Forests, Trees and Livelihoods, 2008, Vol. 18, pp. 00–001472-8028 $10© 2008 A B Academic Publishers—Printed in Great Britain

Breaking the rings of forest corruption: steps towards Better forest governance

JAnette BulkAn

Doctoral Candidate at the School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University. E-mail for correspondence: janette.bulkan@yale.edu

John PAlmer

Senior Associate at the Forest Management Trust, Gainesville, Florida. E-mail for correspondence: jrpalmer2005@waitrose.com

aBstract

Corruption appears to be the major factor which prevents proper control of long-term forest harvesting concessions by government agencies in Guyana, South America. Corruption is easily affordable because of very low forest taxes and high profits on under-declared log exports. three “rings of power” or social compacts mutually foster the prevalent illegalities.

1 In the highest level social compact, the State itself behaves as a criminal enterprise1, allowing the available technical regulations for improving forest management to be ignored, or used selectively against those loggers who lack political influence.

2 Senior and junior forest officers keep out of each other’s relations with loggers. 3 Small-scale loggers allocated non-commercial forest restore their income by over-quota and

out-of-coupe felling, for which they pay off the junior government staff to forestall field inspections.

Steps towards solutions include:

• the links between loggers and government staff could be broken by implementing the 1997 national policy and 2001 national forest plan (GFC21997, 2001) for strategic allocation of concessions, and matching the capacity of the loggers to concession size, location, duration and quality of forest;

• inter-sectoral action by many actors. the establishment of open forums for spreading information and debating contentious issues in a non-confrontational setting, under the auspices of civil society organisations which have demonstrated durability and effectiveness in securing positive responses from the executive branch of government;

• an increase in the motivation for civil society to participate in such forums;

1Stabroek News 16 September 2007. ‘Above and beyond the law: the ruling elite in the criminal state’. Guyana and the Wider World, weekly column by Clive thomas. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56528935.Stabroek News 23 September 2007. ‘the phantom economy and the ruling elite’ Guyana and the Wider World, weekly column by Clive thomas. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56529419.2throughout this paper, “GFC” stands for Guyana Forestry Commission, the semi-autonomous national forest service.

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• the provision of openings for international nGos to aid local nGos, including harassment-free registration of civil associations;

• the strengthening of parliamentary democracy with the motivation and means to call the executive to account.

All these suggestions run counter to the nexus between the three social compacts, which make it difficult for any one actor to break free of the consequences of regulatory capture3.

introduction

In many forested countries, it appears that rings of corruption or social compacts exert forces which are effective deterrents to legitimate forest management, harvesting and trade. our purpose is to show how the illegitimate forest rings can be countered. Corruption flourishes where governance is weak. Personal weaknesses in government organisations are exploited, especially by private sector enterprises, when detection of mal-feasance is low, chances of prosecution and conviction are negligible, and penalties are derisory. the main causes and mechanisms of corruption affecting larger logging operations in tropical moist forest have been described in several countries recently, and are quite similar: Ghana (tropenbos International – Ghana, 2003, opoku, 2006), honduras and nicaragua (richards et al., 2003), Indonesia and malaysia and the Philippines (ross, 2001), mozambique (mackenzie, 2006), Papua new Guinea (Greenpeace uk, 2005, telapak & eIA, 2005), and Peru (Smith et al., 2006).

We present an additional major factor in the details from Guyana: the official focus on the petty forest crimes committed by the economically less important small-scale loggers while the economically much more significant crimes of large-scale loggers are ignored or unreported. this must be by deliberate decision, because the Guyana Forestry Commission is not short of finance to audit harvesting operations at both large-and small-scale.

In the context of sustainable management of the natural tropical moist forests in northern South America, slippage is the failure to apply correctly and equitably the corresponding laws, regulations, policies, strategies and administrative procedures. our field work during 2005–7 showed that in Guyana the holders of large-scale, long-term forest harvesting concessions were treated by government agencies quite differently from the holders of short-term harvesting concessions. these differences are not required or approved by laws or procedures and cumulatively provide strong circumstantial evidence for widespread corruption with connivance from the apex of government. “Fat cats” get fatter and the forest-dependent poor are impoverished by the inequity and corruption rather than uplifted out of poverty.

the magnitude of illegal logging and sawing is difficult to quantify, and neither the sources of information nor the locations are in the public domain.

3regulatory capture is a phenomenon in which a government regulatory agency which is supposed to be acting in the public interest becomes dominated by the vested interests of the existing incumbents in the industry that it oversees.

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Informants risk their jobs and perhaps their lives to provide evidence that they perceive to be potentially important but which they themselves cannot place in a coherent picture or use effectively on their own. literally hundreds of people have provided oral evidence4 from which we have compiled accounts of the illegal activities of large-scale and small-scale forest harvesters.

this paper starts with a description of the differences between large-scale and small-scale logging concessions in Guyana. We then summarise the three social compacts or rings5 that bind the illegal actors together. next we indicate the barriers to better forest governance and then we suggest how those barriers may be overcome. Such problems recur in other sectors and the solution requires prolonged inter-sectoral action by many actors.

Although Guyana is a small country and its officially declared international trade in forest products is less than half a million cubic metres per year, it is a member of the International tropical timber organization (Itto). the lessons which can be learned from Guyana appear to be applicable to many and much larger countries that are also members of Itto.

Land use and logging concessions in guyana

Guyana’s fertile coastal soils were empoldered and drained by slave labour during Dutch and later British colonial times during the two hundred years from the mid-17th to mid-19th centuries. the economy was based largely on primary agricultural crops and exports dominated by sugar, supplemented later by minerals (bauxite, gold and diamonds) and rice. most of the population of about 750,000 lives in the narrow coastal strip and is composed of the descendants of indentured east Indians who followed the enslaved Africans after emancipation, the second largest ethnic group. Public health measures in the mid-20th century rescued the indigenous Amerindian population that now comprises some 9 per cent of the total and lives mainly in small communities in the forested hinterland and the interior savannas and mountains. Following the flight of skills and capital during the years of the State socialist siege economy, about half the citizens of Guyana live abroad, mainly in Canada and the uSA. that flight still continues, with 85 per cent of graduates of the university of Guyana leaving the country6.

4Such statements in this paper are marked (**) to indicate an unattributable oral source, or a derivation from several such sources.5the detailed circumstantial evidence for these rings has been omitted as the purpose of the paper is more to indicate how they may be broken than how they came to be forged. explaining the latter would involve the historical development of marxist political parties; the great influence of ethnicity in Guyana; the collapse of the formal economy in the 1970s and 80s; the rise of an informal unrecorded economy which persists today; and the unskilled negotiation of foreign direct investment arrangements which opened the door to regulatory capture.6Stabroek News 22 July 2007. ‘there is no mystery: growth and the GDP’. Guyana and the Wider World, weekly column by Clive thomas. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56525143.

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the natural tropical moist forests cover 16.3 million ha, 76 per cent of the land area of Guyana, and are found mostly on the ancient and now infertile soils of the Pre-cambrian Guiana Shield. the forests are adapted to the infertility with the main canopy forest trees growing slowly and tending to have hard and heavy timbers laden with toxins or silica against pests and pathogens.

After independence in 1966, an innovative FAo Forest Industries Development and Survey (FIDS) project carried out reconnaissance-level quantitative inventories over large areas of the main forestry belt. FIDS concluded that, with the technology available at that time, sustainable timber production needed large areas logged at low intensity and long rotations (Grayum 1971). Amendments to the 1953 Forests Act in 1982 allowed the award of timber Sales Agreements (tSAs) to implement that conclusion.

the post-independence marxist regime implemented a policy labelled Co-operative Socialism that placed most of the productive economy in the hands of untrained civil servants. GDP declined at an average of 3.5 per cent per year from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, and the timber industry was in ruins in spite of credit provided by the Interamerican Development Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency. Following the death of President Forbes Burnham in 1985, an economic recovery programme from 1989 liberalised the formerly closed or siege economy and reversed the nationalisation of industries. loss-making logging enterprises and sawmills were sold at knock-down prices. During the late 1980s, political party loyalists were awarded large- and small-scale forestry concessions (Colchester, 1997); some who could not operate their own concessions rented them out to others – contrary to forest law and logging concession policy.

Asian loggers, some of them already in Suriname (Colchester, 1995, Sizer and rice, 1995), obtained concessions in Guyana also in the early 1990s. tax concessions, in foreign direct investment arrangements negotiated by the inexperienced government and without benefit of oeCD guidelines on multinational enterprises, were markedly one-sided in favour of the Asian companies (Sizer, 1996, Colchester, 1997, Palmer and Bulkan, 2007). the economic liberalisation allowed imports without quotas or licences, and hire purchase schemes. redundant bauxite miners took up chainsaw logging and milling with enthusiasm and were soon supplying the domestic lumber market at prices which could not be matched by the technically inappropriate, under-capitalised and badly-maintained fixed sawmills associated with the old family-owned logging companies. Some of these chainsaw operators worked as sub-contractors to forest concession holders but many were (or were alleged to be) illegally cutting in existing concessions or in unallocated State Production Forest (hunter, 2001: 51, mendes and macqueen, 2006: 22).

policy for logging concessions

State Forests comprise 81 per cent of the total forest area. there are only very

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small areas of now-abandoned trial forest plantations. effectively, all forestry in Guyana is in natural stands. land titled to Amerindian Village Councils (13 per cent of national territory) is outside the Guyana Forestry Commission’s (GFC) mandate, as is forest on private lands and on State lands administered by the Guyana lands & Surveys Commission.

the 1993 policy statement on forest concessions laid out clearly and simply a differentiation between three concession types (GFC 1993):

• timber Sales Agreements (tSAs) – licences for up to 25 years (20–25 years by 2004) and issued on presidential authority, exclusive to the concession holder, renewable, for >24,000 ha (>100,000 acres); boundaries to be demarcated on the ground, inventories to be undertaken, forest management plans and annual operational plans to be developed and used, environmental safeguards to be observed;

• Wood Cutting leases (WCls) – licences for 3–10 years (10–15 years by 2004) and issued on presidential authority, exclusive to the concession holder, renewable, for >8,000 ha (8,000–24,000 ha by 2004); conditions much as for tSAs; intended for applicants who could not initially meet criteria for managing a tSA but who might in time satisfy the criteria if a lease aided the raising of finance;

• State Forest Permissions (SFPs) – licences for not more than 2 years and issued on the gfc’s own authority, non-exclusive, renewable, for <8,000 ha; no requirements for demarcation of boundaries, inventories or plans; intended for small sawmillers and loggers and, by 2003, restricted to Guyanese citizens ordinarily domiciled in Guyana (thomas et al., 2003, GFC, 2004a).

the correspondence leading to the manual of procedures (Vieira 1993) accompanying the concession policy makes clear that the short-term SFPs were intended for three situations:

a. clearance logging of forested lands intended for higher-value use such as agriculture, mining or infrastructure;

b. clearance logging of forest which had been so damaged by uncontrolled wildfire or unsupervised logging, or which was naturally poor, that it could not support the cost of sustainable forest management and was therefore a wasting asset;

c. low intensity logging for forest whose management had not finally been decided.

Contrary to repeated consultancy advice, the GFC levies both area fees and volume royalties and a host of other complex taxes (thomson 1994, Palmer 1996, Salmi & Craig 20017).

7Additional references may be obtained from the authors.

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the national forest policy (GFC, 1997) and national forest plan (GFC, 2001, section nFP 320) call for a strategic plan for the allocation of forests and renewals of licences. the 1993 GFC procedures manual and the later, more detailed, manual specifically for the State Forest exploratory Permits (SFePs, a 3-year preliminary no-harvest stage of inventory and planning after which a tSA might be awarded if all conditions are fulfilled; GFC 1999b) emphasise the need for due diligence in both technical and financial aspects when evaluating applications for forest concessions. the GFC procedures prescribe an open, transparent, equitable and verifiable process for award of harvesting concessions opened for tender.

In addition, regulations accompanying the 1953 Forests Act and conditions in the licences for the various types of concessions prohibit private trading of publicly-awarded concessions without special prior approval given by the President for the two classes of long-term concessions and by the GFC for the short-term SFPs. there is no evidence that any such permission has been formally recorded. It would make no sense to have a public tendering process in which bidders demonstrate their experience and capability to manage concessions, and offer a premium price for resource access, and at the same time to allow private uncontrolled trading of those public forest assets.

By 2005, 5.8 million ha of State Forests, or 42 per cent of the 13.8 million ha administered by the Guyana Forestry Commission (GFC), had been allocated for harvesting.

slippage in the operation of the policy on the larger forest concessions

the 1993 policy committed the GFC to auditing the performance of concessions. Inactive concessions, or those logging at less than a GFC-calculated minimum rate, should be cancelled and returned to the strategic allocation pool for reserve or re-tendering to more able operators. Also, it was recognised that in some cases State Forest Permissions (SFPs) had been awarded for harvesting over areas much exceeding the 1993 limits and to licensees who were technically incompetent and financially under-capitalised.

A process of categorising the short-term SFPs was begun in 2001 (Bird and Dhanraj 2001, GFC 2002b). the categories recognised extended the 1993 ideas and provided for removing some forest from production into protection in order to allow time for natural rehabilitation. other categories included limited production and clearance logging, and the selection of areas that were still capable of sustainable forest management (and so appropriate for conversion into long-term concessions). Bird and Dhanraj (2001) recommended increased field monitoring. the GFC Board of Directors agreed this categorization and conversion process in 2006 (GFC, 2006), although the technical process of evaluating the actual forest conditions in the SFPs had slowed greatly after the end of the DFID-funded GFC institutional support project in 2002 and the emigration of trained GFC staff. the intention of upgrading the larger short-term

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SFPs to long-term tSAs remains (GFC, 2007a) although the multiple criteria for selecting candidate SFPs (Bird and Dhanraj, 2001) seems to have come down to the single factor of size.

By 2005, the expectation of logical allocations of forest harvesting concessions, as provided for in policies and legislation from 1953, had been almost extinguished. out of the 33 medium- and long-term concessions (WCls & tSAs) issued during 1985–2005:

• only 5 were still operated by the original Guyanese licensees, • 4 were acquired illegally by known criminals,• 19 were held by or illegally rented to 4 Asian-owned logging companies -

giving Asians control over more than 52 per cent of the allocated forest, • 1 concession was a no-harvest conservation concession (to the uS-based

Conservation International), • 1 concession was exclusively for heart-of-palm harvesting for a French-owned

canning enterprise, • 2 concessions were inactive, • 1 concession was theoretically inactive but was probably used fraudulently to

“legalise” timber that had been illegally cut elsewhere8.

In December 2006 the Commissioner of Forests said that he would consider rescinding inactive concessions9, but no action had been taken by october 2007.

Allocation of short-term SFPs was also a mess. In 2005 there were 289 SFPs covering 1.3 million ha or 21 per cent of the State Forest allocated for harvesting, down from 320 SFPs and 1.1 million ha in 2001 (GFC 2002b). the constancy of area indicates that SFPs have become larger though fewer. this makes sense for a GFC that, contrary to the 1993 policy (GFC 2007b), has largely withdrawn from field monitoring, but that does not make sense when the GFC has a large bank account credited with forest taxes (area fees and royalties) not paid into the national Consolidated Fund (hunter 2001, Salmi & Craig 2001) from which it could easily fund the envisaged audits of concessions.

the strategic plan for concession allocations envisaged in 1997 and 2001 has not been prepared by the GFC. Concessions are renewed without their operations being audited, and the criteria are opaque for selection of new areas to be opened for bidding for new harvesting.

the illegalities in small-scale logging

the expansion of legal and illegal chainsaw logging and milling in the late

8Bulkan, J. with Palmer, J.r. 2006. ‘timber tags: the currency of illegal logging and forest corruption in Guiana Shield countries.’ http://www.illegal-logging.info/documents.php?id=378#378. 9Kaieteur News 11 December 2006. ‘Forestry Commission to repossess unutilised concessions’, news item. Georgetown, Guyana.

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1980s and 1990s caused a variety of problems. the east Indian dominated Party-in-Power encouraged the formation of associations of small-scale loggers. the members of these associations are mostly African Guyanese, ex-bauxite workers and supporters of the main opposition political parties; although at least half of the field workers are Amerindians. Quantitative restrictions on membership of the associations were too little too late, and there are no limits to the number of felling/milling crews recruited by any one member of an association.

the associations (of which there are now 17) are given preference by the GFC in bidding for new short-term forest allocations. SFPs allocated to these associations are often in forest logged many times previously in an uncontrolled manner or are fire-damaged and, now, commercially poor. there is no matching of the logging capacity of an association to the number of commercial trees still available in the already-logged forests made available to it. Applicants for SFPs have to sign that the GFC estimates of forest stocking match their requirements, but no applicant actually checks the forest condition in the field. the possession of a concession licence is more important than the nature and status of the forest covered by the concession. moreover, the associations of loggers claim that they are not offered more appropriate forests because such forests have already been allocated to tSAs (**).

the associations lack marketing and other business skills and tend to cut only the increasingly scarce traditional timber species. the associations do not map out or inventory their areas; so it is every logging crew for itself. Inevitable conflicts occur between logging crews within an association, and between concession holders, through the illegal felling and milling of trees in adjacent concessions. however, adjacent tSA holders may also contract these logging crews to work the more difficult areas of tSAs, for example, where conventional roading would be uneconomical. tSA/WCl holders may purchase GFC timber tags and transport permits from the associations (executives or members), or vice versa, in order to “legitimise” timber illegally felled outside the approved areas or in excess of the GFC annual quota (**).

SFP holders, including associations of small-scale loggers, claim that they are forced into illegal felling because the area fees levied by the GFC are the same for degraded forest and for virgin forest. the GFC only issues timber tags and removal permits progressively to small-scale concessionaires on payment of acreage and royalties due (**). Small-scale concessions are withdrawn after 2 years for any arrears in payments. In contrast, the large-scale concessionaires owed more than uS $1.4 million in acreage fees at the end of 2004 without accruing interest charges or any other penalties (GFC, 2005a: 85, hunter, 2001: 95). this is in spite of the low rates of forest taxation in Guyana; royalty rates are about one sixth of malaysian rates for timbers of comparable quality, and Sarawak logging costs are almost identical to those in Guyana (Bulkan and Palmer 2007). the chances of detection of illegalities are low and the risks worthwhile due to the rarity of field inspections (**).

As much of the timber in SFPs is chainsaw-ripped into lumber at stump, there is ample room for disagreement between logger and GFC staff about the

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origins of truck loads of lumber. We have seen large loads with so few timber tags that, if legitimate, the original trees would have been impossibly large. In other words, the loggers were saving timber tags for use as trading currency10.

Junior members of the GFC staff are mainly employed at roadside checking stations. they have no maps of the boundaries of individual concessions, nor copies of concession licences, nor the forest laws or regulations. there are no posted lists of forest crimes nor of penalties for infractions and none appear on the GFC website. there are almost no cases of forest crimes reaching the courts. Instead, the GFC staff are allowed extra-ordinary administrative discretion to compound forest crimes11. Small-scale loggers are willing to accept compounding of forest crimes and to do deals with junior GFC staff if that will keep those staff from carrying out stump checks. these checks are to verify that a timber

10Bulkan, J. with Palmer, J.r. 2006. ‘timber tags: the currency of illegal logging and forest corruption in Guiana Shield countries.’ http://www.illegal-logging.info/documents.php?id=378#378 11Compounding or seizure of illegal produce was standard practice in the British empire. Some countries, as in British Guiana, returned a proportion of the fine to the field officer. Although a Forest ranger had the authority to compound a shipment of forest produce, only the Assistant Commissioner in charge of Forest Administration could decide on the matter. one-third of any fine eventually imposed would go to the Forest ranger who had compounded the logs or other produce. An essential feature of compounding is that the forest crime is admitted and the offender offers to pay the administrative fine to authorised Forest Administration staff.

legal

Illegal

Figure 1.

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tag issued under the GFC quota for a SFP has been fixed to the stump of a tree felled in that SFP, and that the other half of the bar-coded tag is affixed to a log (or logs) or to chain sawn lumber. As there is so much illegal felling and sale or barter of timber tags and removal permits in the hinterland, any such field check could result in heavy fines (**).

At the checking stations, crimes mainly concern errors in (or the lack of) timber tags and removal permits. Penalties appear to be quite arbitrary (**) and under-the-counter deals between offenders and GFC staff are the norm.12 timber may be seized from boats or trucks and should be auctioned. however, the timber may be sold illegally, either back to the offender or to timber dealers (**).

Some of the compounded fees and sales of seized timber from or associated with short-term SFPs were reported to the GFC Board of Directors during 2003–5. there were no equivalent reports of forest crimes, compounded fees or sales of seized timbers from the medium-term WCls or long-term tSAs. In these years, declared returns from compounded fees and auctions of seized timbers were 5-7 per cent of all GFC revenue from SFPs (GFC 2004b, GFC 2005b). there is no similar report for 2006 (GFC 2007c, GFC 2007d).

the attention given to penalising the small-scale loggers seems to be disproportionate to their small direct contribution to the macro-economy, or even taking into account their legal and illegal sales to the larger-scale loggers. moreover, this scrutiny is not applied equitably. During 2002, when the GFC was still active in the field, the office of the President moved to prevent legal action against larger SFP concession holders who were significant supporters of the Party-in-Power (**).

some of the illegalities in large-scale logging

Similar offences against the forest law and regulations and the conditions in licences occur in large-scale as in small-scale concessions, although there is less chainsaw milling at stump in the larger operations. moreover, there are other forest crimes in the WCls and tSAs that are of much greater financial and environmental significance.

the principal additional forest crime is the private renting of under-used concessions to the Asian-owned logging companies. this private trading of national forest assets deprives the State of the benefits from re-auctioning the concessions and the associated premia offered by bidders. one Asian-owned company alone claims 398,000 ha in rented concessions (Samling Global ltd. 2007), and has a further 72,000 ha in logging agreements with Amerindian Village Councils (SGS Qualifor 2007), such agreements made “in bad faith” being an offence under the Amerindian Act 2006 (Government of Guyana 2006). this same company, although enjoying tax concessions of around uS$ 800,000 per

12Kaieteur News 15 october 2007. ‘GFC has lost its credibility’. letter to the editor by Shannon murray. Georgetown, Guyana.

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year13 under its foreign direct investment agreement to stimulate local industrial processing, has reduced plywood manufacturing and moved to the export of raw logs to Asia (China and India). At least 119,000 m3 of logs were exported by this company alone during financial year 2005-6 (Palmer and Bulkan 2007) even though the GFC itself has determined that there is local capacity for processing this log volume (GFC 2007a); only 63,000 m3 were processed into plywood (running the mill at 25 per cent capacity) and 11,000 m3 into sawn wood (7–8 per cent mill capacity). It seems highly likely that the logs obtained from the illegally rented concessions and from the Amerindian titled lands were the heavy hardwoods suitable for furniture and flooring and highly valued in Asia (GFC, 2007a: 27, Palmer and Bulkan, 2007). estimates suggest further profiteering through under-measurement, under-valuation, mis-declaration and transfer pricing worth uS$ 3-5 million per month on such logs14.

A Forest Products Association (FPA) was formed in 1944 and claims now to represent 58 large-scale loggers (**). however, only the two largest Asian-owned loggers pay FPA dues, thereby effectively controlling this body and dictating its public communications (**).

the 1993 policy for tSA or WCl holders and a condition in tSA licences calls for them to operate an acceptable forest management plan. however, some tSA licences do not include this requirement; it is unclear why they enjoy the freedom to operate unsustainably (**). A review of 16 forest management plans submitted by licence holders between 1980 and 1999 showed that none of them was complete when assessed against 14 criteria listed in GFC management planning guidelines (Bird and evans, 1999; GFC, 1999a). 17 new plans were submitted during 27 months in 2000–2002 but only 3 of those plans were approved (Bird 2002). In spite of these deficiencies, all WCls and tSAs have been allowed to continue, thus facilitating log exports through the dominant Asian-owned enterprises.

holders of long-term tSA and WCl licences are required to follow the Code of Practice for Timber Harvesting (GFC, 2002a); although this is not a statutory obligation. results of any GFC monitoring of those concessions have not been in the public domain since early 2002. the public summaries of Forest Stewardship Council evaluation reports of one tSA (Barama Company limited, tSA 04/1991) by the conformity assessment body SGS Qualifor indicate numerous environmental and some social slippages, apparently undetected or at least not penalised by the GFC (SGS Qualifor 2005, ASI 2007, SGS Qualifor 2007). the GFC removed the Code of Practice for Timber Harvesting from its

13Guyana Revenue Authority. 2005. ‘Loss of revenue during the period January 01, 2004 to December 31, 2004’. Guyana Revenue Authority Advertisement in Guyana Chronicle, 2 February 2005. Guyana Chronicle, Georgetown, Guyana. Guyana Revenue Authority. 2006. ‘Loss of revenue during the period January 01, 2005 to December 31, 2005’. Guyana Revenue Authority Advertisement in Guyana Chronicle, 5 July 2006. Guyana Chronicle, Georgetown, Guyana.14Stabroek News 30 november 2006. ‘Available data strongly suggest that the invoice prices for logs don’t reflect market value’. letter to the editor by mahadeo kowlessar. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56508917.

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website in late 2006 or early 2007 without public explanation but replaced it, also without explanation, following a Presidential claim to excellence.15

accountability in law

According to the GFC Act of 1979, the Presidentially-appointed Board of Directors is responsible for the activities of its executive arm, the Guyana Forestry Commission itself.

the Board is a corporate body and should be subject to company law (haraksingh 2002, ramjattan 2002). In practice, the Board is composed mostly of representatives of government departments/agencies and concession holders – some of whom have illegally sublet their concessions – and is effectively a rubber stamp for the GFC and office of the President. members rarely question GFC policies or activities, and those who do are not re-appointed after their one-year term.

the GFC Board, legally charged with oversight of the Commission, was given no draft of the revised GFC Act passed by the national Assembly on 26 July 2007. Parliamentary procedures were also disregarded and the draft Bill was submitted to opposition Parliamentarians “a mere 24 hours before it was scheduled to be debated”.16 In fact the previous statutory monthly Board meeting was held five months earlier, on 22 February 2007. this was in spite of some 20 articles or letters per month, raising critical questions about the GFC or the forest sector, appearing in the independent newspapers during this time.17 the GFC should lay before the national Assembly an annual report, and should inform the ministry of Finance about the net income from forest-related taxes to facilitate transfer into the Consolidated Fund. Such reports have been spasmodic at best.

three rings of power – the social compacts

Social compact type 1

the foregoing presents strong evidence of regulatory capture by those holders of tSAs and WCls who are sufficiently well connected politically to be immune from GFC monitoring and penalties. the “social compact” between these members of the Forest Products Association (FPA) and the GFC results in the

15Kaieteur News 17 october 2007. ‘Guyana’s log harvesting procedures among best in world – Jagdeo – deploying forests does not mean transferring ownership’. news item by leonard Gildarie. Georgetown, Guyana.16Guyana Chronicle 27 July 2007. ‘Guyana Forestry Commission Bill passed’. top story item by Chamanlall naipaul. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.guyanachronicle.com/topstory.html#Anchor-Present%20a-45001.17http://guyanaforestryblog.blogspot.com.

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large-scale concession holders and their subsidiaries being exempt from serious monitoring or penalties from the GFC, while the FPA members on the GFC Board do not question or offer criticism of GFC policies or practices (**; but see postscript).

Social compact type 2

A second “social compact” exists between senior and junior GFC staff. Senior members of staff handle communications with large-scale (tSA and WCl) concession holders. Junior GFC staff deal with the lesser small-scale (SFP) holders. As indicated above, much of the SFP activity is illegal due to the mis-application of the policy over the strategic allocation of concessions by the GFC.

Social compact type 3

A third “social compact” exists with junior GFC staff penalising timber transport offences but failing to conduct field inspections to match timber tags to tree stumps in SFP areas and to expose the widespread out-of-area and above-quota tree felling (**). the absence of publications on forest law, forest charges, forest penalties and concession details (such as maps, etc.) at GFC field stations provides the opportunity for the small-scale loggers and transporters and junior GFC staff to strike deals (**).

the consequences of the social compacts

newspaper reports suggest that only junior GFC staff who become excessively greedy for illegal deals, or those who are perceived to be interfering with politically-connected operators,18 are dismissed, suspended or posted from one office to another. there are no recent records of court cases for violations of forest law or regulations, or summaries of forest crimes in annual reports from the GFC.

these social compacts can be attributed substantially to that regulatory capture by Asian-owned loggers in the late 1980s/early 1990s, as well as to the prior culture of corruption generated with racial overtones during the siege economy of the mid-1970s to mid-1980s. the political assassination of the minister for Forestry and members of his family in march 2006 serves as a warning to those who do not respect or deliver on these social compacts.

18Stabroek News 15 April 2007. ‘Forest officers disciplined over illegal log shipment’. news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56518208. South China Morning Post 10 may 2007. ‘hSBC reviews green due diligence’. Feature article by C. Dueck. hong kong. Kaieteur News 15 october 2007. ‘GFC has lost its credibility’. letter to the editor by Shannon murray. Georgetown, Guyana.

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the lack of documentation in GFC field offices and the inaccessibility of documents in GFC hQ contribute to a sense that the forest sector is outwith the law. the GFC has been challenged on specific points of forest law in a series of newspaper feature columns and letters during 2006–7, but no detailed reply has been published. the challenges include a request for the Attorney General to make a public pronouncement on the legality of each one of the rented concessions,19 and a call on the President to intervene on the GFC’s abuse of his legal authority.20 these challenges have disturbed the Asian-owned logger Barama and at least someone in government decision-making circles21. however, the absence of formal legal replies suggest that corruption is so much an integral part of political and business life in Guyana (as well as in many other countries) that no one dares to break the “omertà”22 for fear of bringing down the whole house of inter-connected cards.

the government response in mid-2007 has been to revise the 1979 GFC Act so as to make it a criminal offence to disclose or use the kinds of documents on which our analyses and these challenges are based.23 this directly contradicts the

19Stabroek News 08 July 2007. ‘Concession holders who cannot operate their forests should lose their grants, not be allowed to transfer them without a competitive bidding process’. letter to the editor by Janette Bulkan. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56524259. Guyana Chronicle 10 July 2007. ‘Past time for a definitive statement’. letter to the editor by Janette Bulkan. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.guyanachronicle.com/letters.html.20Kaieteur News 18 July 2007. ‘Is the GFC usurping the President’s authority on sub-letting forest concessions?’. letter to the editor by mahadeo kowlessar. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.kaieteurnews.com/letters.htm. Stabroek News 19 July 2007. ‘only President can approve forest subletting – Bulkan’. editorial. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56524854. Stabroek News 13 July 2007. ‘Barama sub-contracting should be validated by regulatory bodies – World Wildlife Fund’. news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56524457.21Stabroek News. 12 may 2007. ‘Barama says losing sales over “false” charges by Bulkan’. General news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56520082 . Stabroek News 18 may 2007. ‘Precision will now have to pay comparable international price for Barama locust’. Business news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56520529. Stabroek News 22 may 2007 ‘the evidence against Barama was consolidated in a dossier which I presented to the Credit Suisse Bank on may 3,4.’ letter to the editor by Janette Bulkan. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56520728. Stabroek News 13 July 2007 ‘Barama sub-contracting should be validated by regulatory bodies -World Wildlife Fund’. Statement by WWF Guianas. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56524457. Guyana Chronicle 31 may 2007. ‘Close the loopholes’. letter to the editor by Janette Bulkan. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.guyanachronicle.com/letters.html. Guyana Chronicle 10 July 2007. ‘Past time for definitive statement’. letter to the editor by Janette Bulkan. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.guyanachronicle.com/letters.html.22omertà is a code of silence, common in areas of southern Italy, such as Sicily, Calabria and Campania, where the criminal organizations like the Mafia, ‘Ndrangheta, and Camorra are strong. 23Stabroek News 27 July 2007. ‘Forestry commission bill passed – concern voiced at ministerial power’. news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56525460

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intention of open government expressed in the 1980 national Constitution, Article 13 (Government of Guyana 1980).

there is parallel, but less well known, evidence (**) that similar social compacts to sustain illegality have the same roots and are found in the environmental Protection Agency, Guyana revenue Authority, Guyana lands and Surveys Commission and Guyana Geology and mines Commission.

Barriers to better forest governance

Critical comments on the performance of the GFC should not overlook the limitations imposed by the frequent loss of qualified and trained staff to better paid jobs elsewhere in the region and through emigration – especially to north America. Another major constraint is being only semi-autonomous; being effectively under political control of the Party-in-Power.

the continual illegalities in the small-scale sub-sector are induced substantially by GFC’s failure to match concession quality to logging capacity and economic efficiency. the GFC continues to disregard evidence that the small-scale sub-sector is a better performer economically and technically than the large-scale concessionaires (GFC 2005a, mendes and macqueen 2006). the GFC does not engage constructively in debate with those who argue for revoking under-performing large-scale concessions and their re-allocation among small-scale operators. the obstacle appears to be the first social compact. In addition, there are no recent reports from the GFC which offer data for a comparison between the productivity of concessions at different scales. the GFC accepts the notion of operable area as opposed to total concession area for large-scale operations, but SFPs are treated as if their entire concessions contained harvestable forest. As many SFPs are in areas damaged by fire or repeated uncontrolled logging, this is wrong.

Illegality in large-scale logging is connected with trafficking in drugs, guns and humans24 and with the money laundering which keeps the low-productivity

Guyana Chronicle 27 July 2007. ‘Guyana Forestry Commission Bill passed’. news item by Chamanlall naipaul. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.guyanachronicle.com/topstory.html#Anchor-Present%20a-45001; see references to Article 13 on non-disclosure and Article 27 on the severe penalties.24Stabroek News 21 August 2004. ‘Cocaine in timber. two jailed for 20 years, four acquitted’. news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=8662631. Stabroek News 7 march 2005. ‘the uS drug report’. editorial. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=13098523. Stabroek News 16 march 2005. ‘the drug cartel has already penetrated our timber industry and has much bigger plans’. letter to the editor by F. hamley Case. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=13955844. Stabroek News 18 April 2005. ‘Commissioner of Forests not aware of drug/forestry links –board to discuss claims’. news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=17055286. Stabroek News 20 April 2005. ‘Credible evidence drug cartels in timber sector – Case’. news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=17292218.

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economy in Guyana from collapse.25 GFC field and office staff are unlikely to move against these dangerous people while the rest of the government apparatus, including the security services, shows reluctance and while the secondary legislation against trafficking remains pending26.

the dominant logger that controls more than one third of the allocated State Production Forest made about half its forest-related payments in financial year 2005–6 in under-the-table rents for illegally sub-let concessions and has gained large undeclared income from improperly disclosed log exports (Palmer and Bulkan 2007). these excess profits could be devoted to improving forest management but it appears that Barama prefers to cultivate the apex of government, as it has done since it arrived in Guyana in 1991. It is probable that three other large logging companies who illegally rent Guyanese-held tSAs and WCls, and who with Barama control over 52 per cent of allocated State Forests, engage in similar practices27 and are protected by social compact 1.

improving forest governance

About 5.9 million ha of State Forests are still not allocated for harvesting, plus about 0.5 million ha currently under exploratory permits (SFePs; see above) which may be converted into long-term tSAs after inventory and management planning. the GFC estimates that 2.8 of the 5.9 million ha could be allocated after inventory, the remaining 3.1 million ha being subject to claims from Amerindian communities for titling or expansion of already titled Village lands, or perhaps should be kept for biodiversity or habitat protection (GFC 2007c). It is unclear why there is no discussion with the small-scale loggers about allocation of this potentially better quality and as-yet unworked forest, to replace the SFP areas which the loggers claim are economically unworkable (and so should be placed in Bird and Dhanraj’s (2001) category for protection while rehabilitating them through natural regeneration).

this allocation of unworked forest (using the established GFC competitive bidding process) could take place while the GFC continues to dither about revoking unworked and underperforming tSAs and WCls. Such allocation could reduce the amount of illegal logging and the tensions between the loggers and GFC junior staff, thus helping to break social compact 3. however, the

Stabroek News 18 march 2006. ‘Commissioner denies forestry permit granted to company named in uS drug report – documents show GFC board approved deal october 5 last year’. news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=48281444.25Stabroek News 2 march 2006. ‘money laundering might account for 40-60% of economy – uS report’. news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=46400147.26Stabroek News 18 march 2006. ‘Commissioner denies forestry permit granted to company named in uS drug report – documents show GFC board approved deal october 5 last year.’ news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=48281444. 27Seapower resources International limited. 2006. ‘Seapower Interim report 2006.’ Pp. 29. hong kong. http://main.ednews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20061218/LTN20061218189.pdf.

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unallocated forest is far from population centres, and the small-scale weakly financed loggers naturally prefer to work close to home. What they want is for the more distant forests, that the bigger operators with bigger trucks should be able to manage, to be exchanged with the tSAs closer to home; the latter then could be broken into smaller pieces suitable for the logger associations and other small-scale SFP holders (**). there was a precedent set in 2005 when 30,000 ha were excised from Barama’s 1.6 million ha concession and allocated to the Port kaituma chainsaw loggers’ association.28 this would also be an opportunity for a much-needed monitored economic comparison between chainsaw milling, in-forest milling with a portable narrow-kerf bandsaw (Clarke, 2005a, Clarke, 2005b, mendes and macqueen, 2006), and FIDS-type industrial-scale logging to a fixed mill (Grayum, 1971).

technical re-allocation to give better quality forest to small-scale loggers would need to be associated with measures to reduce the collusion between the GFC and Asian-owned loggers that involves the GFC awarding excessively large areas of low-quality forest to a loggers association or other small-scale concession. When the loggers cannot pay the area fees and so fall into debt, the GFC offers to cancel the debt provided that the small-scale loggers rent their SFP to Asian loggers (which are protected by social compact type 1) (**).

Social and community forestry projects funded or promoted through FAo and World Bank/ProFor have had little positive and sustained impact at local level, but they have given the GFC a taste for managing external funds and securing a large administrative overhead for doing so (**). It is unclear why the GFC should be managing funds intended by donors for small-scale loggers. Such funds should be routed through a commercial bank or micro-credit agency that could also teach the loggers how to keep financial records, manage bank accounts and report to association members. loggers also need training in the constitution and management of their associations, to prevent their elected executives from creaming off most of the benefits of association and micro-credit (**).

Particular problems of Amerindian titled and claimed land

reducing illegality associated with titled Amerindian Village lands is more difficult. In spite of years of recommendations by external consultants and internal staff, there is no national integrated land use planning. native title, in the Australian or Canadian sense, has never been admitted by either pre- or post-independence governments of Guyana, although historical analysis suggests that the Dutch colonists did recognise Amerindian land rights (Benjamin and Pierre, 1992, letwiniuk, 1996).

Vague wording in one of the conditions for independence from united kingdom colonial control in 1966 leaves unclear whether Amerindians can claim title to land which their ancestors may at one time have occupied or used with a nomadic style of life, or only that land which they were occupying or using

28Stabroek News 22 September 2005. ‘Barama releases concession to Port kaituma loggers.’ news item. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=30660003.

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in mid-1966. If the former, then there would be almost no corner of Guyana which could not be subject to claim. the vague status has been perpetuated in subsequent reports and legislation (Amerindian lands Commission, 1969, letwiniuk, 1996, Government of Guyana, 2006). GFC procedures (GFC, 1999b) should prevent the advertisement of SFePs over land subject to Amerindian claim, but does nothing to define such a claim. An attempt in the current Forest Bill number 21 of 2007 (which would replace the 1953 Forests Act) uses terms which are not themselves defined and which are different from wording about land claims used in the Amerindian Act 2006.

moreover, there are no clear criteria for granting extensions to Amerindian titled lands (Government of Guyana, Amerindian Act 2006: Article 45). Villages experiencing rapid demographic increase but no increase in productivity of agricultural cropping systems feel that they need more land (**). It seems inequitable to give out more State land unconditionally, free of charge and in freehold to Amerindians when other ethnic groups are not equally privileged.

the desire of the Party-in-Power to maintain a form of social compact type 1 means that the government prefers to postpone resolution of this issue rather than solve this (and other issues) through the introduction of integrated land use planning (**). traditionally although not formally, mining and infrastructure have taken precedence over forestry land use. this was recognised in the 1993 concessions policy and in the 1996 National Development Strategy 2001–2010 report (Government of Guyana 1996). use of soft-surfaced logging roads by heavy mine trucks in wet weather has been a frequent source of friction, as control of privately-built logging roads on public land cannot be privatised without ministerial agreement. lack of effective contact between the GFC and the Guyana Geology and mines Commission (GGmC) to plan forest clearance ahead of mining also upsets logging companies that pay area fees for forested land already destroyed by miners ahead of logging (** and debate in the local Press in September/october 2007). the sparse field presence by inspectors from either Commission means that the private sector operators are left to come to local accommodations (**). meanwhile, forest (and government revenue) continues to be lost because social compact types 1 and 3 keep inspectors away.

Problems with forest certification

Forest certification as an independent system to verify the quality of forest management has made little progress in the Guiana Shield and other countries where illegal logging is the norm. the desire of government to dominate and control all standard-setting processes in Guyana made a national forestry standard incompatible with the requirements of schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), and that draft standard remains incomplete. one national and one Asian logger were aided by WWF Guianas and other donors to begin conversion to a FSC-acceptable level of forest stewardship. the local company dropped out of this process, and the Asian logger’s certification by

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SGS Qualifor in February 2006 was the subject of an appeal by civil society and suspended following the november 2006 surveillance mission (SGS Qualifor, 2005, ASI 2007, SGS Qualifor, 2007). Although Samling Global limited, the parent company of Barama, has expressed a determination to regain FSC certification, there is no local evidence that Barama is prepared to give up its hugely profitable illegal logging through rented concessions and on Amerindian lands (Palmer and Bulkan, 2007).

the increasingly stringent requirements of the european union countries, individually and as a trading bloc, for legality assurance systems in timber production are scarcely understood in Guyana, even though much of the exported, unseasoned, profiled lumber is destined for europe. Bar-coded timber tags were introduced in 1999 (Barne, 1999) but because the tagging and database systems were incompletely installed the tags have become a favourite currency for illegal logging.29 A study for the development of a legality assurance system funded by uS-AID in 2006 showed that the GFC had not understood what an eC-acceptable system required – including independent forest monitoring – and how far the illegalities prevalent in Guyana needed to be corrected (Clarke, 2007). the proposal from Guyana for Itto funding (now approved) for further work on a legality assurance system indicates an intention to use it against the small-scale logger, but not equitably for all logging operations; social compact type 1 is still protecting the tSA and WCl holders (GFC, 2007b).

Promoting field inspections

once the social compacts are broken, and equitable pursuit of forest criminals is restored, a reward system used in several countries could stimulate GFC staff to carry out field inspections and lumber yard checks. Such a system provides part of the court-imposed fine as a reward to the forest staff responsible for the detection, apprehension and successful prosecution in court. of course, that implies that suspects are indeed brought to court and that fines are collected as government revenue. Such a fine-sharing system should not be associated with compounding of minor forest crimes because the latter stimulates under-the-counter deals between forest staff and offenders.

Current difficulties and improvements needed in non-forest sectors

traditionally, from the years of the siege economy in Guyana, those who disagreed with the Party-in-Power were encouraged to emigrate rather than be assassinated. there are but small rewards for contesting the culture of corruption. however, there is at least some feeling that “50 good men or women would set Guyana straight” (**). the dictatorial power of the Party-in-Power is sustained by the demographic majority of east Indian Guyanese terrified of the previous racist violence of African Guyanese. this violence has occurred episodically since the

29Bulkan, J. with Palmer, J.r. 2006. ‘timber tags: the currency of illegal logging and forest corruption in Guiana Shield countries.’ http://www.illegal-logging.info/documents.php?id=378#378

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middle of the 19th century and has provoked retaliatory terror (Bisnauth, 2000). the problem is how to break this circle of influence backed by violence.

Corruption allows the illegalities described above, but corruption is itself a symptom of sickness in society. there is no shortage of recipes for combating corruption (transparency International, 2002, Campos and Pradhan, 2007) but these recipes, or road maps, assume moral leadership in government or an element in civil society with levers to influence government. this is not so in Guyana. the apex of government appears to be influenced strongly by corrupt forces, and it can be assumed that such corrupters have incriminating evidence; tapes of intercepted telephone calls are commonly circulated in Guyana where little is recorded on paper.

Democracy is not Parliamentary in the Westminster sense. Compared with Westminster-style parliaments, the national Assembly of Guyana is a part-time organisation, sitting for less than 40 days each year. the Commonwealth Secretariat sponsored a review of procedures and their operation in the national Assembly. the review pointed out how parliamentary powers to monitor and call to account the executive branch of government were not being used (Davies, 2005); strengthened parliamentary Standing orders were drafted (Pender, 2005). however, the Speaker of the Assembly has declined to use those powers, or to energise the Sectoral Committees (which should operate like Westminster Select Committees to question government departments and demand answers on pain of being cited for parliamentary contempt). the GFC was last questioned in the national Assembly in 2004, three years ago, and then only briefly.

Proposals for the reform of the national Assembly and the national Constitution are shelved by the Party-in-Power, as the status quo serves it well. It was the British Government, intent on blocking the election of a marxist government in the pre-independence period and just after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which replaced Assembly members responsible to geographic constituencies with Assembly members selected by the Party leaders. this greatly strengthens the power of an executive President and greatly weakens democratic responsibility and decentralised government. Indeed, the current Party-in-Power has continually postponed elections for local authority government, last held 13 years ago in 1994.

With the national Assembly neutered by its own timidity and part-time nature, civil society has little leverage over the executive government. this weakness induces a tendency to lobby for one’s own individual interests and to bypass representative bodies, such as trade and professional associations. the weakness then allows the executive branch of government to negotiate individual deals – both over and under the table – and to conceal information from competitors (**). opposition parties may welcome objective information briefs from civil society, as a change of diet from the government information agency, but the Party-in-Power has a solid majority to win any motions that reach the floor of the Assembly.

Civil society is weak because of the continued emigration of the middle classes. the same handful of people strives for better governance across the

BreAkInG the rInGS oF ForeSt CorruPtIon 21

sectors. the few social advocacy organisations have their mandates restricted by their key individuals. there are few sustained campaigns in the sense of an organised progression of activities aimed at specific changes in policies or legislation. there are no campaigning environmental nGos of the type of Friends of the earth or Greenpeace. ecologists, foresters and social scientists at the university of Guyana are notably mute in the forest debates, perhaps fearful for their consultancies awarded by the GFC and environmental Protection Agency (**).

Since the liberalisation of the economy in 1986, two independent newspapers, though with limited capacity for investigative journalism, do carry stories and letters of protest sent in by civil society. With all radio stations and a significant percentage of television stations under government control, these independent papers have served in a vital role to counterbalance the government-owned newspaper and information service. the website of the independent newspaper Stabroek News is particularly well used in the anglophone Americas. not surprisingly, the independent media are frequently harassed by government. more recently, low-cost or free blogs provide an opportunity to group contributions on particular themes; http://guyanaforestryblog.blogspot.com has carried most of the forestry issues since the end of 2006.30

As in several other regions – Brazil and other Amazon Basin countries (WWF uk, 2005), Central Africa (Forests monitor, 2001), Indonesia (environmental Investigation Agency and telapak 2001), malaysia (World rainforest movement and Forests monitor, 1998, Greenpeace uk, 2005, Greenpeace International, 2005), myanmar/Burma (Global Witness, 2005) – the social compacts which keep forest inspectors away from logging areas mean that the likelihood is low of detecting illegal logging, and so illegal operations are well worth the risk. even if illegal operations are detected, the social compacts ensure that compounded fines are small. If the GFC should take court action, the slow, inefficient and over-loaded court system in Guyana (allegedly riddled with corruption (**)) means that the chance of conviction is low. the courts are also inefficient in dealing with business disputes over contracts (**). reform of the judiciary and court processes is advocated frequently in the daily Press, but the Party-in-Power prefers to manipulate court appointments. the judiciary should be disconnected from political influence but this is part of a large and stalled programme of constitutional reform.31

A commercial banking system which is better at dealing with small-scale loggers and which had a smaller gap between savings rates (low) and loan rates (high) would be helpful. Guyana could learn much from the Brazilian development bank – BnDS in Amazonia. the banks in Guyana are awash with liquidity, much of it from laundering of money derived from illegal activities such as trafficking of drugs, guns and people (uS Department of State, 2007a). this underground economy (uS Department of State, 2007b) appears to be important for balancing

30A somewhat similar blog operates in Papua new Guinea (http://www.masalai-i-tokaut.com).31Stabroek News. 30 July 2007. ‘moving on.’ editorial. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56525723.

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the budget. there is plenty of international advice on reform of banking systems to resist money laundering (levi et al., 2007, Council of europe, 2005). What is missing is the political will to take action (uS Department of State 2007a); presumably social compact type 1 is the block.

objections to the introduction of value added tax in early 2007 showed how strongly Guyanese cling to the informal, unrecorded economy and measures to avoid taxation. many reports have recommended a tax regime with lower rates but a more efficient and more equitable tax collection system.32 the Guyana revenue Authority and the commercial banks should together develop a strategy to encourage a healthier approach to business. this begs the question whether any such strategy could be feasible when the Party-in-Power is willing to abuse the national budget to support the shaky business ventures of its associates.

A development bank (GAIBAnk) collapsed due to a poor record of loan repayments; this was also the fate of credit to large-scale loggers and millers from the Interamerican Development Bank and from the Canadian International Development Agency (mendes and macqueen 2006:18). An investment agency under the office of the President (Go-Invest) now manages government fiscal incentives for national investors. Foreign direct investment arrangements are handled directly by the office of the President, and are secret (Sizer 1996, Colchester 1997). the slow processing by Go-Invest of applications for the advertised incentives seriously disrupts the flow of investments and tends to stimulate illegal short-cuts to raise bridge funding (**). the government has not yet developed procedures for dealing with forest investment proposals from known criminals, including those on uSA “wanted persons” lists.33

the vague promises on the Go-Invest website should be replaced by a proper investment code. A code for foreign direct investment should incorporate best international practices, including those recommended in the oeCD guidelines for multinational enterprises. the recent World Bank compilation (Campos and Pradhan 2007) contains many suggestions in relation to public procurement also applicable to inward and domestic investment: publish the investment codes in full detail, publish the loans, publish the results of monitoring against progress indicators, publish the penalties applicable and publish the actions taken against under-performance.

32Stabroek News 01 February 2007. ‘reform the tax system and re-introduce Value Added tax (VAt)’. letter to the editor by Jean la rose and 12 other signatories. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56513093. Stabroek News 22 July 2007. ‘there is no mystery: growth and the GDP’. Guyana and the Wider World, weekly column by Clive thomas. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56525143. uS Department of State. 2005. ‘Guyana: Investment Climate Statement 2005.’ uS State Department, Washington D.C. and united States embassy, Georgetown, Guyana. http://georgetown.usembassy.gov/guyana/Investment_Statement.html.33Stabroek News. 20 July 2007. ‘Forestalling failure’. editorial. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56525009.

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other factors that could aid reform of the forest sector in guyana

these include:

a. a literate middle class;b. a tradition of small-scale, principled opposition to dictatorship;c. generally sound, if incomplete, laws and policies and impartial procedures;d. a published knowledge base about the still substantial and diverse natural

forests and the production of the goods and services based on them.

Against these positive factors are aligned:

a. a cross-party ex-marxist tradition of secretive decision-making in government;

b. a reluctance to complete anti-crime secondary legislation;c. limited intellectual resources, with capacities stifled and not respected, and

leading to emigration;d. a tradition of selectively manipulating statistical data about the economy;e. a tradition of restricting access to all information, including the quantitative

forest data, through a fear of open debates and revelation of the illegal dealings.

Ways forward include:

a. the establishment of open forums for spreading information and debating contentious issues in a non-confrontational setting, under the auspices of civil society organisations which have demonstrated durability and effectiveness in securing positive responses from the executive branch of government;

b. an increase in the motivation for civil society to participate in such forums; c. the provision of openings for international nGos to aid local nGos, including

harassment-free registration of civil associations;d. the strengthening of parliamentary democracy with the motivation and means

to call the executive to account.

All these suggestions run counter to the nexus between the three social compacts, which make it difficult for any one actor to break free of the consequences of regulatory capture.

While small-scale loggers and sawmillers are squabbling over a few dollars per cubic metre, the Asian companies are making hundreds of dollars per cubic metre through log exports. the general neglect by the GFC of its legally required reporting has contributed to the population being unaware of the pillage of their country and that the Government of Guyana actually promotes this pillage. At the very least, the independent Press enables the generally literate population to appreciate how under-valuation and under-monitoring of forest resources has

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facilitated in just five years a major growth in an enclave economy34 by Asian-owned loggers and traders. Whether this information and sense of personal outrage will translate into political action is unclear. In Guyana, participants in the social compacts or rings of power continue to benefit from the mafia-like economy, at the expense of everyone else.

postscript

In January 2007 the Commissioner of Forests (head of the GFC) offered an open letter of support for the largest Asian-owned logger: “… Barama has been performing in compliance with the laws of Guyana related to forest operations and the Code of Practice for timber harvesting. the company is considered an exemplary leader in the forest sector …” In october 2007, the President as minister of Forestry publicly criticised Barama and the (junior) minister of Forestry ordered that Barama be fined.35 the GFC used compounding (see footnote 10 above) and imposed fines totalling just under uS$ 0.5 million for a variety of forest crimes stemming mainly from sub-letting under-used concessions held by Guyanese citizens, and wholesale abuse of timber tags. this penalty is an admission that the legality assurance system which the GFC promotes internationally as exemplary is actually quite useless (Bulkan with Palmer, 2006).

Compounding requires an admission of guilt by the offender and an agreement to be fined. the procedure was intended to prevent courts being clogged by minor infractions of forest law, with small quantities and low values of products. Compounding was never intended for major cases. At the time of writing (october 2007), it seems likely that the GFC is so inexperienced in legal matters that it was unable to mount a court case. Instead it has used compounding improperly and possibly incorrectly instead of a public prosecution.36 It is not clear that Barama admitted the forest crimes or that it agreed to be fined; indeed Press releases suggest the opposite.37 As indicated above, there is abundant anecdotal

34A part of a less developed economy which is regulated by foreign capital and has few linkages with the national economy. In this case, more than 60 per cent of log production and most of the plywood are exported by the Asian-owned companies, with very limited value input into local businesses.35Stabroek News 23 october 2007. ‘Barama fined 106 million – for breaches in three concessions’. lead article. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56531605.Guyana Chronicle 23 october 2007. ‘timber scam: Barama fined $ 96.4 m – forestry staffers dismissed, sanctions imposed on three local firms’. lead article. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.guyanachronicle.com/topstory.html#Anchor-------------34600. Kaieteur News 23 october 2007. ‘Forestry probe completed … Government slaps $96m penalty on Barama – three other companies sanctioned; GFC staffers sacked’. lead article. Georgetown, Guyana.36Stabroek News 26 october 2007. ‘the Guyana Forestry Commission should take major offenders to court.’ letter to the editor by mahadeo kowlessar. Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article_archive?id=56531812. 37Malaysiakini 25 october 2007. ‘m’sian logging firm refuses to pay Guyana fine’. www.

BreAkInG the rInGS oF ForeSt CorruPtIon 25

evidence that the GFC uses compounding coercively against small-scale loggers and transporters. An alternative interpretation is that there is such a history of improper relations between the Government of Guyana and Barama that a court case could have revealed deals which both sides preferred to keep concealed.

Given that Barama has been estimated to be earning uS$ 3–5 million per month from improperly declared exports of unprocessed logs38 (Bulkan, 2006), and given that most of these logs have come from illegally rented long-term concessions operated unsustainably, these fines are a token. Given also that compounding prevents further legal action on the forest crimes (Gordon, 1955: 357), this may be convenient for both sides. thus, Barama has got off very lightly in financial terms.

even this small victory is significant, given that the Government of Guyana has refused for years to admit any default by the holders of major forest harvesting concessions and secret foreign direct investment arrangements.

Whether or not the international reputation of its parent company Samling Global limited, and its share price on the hong kong stock exchange, are affected in the medium term depends partly on the persistence of the information campaign. that campaign was created and sustained by a tiny number of people in civil society in Guyana and Switzerland, in the teeth of government opposition and of vilification by the illegal loggers. there was at least an immediate dip in the share price of the parent company Samling Global limited, so international investors are sensitive to quite nominal action by government.

acknowLedgeMents

For the senior author, field work in Suriname (2005) and Guyana (2006-7) was supported by grants from the tropical resources Institute (Yale university), Compton Fellowship, Yale Center for International and Area Studies (YCIAS, now the macmillan Center), Coca Cola World Fund, and Yale university Agrarian Studies. Writing was supported by a Visiting Fellowship for tropical Forest Conservation from the Gordon & Betty moore Foundation for the Amazon Conservation leadership Initiative at the School of Botany and Center for latin American Studies at the university of Florida, Gainesville.

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