Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us": Ottoman and French Views of Their Joint...

“Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us”: Ottoman and French Views

of Their Joint Campaign of 1543–1544

Christine Isom-Verhaaren

This article studies contemporary and historical views of the sixteenth-century alliance between Muslim Ottomans and Christian Frenchmen focusing on the most dramatic manifestation of the alliance, the win-tering of the Ottoman � eet in the French port of Toulon, 1543–44. This episode, and the diplomacy associated with it, led to the creation of an abundance of sources by a wide variety of individuals and groups docu-menting the events. Surprisingly, contemporary Ottoman and French sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of 1543–44 and more generally of the alliance, a view projected largely by the Hapsburgs, foes of the alliance. This article, therefore, has two related purposes: � rst, to reconstruct the events of 1543–44 relying on contemporary Ottoman and French sources; and second, to analyze the historiographical implications of the neglect of the most relevant sources to understand how and why the distortions occurred. Relations between countries with Muslim leaders and inhabitants and non-Muslim countries have exhibited wide-ranging variations since the rise of Islam and Islamic polities beginning in the seventh

French Historical Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer 2007) DOI 10.1215/00161071-2007-003Copyright 2007 by Society for French Historical Studies

Christine Isom-Verhaaren teaches Middle Eastern and global history at Benedictine University. She is author of “Royal French Women in the Ottoman Sultans’ Harem: The Political Uses of Fabricated Accounts from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-� rst Centuries,” Journal of World History 17 (2006): 159–96; and “Shifting Identities: Foreign State Servants in France and the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Early Modern History 8 (2004): 109–34. She is working on a study of the creation of Ottoman identity in the � fteenth century during the reigns of Mehmed II and Bayezid II. The author thanks Linda Darling of the University of Arizona for helpful suggestions, as well as the anonymous readers of this journal.

sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of

menting the events. Surprisingly, contemporary Ottoman and French sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of

tering of the Ottoman � eet in the French port of Toulon, 1543–44. This episode, and the diplomacy associated with it, led to the creation of an abundance of sources by a wide variety of individuals and groups docu-menting the events. Surprisingly, contemporary Ottoman and French sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of

menting the events. Surprisingly, contemporary Ottoman and French sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact

and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of 1543–44 and more generally of the alliance, a view projected largely and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted and perpetuated a distorted view of both this speci� c campaign of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact sources expressing their views of this campaign have had little impact

Tseng 2007.03.29 09:54 7918 French Historical Society • 30:3 • Sheet 54 of 197 Tseng 2007.03.29 09:54 7918 French Historical Society • 30:3 • Sheet 55 of 197

396 FRENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES

century. One recent strain of political thinking sees a “clash of civiliza-tions.”¹ A careful examination of international relations over the cen-turies, however, reveals that while rhetoric composed by both Muslims and Christians often emphasized con� ict, in practice relations allowing trade and intellectual exchange were common. Modern Western histo-rians have frequently misinterpreted the alliance between François I of France (1515–47) and Süleyman (1520–66), sultan of the Ottoman Empire against Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor (1519–56) and king of Spain (1516–56). They have regarded this alliance as a sensational aber-ration from the norms of Renaissance diplomacy. Yet the alliance was neither an aberration nor regarded as particularly sensational in the sixteenth century. The Ottomans were an essential part of the � fteenth- and sixteenth-century European Mediterranean world in the eyes of their contemporaries. They were integral to the political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural world of Europe despite their distinct political and cultural system. The Ottomans and the French viewed their allies from multiple perspectives, not solely as adherents of di� erent reli-gions, and their religious di� erences did not prevent them from pursu-ing joint military action against their mutual enemies.

Historiographical Issues

Recovering the contemporary Ottoman and French perceptions of their alliance, with the aim of tracing their impact on the historio-graphical record, has wider implications than describing one famous alliance in its sixteenth-century context. Ottoman sources have rarely been studied to discover Ottoman perspectives, despite the existence of two chronicles that include detailed accounts of this event, Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş ve Estergon ve İstunibelgrad (History of the Conquest of Şikloş, Ester-gon and İstunibelgrad ) by Nasuh Matrakçı,² and Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa (The Exploits of Hayreddin Pasha) by Muradi.³ Matrakçı participated in

¹ Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign A� airs 72 (1993): 22–49. For a response to Huntington’s views, see Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” Nation, Oct. 22, 2001, 000–000. Also relevant to this topic are Juan Cole, “Review of Bernard Lewis’ What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response,” Global Dialogue 4 (2003): 000–000; Géraud Pou-marède, Pour en � nir avec la Croisade: Mythes et réalites de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVIe et XVIIe siécles (Paris, 2004), 1–2; and Gilles Veinstein, “Sulayman the Magni� cent and Christianity: The Limits of an Antogonism [sic],” Perceptions 8 (2003): 159–72.

² Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Hazine 1608. This has been published as Sinan Çavuş, Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş, Estergon ve Istol[n]i-Belgrad or Süleyman-name (Istanbul, 1987). For a discussion of authorship, see Hüseyin Yurdaydın’s study of Matrakçı’s Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i irakeyn-i (Ankara, 1976), 131–34.

³ Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (hereafter BN), MS Turc 1186. For a discussion of an earlier version of the Gazavat, see Rhoads Murphey, “Seyyid Muradi’s Prose Biography of Hizir Ibn Yakub, Alias Hayreddin Barbarossa: Ottoman Folk Narrative as an Under-

Recovering the contemporary Ottoman and French perceptions of


and cultural system. The Ottomans and the French viewed their allies from multiple perspectives, not solely as adherents of di� erent reli-gions, and their religious di� erences did not prevent them from pursu-ing joint military action against their mutual enemies.


Recovering the contemporary Ottoman and French perceptions of their alliance, with the aim of tracing their impact on the historio-

ing joint military action against their mutual enemies.

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OTTOMAN AND FRENCH CAMPAIGN OF 1543–1544 397

the 1543 campaign and Muradi used informants from the campaign, as well as Ottoman archival material. In addition, Süleyman’s corre-spondence with François I and with his admiral, Hayreddin Pasha, known as Barbarossa in Western sources, reveals his methods of direct-ing campaigns and controlling events.⁴ These contemporary Ottoman chronicles, written almost immediately after the campaign of 1543–44, are the most reliable sources for reconstructing the events from the Ottoman perspective. Matrakçı’s chronicle has only recently become accessible to Western historians as it was locked in the Ottoman sultan’s treasury of valuable manuscripts. Muradi’s account of the events is found in a unique manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. In both instances, knowledge of Ottoman Turkish was necessary to access their information. While Ottoman and French views of the events of this episode are similar to each other, they are not identical. Sixteenth-century French participants’ views can be discovered in a variety of sources, many of which were published in the nineteenth century. The neglected French sources range from decrees of François I to court records, memoirs, archival records from Toulon, and letters.⁵ Individually, none is as valu-able as the Ottoman chronicles, but as a group they make for a rich collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against the Hapsburg threat of Charles V; therefore he requested the Ottoman � eet from the more powerful Süleyman, who graciously dispatched his � eet under the direction of Hayreddin Barbarossa to assist the French king. The Ottoman expedition to the western Mediterranean that fol-lowed, including the � eet’s wintering in France in 1543–44, allowed

exploited Source for Historical Reconstruction,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungarium 54 (2001): 519–32. Matrakçı was associated with the court, Muradi with seafaring. See Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Ottoman-French Interaction, 1480–1580: A Sixteenth-Century Encounter” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1997).

⁴ Süleyman’s correspondence is found in the Gazavat, in Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi 12321, and in Ignaz de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissances étrangères depuis le premier traité conclu en 1536 entre Sulayman I et François I jusqu’à nos jours, 8 vols. (Paris, 1864–1901).

⁵ BN, Moreau 778; Henry, “Documents relatifs au séjour de la � otte turque de Barberousse à Toulon, pendant l’hiver de 1543 à 1544,” in Documents historiques inédits tirés des collections manu-scrites de la Bibliothèque royale, ed. J.-J. Champollion-Figeac, 4 vols. (Paris, 1847), 3:518–66; Ernest Charrière, Négociations de la France dans le Levant, 4 vols. (Paris, 1848–60); Blaise de Monluc, Com-mentaires, 1521–1576, ed. Paul Courteault (Paris, 1964); Guillaume du Bellay, Mémoires de Martin et Guillaume du Bellay, ed. V.-L. Bourrilly and F. Vindry, 4 vols. (Paris, 1908–19); Jérome Maurand, Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand d’Antibes à Constantinople, 1544, ed. and trans. Leon Dorez (Paris, 1901) (the edition of this manuscript prepared by Dorez includes a useful introduction and appendixes drawn mainly from archival sources); Vincent Carloix, Mémoires de la vie de François de Scépeaux, sire de Vieilleville (Paris, 1822).

collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the able as the Ottoman chronicles, but as a group they make for a rich collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their

participants’ views can be discovered in a variety of sources, many of which were published in the nineteenth century. The neglected French sources range from decrees of François I to court records, memoirs, archival records from Toulon, and letters.⁵ Individually, none is as valu-able as the Ottoman chronicles, but as a group they make for a rich collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against

Individually, none is as valu-able as the Ottoman chronicles, but as a group they make for a rich

the Hapsburg threat of Charles V; therefore he requested the Ottoman the Hapsburg threat of Charles V; therefore he requested the Ottoman joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against the Hapsburg threat of Charles V; therefore he requested the Ottoman joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against the Hapsburg threat of Charles V; therefore he requested the Ottoman joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their joint campaign as initiated by François I who needed assistance against alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the able as the Ottoman chronicles, but as a group they make for a rich collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the able as the Ottoman chronicles, but as a group they make for a rich collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the



Ottomans and French to meet in unusual circumstances. The inter-action that resulted from this encounter was consequently more com-plex than what occurred when a few Frenchmen traveled in the Otto-man Empire or an occasional Ottoman envoy journeyed to France. Not only did a large number of Ottomans sail to France; they fought along-side Frenchmen, inhabited their houses, and ate their food. By exam-ining both French views of the Ottomans and Ottoman views of the French that developed as a result of actual contact as allies, rather than theoretical perspectives related to ideals of either Christian or Muslim holy war, this study demonstrates that for both groups, assessing the positive and negative aspects of the alliance was more complex than a simple Muslim-Christian dichotomy.⁶ However, the perspective that has exerted long-lasting in� uence on Western historiography is that of their common enemy, the Haps-burg Charles V. The supporters of Charles V, including prominent his-torians such as Paolo Giovio; nobles such as Alfonso d’Avalos, Marquis del Vasto; and artists such as Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen produced nega-tive propaganda against the French and the Ottomans concerning the alliance of a Christian king with an in� del. Hapsburg propaganda had two main components: First, that it was religiously unacceptable for a Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-tendom against Muslims in general and the Ottomans speci� cally. This propaganda overpowered not only Ottoman but also French perspec-tives. This is not to say that all subjects of the king of France agreed with French policy, or that all Hapsburg subjects supported Hapsburg policy. Nevertheless the o� cial Hapsburg view disseminated by its sup-porters has dominated Western historiography up to the present to the exclusion of both the Ottoman and the French perspectives. Only recently have historians begun to protest against the uncriti-cal acceptance of Hapsburg propaganda, or attempts to portray all of Charles V’s military actions in the Mediterranean as religiously moti-vated e� orts to unite all Western Christendom under Hapsburg leader-ship in a crusade against the Ottomans. In 1998 Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa, in her analysis of the propaganda produced glorifying the 1535 Haps-

⁶ For studies that emphasize the theoretical, holy war perspective, see Géraud Poumarède, “L’Europe de la Renaissance et l’empire ottoman de la chute de Constantinople à la bataille de Lépante: Aspects culturels et politiques,” in La Renaissance: Actes du colloque de 2002 de l’Association des historiens modernistes (Paris, 2003), 47–95; Poumarède, “Justi� er l’injusti� able: L’alliance turque au miroir de la chrétienté (XVIe–XVIIe siècles),” Revue d’histoire diplomatique 111 (1997): 217–46; and Poumarède, Pour en � nir avec la Croisade.

Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, two main components: First, that it was religiously unacceptable for a Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn

torians such as Paolo Giovio; nobles such as Alfonso d’Avalos, Marquis del Vasto; and artists such as Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen produced nega-tive propaganda against the French and the Ottomans concerning the alliance of a Christian king with an in� del. Hapsburg propaganda had two main components: First, that it was religiously unacceptable for a Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-

alliance of a Christian king with an in� del. Hapsburg propaganda had two main components: First, that it was religiously unacceptable for a

tendom against Muslims in general and the Ottomans speci� cally. This tendom against Muslims in general and the Ottomans speci� cally. This tendom against Muslims in general and the Ottomans speci� cally. This in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-tendom against Muslims in general and the Ottomans speci� cally. This in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Chris-that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, two main components: First, that it was religiously unacceptable for a Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, two main components: First, that it was religiously unacceptable for a Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second,



burg expedition to Tunis, emphasized that we must not confuse o� -cial propaganda with genuine political intentions.⁷ In 2002 Miguel Angel de Bunes Ibarra identi� ed a trend in Spanish discourse regard-ing international relations that is evident in other European countries, including France: “One observes a clear dichotomy between the liter-ary culture and the more reality-based reports of the imperial ambas-sadors in Italy. The former would serve to popularize the ideal of the Spanish monarchy as the incarnation of the defense of Christianity in its � ght against the Muslims. . . . The reality . . . reduced the grand humanist ideals to a confrontation between Spaniards and Ottomans.”⁸ The “theoretical view” of events glori� ed Charles as a “crusader,” while the diplomats analyzed the identical events in terms of political moti-vation. Modern scholars are now analyzing the range of viewpoints that existed in the sixteenth century regarding Charles V’s relations with Muslim enemies, but they have not focused on Hapsburg propaganda regarding the Ottoman-French alliance. By comparing the version of events in Hapsburg-inspired sources with that found in Ottoman and French sources, I identify details that have been distorted to produce a narrative that contradicts the views of the major participants in the alliance. Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers in the nineteenth century, as the “sick man of Europe,” but its roots go much deeper. To a degree, it is a result of enormous transforma-tions in comparative power between the Ottomans and the countries of western Europe between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries; by the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire needed French and British support against its enemies rather than providing such support for France, as in the sixteenth century. During the nineteenth cen-tury, western Europeans in general, including the French, were cre-ating empires out of territories that had once been part of the Otto-man Empire, and former Ottoman power was scarcely remembered; the Hapsburg view of sixteenth-century diplomatic relations matched their own views of current relations with Muslims more nearly than the

⁷ See Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa, “L’expédition de Tunis (1535): Images, interprétations, réper-cussions culturelles,” in Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance, ed. Bartolomé Bennassar and Robert Sauzet (Paris, 1998), 75–132, for an excellent account of Hapsburg propaganda through which Giovio and del Vasto, among others, collaborated to portray the 1535 expedition to Tunis as a crusade. See esp. 96n33, where Deswarte-Rosa states that earlier William L. Eisler had criticized Frances Yates for uncritically accepting the claims of Charles V’s biographers.

⁸ Miguel Angel de Bunes Ibarra, “Charles V and the Ottoman War from the Spanish Point of View,” Eurasian Studies 1 (2002): 161–82.

Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly

regarding the Ottoman-French alliance. By comparing the version of events in Hapsburg-inspired sources with that found in Ottoman and French sources, I identify details that have been distorted to produce a narrative that contradicts the views of the major participants in the

Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers

a narrative that contradicts the views of the major participants in the

in the nineteenth century, as the “sick man of Europe,” but its roots in the nineteenth century, as the “sick man of Europe,” but its roots connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers in the nineteenth century, as the “sick man of Europe,” but its roots connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers in the nineteenth century, as the “sick man of Europe,” but its roots connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly connected to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the Great Powers view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French view of events, in preference to the Hapsburg perspective, is directly Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French Subsequent generations’ disregard of the contemporary French



views of sixteenth-century Frenchmen. These French views themselves had been obscured because seventeenth-century patrons preferred historians who wrote polished prose to the neglect of primary sources, in contrast to the sixteenth century, during which legal scholars had introduced their research techniques to historical research and writ-ing. It was not until the nineteenth century that the two traditions met in French historiography.⁹

Diplomacy: Crusading Rhetoric versus Realpolitik

The Ottoman Empire played an integral role in European diplomatic relations from the second half of the � fteenth century through the six-teenth century. During the � fteenth century, many Italian states formed alliances with the Ottomans to strengthen their positions against their neighbors in the power struggles in Italy.¹⁰ Their opponents criticized these alliances on the grounds that Christians were forming alliances with Muslims against other Christians, rather than uniting to launch crusades against in� dels. This rhetoric should not be accepted at face value as re� ecting the primary force that motivated diplomatic rela-tions or military action; it did not prevent states that were threatened by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the Italian states. Most states, whether ruled by Muslims or by Christians, acted to promote their own political advantage, even if some individu-als opposed these policies on religious grounds. In the early sixteenth century, the ideal of universal sovereignty obsessed the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, France, and the Holy Ro-man Empire. Charles V’s rivalry with François I, as well as with Süley-man, drove their diplomacy, warfare, and propaganda in the struggle for preeminence. Charles V’s forces defeated the French on Febru-ary 25, 1525, at Pavia, capturing François I during the battle.¹¹ After

⁹ For an examination of French historiography in the sixteenth century, see Donald Kelley, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship (New York, 1970); and George Huppert, The Idea of Perfect History: Historical Erudition and Historical Philosophy in Renaissance France (Urbana, IL, 1970). Fran-çois Furet provides a brief overview of French historiography in “The Birth of History in France,” in The Workshop of History, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum (Chicago, 1984), 77–98. For French his-toriography in the seventeenth century, see Orest Ranum, Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-Century France (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980).

¹⁰ Halil Inalcik, “The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1451–1522,” in A History of the Cru-sades, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols. (Madison, WI, 1969–89), 6:311–53.

¹¹ Calender of State Papers, Venetian (henceforth cited as CSP, Venetian), ed. R. Brown, C. Ben-tinck, and H. Brown, 9 vols. (London, 1864–98), 3:413; Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1978–85), 3:222–26, 229.

by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an

tions or military action; it did not prevent states that were threatened by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an

with Muslims against other Christians, rather than uniting to launch crusades against in� dels. This rhetoric should not be accepted at face value as re� ecting the primary force that motivated diplomatic rela-tions or military action; it did not prevent states that were threatened by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the

tions or military action; it did not prevent states that were threatened by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other

ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the Italian states. Most states, whether ruled by Muslims or by Christians, ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-ing diplomatic policies developed during the � fteenth century by the alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an alliance with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs, they were continu-Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other Muslim states. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans or other



Pavia the French � rst sent an ambassador, Jean Frangipani, a Croatian, to Istanbul. Frangipani encouraged Süleyman to attack Charles V by claiming that if the imprisoned François I were forced to agree to Charles V’s terms, it would “make him [Charles] master of the world.”¹² Frangipani returned with a friendly letter from Süleyman promising to aid François I, who replied gratefully to the sultan and hoped to recip-rocate in the future.¹³ François I and Charles V took advantage of each other’s controversial actions when attempting to in� uence potential allies. Charles made use of François’s alliance with the Ottomans, while claiming that in contrast, he wished to lead a crusade against the Otto-mans. François I pro� ted from the imperial sack of Rome in 1527 and Charles V’s war against the pope.¹⁴ Although François I and Charles V were rivals for the leadership of Christian Europe, Charles and Süley-man were rivals for the claim to be the true heir of the rule of the Roman Empire. After Charles was crowned emperor in February 1530 and called himself caesar, his rivalry with Süleyman intensi� ed.¹⁵ A common enmity to Charles V was the basis for negotiations between François I and Süleyman. In February 1536 the � rst o� cial French ambassador, Jean de La Forest, negotiated a treaty in the form of a commercial agreement with the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha, although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.¹⁶ Fran-çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain an alliance that contributed to divisions among the Christian powers. The Mediterranean Sea had become an arena in which naval warfare between the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs grew increasingly important as the foremost naval commander in the western Mediterra-nean, Andrea Doria of Genoa, left the service of François I and entered that of Charles V in 1528. Doria’s capture of the Ottoman port Coron

¹² Charrière, Négociations, 1:112–15; Setton, Papacy, 3:244–45; J. Ursu, La politique orientale de François Ier (1515–1547) (Paris, 1908), 30–35; Marino Sanuto, I diarii di Marino Sanuto, 58 vols. (Venice, 1879–1903), 40:824.

¹³ Setton, Papacy, 3:245–46; Charrière, Négociations, 1:119–21, 152; Ordonnances des rois de France, règne de François Ier, 9 vols. (Paris, 1902–75), 4:178–219; Ursu, Politique orientale, 36.

¹⁴ Setton, Papacy, 3:193–94, 232.¹⁵ CSP, Venetian, 5:620; Ursu, Politique orientale, 55; Gülru Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Mag-

ni� cent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry,” Art Bulletin 71 (1989): 401–27.

¹⁶ Halil Inalcik, Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al., 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1960–), s.v. “Imtiyazat”; Charrière, Négociations, 1:283–94; J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1535–1914 (Princeton, NJ, 1956), 1–5. If this treaty was never made o� cial, the Capitulations of 1569 were the � rst commercial agreement between France and the Otto-man Empire. The terms of 1569 were generous to foreigners who traded in the Ottoman Empire, requiring that all Europeans except the Venetians trade under the French � ag (Ursu, Politique orientale, 96–97; Charrière, Négociations, 1:539; Lettres-Patentes de 1569, in de Testa, Recueil des traités, 1:91–96).

although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.form of a commercial agreement with the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha, although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his

and called himself caesar, his rivalry with Süleyman intensi� ed. A common enmity to Charles V was the basis for negotiations between François I and Süleyman. In February 1536 the � rst o� cial French ambassador, Jean de La Forest, negotiated a treaty in the form of a commercial agreement with the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha, although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain

French ambassador, Jean de La Forest, negotiated a treaty in the form of a commercial agreement with the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha,

an alliance that contributed to divisions among the Christian powers.an alliance that contributed to divisions among the Christian powers.own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain an alliance that contributed to divisions among the Christian powers.own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain an alliance that contributed to divisions among the Christian powers.own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.çois I’s commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.form of a commercial agreement with the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha, although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.form of a commercial agreement with the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha, although François I and Süleyman may never have approved it.



in the Morea in 1532 led Süleyman to appoint Hayreddin Barbarossa, an Ottoman seaman who had taken control of Algiers, his grand admi-ral in 1533.¹⁷ Thereafter much of the rivalry between Süleyman and Charles V took place between their � eets in the Mediterranean, in addi-tion to warfare in Hungary. The Ottoman � eet frequently appeared in the western as well as the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Ottoman expedition of 1543–44 was the second attempt by the Ottomans and the French to combine their � eets in operations against Charles V and his supporters. An earlier naval campaign in 1537 revealed how daunt-ing logistical di� culties could be when trying to coordinate operations at great distances.

Ottoman Expectations While on Campaign

Relying on Hapsburg sources, the Ottoman-French campaign of 1543–44 has been portrayed in traditional Western historiography as devas-tating for the south of France, with the Ottomans ravaging the French coast until François I sent them back home. Certainly there were ten-sions between the allies, but this negative view of the alliance origi-nated with Hapsburg propaganda and does not re� ect how the French and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These issues include diplomacy, logistics, leadership, and military organiza-tion as it relates to preparations for campaigns. Certainly one factor in Ottoman military e� ectiveness in the six-teenth century was painstaking preparation before any campaign, which was not characteristic of the Ottomans’ French allies. This con-trast in organization impacted their perspectives concerning this cam-paign, from the initial stages of planning to the � nal homecoming of the � eet. The Ottomans during this campaign, as was typical, provided provisions and paid for their forces. The French, as was more typical of western Europe, lagged far behind in providing for the needs of military forces. Warfare had become increasingly expensive since the � fteenth century, and the French and their Hapsburg opponents were always short of money. The Ottoman military policy was to lavish resources on campaign preparation to an extent inconceivable in western Europe. However, this campaign presented unusual di� culties for the sultan: because he had sent his naval forces so far from Ottoman territory, he

¹⁷ Spanish sources reveal that they considered Süleyman a remote threat but Hayreddin an immediate danger (Bunes Ibarra, “Charles V”).

and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates

nated with Hapsburg propaganda and does not re� ect how the French and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates

tating for the south of France, with the Ottomans ravaging the French coast until François I sent them back home. Certainly there were ten-sions between the allies, but this negative view of the alliance origi-nated with Hapsburg propaganda and does not re� ect how the French and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These

nated with Hapsburg propaganda and does not re� ect how the French and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed

sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These issues include diplomacy, logistics, leadership, and military organiza-sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-sode and their representation in French and Ottoman sources. These evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this epi-their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed and the Ottomans perceived this campaign. Exploring how they viewed



was forced to rely on the French to help feed as well as pay his men. In addition to the sailors on the galleys, Ottoman forces on this expedi-tion included both Janissaries and sipahis. Janissaries were infantry who received a salary from the central government. Sipahis were cavalrymen on land campaigns and marines on the sea who received timars, grants of land revenues in return for military service. The sipahis administered � efs from which they made their living and met their expenses while on campaign. When they were absent longer than the usual half-year cam-paign season they experienced � nancial hardship. On a sea campaign they were expected to bring a six-month supply of biscuit, the mainstay of the naval diet on campaign. If the � eet did not return within six months, this caused provisioning di� culties. In terms of leadership, this episode contrasts the statesmanship of the sultan with that of the king of France. From the primary sources it is evident that Süleyman determined the general parameters of the campaign; François I could make only those decisions that Süleyman determined were his to make, although modern Western accounts of the episode portray it otherwise.¹⁸ Süleyman dictated the timing of the dispatching and recalling of the Ottoman � eet through contact with Hayreddin Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, using Ottoman messen-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and direction. Essentially, François I failed to use the � eet to accomplish a signi� cant conquest, as well as not providing for its needs adequately. Hayreddin Pasha and Antoine Escalin des Eymars, Baron de La Garde, known as Captain Polin, the French ambassador who accompanied the Ottoman � eet and essentially led the French forces, struggled with the contrast between French and Ottoman military expectations. Their relations were strained as they tried to span the distance between Otto-man organization and direction versus French incompetence and vac-illation. Captain Polin and Hayreddin Pasha frequently clashed over potential military targets, because “French” territory was immune from attack.¹⁹ In contrast to Hapsburg views, those expressed in Ottoman and French primary sources deal with the very real issues of these logisti-cal di� culties. Hapsburg propaganda painted a picture that is incom-patible with known Ottoman military policy regarding the behavior of

¹⁸ See, e.g., R. J. Knecht, Francis I (Cambridge, 1982), 364–66.¹⁹ Hayreddin, as a result of his experiences in France in 1543–44, modi� ed his position of

promoting the Ottoman-French alliance to speaking against François’s interests according to the French representative in Istanbul in 1546 (Charrière, Négociations, 1:624).

gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-with Hayreddin Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, using Ottoman messen-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-

campaign; François I could make only those decisions that Süleyman determined were his to make, although modern Western accounts of the episode portray it otherwise.¹⁸ Süleyman dictated the timing of the dispatching and recalling of the Ottoman � eet through contact with Hayreddin Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, using Ottoman messen-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and

the dispatching and recalling of the Ottoman � eet through contact with Hayreddin Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, using Ottoman messen-

direction. Essentially, François I failed to use the � eet to accomplish a direction. Essentially, François I failed to use the � eet to accomplish a ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and direction. Essentially, François I failed to use the � eet to accomplish a ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and direction. Essentially, François I failed to use the � eet to accomplish a ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-ment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-nean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employ-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-with Hayreddin Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, using Ottoman messen-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-with Hayreddin Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, using Ottoman messen-gers throughout the months the � eet was in the western Mediterra-



their military forces.²⁰ While western European troops were likely to plunder friend and enemy alike, the Ottoman military was strictly for-bidden to harm their own territory or that of an ally. An analysis of the campaign of 1543, beginning with the diplomacy that preceded it, delineates the contrast in views clearly.

Diplomatic Preliminaries

The naval campaign of 1543, during which the Ottoman and French � eets joined to attack Charles V, was the result of French diplomats requesting the aid of the Ottoman � eet. Polin � rst requested the Otto-man � eet in 1542 for that same year, but Süleyman responded that there was no longer time to prepare adequately for that campaign sea-son. From the Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş ve Estergon ve İstunibelgrad we learn how Matrakçı perceived relations between the sultan and the king of France as negotiations proceeded before the campaign. Matrakçı compared François I to the great sixth-century Sasanian ruler, Khusraw Nushir-van, whom Muslims considered the supreme example of royal justice, although he was not a Muslim. Matrakçı thus considered François I a great non-Muslim ruler, although he depended on Süleyman to help him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his land forces to attack Hungary.²¹ A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau-rand, a priest who accompanied Polin on the return voyage to Istan-bul in the summer of 1544, began his account by noting that Polin was the French ambassador to the grand seigneur Süleyman, who had sent Barbarossa with his � eet to assist France. Later in his work, Maurand recalled Süleyman’s major victories at Rhodes, at Belgrade, and in Hun-gary and emphasized that Polin was the king’s ambassador to Süley-man, the French king’s more powerful ally.²² In accordance with François I’s entreaties, in April 1543 the Otto-man � eet sailed from Istanbul with the French ambassador Polin on board, and the sultan left on May 6 at the head of an army to � ght in Hungary. Before his departure, Süleyman sent a letter to François I, expressing his intentions regarding the expedition of 1543: “Because of

²⁰ Caroline Finkel, The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606 (Vienna, 1988), 123–26, 128; Gilles Veinstein, “Some Views on Provisioning in the Hungarian Campaigns of Suleyman the Magni� cent,” in Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte: In memoriam Vanco Boskov, ed. H. G. Majer (Wiesbaden, 1986), 182–83; C. H. Imber, “The Navy of Süleyman the Magni� cent,” Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 211–82.

²¹ Matrakçı, Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i irakeyn-i, fols. 10b, 11a–b, 12a.²² Maurand, Itinéraire, 25, 257–59.

him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his land forces to attack Hungary.

great non-Muslim ruler, although he depended on Süleyman to help him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his land forces to attack Hungary. A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of land forces to attack Hungary.

François I to the great sixth-century Sasanian ruler, Khusraw Nushir-van, whom Muslims considered the supreme example of royal justice, although he was not a Muslim. Matrakçı thus considered François I a great non-Muslim ruler, although he depended on Süleyman to help him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his land forces to attack Hungary.²¹ A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau-

great non-Muslim ruler, although he depended on Süleyman to help him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his

the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau-rand, a priest who accompanied Polin on the return voyage to Istan-the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau-the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau-the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau-the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau-the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau- A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau- A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of the Ottoman view of the relative power of the two rulers. Jérome Mau- A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of A French participant’s view of Süleyman con� rms the accuracy of

him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his him � ght Charles V by dispatching his � eet to France and by leading his



the entreaty of your envoy Polin, I have ordered Hayreddin, my Kapu-dan Pasha to listen to your instructions and to form his enterprises to the ruin of your enemies. You will let them leave after they have happily executed them; my army is to return during the same season.”²³ Süley-man’s letter indicates that he expected the � eet to return before win-ter. It also reveals that the sultan designated who was to lead the cam-paign and how the various leaders were to interact with one another. The sultan was the ultimate source of authority, despite his distance from the action in the western Mediterranean. But he instructed his admiral to listen to François I, through his ambassador Polin, to accom-plish French objectives. Moreover, knowing that François I had made treaties with Charles V in the past and deserted his Ottoman allies, he cautioned, “Be on guard that your enemy does not deceive you [again], he will never be reduced to make peace with you because he recognizes that you have enough resolution to constantly make war against him.”²⁴ Süleyman foresaw that François I would desert the alliance if he could achieve his ambitions more easily by a treaty with Charles V.

Views of the Voyage

The Ottoman � eet sailed from Istanbul around Greece to Reggio on the Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not attack any area that Polin claimed was in some sense French.²⁵ Ottoman policy forbade harming Ottoman territory or that of an ally, which was a powerful motivation for areas threatened by the Ottomans to accept Ottoman or their ally’s rule. The � eet then continued to Antibes on the Mediterranean coast of France, where it arrived about July 20. As it sailed up the coast of Italy, many inhabitants � ed the coastal areas. Claudio Tolomei wrote to a friend from Rome on June 30, 1543:

The Turks are here at Ostia and at Porto. All of Rome is in confusion today, the day of Saint Peter. . . . I am convinced that without the letter that Captain Polin wrote, three-quarters of Rome would quit the country. . . . Captain Polin informed us that there is nothing to fear, because the Grand Turk has expressly ordered Barbarossa not to molest the lands of the pope. . . . I am sending you a copy of the letter, so that you can better see the esteem in which the sultan Süleyman holds the Holy See. And take heart, because it may be

²³ This is an anachronism in the French text of this letter. Kapudan pasha was not used as a title for the Ottoman naval commander until about 1567 (S. Ozbaran, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. “Kapudan Pasha”).

²⁴ Ursu, Politique orientale, 141; de Testa, Recueil des traités, 1:37.²⁵ Gazavat, fol. 7b.

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Süleyman foresaw that François I would desert the alliance if he could achieve his ambitions more easily by a treaty with Charles V.

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The Ottoman � eet sailed from Istanbul around Greece to Reggio on the

attack any area that Polin claimed was in some sense French.policy forbade harming Ottoman territory or that of an ally, which was attack any area that Polin claimed was in some sense French.attack any area that Polin claimed was in some sense French.attack any area that Polin claimed was in some sense French.attack any area that Polin claimed was in some sense French.attack any area that Polin claimed was in some sense French.from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not attack any area that Polin claimed was in some sense French.from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not attack any area that Polin claimed was in some sense French.from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn from Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin that the � eet did not Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn The Ottoman � eet sailed from Istanbul around Greece to Reggio on the Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn The Ottoman � eet sailed from Istanbul around Greece to Reggio on the Straits of Messina in Hapsburg territory, which they sacked. We learn The Ottoman � eet sailed from Istanbul around Greece to Reggio on the The Ottoman � eet sailed from Istanbul around Greece to Reggio on the The Ottoman � eet sailed from Istanbul around Greece to Reggio on the The Ottoman � eet sailed from Istanbul around Greece to Reggio on the



that he will become Christian as prophesied. Certainly he wants the Christians to have the best things, since he wants them all for him-self, if possible. This morning, the last day of the month, word has come that Barbarossa has set sail for Civitavecchia, where it is thought that he will do no more evil and will demand only some provisions, paying for them honestly, as he has done in the other places where he has passed. . . . From Rome the last of June 1543.²⁶

As Tolomei indicated, Polin had informed Hayreddin that the pope was a French ally; therefore papal lands were to be spared. Ottoman and French sources repeatedly stated that the Ottomans did not attack the territories of allies or friends of allies. The Italian Tolomei corrobo-rated that this policy was followed on this campaign. Polin wrote to the governor of Teracina on June 27, 1543, assuring him that Süleyman had ordered Barbarossa not to attack the domains of the king of France or his allies.²⁷ This view of Ottoman policy has not been made part of the stan-dard narrative even by those who quote Tolomei directly. A historian of relations between Christians and Muslims in the medieval and early modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-ter, Setton reinforced the Hapsburg view that the Ottomans indiscrimi-nately ravaged all of the lands they entered on this campaign, whether friend or foe.²⁸

Waiting for François I

After the Ottoman � eet arrived at Antibes, the French ambassador went to consult with the king because Polin had promised the sultan that all the necessities for the Ottoman � eet—food and munitions, as well as additional ships—would be ready for them at Antibes or the Iles d’Hyeres on their arrival. Nothing in fact was prepared when they arrived. While the Ottomans awaited Polin’s return, the French leaders at Marseille invited Hayreddin to visit the city.²⁹

²⁶ Maurand, Itinéraire, 326–29.²⁷ This letter from Polin to the governor provides additional evidence that Süleyman was

overseeing the campaign, ensuring that Hayreddin conducted it so as to promote French interests (Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, ed. G. A. Bergenroth, P. de Gayangos, and M. A. S. Hume, 12 vols. [London, 1862–95], vol. 6, pt. 2:557). Murphey indicates that Hayreddin’s subservience to the sultan had been questioned earlier (“Seyyid Muradi’s Prose Biography,” 520–21).

²⁸ Setton, Papacy, 3:470.²⁹ BN, Moreau 778, fols. 151b–153b; Matrakçı, Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i irakeyn-i, fols. 21b, 23b–

modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition

This view of Ottoman policy has not been made part of the stan-dard narrative even by those who quote Tolomei directly. A historian of relations between Christians and Muslims in the medieval and early modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-

of relations between Christians and Muslims in the medieval and early modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-

of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-ter, Setton reinforced the Hapsburg view that the Ottomans indiscrimi-of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-ter, Setton reinforced the Hapsburg view that the Ottomans indiscrimi-of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-ter, Setton reinforced the Hapsburg view that the Ottomans indiscrimi-of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the let-sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-sions that he had demanded en route. Setton’s source, Dorez’s edition ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-ter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for provi-modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-modern periods, Kenneth M. Setton, omitted the section of the let-



The entire Ottoman � eet arrived at Marseille on July 20, 1543, according to a report from the French archives. The � eet consisted of 110 galleys, 40 fustes, and 3 great nefs full of artillery and munitions, as well as 25,000 to 30,000 men.³⁰ François de Bourbon, Comte d’Enghien, wellborn but inexperienced, whom François I had appointed as his commander in the Mediterranean, went to meet Hayreddin to conduct him to the royal lodgings in Marseille.³¹ In the Gazavat Muradi stated that the people of Marseille greatly desired to see Barbarossa, because the French soldiers did not want to � ght alongside Barbarossa until they had evaluated him in person. When it was known that Barbarossa was coming to the city, people came from all directions to Marseille to see him, even bringing their families to enjoy the spectacle. Both Ottoman authors noted the honor shown to Hayreddin by the French. Matrakçı stated that Hayreddin was given complete honor and respect and was not neglected “even as much as a hair.”³² Both the Ottomans and the French wished to observe each other and discover what their allies were like. In the Gazavat Muradi frequently noted the curiosity that people of all social levels had to see Barbarossa.³³ François de Scé-peaux de Vieilleville, who accompanied d’Enghien, noted that there was almost an exodus from the court in Paris to see Barbarossa. There was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they would have taken all the youth of the court.”³⁴ The impression from these sources is that a festival atmosphere characterized this meeting. Hayreddin then sailed back to Toulon to await the return of Polin.³⁵ About twenty days later Polin brought the king’s message to Hayred-din that he wished the Ottoman � eet to help the French attack Nice.

26a, 26a; Gazavat, fols. 2a, 4a, 5b; Charles de La Roncière, Histoire de la marine française, 6 vols. (Paris, 1899–1932), 3:378; Ursu, Politique orientale, 139; Maurand, Itinéraire, xxv.

³⁰ A fuste was a light, speedy, low-draft galley with one or two oars per bench, frequently used for coastal shipping or raiding. See Henry Kahane, Renée Kahane, and Andreas Tietze, The Lingua Franca in the Levant: Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin (1958; rpt. Istanbul, 1988), 235; Imber, “Navy of Süleyman,” 279; Palmira Brummett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery (Albany, NY, 1994), 252. Nave, or nef in French, is a general term for round-hulled sailing ships, often applied to large merchant ships (Brummett, Ottoman Seapower, 253; Kahane, Kahane, and Tietze, Lingua Franca, 315–16).

³¹ Jean Deny and Jane Laroche, “L’expédition en Provence de l’armée de mer du Sultan Suleyman sous le commandement de l’amiral Hayreddin Pacha, dit Barberousse (1543–1544),” Turcica 1 (1969): 201–2. This excellent article provides a French translation of Matrakçı, as well as a wealth of material from Western sources.

³² Gazavat, fols. 2a–5a; Matrakçı, Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i irakeyn-i, fols. 24a, 25b–26a.³³ Gazavat, fols. 2a–3b, 4b–5a.³⁴ Vieilleville was a relative of d’Enghien and accompanied him to Marseille (Carloix,

Mémoires, 107).³⁵ D’Enghien sent biscuit for the Ottoman � eet on Aug. 2 and 3 (La Roncière, Histoire,

3:382; BN, Moreau 778, fols. 153b–154a).

was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this was almost an exodus from the court in Paris to see Barbarossa. There was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might

and the French wished to observe each other and discover what their Muradi frequently noted the curiosity

that people of all social levels had to see Barbarossa.peaux de Vieilleville, who accompanied d’Enghien, noted that there was almost an exodus from the court in Paris to see Barbarossa. There was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they

peaux de Vieilleville, who accompanied d’Enghien, noted that there was almost an exodus from the court in Paris to see Barbarossa. There

would have taken all the youth of the court.”would have taken all the youth of the court.”not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they would have taken all the youth of the court.”not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they would have taken all the youth of the court.”not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might not occur again. But “if they had taken all those who talked of it, they army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this army and the manner of the Turks.” This was an occasion that might was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this was an “in� nity of gentlemen” who wished to go to Marseille to see “this



Nice was in the territory ruled by the Duke of Savoy, the uncle of Fran-çois I, but an ally of Charles V. Shortly before the Ottoman � eet arrived in French waters, the constable of the citadel of Nice had humiliated the French. Together with Andrea Doria, he had arranged to capture French ships by pretending to surrender the citadel to the French if they sent four galleys.³⁶

Süleyman’s Orders

Süleyman left on campaign to Hungary shortly after the � eet sailed west, but he maintained contact with Hayreddin, François I, and the French ambassador Polin, despite the distance, through messengers dis-patched between them. Süleyman informed Hayreddin and the French of his decisions regarding the Ottoman � eet’s future activities based on the information he received from them. Muradi, in the Gazavat, provided some of the correspondence between Süleyman and Hayred-din, in the form of hüküms (orders) sent to Hayreddin; they included detailed information that Hayreddin had sent to the sultan.³⁷ Süleyman began the � rst hüküm to Hayreddin by reviewing what the sultan knew concerning the voyage and the � eet’s activities while awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-menced these operations.³⁸ At this early date he reported to the sultan that since they had been delayed by contrary winds and winter was near, the Ottoman � eet would be forced to spend the winter in France. Süleyman informed Hayreddin that he had also received letters from François I and Polin; François I had promised not to make peace with Charles V, while Polin had promised to care for the � eet and to provide provisions and had also requested that the � eet be available to serve the French the following spring.³⁹

³⁶ The Gazavat’s account of this stratagem and its results agrees closely with that of Vieille-ville (Gazavat, fols. 6a–7a; La Roncière, Histoire, 3:380; Carloix, Mémoires, 100–101, 104–9).

³⁷ A copy of this hüküm would have been written in the Mühimme Registers. However, the earliest surviving register is from 1545; therefore the only knowledge we have of these particular orders is the fact that they are contained in this history. Since their form is identical to the orders in the Mühimme registers, they seem to have been copied by the author from the archival copy or the actual order sent to Hayreddin Pasha. These orders were usually issued in response to a letter or petition sent by an individual to the Ottoman ruler. After addressing the recipient, the order from the sultan repeats in some detail the information sent by the writer. In this way we know to a degree what was said in the original letter, although it may not have been preserved. For a detailed study of the documents in the Mühimme Registers, see Uriel Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552–1615: A Study of the Firman according to the Mühimme Defteri (Oxford, 1960).

³⁸ He probably wrote about Aug. 1.³⁹ Gazavat, fols. 7b–9a.

awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in

the sultan knew concerning the voyage and the � eet’s activities while awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in

s (orders) sent to Hayreddin; they included detailed information that Hayreddin had sent to the sultan. Süleyman began the � rst hüküm to Hayreddin by reviewing what hüküm to Hayreddin by reviewing what hükümthe sultan knew concerning the voyage and the � eet’s activities while awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-

the sultan knew concerning the voyage and the � eet’s activities while awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to

fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-menced these operations.fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they com-the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman � eet attack other capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to awaiting François I’s orders. Süleyman knew that the king wished to



The sultan then questioned Hayreddin as to how the � eet could pass the winter in this situation, as well as how to provide for the army’s provisions and pay. In his letter he con� rmed that he was attempting to maintain the usual Ottoman � nancial arrangements for the � eet, to provide provisions and to pay salaries. Süleyman was concerned with the adequate care of his � eet and emphasized that if the French could not provide this, then the � eet was to winter in Ottoman ports. Polin, in a letter to the sultan, claimed that winter provisions were more abundant than he, Polin, had requested previously. This was untrue, because when the Ottoman � eet arrived, nothing had been prepared for them.⁴⁰ Süleyman then informed Hayreddin that he had written to both François I and Polin and had advised them of his views on this matter:

Now it is impossible for the pay of the soldiers who are with my imperial � eet or for the � eet’s needs to be sent by land or by sea from here because of the great distance. For you [the French] I am committing the charge of all the � eet’s and army’s a� airs to the Beylerbey of Algiers [Hayreddin Pasha]. You should make arrange-ments with him so that if you prepare my army’s salaries and provi-sions, the � eet’s oarsmen’s needs, weapons, and other necessities, well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army can be provisioned from there. Then you should, as a sign of friend-ship, provision my army as necessary to keep it safe from harm and hardship.⁴¹

If the French provided the � eet with supplies and also paid the men’s salaries, then the Ottoman � eet could remain in France until the fol-lowing spring. If not, the � eet was to return to Ottoman ports. There-fore, when François I retained the Ottoman � eet in France until the spring of 1544, he was committing himself to paying their expenses, in provisions and in salaries. Süleyman relied on Hayreddin both to negotiate arrangements with the French and to ensure the well-being of the � eet. Süleyman instructed Hayreddin that when Hasan, one of Süleyman’s transla-tors, arrived, if the king had agreed to pay and provision the Ottoman forces, then � ne, Hayreddin had the pay register giving the rate of pay for the men. However, if the French had not agreed to these terms, Hayreddin must decide the proper course. The sultan deliberated over

⁴⁰ Ibid., fol. 9a; La Roncière, Histoire, 3:378.⁴¹ Gazavat, fols. 9a–9b.

well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain

sions, the � eet’s oarsmen’s needs, weapons, and other necessities, well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of

from here because of the great distance. For you [the French] I am committing the charge of all the � eet’s and army’s a� airs to the Beylerbey of Algiers [Hayreddin Pasha]. You should make arrange-ments with him so that if you prepare my army’s salaries and provi-sions, the � eet’s oarsmen’s needs, weapons, and other necessities, well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army can be provisioned from there. Then you should, as a sign of friend-

ments with him so that if you prepare my army’s salaries and provi-sions, the � eet’s oarsmen’s needs, weapons, and other necessities, well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to

can be provisioned from there. Then you should, as a sign of friend-can be provisioned from there. Then you should, as a sign of friend-can be provisioned from there. Then you should, as a sign of friend-Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army can be provisioned from there. Then you should, as a sign of friend-Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army can be provisioned from there. Then you should, as a sign of friend-Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial � eet to remain well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to well and good, let it be done as he sees � t. But if you cannot see to



the best course of action should the French refuse to supply and pay the � eet, but regardless, he expected Hayreddin both to preserve the well-being of the � eet and to be in a position to � ght the Hapsburgs in the western Mediterranean in the spring. The sultan closed the letter warning Hayreddin to ensure that no harm befall the Ottoman � eet in any way while it was sailing.⁴² This letter from Süleyman to Hayreddin Pasha emphasized that the safety of his � eet was of the utmost concern to the sultan. Given the huge expense of out� tting a � eet, the sultan’s concern was justi� ed.⁴³ Süleyman’s expectation that the French should contribute to the necessities of the expedition was reasonable, since the Ottoman � eet was at the disposition of the king of France. The letter from the sultan to Hayreddin corrects distortions in many accounts of this episode that result from relying on the Hapsburg sources or misreading the contemporary French sources. For instance, the nineteenth-century historian Ernest Charrière stated, “In return for gold, he obtained the departure of the Ottoman � eet [in 1544],” and continued, “The memoirs of Vieilleville give an idea of the sacri� ces imposed on François I, in spite of the kingdom’s precarious � nances.”⁴⁴ Vieilleville indeed discussed paying the Ottomans, not in 1544 but in 1543 after the siege of Nice, when Vieilleville stated: “Hayreddin bade farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for what they had accomplished. Thirty-two treasurers at Toulon worked continuously for three days, well into the night, counting out sacks of one thousand, two thousand, and three thousand ecus each.”⁴⁵ This could not refer to the spring of 1544, because d’Enghien was not in Marseille with the French � eet during the winter and certainly was not there that spring.⁴⁶ Charrière’s misinterpretation of Vieilleville sug-gests that the Ottomans had made unreasonable � nancial demands on the French, but the sultan’s letter reveals that he expected the French to contribute to the expenses of the expedition while the � eet was in France, since he could no longer do so because of the distance. Regarding Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin Pasha, Set-ton once again revealed both his bias, by his tone, and the dangers of relying solely on Western sources when he stated, “On the whole Barba-

⁴² Ibid., fols. 10a–11a.⁴³ Imber, “Navy of Süleyman,” 218–20. According to Polin, Süleyman spent 1.2 million

ducats to prepare the � eet to send to François I (BN, Moreau 778, fol. 152; Ursu, Politique orientale, 140).

⁴⁴ Charrière, Négociations, 1:578n2.⁴⁵ Carloix, Mémoires, 119.⁴⁶ Du Bellay, Mémoires, 4:188, 196–231.

farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for 1543 after the siege of Nice, when Vieilleville stated: “Hayreddin bade farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid

for gold, he obtained the departure of the Ottoman � eet [in 1544],” and continued, “The memoirs of Vieilleville give an idea of the sacri� ces imposed on François I, in spite of the kingdom’s precarious � nances.”Vieilleville indeed discussed paying the Ottomans, not in 1544 but in 1543 after the siege of Nice, when Vieilleville stated: “Hayreddin bade farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for

Vieilleville indeed discussed paying the Ottomans, not in 1544 but in 1543 after the siege of Nice, when Vieilleville stated: “Hayreddin bade

what they had accomplished. Thirty-two treasurers at Toulon worked what they had accomplished. Thirty-two treasurers at Toulon worked what they had accomplished. Thirty-two treasurers at Toulon worked more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for what they had accomplished. Thirty-two treasurers at Toulon worked more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid more than eight hundred thousand ecus, which was a great deal for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for 1543 after the siege of Nice, when Vieilleville stated: “Hayreddin bade farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for 1543 after the siege of Nice, when Vieilleville stated: “Hayreddin bade farewell to M. d’Enghien, without performing additional services [for



rossa’s success in the western Mediterranean was obviously nothing to write home about, and Barbarossa did not do so.”⁴⁷ Setton’s source, the Venetian archives, was not privy to the correspondence that had passed between the sultan and his admiral, nor was this source neces-sarily cognizant of how the sultan evaluated the success or failure of this expedition.

The Ottoman-French Siege of Nice

The events of the siege of Nice exhibit the leadership challenges during this campaign. Hayreddin was the more experienced military leader, but he was constrained by the sultan’s command that he please the French. Although in theory d’Enghien was commanding the French forces, in fact the responsibility for most decisions lay with Polin. He and Hayreddin frequently disagreed as to the best way to conduct the siege, and their priorities di� ered. Naturally, Hayreddin was bound to follow the instructions that he received from the sultan, but they included the order to maintain a good working relationship with the French. Polin was trying to achieve French objectives without angering Hayreddin or using more of France’s resources than absolutely necessary. Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon, because he did not want the buildings damaged. But since the siege did not commence until the second week of August and the � ghting season was rapidly passing, eventually the Ottomans employed cannon to breach the walls, and they captured the outer fortress on August 22. Once again the duke’s commanders at Nice tried to gain time by informing Polin that they would surrender the citadel to the French on condition that he arrange for the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces. Hayreddin believed that this was a trick, saying, “What will be, will be, but God knows best,” and ordered the Ottoman forces to withdraw to their ships. As soon as this had happened, the troops in the citadel resumed � ghting and refused to surrender. Polin had to beg Hayreddin to return to the siege, and d’Enghien was soon forced to ask to borrow ammunition because the French had run out.⁴⁸ These delays guaranteed the failure of the siege. The Duke of Savoy negotiated with the Marquis del Vasto, Charles V’s commander

⁴⁷ Setton, Papacy, 3:471.⁴⁸ Matrakçı, Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i irakeyn-i, fols. 26b, 28b–29b; Gazavat, fol. 11b–14b; Mon-

luc, Commentaires, 92; Ursu, Politique orientale, 143–44; La Roncière, Histoire, 3:382–84.

Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged

using more of France’s resources than absolutely necessary. Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged

the instructions that he received from the sultan, but they included the order to maintain a good working relationship with the French. Polin was trying to achieve French objectives without angering Hayreddin or using more of France’s resources than absolutely necessary. Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon,

using more of France’s resources than absolutely necessary. Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice

the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon, because he did not want the buildings damaged. But since the siege the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon, the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon, the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon, the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon, the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon, these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon, these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon, these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice without a siege. The Duke of Savoy’s commanders at Nice prolonged Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice Therefore Polin � rst sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice



at Milan, for additional troops, which Doria transported from Genoa to Nice. At this time a storm threatened the area, and Hayreddin judged the harbor at Nice insu� ciently sheltered for the Ottoman navy. Hayreddin considered the safety of the � eet more important than the capture of Nice, so he withdrew it to a safe harbor among nearby islands. The French were forced to raise the siege, and they burned the city as the advance troops of the Duke of Savoy and the Marquis del Vasto appeared. Doria lost four galleys in the storm, but the Ottoman � eet escaped harm. Although Nice remained under the control of the Duke of Savoy, the Ottoman � eet enabled the French to gain many other towns in the area.⁴⁹ Accounts of the siege by those who favored the Hapsburgs, such as Paolo Giovio of Como (1483–1553), or in modern historiography, such as Charles de La Roncière, re� ect the bias of their times. For example, Giovio relates that Barbarossa rebuked the French, “qui avoient mieux aimé charger leurs naus de vin à Marseille que de choses nécessaires à la guerre.”⁵⁰ French sources mention having to borrow munitions, but there is nothing about wine, a � ction told by Giovio, who was unfavor-able to both the French and the Ottomans for what he saw as their negative impact on Italy.⁵¹ We see another example of bias when La Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern Western bias that the French, not the Ottomans, were directing events. Although he claimed that politeness had led d’Enghien to consult with Barbarossa,⁵² it was necessity, because this was a joint Ottoman-French campaign. Hayreddin Pasha determined policy, although he was con-strained by the wishes of Polin, and in fact it was not d’Enghien but Polin who was e� ectively in command of the French. Vieilleville was the � rst to note distortions in accounts of these events when he stated that Hayreddin and the Ottomans were blamed for burning Nice even though the French had done it. He claimed that the terms of the capitulation had been violated by relatives and friends

⁴⁹ Matrakçı, Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i irakeyn-i, fols. 30a–30b; Gazavat, fols. 15a–17b, 22b–23a; Ursu, Politique orientale, 144; La Roncière, Histoire, 3:384–85.

⁵⁰ Clarence Dana Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought, and Literature (Paris, 1941), 120n3, quotes Giovio, Histoires, 2:598, livre 44; Giovio is also quoted by Charrière, Négociations, 1:566. Naus means “ship” in Provençal (Kahane, Kahane, and Tietze, Lingua Franca, 315–16).

⁵¹ Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantôme, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Ludovic Lalanne, 11 vols. (Paris, 1864–82), 3:221; Monluc, Commentaires, 92. Ottoman sources record nothing concern-ing this incident. On Giovio, see Eric Cochrane, Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renais-sance (Chicago, 1981), 372–73.

⁵² La Roncière, Histoire, 3:383; Ursu, Politique orientale, 144.

Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August We see another example of bias when La

Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation

aimé charger leurs naus de vin à Marseille que de choses nécessaires à French sources mention having to borrow munitions, but

there is nothing about wine, a � ction told by Giovio, who was unfavor-able to both the French and the Ottomans for what he saw as their negative impact on Italy.⁵¹ We see another example of bias when La Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern

able to both the French and the Ottomans for what he saw as their We see another example of bias when La

Western bias that the French, not the Ottomans, were directing events. Western bias that the French, not the Ottomans, were directing events. Western bias that the French, not the Ottomans, were directing events. Western bias that the French, not the Ottomans, were directing events. to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation to Barbarossa, then at Villefranche.” La Roncière re� ected a modern 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August 22, the latter “had the politeness to submit the terms of the capitulation Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August

We see another example of bias when La Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August

We see another example of bias when La Roncière states that when Nice surrendered to d’Enghien on August



of the captains Magdalon d’Ornesan and Michelet, who had been killed in the abortive attempt to take Nice in June. Vieilleville further claimed that Barbarossa and his “Saracens” were far away at the time but were being blamed to save the honor of France.⁵³ The most controversial aspect of the siege in Hapsburg or in mod-ern accounts of it is that Hayreddin removed the Ottoman � eet from Nice to a safe harbor during the storm. Both Ottoman accounts empha-size that the siege of Nice was abandoned because approaching storms threatened the safety of the Ottoman � eet. Süleyman in his letters had repeatedly warned Hayreddin to preserve his � eet.⁵⁴ Since Doria had lost four ships in the storm, Hayreddin realized that he had little to gain by risking the Ottoman � eet in an unnecessary engagement. Gio-vio, on the other hand, claimed that the French were disgruntled when Hayreddin did not take advantage of Doria’s loss of ships to attack him, and he posited a long-standing agreement between Hayreddin and Doria as the cause. Giovio also claimed that the Ottoman military leaders mocked Hayreddin’s relations with Doria.⁵⁵ Pierre de Brantôme, Seigneur de Bourdeille, a late-sixteenth-century French biographer of famous men, repeats almost word for word the French translation of Giovio’s work concerning Doria’s rela-tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.⁵⁶ Brantôme’s account does not indicate what the French actually thought of the relations between Doria and Hayreddin in 1543, but a letter from Polin to the king in the spring of 1544 does. Polin informed the king that he had investi-gated Spanish approaches to Barbarossa as the king wished. He did not believe that the king had any reason to fear that Hayreddin or his associates would be persuaded to change sides by Spanish o� ers con-veyed by Doria. But Polin promised to continue to monitor the situa-tion and try to make the Ottomans content with the French, although it might cost something. However, knowing the king’s � nancial di� -

⁵³ Carloix, Mémoires, 119.⁵⁴ Gazavat, fols. 11a, 15a–16b, 22b, 24b; Matrakçı, Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i irakeyn-i, fols.

30a–30b.⁵⁵ Maurand, Itinéraire, xxix–xxxi. Dorez was basing this on Giovio (Brantôme, Oeuvres com-

plètes, 2:35n3). The Ottomans under Hayreddin defeated the � eets of Venice, the pope, and Doria at Preveza in 1538, and Venice blamed the outcome on Doria’s unwillingness to engage his ships. Venice then lost the war with the Ottomans, as well as all the remaining Venetian possessions in the Morea. See Setton, Papacy, 3:445–47; V. J. Parry, “The Reign of Sulaiman the Magni� cent, 1520–66,” in A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730, ed. M. A. Cook (Cambridge, 1976), 88–89.

⁵⁶ Brantôme, Oeuvres complètes, 2:35–36. Monluc stated only that the Ottomans went to win-ter quarters (Commentaires, 92). Du Bellay also only wrote that Barbarossa saw that winter was approaching and retired his army to Toulon (Mémoires, 4:188).

tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than word the French translation of Giovio’s work concerning Doria’s rela-tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates

and Doria as the cause. Giovio also claimed that the Ottoman military leaders mocked Hayreddin’s relations with Doria.⁵⁵ Pierre de Brantôme, Seigneur de Bourdeille, a late-sixteenth-century French biographer of famous men, repeats almost word for word the French translation of Giovio’s work concerning Doria’s rela-tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.

century French biographer of famous men, repeats almost word for word the French translation of Giovio’s work concerning Doria’s rela-

not indicate what the French actually thought of the relations between not indicate what the French actually thought of the relations between the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.not indicate what the French actually thought of the relations between the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.not indicate what the French actually thought of the relations between the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates the pervasiveness of Hapsburg propaganda.on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than on French participants’ accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than word the French translation of Giovio’s work concerning Doria’s rela-tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than word the French translation of Giovio’s work concerning Doria’s rela-tions with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relies on Giovio rather than



culties, he promised not to spend more than necessary.⁵⁷ The impact of Giovio’s viewpoint remains so powerful that it even in� uenced mod-ern French historians who published a French translation of Matrakçı. Jean Deny and Jane Laroche accepted Giovio’s version of the relation-ship between Doria and Barbarossa, despite providing a translation of Matrakçı’s account of the siege of Nice that contradicts it.⁵⁸ When an Ottoman source contradicts Giovio’s biased account, Western histori-ans often presume that the Ottoman source is less reliable. The nega-tive view of Hayreddin’s decision to preserve the � eet is believable only if one ignores the commands that the sultan repeatedly gave to Hayred-din to protect the Ottoman � eet. From the Ottoman perspective, the capture of one insigni� cant city among many was much less important than preserving the Ottoman � eet to � ght another day.

Negotiations for the Ottoman Fleet to Remain in France

As mentioned above, Western historiography depicting Ottoman actions in France in 1543–44 has relied on sources with a Hapsburg bias instead of using French and Ottoman ones. The Ottomans consid-ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other areas of southern France in general, to gain an accurate assessment of Ottoman actions in that city. The decision for the Ottoman � eet to remain at Toulon caused a � urry of negotiations between the king and his leaders in Provence, between the civic leaders of Toulon and the king’s representatives in Provence, and between Hayreddin Pasha and the French. This alone is indicative of Ottoman policy. If the Ottomans had envisioned ravaging France to obtain supplies, there would have been no need for pro-longed discussions about who was to provide what when. During these negotiations Hayreddin informed Polin that he proposed to depart as a ploy to obtain a � rm commitment from the French to provide for the � eet. Polin countered that he had François I’s command to supply the � eet and, even more persuasively, that “the noble order of the sultan requires you to depend on us. And afterward, whatever time that we agree to your going, we will give you permission to go. You should go at

⁵⁷ Maurand, Itinéraire, 316–17; BN, Moreau 778, fols. 243a–245b.⁵⁸ See Deny and Laroche, “Expédition en Provence,” 195–96, where they provided com-

mentary to accompany their translation of Matrakçı.

ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the

bias instead of using French and Ottoman ones. The Ottomans consid-ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the

As mentioned above, Western historiography depicting Ottoman actions in France in 1543–44 has relied on sources with a Hapsburg bias instead of using French and Ottoman ones. The Ottomans consid-ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other

bias instead of using French and Ottoman ones. The Ottomans consid-ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman

records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other areas of southern France in general, to gain an accurate assessment of records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman ered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally; therefore Ottoman



that time.”⁵⁹ By retaining the � eet, the French admitted responsibility for its welfare; Polin and Hayreddin had already agreed on what was necessary for the wintering of the Ottoman forces, and the possibility that the � eet would need to winter in France had been discussed before leaving Istanbul. Only after negotiations between Polin and Hayreddin were completed did the Ottoman forces proceed to Toulon. On Octo-ber 9 François I instructed Polin and d’Enghien to do whatever was nec-essary for Barbarossa to winter in Provence. The king promised to pro-vide everything on condition that Barbarossa both repaid the French when he received his salary and stood ready to serve the king in the spring.⁶⁰ During the siege of Nice, Hayreddin had informed François I that if he wished to keep the � eet in his service, he must immediately furnish the men’s pay and other needs; otherwise he wished to sail to Istanbul. As early as September 8 François I had sent orders to empty Toulon so that the Ottomans could winter there.⁶¹ Evidently, what was at stake was not whether the � eet remained in France for the winter but who was ultimately responsible for its supplies and expenses. Since Süleyman could not provide for the Ottomans at such a distance, the French promised to do so, but Hayreddin was then required to spend his salary reimbursing them. Neither the French nor the Ottomans would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the land by raiding the local inhabitants. Royal lettres patentes of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé-mar, Comte de Grignan, the governor of Provence, commanding the people of Toulon to leave the city. The councillors of Toulon recorded on September 16 that after receiving the king’s command they had decided to send a commission to Grignan to arrange matters. Know-ing the king’s � nancial di� culties, they immediately planned to raise twenty thousand ecus for expenses in conjunction with the Ottoman � eet’s sojourn in Toulon. On September 25 the commission to Barba-rossa reported that it had negotiated with d’Enghien, who stated that it was not necessary for all of the inhabitants of the city to leave; heads of households and artisans should remain. He also promised that the sojourn of the Ottoman � eet would not incommode the city.⁶² After deciding to remain in France, Hayreddin wrote to the sultan explaining his reasons; if they left, Doria would ravage French territo-

⁵⁹ Gazavat, fols. 19b–20b.⁶⁰ See Süleyman’s hüküm to Hayreddin (Matrakçı, Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i irakeyn-i, fol. 31a).

The archives of Toulon indicate that they arrived on Sept. 29 (see Henry, “Documents relatifs,” 542).

⁶¹ BN, Moreau 778, fols. 155a–156a; Maurand, Itinéraire, xxviii–xxxii; Henry, “Documents relatifs,” 525, 557–58.

⁶² Henry, “Documents relatifs,” 525–28, 530.

would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the his salary reimbursing them. Neither the French nor the Ottomans would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the land by raiding the local inhabitants.would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the land by raiding the local inhabitants.

at stake was not whether the � eet remained in France for the winter but who was ultimately responsible for its supplies and expenses. Since Süleyman could not provide for the Ottomans at such a distance, the French promised to do so, but Hayreddin was then required to spend his salary reimbursing them. Neither the French nor the Ottomans would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the land by raiding the local inhabitants.

of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé-

French promised to do so, but Hayreddin was then required to spend his salary reimbursing them. Neither the French nor the Ottomans

mar, Comte de Grignan, the governor of Provence, commanding the mar, Comte de Grignan, the governor of Provence, commanding the of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé-

mar, Comte de Grignan, the governor of Provence, commanding the of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé-

mar, Comte de Grignan, the governor of Provence, commanding the of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé- of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé- of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé- of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé- of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé- of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé- of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé- of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé- of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé- of September 8, 1543, were sent to Louis Adhé-

would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the his salary reimbursing them. Neither the French nor the Ottomans would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the his salary reimbursing them. Neither the French nor the Ottomans would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live o� the



ries with his � eet. Also, because it was so late in the season, it would be di� cult for the Ottoman � eet to � nd a safe harbor on the way home. Since the French king had taken responsibility for supplying the Otto-man � eet with its forces, he hoped that they would be well taken care of in France. When Süleyman received this letter, he sent a hüküm to Hayreddin giving him permission to winter in France. Süleyman had also received a letter from Polin concerning the Ottoman � eet. Süley-man told Hayreddin that he knew that the salary and provisions for the � eet had been given on a six-month basis. It was now impossible to send anything by land or sea, but he had warned the king and Polin earlier to prepare the � eet’s needs so that the men would su� er no hardships and “to have a good agreement with you on all other matters.”⁶³ Süleyman questioned Hayreddin about the provisioning of the � eet. Apparently Hayreddin had informed the sultan that the French people (halk) had assumed responsibility for the provisions. The sultan wanted to know on whose authority, the French king’s or merely Polin’s. He reiterated that Hayreddin had not informed him what had been arranged for the army’s salaries. He told Hayreddin to write in detail, quickly, and to keep him informed of all the news from “those parts.”⁶⁴

The Ottoman Fleet Winters at Toulon

To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The order of François I requiring the inhabitants of Toulon to leave stated that there were thirty thousand combatants.⁶⁵ This was a huge number to be lodged in a town that at the end of the sixteenth century had only 637 houses within its walls, although Toulon also had several suburbs. The Ottoman forces were lodged in the city, the suburbs, and tents. Obtaining supplies for the Ottoman � eet also proved di� cult, for Toulon was isolated from the rest of Provence by mountains. François I gave the people of Toulon immunity from taxes for ten years because of their inconvenience, and he gave them permission to go elsewhere to buy food for the Ottomans.⁶⁶ Purchasing supplies was a major expense, however, and François I was short of money. On November 29, 1543,

⁶³ Gazavat, fols. 21b, 23b–24b.⁶⁴ Gazavat, fols. 25a, 32a; Matrakçı, Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i irakeyn-i, fols. 133a–136a. In the

Gazavat Hasan seemed to bring permission to winter in Toulon, and in Matrakçı he seemed to bring permission for the Ottomans to depart. Matrakçı did not mention anymore concerning the Ottomans in Toulon. Matrakçı returned to the Ottoman Empire in 1543; therefore some of the Ottoman forces did leave at this time, while the majority of them remained in France. But in the Gazavat it was at this point that Hayreddin made preparations to remain in Toulon.

⁶⁵ Henry, “Documents relatifs,” 558.⁶⁶ Ibid., 559.

The Ottoman Fleet Winters at ToulonThe Ottoman Fleet Winters at Toulon

wanted to know on whose authority, the French king’s or merely Polin’s. He reiterated that Hayreddin had not informed him what had been arranged for the army’s salaries. He told Hayreddin to write in detail, quickly, and to keep him informed of all the news from “those

The Ottoman Fleet Winters at Toulon

To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The

detail, quickly, and to keep him informed of all the news from “those

To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The order of François I requiring the inhabitants of Toulon to leave stated To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The To accommodate the Ottoman � eet was di� cult because of its size. The

The Ottoman Fleet Winters at ToulonThe Ottoman Fleet Winters at ToulonThe Ottoman Fleet Winters at ToulonThe Ottoman Fleet Winters at ToulonThe Ottoman Fleet Winters at ToulonThe Ottoman Fleet Winters at Toulon



thirty thousand livres were given to the treasurer of the marine of the Levant for the maintenance of the Ottoman � eet. The staple of the Ottoman forces was biscuit.⁶⁷ Polin claimed that 105,960 quintaux of it were needed for the time that the Ottoman � eet was at Toulon,⁶⁸ but the total amount came to 193,400 quintaux, because biscuit also had to be supplied for the Ottoman � eet’s return to Istanbul. Since the king could provide only 84,000 quintaux, the king’s o� cers in Provence had to furnish the rest. Supplies were requisitioned from as far away as Lyon and the towns of southeastern France. A merchant of Lyon paid six thousand livres to Barbarossa, which he promised to repay after he had received the pay of the � eet.⁶⁹ Some areas provided food, others money, but nothing was taken by force, and it was the French govern-ment that demanded these resources for the Ottoman � eet. The “pieces” that the consuls of Toulon, Peusin, Gardane, and Brun submitted to the town council on April 28, 1544, contain a list of expenses that they incurred to provide for the Ottomans in Toulon. The consuls recorded the cost of what they purchased, mainly food, and to whom it was given. Infrequently, they also recorded expenses that reveal somewhat more about the events of the winter than the number of pieces of fruit purchased. For example, Consul Vincens Gar-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident in which Turks had been killed. Consul Honorat Brun also rented a horse for the same investigation.⁷⁰ According to the Gazavat, Hayreddin paid for additional supplies for the � eet, as the king’s o� cers did, and also obtained food from places outside France, including Genoa, Corsica, and Sardinia. The civic leaders in these areas, ruled by Hapsburg allies, decided that it would be wiser to trade with the Ottomans than to refuse, since the Ottomans would need food, and if they could not buy it, they would probably seize it.⁷¹ When the leaders informed their people, the inhabi-tants were delighted, because they could sell their goods and perhaps glimpse Barbarossa. They brought so much merchandise that the army

⁶⁷ Knecht, Francis I, 377; La Roncière, Histoire, 3:382, 387; BN, Moreau 778, fol. 153b.⁶⁸ A quintal is 56.449 kilograms (Imber, “Navy of Süleyman,” 281).⁶⁹ In Mar. 1544 Grignan was repaid six thousand livres tournois for his expenses (BN,

Moreau 778, fols. 158b–160b, 165b–166b, 167b, 243b; Maurand, Itinéraire, xxxiii–xxxv, 315; Ursu, Politique orientale, 147).

⁷⁰ Henry, “Documents relatifs,” 547–48, 554.⁷¹ Cities such as Marseille, Venice, and Genoa were known to seize grain ships if threatened

by famine (Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. [New York, 1976], 1:331, 575).

dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-number of pieces of fruit purchased. For example, Consul Vincens Gar-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes

of expenses that they incurred to provide for the Ottomans in Toulon. The consuls recorded the cost of what they purchased, mainly food, and to whom it was given. Infrequently, they also recorded expenses that reveal somewhat more about the events of the winter than the number of pieces of fruit purchased. For example, Consul Vincens Gar-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident

that reveal somewhat more about the events of the winter than the number of pieces of fruit purchased. For example, Consul Vincens Gar-

in which Turks had been killed. Consul Honorat Brun also rented a in which Turks had been killed. Consul Honorat Brun also rented a together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident in which Turks had been killed. Consul Honorat Brun also rented a together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident in which Turks had been killed. Consul Honorat Brun also rented a together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-man Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-number of pieces of fruit purchased. For example, Consul Vincens Gar-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-number of pieces of fruit purchased. For example, Consul Vincens Gar-dane claimed the expense he had incurred for renting a horse for Soli-



was easily supplied.⁷² Between the biscuit supplied by the French, the e� orts made by the consuls of Toulon, and Hayreddin’s own initiatives, the Ottoman � eet was amply fed that winter. The Ottoman forces were accustomed to adequate supplies on campaign. Compared to traditional methods of provisioning in Europe, which often involved seizing supplies on the spot without compensa-tion, the Ottomans’ logistical preparations gave them a military advan-tage. Whether on Ottoman or vassal lands, the troops were required to pay for anything that they obtained. Auxiliary troops were required to bring food supplies for several months with them. Sipahis who were levied for a naval campaign were supposed to embark with enough bis-cuit for six months.⁷³ Thus Ottoman troops on French soil knew that they must purchase whatever they needed. Polin records that since no adequate arrange-ments had been made to feed them, they came to him and demanded their pay, “because they do not know how they can live.” Polin begged the king to send money to pay them immediately.⁷⁴ The consuls at Toulon only once mentioned that supplies (a barrel of oil) had been obtained by force, and their statement leaves it unclear whether it was the Ottomans or the consuls who had used it.⁷⁵ Generally, contempo-rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon. From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces-sities in France; they also expected to be paid for their military service. Hayreddin had entered into agreements with the French to reimburse them for supplies after he himself was paid. To discharge these debts, Hayreddin needed funds in France. The expenses of the expedition were justi� ed from the French perspective, since the Ottomans pro-tected the Mediterranean coast of France, which had su� ered from invasions by Hapsburg forces during previous wars with Charles V.

Spring 1544: French Indecision

By the spring the Ottoman forces were pressuring Hayreddin to return home. Hayreddin also wanted to leave France, but he needed the

⁷² Gazavat, fols. 32b–33a. Braudel described a similar phenomenon concerning grain prices in the Mediterranean (Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World, 1:574). Often when it became known that one region had had a poor harvest so grain was bringing high prices, so many mer-chants would send ships of grain to the area that prices would fall in that region but would rise in the surrounding districts.

⁷³ Finkel, Administration of Warfare, 123–26, 128. Veinstein refers to orders that required an eight-month supply (“Some Views,” 178–79, 182–83).

⁷⁴ BN, Moreau 778, fols. 243b–244a; Maurand, Itinéraire, 315–16.⁷⁵ Henry, “Documents relatifs,” 544.

rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon.the Ottomans or the consuls who had used it.rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon. From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon. From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces

their pay, “because they do not know how they can live.” Polin begged the king to send money to pay them immediately.Toulon only once mentioned that supplies (a barrel of oil) had been obtained by force, and their statement leaves it unclear whether it was the Ottomans or the consuls who had used it.⁷⁵ Generally, contempo-rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon. From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces-

obtained by force, and their statement leaves it unclear whether it was the Ottomans or the consuls who had used it.

sities in France; they also expected to be paid for their military service. sities in France; they also expected to be paid for their military service. sities in France; they also expected to be paid for their military service. expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces-sities in France; they also expected to be paid for their military service. expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces-expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces-expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces-expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces-expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces-expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces-expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces- From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces- From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces- From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other neces- From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon. From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon. From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon.rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon.rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon.rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon.rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon.rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon.rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon.

Generally, contempo-rary observers praised the Ottoman troops’ behavior in Toulon.



sultan’s permission � rst, so he wrote Süleyman to explain the situa-tion in France. Since the � eet had remained in France over the win-ter to be in a position to aid the French in 1544, the main question was determining French military objectives as the campaign season began. Hayreddin wrote that the � eet would sail on March 22 to begin the campaign season, but because the king of England had prevented François I from coming to the Mediterranean with French troops, a successful Ottoman attack without additional forces was unlikely. The French had suggested Sardinia, Naples, and Tunis as targets. Hayred-din informed the sultan that until the � eet obtained provisions from the French, he would agree to whatever was suggested, because the Ottoman � eet was dependent on them for grain and other provisions. But, Hayreddin said, “we have had experience of the French ambas-sador. He does not agree to the destruction of any enemy territory. Recently, when they wanted Salih Reis to attack Spanish territory, they regretted it later.”⁷⁶ Hayreddin noti� ed the sultan that men were pass-ing between the king of Spain and the French, so it was possible that the French would make peace with Charles V.⁷⁷ Polin had gone to the king to obtain the salary of the Ottoman forces, but Hayreddin consid-ered this a ploy to detain the Ottoman � eet in France for the summer. The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the French as well; in essence, he instructed Hayreddin to judge for him-self the best course of action.⁷⁸ Among the possible targets of a naval campaign, the most impor-tant was Genoa. Plans were made for a joint Ottoman-French enterprise with su� cient French troops to support the Ottoman forces. François I sent an envoy to Genoa to demand that it place its ports at his disposal and give him one hundred thousand ecus. The Genoese responded by instructing their envoy to delay any French action by dragging out nego-tiations as long as possible. François I fell into the trap. The French envoy to Genoa was kept waiting, and on March 31, 1544, Polin was ordered to postpone the expedition. The French troops designated for this cam-paign were sent to reinforce d’Enghien for the battle of Cerisoles in the Alps, and the Ottoman-French attack on Genoa never material-ized. However, while the Ottoman � eet remained in French territory, it protected the French coasts, terrorized the enemy, and prevented

⁷⁶ Gazavat, fols. 38b–39b.⁷⁷ François I sought peace after the Anglo-Hapsburg invasion of France began in May 1544

(Knecht, Francis I, 367–70).⁷⁸ Gazavat, fols. 38b–40b.

The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the ered this a ploy to detain the Ottoman � eet in France for the summer. The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the

Hayreddin noti� ed the sultan that men were pass-ing between the king of Spain and the French, so it was possible that the French would make peace with Charles V.⁷⁷ Polin had gone to the king to obtain the salary of the Ottoman forces, but Hayreddin consid-ered this a ploy to detain the Ottoman � eet in France for the summer. The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the

king to obtain the salary of the Ottoman forces, but Hayreddin consid-ered this a ploy to detain the Ottoman � eet in France for the summer.

French as well; in essence, he instructed Hayreddin to judge for him-French as well; in essence, he instructed Hayreddin to judge for him-� eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the French as well; in essence, he instructed Hayreddin to judge for him-� eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the French as well; in essence, he instructed Hayreddin to judge for him-� eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the � eet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the letter. In response, the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the ered this a ploy to detain the Ottoman � eet in France for the summer. The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the ered this a ploy to detain the Ottoman � eet in France for the summer. The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the



the transfer of Spanish troops to Italy.⁷⁹ Therefore, when Hayreddin and the � eet departed from Toulon in March, they sailed only to the Iles d’Hyeres, where they remained for about two months while Fran-çois I decided how to employ the � eet or arrange for land forces to support them. By May the Ottomans feared that if they remained in France any longer, no campaign would be undertaken and the sailing season would pass. Finally, Hayreddin went to Marseille, where only the ambassador remained with � ve galleys. Hayreddin freed the Mus-lim galley slaves, who were prisoners on French ships, which weakened French naval forces.⁸⁰

Voyage to Istanbul

The Ottoman � eet sailed for home toward the end of May 1544. Cap-tain Polin with � ve ships accompanied them to report on the campaign to the sultan. Since no major expedition had been undertaken, Polin gave orders to ravage the coasts and islands of Italy on the return jour-ney.⁸¹ In the Gazavat Muradi stated that Hayreddin had followed the sultan’s order by heading for Istanbul, capturing and sacking the for-tresses that he passed. When the Ottomans were poised to assault Savoy and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to attack.⁸² As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they attacked and captured some fortresses with French support. The French either manned them or, if they were too far from France, abandoned and burned them. The Ottoman � eet sailed past papal lands but, together with the French, attacked towns in the region of Naples.⁸³ They con-quered the city of Lipari and captured many of the inhabitants. When the people of Messina o� ered � fteen thousand ducats for all the people of Lipari, Barbarossa asked in addition for eight thousand quintaux of biscuit,⁸⁴ indicating that supplies for the � eet continued to be scarce during the return voyage. Polin with his galleys separated from the Ottoman � eet on July 16 because he needed to return to Istanbul more quickly than Hayreddin

⁷⁹ BN, Moreau 778, fols. 168b–169a, 173a–174a; La Roncière, Histoire, 3:389–90; Ursu, Poli-tique orientale, 152.

⁸⁰ The French perspective on Hayreddin’s actions at Marseille is quite di� erent from the Ottoman one, because releasing the galley slaves weakened the French naval forces (La Roncière, Histoire, 3:390; BN, Moreau 778, fol. 163; Gazavat, fols. 36b–38b).

⁸¹ BN, Moreau 778, fols. 169b–170a; Maurand, Itinéraire, xlv.⁸² Gazavat, fols. 40b–41b.⁸³ Ibid., fol. 43a–b; Maurand, Itinéraire, 67, 95–99.⁸⁴ Maurand, Itinéraire, 125–27, 135–37.

and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to

tresses that he passed. When the Ottomans were poised to assault Savoy and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to

gave orders to ravage the coasts and islands of Italy on the return jour- Muradi stated that Hayreddin had followed the

sultan’s order by heading for Istanbul, capturing and sacking the for-tresses that he passed. When the Ottomans were poised to assault Savoy and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to

As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they

tresses that he passed. When the Ottomans were poised to assault Savoy and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with

As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they attacked and captured some fortresses with French support. The French As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they As the Ottoman � eet sailed down the western coast of Italy, they

Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with Genoa and the pope, so that their territories were no longer open to and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with



Pasha could if he stopped to capture various places on the way. Inform-ing Hayreddin that he must reach Istanbul in time to return to Fran-çois I before winter, Polin sailed directly for Istanbul, while the Otto-man � eet continued to attack the coasts of Calabria.⁸⁵ Polin arrived in Istanbul on August 10 and set out again on September 9. Hayreddin and the � eet arrived at Istanbul on October 14. Polin reached Marseille on October 2, where he probably learned that François I and Charles V had concluded the Peace of Crépy on September 18.

Conclusion

Süleyman was hardly surprised by the defection of his ally, in view of the warning he had given François I in April 1543. The sultan knew from experience that François I was unreliable, so he had no illusions about the king’s commitment to their alliance, but it served Ottoman interests to promote the alliance for its divisive e� ect on Christian Europe. The sultan responded in February 1545 to the letter in which François I claimed to have made peace to deceive his enemies. Süley-man informed François I that he approved of this course of action if it caused the plans of François’s enemies to come to naught, that his ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.⁸⁶ The Haps-burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when he heard the news, but as Süleyman had foreseen François I’s treaty with Charles, this, too, appears to have been propaganda.⁸⁷ Although François I’s defection was a poor return for the sultan’s e� orts on his behalf, Süleyman valued the bene� ts of preserving the alliance until François I’s ambition again led to a rupture with Charles V.⁸⁸ Years of diplomacy resulted in joint action by Ottoman and French forces in 1543 and 1544. Despite the extensive and expensive prepara-tions and the notoriety that the campaign generated, the combined Ottoman and French forces made no spectacular conquests, not only because of the di� culties of long-distance planning but also because of the vacillations of the king of France. Although François I had instructed Polin to arrange for the Ottoman � eet to come to aid the French, he did not employ it e� ectively. He failed to supply adequate French troops

⁸⁵ BN, Moreau 778, fols. 169b–170a; Maurand, Itinéraire, xlv–xlvi, xlix–l, lii, 137–39; La Ron-cière, Histoire, 3:393.

⁸⁶ Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi 12321, no. 226.⁸⁷ Charrière, Négociations, 1:593; Ursu, Politique orientale, 158.⁸⁸ Ursu, Politique orientale, 156–70.

ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.

it caused the plans of François’s enemies to come to naught, that his ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.

Europe. The sultan responded in February 1545 to the letter in which François I claimed to have made peace to deceive his enemies. Süley-man informed François I that he approved of this course of action if it caused the plans of François’s enemies to come to naught, that his ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when

it caused the plans of François’s enemies to come to naught, that his ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue

ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when he heard the news, but as Süleyman had foreseen François I’s treaty ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-ened to impale d’Aramon, the French representative in Istanbul, when burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.burg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threat-to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue



to support the Ottoman forces. He did not furnish the necessary sup-plies that had been promised for the Ottoman � eet, nor did he ade-quately supply his own insu� cient forces. Often François I could not decide how, or even whether, to employ the Ottoman � eet. When the � eet arrived, it could not immediately begin operations, because noth-ing was ready and Polin had to obtain orders from François I, who was on the northern coast. When Polin returned with instructions to cap-ture Nice, French troops were not available to begin the siege immedi-ately. François I put the French forces under the command of a young, untried nobleman. After failing to take the citadel of Nice, because the siege was not prosecuted with vigor, only minor raiding was required of the Ottoman forces. The king wished to retain the use of the � eet for the next year, so he made Toulon available for it to winter in, with the expectation that the Ottomans would follow his commands during the following campaign season. But when spring came, the king could not decide which city to besiege. Many plans were proposed, none approved. Genoa, under French control as recently as 1528, would have been a worthy target for the combined French and Ottoman forces, as possession of it would have greatly enhanced French power in the region, but it was not attacked because the Genoese tricked François I. Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season was lost to inactivity. This episode elicited a range of views by the French, the Ottomans, and their enemies. Traditional Western historiography views the Otto-mans as puppets controlled by the French, claiming that François I sent the Ottoman � eet away under pressure both from his subjects and from fellow Christian rulers.⁸⁹ On the contrary, Süleyman directed his naval forces through contact with Hayreddin, and the � eet returned to the Ottoman Empire when he ordered it to do so. The dissatisfaction of the Ottoman forces with French leadership and organization, not the French displeasure with Ottoman behavior, � nally resulted in Hayred-din’s request that the sultan allow them to return home. The lack of tangible accomplishment, however, does not lessen the propaganda value of an event. Charles V’s plans may have been temporarily checked by the Ottoman-French military action of 1543, but he perceived an opportunity to weaken François I, and indirectly Süleyman, by condemning a Christian alliance with a Muslim power.

⁸⁹ Knecht, Francis I, 364–66; Setton, Papacy, 3:470–73; Miguel Angel de Bunes Ibarra, “The Maritime War between the Ottoman and Spanish Empires during the Time of Sultan Selim and Süleyman,” in The Turks, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel et al., 6 vols. (Ankara, 2002), 3:291–92.

Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-region, but it was not attacked because the Genoese tricked François I. Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season

not decide which city to besiege. Many plans were proposed, none approved. Genoa, under French control as recently as 1528, would have been a worthy target for the combined French and Ottoman forces, as possession of it would have greatly enhanced French power in the region, but it was not attacked because the Genoese tricked François I. Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season was lost to inactivity.

as possession of it would have greatly enhanced French power in the region, but it was not attacked because the Genoese tricked François I.

This episode elicited a range of views by the French, the Ottomans, This episode elicited a range of views by the French, the Ottomans, This episode elicited a range of views by the French, the Ottomans, This episode elicited a range of views by the French, the Ottomans,

ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-ritory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-region, but it was not attacked because the Genoese tricked François I. Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-region, but it was not attacked because the Genoese tricked François I. Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Hapsburg ter-



The dominance of the Hapsburg view of this alliance continues to over-shadow both the Ottoman and the French perspectives. As mentioned above, there were two main aspects to Hapsburg “attacks,” as Géraud Poumarède calls them,⁹⁰ or “propaganda,” as Jean Bérenger, Gilles Veinstein, and Bunes Ibarra term these e� orts to con-demn the Ottoman-French alliance. The � rst relates to philosophical issues concerning di� erences of religion, while the second slanders the behavior of the Ottomans while in France. With regard to the � rst point, the opinions of Frenchmen about an alliance between Chris-tians and Muslims varied: some accepted pro-Hapsburg views favoring a crusade of all Christians against the Ottomans; others agreed with o� cial French policy and supported the alliance. As for the second aspect, contemporary French sources do not suggest that the Otto-mans harmed French territory while they wintered in France, but Haps-burg propaganda does. This is not to suggest that there was no friction between the allies, for it is demonstrated above that Hayreddin and Polin frequently disagreed about the status of territories, but it is clear that the lands of the French and their allies were not harmed.⁹¹ On the contrary, it is equally clear that territories of the Hapsburgs and their supporters were attacked by the Ottomans and the French throughout this campaign. Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an unbiased source. He claimed that the Ottomans devastated Provence by enslaving the inhabitants, but sixteenth-century French eyewitnesses revealed that while the Ottomans had devastated Hapsburg territory, as assigned, they protected French territory from Hapsburg attacks.⁹² Provençal authors either did not mention the sojourn of the Ottoman � eet or merely indicated that it had wintered at Toulon. If the people of Toulon had been ill treated while the Ottoman � eet was quartered there, the consuls would surely have used the information to gain greater tax concessions from the French government.⁹³ On the con-trary, Polin, who had handled the negotiations between the French and

⁹⁰ Poumarède, “Justi� er,” 218–19, 229; Veinstein, “Sulayman,” 160; Gilles Veinstein, “Charles Quint et Soliman le Magni� que: Le grand de� ,” in Carlos V: Europeísmo y universalidad, ed. Juan Luis Castellano Castellano and Francisco Sánchez-Montes González, 5 vols. (Madrid, 2001), 3:519–29; Jean Bérenger, Histoire de l’empire des Habsbourg, 1273–1918 (Paris, 1990), 112; Bunes Ibarra, “Charles V,” 161–64.

⁹¹ For a view of relations between French ambassadors and Ottoman admirals in general, and Polin and Hayreddin Pasha in particular, that is not consistent with the Ottoman sources, see Jean Bérenger, “La collaboration militaire franco-ottomane à l’époque de la Renaissance,” Revue internationale d’histoire militaire 68 (1987): 51–66.

⁹² Maurand, Itinéraire, xxxii.⁹³ Deny and Laroche, “Expédition en Provence,” 198–99.

supporters were attacked by the Ottomans and the French throughout

Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis

between the allies, for it is demonstrated above that Hayreddin and Polin frequently disagreed about the status of territories, but it is clear that the lands of the French and their allies were not harmed.contrary, it is equally clear that territories of the Hapsburgs and their supporters were attacked by the Ottomans and the French throughout

Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an

contrary, it is equally clear that territories of the Hapsburgs and their supporters were attacked by the Ottomans and the French throughout

unbiased source. He claimed that the Ottomans devastated Provence unbiased source. He claimed that the Ottomans devastated Provence unbiased source. He claimed that the Ottomans devastated Provence unbiased source. He claimed that the Ottomans devastated Provence del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis del Vasto, Charles V’s commander in Milan, cannot be considered an Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis

supporters were attacked by the Ottomans and the French throughout supporters were attacked by the Ottomans and the French throughout



the Ottomans in Toulon, stated that no military force had ever been as orderly as the Ottoman � eet.⁹⁴ Polin’s statement is supported by a letter from Lyon, dated January 21, 1544, regarding the Ottoman presence at Toulon: “As for Barba-rossa, he and his army are at Toulon and are making Turkish merchan-dise with great order and justice, but at the same time continuing to privateer. In fact, some days ago he [Barbarossa] seized seven galleys and other vessels . . . under way from Spain to Italy, full of men and money.”⁹⁵ According to this letter, the Ottomans harmed the Haps-burgs, not the French, in typical Ottoman fashion: attack your enemy, protect your ally. Jean de Monluc, the French ambassador to Venice, contrasted the orderliness of the Ottoman troops in France to the havoc caused by the Hapsburg troops in Venetian territory when they were given passage to Carignano in 1544. He said that there were a thousand complaints about the soldiers’ evil deeds. In contrast, “the large and powerful army . . . composed of soldiers who were strangers to our religion . . . [but were] destined and sent to succor our king” gave no one cause to complain that they had hurt anyone; they were courteous and paid for all that they took for their provision. Monluc claimed that “there had never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”⁹⁶ It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet was recalled to Istanbul by the sultan. They left behind not a city that they had devastated but a coast that they had protected. A painting of the Ottoman � eet at anchor in the harbor of Toulon hung for centuries in the grande salle of the hôtel de ville of Toulon, commemorating the sojourn of the Ottoman � eet at Toulon. Included in the verse under-neath the painting were these words: “This is Barbarossa and his army, who came to succor all of us.”⁹⁷ In Provence, the Ottoman � eet was remembered as a protection against the forces of Charles V, which had invaded the region in 1536. The people of Provence were grateful that the coast had been spared the harm it had endured under Hapsburg invasions in 1524 and 1536. In Provence in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans were seen as protectors, while the Hapsburgs were regarded as ravagers. The Hapsburgs exerted a tremendous propaganda e� ort to attack the Ottoman-French alliance because it e� ectively threatened

⁹⁴ La Roncière, Histoire, 3:386; BN, Moreau 778, fol. 224a.⁹⁵ Maurand, Itinéraire, 311.⁹⁶ Monluc, Commentaires, 84–85.⁹⁷ This painting was destroyed in the French Revolution (Henry, “Documents relatifs,”

566).

never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”all that they took for their provision. Monluc claimed that “there had never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.” It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.” It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused

about the soldiers’ evil deeds. In contrast, “the large and powerful army . . . composed of soldiers who were strangers to our religion . . . [but were] destined and sent to succor our king” gave no one cause to complain that they had hurt anyone; they were courteous and paid for all that they took for their provision. Monluc claimed that “there had never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.” It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet

complain that they had hurt anyone; they were courteous and paid for all that they took for their provision. Monluc claimed that “there had

was recalled to Istanbul by the sultan. They left behind not a city that was recalled to Istanbul by the sultan. They left behind not a city that was recalled to Istanbul by the sultan. They left behind not a city that François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet was recalled to Istanbul by the sultan. They left behind not a city that François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused François I to send the Ottoman � eet away; rather, the Ottoman � eet It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.” It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.” It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”all that they took for their provision. Monluc claimed that “there had never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”all that they took for their provision. Monluc claimed that “there had never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.”



their ability to unite Christendom behind them in a “crusade,” despite the alliance’s failure to secure any spectacular conquests as a result of joint military ventures. Understanding the place of religion in sixteenth-century con� icts and beyond into those of the seventeenth century requires understand-ing the context for the religious claims that were made during these wars. Speaking of Spain’s wars in the Low Countries, the Belgian histo-rian Ernest Gossart warned in 1905, “We have considered the religious side of the struggle too much,” which advice Geo� rey Parker claimed in 1970 was sound but rarely followed.⁹⁸ Both historians were referring to wars between Protestant and Catholic Christians, but the advice is equally valid for studying con� icts of the sixteenth century involving Muslims and Christians, whether as allies or as adversaries. Religion is only one facet of the picture and not always deserving the greatest prominence among the factors that motivated the actions of individuals that were directly concerned. Concentrating on Islam as though it were the sole factor that in� uenced Middle Eastern politics often obscures the deeper economic, political, and societal issues.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Ernest Bossart, Espagnols et Flamands au XVIe siècle: L’établissement du régime espagnol dans les Pays Bas et l’insurrection (Brussels, 1905), quoted in Geo� rey Parker, “Spain, Her Enemies, and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1559–1648,” Past and Present, no. 49 (1970): 73–74.

⁹⁹ For a discussion of Islamic political movements, see James Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History (New York, 2005), 290–99. See also Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York, 2004).

that were directly concerned. Concentrating on Islam as though it were the sole factor that in� uenced Middle Eastern politics often obscures the deeper economic, political, and societal issues.⁹⁹


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