RBAs (namelythe enhanced levels of legitimacy and cooperation that they would generate), they mustactually respect the rights of individuals in local populations, acting in a neutral andtrustworthy manner, treating them with interpersonal respect, and providing them withparticipation and voice in decision-making. Of course, this remains a significantchallenge in many contexts not simply because of potential misunderstandings anddiverging expectations between conservationists and local communities (Pierce Colfer2011) but also because the former may continue to be operating with constraininghistorical narratives that have served to undermine the rights and agency of localcommunities in the context of development and environmental governance (Johnsonand Forsyth 2002).

If RBAs can lead to improvements in the human rights of local populations andthereby improve conservation outcomes, this may create an opportunity to develop acoalition of actors that are chiefly committed to human rights norms and those areprimarily motivated by the achievement of conservation objectives. By bringingtogether these two groups into contact with one another through practical tools suchas RBAs, the emerging transnational community of practice at the intersection ofhuman rights and conservation (Conservation Initiative on Human Rights 2010)9 couldtrigger dynamics capable of further institutionalising human rights norms in the field ofconservation in the long-term 10 and generating the sort of social learning that isnecessary for alternative approaches to become effective on the ground (Adams andHutton 2007, p. 169). Accordingly, rather than view human rights and conservationobjectives as being in tension, the relational account that I have developed provides aconvincing account of how and why further linkages between these two fields are likelyto lead to mutually beneficial outcomes.

Acknowledgments The author acknowledges the support of the Yale Institute of Biospheric Studies for thisresearch and thanks Benjamin Cashore, participants in the Politics, Environment & Markets workshop seriesat Yale, Jessica Campese, and two anonymous peer reviewers for their feedback and comments. Thanks arealso due to Lindsay Buchanan who assisted with proofreading and reference formatting.

9 Through the Conservation Initiative on Human Rights launched in 2008, a number of large conservationorganisations have signed onto a framework that commits them to “support and promote the protection andrealization of human rights within the scope of our conservation programmes” (Conservation Initiative onHuman Rights 2010, p. 1).10 For a similar argument regarding the developing authority of non-state forms of governance, see Bernsteinand Cashore (2007).

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