Between the “Already” and the “Not Yet”: A Peace Perspective and a Catholic Theological...

[PT 11.5 (2010) 738-763] Political Theology (print) ISSN 1462-317Xdoi:10.1558/poth.v11i5.738 Political Theology (online) ISSN 1473-1719

© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2010, 1 Chelsea Manor Studios, Flood Street, London SW3 5SR.

Between the “AlreAdy” And the “not yet”:A PeAce PersPective And A cAtholic theologicAl

viewPoint on religion And Politics

Julianne Funk Deckard1

Lenoir-Rhyne University625 7th Ave NE

Hickory, NC 28601, [email protected]

Ellen Van Stichel2

Faculty of TheologySint-Michielsstraat 6, bus 3101

3000 Leuven, [email protected]

AbstrAct

Taking an interdisciplinary approach, this article questions the mainstream idea about the relationship between religion and politics that associates the church and state separation with a strict private–public division. Agreeing with the former distinction, we criticize the latter from the perspectives of both Catholic theology and peace and conflict studies. Both fields offer ade-quate reasons to challenge this narrow dualism, envisioning the spheres of religion and politics as complementary and mutually enriching. In response to increased violence involving religions across the globe, “religious peace-building” is currently developing approaches to explain such conflicts and inform peacebuilding methods and strategies. Additionally, the theological

1. Julianne Funk Deckard is a doctoral candidate at the KULeuven, as a part of the Institute for International and European Policy and the Center for Peace Research and Stra-tegic Studies (Faculty of Social Sciences). Her current research concerns the religious factor in peacebuilding and conflict transformation as applied to the case of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. 2. Ellen Van Stichel has a PhD in Theological Ethics connected to the Faculty of Theology (KULeuven, Belgium). Her dissertation focused on the dialogue between moral philosophy and Catholic social thought with regard to global duties towards the poor in the two-thirds world in terms of charity, humanity and justice. Currently she is working for the “Anthropos” project, an inter-disciplinary project on Christian anthropology from a systematic theological and ethical perspective.

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Stichel and Deckard Between the “Already” and the “Not Yet” 739

© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2010.

emphasis on the eschatological presence of the “already” appeals to Catholic faith to pertinently reflect upon and frame public life. Consequently, we plead for the critical and beneficial engagement of religions in the public sphere as “not yet” sufficiently acknowledged.

Keywords: Catholic theology; religion and politics; religious peacebuilding.

The recognition and establishment of religious freedom is, without a doubt, one of the most important acquisitions from the aftermath of the Reformation and the Enlightenment. In the attempt to realize and safeguard these acquisitions, the separation of church and state was intro-duced as a necessary precondition. As a consequence, however, a suspi-cion toward any religious involvement in the public or political sphere grew, resulting in the equation of the separation of church and state with a strict distinction between the private and the public. It is the seemingly “natural” link, including the split between religion and politics, that this article aims to challenge from an interdisciplinary perspective.3 Within both peace studies and Catholic theology, religious involvement in the public sphere has also been looked upon with misgiving, but there are ele-ments in both fields that point to a wider and more positive relationship between religion and the public sphere. Moreover, we aim to show that there are good reasons within each discipline to argue that religion should play a more extended role in society—although why this is the case and how it should be is still subject to debate in both domains. In this sense, the aims of this contribution are twofold: first, to counter the secular sus-picion of religion in public life by exploring its de facto presence as well as its peacebuilding capacity and second, to demonstrate why Catholics need not think religious involvement in politics undermines their faith; rather, the opposite is true. Developing the argument requires first investigating the origin of the sus-picion of religious involvement in the public sphere, in which we consider the effects of the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the secularization thesis (section 1). However, this suspicion appears ungrounded: not only

3. Although we wish to focus on the problematic equation of the church–state sepa-ration and the private–public distinction, one could also investigate the ways in which the separation of church and state is, as such, interpreted: namely, in terms of non-involvement and the non-establishment of any religious tradition within a state. Different interpreta-tions of these terms are possible, but in any case the goal is to safeguard the neutrality of the state. See Robert F. Thiemann, Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 62. It is important to note that this neutrality aims to ensure the freedom of religion, but as a consequence, however, it often marginalizes religion from concerns of the polity and the public sphere. See David Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 62.

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does religion play a role publicly (be it positively or negatively in relation to peace and the common good), but there are good reasons to claim that it should do so. Hence, in the following sections the argument that religions not only do, but should have, a public role will be developed first from a peace perspective (section 2), then from a Catholic (section 3) point of view. As such, both disciplines start from the assumption that religions are “already” public actors but are “not yet” sufficiently involved and engaged.

1. Repercussions of the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Secularization Thesis

The possible role or involvement of religion in politics is still regarded with much distrust, which can be explained by several contributing factors. First, due to the religious wars on the European continent during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) established the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (each region its religion) as a way to deal with religious diversity within Christianity and to ensure that religions would play no role in interstate relations. In other words, tolerance appeared to be the means to establish peace between religions across borders. Hence, the problem of religion in the “international” scene was “solved,” namely by keeping it out of this sphere; however, this left many unanswered questions about religious plurality within societies. Second, the Enlightenment’s suspicion of tradition and its emphasis on the human person as a rational individual led to a shift in focus to this latter, unanswered issue. The birth of “the individual” and the focus on its autonomy played a vital role in the emer-gence of individual religious tolerance, implying freedom of choice, speech and conscience. The political liberalism this idea gave rise to considers all individuals, and thus their particular and individual views on the good, as equal.4 Protecting this equality and guaranteeing personal liberty led consequently to the need for tolerance and neutrality at the public level, implying the privatization of religions in order to avoid its dominance. Third, the sociological “secularization theory” expanded during the 1950s and 1960s by Berger,5 among others, proposed that “modernization

4. According to David Fergusson (Church, State and Civil Society, 48), political liber-alism is based on the following three premises: “the equality of all citizens under the law; the freedom of each to pursue the goods of his or her own choosing while not interfering unduly with another’s freedom; and the neutrality of the state with respect to the particular preferences of its citizens, including religion.” For the link between the ideas of equality and neutrality, see also David Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10–22. 5. Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,” in The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, ed. Peter L. Berger (Grand



necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals.”6 Some social scientists have been more cautious, asserting only that modernization and the development of scientific knowledge have effected a decrease in religion’s social influence by means of a differentia-tion of secular and religious spheres,7 while others have understood the paradigm to imply the marginalization of religion to the private realm.8 In a normative assertion, secularists have cherished the idea that these trends will lead to religion’s extinction. Implicated in their distrust of religion, these three factors give rise to a fear of religious involvement in public life. Like most social groupings, religions are inherently exclusive because membership is based on particular identities grounded in historical tradi-tions and truth claims. However, it is believed that religions inherently aim to impose their membership criteria and their conceptions of the good at both the public and the individual (private) level, potentially to the point of oppression and, thus, conflict—particularly in the case of reli-gious diversity.9 Hence, if social conflicts are to be avoided and individual liberties are to be secured, religion must be banned from the public sphere in order to achieve the necessary neutrality. Several difficulties arise from this conclusion, based on its presupposi-tions. Firstly, if religious background premises are considered suspicious since they potentially endanger public neutrality, all moral convictions should be regarded similarly, resulting in the privatization of both morality and religion.10 Any morality contains particular views that can threaten the neutrality of the public sphere. In other words, limiting religious speech to the private sphere will not guarantee neutrality in the public sphere, since every public decision is somehow biased toward some moral and thus a

Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 1–18. See also Berger’s The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Socio-logical Theory of Religion (New York: Anchor Books, 1990) and Grace Davie’s overview of secularization in her The Sociology of Religion (London: Sage, 2007), 46–66. Note that Berger has, in his 1999 text, called this theory “essentially mistaken” (2) and other social scientists are equally disenchanted. 6. Berger, “Desecularization of the World,” 2. 7. According to Davie (Sociology of Religion, 55), one example is Bryan Wilson as shown in his “The Secularization Thesis: Criticisms and Rebuttals,” in Secularization and Social Integration: Papers in Honour of Karel Dobbelaere, ed. R. Laermans, B. Wilson and J. Billiet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998), 45–66. 8. Davie (Sociology of Religion, 56) refers primarily to the contemporary scholar Steve Bruce who maintains this thesis. 9. This was essentially Samuel Huntington’s claim in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), although referring to civilizations (as both religious and cultural identities) in general rather than to religions in particular. 10. See Hollenbach, Common Good, 28.



particular viewpoint.11 Secondly, and related, this idea of tolerance as a privatization of morality and religion reveals an underlying conception of the function and goal of the public sphere: considering persons as autono-mous individuals who focus on their own rights and interests, the public sphere is conceived as the forum where persons bargain for their interests without regard for human beings as more than self-interested and able to pursue a or the common good. Thirdly, and again related, this view results in a strict separation between the state on the one hand, and the individual or private sphere on the other hand. In other words, the public sphere of the government is placed in opposition to what is private, including advocacy groups and the like. This perception is problematic insofar as it pushes otherwise public actors, such as advocacy groups—who advocate not only for their own self-interests but also for the common good—into the private sphere.12

This resulting equation of state–church with public–private is based on an inaccurate and simplistic, although common, assumption.13 Both the secularization thesis and the strict distinction between the private and the public sphere are being undermined by present influences and evolutions

11. See Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 59–62; Franklin I. Gamwell, Politics as a Christian Vocation: Faith and Democracy Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 114–15; Thiemann, Religion in Public Life, 77. Consequently, the question arises: if pluralism is such a treat for society, how can society reach the consensus necessary for its functioning? Since moral differences are not temporal, some have argued for relinquishing the idea of a moral consensus and instead focus on living in peace by a modus vivendi (see Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 53). The result is, however, a kind of anomie that paralyzes the whole society due to the absence of “any strong moral commitment on the part of its citizens” (Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 54). See also David Hollen-bach, The Global Face of Public Faith: Politics, Religion and Christian Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 5. In contrast, liberal thinkers such as John Rawls believe that at least an “overlapping consensus” may be achieved, assuming people do not refer to their “comprehensive” idea(l)s, but use only accessible “public reason” (Political Liberalism [New York: Columbia University Press, 2005], 38). From a religious point of view, this is more acceptable than the extreme liberal view, but remains problematic in its intrinsic restriction of religious speech and reduction of religion to the private sphere. Responding to this potential impasse, Eric Gregory states that he does not “think that any ethics of citizenship should offer moral constraints on political discourse, but these con-straints need not take account of whether or not such speech is ‘religious’ or not” (Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2008], 63). 12. See Thiemann, Religion in Public Life, 96–97. 13. For a discussion of this inaccurate assumption, see Jeff Weintraub, “The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction,” in Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy, ed. Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kumar (Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago, 1997), 1–42.



of religions in the public sphere. At a descriptive level, it is important to see that religions do, de facto, contribute to society, for better (1) or for worse (2). (1) In the former case, research has indicated the important role of religious associations and organizations in the building and forma-tion of “social capital”—the social networks based on trust and reciprocity within civil society that lead to civic engagement.14 More directly, reli-gions do influence society not only through the advocacy of their civil society institutions and associations,15 but also through the commonly accessible language of religions immersed in culture; this is a potential tool for a more immediate role in politics.16 (2) Regarding the negative contributions of religion, current events demonstrate the violent reas-sertion of religion—e.g. militant elements of American Christianity or Middle Eastern Islam—that undermines social integration in the whole

14. See the contributions of Mark Warren, Richard Wood, David Campbell and Steven Yonish in Religions as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good, ed. Corwin Smidt (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2003). See also Sidney Verba, Kay L. Schlozman and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge, MA: Har-vard University Press, 1995). This capacity of religions for social capital, however, depends on several factors. First, the structure of the religion plays an important role. As Robert Putnam has shown in Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), church membership and civic engagement are more positively correlated in Protestant churches than Catholic ones. The Catholic hierarchy seems to encourage passive congregations while Protestants are challenged to take a more active role. The second factor is the structure of the political sphere: the US’s limited gov-ernment and welfare programs allow for church involvement in care for the poor, sick, homeless, and migrants, whereas Europe’s more developed social security system seems to discourage religious individuals and groups from feeling such responsibility, potentially reducing the tie between church attendance and social action. Third, spirituality must be lived out in a religious community in order to translate itself into social commitment, as Robert Wuthnow has shown in Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). Consequently, as David Hollenbach points out, “if one is seeking to strengthen civic life in a democracy, encouragement of the privatization of religion does not appear to be a fitting normative objective” (Common Good, 106). 15. See Robert Wuthnow, “Can Religion Revitalize Civil Society? An Institutional Perspective,” in Religions as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good, ed. Corwin Smidt (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2003), 191–210. 16. In his article “The Language of God in the City of Man: Religious Discourse and Public Politics in America” (in Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good, ed. Corwin Smidt [Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2003], 171–90 [171]), Rhys Wil-liams states that “one criticism…of the concept of social capital is that it does not consider religions as an overtly political force. And yet such a presence is unavoidable. Religion has too much to say about the shape of social life to sit by and only exert its influence indi-rectly. Sometimes it simply must be political.” Religious language, considered a “cultural resource” accessible to all, can then impact the political sphere, given its inclusivity.



in its pursuit of the minority’s ends. We once again see the religious factor playing a dynamic role in armed conflicts by polarizing differences at a very personal level, such that conflicts are now often “characterized by deep-rooted, intense animosity; fear; and severe stereotyping” rather than elite-level power politics.17 As a result, religions have the capacity to both externally bridge and internally bond.18 In any case, both observations show that, today, the world “is as furiously religious as ever was”19 and that these religions “are refusing to accept the marginalized and privatized role that theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them.”20 Consequently, a strict distinction between religion and politics appears to be uncertain. Moreover, at the normative level, this separation is neither feasible nor desirable. In what follows we therefore argue that reflections from both peacebuilding and Catholic theology offer reasons to sustain the claim that religions (in general or Catholic faith in particular) should contribute to the public sphere. Hence, one need not choose between a conflict of religion versus the public sphere and a complete privatization of religion,21 but religion can and should be a “vehicle for critique”22 and renewal of society.

2. Religious Peacebuilding

“Religious peacebuilding,” a term for a relatively new focus within the academic field of conflict and peace studies, makes its own case for the necessity of interaction between religions and political activity/policymak-ing. An area of both study and practice, religious peacebuilding can be defined as a “comprehensive, theoretically sophisticated, and systematic process performed by religious and secular actors working in collaboration at different levels and at various proximities to conflict zones.”23 As such, it is a natural meeting point for religious and political actors because, as will be explained, they seek a mutual goal: peace between religious groups.

17. John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 34. 18. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Commu-nity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 23. 19. Berger, “Desecularization of the World,” 2. 20. José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 5. 21. See Hollenbach, Common Good, 88. 22. Thiemann, Religion in Public Life, 90. 23. R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 20.



From a political scientific view, inter-religious peace is a good for the sake of political relations and social solidarity whereas for religious actors, improved relations between communities may have particular religious significance, such as the achievement of social justice or reconciliation. Furthermore, religious peacebuilding scholars and practitioners point out that the very relevance and effectiveness of peacebuilding today is at stake if religion is marginalized from this process, particularly in conflict zones where religion is a factor. Religious peacebuilding therefore presumes the interaction of religion and politics via contemporary conflicts. However, the variety of cooperative potential for peacebuilding, which makes this a rich field of study and practice, has been underestimated and insufficiently engaged.24

Any talk of religion and peace today begs the question: but is religion not inherently violent? This is one common oversimplification that may lead to the conclusion that less religion means more peace while more religion means more violence.25 In fact, religion has a much more complex relationship with violence and peace, as explored by Elise Bould-ing’s two “cultures” of religion: the culture of holy war and the culture of utopian peaceableness.26 Each religion, according to her findings, has both of these archetypes built into their interpretive frameworks of the world. The holy war archetype refers to divinely legitimated violence, and is easily politicized, while the peaceable utopia refers to a vision of “mystic oneness of humankind with the creator or cosmos,” such as might be sought in intentional community or a monastery.27 Boulding applies these two archetypes to two opposing ways of responding to conflict, mapped along a continuum where absolute, violent destruction falls on one end and total integration/union (perfect peace) is on the other. The tendency in most religions is to embrace these two poles. Between these extreme conflict responses, however, lie more moderate responses, such as arbitra-tion, mediation, negotiation, and exchange, that, as we will see below, are increasingly embraced by religious peacebuilding.

24. Although a full accounting for this lacuna is beyond the scope of this paper, we mention the frameworks of secularism, liberalism, and realpolitik (among others) whose general move away from religion weakened their adherents’ ability to understand religions’ inner rationalities and motivations. Consequently, western responses to religious engage-ment in international politics have been lacking insight and effectiveness. 25. David Little, “Religion, Violent Conflict, and Peacemaking,” in Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution, ed. David Little (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 2007), 429–48. 26. Elise Boulding, “Two Cultures of Religion as Obstacles to Peace,” Zygon 21, no. 4 (1986): 501–518. 27. Boulding, “Two Cultures,” 502.



The concept of religious peacebuilding must consequently start with the dichotomy of religions’s capacity for both destructive violence and transformative peacemaking. As mentioned already, it is quite common to hear in the news about violent acts by or in the name of religions in places like Iraq, Sri Lanka, or Sudan. Many post-Cold War conflicts have been characterized by identity politics, where religion—as well as eth-nicity, nationality, etc.—has been a key determinant. In these cases, reli-gion may be implicated at the root of the violence, but more often it is co-opted for political mobilization and/or justifying and even upholding the sanctity of parties’ purposes. On the other hand, however, historical evidence shows that some religious actors have made significant contri-butions to peacebuilding that remain underappreciated and unengaged.28 “Indeed,” as Cynthia Sampson claims, “some aspects of peacebuilding are best understood using concepts and approaches found in religion. In particular, the processes associated with reconciliation—confession, repentance, forgiveness, mercy, and conversion based on self-reflection and acceptance of personal responsibility—have emerged from religious, not secular, contexts.”29 Religious peacebuilding is tapping into the “spiritual energy and charismatic legitimation”30 of religion to develop the moderate middle spectrum of Boulding’s conflict continuum, using unconventional approaches in our context, which is beginning to recog-nize the limitations of traditional, rational and state-centric methods of diplomacy. These peacebuilding actors seek to explain the conditions for these two dichotomous aspects of religion so as to encourage peace and prevent violence.

Religions and Violent ConflictThere is currently no agreement upon a general theory of the relationship between religion and violent conflict. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that religiously related violence has both tangible and elusive aspects. The tangible facts of violence involving religion are evident: for example, the location of violence often occurs in or towards religious sites, religious leaders may instigate violence or be victims of violence, or perpetrators may claim to act violently according to the command of God. The elusive aspects, on the other hand, tend to significantly hinder peacebuilding

28. See Douglas Johnston’s discussion in his “Religion and Foreign Policy,” in Forgive-ness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Transformation, ed. Raymond G. Helmick, sj and Rodney L. Petersen (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001), 117–28. 29. Cynthia Sampson, “Religion and Peacebuilding,” in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, ed. I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washing-ton, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 276; emphasis added. 30. Boulding, “Two Cultures,” 511.



practice and strategy: religions—with their focus on (for example) faith, divine revelation, the sacred, etc.—continue to act within their own realms of rationality that elude secular or “scientific” understandings of violence and peace. For example, game theory, realpolitik, and other stan-dard models used in political decision-making suggest incentives such as power, rationality or personal interest, whereas religious perspectives often have completely different motivations: for example, integration and collective unity, stepping out in faith, or following a vocation that “defies” modern reason. In what seems to be an attempt to bridge these spheres, political scientist Jonathan Fox has synthesized four basic social functions of religion in ethnic conflict—“whenever any aspect of religion becomes involved in ethnic conflict, or, for that matter, becomes involved in most aspects of politics and society, it is as a direct result of one of these four social functions of religion”:31

Religion provides a meaningful framework for understanding the world. Religion provides rules and standards of behaviour that link individual actions and

goals to this meaningful framework. Religion links individuals to a greater whole and sometimes provides formal insti-

tutions which help to define and organize that whole. Religion has the ability to legitimize actions and institutions.32

The first two functions provide the basis for how religion can (help) initiate conflict and violence while the latter two functions point to ways religion can (help to) facilitate pre-existing conflict. The first two functions revolve around the religious framework of meaning, which is a kind of world view that not only interprets reality for religious people, but even “become[s] a basic part of reality for those who depend upon [it].”33 The religious framework of meaning can become a crucial element defining one’s identity. Identity is a social category that shapes the characteristics of an individual’s self-definition; in identity, public and private are inseparable. Identifying with, or being a member of a social category, is “represented in the individual member’s mind as a social identity that both describes [function 1] and prescribes [function 2] one’s attributes as a member of that group.”34 While social scientists would

31. Jonathan Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century: A General Theory (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002), 103. 32. Jonathan Fox, “Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-Religious Conflict,” Nations and Nationalism 5 (1999): 431–63 (445). 33. Fox, “Towards a Dynamic Theory,” 451. 34. Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry and Katherine M. White, “A Tale of Two Theo-ries: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychol-ogy Quarterly 58 (1995): 255–69 (259–60).



say that identities are socially constructed and therefore changeable,35 identities are typically experienced as significant and not value-neutral—rather as socially compared—which naturally leads to competition and even conflict. Identities can lead to violence when a perceived challenge to the religious framework can be perceived as a (psychological) threat to the very self and its basic human needs. The threatened person or community commonly reacts defensively; if the threat seems great, the defence may “necessitate” extreme acts of self-preservation. This is particularly the case when identities are framed primordially: as unchangeable and inherently antagonistic to the other group.36 The second of Fox’s social functions is slightly more tangible: the religious framework may instruct its adherents to engage in either outright violent conflict—declaring a holy war, for instance—or to behave provocatively such that conflict might arise, or both.37 The typically “elusive” grounds for these instructions may be iden-tity, as just mentioned, or another equally “irrational” element of religion, such as a belief system or an act of faith. Fox’s latter two social functions of religion in conflict (as a connec-tion to and organization of the collective and its legitimation of actions and institutions) can facilitate pre-existent conflicts, even conflicts that have non-religious demands. Fox’s study found that whether or not the conflict is religious, if religious issues are salient, non-religious abuses and feelings of grievance increase. It seems as if the increased sensitivity of religious conflict is passed on to a non-religious conflict; this heightens the dynamics and weight of what is at stake. Religions may (function 3), through their own organizational capacity, help groups mobilize for con-flict, and/or (function 4) use their authority to legitimate truly anything, even the most unthinkable violence. Particularly in a context where legal and even social constraints disappear (e.g., state collapse), momentary feelings of grievance or threat are more easily mobilized and acted upon. If religious resources (apocalyptic narratives and scriptural “mandates,” for example) are perceived of as supporting these acts, emotional motiva-tions gain validity. Two poignant cases of legitimized, or even sacralized, violence are when suicide becomes martyrdom and when murder is called

35. Today, social scientists widely agree that identity is socially constructed: identities are social categories and as such are human products that naturally change over time. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54 (2000): 845–77. 36. The “primordialist” view is that identity carries essential and enduring character-istics, that, if antagonistic, will naturally always lead to violence (Fearon and Laitin, “Vio-lence,” 849). 37. Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict, 108.



a holy war.38 Such an emotional act may be regretted later, but a religiously legitimated emotional act may be labelled “inspired” or even “sacred” in order to assuage feelings of guilt and to avoid punishment. This is where leaders and “violence engineers” can mobilize the masses by using religion as a venue and framework of meaning to support their political demands as ultimate, even apocalyptic goals. The mix of religious and socio-political realms in the cross-pollination by violence engineers can be confusing, such that religious people may also follow along in violent acts thinking they are somehow religious duties.

Religions and PeacebuildingMany assert that since religion is often an instigator of violence, it should be sidelined, rather than engaged in the peacebuilding process. In a way, this is logical: it may seem easiest and best to (if possible) remove the offending element of the conflict. However, ignoring or avoiding a dif-ficult party in a conflict often simplifies the immediate peace process, but in the long term, the party’s repressed or unrecognized concerns will resurface because they have not been addressed. Conflict transforma-tion necessitates deep, often painful and unpleasant work that produces something new, changed. Only transformed relations between parties in conflict have the potential for sustainable peace. As we are currently witnessing and as the increasing rebuttals of secularization assumptions demonstrate, suppressing the needs of religious actors seems to encourage so-called terrorist acts. Therefore, what do religious peacebuilding experts recommend as the best response to such violence? Religious peacebuilders—actors who are often themselves religious adherents who work in the (secular) public sector—propose strengthening religion, with the condition that this include the orientation towards the religious priority for peace, as the most effective response, rather than eradicating religion or undermining its influence.39 If this recommendation is truly the most effective approach, it is a place where the interests of political leaders and the religious faithful can overlap. Building “strong” (Appleby), or “grounded” (Bock40), peace-focused religions as a shared political and religious goal should be a key agenda for

38. Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict. 39. According to the Fundamentalism Project, strong religion can equally be violent. For this reason, strengthening religion should be conditioned by a sacred priority of peace and reconciliation (i.e. in the direction of Boulding’s peaceable culture of religion). See Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fun-damentalisms around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 40. Joseph F. Bock, Sharpening Conflict Management: Religious Leadership and the Double-Edged Sword (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).



religious peacebuilding. According to Appleby of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, this can be done through (1) efforts to reverse religious “illiteracy”—a lack of training in one’s religion’s “doctrinal and moral teaching and [un]practiced in its devotional, ritual and spiritual traditions”41—and (2) by informing “folk religion”—Appleby’s term for a form of religion that is so disconnected from its broader faith community, its institutions and traditions, that it can mistake cultural habits for reli-gious ones. Religiously illiterate people who adhere to folk religions often mix up religious beliefs and the “superstitions” of their ancestors. While all religions are internally diverse with their evolving discussions on how to negotiate internal pluralism, folk religions and the religiously illiterate too often miss this debate and the development of new conclusions within their religions. They may be isolated from their own religious institutions worldwide and their shared beliefs and practices because they are stuck in a context where religion and ethnic culture have become indistin-guishable.42 Therefore, anyone with authority can manipulate religion to legitimate exclusive attitudes and violent behaviour (Fox’s function 4) that would be rejected by co-religious adherents elsewhere. Conversely, reli-gious peacebuilding leadership can exert great influence for re-humanizing the “other,” for forgiveness, and reconciliation. To address the problems of religious illiteracy and folk religion, religious peacebuilding leaders can strengthen the connection of local religious communities with their global religious networks as one way of building grounded religion. The peacebuilding religious leader can also provide religious education and oversee spiritual formation, explaining the foundations of beliefs and the meaning behind morality in a way that “reinforce[s] and contextualize[s] the priority given to peace and reconciliation.”43 (In)Formed, religious communities oriented towards just peace and trained in conflict resolu-tion are less susceptible to manipulated messages, “mob thinking,” and overwhelming emotions of fear, resentment, etc., while they are more capable of managing their religious grievances nonviolently. To take the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina, many in the religious establishment joined the nationalist movements during the recent war (1992–1995) and now have positions of political influence. Religious peacebuilding leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina are scarce, often operating with very poor funding or on a voluntary basis. Scholars and peacebuild-ers in the field increasingly agree that the leadership of religious agents for peace is essential to the success of religious peacebuilding. These leaders

41. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 77. 42. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 76–7. 43. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 119.



need, according to Appleby, a commitment to and training in nonviolence, a religious education and spiritual formation, as well as a connection with the religious community beyond state borders that can inspire and guide others down that path. Evidence shows that these exceptional leaders can have a great impact, often counteracting violence engineers and extrem-ist leaders.44 External religious institutions and individuals can encourage these courageous leaders with financial support, personnel, and training. The political establishment can encourage religious peacebuilding by not hindering their work and by making policies that enhance diversity, includ-ing a diversity of religious opinions. Returning to Bosnia-Herzegovina, this latter element continues to challenge alternative religious voices for peace both at the level of laws promoting religious freedom and at the level of religious leadership upholding nationalist agendas. We see therefore that religions have the internal resources to build peace just as they have the internal resources for violence. One cannot expect the social functions of religion in conflict to change, but the grounds and con-tent underlying those functions are constantly evolving (with the internal understandings of religion and the external influences of culture) such that conflicts can be handled peacefully for transformative social change. Religious peacebuilding leaders are, according to Appleby, Bock, and others, key actors in this process because they interpret and voice the reli-gious tradition regarding how to deal with conflict, when it is legitimate to pursue violence, and the religious priority of peace. Directly against the efforts of violent religious leadership, they “channel the militancy of reli-gion in the direction of the disciplined pursuit of justice and nonviolent resistance to extremism.”45 These leaders, as compared with the military, external “experts,” or others employed in peacemaking, are: indigenous and invested, legitimate and trusted, uniquely insightful, persistent, dili-gent, and morally authoritative.46 Consequently, they are “better equipped than their political counterparts to deal with religious issues.”47 However, these peacebuilding leaders need support since their work and views are often contrary to those in positions of power, which means they are less visible, which tends to reduce the scope of their effect.

44. Some obvious examples are Mahatma Ghandi, Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., Mother Theresa, Bishop Desmond Tutu and the Dalai Lama, but there are many other less famous religious peacebuilding leaders. 45. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 283. 46. See Bock, Sharpening Conflict Management, as well as the Introduction and the con-tributions of Richard Holbrooke and David Little in Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution, ed. David Little (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 47. International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, “For Political Leaders,” http://www.icrd.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=69.

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On the other side—the political establishment—we, with Johnston of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, are convinced that political decision-makers “will have to begin treating religion as a serious variable in the conduct of international relations.”48 They can no longer excuse their ignorance of and lack of engagement with religious motiva-tions in conflict by equating this with the separation of church and state. The emerging literature on religious peacebuilding can provide support to this new endeavour by persistently addressing the issue of religion in violent conflict as valid and necessary for peacebuilding.49 The growing body of case studies helps peace and conflict scholars to systematize the field of religious peacebuilding with the goal of developing theory and methods for future religious peacebuilding leaders.50 Through continued attention to religions’ interactions with conflict, in the direction of both violence and peace, the secular sphere of politics and international rela-tions may be enhanced and become more effective in the intricacies of conflicts involving religion. However, the test is whether decision- and policy-makers choose to adopt strategies to better understand religious perspectives and encourage their peacebuilding potential. This would mean a change from responding to the violence of religious adherents to making political initiatives to “get to the ideas behind the guns.”51 As every human being knows at heart, but tends to forget in action, “[m]utual engagement based on demonstrated respect for the other’s values provides far greater leverage to influence a situation than do policies based on isolation and demonization.”52 This applies equally to the reli-gious “other.”

3. Faith in Society

After examining the peacebuilding perspective which demonstrates the challenges and necessities of including religion in (peacebuilding) politics, we now turn to some arguments from a Catholic theological perspective

48. Douglas Johnston, “Foreword,” in Religion and Security: The New Nexus in Interna-tional Relations, ed. Robert A. Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), ix–xi (x). 49. Little, “Religion, Violent Conflict, and Peacemaking,” 441–2. 50. For example, we can discern sets of actors, key personal qualities, commonly used, effective techniques, types of religious peacebuilding activities, and unique contributions to the field of conflict and peace studies. However, these details go beyond the scope of this article. 51. Douglas M. Johnston, “Faith-based Diplomacy: Bridging the Religious Divide,” presentation to the Secretary’s Open Forum, US Department of State (December 8, 2006), 5; my emphasis. 52. Johnston, “Faith-based Diplomacy,” 4.



to sustain the idea(l) of an increased role of religion in politics. More than aiming to convince nonreligious people that this involvement is important and that it is unnecessary to fear a takeover of the public sphere by Catho-lic faith, these thoughts hope to clarify that faithful people can be liberated from the worry that active participation in society would jeopardize their loyalty to the Church and their relationship with God.53

“Faith in society” refers then to a double movement. On the one hand, it points to the positive recognition within Catholic theology, and more exactly, within official Catholic social teaching, of the value of society. On the other hand, it refers to the ideas about the role of faith in the public sphere implicated in the Catholic faith. Both aspects are immediately intertwined, for the idea that the particular Catholic belief implies a com-mitment to an active role in society necessarily requires a consideration of society as intrinsically good and a bearer of God’s grace. Furthermore, when society is considered as such, the Catholic community as a faith-ful witness can no longer isolate itself from this world, but needs to get involved. As will become clear, neither of these aspects were previously evident in Catholic theology and still cannot be taken for granted.

Openness to the World and SocietyAn increasing openness to the world, as a necessary condition to even start thinking about the relationship between Catholic faith and politics, implies a recognition of society outside the Church as both autonomous and good, neither of which can be assumed. Acknowledging the autonomy of worldly affairs and its separation from the spiritual sphere required a major shift within theology: from the time of Constantine until the Middle Ages there was a “synthesis between Church and culture”54 dominated by the idea that the temporal and the political should be subordinated to the spiritual. However, the two spheres were alienated from each other because of developments caused by the Reformation and modernity. Correspondingly, from the Enlightenment onwards, the Church took a more defensive stance, explicitly isolating itself from society, which it condemned for its modern character. The papal writings of Leo XIII at the end of the nineteenth century reflected a somewhat positive account of society, but these were diminished by the pontificate of his successors. (At least, this was the case for the official

53. See Hollenbach, Common Good, 113. 54. See Richard R. Gaillardetz, “The Ecclesiological Foundations of Modern Catho-lic Social Teaching,” in Modern Catholic Social Teaching, ed. Kenneth R. Himes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 73. See also Roger Vekemans, Caesar and God: Priesthood and Politics (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1972), 12–13; Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 34.



institution, since many faithful people continued in their committed caring for the poor, the homeless and the sick at the local level.) With John XXIII’s writings and his initiative to organize a Second Vatican Coun-cil, the Church explicitly showed a renewed openness to worldly devel-opments. The Council document Gaudium et spes (1965), in particular, officially entitled “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” reflects this shift in Catholic social teaching.55 The establishment of the idea that the social world is an autonomous sphere might seem of minor importance, but from an internal perspective, taking into account the history of the Catholic Church, it was a major achievement. In stating the “autonomy of earthly affairs,”56 the document acknowledges the par-ticular rationality of politics, economics, science and cultures and, hence, let go of the concern for controlling these aspects of life. With regard to the nature of society, in terms of its goodness, Catho-lic tradition can refer to a spectrum of thoughts.57 The first is based on Augustine and considers the state or the political as a restraint of sin in this world. Central to this view are the consequences of the Fall of Adam: “the relation of political rulers and subjects must inevitably be situated within the disordered and fractured world of Adam’s descendants.”58 In this broken world, human beings are in need of God’s grace for restora-tion, which is not imminent until the final coming of the City of God. Consequently, the political is the sphere that needs to take care of and balance the evil forces caused by sin. Although the City of God is partially present in the Earthly City, it is hidden and ultimately “within the Earthly City man is alien.”59 At an ecclesiological level, this might lead to a strict

55. Notice that the title says “the Church in the modern world” and not “the Church and the modern world”. See Gaillardetz, “Ecclesiological Foundations,” 75. 56. Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et spes, in Acta Apostolicae Sedes 58 (1966), 1025-1115: §36 (hereafter AAS). http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. 57. The account given here to defend Catholic religious involvement in the public sphere is limited to general theological arguments. However, we mention that the Church’s social analysis of current events also plays a major role in its relationship with particular societies. For example, when the Magisterium describes a culture allowing euthanasia and abortion as “a culture of death,” the Church instructs the faithful to oppose or resist the cultural assumptions underlying such morality and hence take a more oppositional stance toward that given society (is this better?). 58. Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 29. See also William T. Cavanaugh, “From One City to Two: Christian Reimagination of Political Space,” Political Theology 7, no. 3 (2006): 313. 59. Cavanaugh, “From One City to Two,” 310. It is interesting that in this view, the political is considered all but neutral, for it is characterized by self-love: individuals or nations only care for their own interests.

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separation of church and state and an attitude of non-involvement from the side of religion.60 In contrast to this “eschatological humanism,” the second view of “incarnational humanism” is based on Thomas Aquinas.61 It states that the perfection of man will be the perfection of its nature: “grace perfects nature, does not destroy it.”62 Hence, what is accom-plished already need not be completely abolished by the final coming of the Kingdom of God, but human beings participate in it. Moreover, the focus is on God the Creator of both heaven and earth, and thus there is a rightful space for the terrestrial, the human.63 Furthermore, as children of God, all human beings are united and interdependent, so that “love of God cannot be separated from love of neighbour.”64 Finally, the Thomistic integration of the Aristotelian account in theology—of human beings as political animals and social human beings—appears to be crucial. Rec-ognizing the social nature of persons, as Aristotle did, led to a positive account of the role and status of society as the forum where people can decide on the common good.65 Since this social aspect is inherent in human persons, during recent decades, the Church has not hesitated to emphasize the importance of social groups and associations within the public sphere. This so-called socialization ensures that persons are given the ability to live a fulfilling life in accordance with their sociality, thereby recognizing the positive account of society and associations instead of its

60. This is simply one possible, realist conclusion to draw from Augustine. In his book Politics and the Order of Love, Eric Gregory distinguishes two other ways of reading Augustine, resulting in either a Rawlsian account of religion in politics or a call for civic republicanism. 61. See John C. Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Propo-sition, introduction by Peter Lawler, foreword by Walter Burghardt (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 174–76. A similar interpretation of Thomas can be found in the works of Jacques Maritain, especially his Humanisme Intégrale: problèmes temporels et spirituels d’une nouvelle chrétienté (Paris: Aubier, 1947). Those interpretations of Thomas, however, do not fully capture Thomas’s loyalty to Augustine in considering the realization of the Kingdom of God as an eschatological reality and more vertical (as the relationship between God and the believer after life) than horizontal (implications for the interrelations between human beings). Whereas, within both Augustine and Thomas, this idea implies that we are already participating this eschatological reality as pilgrims, writers like Maritain and Murray—and later Catholic social teaching—read Thomas as if we are builders of this eschatological real-ity. We thank Stephen Pope for this comment. 62. Murray, We Hold These Truths, 176. 63. See Murray, We Hold These Truths, 177. See also Gaillardetz, “Ecclesiological Foun-dations,” 74. 64. Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et spes, §24. 65. See Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 32.



Augustinian interpretation as a necessary condition to limit sin.66 While an Augustinian approach tends to focus on the “not yet” of the eschatological character of the earthly world, a more Thomistic approach emphasizes the “already.” With the incarnation of God in Christ, humanity participates in the Kingdom of God present in history, and in the expectation of its ultimate realization. The recognition of the autonomy of worldly affairs by no means implies that dialogue between Catholic faith and public sphere is not possible. As the Council stated: “[the Church] is convinced that she can be abundantly and variously helped by the world in the matter of preparing the ground for the Gospel. This help she gains from the talents and industry of indi-viduals and from human society as a whole.”67 Hence, a genuine dialogue is necessary. Our next step is to show why the Church’s involvement in political affairs, in the broad sense, is therefore a necessary implication.

The Involvement of Catholic Faith in SocietyA famous statement from Gaudium et spes is that the Church “has the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the gospel.”68 It continues to say that “she can respond to the perennial questions which men ask about this present life and the life to come,” which refers to the link between the Church and society. From its tradi-tion, and in particular its most important resource—the Gospel—Catholic faith can and should contribute to public debates and discernment pro-cesses on current political events and developments. Indeed, investigating some elements of the Gospel, as the written tradition of the experience of God’s self-disclosure, offers supporting arguments for this view. Hence we arrive at the main question: how does God reveal God’s self and what does that imply for human beings and their relationships? Through the incarnation, God revealed God’s self in Christ as love, immediately giving practical applications of this belief when he sat down with sinners and forgave them, spoke publicly, healed the poor and the sick, and so forth. Christ’s life was a public manifestation of this love.69

66. Cf. John XXIII, Mater et magistra, in AAS 53 (1961), 401-464: §59–60. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.html; Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et spes, §13. 67. Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et spes, §40. 68. See Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et spes, §4. Paradoxically, the shift from a natural law approach—with a universalistic ethic based on human nature and reason—to scriptural resources—with an ethic of distinctive Christian character—opened the Catholic Church toward society. 69. See Gamwell, Politics as a Christian Vocation, 71: the “essential meaning” of Christ is that “Jesus decisively reveals God, the ultimate source of all things and the ultimate ground

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As the Gospel shows, these were not just private and interpersonal events, but in light of their consequences, they may be considered public state-ments. In his life, Christ was the sign of that loving God. Here we return to the eschatological meaning of the incarnation, pointing to both “the already” and the “not yet.” However incomplete the Kingdom of God may be, the “not yet” cannot be an excuse for inactivity/passivity. Even more so, the “not yet” anticipates the world to come, supported by its vision of that world. As Fergusson points out, Jesus modelled this: “For Jesus, the present is an occasion for living the new life in anticipation of the future.”70 Appealing to the Gospel implies a conviction that faith may not merely be private, but must—by reason of its basic beliefs—be public and political, remembering, however, the incompleteness of all human efforts. Consequently, “the expectation of a new earth must not weaken but rather stimulate our concern for cultivating this one.”71

Moreover, as has been said, the Catholic emphasis on the social nature of persons, derived from their creation by God, leads to the formation of associations and their involvement in society. This statement has even more profound implications: the subsequent unity assumes solidarity between all people that believers should pragmatically embody. Solidarity or, put differently, love of neighbour, is a demanding obligation. Since this unity of all human beings transcends not only national borders, but also boundaries between political and even religious associations, the practical implications of living out this solidarity are themselves public. As such, a life of faith cannot be reduced to a private matter, because it implies improving or advocating for the human dignity of all, which makes it public and non-exclusive. No matter how motivating and persuasive these ideas might seem, their implications for the role of the Church and its faithful is still not taken for granted. What these ideas plead for is “prophetic criticism,”72 meaning that the Church should contribute to society and avoid escapism from and condemnation of worldly affairs.73 However, a brief comparison

of worth, as all-embracing love, who calls all women and men to love this God without reservation and, thereby, to have their every purpose express love for all the world God loves.” 70. Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 12. 71. Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et spes, §39. David Hollenbach (Global Face, 118) puts it this way: “private religion is theologically self-contradictory” from a Christian point of view. See also Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 21; Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology, trans. and ed. J. Matthew Ashley (New York: Crossroad, 2007), xi. 72. Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 22. 73. See Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 22; Vekemans, Caesar and God, 22.



between two documents of Catholic social teaching show that this view is all but self-evident: here we look at Justitia in mundo, the written result of a synod of bishops held in 1971, and Deus caritas est, the first papal encycli-cal of Benedict XVI. Although both documents discuss the mission of the Church, their motivations to do so are entirely different, originat-ing from their very different contexts. The Synod occurred within the process started with the Vatican Council document Gaudium et spes that introduced the “Third World Agenda” and a new, inductive approach into Catholic social teaching. Unlike the Council, however, this Synod was characterized by the fact that the majority of the bishops came from Southern countries. Hence, “it was the first time that leaders of churches in poor nations had a formal opportunity to dialogue about justice with members of the curia and bishops from the wealthy nations.”74 Quite dif-ferently, Deus caritas est originated in the personal initiative of the pope and it appears to be part of a trilogy on faith, hope and charity. In Justitia in mundo, the motivation to bring up this issue was extrinsic: the bishops felt urged to question the task of the Church, faced with the reality of massive inequality, deprivation and injustice affecting so many people. In contrast, the encyclical starts from an internal perspective, deducing ideas on the relationship between the Church and the world from faith convictions. As will become clear, these dissimilar motivations have led to different ideas about the relationship between justice and charity and, immediately linked with that, between faith and politics. From its particular context, Justitia in mundo stated that to care and to stand up for the poor and powerless cannot be reduced to charity but that these obligations must be considered “duties of justice.”75 Hence, love and justice cannot be separated, “for love implies an absolute demand for justice, namely a recognition of the dignity and rights of one’s neighbour.”76 These statements resulted in the most disputable phrase of Justitia in mundo although it was not discussed during the Synod:77 “action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appears to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel.”78 “Consti-

74. Kenneth R. Himes, “Commentary on Justitia in Mundo,” in Modern Catholic Social Teaching, ed. Himes, 335. 75. Synod of Bishops, “Justice in the World,” in Catholic Social Thought: The Documen-tary Heritage, ed. David J. Shannon and Thomas A. O’Brien (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), 293. 76. Synod of Bishops, “Justice in the World,” 293. 77. See Himes, “Commentary on Justitia in Mundo,” 352; Donal Dorr, Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching, 2nd ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), 238. 78. Synod of Bishops, “Justice in the World,” 289; emphasis added.



tutive” can be understood as “something that can never be absent without the Church failing to be itself ”79 so that “not to struggle for justice was to be unfaithful to the Gospel.”80

On the other hand, how different is the encyclical. Referring to histori-cal examples of the influence of charitable works within the Christian tra-dition, Benedict XVI correctly considers caritas “essential” to the Church.81 Problems arise, however, when this statement or conviction becomes the basis for arguing in favour of a moral division of labour between charity and justice. From the idea of charity’s essentiality, Benedict XVI draws the conclusion that charitable works are the only task of the Church, whereas “the pursuit of justice must be a fundamental norm of the State”82 and of politics in general.83 Hence, founded on the “fundamental distinction between what belongs to God and to Caesar,”84 the separation of church and state is unquestionably bound up with separating charity and justice. Here the Pope tends to fall into the same trap as liberalism: it equates the church–state separation with a strict distinction between the private–public sphere, or with religion and politics. The consequent separation of charity (as a matter of the Church) and justice (as a matter of the state) reduces the possible contribution of the Church as a discussion partner with political actors on the issue of justice. Hence, the role of the Church with regard to establishing justice can only be indirect and is limited to the purification of reason, formation of conscience, bringing insights to the requirements of justice, and motivating people to act accordingly. The consequent necessity is not only to define politics (and it seems that the interpretation within Deus caritas est tends to neglect civil society altogether), but also which Church we are talking about. For even if one accepts that the Catholic Church evidently lacks the power to implement justice legally, it has other instruments to work for justice, such as theo-logians and local groups who investigate the particularity of the Catholic faith’s relationship to justice. On the other hand, Catholic development agencies, for example, work for structural justice within the sphere of civil society. Hence, the encyclical tends to equate the Church–state

79. Dorr, Option for the Poor, 239. 80. Peter Hebblethwaite, “The Popes and Politics: Shifting Patterns in Catholic Social Doctrine,” in Official Catholic Social Teaching, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard M. McCor-mick (Readings in Moral Theology; New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 275. 81. Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est, in AAS 98 (2006), 217-252: §22; 25b. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xviencyclicals/documents/hf_benxvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html. 82. Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est, §26. 83. Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est, §28a. 84. Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est, §28a.

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distinction, with the private–public and the charity–justice distinctions, which is problematic given everything just argued. Accordingly, this section has tried to show that theology has the task “first of all to understand the world in all its complexity; second, to respect it in its secularity; third to be restless about its infirmities and limitations; and fourth, to feel driven to lay hands on it, which is what Catholic social ethics calls the world to do—to lay hands on a world you respect but are not ready to accept in its present form.”85

4. A Refusal to Conclude

The basic presumption of liberalism in the aftermath of Reformation and Enlightenment is that in order to guarantee the equality of every indi-vidual, tolerance must prevail, implying that the public and the private spheres must be separated and religious faith privatized. From another point of view, there is a hope and conviction that peace and the common good may be achieved by recognizing the contributing role of religion in the public and even the political sphere. Implicated in this view is the hope that all peace may be elicited through conflict transformation86 and the common good be achieved by means of consensus. Therefore, as Eric Gregory has pointed out, limiting and restricting religious speech to the private sphere is

(1) impractical (our rational justifications are always relative to epistemic or cognitive context); (2) historically naïve (religious convictions have inspired some of the most democratic episodes in public life); (3) strategically self-defeating (sterilizing public speech will not alleviate, and may fuel, the very real political dangers of religious convictions) and (4) anti-democratic (these restrictions impose an unjust political burden on many religious citizens that often betrays an excessive fear of democratic politics and stifles the capacity for dissent).87

While we maintain the integrity of the separation of church and state, we point to the emerging need and desire for increased dialogue within these two and other disciplines. Better dialogue builds awareness about

85. J. Bryan Hehir, “Catholic Theology at its Best,” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 27, nos. 2–3 (1998): 14. 86. See John Paul Lederach’s “elicitive approach” to conflict transformation in Prepar-ing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995). This approach (very simply put) proposes that external actors should limit them-selves to eliciting concepts, mechanisms of peace and strategies from inside cultures in conflict and empowering locals with conflict financial assistance and training in nonviolent conflict transformation. 87. Gregory, Politics, 62.



key concerns within each field and has the potential of enhancing the effectiveness of policies supporting conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It may also encourage Catholic theology’s self-critique as well as provid-ing enriching elements from theology for broader public reflection upon the changing nature of political reality. This article is one attempt at such a dialogue “already” begun, though “not yet” fully realized.

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Between the “Already” and the “Not Yet”: A Peace Perspective and a Catholic Theological...

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