Boundaries of Consent: Stakeholder Representation

in River Basin Management in Mexico and

South Africa

PHILIPPUS WESTERWageningen University, The Netherlands

and

DOUGLAS J. MERREY, MARNA DE LANGE *International Water Management Institute, Pretoria, South Africa

Summary. — Increasing the capacity of water users to influence decision-making is crucial in riverbasin management reforms. This article assesses emerging forums for river basin management inMexico and South Africa and concludes that the pace of democratization of water management inboth is slow. Mexico is characterized by continued government dominance and attempts to includealready organized stakeholders in decision-making, while substantive stakeholder representation islacking. South Africa is placing emphasis on social mobilization and transformation, leading to aslower implementation process and struggles over the redistribution of resources. While not apanacea, moving from stakeholder participation to substantive stakeholder representation in riverbasin management holds more promise of achieving equitable water management.� 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words — river basin management, institutional change, Mexico, Latin America, South Africa,

Africa

1. INTRODUCTION

The second World Water Forum (WWF)held in March 2000 highlighted the growingglobal concern about freshwater, and thecomplexity of the challenges facing developingcountries striving to attain effective water gov-ernance (Cosgrove & Rijsberman, 2000). In the20th century, freshwater withdrawals grewdramatically, resulting in water stress in manycountries of the world (Seckler, Amarasinghe,De Silva, & Barker, 1998). While it has becomeconventional to cite water scarcity as a signifi-cant threat to human well-being, a danger ofthe water scarcity narrative is that it obscuresissues concerning unequal access to and controlover water (Mehta, 2000). While freshwatersupplies are clearly limited, for most peoplewater scarcity is caused by competition betweenwater uses and by political, technological andeconomic barriers that limit their access towater (Falkenmark & Lundqvist, 1998).

As a result of water overexploitation manyriver basins have become ‘‘closed’’ from a water

World Development Vol. 31, No. 5, pp. 797–812, 2003� 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Printed in Great Britain0305-750X/03/$ - see front matter

doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(03)00017-2www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

*The research underlying this article received staffingsupport from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

through its Associate Expert Program and financial

support from a grant to IWMI from the German Fed-

eral Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-

ment (BMZ: Bundesministerium f€uur Wirtschaftliche

Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) through a contract

administered by the German Agency for Technical Co-

operation (GTZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft f€uur Technische

Zusammenarbeit). Our analysis has greatly benefited

from discussions with many government officials, re-

searchers and water users in Mexico and South Africa,

too numerous to mention by name, to whom we are

deeply grateful. The constructive and insightful com-

ments of Alex Bolding, Barbara van Koppen, Margreet

Zwarteveen and Jeroen Warner on earlier drafts of this

paper are highly appreciated. Final revision accepted: 16

December 2002.

797

perspective, meaning they no longer have uti-lizable outflows as consumptive water useequals or exceeds the amount of annual re-newable water (Keller, Keller, & Seckler, 1996;Seckler, 1996). The closure of river basins re-sults in a complex interplay among declines inwater quality, intersectoral water transfers, in-equitable water allocation and reduced accessto water, especially by poor people. The seriousinequality in access to and control over waterand the conflicts between the different uses andusers of water lie at the heart of the need fornew approaches to water management (Mehta,2000; Vermillion & Merrey, 1998). This need iswidely recognized as is the belief that existinginstitutional arrangements for water manage-ment are inappropriate and a major constraintfor achieving sustainable water management(Cosgrove & Rijsberman, 2000; Gleick, 2000;Merrey, 1997).To make the transition to more sustainable

water management, most analysts recommendmanaging water based on river basins and in-creasing stakeholder participation in watermanagement. These prescriptions build on theexperiences gained with decentralizing watermanagement for agriculture in the past 25years, which saw much attention directed atcreating or strengthening Water Users� Asso-ciations (WUAs) and transferring financial andmanagement responsibility for irrigation ser-vices to these associations. In the irrigationsector the record is mixed, and even where Ir-rigation Management Transfer (IMT) policiesare judged as ‘‘successful,’’ it is rare to finddramatic changes in agricultural productivity(Kloezen, Garc�ees-Restrepo, & Johnson III,1997; Samad & Vermillion, 1999; Vermillion,Samad, Pusposutardjo, Arif, & Rochdyanto,1999).Many policy-makers, researchers, and water

managers advocate that water must be man-aged at the level of river basins, based on theargument that river basins are a ‘‘natural’’ unitand thus the ‘‘logical’’ unit for water manage-ment (see Newson, 1997 for a summary of theliterature). This new territoriality in watermanagement has become the basis for a newbreed of policy instruments (Buller, 1996) andhas led many countries to embark on a newround of water reforms, focused on nationalpolicies, and on creating new institutions formanaging river basins. These reforms poseprofound institutional and political challengesand are even more complex and problematicthan reforms at the local level (Vermillion &

Merrey, 1998). The few examples of function-ing coordinating bodies at the river basin levelare in rich countries such as France, Australiaand England (Betlem, 1999; Buller, 1996;Chenoweth, 1999; Malano, Bryant, & Turral,1999; Pigram, 2000). For countries where im-plementing even local level reforms strains thefinancial and implementation capacities, tryingto reform river basin management is difficultindeed. The political economy of such reformsis daunting, with strong vested interests andweak institutions affecting the capacity of therural and urban poor and small-scale farmersto gain a voice in water management.Although stakeholder participation in water

management is frequently advocated, actuallyincluding the poor and achieving substantivestakeholder representation has proven elusivein practice (Cleaver, 1999). More often thannot, participation is little more than tokenconsultation, with no decision-making power inthe hands of the people concerned (Wester &Bron, 1998). Too often, the participation dis-course draws attention away from the very realsocial and economic differences between peopleand the need for the redistribution of resources,entitlements, and opportunities. This is typifiedby the definition of stakeholders as water userswith recognized water rights, thereby excludingthose without water rights. The participa-tion discourse also obscures that water is apolitically contested resource (Mehta, 2000;Mollinga, 2001), although there is growingrecognition that there is a need to move beyondmere participation. As the Chairman andRapporteur of the second WWF stated,

Support for ‘‘participation’’ has become an acceptedprinciple for many countries and organizations. Theuser representatives in the Forum [pointed out] thatthis should not be limited to asking users to partici-pate in government programs. Participation impliessharing power: democratic participation of citizensin elaborating or implementing water policies and pro-jects and in managing water resources (HRH ThePrince of Orange & Rijsberman, 2000, pp. 391–392).

This concern for democracy in water man-agement is both timely and important. As de-cision-making moves to the river basin level,serious thought needs to be given to how hard-won democratic rights in conventional socialand political domains are assured in the riverbasin domain (Barham, 2001). This raises thequestion which type of democracy is implied.Liberal democratic theory is premised on anotion of abstract individualism and assumes

WORLD DEVELOPMENT798

that all people are equal in the public sphere,which is characterized by modern values ofrationality and impartiality (Held, 1995;Luckham, Goetz, & Kaldor, 2000). In waterreforms informed by liberal democracy, it isassumed that it is possible for water manage-ment stakeholders to bracket status differentialsand power inequalities and to deliberate ‘‘as if’’they were equals in water management forumssuch as WUAs or river basin councils. Socialdemocracy, on the other hand, departs fromsocial inequalities and attempts to increase cit-izen involvement in the affairs of governmentand expand the concept of citizenship to covereconomic and social rights as well as politicalrights. Thus, it aims at a redistribution ofpower and resources to enable citizens to par-ticipate in the decisions that affect their lives(Luckham et al., 2000). In water reforms in-formed by social democracy, water is seen as abasic human right and a politically contestedresource (Gleick, 1998; Mehta, 2000).Choice and consent are central to both liberal

and social democracy, with the legitimacy ofgovernment premised on the notion that amajority has consented to be represented by it(Held, 1995; Luckham et al., 2000). In watermanagement, the boundaries of consent areshifting, through increased stakeholder partic-ipation in decision-making at both the water-use and water resource (river basin) levels. Tounderstand if and how current water reformsare deepening democracy, empirical research isneeded to assess emerging forums for riverbasin management and their democratic con-tent. This entails studying where the line isdrawn between token stakeholder participationand actual control over water managementdecision-making by water users and citizens. Italso entails questioning whether liberal or so-cial notions of democracy inform current waterreforms, that is, whether emphasis is placed onprotecting proven productive capacity and as-suming that growth will lead to redistributionor whether real attempts are made to redis-tribute productive resources.This article reviews how Mexico and South

Africa are putting democratic stakeholder rep-resentation in river basin management intopractice. Both are committed to the ideals ofequitable, productive and sustainable watermanagement and stakeholder participation.Based on the recognition of the unitary natureof water in river basins and the need to dealwith the interrelations between surface andgroundwater, water quantity and quality and

land–water-ecosystem interactions, both gov-ernments are sponsoring attempts to createnew institutional arrangements for river basinmanagement. This article is based on extensiveresearch in the Lerma-Chapala River Basin inMexico and the Olifants River Basin in SouthAfrica, which consisted of in-depth interviewswith policy-makers, water managers and waterusers, analysis of policy documents pertainingto these basins, and participant observation atnumerous water meetings.This article does not analyze the goals, effi-

ciency, and effectiveness of river basin man-agement in the two basins studied. Rather, wefocus on the process of stakeholder represen-tation, paying attention to variables such asstakeholder composition, involvement of stake-holders in decision-making, and the types ofparticipation allowed (cf. Griffen, 1999). Ouranalysis is informed by the notion that water isa politically contested resource and that watermanagement institutions and policies are effectsof political practices (Mehta et al., 1999; Mol-linga, 1998, 2001; Mosse, 1997). Thus, institu-tions are not seen simply as ‘‘the rules of thegame’’ (cf. North, 1990) but as embedded inpractice where they are reproduced, trans-formed and subverted through interactions andnegotiations between actors (Cleaver, 2000).Such a notion of institutions opens avenuesto analyze how power pervades institutionalarrangements and gives rise to differentiatedaccess to and control over water, and, moreimportantly, how to design processes to redressinequities.

2. RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT INMEXICO AND SOUTH AFRICA

Internationally, Mexico and South Africa areat the forefront of applying innovative ap-proaches to water and river basin management.By comparing their attempt to arrive at sub-stantive stakeholder representation in watermanagement important lessons can be learnedfor other countries. Although comparisons be-tween countries pertaining to water manage-ment are notoriously difficult to make, thesimilarities between Mexico and South Africaare striking. Both are middle-income countrieswith comparable levels of income (US$7,719/capita in Mexico and US$8,318/capita in SouthAfrica in 1999 measured at Purchasing PowerParity (PPP)), poverty (17.9% in Mexico and11.5% in South Africa of the population below

BOUNDARIES OF CONSENT 799

US$1 PPP/day), and marked inequalities inincome distribution (10% of the populationenjoys 42.8% of income in Mexico and 45.9%in South Africa) (World Bank, 2000). Bothcountries are also undergoing significant polit-ical and social transformations, with free andfair national elections held for the first time in1994 in both South Africa and Mexico. Agri-culture accounts for 5% of GDP and withdraws78% of freshwater in Mexico (World Bank,2000), while in South Africa this is 4.5% andclose to 60% respectively (DWAF, 2002). Bothcountries have embarked on extensive andcomparable water reforms, with water definedas national property held in trust by the na-tional government, in line with modern waterresources legislation (Burchi, 1991).Even more complicated than comparing

countries is the comparison of river basins. But,the Olifants Basin in South Africa and theLerma-Chapala Basin in Mexico share a suffi-cient number of physical and social character-istics to validate drawing conclusions from acomparison between them (see Table 1). Bothbasins exhibit a similar pattern of development,with their upper catchment areas located closeto the capitals of their respective countries andcontaining significant industrial development.Their middle reaches contain extensive irrigatedareas while in the lower reaches both basinscontain important environmental areas (LakeChapala in the Lerma-Chapala Basin andKruger National Park in the Olifants Basin). Inaddition, both basins form part of a largerbasin (the Limpopo for the Olifants and the

Lerma-Chapala-Santiago for the Lerma-Cha-pala), and cross administrative boundaries.Although both basins cover nearly the samearea, water availability in the Lerma-Chapalais nearly three times that of the Olifants,while consumptive water use is nearly 10times higher. The two basins are increasinglywater-stressed, characterized by mounting com-petition among domestic, industrial and agri-cultural uses of water, serious environmentalissues, and significant water deprivation amonglarge segments of the population. Finally, bothbasins are in the early stages of serious and far-reaching institutional reform at the water useand river basin levels.

(a) Mexico: the Lerma-Chapala Basin

The Lerma-Chapala Basin in central Mexicolies between Mexico City and Guadalajara andcrosses five states: Quer�eetaro, Guanajuato,Michoac�aan, Mexico and Jalisco (see Figure 1).The basin accounts for 9% of Mexico�s GNPand is the source of water for around 15 millionpeople (11 million in the basin and two millioneach in Guadalajara and Mexico City) (CNA,1999a). Irrigated agriculture, covering some700,000 ha, accounts for 68% of current wateruse in the basin, while evaporation from waterbodies (Lake Chapala and storage reservoirs)accounts for 23% of water consumed (Wester,Melville, & Ramos-Osorio, 2001). Eleven large-scale canal irrigation districts (formerly state-managed) cover around 285,000 ha, while some16,000 farmer-managed or private irrigationsystems (termed ‘‘irrigation units’’ in Mexico)cover 510,000 ha. Twenty-seven reservoirs pro-vide 235,000 ha in the irrigation districts withsurface water while around 1,500 smaller res-ervoirs serve 180,000 ha in the units. An esti-mated 17,500 tubewells provide around 380,000ha in the basin with groundwater, of which47,000 ha is located in irrigation districts (CNA,1993; CNA/MW, 1999). In the irrigation dis-tricts there are an estimated 88,000 water userscompared to 100,000 water users in the irriga-tion units (CNA/MW, 1999).The average annual runoff in the basin dur-

ing 1940–95 was 5,757 million cubic meters(MCM), while annual groundwater recharge isestimated to be 3,980 MCM giving a total of9,737 MCM annual renewable water (CNA,1999a). The best available estimates place totalprocess and nonprocess water depletion at10,637 MCM, yielding an annual deficit of 900MCM (CNA, 1999a). As a consequence of the

Table 1. Salient features of the Lerma-Chapala and theOlifants Basins

Lerma-Chapala

Basin

Olifants

Basin

Mexico South Africa

Area (km2) 54,300 54,388

Population

(in 1999)

11,000,000 3,400,000

Irrigated area (ha) 700,000 107,000

Mean annual runoff

(million m3)

5,757 1,992

Groundwater safe

yield (million m3)

3,980 1,800

Annual renewable

water (million m3)

9,737 3,792

Consumptive water

use (million m3)

10,637 1,135

Sources: BKS (2000) and CNA (1999a).

WORLD DEVELOPMENT800

overexploitation of water in the basin ground-water is being mined, with sustained declines inaquifer levels of 1.00–2.58 myear�1 (Scott &Garc�ees-Restrepo, 2001), and the flows in theLerma River have been reduced to a trickle as aresult of which Lake Chapala, into which theriver flows, is rapidly drying up. This Lake isthe largest in Mexico, giving it a high symbolicvalue, and it generates significant tourism rev-enues.In response to the deterioration in the basin�s

water resources, several institutional innova-tions have occurred in the basin since 1989,including the signing of a river basin coordi-nation agreement (1989), the creation of a riverbasin council (1993) and the establishment ofaquifer management councils (1995-onward).Water reforms at the national level, such as thecreation of a national water agency in 1989, thedecentralization of domestic water supply andsanitation to states and municipalities (startingin 1983), the transfer of government irrigationdistricts to users (1991–present), the creation ofstate water commissions from 1991 onward,and the promulgation of a new water law in1992, have also significantly altered institu-tional arrangements for water management inthe basin. Driving the water reforms in Mexicoare increasing water overexploitation, the in-stitutional resources of Mexican society to dealwith this overexploitation, the vested interestsof the hydraulic bureaucracy, and the neolib-eral policies pursued by the Mexican govern-ment.

Although states, municipalities and waterusers currently have a larger say in watermanagement decision-making, the role of thefederal government is still paramount as sur-face water is defined in the constitution as na-tional property placed in the trust of the federalgovernment. As the trustee, the federal gov-ernment has the right to concession surfacewater-use rights to users for periods rangingfrom five to 50 years (Kloezen, 1998). Theconcession titles set out the volume of water auser is entitled to, although CNA may adjustthe actual quantity a user receives annually toreflect water availability, with priority accordedto domestic water use (CNA, 1999b). For al-locating surface water, Mexico follows the pro-portional appropriation doctrine and in theoryall concession holders share proportionally inany shortages or surpluses of water. Onceissued, water concessions need to be registeredin the Public Registry of Water Rights, main-tained by CNA. After registration the con-cessions become fully tradable within riverbasins, although the CNA needs to be notifiedof the trade and needs to approve it (Kloezen,1998).The situation surrounding groundwater is

more complex, as the constitution does notdefine it as national property, but rather statesthat overlying landowners may bring ground-water to the surface as long as this does notaffect other users. In 1946 the constitution wasamended to the effect that the federal govern-ment can intervene in aquifers in overdraft, by

Figure 1. Map of the Lerma-Chapala Basin.

BOUNDARIES OF CONSENT 801

issuing pump permits or declaring that newpumps may not be installed. Based on a rulingof the Supreme Court in 1983 groundwater isnow considered national property, althoughthis is not reflected in the constitution or the1992 water law. Groundwater concessions inMexico are granted by CNA on a volumetricbasis with a maximum extraction or pumpingrate specified.Mexico has proceeded quickly in establishing

new institutions for irrigation management andhas followed what is sometimes called a ‘‘bigbang’’ approach. As part of the Mexican IMTprogram in the 1990s 10 irrigation districts inthe Lerma-Chapala Basin were transferred toWUAs, that now manage secondary canal unitsvarying in size from 1,500 to 30,000 ha. TheWUAs were formed as legally recognized non-profit associations to whom CNA grantedconcessions for the use of water and irrigationinfrastructure. In all the districts CNA contin-ues to manage the dams and main canals anddelivers water in bulk to the WUAs, except inthe Alto R�ııo Lerma irrigation district where afederation of WUAs has been formed to man-age the main system (Kloezen, 2000). Researchcarried out by Kloezen et al. (1997) and John-son (1997a, 1997b) shows that the new WUAshave been effective in improving the provisionof services and recovering costs from waterusers, though the impact on agricultural pro-ductivity is minimal. More recent work in onedistrict in the Lerma-Chapala Basin raisesquestions about the WUAs� long-term sustain-ability and shows how they are an impor-tant form of political capital for their leaders(Kloezen, 2000; Monsalvo, 1999).The management structures in the irrigation

units are much more diverse, and may consistof informal WUAs, government-recognizedWUAs, water judges, pump groups or com-mercial management. As state intervention inthe units has been piecemeal in comparisonto the districts and has usually only consistedof assistance in construction and the conces-sioning of water rights, their representation informal decision-making forums is weak (Silva-Ochoa, 2000).The federal government agency responsible

for water management in the Lerma-ChapalaBasin is the CNA, which is charged with de-fining water policy, granting water concessionsand wastewater discharge permits, establishingnorms for water use and water quality, andformulating regional and national water man-agement plans (Herrera-Toledo, 1997). The

official aim of vesting all government respon-sibilities and powers related to water in theCNA was to create the necessary conditions formoving toward sustainable water management.To complement this move a modern and com-prehensive water law was promulgated in 1992(CNA, 1999b). Unlike in South Africa, this lawwas not preceded by an extensive consultationprocess, but rather was written by CNA�s legalexperts with input from engineering staff and anextensive review of international experiences.This law defines an integral approach for man-aging surface and groundwater in the contextof river basins, which it considers as the idealgeographical unit for the planning, devel-opment and management of water. It alsopromotes decentralization, stakeholder partici-pation, control over wastewater discharges andfull-cost pricing (Herrera-Toledo, 1997).Although Mexico has a long tradition in river

basin development and in using river basins asthe basic unit for water management (Barkin &King, 1970), including the Lerma-Chapala Ba-sin (Wester et al., 2001), an important provisionof the 1992 water law is the stipulation thatstakeholder participation is mandatory in watermanagement at the river basin level. To this endriver basin councils, defined in the water law ascoordinating and consensus-building bodiesbetween the CNA, federal, state and municipalgovernments and water user representatives(CNA, 1999b), have been established by CNAin 25 river basins (CNA, 2000a). To facilitateriver basin planning and interaction withstakeholders CNA has divided the country into13 hydrologic regions and established an officein each region. The stated goal of the councils isto foster the integral management of water intheir respective river basins through proposingand promoting programs to improve watermanagement, develop hydraulic infrastructureand the corresponding services and preserve theresources of the river basin. Formally, the riverbasin councils have very little decision-makingpowers, as CNA remains responsible for waterlicensing, the collection of water taxes andwater investment programs. The formal role ofthe councils is to assist CNA in the execution ofits vested powers and to ensure that stake-holders� opinions are taken into account (CNA,2000b). The original intent behind the creationof river basin councils was that they wouldfunction as water parliaments that would ap-prove water programs and proposals by thefederal water management agency as well ascontrol the budgets to fund these programs. It

WORLD DEVELOPMENT802

was hoped that Mexico would choose a dualstructure for river basin management as used inFrance and vest more substantive powers in theriver basin councils. Due to resistance by thewater bureaucracy, this did not come to pass.Mexico�s first river basin council was estab-

lished in the Lerma-Chapala Basin, in responseto the drying up of Lake Chapala in the 1980s,combined with the severe contamination of theLerma River. According to Mestre, ‘‘A wide-ranging water diagnosis existing by mid 1989clearly presented four capital problems in theLerma River Basin: scarcity, as well as unsuit-able water allocation, pollution, inefficiency ofwater use, and environmental depredation’’(1997, p. 144). He adds that ‘‘To turn the tide, itbecame clear that it would be insufficient andimprudent to maintain that the federal gov-ernment was solely responsible for this chaosand for its solution or mitigation’’ (Mestre,1997, p. 144). In April 1989, the federal gov-ernment and the five state governments signeda coordination agreement to improve watermanagement in the basin, by (a) allocating sur-face and groundwater fairly among users andregulating water use; (b) improving water qual-ity by treating municipal and industrial efflu-ents; (c) increasing water-use efficiency; and (d)conserving the river basin ecosystem and water-sheds.On September 1, 1989 a formal Consultative

Council was formed to follow up on these ob-jectives. Based on the 1992 water law theConsultative Council became the Lerma-Cha-

pala River Basin Council on January 28, 1993.Until the end of 1997, the Governing Board ofthe Council was very top heavy: its presidentwas the federal minister of agriculture until1995 and the federal minister of the environ-ment during 1995–97, while its members werethe governors of the five states making up thebasin, five federal ministers and the DirectorsGeneral (DG) of CNA and the federal oil andelectricity companies. In 1998 this changed,based on a modification in 1997 of the waterlaw and its regulations to allow for greater userrepresentation, with user representatives fromsix sectors (agriculture, fisheries, services, in-dustry, livestock and urban) being appointed tothe Governing Board by CNA. Moreover, theDG of CNA became the president of theCouncil and the five state governors continuedas members, yielding a total of 12 members onthe Governing Board.The Lerma-Chapala River Basin Council has

been in flux in the past 10 years, and only inAugust 2000 was its structure formalized byCNA (2000b). It now consists of the GoverningCouncil, a Monitoring and Evaluation Group(MEG), an Assembly of User Representativesand Special Working Groups, while CNA�sregional office forms the Council�s secretariat(see Figure 2). The actual decision-makingbody of the River Basin Council is the MEG,which is a carbon-copy of the Governing Boardexcept that state governors send representativesin their stead, while CNA is represented by thehead of its regional office. The MEG meets on a

Figure 2. Structure of the Lerma-Chapala River Basin Council.

BOUNDARIES OF CONSENT 803

regular basis and is charged with preparingand convening Council meetings and moreimportantly drafting agreements to be signedat formal Council meetings. The structure ofthe River Basin Council is complemented by astepped form of user representation consistingof water user committees for the six water-usesectors represented on the Council. These sec-toral committees can be formed at the regional,state or local level, where possible building onalready existing WUAs or other legally recog-nized water management groups. The wateruser committees form the Assembly of UserRepresentatives which elects the six user rep-resentatives on the Council. In addition, fo-rums at the subbasin level, such as watershedcommissions and aquifer management councils(user organizations formed to reverse ground-water depletion, see CNA, 2000b; Mara~nn�oon &Wester, 2000), form part of the structure of theRiver Basin Council.A challenge for the River Basin Council has

been ensuring effective user representation––critical in the consensus-building and coordi-nation role envisioned in the law. The six userrepresentatives on the Council have been nom-inated by CNA, and are not known to, nordo they necessarily reflect the interests of thewater-use sector they represent. At present thewater user committees are still being formed,but it is unclear at which levels they will beformed (regional, state or local), how manymembers these committees will have, and howthey will be elected. What is clear is that onlywater users with a water license will be eligibleto elect committee members, thus excluding thevast majority of the basin�s population. Mestre(1997) emphasizes the Council is intended to be‘‘an open and plural forum.’’ The role of ‘‘So-ciety’’ is seen as paramount and ‘‘comprisesnongovernmental organizations, private sec-tor organisms and individuals, academic andscientific actors, as well as a myriad of othersocial groups who participate in a regionalwater scenario’’ (1997, p. 142). He notes soci-ety is ‘‘commonly organized through diversegroups.’’ The assumption that society is alreadyorganized and ready to participate in the newCouncils is an important one, and under-standable in light of the corporatist structure ofMexican society (Camp, 1999). It also explainswhy Mexico has not felt it necessary to considerthe significant numbers of rural poor who arevoiceless, and facing ‘‘water deprivation’’ andto invest in social mobilization for the estab-lishment of river basin councils. This is espe-

cially relevant for the irrigation units thatdepend on surface water, which cover some180,000 ha and currently have no voice in theCouncil (Silva-Ochoa, 2000).A recent development has been that agricul-

tural water users have started to organize them-selves to gain a larger voice in the Council. Atthe fourth ordinary session of the Council, heldon August 24, 2000, agricultural water userswere present in large numbers for the first timeand demanded a larger say in the Council�sdeliberations. The River Basin Council is be-coming an important forum for the agriculturalsector, as the annual surface water allocationsto the irrigation districts and units are dis-cussed in the MEG of the Council. Due to poorrainfall the allocations for the 1999–2000 andthe 2000–01 growing seasons have been verylow; as a result the WUAs in the irrigationdistricts decided to forego the 2000–01 grow-ing season altogether, letting 200,000 ha of ir-rigated land lie fallow. Scott, Silva-Ochoa,Florencio-Cruz, and Wester (2001) calculate thatthe benefits foregone in the 1999–2000 growingseason for one irrigation district where 27,000ha were not irrigated amounted to US$14 mil-lion, giving some indication of the devastatingimpact on both large and small farmers of thecurrent situation.Before 1999 none of the WUA leaders in the

largest irrigation district of the basin wereaware of the existence of the River BasinCouncil, but the lack of irrigation water in thepast two years have galvanized them to takeaction. Together with the agricultural userrepresentative on the Council, the WUA pres-idents of the irrigation districts in Guanajuato,Michoac�aan and Jalisco have formed a Special-ized Working Group in the Council. Thisworking group consists of representatives fromthe five State Agricultural Water User Com-mittees, made up of the governing boards of allthe WUAs in the state, both from irrigationdistricts and units. An interesting aspect of thisdevelopment is that it has been fully carried outby the water users themselves without externalsupport. Essentially, they are filling the void ofineffectual user representation on the Council.The lack of substantive stakeholder repre-

sentation in the River Basin Council to date isindicative of the difficulties of decentralizingwater management. After nearly 70 years ofstrongly centralized control over water, the past10 years have seen the five states in the Lerma-Chapala Basin gain much more control overwater management decision-making through

WORLD DEVELOPMENT804

negotiations in the River Basin Council. Initself this is no small feat and from a liberaldemocratic standpoint it could be argued thatall is well as water users are represented on theCouncil through their elected governments.But, the institutional arrangements for watermanagement in the Lerma-Chapala Basin re-volve around who controls water. With basinclosure, the competition for access to water isbecoming more severe and poor people arelosing their access to water, due to reductionsin surface irrigation and increased costs forgroundwater irrigation. Meeting the water needsof poor people and substantive stakeholderrepresentation at all levels of water manage-ment decision-making is not a priority of theCouncil, nor of the larger set of institutionalarrangements for water management in Mex-ico. The Mexico case can be characterizedas a combination of continued governmentdominance and attempts to include alreadyorganized stakeholders in the river basin deci-sion-making process. South Africa is placinggreater emphasis on social mobilization and ontransformation from a social democratic per-spective, leading to a slower implementationprocess and protracted struggles over the re-distribution of resources.

(b) South Africa: the Olifants Basin

The Olifants River in the north-east of SouthAfrica has it source in Gauteng province andtraverses Mpumalanga and Limpopo provincesinto the Kruger National Park before crossingthe border into Mozambique, where it joins theLimpopo River (see Figure 3). Irrigation is thelargest single user of water (48%) in the basin,covering some 107,000 ha. In the upper catch-ment of the basin, thermal power plants gen-erate almost 55% of the country�s power, usingcoal from over 50 mines. Some water is im-ported into the basin to satisfy the powerplants� requirement but this is not a significantpercentage of the total available water; verysmall amounts are also exported from the basinfor cities. Pollution, largely from the mines, is aserious problem. In all there are over 200 activemines in the basin for gold, platinum, tin, etc.;these are expected to expand significantly overthe next decade (BKS, 2000; Stimie, Richters,Thompson, & Perret, 2001).Over half of the Olifants flow enters the river

below its midsection, making the middle area,where much of the irrigation is located, par-ticularly water-short. About 65% of the totalavailable water in the basin is already used, and

Figure 3. Map of the Olifants Basin. Source: Ligthelm (2001).

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much of the remaining water is in the lowertributaries and is difficult to develop for use inSouth Africa, though this may be seen as anopportunity for Mozambique in future. Insome years there is no flow at all into the na-tional park at the downstream end of the basin;and continued development of the uppercatchment is likely to prolong these low- or no-flow periods in future. Although the basin isnot as stressed as is the Lerma-Chapala, it isalso a ‘‘closing’’ basin under increasing pres-sure.An important feature of this river basin is

that large areas, particularly in the middleportion, pass through former ‘‘homelands’’ orbantustans set up under the previous regime.These marginal areas probably account formore than half of the basin�s population, whoare desperately poor with inadequate access tobasic services and infrastructure. Of the irri-gated area in the basin, white commercialfarming controls 95%.Since 1994 the new democratic government

has devoted enormous effort to restructuringthe constitution, legal system, policies and in-stitutions to overcome the legacy of the apart-heid system. Its water reforms must be seenin this context. The new water managementpolicies were developed through a detailedprocess of public consultations and commis-sioned studies, and culminated in the NationalWater Act (No. 36 of 1998) and its companionWater Services Act (No. 108 of 1997) (seeThompson, Stimie, Richters, & Perret, 2001).Thenew legal framework adopts integratedwaterresources management at the ‘‘catchment,’’ i.e.,river basin level. Local water services are tobe provided through Water Service Providers(for municipal supplies) and WUAs (for agri-cultural supplies) while river basin manage-ment will be through Catchment ManagementAgencies (CMAs). The law embodies the fol-lowing principles (see Karodia & Weston, 2001;Muller, 2001; Schreiner & van Koppen, 2001for discussions of the new National Water Actand water policies):––equity in access to water resources, bene-fits and services;––sustainability;––optimal beneficial use;––redress of past racial and gender discrimi-nation and inequities;––participation by stakeholders in decision-making about water resources;––‘‘representivity’’ to ensure considerationof all stakeholder needs, interests and values;

––subsidiarity, i.e., devolution of responsi-bility to the lowest appropriate level;––integration of water management func-tions;––alignment of water management withother related departments� functions, and––transparency to foster cooperation andencourage stakeholder support for deci-sions.The Department of Water Affairs and For-

estry (DWAF) is the lead agency in imple-menting the new policy. The National WaterAct makes the Government responsible foroverall water resources management as publictrustee, and provides for licensing of water usesas in Mexico. But it also provides for reserva-tion of minimum flows for environmental pur-poses and basic human needs, and allows anyperson to use water for ‘‘reasonable’’ domesticuse, gardening, stock watering and recreation.The Act also includes a specific ‘‘good neigh-bor’’ provision applicable to its internationallyshared rivers.An important thrust of the new water act is

to replace the previous system of centralizedwater management by DWAF with decentral-ized water management at the river basin level.For this purpose DWAF has divided SouthAfrica into 19 water management areas; de-fined as a large river basin, or several adjacentsmaller basins to be managed by CMAs. TheCMAs are intended to be statutory bodiesestablished under Chapter 7 of the NationalWater Act, with five initial functions assignedto them under the law (Section 80): (i) inves-tigate and advise on the protection, use, de-velopment and control over water in thecatchment, (ii) develop a catchment manage-ment strategy, (iii) coordinate related activitiesof water users and institutions, (iv) promotecoordination of the implementation of thecatchment management strategy with develop-ment plans resulting from the Water ServicesAct, and (v) promote community participation.Additional functions, powers and duties maybe delegated or assigned to the CMAs by theMinister, including the review, authorization,extension and registration of water licenses. Itis foreseen that CMAs will be primarily fundedfrom water-use charges in their respective watermanagement areas and that they may choose tocarry out their functions in-house or delegatefunctions to other parties such as CatchmentManagement Committees, other water-relatedinstitutions, DWAF, contractors or even neigh-boring CMAs.

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The establishment of CMAs consists of fourstages: initiating participation; formalizing par-ticipation; interim management arrangements;and the formation of the CMA and the ap-pointment of its Governing Board (DWAF,1999). The exact structure of a CMA dependson the consultation process but will probablybe a variation of the structure shown in Figure4. The Governing Board is accountable tothe Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry forthe performance of the CMA and must set thevision, mission, and strategic direction of theCMA. It will consist of nine to 15 members, tobe appointed by the Minister, based on rec-ommendations of an Advisory Committee, inturn also established by the Minister. As de-tailed in Section 81 of the National Water Act,in making the appointments the Minister muststrive to achieve a balance among the interestsof water users, potential water users, localand provincial government and environmentalinterest groups as well as ensure that there issufficient gender representation, demographicrepresentation and representation of disad-vantaged persons or communities. Althoughstakeholders will not directly elect user repre-sentatives on the CMA and formal provisionsfor the election of representatives as in place inMexico do not exist in South Africa, the Ad-visory Committee must consult with the rele-vant organs of state and interest groups before

making recommendations to the Minister. Thisapproach to selecting stakeholder representa-tives for river basin management would appearto conflict with the general thrust of democra-tization in the new South Africa, but waseventually chosen to ensure that well-organizedinterests would not capture the CMA. Throughthe provisions of the National Water Act theMinister is bound to ensure representivity andthe inclusion of the poor.Currently, the development of proposals

for the establishment of CMAs is at differentstages for about a third of the 19 designatedwater management areas, including the OlifantsRiver. DWAF uses consulting firms to lead theprocess of developing catchment managementproposals. The proposal is intended to be de-veloped through consultation with stakehold-ers, and in its final form should lay out thebroad scope and shape of the proposed CMA.After a period of public comment on the draftproposal, the final version goes to the Ministerfor approval. To date, there are no approvedCMA proposals as the process only began in1998. The first proposal, for the Inkomati Ba-sin, is currently under review within DWAF.The Olifants proposal was scheduled to be sentto the Minister by early 2001, but has beendelayed pending the decision on the Inkomatiproposal. Proposals are to be accompaniedby an independent review of the process of

Figure 4. Proposed Structure of the Olifants Catchment Management Agency. Source: Ligthelm (2001).

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developing the proposal and its provisions, as-sessing whether it meets the requirements of thepolicy and Act.An enormous effort is being devoted to de-

veloping the CMA proposal (see Ligthelm,2001). It will include the proposed name anddefined water management area of the CMA, adescription of the existing water resources andtheir management, proposed functions and in-stitutional structure of the CMA, the feasibilityof the CMA in terms of technical, financial andadministrative matters, and a description of theconsultation process followed.Our research on the consultation process in

the Olifants Basin brings out that the miningand industrial sectors, the suppliers of waterto larger towns, and the commercial farmersare well-organized to represent and articulatetheir interests. The commercial farms are largemodern farms, using the latest irrigation tech-nologies, some producing citrus and other high-value products for export. The governmentis seeking to balance the need for establishedusers to have a reasonable and secure watersupply with its policy to redress previous in-equities. All of these interests are not only well-organized but speak the language of, and comefrom the same culture as, the consultants andDWAF officials.On the other hand, the millions of rural poor

in the former homelands are not well-organizedto participate effectively in a consultation pro-cess on water. There are a number of small-scale irrigation schemes in the basin, many ofwhich were originally built and managed by theprevious government. These are in the processof being transferred to the users, but thesmallholder sector is still struggling to get or-ganized. Currently, one finds both ‘‘traditional’’tribal chiefs, many of whom emerged in theapartheid era as a means of social control, andnewly elected local councils which as yet havelittle financial or managerial capacity. Neitherof these entities are effective representativesof local communities. The government has amajor investment program to supply domesticwater to these areas, but its approach has em-phasized rapid construction of infrastructure tomake up a huge backlog of some 12 millionpeople with no access to safe drinking water.Therefore, insufficient attention has been paidto strengthening local domestic water entities.Similarly, the small-scale irrigation sector is stillunorganized, and in most cases not profitable.DWAF has not yet approved the establishmentof WUAs for smallholders under the new leg-

islation. Currently there is an interministerialprocess underway to agree on a consistentpolicy for ‘‘revitalizing’’ South Africa�s small-holder irrigation sector.A study carried out in the Steelpoort Basin, a

major tributary basin to the Olifants, foundthat rural communities are unaware of the pro-visions of the new water law and of the CMAprocess, despite efforts to inform people andoffer them opportunities for expressing theirviews. Small-scale farmers had not heard aboutthe CMA, and municipalities and mining com-panies were mixed––some knew, some did not.Some of the Irrigation Boards providing waterto commercial farmers were however partici-pating actively in the process (Stimie et al.,2001).Our initial observations of the public con-

sultation process have surfaced many impor-tant issues. In short, the effectiveness of theprocess in the poor rural areas is doubtful. Tworeasons for this seem most important. First, theconsultants do not speak the prevalent lan-guages of the rural areas, and indeed do notunderstand the cultures of the rural poor. Theyhave sought to overcome this by using facili-tators who do speak the common languages,with only partial success. The minutes of themeetings demonstrate that poor people raiseissues of immediate concern to them such as thelack of drinking water, while the consultantsare focused on higher level issues, with littleattempt to relate the solutions to immediateproblems to this higher level process. One fearis that the well-organized sectors may yet mo-nopolize access to most of the water, deprivingthe poor rural communities, in spite of thestrong political commitment to redress theseinequities.Second, the consultants and some DWAF

officials appear to see developing the CMA as alargely technical process, and do not recognizethat it is a quintessentially political process.Similar concerns are raised by Rogers, Roux,and Biggs (2000), who state that,

There is a tendency to superimpose the adaptive man-agement process on old, usually bureaucratic, institu-tional structures and processes. (. . .) ignor[ing] thefundamental management axiom of ‘‘form must fol-low function’’ when planning or changing institutions.Recent conferences and workshops on CMAs revealedthat many regional DWAF offices are falling foul ofthis axiom. There is a rush to set up structures to formthe precursors of CMAs, without due regard for theprocesses needed to perform their intended functions(2000, pp. 506–507).

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Water is a political issue, especially when it isa scarce and valuable good, and when access isso skewed. There are many conflicting views––and real conflicts––among stakeholders overwater issues, which need to be articulatedclearly as part of the CMA establishmentprocess. Experience from developing the firstCMA proposal on the Inkomati Basin, wheredisagreements of some stakeholders with theproposal delayed its finalization, suggests thatnot addressing or at least identifying theseconflicts may yet lead to similar problems in theOlifants. Again, the economic power of well-organized sectors may lead to continuing in-equity in access to water.

3. DISCUSSION

On the face of it, stakeholder platforms forriver basin management such as river basincouncils or catchment management agenciesdemocratize water management by giving voiceto a multiplicity of stakeholders. Much de-pends, however, on how new institutions forriver basin management are established andfrom which social/material practices they em-erge, as many roles and rights (sanctioned orinformal, established or highly flexible), andcertainly the technologies and physical infra-structure for controlling water are already inplace. In river basins, it is the norm that watermanagement stakeholders have different levelsand kinds of education, speak different lan-guages, differ in access to politics, and holddifferent beliefs about how nature and societyfunction (see Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001). Ifthis is not taken into account when creatingnew rules, roles and rights, participatory pro-cesses may further institutionalize power dif-ferentials, a real danger in both Mexico andSouth Africa. Much depends then on the mea-sures taken to ensure inclusive stakeholder rep-resentation.It is clear that the size of the population in

most river basins is such that it precludes thedirect participation of all stakeholders in basin-level decision-making. The question of who willrepresent groups of stakeholders in river basinmanagement is a highly political one. The re-lationship of the people participating in anymultistakeholder process to their constituents isproblematic, especially when third parties areinvolved. It is a nostrum of development workthat third-party facilitators (researchers, con-sultants, NGOs) are needed to identify, mobi-

lize, organize and inform stakeholder groups.But, as pointed out by Edmunds and Wollen-berg:

the relationship of a representative to his/her constitu-ency is perhaps most politically charged when repre-sentatives of a group are designated by outsiders orare accountable to them, as is often the case in multi-stakeholder negotiations. From the start, outside con-venors and facilitators influence representation by theselection of stakeholder groups, the people to repre-sent each group and how the expression of interestsis facilitated in the meeting (2001, p. 240).

In both Mexico and South Africa the rela-tionship of stakeholder representatives withtheir constituencies is problematic, not leastbecause the government had a decisive say intheir selection. As poverty is not a condition,but an outcome of how societies are structured,it is to be expected that marginal groups areexcluded from decision-making. This points tothe need for the redistribution of resources,entitlements, and opportunities, as marginalgroups will only gain a voice in river basinmanagement when they are no longer marginal.

4. CONCLUSIONS

This paper does not provide a completeanalysis of the complex issues that arise whencountries seek to implement new policies andcreate new institutional arrangements for riverbasin management. Indeed the processes areon-going, as is research on this subject. Butseveral general observations emerge from thisoverview.First, there are important contrasts among

developing countries in how they go aboutcrafting new policies and implementation ar-rangements. On one extreme, one finds a top-down, almost entirely bureaucratic approach,driven by government agencies as the majorstakeholders. In these cases, the process is es-sentially driven by a combination of technicaland economic concerns and interagency poli-tics. There is no room in such approaches forless organized, ‘‘informal’’ interests, especiallypoor people, to participate and gain access towater. In countries characterized by largegroups of voiceless poor people, such an ap-proach is unlikely to lead to overcoming waterdeprivation as a central element of poverty andwill see the continued dependence of the pooron the random goodwill of the state.

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Second, the Mexico case exhibits a combi-nation of a top-down, government-driven pro-cess with inclusion of representatives of theorganized users. An important result in Mexicois that the Council has been able to begin ad-dressing serious water issues; and includingrepresentatives of organized users lends theCouncil legitimacy. This approach is appro-priate in conditions where the major stake-holders are organized, as is partly the case inMexico, or where economic growth is provid-ing opportunities for poor people to improvetheir lives through other means. It is question-able however, whether many developing coun-tries are characterized by these conditions.Therefore, following such an approach, whileensuring key organized sectors are represented,and enabling rapid attention to problem-solv-ing, also presents the danger of excluding largenumbers of poor water users, as is happening inMexico. As water becomes scarcer, this willamplify the degree of water deprivation amongpoor people.The South African approach should be of

special interest to developing countries consid-ering how to design new policies and institu-tional arrangements for river basin management.A clear disadvantage is the time it takes beforethe basin institution is able to address watermanagement problems. In South Africa, thereare parallel processes underway to respond todemands for water from new mines, for exam-ple, and decisions will either be postponed at

potentially considerable cost in terms of eco-nomic development and job creation, or will bemade by DWAF, with little involvement ofstakeholders. On the other hand, successfulempowerment of poor rural stakeholders couldenable them to gain access to significant waterrights. These could be valuable assets whichthey could use for productive uses (providedthe necessary water infrastructure is put inplace), or for bargaining with mines and othercommercial users needing additional water.Mexico and South Africa are two middle-

income countries that are at the forefront ofapplying innovative approaches to water andriver basin management. Their experiencesshow however, that the ‘‘democratization’’ ofwater management is fraught with difficultiesand largely informed by liberal notions of de-mocracy and a concern not to disrupt theproductive capacity of advanced sectors of theeconomy through the redistribution of re-sources. From a social democratic perspective,including the poor and achieving substantivestakeholder representation in river basin man-agement is premised on the redistribution ofpower and resources to enable citizens to par-ticipate in decisions that affect their lives. Al-though few would disagree that the institutionsfor managing river basins should be broadlydemocratic, where the boundaries of consentfor river basin management are drawn is apolitical choice, and should be treated as suchin current water reforms.

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